Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran | Independent Indian: Work & Life of Professor Subroto Roy

Subroto Roy regrets getting the sisters’ names wrong earlier; they were not Kulsooma and Yasmin but Akhtara, 19, and Arifa, 17. Their killings by terrorists in Sopore, and that of young Manzoor Ahmad Magray, 22, by the Army in Handwara within the week, mark a tipping point, for myself at least.

Subroto Roy reflecting on the Lashkar-e-Toiba killing of the teenage Sopore sisters and the Indian Army killing of Manzoor Ahmad Magray in Handwara, all in one week, is reminded only of: *Where be these enemies?… See, what a scourge is laid upon your hate,…all are punish’d.*

From Facebook:

Subroto Roy says at Seema Mustafa’s Wall “Some of these comments seem to be addressed to me in a somewhat ill-mannered way. I am due to speak in Lahore next month on Kashmir and Pakistan, and have published quite extensively over 20 years perhaps on the subject, apropos the University of Hawaii volume *Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s* etc.

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=247284116125&id=632437284

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=171926377284&set=a.136688412284.112038.632437284

I am quite happy to engage in any conversation with any shade of opinion from the leader of the United Jehad Council onwards. But discussion needs to be in English not pidgin English or slang, it needs to be polite and well-mannered, and it needs to be as well thought out and well-informed as possible. I may be addressed as Dr Roy or Mr Roy by people I do not know.

Subroto Roy says to Mr Changal, Apropos your “@mr roy…. i hope u carry a message that KASHMIRIS WIL NEVER LIKE TO B A PART OF INDIA”, I am given to understand that you as an individual have no wish to be an Indian national, which to me is fair enough. A lot of Indian nationals have travelled after all to the USA, Britain etc and there have gone about freely renouncing their Indian nationality and accepting that of another country. May I assume that if you, as an individual, were given such a choice by the Govt of India to formally renounce, on paper, in a private decision with full security and no fear of repercussions, your Indian nationality, you would do so? You may then become stateless in international law, following which the Govt of India could assist you as an individual to accept the nationality of some other country for which you were eligible, e.g. the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. If that went through properly, the Govt of India could also give you full “Green Card” or PIO status vis a vis the Indian territory you may wish to live or work etc in.

Ajmal Nazir ‎@ subroto sir…..I personally appreciate the kind of efforts you are putting to highlight the meseries that kashmiris are going through. May God succeed you in your efforts . However there are lot of realities that one need to understand before talking about Kashmir.This issue is not a demographical or political issue. This is an human issue where kashmiris suffer. Before going into any discussion , both Pakistan and India should understand that this problems is taking its toll on common kashmiri who is getting killed everyday. Kashmir is like a beautiful prison where one can survive but cannot live freely. It looks completely normal from outside. But unfortunately you cannot see the fear that is inside the hearts of common people. You cannot see the uncertainty in the minds of those people.I wish you could have feel the fear in the mind of mothers when their kids are outside. I wish you could have feel the fear in the eyes of kids, when they see these indian forces roaming in their fields. There is a check post in every corner of the street, where it is obligatory for us to go through checking. We have to prove our identity in our own homes. It is not happening only on 26th Jan (like it happens in your states ]. It happening everyday, every-hour and every-time.I wish you could feel the fear when we have to go through these checking. Everyday, we have to make sure that we come home before 6:00 pm otherwise you will be picked up and your name will get added into hundrends and thousands of disappeared people. There are so many fake encounters happening in valley that nobody from outside world knows. Try to listen to local news here and there is a separate sections which tells you about the number of people that got killed every 24 hours. In 90’s that list was always above 20 and there was no such news outside kashmir. There is no such family in kashmir that hasn’t suffer I am not talking about mental suffering, I am talking about where somebody got killed.I wish you could have seen the pain of those mothers who lost their innocent sons, I wish you could seen the hopelessness in the minds of those fathers, who lost their only sons. There are so many half widows in kashmir, whose husbands were picked by forces and they never came back. they are still waiting for their husbands to return. In every community , there is an orphanage, where you will find the so many orphan kids. i believe you will find the most numbers orphans in kashmir than in any other state. These suffering are not visible from outside.We need to feel like kashmiris to understand these problems You need to take little pain to find the actual realities in kashmir. Every kashmir including our pandiths brothers suffer. KAshmir issue is not the political issue, neither is it regional issue. This is a human issue . This issue is not related to the geographical demographies, it is related with the people who live there.These boundaries are of no meaning for those mothers and fathers, who suffer everyday. If Indian wants kashmir, you have to win the hearts of kashmiris, Treat us like humans, Give us basic human rights . Release kashmiris from this militarized prison. Let us decide what is good for us.. Give us the freedom to express our problems. Let us bring kashmiris youth in your national media and let them discuss this issue. India is a democratic country so i believe everybody has a right to express their feelings.Highlight our miseries and punish the culprits who have killed innocent kashmiris. How can you justify the killing of those small kids who pelt stones on the streets. Does indian constitution allow killings of kids if they pelt stones. If they damage property, arrest them but how can we kill those small kids.Even some where beaten to death.What about Tufail Matoo who got killed when he was going to tuition classes. He didn;t damage any property. There are so many untold stories in kashmir that nobody knows.

Subroto Roy says to Mr Nazir, Thank you for the lengthy and pertinent statement which clearly reflects your experience as well as your hopes and fears. I have no hesitation in accepting your saying the situation in recent times has become intolerable for ordinary people. I believe it is the outcome of a process which has evolved over decades in which the peoples and Governments of India, the peoples and Governments of Pakistan, and the peoples and Governments of J&K too, have all contributed. It is something for which *everyone* is responsible, no single person or country or community can be said to be exempt (other than perhaps the gentle people of Laddakh). And all the facts of history and the present have to be understood, and yes felt as well — each and every clear fact. I hope to show how this may be done during my Lahore lectures next month. Cordial regards and thanking you once more.

Subroto Roy says to Mr Changal, Thank you for the reply though you may have made a mistake with my identity: I am not Mr Subroto who has been a senior minister in Indonesia, but rather Dr Roy or Mr Roy as you please. No I do not think I am or would want to be blind to any atrocities by armed forces on civilians in any country, my own included. Apropos your statement “we reject the illegal n forceful occupation of kashmir by the cruel hindu india”, I shall be glad to hear the basis of your opinion. Re Hindus and Muslims and my opinion thereof, there is a lot of material to be found at my site and among my Notes. Cordially, SR

Sajad Malik I just wud humbly like to ask you a question sir, Do you deny the disputed nature of kashmir?

Subroto Roy Mr Malik, Thank you for the question. I think it was I who said *twenty years ago*, when I was almost as young as some of you are now “The core of the continuing dispute between Pakistan and India has been Kashmir, where vast resources have been drained from the budgets of both countries by two large armies facing one another for decades over a disputed boundary”. I do not think the Govt of Pakistan had used the word “core” until that time. Please see p 15 of the book

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=171926377284&set=a.136688412284.112038.632437284

Subroto Roy says to Mr Changal, I cannot know but perhaps you speak from terrible personal experiences as an individual at the hands of governmental machinery; I know what that can be like.

I would agree it is important in this grave and mortal matter to go into the whole history piece by piece, frankly and candidly, with scientific honesty and freedom of inquiry and thought. That is the only real way to aim for complete agreement across the political spectrum in the subcontinent. Such an agreement is possible too, and the only real way forward for all, especially the people of J&K, your generation and the future. I am sure my Lahore lectures will be public immediately after they are delivered next month, which you may find of interest.

Clearly we have a number of factual questions for one another whose answers may emerge in time. Rape is an evil thing, and I find what you mention is discussed here. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunan_Poshpora_incident

Thank you for your comment and suggestion. The solution I have proposed since 2005 is far better than the plebiscite idea you mention. But I am afraid you will have to make a study of my publications here at FB or at my site or in my books, or wait until the Lahore lectures. I also wonder if you are aware that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad *offered a plebiscite* when it was first mentioned in 1948 during the Pashtun tribal invasion from Pakistan but Pakistan balked.

Subroto Roy says the solution he has proposed since 2005 is far better than the plebiscite idea often mentioned. Many are also unaware that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad *offered a plebiscite* when it was first mentioned in 1948 during the Pashtun tribal invasion from Pakistan but Pakistan balked.

Ganai Danish: It was pandit nehru,who in 1952 addressed the public gathering in lal chowk sgr,promised that the people of jk will be given a chance to decide their future whether they want to be part of india or accede with pakistan.It is worth mentioning that it was india itself who took the case of disputed nature of kashmir to UN by passing a resolution in 1948.But 63 years passed, india is yet to fulfull its promise and has mulishly held on to the uncompromising stance that jk is an integral part of india.

Subroto Roy: Mr Danish, Thank you for the comment. Pandit Nehru’s Lal Chowk speech may have been 1947/48 during the Pashtun invasion. There is a small pic at my site here https://independentindian.com/2009/03/28/india-is-not-a-monarchy-and-urgently-needs-to-universalize-the-french-concept-of-citoyen-some-personal-thoughts/

By 1952, Sheikh Abdullah had pioneered the J&K Constitution

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=244956301112

Ganai Danish Respected Dr Roy,1952 or 1948,that isn’t the question.The question is why india uses its military might to crush our movement.By calling itself the world’s largest democrac<z>y,its democracy is buried in kashmir.Our movement is indegenious,peaceful,genuine,and non violent and we will take it to its conclusion

Subroto Roy Mr Danish, Thank you for the comment. The difference between 1948 and 1952 is vital because that is the time Kashmir *made its decision*, and it was a *democratic* decision led by Sheikh-Sahib who had — practically single-handedly — awoken the Muslim masses from their slumber and oppression under the Dogras. Sheikh Abdullah paid the penalty for that most heavily– being jailed by the Dogras numerous times because of it. But even so I think you have raised a critically important question — which is how it is that your generation has become so utterly alienated and disaffected with their political experience of repression, war, terrorism etc that they want to free themselves of it.

Ganai Danish It is very true that late sheikh abdullah traitor fought against dogra rule but he did such a blunder that whatever happened in kashmir since 1989 to 2010,sheikh is responsible for this.He sold kashmir to india and sold the blood of martyrs that were in favour of accession to pakistan.It was the same traitor’s son farooq abdullah who signed noozle to Shaheed Maqbool bhat,the first martyr of kashmir.It was the same farooq abdullah’s leadership in 1989 who killed 1 lac kashmiris and brought POTA,AFSPA,PSA and so on in kashmir.It was the same traitors son omer abdullah who killed 112 innocents in kashmir in just 4 months.So far as the imprisonment is concerned.,It is Syed Ali shah geelani,a vetern leader of kashmir,who spent more than 22 years in jail and is still under house arrest.

Subroto Roy says to Mr Danish, Thanks for this point of view of which I know less than I should. I am glad we have reached a stage so quickly where we may discuss different interpretations of factual events. I reaoet what I have said to Mr Nazir, that I have no hesitation in accepting your saying the situation in recent times has become intolerable for ordinary people. I believe it is the outcome of a process which has evolved over decades in which the peoples and Governments of India, the peoples and Governments of Pakistan, and the peoples and Governments of J&K too, have all contributed. It is something for which *everyone* is responsible, no single person or country or community can be said to be exempt (other than perhaps the gentle people of Laddakh). And all the facts of history and the present have to be understood, and yes felt as well — each and every clear fact. I hope to show how this may be done during my Lahore lectures next month. Cordial regards and thanking you once more.

Sajad Malik ‎@ Mr. Roy, you mean Sheikh Abdullah “offered” Plebiscite? well this is a news to me; as i am wondering on what authority wud they do that? All i have been knowing till now is, Plebiscite was in the offing, had Nehru not insisted that the tribes men from NWFP leave Kashmir and at the same time Jinnah insisting that for the plebiscite to happen, Indian forces need to be out of kashmir first.

Subroto Roy says to Mr Malik, Yes, Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad *offered* a plebiscite when it was first mentioned and it was the Pakistanis who balked.

Re. “disputed territory” and “core issue”, as I said yesterday, I do not have to *admit* it because I may have been the first to say so *twenty years ago* when I was almost as young as some of you are now “The core of the continuing dispute between Pakistan and India has been Kashmir, where vast resources have been drained from the budgets of both countries by two large armies facing one another for decades over a disputed boundary”. I do not think the Govt of Pakistan had used the word “core” until that time. Please see p 15 of the book

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=171926377284&set=a.136688412284.112038.632437284

You may perhaps see that it is a leap of logic from saying Pakistan and India have a disputed boundary to saying as you suggest “So what is the problem if a Kashmiri asks Azadi sir?”. 🙂

Subroto Roy says to Mr Malik: Mr Malik, Indeed as I have said Sheikh-Sahib and Bakshi did so; you would have to know how ghastly and vicious the tribal invasion from Pakistan was starting on October 22 1947, and how the Rape of Baramulla had proceeded (with Kashmiri women of all communities, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu, being abducted by lorry en masse to be sold in markets in Peshawar etc), to know that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad could confidently predict the outcome at the time of any such plebiscite, which would explain why Liaquat Ali Khan (who had condemned Sheikh as a “Quisling of India”) would have ignored it. I say this having read reports from the original newspapers at the time, and have today asked the editor of that national newspaper to produce a set of reprints of all articles published from, say, the 1946 Cabinet Mission to the Jan-Feb 1949 ceasefire, since all this material is unknown by all the parties, and making it known would contribute to resolving this grave and mortal problem. Do please explain what you mean or Sheikh meant by “Siyasi Awaragardi”; also I would certainly be grateful to learn of your view and that of your friends on the history of J&K between, say, 1952 and the 1965 War.

Sajad Malik: Mr Roy, I have been lately reading a piece done by Haroon Rashid. He pens down all that Kashmiri’s suffered at the hands of tribesmen..looting and arson, even killing of a lady running a convent. He outrightly rejects rape, (anyway thats altogether a diffrent debate). Sheikh Abdullah, wen released from the prison (Imprisoned by Nehru,for taking the plebscite front) scorned his ownself for taking up Plebscite front and termed it as “Siyasi-Awaragardi” (Political Intrigue). For your further enlightment here Mr. Roy;- 1951: Indian holds elections and tries to impose its democratic institution in Kashmir. It is opposed by the United Nations. They pass a resolution to declare elections void and stress on plebiscite. India ignores the opposition blatantly. Sheikh Abdullah wins unopposed and rumors of election rigging plague Kashmiri politics. 1952: Sheikh Abdullah signs the Delhi Agreement on July, 1952. It chalks out state-centre sharing of power and gives abidance to Kashmir to have its own flag. Sheikh Abdullah creates Kashmir centric land reforms which create resentment among the people of Jammu and Ladakh. Delhi Agreement provides the first genuine erosion in international resolution of Kashmir. Nehru’s Speech: ”On August1952, Jawahar Lal Nehru gives a negating speech contradicting the settlement provided in the Delhi Agreement: “Ultimately – I say this with all deference to this Parliament – the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir; neither in this Parliament, nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else” 1953-1954: Sheikh Abdullah takes U turns and procrastinates in conforming the accession of Kashmir to India. Sheikh Abdullah is jailed. In August, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad is installed in place of Sheikh Abdullah. He officially ratifies Kashmir’s accession with India. On April, 1954, India & Pakistan both agree in appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. 1956-1957: On 30th October, 1956, J&K Constituent Assembly adopts a fresh constitution, and dissolves the Constituent Assembly, which further defines the relationship of Kashmir with the Indian Dominion. UN strongly condemns the developments and passes a resolution stating such attempts will not result in any final resolution. On 26th January, 1957, the new constitution is made enforceable. Kashmir is now a Republican-Democratic state under Indian Union. 1964: Sheikh Abdullah is released from jail. Jawahar Lal Nehru sends Sheikh Abdullah with a delegation to Pakistan in an effort to find a resolution discourse for Kashmir. In the meantime, masses in Kashmir protest against the implementation of Article 356 & 357, which allows Indian central authority over constituting legislative powers in Kashmir. The special status of Kashmir continues to get eroded. 1965-1971: The nomenclature is changed from ‘Sadr-e-Riyasat’ to Governor and from Prime Minister to Chief Minister. The Governor is now no longer elected locally, and is installed as per the orders of the President of India. This amendment lightens off Kashmir from its special titles. Free & fair elections in the guise of democracy are championed as just causes, and Indian mainstream parties are allowed to contest in the elections. However, these elections aren’t well received by the public. In many cases, international watchdogs accuse India of rigging elections. In 1967, Jammu Autonomy Forum is constituted with the aim of institutionalizing regional autonomy. Excerpts, “chronology of Kashmir conflict” by Naveed Qazi”

Subroto Roy says to Mr Sajad Malik: thank you for this brief chronology which I shall certainly study more carefully. Am I to understand that you and perhaps others with you deny the Rape of Baramullah? Perhaps you mean that the thousands, but thousands, of Kashmiri women of all three communities who were abducted against their will by the tribesmen in lorries and later sold in Peshawar and other markets were not raped but taken in matrimony at their new destinations?

Sajad Malik: Mr Roy, I am not denying anything. All I am saying is that Haroon Rashid (BBC) is rejecting it and that I maintain, its a separate debate. The thing which we are discussing here is that India has no legitimate authority over Kashmir. It’s military might, deciept, savagery has not been able to turn a leaf in Kashmir, despite tens of thousands been killed, despite all the laws it sought from the “once wicked” Britian. I am not a political analyst nor a strategist but with full conviction Mr. Roy, m telling you Kashmir can never be India. Smell our land it smells saffron, m not sure what it smells in India. Comment not intended to hurt your or any Indian’s emotions Mr. Roy. If it inadvertently does, I apologise.

Subroto Roy: Mr Malik, Thank you; no not at all, there is *absolutely* no need for you to apologise in this discussion for anything. Clearly there are many factual disagreements here, as to what happened precisely, who said and did what precisely, and so on, and an exchange of views and references is always constructive. From what you say, you may find of interest these two articles of mine from 2006; the former is “History of J&K” and the latter contains a Brief History of Gilgit too:

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152343836125

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152345826125

You may also like to see my FB Note giving Sheikh Abdullah in his own words for you and others to judge, here

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=244956301125

and also Sheikh-Sahib, and Dr Zakir Hussain and Maulana Azad and others here:

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=153977181125

Your statement “Kashmir can never be India” is perhaps intended to be controversial as it appears to beg the question, though of course you may agree *some* Kashmiris are Indians and wish to be Indians, and I may agree *some* Kashmiris are not Indians and do not wish to be Indians and also *some* Kashmiris are Indians and do not wish to be Indians; there may also be *some* Kashmiris who are not Indians but who wish to be Indians. Cordially.

Subroto Roy

Mr Malik, you are quoting from perhaps Dr Zakir Hussain or Sheikh Abdullah, not from my words. Secondly, are you saying Pakistan did not invade J&K in 1947? Britain did? I would agree there was a British-induced coup d’etat in Gilgit, but I trust you do not deny the whole history of the (then new) Pakistan’s military and political forces causing the vicious and ghastly Pashtun invasion along the Nowshera Road commencing October 22 1947. Modern Pakistan’s most eminent historians may agree with me I am afraid as to what happened as a matter of fact! You and I may not be able to progress much with conversation at this rate if our factual histories are so far apart as at present.. 🙂 But rest assured, all may become clear after my Lahore lectures next month, or at least all of my analysis and assessment of what happened and prescription of what may be best done now for everyone. I shall try to comment further on your statement later in the day.

Sajad Malik Sir, I am not saying Britian carried out the invasion *laughs*. All, m saying is, General Gracey was heading the Pak army at the time of invasion and there has been no evidence so far, to establish a link b/n Pak army and the tribes men. I can furnish to you the reference of what I assert. shall inshallah pray for your lahore lecture, and hope our thinking and understanding converge as per the aspirations of me, the prime stake holder..and a kashmiri. (smiles)

Subroto Roy Mr Malik, I am grateful for the clarification 🙂 — though as I have said, there *was* a British-induced coup in Gilgit, and you may also find my article “Pakistan’s Allies” of interest about the US and UK seeing themselves in battle against the old USSR etc.

Suppose I said to you and your friends that in fact Sheikh-Sahib (and his mentor at the time Jawaharlal Nehru) were influenced by socialism and, at one remove perhaps by Soviet communism — and *that* is why they were against the Dogra regime? While the Hurriyat’s predecessor, Muslim Conference, were *opposed* to Sheikh Abdullah, and because the Dogras were also opposed to Sheikh-Sahib, the Muslim Conference’s Hamidullah Khan as of May 22-24 1947 said they wanted to not only preserve the Dogra regime but make him an international sovereign so he could be called “Your Majesty” instead of merely “Your Highness”? :)! And in that they were, oddly enough, joined by many in the Hindu and Sikh minorities who saw the Dogras as protecting them from Sheikh Sahib’s secular majoritarianism, as well as by perhaps British Conservatives like Churchill as well as Mr Jinnah…. History yields some unusual and paradoxical things…. 🙂 Re your offer to furnish a reference that “there has been no evidence so far, to establish a link b/n Pak army and the tribesmen” I would be most grateful for this. The classic work on it has been by the late General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army who was an author of the invasion, http://openlibrary.org/books/OL15997912M/Raiders_in_Kashmir.

I have yet to own a copy of this book though am aware of its contents. I am most grateful for your good wishes for Lahore! I certainly need them, and I assure you, if you send me an email at my site, I shall send you a copy of what I say there as soon as possible after it is said. And indeed, I *completely* agree with you that the ordinary people of J&K of all communities have suffered most from this terrible and awful state of affairs, and their material and moral wellbeing needs most important and urgent relief. Cordially.

I wrote & publicized a document “An Economic Solution to Kashmir” in Washington back in 1993, which referred for the first time to ideas of a condominium, an Andorra solution etc….This seemed at the time a logical result of the UH Manoa Pakistan project. But in retrospect it has seemed naive and uninformed. I’m afraid I think Mr Kasuri has been overoptimistic about the robustness of the near-agreement he suggests was reached some years ago. .

On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State: An Excerpt from the Munir Report of 1954

January 15, 2011 — drsubrotoroy

On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State: An Excerpt from the Munir Report of 1954

From REPORT of THE COURT OF INQUIRY constituted under PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954 to enquire into the PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953 “Munir Report”

“ISLAMIC STATE
It has been repeatedly said before us that implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic State. Some speeches of important leaders who were striving for Pakistan undoubtedly lend themselves to this construction. These leaders while referring to an Islamic State or to a State governed by Islamic laws perhaps had in their minds the pattern of a legal structure based on or mixed up with Islamic dogma, personal law, ethics and institutions. No one who has given serious thought to the introduction of a religious State in Pakistan has failed to notice the tremendous difficulties with which any such scheme must be confronted. Even Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, who must be considered to be the first thinker who conceived of the possibility of a consolidated North Western Indian Muslim State, in the course of his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 said:

“Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such States. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism”.

When we come to deal with the question of responsibility we shall have the occasion to point out that the most important of the parties who are now clamouring for the enforcement of the three demands on religious grounds were all against the idea of an Islamic State. Even Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi of Jama’at-i-Islami was of the view that the form of Government in the new Muslim State, if it ever came into existence, could only be secular.

Before the Partition, the first public picture of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam gave to the world was in the course of an interview in New Delhi with Mr. Doon Campbell, Reuter’s Correspondent. The Quaid-i-Azam said that the new State would be a modern democratic State, with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed. When Pakistan formally appeared on the map, the Quaid-i-Azam in his memorable speech of 11th August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, while stating the principle on which the new State was to be founded, said:—

“All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations., there will be no end to the progress you will make. “I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathana, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this (Applause). Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State (Hear, hear). As you know, history shows that in England conditions sometime ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (Loud applause). The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the Government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. “Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”.

The Quaid-i-Azam was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own people including non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new State was to devote all its energies. There are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future subject of the State is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective of colour, caste, creed or community. The word ‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to do with the business of the State and to be merely a matter of personal faith for the individual.

We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State was acceptable to them and everyone of them replied in an unhesitating negative, including the Ahrar and erstwhile Congressites with whom before the Partition this conception was almost a part of their faith.

If Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi’s evidence correctly represents the view of Jama’at-i-Islami, a State based on this idea is the creature of the devil, and he is confirmed in this by several writings of his chief, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the founder of the jama’at. None of the ulama can tolerate a State which is based on nationalism and all that it implies; with them millat and all that it connotes can alone be the determining factor in State activity.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national State, it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949; but it has been freely admitted that this Resolution, though grandiloquent in words, phrases and clauses, is nothing but a hoax and that not only does it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic State but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic State.

FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC STATE

What is then the Islamic State of which everybody talks but nobody thinks? Before we seek to discover an answer to this question, we must have a clear conception of the scope and function of the State.

The ulama were divided in their opinions when they were asked to cite some precedent of an Islamic State in Muslim history. Thus, though Hafiz Kifayat Husain, the Shia divine, held out as his ideal the form of Government during the Holy Prophet’s time, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi also included in his precedent the days of the Islamic Republic, of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Salah-ud-Din Ayyubi of Damascus, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad Tughlaq and Aurangzeb and the present regime in Saudi Arabia. Most of them, however, relied on the form of Government during the Islamic Republic from 632 to 661 A. D., a period of less than thirty years, though some of them also added the very short period of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni stated that the details of the ideal State would be worked out by the ulama while Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari’s confused notion of an Islamic State may be gathered from the following portion of his interrogation :—

“Q.—Were you also in the Khilafat movement ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—When did the Khilafat movement stop in India ?
A.—In 1923. This was after the Turks had declared their country to be a secular State.
Q.—If you are told that the Khilafat movement continued long after the Turks had abolished Khilafat, will that be correct?
A.—As far as I remember, the Khilafat movement finished with the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turks.
Q.—You are reported to have been a member of the Khilafat movement and having made speeches. Is it correct ?
A.—It could not be correct.
Q.—Was the Congress interested in Khilafat ?
A.— Yes.
Q.—Was Khilafat with you a matter of religious conviction or just a political movement ?
A.— It was purely a religious movement.
Q.— Did the Khilafat movement have the support of Mr Gandhi ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— What was the object of the Khilafat movement ?
A.— The Britisher was injuring the Khilafat institution in Turkey and the Musalman was aggrieved by this attitude of the Britisher.
Q.— Was not the object of the movement to resuscitate the Khilafat among the Musalmans ?
A.—No.
Q.— Is Khilafat with you a necessary part of Muslim form of Government ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— Are you, therefore, in favour of having a Khilafat in Pakistan ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— Can there be more than one Khalifa of the Muslims ?
A.— No.
Q.— Will the Khalifa of Pakistan be the Khalifa of all the Muslims of the world ?
A.— He should be but cannot be.”

Throughout the three thousand years over which political thought extends, and such thought in its early stages cannot be separated from religion, two questions have invariably presented themselves for consideration : —

(1) what are the precise functions of the State ? and
(2) who shall control the State ?

If the true scope of the activities of the State is the welfare, temporal or spiritual or both of the individual, then the first question directly gives rise to the bigger question:

What is the object of human life and the ultimate destiny of man? On this, widely divergent views have prevailed, not at different times but at one and the same time. The pygmies of equatorial West Africa still believe that their God Komba has sent them into the forest to hunt and dance and sing. The Epicureans meant very much the same when they said that the object of human life is to drink and eat and be merry, for death denies such pleasures. The utilitarians base their institutions on the assumption that the object of human life is to experience pleasant sensations of mind and body, irrespective of what is to come hereafter. The Stoics believed in curbing and reducing all physical desires, and Diogenes found a tub good enough to live in. German philosophers think that the individual lives for the State and that therefore the object of life is service of the State in all that it might decide to undertake and achieve. Ancient Hindu philosophers believed in the logic of the fist with its natural consequence, the law of natural selection and the struggle for survival. The Semitic theory of State, whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic, has always held that the object of human life is to prepare ourselves for the next life and that, therefore, prayer and good works are the only object of life. Greek philosophers beginning with Socrates thought that the object of human life was to engage in philosophical meditation with a view to discovering the great truths that lie in nature and that the business of the others is to feed the philosophers engaged in that undertaking.

Islam emphasises the doctrine that life in this world is not the only life given to man but that eternal life begins after the present existence comes to an end, and that the status of a human being in the next world will depend upon his beliefs and actions in this world. As the present life is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end, not only the individual but also the State, as opposed to the secular theory which bases all political and economic institutions on a disregard of their consequences on the next life, should strive for human conduct which ensures for a person better status in the next world.

According to this theory Islam is the religion which seeks to attain that object. Therefore the question immediately arises : What is Islam and who is a momin or a Muslim ? We put this question to the ulama and we shall presently refer to their answers to this question. But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us that the ulama whose first duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were hopelessly disagreed among themselves.

Apart from how these learned divines have expressed themselves, we conceive of Islam as a system that covers, as every systematic religion must, the following five topics :—
(1) the dogma, namely, the essentials of belief ;
(2) the cult, namely, religious rites and observances which a person must
perform ;
(3) ethics, i. e. rules of moral conduct ;
(4) institutions, social, economic and political ; and
(5) law proper.

The essential basis of the rules on all these subjects is revelation and not reason, though both may coincide. This coincidence, however, is accidental because human reasoning may be faulty and ultimate reason is known only to God, Who sends His message to humanity through His chosen messengers for the direction and guidance of the people. One must, therefore, accept the dogma, observe the cult, follow the ethics, obey the law and establish institutions which God has revealed, though their reason may not be apparent—nay even if they be opposed to human reason. Since an error by God is an impossibility, anything that God has revealed, whether its subject be something occult or preternatural, history, finance, law, worship or something which according to human thought admits of scientific treatment as for instance, birth of man, evolution, cosmology, or astronomy, has got to be accepted as absolute truth. The test of reason is not the acid test and a denial of this amounts to a denial of the supreme wisdom and designs of Allah—it is kufr. Now God has revealed Himself from time to time to His favoured people of whom our Holy Prophet was the last. That revelation is contained in the Qur’an and covers the five topics mentioned above. The true business of a person who believes in Islam is therefore to understand, believe in and act upon that revelation. The people whom God chooses as medium for the transmission of His messages are rasuls (messengers) or nabis (prophets). Since every action or saying of a prophet is, in the case of our own Holy Prophet it certainly was, prompted by Allah, it has the same degree of inerrancy as the formal revelation itself, because prophets are ma’sum, incapable of doing or saying something which is opposed to Divine wishes. These sayings and actions are sunna having the same infallibility as the Qur’an. The record of this sunna is hadith which is to be found in several books which were compiled by Muslim scholars after long, laborious and careful research extending over several generations.

The word hadith means a record of actions or sayings of the Prophet and his companions. At first the sahaba. i. e. people who had lived in the society of the Prophet, were the best authority for a knowledge of the sunna. Later people had to be content with the communications of the tabi’un, i. e. successors, people of the first generation after the Holy Prophet who had received their information from the sahaba, and then in the following generations with the accounts of the so-called successors of the successors (tabi’ul-tabi’un), i.e. people of the second generation after the Holy Prophet, who had concerted with the successors. Marfu’ is a tradition which contains a statement about the Prophet ; mawquf, a tradition that refers only to the sayings or doings of the sahaba ; and maqtu’ a tradition which does not at most go further back than the first generation after the Holy Prophet and deals only with sayings or doings of tabi’un. In some of the ahadith the actual word of God is to be found. Any such tradition is designated Hadith-i-Qudsi or Ilahi as distinguished from an ordinary Hadith-i-Nabvi.

A very large portion of sayings ascribed to the Prophet deals with the ahkam (legal professions), religious obligations, halal and haram (what is allowed and forbidden), with ritual purity, laws regarding food and criminal and civil law. Further they deal with dogma, retribution at the Last Judgment, hell and paradise, angels, creation, revelations, the earlier prophets. Many traditions also contain edifying sayings and moral teachings by the Holy Prophet. The importance of ahadith was realised from the very beginning and they were not only committed to memory but in some cases were reduced to writing. The work of compilation of hadith began in the third century after the Hijra and the Sihah Sitta were all compiled in that century. These are the musannifs of —
(1) Al-Bukhari, died 256/870,
(2) Muslim, died 261/875,
(3) Abu Dawud, died 275/888,
(4) Al-Tirmizi, died 279/892,
(5) All Nasa’i, died 303/915, and
(6) Ibn-i-Maja, died 273/886.

According to modern laws of evidence, including our own, the ahadith are inadmissible evidence of sunna because each of them contains several links of hearsay, but as authority on law they are admissible pro prio vigore. The merit of these collections lies not so much in the fact that (as is often wrongly stated) their authors decided for the first time which of the numerous traditions in circulation were genuine and which false but rather in the fact that they brought together everything that was recognised as genuine in orthodox circles in those days.

The Shias judge hadith from their own stand-point and only consider such traditions reliable as are based on the authority of Ali and his adherents. They have, therefore, their own works on the subject and hold the following five works in particularly high esteem—
(1) Al-Kafi of Muhammad b. Yaqub Al-Kulini, died 328/939,
(2) Man La Yastahdiruhu’ul-Fakih of Muhammad b. Ali b. Babuya Al-Kummi,
died 381/991,
(3) Tahdib Al-Ahkam,
(4) Al-Istibsar Fi-Ma’khtalafa Fihi’l-Akhbar (extract from the preceding) of
Muhammad Altusi, died 459/1067, and
(5) Nahj Al-Balagha (alleged sayings of Ali) of Ali b. Tahir Al-Sharif Al-Murtaza, died 436/1044 (or of his brother Radi Al-Din Al-Baghdadi.)

After the ritual, the dogma and the most important political and social institutions had taken definite shape in the second and third centuries, there arose a certain communis opinio regarding the reliability of most transmitters of tradition and the value of their statement. The main principles of doctrine had already been established in the writings of Malik b. Anas, Al-Shafi’i and other scholars regarded as authoritative in different circles and mainly on the authority of traditional sayings of the Holy Prophet. In the long run no one dared to doubt the truth of these traditions and this almost conclusive presumption of truth has since continued to be attached to the ahadith compiled in the Sihah Sitta.

We have so far arrived at this result that any rule on any subject that may be derived from the Qur’an or the sunna of the Holy Prophet is binding on every Musalman. But since the only evidence of sunna is the hadith, the words sunna and hadith have become mixed up with, and indistinguishable from, each other with the result that the expression Qur’an and hadith is not infrequently employed where the intention is to refer to Qur’an and sunna.

At this stage another principle, equally basic, comes into operation, and that is that Islam is the final religion revealed by God, complete and exhaustive in all respects, and that God will not abrogate, detract from or add to this religion (din) any more than He will send a fresh messenger. The din having been perfected (Akmalto lakum dinokum, Sura V, verse 3), there remains no need for any new code repealing, modifying or amplifying the original code; nor for any fresh messenger or message. In this sense, therefore, prophethood ceased with the Holy Prophet and revelation stopped for ever. This is the doctrine of the cessation of wahi-i-nubuwwat.

If the proposition that Muslim dogma, ethics and institutions, etc., are all based on the doctrine of inerrancy, whether such inerrancy lies in the Qur’an, the sunna, ijma’ or ijtihad-i-mutlaq, is fully comprehended, the various deductions that follow from it will be easily understandable. As the ultimate test of truth, whether the matter be one of a ritual or political or social or economic nature, is revelation and revelation has to be gathered from the Qur’an, and the sunna carries almost the same degree of inerrancy as revelation and the only evidence of sunna is hadith, the first duty of those who desire to establish an Islamic State will be to discover the precise rule applicable to the existing circumstances whether that rule is to be found in the Qur’an or hadith. Obviously the persons most suited for the purpose would be those who have made the Qur’an and hadith their lifelong study, namely, among the Sunnies, the ulama, and among the Shias, the mujtahids who are the spokesmen of the hidden Imam, the ruler de jure divino. The function of these divines would be to engage themselves in discovering rules applicable to particular situations and they will be engaged in a task similar to that in which Greek philosophers were engaged, with only this difference that whereas the latter thought that all truth lay in nature which had merely to be discovered by individual effort, the ulama and the mujtahids will have to get at the truth that lies in the holy Book and the books of hadith.

The ulama Board which was recommended by the Basic Principles Committee was a logical recognition of this principle, and the true objection against that Board should indeed have been that the Board was too inadequate a mechanism to implement the principle which had brought that body into existence.

Ijma’ means concurrence of the mujtahids of the people, i.e., of those who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgment of their own, after the death of the Holy Prophet. The authority of ijma’ rests on the principle of a divine protection against error and is founded on a basal tradition of the Holy Prophet, “My people will never agree in error”, reported in Ibn Maja, By this procedure points which had been in dispute were fixed, and when fixed, they became an essential part of the faith and disbelief in them an act of unbelief (kufr). The essential point to remember about ijma’ is that it represents the agreement of the mujtahids and that the agreement of the masses is especially excluded.

Thus ijma’ has not only fixed unsettled points but has changed settled doctrines of the greatest importance.

The distinction between ijma’ and ijtihad is that whereas the former is collective, the latter is individual. Ijtihad means the exerting of one’s self to the utmost degree to form an opinion in a case or as to a rule of law. This is done by applying analogy to the Qur’an and the sunna. Ijtihad did not originally involve inerrancy, its result being always zann or fallible opinion. Only combined ijtihad led to ijma, and was inerrant. But this broad ijtihad soon passed into special ijtihad of those who had a peculiar right to form judgments. When later doctors looked back to the founding of the four legal schools, they assigned to their founders an ijtihad of the first rank (ijtihad-i-mutlaq). But from time to time individuals appeared who returned to the earliest meaning of ijtihad and claimed for themselves the right to form their own opinion from first principles. One of these was the Hanbalite Ibn Taimiya (died 728). Another was Suyuti (died 911) in whom the claim to ijtihad unites with one to be the mujaddid or renewer of religion in his century. At every time there must exist at least one mujtahid, was his contention, just as in every century there must come a mujaddid.

In Shia Islam there are still absolute mujtahids because they are regarded as the spokesmen of the hidden Imam. Thus collective ijtihad leads to ijma’, and the basis of ijma’ is divine protection against error—inerrancy.

ESSENTIALS OF ISLAMIC STATE
Since the basis of Islamic law is the principle of inerrancy of revelation and of the Holy Prophet, the law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna is above all man-made laws, and in case of conflict between the two, the latter, irrespective of its nature, must yield to the former. Thus, provided there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna on a matter which according to our conceptions falls within the region of Constitutional Law or International Law, the rule must be given effect to unless that rule itself permits a departure from it. Thus no distinction exists in Islamic law between Constitutional Law and other law, the whole law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna being a part of the law of the land for Muslim subjects of the State. Similarly if there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna relating to the State’s relations with other States or to the relations of Muslim subjects of the State with other States or the subjects of those States, the rule will have the same superiority of sanction as any other law to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna.

Therefore if Pakistan is or is intended to be converted into an Islamic State in the true sense of the word, its Constitution must contain the following five provisions:—

(1) that all laws to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna shall be deemed to be a part of the law of the land for Muslims and shall be enforced accordingly;
(2) that unless the Constitution itself is framed by ijma’-i-ummat, namely, by the agreement of the ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status, any provision in the Constitution which is repugnant to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(3) that unless the existing laws of Pakistan are adapted by ijma’-i-ummat of the kind mentioned above, any provision in the existing law which is contrary to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(4) that any provision in any future law which is repugnant to Qur’an or sunna shall be void;
(5) that no rule of International Law and no provision in any convention or treaty to which Pakistan is a party, which is contrary to the Qur’an or the sunna shall be binding on any Muslim in Pakistan.

SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAMIC STATE
That the form of Government in Pakistan, if that form is to comply with the principles of Islam, will not be democratic is conceded by the ulama. We have already explained the doctrine of sovereignty of the Qur’an and the sunna. The Objectives Resolution rightly recognised this position when it recited that all sovereignty rests with God Almighty alone. But the authors of that Resolution misused the words ‘sovereign’ and ‘democracy’ when they recited that the Constitution to be framed was for a sovereign State in which principles of democracy as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.

It may be that in the context in which they were used, these words could not be misunderstood by those who are well versed in Islamic principles, but both these words were borrowed from western political philosophy and in that sense they were both wrongly used in the Resolution. When it is said that a country is sovereign, the implication is that its people or any other group of persons in it are entitled to conduct the affairs of that country in any way they like and untrammelled by any considerations except those of expediency and policy. An Islamic State, however, cannot in this sense be sovereign, because it will not be competent to abrogate, repeal or do away with any law in the Qur’an or the sunna. Absolute restriction on the legislative power of a State is a restriction on the sovereignty of the people of that State and if the origin of this restriction lies elsewhere than in the will of the people, then to the extent of that restriction the sovereignty of the State and its people is necessarily taken away. In an Islamic State, sovereignty, in its essentially juristic sense, can only rest with Allah. In the same way, democracy means the rule of the demos, namely, the people, directly by them as in ancient Greece and Rome, or indirectly through chosen representatives as in modern democracies. If the power of the people in the framing of the Constitution or in the framing of the laws or in the sphere of executive action is subject to certain immutable rules, it cannot be said that they can pass any law that they like, or, in the exercise of executive functions, do whatever they like. Indeed if the legislature in an Islamic State is a sort of ijma’, the masses are expressly disqualified from taking part in it because ijma’-i-ummat in Islamic jurisprudence is restricted to ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status and does not at all extend, as in democracy, to the populace.

OTHER INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIC STATE ACCORDING TO ULAMA

In the preceding pages we have attempted to state as clearly as we could the principles on which a religious State must be built if it is to be called an Islamic State. We now proceed to state some incidents of such State, with particular reference to the ulamas’ conception of it.

LEGISLATURE AND LEGISLATION

Legislature in its present sense is unknown to the Islamic system. The religiopolitical system which is called din-i-Islam is a complete system which contains in itself the mechanism for discovering and applying law to any situation that may arise. During the Islamic Republic there was no legislature in its modern sense and for every situation or emergency that arose law could be discovered and applied by the ulama. The law had been made and was not to be made, the only function of those entrusted with the administration of law being to discover the law for the purposes of the particular case, though when enunciated and applied it formed a precedent for others to follow. It is wholly incorrect, as has been suggested from certain quarters, that in a country like Pakistan, which consists of different communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, and where representation is allowed to non-Muslims with a right to vote on every subject that comes up, the legislature is a form of ijma’ or ijtihad, the reason being that ijtihad is not collective but only individual, and though ijma’ is collective, there is no place in it for those who are not experts in the knowledge of the law. This principle at once rules out the infidels (kuffar) whether they be people of Scriptures (ahl-i-kitab) or idolators (mushrikeen).

Since Islam is a perfect religion containing laws, express or derivable by ijma’ or ijtihad, governing the whole field of human activity, there is in it no sanction for what may, in the modern sense, be called legislation.

Questioned on this point Maulana Abul Hasanat, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan says :—

“Q.—Is the institution of legislature as distinguished from the institution of a person or body of persons entrusted with the interpretation of law, an integral part of an Islamic State?
A.—No. Our law is complete and merely requires interpretation by those who are experts in it. According to my belief no question can arise the law relating to which cannot be discovered from the Qur’an or the hadith.
Q.—Who were Sahib-ul-hall-i-wal-aqd
A.—They were the distinguished ulama of the time. These persons attained their status by reason of the knowledge of the law. They were not in any way analogous or similar to the legislature in modern democracy.”

The same view was expressed by Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches reported in the ‘Azad’ of 22nd April, 1947, in the course of which he said that our din is complete and perfect and that it amounts to kufr to make more laws.

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, however, is of the opinion that legislation in the true sense is possible in an Islamic State on matters which are not covered by the Qur’an, the sunna, or previous ijma’ and he has attempted to explain his point by reference to the institution of a body of persons whom the Holy Prophet, and after him the khulafa consulted on all matters relating to affairs of State. The question is one of some difficulty and great importance because any institution of legislature will have to be reconciled with the claim put forward by Maulana Abul Hasanat and some other religious divines that Islam is a perfect and exhaustive code wide enough to furnish an answer to any question that may arise relating to any human activity, and that it does not know of any “unoccupied field” to be filled by fresh legislation. There is no doubt that Islam enjoins consultation and that not only the Holy Prophet but also the first four caliphs and even their successors resorted to consultation with the leading men of the time, who for their knowledge of the law and piety could well be relied upon.

In the inquiry not much has been disclosed about the Majlis-i-Shura except what is contained in Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s written statement which he supplied to the Court at its request. That there was a body of men who were consulted is true, but whether this was a standing body and whether its advice had any legal or binding force, seems somewhat doubtful. These men were certainly not elected in the modern way, though their representative character cannot be disputed. Their advice was certainly asked ad hoc, but that they were competent to make law as the modern legislatures make laws is certainly not correct. The decisions taken by them undoubtedly served as precedents and were in the nature of ijma’, which is not legislation but the application of an existing law to a particular case. When consulted in affairs of State, their functions were truly in the nature of an advice given by a modern cabinet but such advice is not law but only a decision.

Nor can the legislature in a modern State correspond to ijma’ because as we have already pointed out, the legislature legislates while the ulama of Majlis-i-Shura who were called upon to determine what should be the decision on a particular point which was not covered by the Qur’an and the sunna, merely sought to discover and apply the law and not to promulgate the law, though the decision when taken had to be taken not only for the purposes of the particular case but for subsequent occasions as a binding precedent.

An intriguing situation might arise if the Constitution Act provided that any provision of it, if it was inconsistent with the Qur’an or the sunna, would be void, and the intra vires of a law made by the legislature were questioned before the Supreme Court on the ground that the institution of legislature itself was contrary to the Qur’an and the sunna.

POSITION OF NON-MUSLIMS

The ground on which the removal of Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan and other Ahmadis occupying key positions in the State is demanded is that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims and that therefore like zimmies in an Islamic State they are not eligible for appointment to higher offices in the State. This aspect of the demands has directly raised a question about the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan if we are to have an Islamic Constitution.

According to the leading ulama the position of non-Muslims in the Islamic State of Pakistan will be that of zimmies and they will not be full citizens of Pakistan because they will not have the same rights as Muslims They will have no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.

A full statement of this position will be found in the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, Maulana Ahmad Ali, Mian Tufail Muhammad and Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni. Maulana Abul Hasanat on being questioned on the subject stated as follows :—

“Q.—If we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar (non-Muslims)? Will they have a voice in the making of laws, the right of administering the law and the right to hold public offices?
A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no voice in the making of laws, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.
Q.—In an Islamic State can the head of the State delegate any part of his powers to kuffar?
A.—No.”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, when questioned, said:—
“Q.—if we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar? Will they have a hand in the making of the law, the right to administer the law and the right to hold public offices ?
A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no say in the making of law and no right to administer the law. Government may, however, permit them to hold any public office”.

Mian Tufail Muhammad stated as follows :—
“Q.—Read the article on minorities’ rights in the ‘Civil and Military Gazette’ of 13th October, 1953, and say whether it correctly represents your view of an Islamic State? (It was stated in the articles that minorities would have the same rights as Muslims).
A.—I have read this article and do not acknowledge these rights for the Christians or other non-Muslims in Pakistan if the State is founded on the ideology of the Jama’at”.

The confusion on this point in the mind of Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, is apparent from the following: —

“Q.—Have you ever read the aforesaid speech (the speech of the Quaid-i-Azam to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947)?
A.—Yes, I have read that speech.
Q.—Do you still agree with the conception of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam presented to the Constituent Assembly in this speech in which he said that thereafter there would be only one Pakistan nation, consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims, having equal civic rights, without any distinction of race, religion or creed and that religion would be merely a private affair of the individual ?
A.—I accept the principle that all communities, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, should have, according to their population, proper representation in the administration of the State and legislation, except that non-Muslims cannot be taken in the army or the judiciary or be appointed as Ministers or to other posts involving the reposing of confidence.
Q.—Are you suggesting that the position of non-Muslims would be that of zimmies or any better ?
A.—No. By zimmies are meant non-Muslim people of lands which have been conquered by an Islamic State, and the word is not applicable to non-Muslim minorities already living in an Islamic State. Such minorities are called mu’ahids, i.e. those people with whom some agreement has been made.
Q.—What will be their status if there is no agreement with them ?
A.—In that case such communities cannot have any rights of citizenship.
Q.—Will the non-Muslim communities inhabiting Pakistan be called by you as mu’ahids?
A.—No, not in the absence of an agreement with them. To my knowledge there is no such agreement with such communities in Pakistan.”

So, according to the evidence of this learned divine, the non-Muslims of Pakistan will neither be citizens nor will they have the status of zimmies or of mu’ahids. During the Islamic Republic, the head of the State, the khalifa, was chosen by a system of election, which was wholly different from the present system of election based on adult or any other form of popular suffrage. The oath of allegiance (ba’it) rendered to him possessed a sacramental virtue, and on his being chosen by the consensus of the people (ijma’-ul-ummat) he became the source of all channels of legitimate Government. He and he alone then was competent to rule, though he could delegate his powers to deputies and collect around him a body of men of outstanding piety and learning, called Majlis-i-Shura or Ahl-ul-Hall-i-wal-Aqd. The principal feature of this system was that the kuffar, for reasons which are too obvious and need not be stated, could not be admitted to this majlis and the power which had vested in the khalifa could not be delegated to the kuffar. The khalifa was the real head of the State, all power vesting in him and not a powerless individual like the President of a modern democratic State who is merely to sign the record of decisions taken by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. He could not appoint non-Muslims to important posts, and could give them no place either in the interpretation or the administration of the law, the making of the law by them, as already pointed out, being a legal impossibility.

This being the position, the State will have to devise some machinery by which the distinction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim may be determined and its consequences enforced. The question, therefore, whether a person is or is not a Muslim will be of fundamental importance, and it was for this reason that we asked most of the leading ulama, to give their definition of a Muslim, the point being that if the ulama of the various sects believed the Ahmadis to be kafirs, they must have been quite clear in their minds not only about the grounds of such belief but also about the definition of a Muslim because the claim that a certain person or community is not within the pale of Islam implies on the part of the claimant an exact conception of what a Muslim is. The result of this part of the inquiry, however, has been anything but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our ulama on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matters will be. Below we reproduce the definition of a Muslim given by each alim in his own words. This definition was asked after it had been clearly explained to each witness that he was required to give the irreducible minimum conditions which, a person must satisfy to be entitled to be called a Muslim and that the definition was to be on the principle on which a term in grammar is defined.

Here is the result : —

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulamai-
Pakistan —
“Q.— What is the definition of a Muslim ?
A — (1) He must believe in the Unity of God.
(2) He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet as well as in all other prophets who have preceded him,
(3) He must believe in the Holy Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets (khatam-un-nabiyin).
(4) He must believe in the Qur’an as it was revealed by God to the Holy
Prophet of Islam.
(5) He must believe as binding on him the injunctions of the Prophet of
Islam.
(6) He must believe in the qiyamat.
Q.—Is a tarik-us-salat a Muslim ?
A.—Yes, but not a munkir-us-salat”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Maghribi Pakistan —
“Q.— Please define a Muslim ?
A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet. Any person who possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim without his being required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir Jama’at-i-Islami —
“Q.—Please define a Muslim ?
A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in tauheed, (2) in all the prophets (ambiya), (3) all the books revealed by God, (4) in mala’ika (angels), and (5) yaum-ul-akhira (the Day of Judgment).
Q.—Is a mere profession of belief in these articles sufficient to entitle a man
to call himself a Musalman and to be treated as a Musalman in an Islamic State ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—If a person says that he believes in all these things, does any one have a right to question the existence of his belief ?
A.—The five requisites that I have mentioned above are fundamental and any alteration in anyone of these articles will take him out of the pale of Islam.”

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir—
“Q.—Please define a Muslim ?
A.—I consider a man to be a Muslim if he professes his belief in the kalima, namely, La Ilaha Illalah-o-Muhammad-ur-Rasulullah, and leads a life in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet.”

Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jamia Ashrafia, Nila Gumbad, Lahore—
“Q.—Please give the definition of a Musalman ?
A.—The word ‘Musalman’ is a Persian one. There is a distinction between the word ‘Musalman’ which is a Persian word for Muslim and the word ‘momin’. It is impossible for me to give a complete definition of the word ‘momin’. I would require pages and pages to describe what a momin is. A person is a Muslim who professes to be obedient to Allah. He should believe in the Unity of God, prophethood of the ambiya and in the Day of Judgment. A person who does not believe in the azan or in the qurbani goes outside the pale of Islam. Similarly, there are a large number of other things which have been received by tavatir from our prophet. In order to be a Muslim, he must believe in all these things. It is almost impossible for me to give a complete list of such things.”

Hafiz Kifayat Hussain, Idara-i-Haquq-i-Tahaffuz-i-Shia—
“Q.—Who is a Musalman?
A.—A person is entitled to be called a Musalman if he believes in (1) tauheed, (2) nubuwwat and (3) qiyamat. These are the three fundamental beliefs which a person must profess to be called a Musalman. In regard to these three basic doctrines there is no difference between the Shias and the Sunnies. Besides the belief in these three doctrines, there are other things called ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ which a person must comply with in order to be entitled to be called a Musalman. These will take me two days to define and enumerate. But as an illustration I might state that the respect for the Holy Book, wajoob-i-nimaz, wajoob-i-roza, wajoob-i-hajj-ma’a-sharait, and other things too numerous to mention, are among the ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ ”

Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan :
“Q.—Who is a Musalman according to you ?
A.—A person who believes in the zarooriyat-i-din is called a momin and every momin is entitled to be called a Musalman.
Q.—What are these zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—A person who believes in the five pillars of Islam and who believes in the rasalat of our Holy Prophet fulfils the zarooriyat-i-din.
Q.—Have other actions, apart from the five arakan, anything to do with a man being a Muslim or being outside the pale of Islam?
(Note—Witness has been explained that by actions are meant those rules of moral conduct which in modern society are accepted as correct.)
A.—Certainly.
Q.—Then you will not call a person a Muslim who believes in arakan-ikhamsa and the rasalat of the prophet but who steals other peoples’ things, embezzles property entrusted to him, has an evil eye on his neighbour’s wife and is guilty of the grossest ingratitude to his benefector?
A.—Such a person, if he has the belief already indicated, will be a Muslim despite all this”.

Maulana Muhammad Ali Kandhalvi, Darush-Shahabia, Sialkot —
“Q.—Please define a Musalman?
A.—A person who in obedience to the commands of the prophet performs all the zarooriyat-i-din is a Musalman.
Q.—Can you define zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—Zarooriyat-i-din are those requirements which are known to every Muslim irrespective of his religious knowledge.
Q.—Can you enumerate zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—These are too numerous to be mentioned. I myself cannot enumerate these zarooriyat. Some of the zarooriyat-i-din may be mentioned as salat, saum, etc.”

Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi —
“Q.—Who is a Musalman?
A.—There are two kinds of Musalmans, a political (siyasi) Musalman and a real (haqiqi) Musalman. In order to be called a political Musalman, a person must:
(1) believe in the Unity of God,
(2) believe in our Holy Prophet being khatam-un-nabiyin, i.e., ‘final
authority’ in all matters relating to the life of that person,
(3) believe that all good and evil comes from Allah,
(4) believe in the Day of Judgment,
(5) believe in the Qur’an to be the last book revealed by Allah,
(6) perform the annual pilgrimage to Mecca,
(7) pay the zaka’at,
(8) say his prayers like the Musalmans,
(9) observe all apparent rules of Islami mu’ashira, and
(10) observe the fast (saum).

If a person satisfies all these conditions he is entitled to the rights of a full citizen of an Islamic State. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the person concerned will not be a political Musalman. (Again said) It would be enough for a person to be a Musalman if he merely professes his belief in these ten matters irrespective of whether he puts them into practice or not. In order to be a real Musalman, a person must believe in and act on all the injunctions by Allah and his prophet in the manner in which they have been enjoined upon him.
Q.—Will you say that only the real Musalman is ‘mard-i-saleh’ ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—do we understand you aright that in the case of what you have called a political (siyasi) Musalman, belief alone is necessary, while in the case of a haqiqi Musalman there must not only be belief but also action?
A.—No, you have not understood me aright. Even in the case of a political (siyasi) Musalman action is necessary but what I mean to say is that if a person does not act upon the belief that is necessary in the case of such a Musalman, he will not be outside the pale of a political (siyasi) Musalman.
Q.—If a political (siyasi) Musalman does not believe in things which you
have stated to be necessary, will you call such a person be-din ?
A.—No, I will call him merely be-amal”.

The definition by the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiya, Rabwah, in its written statement
is that a Muslim is a person who belongs to the ummat of the Holy Prophet and professes belief in kalima-i-tayyaba.

Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else.

APOSTASY

Apostasy in an Islamic State is punishable with death. On this the ulama are practically unanimous (vide the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Punjab; Maulana Ahmad Ali, Sadr Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, West Pakistan; Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, founder and ex-Amir-i-Jama’at-i-Islami, Pakistan; Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jami’Ashrafia, Lahore, and Member, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan; Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, President, Jami’at-i-Ahl-i-Hadith, Maghribi Pakistan; Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasimi, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Punjab; and Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti). According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis and Wahabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, Board of Talimat-i-Islami attached to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a beautiful tree in the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic State. And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State, he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come within the definition of murtadd, namely, if they have changed and not inherited their religious views.

The genuineness of the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 13, by the Deobandis which says that Asna Ashari Shias are kafirs and murtadds, was questioned in the course of enquiry, but Maulana Muhammad Shafi made an inquiry on the subject from Deoband, and received from the records of that institution the copy of a fatwa signed by all the teachers of the Darul Uloom including Maulana Muhammad Shafi himself which is to the effect that those who do not believe in the sahabiyyat of Hazrat Siddiq Akbar and who are qazif of Hazrat Aisha Siddiqa and have been guilty of tehrif of Qur’an are kafirs. This opinion is also supported by Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti who has studied and knows his subject. He thinks the Shias are kafirs because they believe that Hazrat Ali shared the prophethood with our Holy Prophet. He refused to answer the question whether a person who being a Sunni changes his view and agrees with the Shia view would be guilty of irtidad so as to deserve the death penalty. According to the Shias all Sunnis are kafirs, and Ahl-i-Qur’an; namely, persons who consider hadith to be unreliable and therefore not binding, are unanimously kafirs and so are all independent thinkers. The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim. If the constituents of each of the definitions given by the ulama are given effect to, and subjected to the rule of ‘combination and permutation’ and the form of charge in the Inquisition’s sentence on Galileo is adopted mutatis mutandis as a model, the grounds on which a person may be indicted for apostasy will be too numerous to count.

In an earlier part of the report we have referred to the proscription of the ‘Ashshahab’, a pamphlet written by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani who later became Sheikh-ul-Islam-i-Pakistan. In that pamphlet the Maulana had attempted to show from the Qur’an, the sunna, the ijma’ and qayas that in Islam the punishment for apostasy (irtidad) simpliciter is death. After propounding the theological doctrine the Maulana had made in that document a statement of fact that in the time of the Caliph Siddiq-i-Akbar and the subsequent Caliphs vast areas of Arabia became repeatedly red with the blood of apostates. We are not called upon to express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of this doctrine but knowing that the suggestion to the Punjab Government to proscribe this pamphlet had come from the Minister for the Interior we have attempted to inquire of ourselves the reasons for Government’s taking a step which ex hypothesi amounted to condemning a doctrine which the Maulana had professed to derive from the Qur’an and the sunna. The death penalty for irtidad has implications of a far-reaching character and stamps Islam as a religion of fanatics, which punishes all independent thinking. The Qur’an again and again lays emphasis on reason and thought, advises toleration and preaches against compulsion in religious matters but the doctrine of irtidad as enunciated in this pamphlet strikes at the very root of independent thinking when it propounds the view that anyone who, being born a Muslim or having embraced Islam, attempts to think on the subject of religion with a view, if he comes to that conclusion, to choose for himself any religion he likes, has the capital penalty in store for him. With this implication Islam becomes an embodiment of complete intellectual paralysis. And the statement in the pamphlet that vast areas of Arabia were repeatedly bespattered with human blood, if true, could only lend itself to this inference that even when Islam was at the height of its splendour and held absolute sway in Arabia there were in that country a large number of people who turned away from that religion and preferred to die than to remain in that system. It must have been some such reaction of this pamphlet on the mind of the Minister for the Interior which prompted him to advise the Punjab Government to proscribe the pamphlet. Further the Minister who was himself well-versed in religious matters must have thought that the conclusion drawn by the author of the pamphlet which was principally based on the precedent mentioned in paras. 26, 27 and 28 of the Old Testament and which is only partially referred to in the Qur’an in the 54th verse of the Second Sura, could not be applicable to apostasy from Islam and that therefore the author’s opinion was in fact incorrect, there being no express text in the Qur’an for the death penalty for apostasy. On the contrary each of the two ideas, one underlying the six brief verses of Surat-ul-Kafiroon and the other the La Ikrah verse of the second Sura, has merely to be understood to reject as erroneous the view propounded in the ‘Ash-Shahab’. Each of the verses in Surat-ul-Kafiroon which contains thirty words and no verse of which exceeds six words, brings out a fundamental trait in man engrained in him since his creation while the La Ikrah verse, the relevant portion of which contains only nine words, states the rule of responsibility of the mind with a precision that cannot be surpassed. Both of these texts which are an early part of the Revelation are, individually and collectively, the foundation of that principle which human society, after centuries of conflict, hatred and bloodshed, has adopted in defining one of the most important fundamental rights of man. But our doctors would never dissociate chauvinism from Islam.

PROPAGATION OF OTHER RELIGIONS

Closely allied to the punishment for apostasy is the right of non-Muslims publicly to preach their religion. The principle which punishes an apostate with death must be applicable to public preaching of kufr and it is admitted by Maulana Abul Hasanat, Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir and Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari, though the last subordinates his opinion to the opinion of the ulama, that any faith other than Islam will not be permitted publicly to be preached in the State. And Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, as will appear from his pamphlet ‘Punishment in Islam for an apostate’, has the same views on the subject.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir, when questioned on this point, replied :—
“Q.—What will you do with them (Ahmadis) if you were the head of the
Pakistan State ?
A.—I would tolerate them as human beings but will not allow them the right
to preach their religion”.

The prohibition against public preaching of any non-Muslim religion must logically follow from the proposition that apostasy will be punished with death and that any attack on, or danger to Islam will be treated as treason and punished in the same way as apostasy.

JIHAD
Earlier we have pointed out that one of the doctrines on which the Musalmans and Ahmadis are at variance is that of jihad. This doctrine at once raises a host of other allied matters such as the meanings of ghazi, shahid, jihad-bis-saif, jihad fi sabili’llah, dar-ul-Islam, dar-ul-harb, hijrat, ghanima, khums and slavery, and the conflict or reconciliation of these conceptions with modern international problems such as aggression, genocide, international criminal jurisdiction, international conventions and rules of public international law.

An Islamic State is dar-ul-Islam, namely, a country where ordinances of Islam are established and which is under the rule of a Muslim sovereign. Its inhabitants are Muslims and also non-Muslims who have submitted to Muslim control and who under certain restrictions and without the possibility of full citizenship are guaranteed their lives and property by the Muslim State. They must, however, be people of Scriptures and may not be idolaters. An Islamic State is in theory perpetually at war with the neighbouring non-Muslim country, which at any time may become dar-ul-harb, in which case it is the duty of the Muslims of that country to leave it and to come over to the country of their brethren in faith. We put this aspect to Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and reproduce his views :—

“Q.—is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic State in the position of dar-ul-harb ?
A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.

According to Ghias-ul-Lughat, dar-ul-harb is a country belonging to infidels which has not been subdued by Islam, and the consequences of a country becoming darul-harb are thus stated in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam :—

“When a country does become a dar-ul-harb, it is the duty of all Muslims to withdraw from it, and a wife who refuses to accompany her husband in this, is ipso facto divorced”.

Thus in case of a war between India and Pakistan, if the latter is an Islamic State, we must be prepared to receive forty million Muslims from across the border into Pakistan.

In fact, Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i- Pakistan, thinks that a case for hijrat already exists for the Musalmans of India. The following is his view on this subject :—
“Q.—Do yon call your migration to Pakistan as hijrat in the religious sense ?
A.—Yes”.

We shall presently point out why Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s version of the doctrine of jihad is relied on as a ground for his and his community’s kufr, but before we do that it is necessary first to state how jihad has been or is understood by the Musalmans. There are various theories about jihad which vary from the crude notion of a megalomaniac moved by religious frenzy going out armed with sword and indiscriminately slaughtering non-Muslims in the belief that if he dies in the combat he becomes a shahid and if he succeeds in killing attains the status of a ghazi, to the conception that a Musalman throughout his life is pitted against kufr, kufr here being used in the sense of evil and wrong, and that his principal activity in life is to strive by argument a where necessary by force to spread Islam until it becomes a world religion. In the latter case he fights not for any personal end but because he considers such strife as a duty and an obligation which he owes to Allah and the only recompense for which is the pleasure of Allah. The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam contains the following brief article on djihad :—
“DJIHAD (A), holy war. The spread of Islam by arms is a religious duty upon Muslims in general. It narrowly escaped being a sixth rukn, or fundamental duty, and is indeed still so regarded by the descendants of the Kharidjis. This position was reached gradually but quickly. In the Meccan Suras of the Qur’an patience under attack is taught ; no other attitude was possible. But at Medina the right to repel attack appears, and gradually it became a prescribed duty to fight against and subdue the hostile Meccans.

Whether Muhammad himself recognised that his position implied steady and unprovoked war against the unbelieving world until it was subdued to Islam may be in doubt. Traditions are explicit on the point ; but the Qur’anic passages speak always of the unbelievers who are to be subdued as dangerous or faithless. Still, the story of his writing to the powers around him shows that such a universal position was implicit in his mind, and it certainly developed immediately after his death, when the Muslim armies advanced out of Arabia. It is now a fard ala’l-kifaya, a duty in general on all male, free, adult Muslims, sane in mind and body and having means enough to reach the Muslim army, yet not a duty necessarily incumbent on every individual but sufficiently performed when done by a certain number. So it must continue to be done until the whole world is under the rule of Islam. It must be controlled or headed by a Muslim sovereign or imam. As the imam of the Shias is now invisible, they cannot have a djihad until he reappears. Further, the requirement will be met if such a sovereign makes an expedition once a year, or, even, in the later view, if he makes annual preparation for one. The people against whom the djihad is directed must first be invited to embrace Islam. On refusal they have another choice. They may submit to Muslim rule, become dhimmis (q. v.) and pay djizya and kharadj (q. v.) or fight. In the first case, their lives, families and property are assured to them, but they have a definitely inferior status, with no technical citizenship, and a standing only as protected wards. If they fight, they and their families may be enslaved and all their property seized as booty, four-fifths of which goes to the conquering army. If they embrace Islam, and it is open to them to do so even when the armies are face to face, they become part of the Muslim community with all its rights and duties. Apostates must be put to death. But if a Muslim country is invaded by unbelievers, the imam may issue a general summons calling all Muslims there to arms, and as the danger grows so may be the width of the summons until the whole Muslim world is involved. A Muslim who dies fighting in the path of Allah (fi sabil Allah) is martyr (shahid) and is assured of Paradise and of peculiar privileges there. Such a death was, in the early generations, regarded as the peculiar crown of a pious life. It is still, on occasions, a strong incitement, but when Islam ceased to conquer it lost its supreme value. Even yet, however, any war between Muslims and non-Muslims must be a djihad with its incitements and rewards. Of course, such modern movements as the so-called Mu’tazili in India and the Young Turk in Turkey reject this and endeavour to explain away its basis; but the Muslim masses still follow the unanimous voice of the canon lawyers. Islam must be completely made over before the doctrine of djihad can be eliminated”.

The generally accepted view is that the fifth verse to Sura-i-Tauba (Sura IX) abrogated the earlier verses revealed in Mecca which permitted the killing of kuffar only in self-defence. As against this the Ahmadis believe that no verso in the Qur’an was abrogated by another verse and that both sets of verses, namely, the Meccan verses and the relative verses in Sura-i-Tauba have different scopes and can stand together. This introduces the difficult controversy of nasikh and mansukh, with all its implications. It is argued on behalf of the Ahmadis that the doctrine of nasikh and mansukh is opposed to the belief in the existence of an original Scripture in Heaven, and that implicit in this doctrine is the admission that unless the verse alleged to be repealed was meant for a specific occasion and by the coming of that occasion fulfilled its purpose and thus spent itself, God did not know of the subsequent circumstances which would make the earlier verse inapplicable or lead to an undesired result.

The third result of this doctrine, it is pointed out, cuts at the very root of the claim that laws of Islam are immutable and inflexible because if changed circumstances made a new revelation necessary, any change in the circumstances subsequent to the completion of the revelation would make most of the revelation otiose or obsolete.

We are wholly incompetent to pronounce on the merits of this controversy but what has to be pointed out is the result to which the doctrine of jihad will lead if, as appears from the article in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam and other writings produced before us including one by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and another by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, it involves the spread of Islam by arms and conquest. ‘Aggression’ and ‘genocide’ are now offences against humanity for which under sentences pronounced by different International tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokio the war lords of Germany and Japan had to forfeit their lives, and there is hardly any difference between the offences of aggression and genocide on the one hand and the doctrine of spread of Islam by arms and conquest on the other. An International Convention on genocide is about to be concluded but if the view of jihad presented to us is correct, Pakistan cannot be a party to it. And while the following verses in the Mecca Suras :—

Sura II, verses 190 and 193 :190. “Fight in the Cause of God Those who fight you,
But do not transgress limits ;
For God loveth not transgressors”.
193. “And fight them on
Until there is no more
Tumult or oppression,
And there prevail
Justice and faith in God ;
But if they cease,
Let there be no hostility
Except to those
Who practise oppression”.
Sura XXII, verses 39 and 40:
39. “To those against whom
War is made, permission
Is given (to fight) because
They are wronged;— and verily,
God is most Powerful
For their aid;—”
40. “(They are) those who have
Been expelled from their homes
In defiance of right,—
(For no cause) except
That they say, ‘Our Lord
Is God.’ Did not God
Check one set of people
By means of another,
There would surely have been
Pulled down monasteries, churches,
Synagogues, and mosques, in which
The name of God is commemorated
In abundant measure. God will
Certainly aid those who
Aid His (cause);—for verily
God is Full of Strength,
Exalted in Might,
(Able to enforce His Will),”

contain in them the sublime principle which international jurists have only faintly begun to discover, we must go on preaching that aggression is the chief characteristic of Islam. The law relating to prisoners of war is another branch of Islamic law which is bound to come in conflict with International Law.

As for instance, in matters relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, we shall have to be governed by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s view, assuming that view is based on the Qur’an and the sunna, which is as follows :—

“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Does it differ fundamentally from the modern International Law of war?
A.—These two systems are based on a fundamental difference.
Q.—What rights have non-Muslims who are taken prisoners of war in a jihad?
A.—The Islamic law on the point is that if the country of which these prisoners are nationals pays ransom, they will be released. An exchange of prisoners is also permitted. If neither of these alternatives is possible, the prisoners will be converted into slaves for ever. If any such person makes an offer to pay his ransom out of his own earnings, he will be permitted to collect the money necessary for the fidya (ransom).
Q.—Are you of the view that unless a Government assumes the form of an Islamic Government, any war declared by it is not a jihad?
A.—No. A war may be declared to be a jihad if it is declared by a national Government of Muslims in the legitimate interests of the State. I never expressed the opinion attributed to me in Ex. D. E. 12:—
“Raha yeh masala keh agar hukumat-i-Pakisten apni maujuda shukl-o-surat ke sath Indian Union ke sath apne mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke i’lan-i-jang bar bhi de to kya us-ki yeh jang jihad ke hukam men a-ja’egi ? Ap ne is bare men jo rae zahir ki hai woh bilkul darust hai – Jab-tak hukumat Islami nizam ko ikhtiyar kar-ke Islami nah ho jae us waqt tak us-ki kisi jang ko jihad kehna aisa hi hai jaisa kisi ghair Muslim ke Azad Kashmir ki fauj men bharti ho-kar larne ko jihad aur us-ki maut ko shahadat ka nam dediya jae – Maulana ka jo mudd’a hai woh yeh hai keh mu’ahadat ki maujudgi men to hukumat ya us-ke shehriyon ka is jang men sharik hona shar’-an ja’iz hi nahin – Agar hukumat mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke jang ka
i’lan kar-de to hukumat ki jang to jihad phir bhi nahin hogi ta-an keh hukumat Islami nah ho jae.’

(translation)

‘The question remains whether, even if the Government of Pakistan, in its present form and structure, terminates her treaties with the Indian Union and declares war against her, this war would fall under the definition of jihad? The opinion expressed by him in this behalf is quite correct. Until such time as the Government becomes Islamic by adopting the Islamic form of Government, to call any of its wars a jihad would be tantamount to describing the enlistment and fighting of a non-Muslim on the side of the Azad Kashmir forces jihad and his death martyrdom. What the Maulana means is that, in the presence of treaties, it is against Shari’at, if the Government or its people participate in such a war. If the Government terminates the treaties and declares war, even then the war started by Government would not be termed jihad unless the Government becomes Islamic’.

About the view expressed in this letter being that of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, there is the evidence of Mian Tufail Muhammad, the writer of the letter, who states: “Ex. D. E. 12 is a photostat copy of a letter which I wrote to someone whose name I do not now remember.”

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri’s view on this point is as
follows:—
“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Does it differ in fundamentals from the present International Law?
A.—Yes.
Q.—What are the rights of a person taken prisoner in war?
A.—He can embrace Islam or ask for aman, in which case he will be treated as a musta’min. If he does not ask for aman, he would be made a slave”.
Similar is the opinion expressed by Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jam’at-i-Islami who says:—
“Q.—Is there any law of war in Islamic laws?
A.—Yes.
Q.—If that comes into conflict with International Law, which will you follow?
A.—Islamic law.
Q.—Then please state what will be the status of prisoners of war captured by your
forces?
A.—I cannot reply to this off hand. I will have to study the point.”
Of course ghanima (plunder) and khums (one-fifth) if treated as a necessary incident of
jihad will be treated by international society as a mere act of brigandage.

REACTION ON MUSLIMS OF NON-MUSLIM STATES
The ideology on which an Islamic State is desired to be founded in Pakistan must have certain consequences for the Musalmans who are living in countries under non-Muslim sovereigns.

We asked Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ataullah Shah Bukhari whether a Muslim could be a faithful subject of a non-Muslim State and reproduce his answer:—
“Q.—In your opinion is a Musalman bound to obey orders of a kafir Government?
A.—It is not possible that a Musalman should be faithful citizen of a non-Muslim Government.
Q.—Will it be possible for the four crore of Indian Muslims to be faithful citizens of their State?
A—No.”

The answer is quite consistent with the ideology which has been pressed before us, but then if Pakistan is entitled to base its Constitution on religion, the same right must be conceded to other countries where Musalmans are in substantial minorities or if they constitute a preponderating majority in a country where sovereignty rests with a non-Muslim community. We, therefore, asked the various ulama whether, if non-Muslims in Pakistan were to be subjected to this discrimination in matters of citizenship, the ulama would have any objection to Muslims in other countries being subjected to a similar discrimination. Their reactions to this suggestion are reproduced below:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan:—
“Q.—You will admit for the Hindus, who are in a majority in India, the right to have a Hindu religious State?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Will you have any objection if the Muslims are treated under that form of Government as malishes or shudras under the law of Manu?
A.— No.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi :—
“Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion?
A—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India.”

Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Skak Bukhari :—
“Q.—How many crores of Muslims are there in India?
A.—Four crores.
Q.—Have you any objection to the law of Manu being applied to them according to which they will have no civil right and will be treated as malishes and shudras?
A.—I am in Pakistan and I cannot advise them.”

Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jama’at-i-Islami :—
“Q.—What is the population of Muslims in the world?
A.—Fifty crores.
Q.—If the total population of Muslims of the world is 50 crores, as you say, and the number of Muslims living in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Turkey and Iraq does not exceed 20 crores, will not the result of your ideology beto convert 30 crores of Muslims in the world into hewers of wood anddrawers of water?
A.—My ideology should not affect their position.
Q.—Even if they are subjected to discrimination on religious grounds and denied ordinary rights of citizenship ?
A.—Yes.”
This witness goes to the extent of asserting that even if a non-Muslim Government were to offer posts to Muslims in the public services of the country, it will be their duty to refuse such posts.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir :—
“Q.—Do you want an Islamic State in Pakistan?
A.—Surely.
Q.—What will be your reaction if the neighbouring country was to found
their political system on their own religion?
A.—They can do it if they like.
Q.—Do you admit for them the right to declare that all Muslims in India, are shudras and malishes with no civil rights whatsoever?
A.—We will do our best to see that before they do it their political
sovereignty is gone. We are too strong for India. We will be strong enough to prevent India from doing this.
Q.—Is it a part of the religious obligations of Muslims to preach their religion?
A—Yes.
Q.—Is it a part of the duty of Muslims in India publicly to preach their religion?
A.—They should have that right.
Q.—What if the Indian State is founded on a religious basis and the right to preach religion is disallowed to its Muslim nationals?
A —If India makes any such law, believer in the Expansionist movement as I am, I will march on India and conquer her.”

So this is the reply to the reciprocity of discrimination on religious grounds.

Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari :—
“Q.—Would you like to have the same ideology for the four crores of Muslims in India as you are impressing upon the Muslims of
Pakistan?
A.—That ideology will not let them remain in India for one minute.
Q.—Does the ideology of a Muslim change from place to place and from time to time?
A.—No.
Q.—Then why should not the Muslims of India have the same ideology as you have?
A.—They should answer that question.”

The ideology advocated before us, if adopted by Indian Muslims, will completely
disqualify them for public offices in the State, not only in India but in other countries also which are under a non-Muslim Government. Muslims will become perpetual suspects everywhere and will not be enrolled in the army because according to this ideology, in case of war between a Muslim country and a non-Muslim country, Muslim soldiers of the non-Muslim country must either side with the Muslim country or surrender their posts.

The following is the view expressed by two divines whom we questioned on this point:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-
Ulama-i-Pakistan :—
“Q.—What will be the duty of Muslims in India in case of war between India
and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, namely, to side with us and not to fight against us
on behalf of India.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi : —
“Q.—What will be the duty of the Muslims in India in case of war between
India and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, and that is not to fight against Pakistan or to do
anything injurious to the safety of Pakistan.”

OTHER INCIDENTS

Other incidents of an Islamic State are that all sculpture, playing of cards, portrait
painting, photographing human beings, music, dancing, mixed acting, cinemas and
theatres will have to be closed.

Thus says Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasimi, representative of Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan: —

“Q.—What are your views on tashbih and tamseel ?
A.—You should ask me a concrete question.
Q.—What are your views on lahw-o-la’b?
A.—The same is my reply to this question.
Q.—What are your views about portrait painting?
A.—There is nothing against it if any such painting becomes necessary.
Q.—What about photography?
A.—My reply to it is the same as the reply regarding portrait painting.
Q.—What about sculpture as an art?
A.—It is prohibited by our religion.
Q.—Will you bring playing of cards in lohw-o-la’b?
A.—Yes, it will amount to lahw-o-la’b.
Q.—What about music and dancing?
A.—It is all forbidden by our religion.
Q.—What about drama and acting?
A —It all depends on what kind of acting you mean. If it involves immodesty
and intermixture of sexes, the Islamic law is against it.
Q.—If the State is founded on your ideals, will you make a law stopping
portrait painting, photographing of human beings, sculpture, playing
of cards, music, dancing, acting and all cinemas and theatres?
A.—Keeping in view the present form of these activities, my answer is in the affirmative.”

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni considers it to be a sin (ma’siyat) on the part of
professors of anatomy to dissect dead bodies of Muslims to explain points of anatomy to the students.

The soldier or the policeman will have the right, on grounds of religion, to disobey a command by a superior authority. Maulana Abul Hasanat’s view on this is as follows :—

“I believe that if a policeman is required to do something which we consider to be contrary to our religion, it should be the duty of the policeman to disobey the authority. The same would be my answer if ‘army’ were substituted for ‘police’.

Q.—You stated yesterday that if a policeman or a soldier was required by a
superior authority to do what you considered to be contrary to religion, it would be the duty of that policeman or the soldier to disobey such authority. Will you give the policeman or the soldier the right of himself determining whether the command he is given by his superior authority is contrary to religion ?
A.—Most certainly.
Q.—Suppose there is war between Pakistan and another Muslim country and the soldier feels that Pakistan is in the wrong; and that to shoot a soldier of other country is contrary to religion. Do you think he would be justified in disobeying his commanding officer ?
A.—In such a contingency the soldier should take a fatwa of the ‘ulama’.”

We have dwelt at some length on the subject of Islamic State not because we intended to write a thesis against or in favour of such State but merely with a view to presenting a clear picture of the numerous possibilities that may in future arise if true causes of the ideological confusion which contributed to the spread and intensity of the disturbances are not precisely located. That such confusion did exist is obvious because otherwise Muslim Leaguers, whose own Government was in office, would not have risen against it; sense of loyalty and public duty would not have departed from public officials who went about like maniacs howling against their own Government and officers; respect for property and human life would not have disappeared in the common man who with no scruple or compunction began freely to indulge in loot, arson and murder; politicians would not have shirked facing the men who had installed them in their offices; and administrators would not have felt hesitant or diffident in performing what was their obvious duty. If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense.

Pakistan is being taken by the common man, though it is not, as an Islamic State. This belief has been encouraged by the ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic State that is being heard from all quarters since the establishment of Pakistan. The phantom of an Islamic State has haunted the Musalman throughout the ages and is a result of the memory of the glorious past when Islam rising like a storm from the least expected quarter of the world—wilds of Arabia—instantly enveloped the world, pulling down from their high pedestal gods who had ruled over man since the creation, uprooting centuries old institutions and superstitions and supplanting all civilisations that had been built on an enslaved humanity. What is 125 years in human history, nay in the history of a people, and yet during this brief period Islam spread from the Indus to the Atlantic and Spain, and from the borders of China to Egypt, and the sons of the desert installed themselves in all old centres of civilisation—in Ctesiphon, Damascus, Alexandria, India and all places associated with the names of the Sumerian and the Assyrian civilisations. Historians have often posed the question : what would have been the state of the world today if Muawiya’s siege of Constantinople had succeeded or if the proverbial Arab instinct for plunder had not suddenly seized the mujahids of Abdur Rahman in their fight against Charles Martel on the plains of Tours in Southern France. May be Muslims would have discovered America long before Columbus did and the entire world would have been Moslemised; may be Islam itself would have been Europeanised. It is this brilliant achievement of the Arabian nomads, the like of which the world had never seen before, that makes the Musalman of today live in the past and yearn for the return of the glory that was Islam. He finds himself standing on the crossroads, wrapped in the mantle of the past and with the dead weight of centuries on his back, frustrated and bewildered and hesitant to turn one corner or the other. The freshness and the simplicity of the faith, which gave determination to his mind and spring to his muscle, is now denied to him. He has neither the means nor the ability to conquer and there are no countries to conquer. Little does he understand that the forces, which are pitted against him, are entirely different from those against which early Islam, had to fight, and that on the clues given by his own ancestors human mind has achieved results which he cannot understand. He therefore finds himself in a state of helplessness, waiting for some one to come and help him out of this morass of uncertainty and confusion. And he will go on waiting like this without anything happening. Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic in congruity that he is today. It is this lack of bold and clear thinking, the inability to understand and take decisions which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist and repeatedly create situations of the kind we have been inquiring into until our leaders have a clear conception of the goal and of the means to reach it. It requires no imagination to realise that irreconcilables remain irreconcilable even if you believe or wish to the contrary. Opposing principles, if left to themselves, can only produce confusion and disorder, and the application of a neutralising agency to them can only produce a dead result. Unless, in case of conflict between two ideologies, our leaders have the desire and the ability to elect, uncertainty must continue. And as long as we rely on the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog our steps. The sublime faith called Islam will live even if our leaders are not there to enforce it. It lives in the individual, in his soul and outlook, in all his relations with God and men, from the cradle to the grave, and our politicians should understand that if Divine commands cannot make or keep a man a Musalman, their statutes will not….

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India has never, not once, initiated hostilities against Pakistan: A Note to Mr Clemons

December 3, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

From Facebook:

Mr Clemons,

Apropos your statement:

“The U.S. has an awkward problem with Pakistan in that substantial parts of its government actually favor the Afghan Taliban achieving political primacy in Afghanistan as a buffer against incursions by India” (italics added):

the US makes a mistake by accepting at face-value the psychotic delusion of the Pakistan military that it has faced or faces now a threat from India.

As I have said before, the last place on earth that New Delhi’s nomenclatura would like to extend its misgovernance would be Pakistan.

And the historical record is clear that India has never initiated hostilities against Pakistan, not once.

In Oct 1947, the new Pakistan started with an armed attack against the old “princely” State of Jammu & Kashmir with whom it had signed a “Standstill Agreement”. That State came into existence in international law in 1846.

In Sep 1965, Ayub Khan’s Pakistan, armed with Patton tanks and F-104s and F-86s, started an inflitration and then a war hoping to drive tanks all the way to Delhi but did not succeed.

In 1971, East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan, and though India made it militarily possible it was not something that India conspired to bring about but was something caused by West Pakistanis lording it over their own compatriots. The Richard Sisson-Leo Rose book “War and Secession” is quite a definitive history. 90,000 Pakistanis surrendered as POWs whom India protected from Bangladeshi revenge.

In 1999, Musharraf had his Kargil misadventure. Other than the ghastly mutilation and murder of Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and his platoon as POWs by the Pakistan Army and its Taliban friends,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saurabh_Kalia
Musharraf achieved nothing. He then sought to stay on in power unlawfully for almost a decade despite his civillian boss trying to sack him.

And then there was the 2008 attack on Mumbai by ten youthful terrorists from Pakistan who were trained by elements of the Pakistan military.

Where has there ever been an Indian “incursion”?

To the contrary, India had proposed the name of Pakistan as a new member of the UNO back in 1947 — and Zahir Shah’s Afghanistan was the only country to oppose it, for precisely the same unresolved problem as continues today, namely, the destiny of the Pashtuns.

Cordially

Suby Roy

Annals of Diplomacy & International Relations

November 29, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

From Facebook:

Subroto Roy finds it odd in diplomatic law and protocol that two American Presidents in succession have said respectively to the same Indian Prime Minister “You’re a good man” and a person of “honesty and integrity”.

Subroto Roy thinks Asia (from Israel-Palestine to Japan & Indonesia) needs its own Metternich and Congress of Vienna, but won’t get it and hence may remain many many decades behind Europe in political development. (And why Asia won’t get what Europe did may be because Europe did what it did.)

Subroto Roy agrees with Professor Juan Cole’s summary position: “India and Russia want an Obama ‘surge’ in Afghanistan because they are afraid that if Muslim extremists take over the country, that development could threaten their own security. China is more or less bankrolling the Afghanistan War…In contrast, Pakistan does not seem… eager for the further foreign troops, in part because it wants to project power and influence into Afghanistan itself”. But he would add Russia, China, India and Iran too are free-riders from the military standpoint (though India has built power-stations, roads etc for civilian economic development), while Pakistan remains schizophrenic as to whether it wishes to define itself by the lights of Iqbal and Jinnah or by the lunacy of Rahmat Ali.

Did civil-military conflict contribute to the 26/11 destruction?

November 26, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

From Facebook:

Subroto Roy repeats what he said in Jan 2009 that Mumbai policemen showed exemplary bravery and no cowardice; the problem was civil-military conflict, e.g. the refusal of the Army contingent sent to the Taj hotel to go inside without Army orders though the police demanded it and DCP Patil had long identified where the terrorists were and had been pleading for reinforcements.

Posted in India's Military Defence, Mumbai massacres, Mumbai terrorist Kasab, Mumbai's Police, Mumbai/Bombay, Nariman House massacre, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism. Leave a Comment »

MK Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan “Frontier Gandhi”

November 11, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

Following my 2006 article “The Greatest Pashtun: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan”, I have today posted at Facebook this photograph from a book in my Library :

scan0057

Posted in Abdul Ghaffar Khan, India's History, MK Gandhi, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pashtuns. 3 Comments »

Afghanistan should become a major manufacturer of morphine using its poppy

October 29, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

From Facebook:

Subroto Roy thinks the Senlis Council’s advice on regulating and licensing Afghanistan’s poppy market may be more important than trying to ham-handedly fight “drug wars” there…. Poppy may be best-suited to grow in that arid country which may not be otherwise able to feed itself.

Postcript: This report on regulating India’s poppy market for phramaceutical uses seems a good model.

Posted in Afghanistan, Agriculture, Food and agriculture, Government of Afghanistan, Government of India, India's agriculture, India's Agriculture & Food, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Poppy and morphine, Senlis Council. Leave a Comment »

Map of Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Durand Line area)

October 20, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

A US Government map from the 1980s now in the public domain showing the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier (Durand Line area) and seeming to indicate Pashtun areas.

AFGHAN~1

Posted in Afghanistan, Balochistan, Durand Line, Pakistan's history, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pashtuns. 10 Comments »

On the Existence of a Unique and Stable Solution to the Jammu & Kashmir Problem that is Lawful, Just and Economically Efficient

October 15, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

P Chidambaram may recall our brief interaction at the residence of the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi in September-October 1990, and also my visit in July 1995 when he was a member of Narasimha Rao’s Government.

I am delighted to read in today’s paper that he believes a “unique solution” exists to the grave mortal problem of Jammu & Kashmir. Almost four years ago, I published in The Statesman my discovery of the existence of precisely such a unique solution in the three-part article “Solving Kashmir”.

This came to be followed by “Law, Justice and J&K”, “History of Jammu & Kashmir”, “Pakistan’s Allies”, “What to tell Musharraf” and a few others. The purpose of this open letter is to describe that solution which provides, I believe, the only just and lawful path available to the resolution of what has been known universally as the Kashmir problem.

Very briefly, it involves recognizing that the question of lawful territorial sovereignty in J&K is logically distinct from the question of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants. The solution requires

(a) acknowledging that the original legal entity in the world system of nations known as Jammu & Kashmir arose on March 16 1846 and ceased to exist on or about October 22 1947; that the military contest that commenced on the latter date has in fact resulted, given all particular circumstances of history, in the lawful and just outcome in international law;

(b) offering all who may be Indian nationals or stateless and who presently live under Article 370, a formal choice of nationality between the Republics of India, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: citizen-by-citizen, without fear or favour, under conditions of full information, individual privacy and security; any persons who voluntarily choose to renounce Indian nationality in such private individual decisions would be nevertheless granted lawful permanent residence in the Indian Republic and J&K in particular.

In other words, the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by the entities known today as the Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India that occurred since October 22 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining democratic question has to do with free individual choice of nationality by inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who might wish to choose, for deeply personal individual reasons, not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead (or remain stateless). Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed if Pakistan agreed to act similarly this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be resolved most appropriately. Pakistan and India are both wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused over decades by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

The full reasoning underlying this, which I believe to be the only lawful, just, efficient and stable solution that exists, is thoroughly explained in the following six articles. The first five, “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice & J&K”, “History of J&K”, and “Pakistan’s Allies”, “What to Tell Musharraf” were published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and are marked ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE below, and are also available elsewhere here. The sixth “An Indian Reply to President Zardari”, marked SIX, was published for the first time here following the Mumbai massacres.

I believe careful reflection upon this entire body of reasoning may lead all reasonable men and women to a practically unanimous consensus about this as the appropriate course of action; if such a consensus happened to arise, the implementation of the solution shall only be a matter of (relatively) uncomplicated procedural detail.

Subroto Roy
October 15 2009

“ONE
SOLVING KASHMIR: ON AN APPLICATION OF REASON by Subroto Roy First published in three parts in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, December 1,2,3 2005, http://www.thestatesman.net

(This article has its origins in a paper “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir” which circulated in Washington DC in 1992-1995, including at the Indian and Pakistani embassies and the Carnegie Endowment, and was given as an invited lecture at the Heritage Foundation on June 23 1998. It should be read along with other articles also republished here, especially “History of J&K”, “Law, Justice and J&K” , “Understanding Pakistan”, “Pakistan’s Allies” and “What to Tell Musharraf”. The Washington paper and lecture itself originated from my ideas in the Introduction to Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, edited by WE James and myself in the University of Hawaii project on Pakistan 1986-1992.)

I. Give Indian `Green Cards’ to the Hurriyat et al

India, being a liberal democracy in its constitutional law, cannot do in Jammu & Kashmir what Czechoslovakia did to the “Sudeten Germans” after World War II. On June 18 1945 the new Czechoslovakia announced those Germans and Magyars within their borders who could not prove they had been actively anti-fascist before or during the War would be expelled — the burden of proof was placed on the individual, not the State. Czechoslovakia “transferring” this population was approved by the Heads of the USA, UK and USSR Governments at Potsdam on August 2 1945. By the end of 1946, upto two million Sudeten Germans were forced to flee their homes; thousands may have died by massacre or otherwise; 165,000 remained who were absorbed as Czechoslovak citizens. Among those expelled were doubtless many who had supported Germany and many others who had not — the latter to this day seek justice or even an apology in vain. Czechoslovakia punished none of its nationals for atrocities, saying it had been revenge for Hitler’s evil (”badla” in Bollywood terms) and the post Cold War Czech Government too has declined to render an apology. Revenge is a wild kind of justice (while justice may be a civilised kind of revenge).

India cannot follow this savage precedent in international law. Yet we must recognise there are several hundred and up to several hundred thousand persons on our side of the boundary in the State of Jammu & Kashmir who do not wish to be Indian nationals. These people are presently our nationals ius soli, having been born in territory of the Indian Republic, and/or ius sanguinis, having been born of parents who are Indian nationals; or they may be “stateless” whom we must treat in accordance with the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons. The fact is they may not wish to carry Indian passports or be Indian nationals.

In this respect their juridical persons resemble the few million “elite” Indians who have in the last few decades freely placed their hands on their hearts and solemnly renounced their Indian nationality, declaring instead their individual fidelity to other nation-states — becoming American, Canadian or Australian citizens, or British subjects or nationals of other countries. Such people include tens of thousands of the adult children of India’s metropolitan “elite”, who are annually visited abroad in the hot summer months by their Indian parents and relatives. They are daughters and sons of New Delhi’s Government and Opposition, of retired generals, air marshals, admirals, ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, public sector bureaucrats, private sector businessmen, university professors, journalists, doctors and many others. India’s most popular film-actress exemplified this “elite” capital-flight when, after a tireless search, she chose a foreign husband and moved to California.

The difference in Jammu & Kashmir would be that those wishing to renounce Indian nationality do not wish to move to any other place but to stay as and where they are, which is in Kashmir Valley or Jammu. Furthermore, they may wish, for whatever reason, to adopt, if they are eligible to do so, the nationality of e.g. the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

They may believe themselves descended from Ahmad Shah Abdali whose Afghans ruled or mis-ruled Kashmir Valley before being defeated by Ranjit Singh’s Sikhs in 1819. Or they may believe themselves of Iranian descent as, for example, are the Kashmiri cousins of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Or they may simply have wished to be, or are descended from persons who had wished to be on October 26 1947, citizens of the then-new British Dominion of Pakistan — but who came to be prevented from properly expressing such a desire because of the war-like conditions that have prevailed ever since between India and Pakistan. There may be even a few persons in Laddakh who are today Indian nationals but who wish to be considered Tibetans instead; there is, however, no Tibetan Republic and it does not appear there is going to be one.

India, being a free and self-confident country, should allow, in a systematic lawful manner, all such persons to fulfil their desires, and furthermore, should ensure they are not penalised for having expressed such “anti-national” desires or for having acted upon them. Sir Mark Tully, the British journalist, is an example of someone who has been a foreign national who has chosen to reside permanently in the Republic of India — indeed he has been an exemplary permanent resident of our country. There are many others like him. There is no logical reason why all those persons in Jammu & Kashmir who do wish not to be Indians by nationality cannot receive the same legal status from the Indian Republic as has been granted to Sir Mark Tully. There are already thousands of Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese nationals who are lawful permanent residents in the Indian Republic, and who travel back and forth between India and their home countries. There is no logical reason why the same could not be extended to several hundred or numerous thousand people in Jammu & Kashmir who may wish to not accept or to renounce their Indian nationality (for whatever personal reason) and instead become nationals, if they are so eligible, of the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, or, for that matter, to remain stateless. On the one hand, their renunciation of Indian nationality is logically equivalent to the renunciation of Indian nationality by the adult children of India’s “elite” settled in North America and Western Europe. On the other hand, their wish to adopt, if they are eligible, a foreign nationality, such as that of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, and yet remain domiciled in Indian territory is logically equivalent to that of many foreign nationals domiciled in India already like Sir Mark Tully.

Now if you are a permanent resident of some country, you may legally have many, perhaps most, but certainly not all the rights and duties of nationals of that country. e.g., though you will have to pay all the same taxes, you may not be allowed to (or be required to) vote in national or provincial elections but you may in local municipal elections. At the same time, permanently residing foreign nationals are supposed to be equal under the law and have equal access to all processes of civil and criminal justice. (As may be expected though from human frailty, even the federal courts of the USA can be notorious in their injustice and racism towards “Green Card” holders relative to “full” American citizens.) Then again, as a permanently resident foreigner, while you will be free to work in any lawful trade or profession, you may not be allowed to work in some or perhaps any Government agencies, certainly not the armed forces or the police. Many Indians in the USA were engineering graduates, and because many engineering jobs or contracts in the USA are related to the US armed forces and require US citizens only, it is commonplace for Indian engineers to renounce their Indian nationality and become Americans because of this. Many Indian-American families have one member who is American, another Indian, a third maybe Canadian, a fourth Fijian or British etc.

The same can happen in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir if it evolves peacefully and correctly in the future. It is quite possible to imagine a productive family in a peaceful Kashmir Valley of the future where one brother is an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, another brother a civil servant and a sister a police officer of the J&K State Government, another sister being a Pakistani doctor, while cousins are Afghan or Iranian or “stateless” businessmen. Each family-member would have made his/her choice of nationality as an individual given the circumstances of his/her life, his/her personal comprehension of the facts of history, his/her personal political and/or religious persuasions, and similar deeply private considerations. All would have their children going to Indian schools and being Indian citizens ius soli and/or ius sanguinis. When the children grow up, they would be free to join, if they wished, the existing capital flight of other Indian adult children abroad and there renounce their Indian nationality as many have come to do.

II Revealing Choices Privately with Full Information
For India to implement such a proposal would be to provide an opportunity for all those domiciled in Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Laddakh to express freely and privately as individuals their deepest wishes about their own identities, in a confidential manner, citizen by citizen, case by case. This would thereby solve the fundamental democratic problem that has been faced ever since the Pakistani attack on the original State of Jammu & Kashmir commenced on October 22 1947, which came to be followed by the Rape of Baramulla — causing the formal accession of the State to the then-new Dominion of India on October 26 1947.

A period of, say, 30 months may be announced by the Government of India during which full information would be provided to all citizens affected by this change, i.e. all those presently governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The condition of full information may include, for example, easy access to Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani newspapers in addition to access to Indian media. Each such person wishing to either remain with Indian nationality (by explicitly requesting an Indian passport if he/she does not have one already — and such passports can be printed in Kashmiri and Urdu too), or to renounce Indian nationality and either remain stateless or adopt, if he/she is so eligible, the nationality of e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan, should be administratively assisted by the Government of India to make that choice.

In particular, he/she should be individually, confidentially, and without fear or favour assured and informed of his/her new rights and responsibilities. For example, a resident of Kashmir Valley who chooses to become a Pakistani citizen, such as Mr Geelani, would now enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in the Indian Republic that Mr Tully enjoys, and at the same time no longer require a visa to visit Pakistan just as Mr Tully needs no visa to enter Britain. In case individual participants in the Hurriyat choose to renounce Indian nationality and adopt some other, they would no longer be able to legally participate in Indian national elections or J&K’s State elections. That is something which they say they do not wish to do in any case. Those members of the Hurriyat who chose e.g. Pakistani nationality while still residing in Jammu & Kashmir, would be free to send postal ballots or cross the border and vote in Pakistan’s elections if and when these occur. There are many Canadians who live permanently in the USA who cross home to Canada in order to cast a ballot.

After the period of 30 months, every person presently under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution would have received a full and fair opportunity to privately and confidentially reveal his/her preference or choice under conditions of full information. “Partition”, “Plebiscite”, and “Military Decision” have been the three alternatives under discussion ever since the National Conference of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his then-loyal Deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, helped the Indian Army and Air Force in 1947-1948 fight off the savage attack against Jammu & Kashmir State that had commenced from Pakistan on October 22 1947. When, during the Pakistani attack, the Sheikh and Bakshi agreed to the Muslim Conference’s demand for a plebiscite among the people, the Pakistanis balked — the Sheikh and Bakshi then withdrew their offer and decisively and irrevocably chose to accede to the Indian Union. The people of Jammu & Kashmir, like any other, are now bound by the sovereign political commitments made by their forebears. Even so, given the painful mortal facts of the several decades since, the solution here proposed if properly implemented would be an incomparably more thorough democratic exercise than any conceivable plebiscite could ever have been.

Furthermore, regardless of the outcome, it would not entail any further “Partition” or population “transfer” which inevitably would degenerate into a savage balkanization, and has been ruled out as an unacceptable “deal-breaker” by the Indian Republic. Instead, every individual person would have been required, in a private and confidential decision-making process, to have chosen a nationality or to remain stateless — resulting in a multitude of cosmopolitan families in Jammu & Kashmir. But that is something commonplace in the modern world. Properly understood and properly implemented, we shall have resolved the great mortal problem we have faced for more than half a century, and Jammu & Kashmir can finally settle into a period of peace and prosperity. The boundary between India and Pakistan would have been settled by the third alternative mentioned at the time, namely, “Military Decision”.

III. Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar and Gilgit
Pakistan has demanded its flag fly in Srinagar. This too can happen though not in the way Pakistan has been wishing to see it happen. A Pakistan flag might fly in the Valley just as might an Afghan and Iranian flag as well. Pakistan has wished its flag to fly as the sovereign over Jammu & Kashmir. That is not possible. The best and most just outcome is for the Pakistani flag to fly over a recognised Pakistani consular or visa office in Srinagar, Jammu and Leh. In diplomatic exchange, the Indian tricolour would have to fly over a recognised Indian consular or visa office in Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu.

Pakistan also may have to act equivalently with respect to the original inhabitants of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir that it has been controlling — allowing those people to become Indian nationals if they so chose to do in free private decisions under conditions of full information. In other words, the “Military Decision” that defines the present boundary between sovereign states must be recognised by Pakistan sincerely and permanently in a Treaty relationship with India — and all of Pakistan’s official and unofficial protégés like the Hurriyat and the “United Jehad Council” would have to do the same. Without such a sovereign commitment from the Government of Pakistan, as shown by decisive actions of lack of aggressive intent (e.g. as came to be implemented between the USA and USSR), the Government of India has no need to involve the Government of Pakistan in implementing the solution of enhancing free individual choice of nationality with regard to all persons on our side of the boundary.

The “Military Decision” regarding the sovereign boundary in Jammu & Kashmir will be so recognised by all only if it is the universally just outcome in international law. And that in fact is what it is.

The original Jammu & Kashmir State began its existence as an entity in international law long before the present Republics of India and Pakistan ever did. Pakistan commences as an entity on August 14 1947; India commences as an entity of international law with its signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 20 1918. Jammu & Kashmir began as an entity on March 16 1846 — when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh Dogra and the British, one week after the Treaty of Lahore between the British and the defeated Sikh regency of the child Daleep Singh.

Liaquat Ali Khan and Zafrullah Khan both formally challenged on Pakistan’s behalf the legitimacy of Dogra rule in Jammu & Kashmir since the Treaty of Amritsar. The Pakistani Mission to the UN does so even today. The Pakistanis were following Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru himself, who too had at one point challenged Dogra legitimacy in the past. But though the form of words of the Pakistan Government and the Nehru-Abdullah position were similar in their attacks on the Treaty of Amritsar, their underlying substantive reasons were as different as chalk from cheese. The Pakistanis attacked the Dogra dynasty for being Dogra — i.e. because they were Hindus and not Muslims governing a Muslim majority. Nehru and Abdullah denounced monarchic autocracy in favour of mass democracy, and so attacked the Dogra dynasty for being a dynasty. All were wrong to think the Treaty of Amritsar anything but a lawful treaty in international law.

Furthermore, in this sombre political game of great mortal consequence, there were also two other parties who were, or appeared to be, in favour of the dynasty: one because the dynasty was non-Muslim, the other, despite it being so. Non-Muslim minorities like many Hindus and Sikhs in the business and governmental classes, saw the Dogra dynasty as their protector against a feared communalist tyranny arising from the Sunni Muslim masses of Srinagar Valley, whom Abdullah’s rhetoric at Friday prayer-meetings had been inciting or at least awakening from slumber. At the same time, the communalists of the Muslim Conference who had broken away from Abdullah’s secular National Conference, sought political advantage over Abdullah by declaring themselves in favour of keeping the dynasty — even elevating it to become an international sovereign, thus flattering the already pretentious potentate that he would be called “His Majesty” instead of merely “His Highness”. The ancestry of today’s Hurriyat’s demands for an independent Jammu & Kashmir may be traced precisely to those May 21-22 1947 declarations of the Muslim Conference leader, Hamidullah Khan.

Into this game stumbled the British with all the mix of cunning, indifference, good will, impatience, arrogance and pomposity that marked their rule in India. At the behest of the so-called “Native Princes”, the 1929 Butler Commission had hinted that the relationship of “Indian India” to the British sovereign was conceptually different from that of “British India” to the British sovereign. This view was adopted in the Cabinet Mission’s 12 May 1946 Memorandum which in turn came to be applied by Attlee and Mountbatten in their unseemly rush to “Divide and Quit” India in the summer of 1947.

It created the pure legal illusion that there was such a thing as “Lapse of Paramountcy” at which Jammu & Kashmir or any other “Native State” of “Indian India” could conceivably, even for a moment, become a sovereign enjoying the comity of nations — contradicting Britain’s own position that only two Dominions, India and Pakistan, could ever be members of the British Commonwealth and hence members of the newly created UN. British pusillanimity towards Jammu & Kashmir’s Ruler had even extended to making him a nominal member of Churchill’s War Cabinet because he had sent troops to fight in Burma. But the legal illusion had come about because of a catastrophic misunderstanding on the part of the British of their own constitutional law.

The only legal scholar who saw this was B R Ambedkar in a lonely and brilliant technical analysis released to the press on June 17 1947. No “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Native Princes” of Indian India could occur in constitutional law. Paramountcy over Indian India would be automatically inherited by the successor state of British India at the Transfer of Power. That successor state was the new British Dominion of India as well as (when it came to be finalised by Partition from India) the new British Dominion of Pakistan (Postscript: the deleted words represent a mistake made in the original paper, corrected in “Law, Justice & J&K” in view of the fact the UN in 1947 deemed India alone the successor state of British India and Pakistan a new state in the world system). A former “Native Prince” could only choose to which Dominion he would go. No other alternative existed even for a single logical moment. Because the British had catastrophically failed to comprehend this aspect of their own constitutional law, they created a legal vacuum whereby between August 15 and October 22-26 1947, Jammu & Kashmir became a local and temporary sovereign recognised only by the Dominion of Pakistan (until October 22) and the Dominion of India (until October 26). But it was not a globally recognised sovereign and was never going to be such in international law. This was further proved by Attlee refusing to answer the J&K Prime Minister’s October 18 1947 telegram.

All ambiguity came to end with the Pakistani attack of October 22 1947, the Rape of Baramulla, the secession of an “Azad Kashmir”declared by Sardar Ibrahim, and the Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on October 31 1947 followed by the massacre of Sikh soldiers of the J&K Army at Bunji. With those Pakistani actions, Gulab Singh’s Jammu & Kashmir State, founded on March 16 1846 by the Treaty of Amritsar, ceased to logically exist as an entity in international law and fell into a state of ownerless anarchy. The conflict between Ibrahim’s Muslim communalists backed by the new Dominion of Pakistan and Abdullah’s secularists backed by the new Dominion of India had become a civil war within a larger intra-Commonwealth war that itself was almost a civil war between forces of the same military.

Jammu & Kashmir territory had become ownerless. The Roman Law which is at the root of all municipal and international law in the world today would declare that in the ownership of such an ownerless entity, a “Military Decision” was indeed the just outcome. Sovereignty over the land, waters, forests and other actual and potential resources of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir has become divided by “Military Decision” between the modern Republics of India and Pakistan. By the proposal made herein, the people and their descendants shall have chosen their nationality and their domicile freely across the sovereign boundary that has come to result.

TWO
LAW, JUSTICE AND J&K by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, July 2 2006 and The Statesman July 3 2006 http://www.thestatesman.net Editorial Page Special Article

I.
For a solution to J&K to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion in Pakistan and India as well as all people and parties in J&K ~ those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others ~ will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

On August 14, 1947, the legal entity known as “British India”, as one of its final acts, and based on a sovereign British decision made only two months earlier, created out of some of its territory a new State defined in international law as the “Dominion of Pakistan”. British India extinguished itself the very next day, and the newly independent “Dominion of India” succeeded to all its rights and obligations in international law. As the legal successor of the “India” which had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the San Francisco Declaration of 1945, the Dominion of India was already a member of the new UN as well as a signatory to many international treaties. By contrast, the Dominion of Pakistan had to apply afresh to sign treaties and become a member of international organisations. The theory put forward by Argentina that two new States, India and Pakistan, had been created ab initio, came to be rejected and was withdrawn by Argentina. Instead, Pakistan with the wholehearted backing of India was made a member of the UN, with all except Afghanistan voting in favour. (Afghanistan’s exceptional vote signalled presence of conflict over the Durand Line and idea of a Pashtunistan; Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were imprisoned by the Muslim League regime of NWFP which later supported the tribesmen who attacked J&K starting October 22, 1947; that conflict remains unresolved to this day, even after the American attack on the Taliban, the restart of a constitutional process in Afghanistan, and the purported mediation of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.)

Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s distinguished first ambassador to the UN, claimed in September 1947: “Pakistan is not a new member of UNO but a successor to a member State which was one of the founders of the Organisation.” He noted that he himself had led India to the final session of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939, and he wished to say that Pakistan had been present “as part of India… under the latter name” as a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles. This was, however, logically impossible. The Treaty of Versailles long predated (1) Mohammad Iqbal’s Allahabad Address which conceptualised for the first time in the 20th Century a Muslim State in Northwest India; (2) Rahmat Ali’s invention of the word “PAKSTAN” on the top floor of a London omnibus; (3) M. A. Jinnah and Fazlul Haq’s Lahore Resolution; and (4) the final British decision of June 3, 1947 to create by Partition out of “British India” a Dominion named Pakistan. Pakistan could not have acted in international law prior to having come into being or been created or even conceived itself. Zafrullah Khan would have been more accurate to say that the history of Pakistanis until August 14, 1947 had been one in common with that of their Indian cousins ~ or indeed their Indian brothers, since innumerable North Indian Muslim families came to be literally partitioned, with some brothers remaining Indians while other brothers became Pakistanis.

Pakistan was created at the behest of Jinnah’s Muslim League though with eventual agreement of the Indian National Congress (a distant ancestor of the political party going by the same name today). Pakistan arose not because Jinnah said Hindus and Muslims were “two nations” but because he and his League wished for a State where Muslims would find themselves ruled by fellow-Muslims and feel themselves part of a pan-Islamic culture. Yet Pakistan was intended to be a secular polity with Muslim-majority governance, not an Islamic theocracy. That Pakistan failed to become secular was exemplified most poignantly in the persecution Zafrullah himself later faced in his personal life as an Ahmadiya, even while he was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. (The same happened later to Pakistan’s Nobel-winning physicist Abdus Salaam.) Pakistan was supposed to allow the genius of Indo-Muslim culture to flourish, transplanted from places like Lucknow and Aligarh which would never be part of it. In fact, the areas that are Pakistan today had in the 1937 provincial elections shown scant popular Muslim support for Jinnah’s League. The NWFP had a Congress Government in the 1946 elections, and its supporters boycotted the pro-Pakistan referendum in 1947. The imposition of Urdu culture as Pakistan’s dominant ethos might have come to be accepted later in West Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but it was not acceptable in East Bengal, and led inevitably to the Pakistani civil war and creation of Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujib in 1971.

In August 1947, the new Dominions of India and Pakistan were each supposed to protect their respective minority populations as their first political duty. Yet both palpably failed in this, and were reduced to making joint declarations pleading for peace and an end to communal killings and the abduction of women. The Karachi Government, lacking the wherewithal and administrative machinery of being a nation-state at all, and with only Liaquat and an ailing Jinnah as noted leaders, may have failed more conspicuously, and West Punjab, the Frontier and Sindh were soon emptied of almost all their many Sikhs and Hindus. Instead, the first act of the new Pakistan Government in the weeks after August 14, 1947 was to arrange for the speedy and safe transfer of the North Indian Muslim elite by air from Delhi using chartered British aeroplanes. The ordinary Muslim masses of UP, Delhi and East Punjab were left in danger from or were subjected to Sikh and Hindu mob attacks, especially as news and rumours spread of similar outrages against Pakistan’s departing minorities.

In this spiral of revenge attacks and counter-attacks, bloodshed inevitably spilled over from West and East Punjab into the northern Punjabi plains of Jammu, though Kashmir Valley remained conspicuously peaceful. Zafrullah and Liaquat would later claim it was this communal civil war which had caused thousands of newly decommissioned Mirpuri soldiers of the British Army, and thousands of Afridi and other Frontier tribesmen, to spontaneously act to “liberate” J&K’s Muslims from alleged tyranny under the Hindu Ruler or an allegedly illegal Indian occupation.

But the main attack on J&K State that began from Pakistan along the Manshera-Muzaffarabad road on October 22, 1947 was admittedly far too well-organised, well-armed, well-planned and well-executed to have been merely a spontaneous uprising of tribesmen and former soldiers. In all but name, it was an act of undeclared war of the new Dominion of Pakistan first upon the State of J&K and then upon the Indian Dominion. This became obvious to Field Marshall Auchinlek, who, as Supreme Commander of the armed forces of both India and Pakistan, promptly resigned and abolished the Supreme Command in face of the fact that two parts of his own forces were now at war with one another.

The invaders failed to take Srinagar solely because they lost their military purpose while indulging in the Rape of Baramula. Thousands of Kashmiri women of all communities ~ Muslim, Sikh and Hindu ~ were violated and transported back to be sold in markets in Peshawar and elsewhere. Such was standard practice in Central Asian tribal wars from long before the advent of Islam, and the invading tribesmen shared that culture. India’s Army and Air Force along with the militias of the secular democratic movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and those remaining loyal units of J&K forces, fought off the invasion, and liberated Baramula, Naushera, Uri, Poonch etc. Gilgit had a British-led coup détat against it bringing it under Pakistan’s control. Kargil was initially taken by the Pakistanis and then lost by them. Leh could have been but was not taken by Pakistani forces. But in seeking to protect Leh and to retake Kargil, the Indian Army lost the siege of Skardu ~ which ended reputedly with the infamous communication from the Pakistani commander to his HQ: “All Sikhs killed; all women raped.”

Legal theory
Now, in this grave mortal conflict, the legal theory to which both the Indian and Pakistani Governments have been wedded for sixty years is one that had been endorsed by the British Cabinet Mission in 1946 and originated with the Butler Commission of 1929. Namely, that “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Indian India” of the “Native States” could and did occur with the extinction of British India on August 15, 1947. By this theory, Hyderabad, J&K, Junagadh and the several other States which had not acceded to either Dominion were no longer subject to the Crown’s suzerainty as of that date. Both Dominions drew up “Instruments of Accession” for Rulers to sign upon the supposed “Lapse” of Paramountcy that was to occur with the end of British India.

Ever since, the Pakistan Government has argued that Junagadh’s Ruler acceded to Pakistan and Hyderabad’s had wished to do so but both were forcibly prevented by India. Pakistan has also argued the accession to India by J&K’s Ruler was “fraudulent” and unacceptable, and Sheikh Abdullah was a “Quisling” of India and it was not his National Conference but the Muslim Conference of Ibrahim, Abbas and the Mirwaiz (precursor of the Hurriyat) which represented J&K’s Muslims.

India argued that Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan or Hyderabad’s independence were legal and practical impossibilities contradicting the wills of their peoples, and that their integration into the Indian Dominion was carried out in an entirely legitimate manner in the circumstances prevailing.

On J&K, India has argued that not only had the Ruler requested Indian forces to fight off the Pakistani attack, and he acceded formally before Indian forces were sent, but also that democratic principles were fully adhered to in the unequivocal endorsement of the accession by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference and further by a duly called and elected J&K Constituent Assembly, as well as generations of Kashmiris since. In the Indian view, it is Pakistan which has been in illegal occupation of Indian territory from Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit to Skardu all the way to the Khunjerab Pass, Siachen Glacier and K2, some of which it illegally ceded to its Communist Chinese ally, and furthermore that it has denied the peoples of these areas any democratic voice.

Roman law
In June 1947, it was uniquely and brilliantly argued by BR Ambedkar in a statement to the Press that the British had made a catastrophic error in comprehending their own constitutional law, that no such thing as “Lapse” of Paramountcy existed, and that suzerainty over the “Native States” of “Indian India” would be automatically transferred in international law to the successor State of British India. It was a legal illusion to think any Native State could be sovereign even for a single logical moment. On this theory, if the Dominion of India was the sole successor State in international law while Pakistan was a new legal entity, then a Native State which acceded to Pakistan after August 15, 1947 would have had to do so with the consent of the suzerain power, namely, India, as may be said to have happened implicitly in case of Chitral and a few others. Equally, India’s behaviour in integrating (or annexing) Junagadh and Hyderabad, would become fully explicable ~ as would the statements of Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel before October 1947 that they would accept J&K going to Pakistan if that was what the Ruler and his people desired. Pakistan unilaterally and by surprise went to war against J&K on October 22, declared the accession to India “fraudulent”, and to this day has claimed the territory of the original State of J&K is “disputed”. Certainly, even if the Ambedkar doctrine is applied that no “Lapse” was possible under British law, Pakistan did not recognise India’s jurisdiction there as the suzerain power as of August 15, 1947. Altogether, Pakistan’s sovereign actions from October 22 onwards amounted to acting to annex J&K to itself by military force ~ acts which came to be militarily resisted (with partial success) by India allied with Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference and the remaining forces of J&K. By these military actions, Pakistan revealed that it considered J&K territory to have descended into a legal state of anarchy as of October 22, 1947, and hence open to resolution by “Military Decision” ~ as is indeed the just outcome under Roman Law, the root of all municipal and international law today, when there is a contest between claimants over an ownerless entity.

Choice of nationality
Hence, the present author concluded (“Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman December 1-3, 2005) that the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by India and Pakistan that has occurred since 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining “democratic” question described has to do with free individual choice of nationality by the inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who may choose not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead. Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of the Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed, if Pakistan agreed to act similarly, this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be peacefully resolved. Both countries are wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

THREE
HISTORY OF JAMMU & KASHMIR by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29 2006 and The Statesman Oct 30 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

At the advent of Islam in distant Arabia, India and Kashmir in particular were being visited by Chinese Buddhist pilgrims during Harsha’s reign. The great “Master of Law” Hiuen Tsiang visited between 629-645 and spent 631-633 in Kashmir (”Kia-chi-mi-lo”), describing it to include Punjab, Kabul and Kandahar. Over the next dozen centuries, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and again Hindu monarchs came to rule the 85 mile long 40 mile wide territory on the River Jhelum’s upper course known as Srinagar Valley, as well as its adjoining Jammu in the upper plains of the Punjab and “Little Tibet” consisting of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit.

In 1344, a Persian adventurer from Swat or Khorasan by name of Amir or Mirza, who had “found his way into the Valley and in time gained great influence at the Raja’s court”, proclaimed himself Sultan Shamsuddin after the death of the last Hindu monarchs of medieval Kashmir. Twelve of his descendants formed the Shamiri dynasty including the notorious Sikander and the just and tolerant Zainulabidin. Sikander who ruled 1386-1410 “submitted himself” to the Uzbek Taimur the Lame when he approached Kashmir in 1398 “and thus saved the country from invasion”. Otherwise, “Sikander was a gloomy ferocious bigot, and his zeal in destroying temples and idols was so intense that he is remembered as the Idol-Breaker. He freely used the sword to propagate Islam and succeeded in forcing the bulk of the population to conform outwardly to the Muslim religion. Most of the Brahmins refused to apostatise, and many of them paid with their lives the penalty for their steadfastness. Many others were exiled, and only a few conformed.”

Zainulabidin who ruled 1417-1467 “was a man of very different type”. “He adopted the policy of universal toleration, recalled the exiled Brahmins, repealed the jizya or poll-tax on Hindus, and even permitted new temples to be built. He abstained from eating flesh, prohibited the slaughter of kine, and was justly venerated as a saint. He encouraged literature, painting and music, and caused many translations to be made of works composed in Sanskrit, Arabic and other languages.” During his “long and prosperous reign”, he “constructed canals and built many mosques; he was just and tolerant”.

The Shamiri dynasty ended in 1541 when “some fugitive chiefs of the two local factions of the Makri and the Chakk invited Mirza Haidar Dughlat, a relation of Babar, to invade Kashmir. The country was conquered and the Mirza held it (nominally in name of Humayan) till 1551, when he was killed in a skirmish. The line… was restored for a few years, until in 1559 a Chakk leader, Ghazi Shah, usurped the throne; and in the possession of his descendants it remained for nearly thirty years.” This dynasty marks the origins of Shia Islam in Srinagar though Shia influence in Gilgit, Baltistan and Laddakh was of longer standing. Constant dissensions weakened the Chakks, and in 1586, Akbar, then at Attock on the Indus, sent an army under Raja Bhagwan Das into Srinagar Valley and easily made it part of his Empire.

Shivaism and Islam both flourished, and Hindu ascetics and Sufi saints were revered by all. Far from Muslims and Hindus forming distinct nations, here they were genetically related kinsmen living in proximity in a small isolated area for centuries. Indeed Zainulabidin may have had a vast unspoken influence on the history of all India insofar as Akbar sought to attempt in his empire what Zainulabidin achieved in the Valley. Like Zainulabidin, Akbar’s governance of India had as its “constant aim” “to conciliate the Hindus and to repress Muslim bigotry” which in modern political parlance may be seen as the principle of secular governance ~ of conciliating the powerless (whether majority or minority) and repressing the bigotry of the powerful (whether minority or majority). Akbar had made the Valley the summer residence of the Mughals, and it was Jahangir, seeing the Valley for the first time, who apparently said the words agar behest baushad, hamee in hast, hamee in hast, hamee in hast: “if Heaven exists, it is here, it is here, it is here”. Yet like other isolated paradises (such as the idyllic islands of the Pacific Ocean) an accursed mental ether can accompany the magnificent beauty of people’s surroundings. As the historian put it: “The Kashmiris remained secure in their inaccessible Valley; but they were given up to internal weakness and discord, their political importance was gone…”

After the Mughals collapsed, Iran’s Turkish ruler Nadir Shah sacked Delhi in 1739 but the Iranian court fell in disarray upon his death. In 1747 a jirga of Pashtun tribes at Kandahar “broke normal tradition” and asked an old Punjabi holy man and shrine-keeper to choose between two leaders; this man placed young wheat in the hand of the 25 year old Ahmed Shah Saddozai of the Abdali tribe, and titled him “Durrani”. Five years later, Durrani took Kashmir and for the next 67 years the Valley was under Pashtun rule, a time of “unmitigated brutality and widespread distress”. Durrani himself “was wise, prudent and simple”, never declared himself king and wore no crown, instead keeping a stick of young wheat in his turban. Leaving India, he famously recited: “The Delhi throne is beautiful indeed, but does it compare with the mountains of Kandahar?”

Kashmir’s modern history begins with Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs who became a soldier at 12, and in 1799 at age 19 was made Lahore’s Governor by Kabul’s Zaman Shah. Three years later “he made himself master of Amritsar”, and in 1806 crossed the River Sutlej and took Ludhiana. He created a fine Sikh infantry and cavalry under former officers of Napoleon, and with 80,000 trained men and 500 guns took Multan and Peshawar, defeated the Pashtuns and overran Kashmir in 1819. The “cruel rule” of the Pashtuns ended “to the great relief of Kashmir’s inhabitants”.

The British Governor-General Minto (ancestor of the later Viceroy), seeing advantage in the Sikhs staying north of the Sutlej, sent Charles Metcalfe, “a clever young civilian”, to persuade the Khalsa; in 1809, Ranjit Singh and the British in the first Treaty of Amritsar agreed to establish “perpetual amity”: the British would “have no concern” north of the Sutlej and Ranjit Singh would keep only minor personnel south of it. In 1834 and 1838 Ranjit Singh was struck by paralysis and died in 1839, leaving no competent heir. The Sikh polity collapsed, “their power exploded, disappearing in fierce but fast flames”. It was “a period of storm and anarchy in which assassination was the rule” and the legitimate line of his son and grandson, Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh was quickly extinguished. In 1845 the Queen Regent, mother of the five-year old Dalip Singh, agreed to the Khalsa ending the 1809 Treaty. After bitter battles that might have gone either way, the Khalsa lost at Sobraon on 10 February 1846, and accepted terms of surrender in the 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore. The kingdom had not long survived its founder: “created by the military and administrative genius of one man, it crumbled into powder when the spirit which gave it life was withdrawn; and the inheritance of the Khalsa passed into the hands of the English.”

Ranjit Singh’s influence on modern J&K was even greater through his having mentored the Rajput Gulab Singh Dogra (1792-1857) and his brothers Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh. Jammu had been ruled by Ranjit Deo until 1780 when the Sikhs made it tributary to the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh, a great grand nephew of Ranjit Deo, had left home at age 17 in search of a soldierly fortune, and ended up in 1809 in Ranjit Singh’s army, just when Ranjit Singh had acquired for himself a free hand to expand his domains north of the River Sutlej.

Gulab Singh, an intrepid soldier, by 1820 had Jammu conferred upon him by Ranjit Singh with the title of Raja, while Bhimber, Chibal, Poonch and Ramnagar went to his brothers. Gulab Singh, “often unscrupulous and cruel, was a man of considerable ability and efficiency”; he “found his small kingdom a troublesome charge but after ten years of constant struggles he and his two brothers became masters of most of the country between Kashmir and the Punjab”, though Srinagar Valley itself remained under a separate Governor appointed by the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh extended Jammu’s rule from Rawalpindi, Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, across Laddakh and into Tibet. His General Zorawar Singh led six expeditions into Laddakh between 1834 and 1841 through Kishtwar, Padar and Zanskar. In May 1841, Zorawar left Leh with an army of 5000 Dogras and Laddakhis and advanced on Tibet. Defeating the Tibetans at Rudok and Tashigong, he reached Minsar near Lake Mansarovar from where he advanced to Taklakot (Purang), 15 miles from the borders of Nepal and Kumaon, and built a fort stopping for the winter. Lhasa sent large re-inforcements to meet him. Zorawar, deciding to take the offensive, was killed in the Battle of Toyu, on 11-12 December 1841 at 16,000 feet.

A Laddakhi rebellion resulted against Jammu, aided now by the advancing Tibetans. A new army was sent under Hari Chand suppressing the rebellion and throwing back the Tibetans, leading to a peace treaty between Lhasa and Jammu signed on 17 September 1842: “We have agreed that we have no ill-feelings because of the past war. The two kings will henceforth remain friends forever. The relationship between Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Lhasa (Dalai Lama) is now established. The Maharajah Sahib, with God (Kunchok) as his witness, promises to recognise ancient boundaries, which should be looked after by each side without resorting to warfare. When the descendants of the early kings, who fled from Laddakh to Tibet, now return they will not be stopped by Shri Maharajah. Trade between Laddakh and Tibet will continue as usual. Tibetan government traders coming into Laddakh will receive free transport and accommodations as before, and the Laddakhi envoy will, in turn, receive the same facilities in Lhasa. The Laddakhis take an oath before God (Kunchok) that they will not intrigue or create new troubles in Tibetan territory. We have agreed, with God as witness, that Shri Maharajah Sahib and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will live together as members of the same household.” The traditional boundary between Laddakh and Tibet “as recognised by both sides since olden times” was accepted by the envoys of Gulab Singh and the Dalai Lama.

An earlier 1684 treaty between Laddakh and Lhasa had said that while Laddakh would send tribute to Lhasa every three years, “the king of Laddakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngarees-khor-sum, that he may be independent there; and he sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kangree (Kailas), and the Holy Lakes of Mansarovar and Rakas Tal”. The area around Minsar village near Lake Mansarovar, held by the rulers of Laddakh since 1583, was retained by Jammu in the 1842 peace-treaty, and its revenue was received by J&K State until 1948.

After Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839, Gulab Singh was alienated from the Lahore Court where the rise of his brothers and a nephew aroused enough Khalsa jealousy to see them assassinated in palace intrigues. While the Sikhs imploded, Gulab Singh had expanded his own dominion from Rawalpindi to Minsar ~ everywhere except Srinagar Valley itself. He had apparently advised the Sikhs not to attack the British in breach of the 1809 Treaty, and when they did so he had not joined them, though had he done so British power in North India might have been broken. The British were grateful for his neutrality and also his help in their first misbegotten adventure in Afghanistan. It was Gulab Singh who was now encouraged by both the British and the Sikhs to mediate between them, indeed “to take a leading part in arranging conditions of peace”, and he formally represented the Sikh regency in the negotiations. The 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore “set forth that the British Government having demanded in addition to a certain assignment of territory, a payment of a crore and a half of rupees, and the Sikh Government being unable to pay the whole”, Dalip Singh “should cede as equivalent to one crore the hill country belonging to the Punjab between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and the Hazara”.

For the British to occupy the whole of this mountainous territory was judged unwise on economic and military grounds; it was not feasible to occupy from a military standpoint and the area “with the exception of the small Valley of Kashmir” was “for the most part unproductive”. “On the other hand, the ceded tracts comprised the whole of the hereditary possessions of Gulab Singh, who, being eager to obtain an indefeasible title to them, came forward and offered to pay the war indemnity on condition that he was made the independent ruler of Jammu & Kashmir.

A separate treaty embodying this arrangement was thus concluded between the British and Gulab Singh at Amritsar on 16 March 1846.” Gulab Singh acknowledged the British Government’s supremacy, and in token of it agreed to present annually to the British Government “one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed and three pairs of Kashmir shawls. This arrangement was later altered; the annual presentation made by the Kashmir State was confined to two Kashmir shawls and three romals (handkerchiefs).” The Treaty of Amritsar “put Gulab Singh, as Maharaja, in possession of all the hill country between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh and Gilgit; but excluding Lahoul, Kulu and some areas including Chamba which for strategic purposes, it was considered advisable (by the British) to retain and for which a remission of Rs 25 lakhs was made from the crore demanded, leaving Rs 75 lakhs as the final amount to be paid by Gulab Singh.” The British retained Hazara which in 1918 was included into NWFP. Through an intrigue emanating from Prime Minister Lal Singh in Lahore, Imamuddin, the last Sikh-appointed Governor of Kashmir, sought to prevent Gulab Singh taking possession of the Valley in accordance with the Treaty’s terms. By December 1846 Gulab Singh had done so, though only with help of a British force which included 17,000 Sikh troops “who had been fighting in the campaign just concluded”. (Contemporary British opinion even predicted Sikhism like Buddhism “would become extinct in a short time if it were not kept alive by the esprit de corps of the Sikh regiments”.)

The British in 1846 may have been glad enough to allow Gulab Singh take independent charge of the new entity that came to be now known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir”. Later, however. they and their American allies would grow keen to control or influence the region vis-à-vis their new interests against the Russian and Soviet Empires.

FOUR
PAKISTAN’S ALLIES by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, June 4 2006, The Statesman June 5 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

From the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar creating the State of Jammu & Kashmir until the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Britain and later the USA became increasingly interested in the subcontinent’s Northwest. The British came to India by sea to trade. Barren, splendid, landlocked Afghanistan held no interest except as a home of fierce tribes; but it was the source of invasions into the Indian plains and prompted a British misadventure to install Shah Shuja in place of Dost Mohammad Khan leading to ignominious defeat. Later, Afghanistan was seen as the underbelly of the Russian and Soviet empires, and hence a location of interest to British and American strategic causes.

In November 1954, US President Dwight Eisenhower authorized 30 U-2 spy aircraft to be produced for deployment against America’s perceived enemies, especially to investigate Soviet nuclear missiles which could reach the USA. Reconnaissance balloons had been unsuccessful, and numerous Western pilots had been shot down taking photographs from ordinary military aircraft. By June 1956, U-2 were making clandestine flights over the USSR and China. But on May 1 1960, one was shot or forced down over Sverdlovsk, 1,000 miles within Soviet territory. The Americans prevaricated that it had taken off from Turkey on a weather-mission, and been lost due to oxygen problems. Nikita Kruschev then produced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, who was convicted of spying, though was exchanged later for a Soviet spy. Powers had been headed towards Norway, his task to photograph Soviet missiles from 70,000 ft, his point of origin had been an American base 20 miles from Peshawar.

America needed clandestine “forward bases” from which to fly U-2 aircraft, and Pakistan’s ingratiating military and diplomatic establishment was more than willing to offer such cooperation, fervently wishing to be seen as a “frontline state” against the USSR. “We will help you defeat the USSR and we are hopeful you will help us defeat India” became their constant refrain. By 1986, the Americans had been permitted to build air-bases in Balochistan and also use Mauripur air-base near Karachi.

Jammu & Kashmir and especially Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins the Pashtun regions whose capital has been Peshawar. In August-November 1947, a British coup d’etat against J&K State secured Gilgit-Baltistan for the new British Dominion of Pakistan.

The Treaty of Amritsar had nowhere required Gulab Singh’s dynasty to accept British political control in J&K as came to be exercised by British “Residents” in all other Indian “Native States”. Despite this, Delhi throughout the late 19th Century relentlessly pressed Gulab Singh’s successors Ranbir Singh and Partab Singh to accept political control. The Dogras acquiesced eventually. Delhi’s desire for control had less to do with the welfare of J&K’s people than with protection of increasing British interests in the area, like European migration to Srinagar Valley and guarding against Russian or German moves in Afghanistan. “Sargin” or “Sargin Gilit”, later corrupted by the Sikhs and Dogras into “Gilgit”, had an ancient people who spoke an archaic Dardic language “intermediate between the Iranian and the Sanskritic”. “The Dards were located by Ptolemy with surprising accuracy on the West of the Upper Indus, beyond the headwaters of the Swat River (Greek: Soastus) and north of the Gandarae (i.e. Kandahar), who occupied Peshawar and the country north of it. This region was traversed by two Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hsien, coming from the north about AD 400 and Hsuan Tsiang, ascending from Swat in AD 629, and both left records of their journeys.”

Gilgit had been historically ruled by a Hindu dynasty called Trakane; when they became extinct, Gilgit Valley “was desolated by successive invasions of neighbouring rulers, and in the 20 or 30 years ending with 1842 there had been five dynastic revolutions. The Sikhs entered Gilgit about 1842 and kept a garrison there.” When J&K came under Gulab Singh, “the Gilgit claims were transferred with it, and a boundary commission was sent” by the British. In 1852 the Dogras were driven out with 2,000 dead. In 1860 under Ranbir Singh, the Dogras “returned to Gilgit and took Yasin twice, but did not hold it. They also in 1866 invaded Darel, one of the most secluded Dard states, to the south of the Gilgit basin but withdrew again.”

The British appointed a Political Agent in Gilgit in 1877 but he was withdrawn in 1881. “In 1889, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British Government, acting as the suzerain power of Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency”. The Agency was re-established under control of the British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir. “It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas”. In 1935, the British demanded J&K lease to them for 60 years Gilgit town plus most of the Gilgit Agency and the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkuman. Hari Singh had no choice but to acquiesce. The leased region was then treated as part of British India, administered by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi, first through the Resident in J& K and later a British Agent in Peshawar. J& K State no longer kept troops in Gilgit and a mercenary force, the Gilgit Scouts, was recruited with British officers and paid for by Delhi. In April 1947, Delhi decided to formally retrocede the leased areas to Hari Singh’s J& K State as of 15 August 1947. The transfer was to formally take place on 1 August.

On 31 July, Hari Singh’s Governor arrived to find “all the officers of the British Government had opted for service in Pakistan”. The Gilgit Scouts’ commander, a Major William Brown aged 25, and his adjutant, a Captain Mathieson, planned openly to engineer a coup détat against Hari Singh’s Government. Between August and October, Gilgit was in uneasy calm. At midnight on 31 October 1947, the Governor was surrounded by the Scouts and the next day he was “arrested” and a provisional government declared.

Hari Singh’s nearest forces were at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, a few miles downstream from where the Indus is joined by Gilgit River. The 6th J& K Infantry Battalion there was a mixed Sikh-Muslim unit, typical of the State’s Army, commanded by a Lt Col. Majid Khan. Bunji controlled the road to Srinagar. Further upstream was Skardu, capital of Baltistan, part of Laddakh District where there was a small garrison. Following Brown’s coup in Gilgit, Muslim soldiers of the 6th Infantry massacred their Sikh brothers-at-arms at Bunji. The few Sikhs who survived escaped to the hills and from there found their way to the garrison at Skardu.

On 4 November 1947, Brown raised the new Pakistani flag in the Scouts’ lines, and by the third week of November a Political Agent from Pakistan had established himself at Gilgit. Brown had engineered Gilgit and its adjoining states to first secede from J&K, and, after some talk of being independent, had promptly acceded to Pakistan. His commander in Peshawar, a Col. Bacon, as well as Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary in the new Pakistan and later to lead the first military coup détat and become President of Pakistan, were pleased enough. In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat.

Gilgit’s ordinary people had not participated in Brown’s coup which carried their fortunes into the new Pakistan, and to this day appear to remain without legislative representation. It was merely assumed that since they were mostly Muslim in number they would wish to be part of Pakistan ~ which also became Liaquat Ali Khan’s assumption about J&K State as a whole in his 1950 statements in North America. What the Gilgit case demonstrates is that J&K State’s descent into a legal condition of ownerless anarchy open to “Military Decision” had begun even before the Pakistani invasion of 22 October 1947 (viz. “Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, 1-3 December 2005). Also, whatever else the British said or did with respect to J & K, they were closely allied to the new Pakistan on the matter of Gilgit.

The peak of Pakistan’s Anglo-American alliance came with the enormous support in the 1980s to guerrilla forces created and headquartered in Peshawar, to battle the USSR and Afghan communists directly across the Durand Line. It was this guerrilla war which became a proximate cause of the collapse of the USSR as a political entity in 1991. President Ronald Reagan’s CIA chief William J. Casey sent vast sums in 1985-1988 to supply and train these guerrillas. The Washington Post and New Yorker reported the CIA training guerrillas “in the use of mortars, rocket grenades, ground-to-air missiles”. 200 hand-held Stinger missiles were supplied for the first time in 1986 and the New Yorker reported Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s “Hizbe Islami” guerrillas being trained to bring down Soviet aircraft. “Mujahideen had been promised two Stingers for every Soviet aircraft brought down. Operators who failed to aim correctly were given additional training… By 1986, the United States was so deeply involved in the Afghan war that Soviet aircraft were being brought down under the supervision of American experts”. (Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 1988, p. 234).

The budding US-China détente brokered by Pakistan came into full bloom here. NBC News on 7 January 1980 said “for the first time in history (a senior State Department official) publicly admitted the possibility of concluding a military alliance between the United States and China”. London’s Daily Telegraph reported on 5 January 1980 “China is flying large supplies of arms and ammunition to the insurgents in Afghanistan. According to diplomatic reports, supplies have arrived in Pakistan from China via the Karakoram Highway…. A major build-up of Chinese involvement is underway ~ in the past few days. Scores of Chinese instructors have arrived at the Shola-e-Javed camps.”

Afghan reports in 1983-1985 said “there were eight training camps near the Afghan border operated by the Chinese in Sinkiang province” and that China had supplied the guerrillas “with a variety of weapons including 40,000 RPG-7 and 20,000 RPG-II anti tank rocket launchers.” Like Pakistan, “China did not publicly admit its involvement in the Afghan conflict: in 1985 the Chinese Mission at the UN distributed a letter denying that China was extending any kind of help to the Afghan rebels” (Anwar, ibid. p. 234). Support extended deep and wide across the Arab world. “The Saudi and Gulf rulers … became the financial patrons of the Afghan rebels from the very start of the conflict”. Anwar Sadat, having won the Nobel Peace Prize, was “keen to claim credit for his role in Afghanistan…. by joining the Afghanistan jihad, Sadat could re-establish his Islamic credentials, or so he believed. He could thus not only please the Muslim nations but also place the USA and Israel in his debt.” Sadat’s Defence Minister said in January 1980: “Army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels; they are being supplied with weapons from Egypt” and Sadat told NBC News on 22 September 1981 “that for the last twenty-one months, the USA had been buying arms from Egypt for the Afghan rebels. He said he had been approached by the USA in December 1979 and he had decided to `open my stores’. He further disclosed that these arms were being flown to Pakistan from Egypt by American aircraft. Egypt had vast supplies of SAM-7 and RPG-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons which Sadat agreed to supply to Afghanistan in exchange for new American arms. The Soviet weapons, being light, were ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. … the Mujahideen could easily claim to have captured them from Soviet and Afghan troops in battle.… Khomeini’s Iran got embroiled in war (against Iraq) otherwise Kabul would also have had to contend with the full might of the Islamic revolutionaries.” (Anwar ibid. p. 235).

Afghanistan had been occupied on 26-27 December 1979 by Soviet forces sent by the decrepit Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov to carry out a putsch replacing one communist, Hafizullah Amin, with a rival communist and Soviet protégé, Babrak Karmal. By 1985 Brezhnev and Andropov were dead and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had begun his attempts to reform the Soviet system, usher in openness, end the Cold War and in particular withdraw from Afghanistan, which by 1986 he had termed “a bleeding wound”. Gorbachev replaced Karmal with a new protégé Najibullah Khan, who was assigned the impossible task of bringing about national reconciliation with the Pakistan-based guerrillas and form a national government. Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 having lost 14,500 dead, while more than a million Afghans had been killed since the invasion a decade earlier.

Not long after Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, Gregory Zinoviev had said that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, `Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). Now instead, the Afghan misadventure had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire itself, the USSR ceasing to be a political entity by 1991, and even Gorbachev being displaced by Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin in a new Russia.

What resulted for the people of the USA and Britain and the West in general was that they no longer had to live under threat of hostile Soviet tanks and missiles, while the people of Russia, Ukraine and the other erstwhile Soviet republics as well as Eastern Europe were able to throw off the yoke of communism that had oppressed them since the Bolshevik Revolution and instead to breathe the air of freedom.

What happened to the people of Afghanistan, however, was that they were plunged into further ghastly civil war for more than ten years. And what happened to the people of Pakistan was that their country was left resembling a gigantic Islamist military camp, awash with airfields, arms, ammunition and trained guerrillas, as well as a military establishment enlivened as always by perpetual hope that these supplies, provisions and personnel of war might find alternative use in attacks against India over J& K. “We helped you when you wished to see the Soviet Union defeated and withdrawing in Afghanistan”, Pakistan’s generals and diplomats pleaded with the Americans and British, “now you must help us in our wish to see India defeated and withdrawing in Kashmir”. Pakistan’s leaders even believed that just as the Soviet Union had disintegrated afterwards, the Indian Union perhaps might be made to do the same. Not only were the two cases as different as chalk from cheese, Palmerstone’s dictum there are no permanent allies in the politics of nations could not have found more apt use than in what actually came to take place next.

Pakistan’s generals and diplomats felt betrayed by the loss of Anglo-American paternalism towards them after 1989.

Modern Pakistanis had never felt they subscribed to the Indian nationalist movement culminating in independence in August 1947. The Pakistani state now finally declared its independence in the world by exploding bombs in a nuclear arsenal secretly created with help purchased from China and North Korea. Pakistan’s leaders thus came to feel in some control of Pakistan’s destiny as a nation-state for the first time, more than fifty years after Pakistan’s formal creation in 1947. If nothing else, at least they had the Bomb.

Secondly, America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do. In response, America attacked and removed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, once again receiving the cooperative use of Pakistani manpower and real estate ~ except now there was no longer any truck with the Pakistani establishment’s wish for a quid pro quo of Anglo-American support against India on J&K. Pakistan’s generals and diplomats soon realised their Anglo-American alliance of more than a half-century ended on September 11 2001. Their new cooperation was in killing or arresting and handing over fellow-Muslims and necessarily lacked their earlier feelings of subservience and ingratiation towards the Americans and British, and came to be done instead under at least some duress. No benefit could be reaped any more in the fight against India over Jammu & Kashmir. An era had ended in the subcontinent.

FIVE

WHAT TO TELL MUSHARRAF: PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT NON-AGGRESSIVE PAKISTANI INTENTIONS by Subroto Roy, First published in The Statesman December 15 2006 Editorial Page Special Article, www.thestatesman.net

In June 1989 a project at an American university involving Pakistani and other scholars, including one Indian, led to the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s published in Karachi, New Delhi and elsewhere. The book reached Nawaz Sharif and the Islamabad elite, and General Musharraf’s current proposal on J&K, endorsed warmly by the US State Department last week, derives from the last paragraph of its editorial introduction: “Kashmir… must be demilitarised and unified by both countries sooner or later, and it must be done without force. There has been enough needless bloodshed on the subcontinent… Modern Pakistanis and Indians are free peoples who can voluntarily agree in their own interests to alter the terms set hurriedly by Attlee or Mountbatten in the Indian Independence Act 1947. Nobody but we ourselves keeps us prisoners of superficial definitions of who we are or might be. The subcontinent could evolve its political identity over a period of time on the pattern of Western Europe, with open borders and (common) tariffs to the outside world, with the free movement of people, capital, ideas and culture. Large armed forces could be reduced and transformed in a manner that would enhance the security of each nation. The real and peaceful economic revolution of the masses of the subcontinent would then be able to begin.”

The editors as economists decried the waste of resources involved in the Pakistan-India confrontation, saying it had “greatly impoverished the general budgets of both Pakistan and India. If it has benefited important sections of the political and military elites of both countries, it has done so only at the expense of the general welfare of the masses.”

International law

Such words may have been bold in the early 1990s but today, a decade and a half later, they seem incomplete and rather naïve even to their author, who was myself, the only Indian in that project. Most significantly, the position in international law in the context of historical facts had been wholly neglected. So had been the manifest nature of the contemporary Pakistani state.

Jammu & Kashmir became an entity in international law when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh and the British on March 16 1846. British India itself became an entity in international law much later, possibly as late as June 1919 when it signed the Treaty of Versailles. As for Pakistan, it had no existence in world history or international law until August 14 1947, when the British created it as a new entity out of certain demarcated areas of British India and gave it the status of a Dominion. British India dissolved itself on August 15 1947 and the Dominion of India became its successor-state in international law on that date. As BR Ambedkar pointed out at the time, the new India automatically inherited British India’s suzerainty over any and all remaining “princely” states of so-called “Indian India”. In case of J&K in particular, there never was any question of it being recognised as an independent entity in global international law.

The new Pakistan, by entering a Standstill Agreement with J&K as of August 15 1947, did locally recognise J&K’s sovereignty over its decision whether to join Pakistan or India. But this Pakistani recognition lasted only until the attack on J&K that commenced from Pakistani territory as of October 22 1947, an attack in which Pakistani forces were complicit (something which, in different and mutating senses, has continued ever since). The Dominion of India had indicated it might have consented if J&K’s Ruler had decided to accede to Pakistan in the weeks following the dissolution of British India. But no such thing happened: what did happen was the descent of J&K into a condition of legal anarchy.

Beginning with the Pakistani attack on J&K as of October 22 upto and including the Rape of Baramulla and the British-led Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on one side, and the arrival of Indian forces as well as mobilization by Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad of J&K’s civilians to repel the Pakistani invaders on the other side, the State of Jammu & Kashmir became an ownerless entity in international law. In Roman Law, from which all modern international and municipal law ultimately derives, the ownership of an ownerless entity is open to be determined by “military decision”. The January 1949 Ceasefire Line that came to be renamed the Line of Control after the 1971 Bangladesh War, demarcates the respective territories that the then-Dominions and later Republics of India and Pakistan acquired by “military decision” of the erstwhile State of J&K which had come to cease to exist.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. It is only sheer ignorance on the part of General Musharraf’s Indian interviewer the other day which caused it to be said that Pakistan was willing to “give up” its claim on erstwhile J&K State territory which India has held: Pakistan has never had nor even made such a claim in international law. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~ forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area.

Accordingly, the lawful solution proposed in these pages a year ago to resolve that matter, serious as it is, has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under Article 370, citizen-by- citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self- appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

Military de-escalation

Equally significant though in assessing whether General Musharraf’s proposal is an anachronism, is Pakistan’s history since 1947: through Ayub’s 1965 attack, the civil war and secession of Bangladesh, the Afghan war and growth of the ISI, the Kargil incursion, the 1999 coup détat, and, once or twice removed, the 9/11 attacks against America. It is not a history that allows any confidence to arise in Indians that we are not dealing with a country misgoverned by a tiny arrogant exploitative military elite who remain hell-bent on aggression against us. Like the USA and USSR twenty years ago, what we need to negotiate about, and negotiate hard about, is an overall mutual military drawdown and de-escalation appropriate to lack of aggressive intent on both sides. Is General Musharraf willing to discuss that? It would involve reciprocal verifiable assessment of one another’s reasonable military requirements on the assumption that each was not a threatening enemy of the other. That was how the USA-USSR drawdown and de-escalation occurred successfully. If General Musharraf is unwilling to enter such a discussion, there is hardly anything to talk about with him. We should wait for democracy to return.

SIX

“AN INDIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT ZARDARI: REWARDING PAKISTAN FOR BAD BEHAVIOUR LEADS TO SCHIZOPHRENIC RELATIONSHIPS”

by Subroto Roy, December 17 2008

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani. Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

1. Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”. It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”. British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none. (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent. Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan. Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.) Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be. The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919. India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions. An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN. Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today. Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later. The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision. It succeeded only partially. Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949. After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India. The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947. Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts a fight does not get to finish it.

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem. The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan. This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law. BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India. It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~ forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

2. Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres
Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago. Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s. Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war. Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces. Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists. President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general. Rather, it serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

3. Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

This may be overly simplistic. As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”, Gregory Zinoviev himself after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism. Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback! The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own. Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over. Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

4. Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc – President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals, whether in thought, word or deed. Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships. (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory, an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons
“We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use
“We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India
“We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
“We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them
“We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way
“We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan
“We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies
“We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works
“We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past
“We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks
“We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks
“We do not harbour any terrorists
“We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons
“We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country
“We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons
“We hate India and do not want to become like India
“We love India and want to become like India
“We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere
“We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives
“We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems
“We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up
“We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.”

Posted in Academic economics, Academic research, Asia and the West, asymmetric information, Britain in India, Dogras, Economic Theory, Freedom, Governance, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, Imperialism, India's Constitution, India's Democracy, India's Diplomacy, India's Jurisprudence, India's Muslims, India's Partition, India's Polity, India's Rule of Law, India's secularism, India's Union-State relations, India-Pakistan peace process, International diplomacy, International Law, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Law, Liberalism/Libertarianism, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's origins, Pakistan's psychology, Pakistan's military, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism, Pervez Musharraf, Political legitimacy, Political Philosophy, Political Science, Regional cooperation, Roman Law, Secular governance, Secularism in practice, Sheikh Abdullah, Sikhs, Sunnis and Shias, War, World History, Zafrullah Khan, Zainulabidin. Leave a Comment »

Comment on Mr Clemons’ note on the Pakistan military after the Rawalpindi attack

October 12, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

From Facebook:

Mr Clemons has made interesting and astute observations on Pakistan’s military following the Rawalpindi attack of the last few days.

But some political history is important. Pakistan’s military between 1947 and 1971 had built up an illusion that it could, with help from Patton tanks and Sabre jets and Starfighters, defeat India (one Pakistani is equivalent to 9 Indians etc etc).

In Dec 1971, despite the machinations of Nixon and Kissinger with the Pakistani strongman Yahya Khan, a free Bangladesh came to be born from the old colonized East Pakistan. 90,000 Pakistani POWS languished in Indian camps for more than a year (after being protected by India from Bangladeshi revenge).

The debacle led to some candid soul-searching and the official Pakistani inquiry commission squarely blamed debauchery and corruption in the Army from Yahya Khan downwards for bad generalship. Bangladesh seceded from West Pakistan essentially because of internal political contradictions, e.g. the imposition of Urdu on Bengali-speakers etc. Certainly Indian military help proved vital at the end but India did not cause the secession. (I was personally helping at a refugee camp as a schoolboy volunteer, when Ted Kennedy flew in to visit etc… stories for another time).

The Pakistan military has maintained a self-delusion that India caused the break-up of the original Pakistan and that India harbours similar designs to this day. India neither does nor has the capacity or motivation to do so.

The second factor was that Zia, who succeeded Yahya as military strongman and US ally, brought in Islamisation of the officer-corps as a counterweight to the trends of debauchery and corruption. These might be two crucial subjects for discussion if US discussants decide to go on a reflective retreat with Pakistan’s top military brass.

Posted in Bangladesh, India's military doctrine, India's Army, India's Bangladesh liberation war, India's Military Defence, India-Pakistan peace process, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's history, Pakistan's military, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism, War, World History. Leave a Comment »

Seventy Years Today Since the British Government Politically Empowered MA Jinnah (2009)

September 4, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

Seventy Years Today Since the British Government Politically Empowered MA Jinnah

by

Subroto Roy

The bloated armies of Indian and Pakistani historians and pseudo-historians have failed to recognize the significance of the precise start of the Second World War upon the fortunes of the subcontinent. Yet, twenty years ago, in the book I and WE James created at an American university, Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (now in pdf), one of our authors, Professor Francis Robinson of the University of London, had set out the principal facts most clearly as to what flowed from the September 4 1939 empowerment of MA Jinnah by the British Government.

Germany invaded Poland on September 1 1939 and Britain declared war on Germany on September 3. The next day, Linlithgow, the British Viceroy in India, started to treat MA Jinnah’s Muslim League on par with the Congress’s nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. Until September 4 1939, the British “had had little time for Jinnah and his League. The Government’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September, however, transformed the situation. A large part of the army was Muslim, much of the war effort was likely to rest on the two Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The following day, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks on an equal footing with Gandhi” (Robinson, in James & Roy (eds) Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy 1989, 1992).

Jinnah himself was amazed by the new British attitude towards him: “suddenly there was a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi.”

Jinnah’s political weakness had been made obvious by the electoral defeats the Muslim League had suffered in the 1937 elections in the very provinces which more or less came to constitute West Pakistan and today constitute modern Pakistan. Britain, at war with Germany and soon Japan, was faced with the intransigence of the Congress leadership. It was unsurprising this would contribute to the British tilt empowering Congress’s declared adversary, Jinnah and the Muslim League, and hence make credible the possibility of the Pakistan that they had demanded:

“As the Congress began to demand immediate independence, the Viceroy took to reassuring Jinnah that Muslim interests would be safeguarded in any constitutional change. Within a few months, he was urging the League to declare a constructive policy for the future, which was of course presented in the Lahore Resolution. In their August 1940 offer, the British confirmed for the benefit of Muslims that power would not be transferred against the will of any significant element in Indian life. And much the same confirmation was given in the Cripps offer nearly two years later…. Throughout the years 1940 to 1945, the British made no attempt to tease out the contradictions between the League’s two-nation theory, which asserted that Hindus and Muslims came from two different civilisations and therefore were two different nations, and the Lahore Resolution, which demanded that ‘Independent States’ should be constituted from the Muslim majority provinces of the NE and NW, thereby suggesting that Indian Muslims formed not just one nation but two. When in 1944 the governors of Punjab and Bengal urged such a move on the Viceroy, Wavell ignored them, pressing ahead instead with his own plan for an all-India conference at Simla. The result was to confirm, as never before in the eyes of leading Muslims in the majority provinces, the standing of Jinnah and the League. Thus, because the British found it convenient to take the League seriously, everyone had to as well—Congressmen, Unionists, Bengalis, and so on….”(Robinson in James & Roy (eds) Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, pp. 43-44).

Even British socialists who were sympathetic to Indian aspirations, would grow cold when the Congress seemed to abjectly fail to appreciate Britain’s predicament during war with Germany and Japan (Gandhi, for example, dismissing the 1942 Cripps offer as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank”).

By the 1946 elections, Muslim mass opinion had changed drastically to seem to be strongly in favour of the creation of a Pakistan. The intervening years were the ones when urban mobs all over India could be found shouting the League’s slogans: “Larke lenge Pakistan; Marke lenge Pakistan, Khun se lenge Pakistan; Dena hoga Pakistan; Leke rahenge Pakistan” (We will spill blood to take Pakistan, you will have to yield a Pakistan.)

Events remote from India’s history and geography, namely, the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, had contributed between 1937 and 1947 to the change of fortunes of the Muslim League and hence of all the people of the subcontinent.

The British had long discovered that the mutual antipathy between Muslims and Hindus could be utilised in fashioning their rule; specifically that the organisation and mobilisation of Muslim communal opinion in the subcontinent was a useful counterweight to any pan-Indian nationalism which might emerge to compete with British authority. As early as 1874, well before Allan Octavian Hume, ICS, had conceived the Indian National Congress, John Strachey, ICS, was to observe “The existence side by side of these (Hindu and Muslim) hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are a source of strength to us and not of weakness. They constitute a comparatively small but an energetic minority of the population whose political interests are identical with ours.” By 1906, when a deputation of Muslims headed by the Aga Khan first approached the British pleading for communal representation, Minto the Viceroy replied: “I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement, regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this Continent.” Minto’s wife wrote in her diary that the effect was “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty two millions of (Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” (The true significance of MAK Azad may have been that he, precisely at the same time, did indeed feel within himself the nationalist’s desire for freedom strongly enough to want to join the ranks of that seditious opposition.)

If a pattern emerges as to the nature of the behaviour of the British political state with respect to the peoples of this or similar regions, it is precisely the economic one of rewarding those loyal to them who had protected or advanced their interests, and penalising those perceived to be acting against their will. It is wishful to think of members of the British political state as benevolent paternalists, who met with matching deeds their often philanthropic words about promoting the general welfare of their colonial wards or subordinate allies. The slogan “If you are not with us you are against us” that has come to be used by many from the Shining Path Maoists of Peru to President George W. Bush, had been widely applied already by the British in India, especially in the form “If you dare not to be with us, we will be certainly with your adversaries”. It came to be used with greatest impact on the subcontinent’s fortunes in 1939 when Britain found itself reluctantly at war with Hitler’s Germany.

British loyalties lay with those who had been loyal to them.

Hence in the “Indian India” of the puppet princes, Hari Singh and other “Native Princes” who had sent troops to fight as part of the British armies would be treated with a pusillanimity and grandeur so as to flatter their vanities, Sheikh Abdullah’s rebellion representing the Muslim masses of the Kashmir Valley would be ignored. And in British India, Jinnah the conservative Anglophile and his elitist Muslim League would be backed, while the radicalised masses of the Gandhi-Bose-Nehru Congress would have to be suppressed as a nuisance.

(Similarly, much later, Pakistan’s bemedalled army generals would be backed by the United States against Mujibur Rehman’s impoverished student-rebels, and India’s support frowned upon regardless of how just the Bangladeshi cause.)

Altruism is a limited quality in all human affairs, never more scarce than in relations between nations. In “Pakistan’s Allies”, I showed how the strategic interests of Britain, and later Britain’s American ally, came to evolve in the Northwest of the subcontinent ever since the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar as long as a Russian and later a Soviet empire had existed. A similar evolution of British domestic interests in India is distinctly observable in British support for the Pakistan Movement itself, leading on August 14 1947 to the creation of the new Dominion of Pakistan.

Sheikh Abdullah’s democratic urges or Nehru’s Indian nationalism or the general welfare of the subcontinent’s people had no appeal as such to the small and brittle administrative machinery in charge of Britain’s Indian Empire — even though individual Britons had come to love, understand and explain India for the permanent benefit of her people. This may help to explain how Britain’s own long democratic traditions at home could often be found so wonderful by Indians yet the actions of the British state abroad so incongruent with them.

Posted in Bangladesh, Britain, Britain in India, British foreign policy, British history, British imperialism, British military doctrine and traditions, Democracy, European history, European politics, FCR Robinson, Freedom, Germany, Governance, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, Hitler, Imperialism, India's religions, India's Bangladesh liberation war, India's History, India's independence, India's Nationalism, India's Partition, India's secularism, India-Pakistan peace process, Indian National Congress Origins, International diplomacy, International Law, International politics, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Jawaharlal Nehru, Liberalism/Libertarianism, Life and death, MA Jinnah, Maulana Azad, Military doctrine, MK Gandhi, Mujibur Rahman, Muslim and Hindu communalism, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's origins, Pakistan's history, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Poland, Serendipity and international relations, Sheikh Abdullah, University of Hawaii, US Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Espionage, US Pakistan policy, War, World History, World War. 7 Comments »

On the curious pre-9/11 quaintness of current criticism of India’s 1998 nuclear tests

August 28, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

I said towards the end of my June 4-5 2006 article in The Statesman “Pakistan’s Allies”

“…America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do….”

Earlier, in The Statesman of October 26 2005, I had outlined a series of recent US espionage failures

“There have been three or four enormous failures of American espionage (i.e. intelligence and counter-intelligence) in the last 20 years. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet communism were salubrious events but they had not been foreseen by the United States which was caught unawares by the speed and nature of the developments that took place. Other failures have been catastrophic.

First, there was the failure to prevent the attack that took place on the American mainland on September 11 2001. It killed several thousand civilians and caused vast, perhaps irreparable, psychological and physical destruction to the United States. The attack was without precedent. The December 7 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, though a surprise, was carried out by one military against another military and did not affect very many civilians (except that thousands of American civilians of Japanese ancestry came to be persecuted and placed in concentration camps for years by the US Government). And the last time the American mainland had been attacked before 2001 was in 1814 when British troops marched south from Canada and burnt down the Capitol and the US President’s house in Washington.

Secondly, there has been a failure to discover any reasonable justification for the American-led attack on Iraq and its invasion and occupation. Without any doubt, America has lost, at the very least, an incalculable amount of international goodwill as a result of this, let aside suffering two thousand young soldiers killed, fifteen thousand wounded, and an unending cost in terms of prestige and resources in return for the thinnest of tangible gains. India at great cost liberated East Pakistan from the brutal military tyranny of Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan in December 1971 but the average Bangladeshi today could hardly care less. Regardless of what form of government emerges in Iraq now, there is no doubt the mass of the Iraqi people will cheer the departure of the bulk of foreign troops and tanks from their country (even if a permanent set of a dozen hermetically sealed American bases remain there for ever, as appears to have been planned).

When things go wrong in any democracy, it is natural and healthy to set up a committee to investigate, and America has done that several times now. For such committees to have any use at all they must be as candid as possible and perhaps the most candid of the American committees has been the US Government’s 9/11 Commission. But it too has appeared no closer to finding out who was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks or who financed it and who, precisely, executed it. Osama Bin Laden may have been the ideological head of a movement allied to the perpetrators, and Bin Laden undoubtedly expressed his glee afterwards, but it beggars the imagination that Bin Laden could have been executive president in charge of this operation while crawling around Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If not him, then whom? Mossad the Israeli spy agency was supposed to have pointed to a super-secret invisible Lebanese terrorist but nobody really knows. The biggest modern mass murder remains unsolved.

As for solutions, the American 9/11 Commission went into the same politically correct formulae that came to be followed in 2005 by British PM Tony Blair’s New Labour Cabinet, namely, that “moderate” peace-loving Muslims must be encouraged and bribed not to turn to terrorism (indeed to expose those among them who do), while “extremist” Muslims must be stamped out with brute force. This rests on a mistaken premise that an economic carrot-and-stick policy can work in creating a set of external incentives and disincentives for Muslims, when in fact believing Muslims, like many other religious believers, are people who feel the power of their religion deep within themselves and so are unlikely to be significantly affected by external incentives or disincentives offered by non-believers. Another committee has been the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence which reported in July 2004, and from whose findings have stemmed as an offshoot the current matter about whether high government officials broke the law that is being investigated by Special Prosecutor Patrick J. Fitzgerald.

Bertrand Russell said in his obituary of Ludwig Wittgenstein that he had once gone about looking under all the tables and chairs to prove to Wittgenstein that there was not a hippopotamus present in the room. In the present case, however, there is in fact a very large hippopotamus present in the room yet the entire American foreign policy establishment has seemed to refuse to wish to see it. Saddam Hussain and OBL are undoubtedly certifiable members of the international gallery of rogues – but the central fact remains they were rogues who were in alliance with America’s defined strategic interests in the 1980s. Saddam Hussain’s Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and gassed the Kurds in 1986; an Iraqi Mirage on May 17 1987 fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark killing 37 American sailors and injuring 21. The Americans did nothing. The reason was that Saddam was still in favour at the time and had not yet become a demon in the political mythology of the American state, and it was expedient for nothing to be done. Indeed Saddam’s Iraq was explicitly removed in 1982 from the US Government’s list of states sponsoring terrorism because, according to the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, it had “moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbours”.

The very large hippopotamus that is present in the room at the moment is April Glaspie, the highly regarded professional career diplomat and American Ambassador to Iraq at the time of the 1990 Gulf War. Saddam Hussein as President had a famous meeting with her on July 25 1990, eight days before he invaded Kuwait. The place was the Presidential Palace in Baghdad and the Iraqis videotaped the meeting:

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – “I have direct instructions from President (George Herbert Walker) Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship – not confrontation – regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?

Saddam Hussein – As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.

U. S. Ambassador Glaspie – What solutions would be acceptable?

Saddam Hussein – If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab – our strategic goal in our war with Iran – we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam’ s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States’ opinion on this?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – We have no opinion on your Arab – Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960’s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)

Saddam had seen himself fighting Islamic Iran on behalf of the Kuwaitis, Saudis and other Arabs, and Islamic Iran was of course the sworn adversary of the USA at least since Khomeini had deposed America’s ally, the Shah. Therefore Saddam could not be all bad in the eyes of the State Department. On August 2 1990, the Iraqi troops seen by American satellites amassed on the border, invaded and occupied Kuwait. On September 2 1990, the Iraqis released the videotape and transcript of the July 29 Saddam-Glaspie meeting and Glaspie was confronted by British journalists as she left the Embassy:

Journalist 1 – Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador? (No answer from Glaspie)

Journalist 2 – You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn’t warn him not to. You didn’t tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite – that America was not associated with Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You encouraged this aggression – his invasion. What were you thinking?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – Obviously, I didn’t think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed , he would give up his Iran(Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as a historic part of their country!

Journalist 1 – America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signalling Saddam that some aggression was okay – that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) – the territories claimed by Iraq?

Glaspie said nothing, the car door closed behind her, the car drove off. Nothing has been apparently heard from Glaspie ever since, and we may have to wait for her memoirs in 25 years when they are declassified to come to know what happened. It is astonishing, however, that the 521 page report of the US Senate’s Select Committee on espionage about Iraq before the 2003 war finds no cause whatsoever to mention Glaspie at all (at least in its public censored version). It is almost as if Glaspie has never existed and her conversation with Saddam never happened. Glaspie has disappeared down an Orwellian memory-hole. Yet her conversation with Saddam was the last official, recorded conversation between the Americans and Saddam while they were still on friendly terms.

There may be many causes explaining how such serious failures have come to occur in a country where billions of dollars have been annually spent on espionage. Among them must be that while America’s great strengths have included creation of the finest advanced scientific and technological base on earth, America’s great intellectual weaknesses in recent decades have included an impatience with historical and philosophical reflection of all sorts, and that includes reflection about her own as well as other cultures. This is exemplified too in the third palpable failure of intelligence of the last 20 years, which has been to have not foreseen or prevented atomic weapons from being developed by America and Britain’s Islamist ally and client-state, Pakistan, and thence to have failed to prevent the proliferation of such weapons in general. The consequences of that may yet turn out to be the most grave.”

Now as it happens, a couple of days ago, eleven years after the Government of India’s May 1998 underground nuclear tests at Pokhran, an Indian scientist who had something to do with them has engaged in a general discussion about the tests’ efficacy. Indian newspapers duly reported this as part of an ongoing domestic discussion about nuclear policy.

Oddly enough, there has been an instantaneous reaction from American critics of India’s nuclear activities – beginning with Dr Jeffrey Lewis:

“Yes, Virginia, India’s H-bomb fizzled. K Santhanam (who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests… has admitted what everyone else has known for a long time — that India’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was unsuccessful.…”

Followed by Mark Hibbs:

“Is this cool or what? I remember what happened when I wrote that article in the fall of 1998 saying in the headline that the US had concluded that the Indian “H-Bomb failed.” Almost overnight after the article was published I got a huge bundle of papers from BARC and DAE sent to me by diplomatic pouch from Mumbai informing me with all kinds of numbers that I was wrong. I gave the papers to laboratory geoscientists at several European countries and the US. One main CTBTO monitoring scientist told me explicitly: “Nope. The stuff in these papers is shitty science. They haven’t shown that you are wrong.” That having been said, please note however that, as PK Iyengar had made the case to me back a decade ago, once again this “news” is surfacing in India because their bomb makers want to keep testing. Some things in India are changing fast. Other things aren’t.”

Followed by Charles Mead:

“I got into a huge pissing match with the Indians on this issue as I was the principal author of Barker et. al. 1998 which had the yield estimates far below the Indian press releases. A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published. On a related note, I saw the other day that wikipedia has a glowing description of the Indian 1998 tests, citing the inflated yields and saying the tests were a huge technical accomplishment. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokhran-II In the next day or so, I plan to submit a corrected analysis.”

Mark Hibbs:

“Charles, I recall one of your co-authors back then explained to me in nitty-gritty detail your frustration on this with these guys. Please do correct the record for posterity.”

Charles Meade:

“Their arguments at the time were quite remarkable. They said that our seismic data didn’t reflect the true yield because of a complex interference pattern caused by the simultaneous tests. Under these circumstances, they said that one could only obtain the correct yield from near field data. We said, “fine, show it to us”. They refused and that was the end of their paper.”

Yale Simkin:

“The Indian argument: ‘For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons.’ is a lot of hooey. They claim to be building a deterrent force, not a war-fighting arsenal with a counter-force capability. For the size and mass of their likely early-generation fusion designs, they can instead use basic fission bombs yielding in the multi-dekakiloton range – multiples of the hell weapons that incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That should be sufficient to deter any rational adversary. And if they aren’t rational, then you have no deterrent.”

Hmmm. The choice of terminology even within such a brief discussion might reveal a little of the mind-set: “shitty science”, “pissing match”, “a lot of hooey”…

Rather uncool, really.

Specifically:

“A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published…. Their arguments at the time were quite remarkable. They said that our seismic data didn’t reflect the true yield because of a complex interference pattern caused by the simultaneous tests. Under these circumstances, they said that one could only obtain the correct yield from near field data. We said, “fine, show it to us”. They refused and that was the end of their paper.

Hmmm — once more. The words that I have placed in bold above might be prima facie evidence of incorrect and hence unfair editorial procedures having been followed at Science (distinguished as its general reputation may be as a journal). Why were these here-unnamed “Indian scientists” not allowed to speak for themselves, rather than have their now-unknown statements be bowdlerised out of their critics’ memories a decade later (when these critics themselves had been the subject of the rebuttal)? Perhaps the rebuttal should not have been refused publication even if it came with an editorial caveat that all the data deemed necessary had not been provided (which may have been the case, for example, due to a Government gag-order). Readers today would have been able to judge for themselves.

I am happy to claim zero expertise in the field known rather sweetly as “Crater Morphology”; but post 9/11, post-Iraq war, it does seem to me a rather quaint form of prejudice to be using such words as those quoted above in discussing the precise tonnage of the Indian explosions and how, really, India’s scientists were not up to it. Perhaps, when matters of public policy or international diplomacy become involved, science everywhere is too important to be left to the scientists.

Are all the available data out there in the public domain on which to judge whether the Indian explosions in 1998 were or were not what was precisely claimed at the time? Apparently not.

Does it matter to anything today? Hardly. Not even to the credibility of the Government of India (something on which I have had a lot to say over decades).

Do Governments lie? Yes Virginia, they do.

Governments the world over, whether Indian, American, Russian, Chinese, British, French, Israeli, Arab, Pakistani or whatever, let aside inter-Governmental bodies constituted by these Governments, are prone to exaggeration, propaganda, self-delusion, self-deception as well as deliberate mendacity, perhaps routinely on a daily basis.

(For myself as an individual, I have had to battle the demonstrated and deliberate mendacity of the government of one of the fifty States in the US federal courts for two decades now, as told of elsewhere…)

An Age of Government Mendacity has seemed to descend upon the world — which makes the smugness expressed so quickly today by the critics of India’s 1998 explosions seem, as I have said, quaint.

Is the current Indian debate indicating something about keeping open the possibility of more tests and isn’t this related to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal? It may well be, I do not know. My position for what it is worth has been clear and described in several articles in The Statesman in recent years e.g.

1) Atoms for Peace (or War) (March 5 2006)

“Atoms for Peace” was Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 speech to the UN (presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru’s sister) from which arose the IAEA. Eisenhower was the warrior par excellence, having led the Allies to victory over Hitler a few years earlier.

Yet he was the first to see “no sane member of the human race” can discover victory in the “desolation, degradation and destruction” of nuclear war. “Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the ‘great destroyers’, but the whole book of history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for peace and mankind’s God-given capacity to build.” Speaking of the atomic capacity of America’s communist adversary at the time, he said: “We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.” Rather, “if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind…. if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material… this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage”. Eisenhower’s IAEA would receive contributions from national “stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials”, and also impound, store and protect these and devise “methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.…to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world… to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.” When Eisenhower visited India he was greeted as the “Prince of Peace” and a vast multitude threw rose petals as he drove by in an open limousine.

Now, half a century later, Dr Manmohan Singh read a speech in Parliament on February 27 relating to our nuclear discussions with America. But it seems unclear even his speech-writers or technical advisers knew how far it was rhetoric and how far grounded in factual realities. There is also tremendous naivete among India’s media anchors and political leaders as to what exactly has been agreed by the Americans on March 2.

Churchill once asked what might have happened if Lloyd George and Clemenceau told Woodrow Wilson: “Is it not true that nothing but your fixed and expiring tenure of office prevents you from being thrown out of power?” The same holds for George W. Bush today. Wilson made many promises to the world that came to be hit for a six by US legislators. In December 2005, Edward Markey (Democrat) and Fred Upton (Republican) promised to scuttle Bush’s agreements with India, and once the pleasant memories of his India visit fade, Bush may quite easily forget most things about us. All the Americans have actually agreed to do is to keep talking.

It needs to be understood that submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the only ultimate military deterrent. Land and air forces are all vulnerable to a massive first-strike. Only submarines lurking silently for long periods in waters near their target, to launch nuclear warheads upon learning their homeland had been hit by the enemy, act as a deterrent preventing that same enemy from making his attack at all. Indeed, the problem becomes how a submarine commander will receive such information and his instructions during such a war. (For India to acquire an ICBM capability beyond the MRBM Agni rockets is to possess an expensive backward technology — as retrograde as the idea India should spend scarce resources sending manned moon missions half a century after it has already been done. The secret is to do something new and beneficial for mankind, not repeat what others did long ago merely to show we can now do it too.) A nuclear-armed submarine needs to be submerged for long periods and also voyage long distances at sea, and hence needs to be nuclear-powered with a miniature version of a civilian nuclear reactor aboard in which, e.g. rods of enriched uranium are bombarded to release enough energy to run hydroelectric turbines to generate power. Patently, no complete separation of the use of atomic power for peace and war may be practically possible. If India creates e.g. its own thorium reactors for civilian power (and we have vast thorium reserves, the nuclear fuel of the future), and then miniaturised these somehow to manufacture reactors for submarines, the use would be both civilian and military. In 1988 the old USSR leased India a nuclear-powered submarine for “training” purposes, and the Americans did not like it at all. In January 2002, Russia’s Naval Chief announced India was paying to build and then lease from 2004 until 2009 two nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarines, and Jaswant Singh reportedly said we were paying $1 thousand crore ($10 bn) for such a defence package. Whether the transaction has happened is not known. Once we have nuclear submarines permanently, that would be more than enough of the minimum deterrent sought.

Indeed, India’s public has been barely informed of civilian nuclear energy policy as well, and an opportunity now exists for a mature national debate to take place — both on what and why the military planning has been and what it costs (and whether any bribes have been paid), and also on the cost, efficiency and safety of the plans for greater civilian use of nuclear energy. Government behaviour after the Bhopal gas tragedy does not inspire confidence about Indian responses to a Three Mile Island/Chernobyl kind of catastrophic meltdown.

That being said, the central question remains why India or anyone else needs to be nuclear-armed at all. With Britain, France or Russia, there is no war though all three are always keen to sell India weapons. Indeed it has been a perennial question why France and Britain need their own deterrents. They have not fought one another for more than 100 years and play rugby instead. If Russia was an enemy, could they not count on America? Or could America itself conceivably become an enemy of Britain and France? America owes her origins to both, and though the Americans did fight the British until the early 1800s, they have never fought the French and love the City of Paris too much ever to do so.

Between China and India, regardless of what happened half a century ago, nuclear or any war other than border skirmishes in sparse barren lands is unlikely. Ever since Sun Yat-sen, China has been going through a complex process of self-discovery and self-definition. An ancient nation where Maoism despoiled the traditional culture and destroyed Tibet, China causes others to fear it because of its inscrutability. But it has not been aggressive in recent decades except with Taiwan. It has threatened nuclear war on America if the Americans stand up for Taiwan, but that is not a quarrel in which India has a cogent role. China (for seemingly commercial reasons) did join hands with Pakistan against India, but there is every indication the Chinese are quite bored with what Pakistan has become. With Pakistan, our situation is well-known, and there has been an implicit equilibrium since Pokhran II finally flushed out their capacity. Had India ever any ambition of using conventional war to knock out and occupy Pakistan as a country? Of course not. We are barely able to govern ourselves, let aside try to rule an ideologically hostile Muslim colony in the NorthWest. Pakistan’s purported reasons for acquiring nuclear bombs are spurious, and cruelly so in view of the abject failures of Pakistan’s domestic political economy. Could Pakistan’s Government use its bombs against India arising from its own self-delusions over J&K? Gohar Ayub Khan in 1998-1999 threatened to do so when he said the next war would be over in two hours with an Indian surrender. He thereby became the exception to Eisenhower’s rule requiring sanity. An India-Pakistan nuclear exchange is, unfortunately, not impossible, leaving J&K as Hell where Jahangir had once described it as Heaven on Earth.

America needs to end her recent jingoism and instead rediscover the legacy of Eisenhower. America can lead everyone in the world today including Russia, China, Israel, Iran and North Korea. But she can do so only by example. America can decommission many of her own nuclear weapons and then lead everyone else to the conference table to do at least some of the same. Like the UN, the IAEA (and its NPT) needs urgent reform itself. It is the right time for serious and new world parleys towards the safe use of atoms for peace and their abolition in war. But are there any Eisenhowers or Churchills to lead them?

2) Our energy interests ( Aug 27-28 2006)

Americans are shrewd and practical people in commercial matters, and expect the same of people they do business with. Caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware”, is the motto they expect those on the other side of the table to be using. Let us not think they are doing us favours in the nuclear deal ~ they are grown-ups looking after their interests and naturally expect we shall look after our own and not expect charity while doing business. Equally, let us not blame the Americans if we find in later years (long after Manmohan Singh and Montek Ahluwalia have exited from India’s stage) that the deal has been implemented in a bad way for our masses of ordinary people.

That said, there is a remarkable disjoint between India’s national energy interests (nuclear interests in particular), and the manner in which the nuclear deal is being perceived and taken to implementation by the two sides. There may be a fundamental gap between the genuine positive benefits the Government of India says the deal contains, and the motivations American businessmen and through them Indian businessmen have had for lobbying American and Indian politicians to support it. An atmosphere of being at cross-purposes has been created, where for example Manmohan Singh is giving answers to questions different from the questions we may want to be asking Montek Ahluwalia. The fundamental gap between what is being said by our Government and what may be intended by the businessmen is something anyone can grasp, though first we shall need some elementary facts.

In 2004, the International Energy Agency estimated the new energy capacity required by rising economic growth in 2020 will derive 1400 GW from burning coal (half of it in China and India), 470 GW from burning oil, 430GW from hydro, and 400 GW from renewable sources like solar or wind power. Because gas prices are expected to remain low worldwide, construction of new nuclear reactors for electricity will be unprofitable. By 2030, new energy expected to be required worldwide is 4700GW, of which only 150GW is expected from new nuclear plants, which will be in any case replacing existing plants due to be retired. Rational choice between different energy sources depends on costs determined by history and geography. Out of some 441 civilian reactors worldwide, France has 59 and these generate 78 per cent of its electricity, the rest coming from hydro. Japan has 54 reactors, generating 34% of its electricity from them. The USA has 104 reactors but generates only 20 per cent of its electricity from them, given its vast alternative sources of power like hydro. In India as of 2003, installed power generating capacity was 107,533.3MW, of which 71 per cent came from burning fuels. Among India’s energy sources, the largest growth-potential is hydroelectric, which does not involve burning fuels ~ gravity moves water from the mountains to the oceans, and this force is harnessed for generation. Our hydro potential, mostly in the North and North-East, is some 150,000MW but our total installed hydro capacity with utilities was only 26,910MW (about 18 per cent of potential). Our 14 civilian nuclear reactors produced merely 4 per cent or less of the electricity being consumed in the country. Those 14 plants will come under “international safeguards” by 2014 under the nuclear deal.

It is extremely likely the international restrictions our existing nuclear plants have been under since the 1970s have hindered if not crippled their functioning and efficiency. At the same time, the restrictions may have caused us to be innovative too. Nuclear power arises from fission of radioactive uranium, plutonium or thorium. India has some 8 million tonnes of monazite deposits along the seacoast of which half may be mined, to yield 225,000 tonnes of thorium metal; we have one innovatively designed thorium reactor under construction. Almost all nuclear energy worldwide today arises from uranium of which there are practically unlimited reserves. Fission of a uranium atom produces 10 million times the energy produced by combustion of an atom of carbon from coal. Gas and fossil fuels may be cheap and in plentiful supply worldwide for generations to come but potential for cheap nuclear energy seems practically infinite. The uranium in seawater can satisfy mankind’s total electricity needs for 7 million years. There is more energy in the uranium impurity present in coal than can arise from actually burning the coal. There is plenty of uranium in granite. None of these become profitable for centuries because there is so much cheap uranium extractable from conventional ores. Design improvements in reactors will also improve productivity; e.g. “fast breeder” reactors “breed” more fissile material than they use, and may get 100 times as much energy from a kilogram of uranium as existing reactors do. India has about 95,000 tonnes of uranium metal that may be mined to yield about 61,000 tonnes net for power generation. Natural uranium is 99.3 per cent of the U-238 isotope and 0.7 per cent of the radioactive U-235 isotope. Nuclear power generation requires “enriched uranium” or “yellow cake” to be created in which U-235 has been increased from 0.7 per cent to 4 to 5 percent. (Nuclear bombs require highly enriched uranium with more than 90 per cent of U-235.) Yellow cake is broken into small pieces, put in metal rods placed in bundles, which are then bombarded by neutrons causing fission. In a reactor, the energy released turns water into steam, which moves turbines generating electricity. While there is no carbon dioxide “waste” as in burning fossil fuels, the “spent” rods of nuclear fuel and other products constitute grave radioactive waste, almost impossible to dispose of.

The plausible part of the Government of India’s official line on the Indo-US nuclear deal is that removing the international restrictions will ~ through importation of new technologies, inputs, fuel etc ~ improve functioning of our 14 existing civilian plants. That is a good thing. Essentially, the price being paid for that improvement is our willingness to commit that those 14 plants will not be used for military purposes. Fair enough: even if we might become less innovative as a result, the overall efficiency gains as a result of the deal will add something to India’s productivity. However, those purchasing decisions involved in enhancing India’s efficiency gains must be made by the Government’s nuclear scientists on technical grounds of improving the working of our existing nuclear infrastructure.

It is a different animal altogether to be purchasing new nuclear reactors on a turn-key basis from American or any other foreign businessmen in a purported attempt to improve India’s “energy security”. (Lalu Yadav has requested a new reactor for Bihar, plus of course Delhi will want one, etc.) The central question over such massive foreign purchases would no longer be the technical one of using the Indo-US deal to improve efficiency or productivity of our existing nuclear infrastructure. Instead it would become a question of calculating social costs and benefits of our investing in nuclear power relative to other sources like hydroelectric power. Even if all other sources of electricity remained constant, and our civilian nuclear capacity alone was made to grow by 100 per cent under the Manmohan-Montek deal-making, that would mean less than 8% of total Indian electricity produced.

This is where the oddities arise and a disjoint becomes apparent between what the Government of India is saying and what American and Indian businessmen have been doing. A “US-India Business Council” has existed for thirty years in Washington as “the premier business advocacy organization promoting US commercial interests in India.… the voice of the American private sector investing in India”. Before the nuclear or any other deals could be contemplated with American business, the USIBC insisted we pay up for Dabhol contracted by a previous Congress Government. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board ~ or rather, its sovereign guarantor the Government of India ~ duly paid out at least $140-$160 million each to General Electric and Bechtel Corporations in “an amicable settlement” of the Dabhol affair. Afterwards, General Electric’s CEO for India was kind enough to say “India is an important country to GE’s global growth. We look forward to working with our partners, customers, and State and Central Governments in helping India continue to develop into a leading world economy”.

Also, a new “US-India CEO Forum” then came about. For two Governments to sponsor private business via such a Forum was “unprecedented”, as noted by Washington’s press during Manmohan Singh’s visit in July 2005. America’s foreign ministry announced it saying: “Both our governments have agreed that we should create a high-level private sector forum to exchange business community views on key economic priorities…” The American side includes heads of AES Corporation, Cargill Inc., Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Honeywell, McGraw-Hill, Parsons Brinckerhoff Ltd, PepsiCo, Visa International and Xerox Corporation. The Indian side includes heads of Tata Group, Apollo Hospitals Group, Bharat Forge Ltd, Biocon India Group, HDFC, ICICI One Source, Infosys, ITC Ltd, Max India Group and Reliance Industries. Presiding over the Indian side has been Montek Ahluwalia, Manmohan’s trusted aide ~ and let it be remembered too that the Ahluwalias were Manmohan’s strongest backers in his failed South Delhi Lok Sabha bid. (Indeed it is not clear if the Ahluwalias have been US or Indian residents in recent years, and if it is the former, the onus is on them to clear any perception of conflict of interest arising in regard to roles regarding the nuclear deal or any other official Indo-US business.)

Also, before the Manmohan visit, the Confederation of Indian Industry registered as an official lobbyist in Washington, and went about spending half a million dollars lobbying American politicians for the nuclear deal. After the Manmohan visit, the US Foreign Commercial Service reportedly said American engineering firms, equipment suppliers and contractors faced a $1,000 billion (1 bn =100 crore) opportunity in India. Before President Bush’s visit to India in March 2006, Manmohan Singh signed vast purchases of commercial aircraft from Boeing and Airbus, as well as large weapons’ deals with France and Russia. After the Bush visit, the US Chamber of Commerce said the nuclear deal can cause $100 billion worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone. What is going on?

Finally, the main aspect of Manmohan Singh’s address to America’s legislature had to do with agreeing with President Bush “to enhance Indo-US cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology”. What precisely does this mean? If it means the Indo-US nuclear deal will help India improve or maintain its existing nuclear infrastructure, well and good. There may be legitimate business for American and other foreign companies in that cause, which also helps India make the efficiency and productivity gains mentioned. Or has the real motivation for the American businessmen driving the deal (with the help of the “CEO Forum” etc) been to sell India nuclear reactors on a turn-key basis (in collaboration with private Indian businessmen) at a time when building new nuclear reactors is unprofitable elsewhere in the world because of low gas prices? India’s citizens may demand to know from the Government whether the Manmohan-Montek deal-making is going to cause importation of new nuclear reactors, and if so, why such an expensive alternative is being considered (relative to e.g. India’s abundant hydroelectric potential) when it will have scant effect in satisfying the country’s energy needs and lead merely to a worsening of our macroeconomic problems. Both Manmohan Singh and Montek Ahluwalia have been already among those to preside over the growth of India’s macroeconomic problems through the 1980s and 1990s.

Lastly, an irrelevant distraction should be gotten out of the way. Are we a “nuclear weapons” state? Of course we are, but does it matter to anything but our vanity? Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had control over vastly more nuclear weapons and they declared together twenty years ago: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought”, which is how the Cold War started to come to an end. We need to remind ourselves that India and Pakistan are large, populous countries with hundreds of millions of materially poor, ill-informed citizens, weak tax-bases, humongous internal and external public debts (i.e. debt owed by the Government to domestic and foreign creditors), non-investment grade credit- ratings in world financial markets, massive annual fiscal deficits, inconvertible currencies, nationalized banks, and runaway printing of paper-money. Discussing nuclear or other weapon-systems to attack one other with is mostly a pastime of our cowardly, irresponsible and yes, corrupt, elites.

3) Need for Clarity A poorly drafted treaty driven by business motives is a recipe for international misunderstanding (August 19 2007)

Confusion prevails over the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians, diplomats, scientists and now the public at large have all joined in the cacophony in the last two years. On Wednesday August 15, America’s foreign ministry made the clearest most unequivocal statement possible as to the official American Government interpretation of the Indo-US nuclear deal: “The proposed 123 agreement has provisions in it that in an event of a nuclear test by India, then all nuclear co-operation is terminated, as well as there is provision for return of all materials, including reprocessed material covered by the agreement” (Sean McCormack). Yet our Prime Minister had told Parliament two days earlier: “The agreement does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary”. What is going on? Our politics are in uproar, and it has been suggested in these pages that the country go to a General Election to allow the people to speak on the matter. Clearly, we need some clarity.

Let us start at the beginning. How did it all originate? The private US nuclear industry prevailed upon India’s government bureaucrats and businessmen over several years that nuclear power is the way forward to solving India’s “infrastructure” problems. They would sell us, in words of the Manmohan-Montek Planning Commission’s energy adviser, “six to eight lightwater reactors” (especially as they may not be able to sell these anywhere else). Our usual prominent self-seeking retired bureaucrats started their waffling about the importance of “infrastructure”.

Then Manmohan Singh felt his foreign travels as PM could be hardly complete without a fife-and-drum visit to the White House. But before he could do so, Dabhol would have to be cleared up since American business in India was on a self-moratorium until GE and Bechtel were paid settlements of some $140-160 million each by the Governments of India and Maharashtra. GE’s CEO for India kindly said afterwards “India is an important country to GE’s global growth. We look forward to working with our partners, customers, and State and Central Governments in helping India continue to develop into a leading world economy”.

Also, before Manmohan’s USA trip, the Confederation of Indian Industry registered as an official Washington lobbyist and spent half a million dollars lobbying American politicians for the deal. (”Why?” would be a good question.)

So Dr Singh was able to make his White House visit, accompanied by US business lobbies saying the nuclear deal can generate $100 billion worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone. It is only when business has lubricated politics in America that so much agreement about the India-deal could arise. The “bottom-line” is that six to eight reactors must be sold to India, whatever politics and diplomacy it takes.

Now Dr Singh is not a PM who is a Member of the Lower House of Parliament commanding its confidence. He says his Government constitutes the Executive and can sign treaties on India’s behalf. This is unwise. If he signs a treaty and then the Congress Party loses the next General Election, a new Executive Government can use his same words to rescind the same treaty. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. One reason we are so confused is that India has not signed very many bilateral treaties, and there is barely a noted specialist in international law anywhere in the country. Dr Singh’s original mentor, PN Haksar, had gone about getting a treaty signed with the USSR back in 1971 which tided us over a war, though the USSR itself collapsed before that treaty ended.

Signing a treaty is much more than signing an international MOU. It requires a national consensus or a least a wide and deep understanding on the part of the public and the political class as to what necessitates the treaty. That plainly does not exist at present. Most people in India do not even know how nuclear power is generated, nor how small and insignificant nuclear power has been in India.

Natural uranium is 99.3 per cent of the U-238 isotope and 0.7 per cent the radioactive U-235 isotope. Nuclear power generation requires “enriched uranium” or “yellow cake” to be created in which U-235 has been increased from 0.7 per cent to 4 to 5 percent. (Nuclear bombs require “highly enriched” uranium with more than 90 per cent of U-235.) Yellow cake is broken into small pieces, put in metal rods placed in bundles, which are then bombarded by neutrons causing fission. In a reactor, the energy released turns water into steam, which moves turbines generating electricity. While there is no carbon dioxide “waste” as in burning fossil fuels, the “spent” rods of nuclear fuel and other products constitute grave radioactive waste, almost impossible to dispose of.

India’s 14 “civilian” nuclear reactors presently produce less than 4% of our total power. 70% of our power arises from burning fossil fuels, mainly coal. Much of the rest arises from hydro. We have vast hydroelectric potential in the North and Northeast but it would take a lot of serious political, administrative and civil engineering effort to organise all that, and there would not be any nice visits to Washington or Paris involved for politicians and bureaucrats.

Simple arithmetic says that even if all our principal energy sources stayed constant and only our tiny nuclear power sector grew by 100%, that would still hardly increase by very much our energy output overall. Placing a couple of expensive modern lightwater reactors around Delhi, a couple around Mumbai and a few other metros will, however, butter already buttered bread quite nicely and keep all those lifts and ACs running.

The agreed text of the “treaty” looks, from a legal standpoint, quite sloppily and hurriedly written ~ almost as if each side has cut and paste its own preferred terms in different places with a nod to the other side. For example, there is mention of “WMD” initially which is repeated as “weapons of mass destruction” just a little later. There is solemn mention of the “Government of India” and “Government of the United States of America” as the “Parties”, but this suddenly becomes merely “United States” and “India” in the middle and then reverts again to the formal usage.

Through the sloppiness comes scope for different interpretations. The Americans have said: try not to test, you don’t need to, we don’t test any more, and you have to know that if you do test, this deal is over, in fact it gets reversed. We have said, okay, we won’t test, and if we do test we know it is over with you but that does not mean it is over with others. Given such sloppy diplomacy and treaty-making, the scope for mutual misunderstanding, even war, remains immense long after all the public Indian moneys have found their way into private pockets worldwide. Will a future President Jeb Bush or Chelsea Clinton send F-22 bombers to bomb India’s nuclear facilities because India has carried out a test yet declined to return American equipment? Riding a tiger is not something generally to be recommended.

The answer to our present conundrum must be patience and the fullest transparency. What is the rush? If it is good or bad for us to buy six or eight new American reactors now, it will remain good or bad to do so a year or two from now after everyone has had a thorough think about everything that is involved. What the Manmohan-Montek Planning Commission needed to do first of all was a thorough cost-benefit analysis of India’s energy requirements but such elementary professionalism has been sorely lacking among our economists for decades.”

Subroto Roy

Excuse me but young Kasab in fact confessed many months ago, immediately after he was captured – he deserves 20 or 30 years in an Indian prison, and a chance to become a model prisoner who will stand against the very terrorists who sent him on his vile mission

July 20, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

I have almost stopped being amazed by the near-imbecility that our English-language TV and print media seem so often to be capable of. Oui mes enfants, Kasab did confess to mass-murder and other crimes in open court today but please do not feign such surprise for commercial reasons — if you had done your homework diligently you would have known that Kasab had confessed quite as fully as he did today many months ago, in fact as soon as he was physically able to do so after being treated in hospital following his capture by Mumbai police. (The BBC proved again it has no institutional memory left by failing to remember these facts too and instead relying on the Indian TV media today. Or, alternatively, the BBC’s dual national Pakistani staffers were quick to get the BBC to veer towards the official GoP line — and the GoP certainly has not wanted to remember the fact Kasab was being truthful from day one of his capture.)

Why was Kasab’s court-appointed lawyer silent and bewildered today? Because Kasab (with his Class 4 schooling) had somehow thought things through on his own during this existential experience and effectively sacked the lawyer peremptorily as was his right to do. It was the lawyer who had chalked out the faulty legal strategy of starting off by pleading not-guilty instead of plea-bargaining on the basis of Kasab’s initial confessions being the primary source of evidence for the Government of India to be able to indict Pakistan in the Mumbai massacres.

(To the lawyer’s credit though, at least he had taken the case when no one else would and furthermore, he had clearly acted in good faith.)

Had Kasab been killed along with his 9 compatriot fellow-terrorists (and he was the youngest and least experienced which is probably why he was teamed with Ishmael who was the team leader), India would have had almost no hard evidence in creating the dossier that we were able to confront Pakistan with.

Kasab’s correct legal strategy was to accept his guilt and plead for mercy on the basis of having turned State’s evidence, indeed the Government of India’s star witness for the prosecution. There is absolutely no jurisprudential benefit in seeing a tiny pawn like him– the very tiniest of all pawns –hang for his evil deeds. That is why I said back in November-December that if I was the judge sentencing him, I would send him to jail for 20-30 years, for his 20 or 30 victims at CST station, and get him to become a model prisoner who could become a prime spokesman against the terrorists who had sent him.

The right way for India and Pakistan to cooperate against the perpetrators of the Mumbai massacres was via a prompt application of common maritime law and the Law of the Sea Treaty’s provisions against piracy, murder etc on the high seas, followed by some well-publicised hangings at sea, on a Pakistan Navy vessel, of the masterminds. Here is a complete list of what I said here between November 28 2008 and March 18 2009 on all this:

1. November 28, 2008 Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until this sad day

Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until today. For two thousand years, in fact perhaps as long as there have ever been Jews in the world, there had been Jews living peacefully in India. I used to say that proudly to my Jewish friends, adding that the Indian Army had even had a Jewish general. Today, November 28 2008, or perhaps yesterday November 27 2008, that changed. Five Hasidic Jews who had been peaceful residents of Nariman House in Mumbai, came to be murdered by terrorists, merely for being Jews, or died in explosions or in the cross-fire between the terrorists and Indian security forces. The Israeli Government had offered India their well-known technical expertise in trying to save their fellow-nationals. I believe the Government of India made a tragic mistake by not accepting it. Yes certainly our national prestige would have taken the slightest of blows if Israeli commandos had helped to release Israeli hostages in India. But our national prestige has taken a much vaster and more permanent blow instead, now that we can no longer say that Jews have never in history been killed for being Jews in India. I am especially sad on this already very sad day to see that proud record destroyed.

2. November 30, 2008 In international law, Pakistan has been the perpetrator, India the victim of aggression in Mumbai

In international law, the attacks on Mumbai would probably reveal Pakistan to have been the aggressor state, India the victim of aggression. It is standard law that a “master” is responsible for the misdeeds of his “servant”. E.g., “Where the relation of master and servant clearly exists, the employer is responsible for injury occasioned by the negligent conduct of the servant in carrying out his orders. And this rule is so extensive as to make the master liable for the careless, reckless and wanton conduct of his servant, provided it be within the scope of his employment”. President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani may declare truthfully they had no prior knowledge of the attacks on Mumbai, that these were not in any way authorized by them or their Government. But it seems likely on the basis of current evidence that the young terrorists who attacked Mumbai were still in a “master-servant” relationship with elements of the Pakistani state and had been financed, trained, motivated and supplied by resources arising, directly or indirectly, from the Pakistani exchequer. Public moneys in Pakistan came to be used or misused to pay for aggression against India – in a quite similar pattern to the October 1947 attack on Kashmir, Ayub Khan’s 1965 “Operation Grand Slam”, and Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 attack on Kargil. And to think that these youth who were made into becoming terroristic mass murderers were toddlers when the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, in primary school when the 1993 WTC bombing happened and adolescents at the time of the 9/11 attacks.

3. December 3, 2008 Habeas Corpus: a captured terrorist mass-murderer tells a magistrate he is not being mistreated by Indian police

A youth who had been a petty thief in Multan, was induced by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds to train to become a mass murderer with an assault rifle and grenades in the Mumbai massacres last week. He was shot and arrested by India’s police and is now in custody. He has already been produced before a magistrate who asked him if he was being mistreated, to which he said he was not. This redounds to India’s credit in view of the vast (and yes, probably racist) mistreatment over years of those held e.g. at Guantanamo Bay. (The argument that the US Constitution and the laws associated with habeas corpus did not apply to the US Government because Guantanamo Bay was not American territory, was always specious.)

4. December 4, 2008 India’s Muslim Voices (Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent) bySubroto Roy

Ill-informed Western observers, especially at purported “think tanks” and news-portals, frequently proclaim the Pakistan-India confrontation and Jammu & Kashmir conflict to represent some kind of savage irreconcilable division between Islamic and Hindu cultures. For example, the BBC, among its many prevarications on the matter (like lopping off J&K entirely from its recently broadcasted maps of India, perhaps under influence of its Pakistani staffers), frequently speaks of “Hindu-majority India” and “Indian-administered Kashmir” being confronted by Muslim Pakistan. And two days ago from California’s Bay Area arose into the Internet Cloud the following profundity: “What we’re dealing with now, in the Pakistani-Indian rivalry, is a true war of civilizations, pitting Muslims against Hindus…. the unfathomable depths of the Muslim-Hindu divide….”. Even President-elect Obama’s top Pakistan-specialists have fallen for the line of Washington’s extremely strong Pakistan lobby: “Pakistan… sees itself as the political home for the subcontinent’s Muslim population and believes India’s continued control over the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley and denial of a plebiscite for its inhabitants represent a lingering desire on India’s part to undo the legacy of partition, which divided the British Indian Empire into India and Pakistan.”

The truth on record is completely different and really rather simple: for more than a century and a half, Muslims qua Muslims on the Indian subcontinent have struggled with the question of their most appropriate cultural and political identity. The starkest contrast may be found in their trying to come to terms with their partly Arabic and partly Hindu or Indian parentage (the words Hindu, Sindhu, Indus, Indian, Sindhi, Hindi etc all clearly have the same Hellenistic root). For example, there was Wali Allah (1703-1762) declaring “We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride”. But here has been Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), in his 1930 Allahabad speech to the Muslim League, conceiving today’s Pakistan as a wish to become free of precisely that Arab influence: “I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.” In an article “Saving Pakistan” published last year in The Statesman and available elsewhere here, it was suggested Iqbal’s “spirit of modern times” may be represented most prominently today by the physicist/political philosopher Pervez Hoodbhoy: in a December 2006 speech Hoodbhoy suggested a new alternative to MA Jinnah’s “Faith, Unity, Discipline” slogan: “First, I wish for minds that can deal with the complex nature of truth…. My second wish is for many more Pakistanis who accept diversity as a virtue… My third, and last, wish is that Pakistanis learn to value and nurture creativity.” He has spoken too of bringing “economic justice to Pakistan”, of the “fight to give Pakistan’s women the freedom which is their birthright”, and of people to “wake up” and engage politically. But Pakistan’s Iqbalian liberals like Hoodbhoy still have to square off with those of their compatriots who sent the youthful squad into Mumbai last week with assault rifles, grenades and heroic Arabic code-names, as well as orders to attack civilians with the ferocity of the original Muslims attacking caravans and settlements in ancient Arabia.

What the extremely strong Pakistan lobbies within the British and American political systems have suppressed in order to paint a picture of eternal Muslim-Hindu conflict is the voice of India’s nationalist Muslims, who historically have had no wish to have any truck with any idea of a “Pakistan” at all. Most eminent among them was undoubtedly Jinnah’s fiercest critic: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad whose classic 1946 statement on Pakistan is available in his India Wins Freedom, the final version published only in 1988……

5. December 6, 2008 A Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough) bySubroto Roy

In my book Philosophy of Economics (Routledge, 1989) and in my August 24 2004 public lecture in England “Science, Religion, Art and the Necessity of Freedom”, both available elsewhere here, I described the “case-by-case” philosophical technique recommended by Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Wisdom and Renford Bambrough. (Bambrough had also shown a common root in the work of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.) Herewith an application of the technique to a contemporary problem that shows the “family resemblance” between two modern terrorist attacks, the September 11 2001 attack on New York and Washington and the Mumbai massacres last week.

Similarity: In both, a gang of motivated youthful terrorists acted as a team against multiple targets; their willingness to accept suicide while indulging in mass-murder may have, bizarrely enough, brought a sense of adventure and meaning to otherwise empty lives.

Difference: In the 9/11 attacks, Mohammad Atta seemed to have been a single predominant leader while each of the others also had complex active roles requiring decisions, like piloting and navigating hijacked jumbo-jets. In the Mumbai massacres, the training and leadership apparently came from outside the team before and even during the operation – almost as if the team were acting like brainwashed robots under long-distance control.

Similarity: Both attacks required a long prior period of training and planning.

Difference: The 9/11 attacks did not require commando-training imparted by military-style trainers; the Mumbai massacres did.

Difference: In the 9/11 attacks, the actual weapons used initially were primitive, like box-cutters; in the Mumbai massacres, assault rifles and grenades were used along with sophisticated telecommunications equipment.

Difference: In 9/11, the initial targets, the hijacked aircraft, were themselves made into weapons against the ultimate targets, namely the buildings, in a way not seen before. In the Mumbai massacres, mass-shooting of terrorized civilians was hardly something original; besides theatres of war, the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Japanese Red Army used these in the 1970s as terrorist techniques (e.g. at Rome Airport Lod Airport; Postscript January 26 2009: I make this correction after reading and commenting on the RAND study which unfortunately did not have the courtesy of acknowledging my December 6 2008 analysis) plus there were, more recently, the Columbine and Virginia Tech massacres.

Similarity: In both cases, Hollywood and other movie scripts could have inspired the initial ideas of techniques to be used.

Similarity: In both cases, the weapons used were appropriate to the anticipated state of defence: nothing more than box-cutters could be expected to get by normal airport security; assault rifles etc could come in by the unguarded sea and attack soft targets in Mumbai. (Incidentally, even this elementary example of strategic thinking in a practical situation may be beyond the analytical capacity contained in the tons of waste paper produced at American and other modern university Economics departments under the rubric of “game theory”.)

Similarity: In both cases, a high-level of widespread fear was induced for several days or more within a targeted nation-state by a small number of people.

Similarity: No ransom-like demands were made by the terrorists in either case.

Similarity: Had the single terrorist not been captured alive in the Mumbai massacres, there would have been little trace left by the attackers.

Difference: The 9/11 attackers knew definitely they were on suicide-missions; the Mumbai attackers may not have done and may have imagined an escape route.

6. December 10, 2008 Congratulations to Mumbai’s Police: capturing a terrorist, affording him his Habeas Corpus rights, getting him to confess within the Rule of Law, sets a new world standard

The full statement to police of the single captured terrorist perpetrator of the Mumbai massacres is now available. It tells a grim story. But Mumbai’s Police, from ordinary beat constables and junior officers to the anti-terrorism top brass, come off very well both with their heroism and their commitment to the Rule of Law. In comparison to the disastrous failures of the Rule of Law in the United States and Britain since 9/11 in fighting terrorism, Mumbai’s Police may have set a new world standard.

The prisoner was several days ago afforded Habeas Corpus rights and produced before a magistrate who asked him if he was being mistreated to which he replied he was not – though there might not be any Indian equivalent of America’s “Miranda” law.

7. December 12, 2008 Kasab was a stupid, ignorant, misguided youth, manufactured by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds into becoming a mass-murdering robot: Mahatma Gandhi’s India should punish him, get him to repent if he wishes, then perhaps rehabilitate him as a potent weapon against Pakistani terrorism

The crime of murder is that of deliberate homicide, that of mass-murder is the murder of a mass of people. There is no doubt the lone captured Mumbai terrorist, “Kasab”, has committed mass-murder, being personally responsible for the murder of probably 20 or 30 wholly innocent people he had never met. He killed them by machine-gun fire and grenades at CST/VT railway station on November 26 2008 before being shot and captured by police. He is also a co-conspirator in the mass-murders carried out by his associate at the railway station and those elsewhere in Mumbai. There is no doubt he should serve rigorous imprisonment for life in an Indian prison for his crimes.

And yet…. And yet…

If the Government of India is sensible, it needs to describe and comprehend the moral subtleties of the circumstances surrounding Kasab’s life, especially during the last year. Here was a stupid, ignorant, rather primitive youth misguided by others first into becoming a petty robber, later into becoming a terrorist-trainee in hope of advancing his career in thievery!

Bakri-Id 2008 has just occurred – it is on Bakri-Id a year ago in 2007 that Kasab reportedly first ventured into volunteering for terrorist training as a way of learning how to use firearms! It is almost certain he had never met a Hindu or an Indian in his life before then, that he knew absolutely nothing about the subcontinent’s history or politics, that he would be ignorant about who, say, Iqbal or Jinnah or Maulana Azad or Sheikh Abdullah or Mahatma Gandhi ever were. Within less than a year, that same youth had been brainwashed and trained adequately enough by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds to become a robotic mass-murderer in Mumbai’s railway station. Now having been caught and treated humanely by his captors, he has confessed everything and even expressed a wish to write a letter to his father in Pakistan expressing remorse for his deeds.

If I was the judge trying him, I would sentence him to a minimum of twenty or thirty years rigorous imprisonment in an Indian prison. But I would add that he should be visited in jail by a few of India’s Muslim leaders, and indeed he should be very occasionally allowed out of the prison (under police supervision) in a structured program to offer Namaz with India’s Muslims in our grandest mosques. He should learn firsthand a little of the lives of India’s Muslims and of India’s people as a whole. Perhaps he will become a model prisoner, perhaps he may even want to become in due course a potent weapon against the terrorist masterminds who ruined his life by sending him to murder people in India.

It bears to be remembered that in an incredible act of Christian forgiveness, the widow of the Australian missionary Graham Staines forgave the cold-blooded murderers who burnt alive her husband and her young sons as they slept in a jeep in Orissa. The family of Rajiv Gandhi may have done the same of those who assassinated or conspired to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. This is the land of Mahatma Gandhi, who had woven a remarkable moral and political theory out of the Jain-Buddhist-Hindu doctrine of ahimsa as well as Christian notions from Tolstoy and Thoreau of forgiving the sinner.

Of course there cannot be forgiveness where there is no remorse. Kasab’s behaviour thus far suggests he will be remorseful and repentant; there are many other thieves and murderers in the world who are not.

Subroto Roy

Reported statement of Mohammad Ajmal Amir ‘Kasab’, 21, to police after arrest: “I have resided in Faridkot, Dinalpur tehsil, Ukada district, Suba Punjab state, Pakistan since my birth. I studied up to class IV in a government school. After leaving school in 2000, I went to stay with my brother in Tohit Abad mohalla, near Yadgar Minar in Lahore. I worked as a labourer at various places till 2005, visiting my native once in a while. In 2005, I had a quarrel with my father. I left home and went to Ali Hajveri Darbar in Lahore, where boys who run away from home are given shelter. The boys are sent to different places for employment. One day a person named Shafiq came there and took me with him. He was from Zhelam and had a catering business. I started working for him for Rs120 per day. Later, my salary was increased to Rs200 per day. I worked with him till 2007. While working with Shafiq, I came in contact with one Muzzafar Lal Khan, 22. He was from Romaiya village in Alak district in Sarhad, Pakistan. Since we were not getting enough money, we decided to carry out robbery/dacoity to make big money. So we left the job.

We went to Rawalpindi, where we rented a flat. Afzal had located a house for us to loot… We required some firearms for our mission… While we were in search of firearms, we saw some LeT stalls at Raja Bazaar in Rawalpindi on the day of Bakri-id. We then realised that even if we procured firearms, we would not be able to operate them. Therefore, we decided to join LeT for weapons training. We reached the LeT office and told a person that we wanted to join LeT. He noted down our names and address and told us to come the next day. The next day, there was another person with him. He gave us Rs200 and some receipts. Then he gave us the address of a place called Marqas Taiyyaba, Muridke, and told us to go to there. It was an LeT training camp. We went to the place by bus. We showed the receipts at the gate of the camp. We were allowed inside… Then we were taken to the actual camp area. Initially, we were selected for a 21 days’ training regimen called Daura Sufa. From the next day, our training started.

The daily programme was as follows: 4.15 am — Wake-up call and thereafter Namaz; 8 am — Breakfast; 8.30 am to 10 am — Lecture on Hadis and Quran by Mufti Sayyed; 10 am to noon – Rest; Noon to 1 pm – Lunch break; 1 pm to 4 pm – Rest; 4 pm to 6 pm – PT; instructor: Fadulla; 6 pm to 8 pm – Namaz and other work; 8 pm to 9 pm – Dinner

After Daura Sufa, we were selected for another training programme called Daura Ama. This was also for 21 days. We were taken to Mansera in Buttal village, where we were trained in handling weapons. The daily programme was as follows: 4.15 am to 5 am – Wake-up call and thereafter Namaz; 5 am to 6 am – PT; instructor: Abu Anas; 8 am – Breakfast; 8.30 am to 11.30 am – Weapons training; trainer: Abdul Rehman; weapons: AK-47, Green-O, SKS, Uzi gun, pistol, revolver; 11.30 am to Noon – rest; Noon to 1 pm – Lunch break; 1 pm to 2 pm – Namaz; 2 pm to 4 pm – Rest; 4 pm to 6 pm – PT; 6 pm to 8 pm – Namaz and other work; 8 pm to 9 pm – Dinner.

After the training, we were told that we will begin the next stage involving advanced training. But for that, we were told, we had to do some khidmat for two months (khidmat is a sort of service in the camp as per trainees’ liking). We agreed. After two months, I was allowed to go to meet my parents. I stayed with my parents for a month. Then I went to an LeT camp in Shaiwainala, Muzaffarabad, for advanced training… We were taken to Chelabandi pahadi area for a training programme, called Daura Khas, of three months. It involved handling weapons, using hand grenade, rocket launchers and mortars.

The daily programme was as follows: 4.15 am to 5 am – Wake-up call and thereafter Namaz; 5 am to 6 am – PT; instructor: Abu Mawiya; 8 am – Breakfast; 8.30 am to 11.30 am – Weapons training, handling of all weapons and firing practices with the weapons, training on handling hand grenade, rocket-launchers and mortars, Green-O, SKS, Uzi gun, pistol, revolver; trainer: Abu Mawiya; 11.30 am to 12 noon – rest; Noon to 1 pm – Lunch break; 1 pm to 2 pm – Namaz; 2 pm to 4 pm – Weapons training and firing practice; lecture on Indian security agencies; 4 pm to 6 pm – PT; 6 pm to 8 pm – Namaz and other work; 8 pm to 9 pm – Dinner

There were 32 trainees in the camp. Sixteen were selected for a confidential operation by one Zaki-ur-Rehman, alias Chacha, but three of them ran away from the camp. Chacha sent the remaining 13 with a person called Kafa to the Muridke camp again. At Muridke, we were taught swimming and made familiar with the life of fishermen at sea… We were given lectures on the working of Indian security agencies. We were shown clippings highlighting atrocities on Muslims in India. After the training, we were allowed to go to our native places. I stayed with my family for seven days. I then went to the LeT camp at Muzaffarabad. The 13 of us were present for training. Then, on Zaki-ur-Rehman’s instructions, Kafa took us to the Muridke camp. The training continued for a month. We were given lectures on India and its security agencies, including RAW. We were also trained to evade security personnel. We were instructed not to make phone calls to Pakistan after reaching India.

The names of the persons present for the training are: n Mohd Azmal, alias Abu Muzahid n Ismail, alias Abu Umar n Abu Ali n Abu Aksha n Abu Umer n Abu Shoeb n Abdul Rehman (Bada) n Abdul Rehman (Chhota) n Afadulla n Abu Umar. After the training, Chacha selected 10 of us and formed five teams of two people each on September 15. I and Ismail formed a team; its codename was VTS. We were shown Azad Maidan in Mumbai on Google Earth’s site on the internet… We were shown a film on VT railway station. The film showed commuters during rush hours. We were instructed to carry out firing during rush hours — between 7 am and 11 am and between 7 pm and 11 pm. Then we were to take some people hostage, take them to the roof of some nearby building and contact Chacha, who would have given us numbers to contact media people and make demands. This was the strategy decided upon by our trainers. The date fixed for the operation was September 27. However, the operation was cancelled for some reason. We stayed in Karachi till November 23. The other teams were: 2nd team: a) Abu Aksha; b) Abu Umar; 3rd team: a) Abdul Rehman (Bada); b) Abu Ali; 4th team: a) Abdul Rehman (Chotta); b) Afadulla; 5th team: a) Abu Shoeb; b) Abu Umer.

On November 23, the teams left from Azizabad in Karachi, along with Zaki-ur-Rehman and Kafa. We were taken to the nearby seashore… We boarded a launch. After travelling for 22 to 25 nautical miles we boarded a bigger launch. Again, after a journey of an hour, we boarded a ship, Al-Huseini, in the deep sea. While boarding the ship, each of us was given a sack containing eight grenades, an AK-47 rifle, 200 cartridges, two magazines and a cellphone. Then we started towards the Indian coast. When we reached Indian waters, the crew members of Al-Huseini hijacked an Indian launch. The crew of the launch was shifted to Al-Huseini. We then boarded the launch. An Indian seaman was made to accompany us at gunpoint; he was made to bring us to the Indian coast. After a journey of three days, we reached near Mumbai’s shore. While we were still some distance away from the shore, Ismail and Afadulla killed the Indian seaman (Tandel) in the basement of the launch. Then we boarded an inflatable dinghy and reached Badhwar Park jetty. I then went along with Ismail to VT station by taxi. After reaching the hall of the station, we went to the toilet, took out the weapons from our sacks, loaded them, came out of the toilet and started firing indiscriminately at passengers. Suddenly, a police officer opened fire at us. We threw hand grenades towards him and also opened fire at him. Then we went inside the railway station threatening the commuters and randomly firing at them. We then came out of the railway station searching for a building with a roof. But we did not find one. Therefore, we entered a lane. We entered a building and went upstairs. On the third and fourth floors we searched for hostages but we found that the building was a hospital and not a residential building. We started to come down. That is when policemen started firing at us. We threw grenades at them.

While coming out of the hospital premises, we saw a police vehicle passing. We took shelter behind a bush. Another vehicle passed us and stopped some distance away. A police officer got off from the vehicle and started firing at us. A bullet hit my hand and my AK-47 fell out of my hand. When I bent to pick it up another bullet hit me on the same hand. Ismail opened fire at the officers in the vehicle. They got injured and firing from their side stopped. We waited for a while and went towards the vehicle. There were three bodies in the vehicle. Ismail removed the bodies and drove the vehicle. I sat next to him. Some policemen tried to stop us. Ismail opened fire at them. The vehicle had a flat tyre near a big ground by the side of road. Ismail got down from the vehicle, stopped a car at gunpoint and removed the three lady passengers from the car. Since I was injured, Ismail carried me to the car. He then drove the car. We were stopped by policemen on the road near the seashore. Ismail fired at them, injuring some policemen. The police also opened fire at us. Ismail was injured in the firing. The police removed us from the vehicle and took us to the same hospital. In the hospital, I came to know that Ismail had succumbed to injuries. My statement has been read to me and explained in Hindi, and it has been correctly recorded.”

8. December 13, 2008 Pakistan’s New Delhi Embassy should ask for “Consular Access” to nine dead terrorists in a Mumbai morgue before asking to meet Kasab

After two weeks of pointblank denials that Pakistan had anything to do with the Mumbai massacres (”the Mumbai incident”, “the Bombay event” as Pakistan’s social butterflies put it), Pakistan’s diplomats are now asking for Consular Access to Kasab, the lone captured terrorist! The cheek of it! Would they please request Consular Access instead to the nine dead terrorists who were Kasab’s companions, and who are presumably in a Mumbai morgue at present because India’s Muslims have denied them a burial? It is certain the Government of India would be relieved and delighted to hand over full custody of the mortal remains of these nine Pakistanis to representatives of His Excellency the High Commissioner of Pakistan to New Delhi for transfer back home to Pakistan.

As for Consular Access to Kasab, the Government of India will doubtless inform His Excellency that His Excellency may appreciate that in present circumstances in which the individual Kasab, not to put too fine a point on it, is singing like a canary, the Government of India deems the security of India could be jeopardised by any possibility of such a song becoming jeopardised. The Government of India will however doubtless assure His Excellency that Kasab is being well cared for in custody and has reported as such to the magistrate.

9. December 19, 2008 An Indian Reply to President Zardari: Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationshipsbySubroto Roy

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani. Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

i. Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”. It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”. British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none. (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent. Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan. Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.) Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be. The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919. India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions. An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN. Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today. Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later. The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision. It succeeded only partially. Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949. After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India. The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947. Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts a fight does not get to finish it.

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem. The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan. This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law. BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India. It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~ forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

ii. Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres

Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago. Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s. Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war. Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces. Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists. President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general. Rather, it serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

iii. Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

This may be overly simplistic. As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”, Gregory Zinoviev himself after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism. Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback! The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own. Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over. Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

iv. Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc – President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals, whether in thought, word or deed. Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships. (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory, an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons

“We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use

“We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India

“We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki

“We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them

“We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way

“We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan

“We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies

“We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works

“We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past

“We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks

“We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks

“We do not harbour any terrorists

“We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons

“We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country

“We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons

“We hate India and do not want to become like India

“We love India and want to become like India

“We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere

“We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives

“We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems

“We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up

“We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.

10. January 1, 2009 A basis of India-Pakistan cooperation on the Mumbai massacres: the ten Pakistani terrorists started off as pirates and the Al-Huseini is a pirate ship

One of my finest teachers at the London School of Economics many years ago had been Professor DHN Johnson, a pioneer of the Law of the Sea Treaty; reflecting upon the aftermath of the Mumbai massacres, it occurs to me that the Law of the Sea Treaty may provide the most expedient and lawful recourse in present circumstances, as well as a proper and clear basis for cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan in the matter.

Both India and Pakistan have signed and ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty which reads at Article 101

“Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”

From the captured Kasab’s confession, it is clear he and his companions began their criminal activities within Pakistan (by training as terrorists and engaging in a conspiracy to commit mass-murder) and this continued outside Pakistan at sea:

“On November 23, the teams left from Azizabad in Karachi, along with Zaki-ur-Rehman and Kafa. We were taken to the nearby seashore… We boarded a launch. After travelling for 22 to 25 nautical miles we boarded a bigger launch. Again, after a journey of an hour, we boarded a ship, Al-Huseini, in the deep sea. While boarding the ship, each of us was given a sack containing eight grenades, an AK-47 rifle, 200 cartridges, two magazines and a cellphone. Then we started towards the Indian coast. When we reached Indian waters, the crew members of Al-Huseini hijacked an Indian launch. The crew of the launch was shifted to Al-Huseini. We then boarded the launch. An Indian seaman was made to accompany us at gunpoint; he was made to bring us to the Indian coast. After a journey of three days, we reached near Mumbai’s shore. While we were still some distance away from the shore, Ismail and Afadulla killed the Indian seaman (Tandel) in the basement of the launch.”

Pirates in law are Hostis humani generis or “enemies of mankind”. As signatories to the Law of the Sea Treaty, India and Pakistan may act jointly against the Al-Huseini and others associated with the acts of piracy including the maritime murders of the Indian fishermen that preceded the Mumbai massacres, thus solving the question of jurisdiction before it arises. The remains of the nine dead Pakistani terrorists presently in a Mumbai morgue can be buried at sea in international waters by whatever funeral procedure is due to dishonourable sailors and pirates. (The fish will not refuse them.) Kasab can be tried as a pirate too — though he really needs an American defence attorney to plea-bargain for him as he turns State’s evidence against the real masterminds of the plot, some of whom may be presently in the custody of the Pakistan Government.

Subroto Roy

11. January 2 2009 How to solve the jurisdiction problem in prosecuting perpetrators of the Mumbai massacres: let the Pakistan and Indian Navies try them (and hang them) at sea as pirates

Should Pakistan hand over the terrorist masterminds now in its custody to India for trial for mass murder? Should India hand over the captured Mumbai terrorist Kasab to Pakistan for trial as a mass murderer? Such questions can lead to endless legal wrangling, no action, and no justice for all the many victims of the Mumbai massacres. It is far more expeditious for both countries to instead hand over all these characters in their custody to their respective navies for trial and punishment as pirates who have violated the Law of the Sea. The Pakistan Navy Chief and the Indian Navy Chief can agree to have their admirals meet with their respective prisoners for a rendezvous at sea in international waters. A joint trial under maritime law can be conducted on board, say, a Pakistan naval vessel in international waters. Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds can be hanged at sea on a scaffold aboard a Pakistan Navy vessel in international waters for crimes of piracy, murder and conspiracy. Kasab, if he turns State’s evidence, can plea-bargain for a lesser sentence; if he does not turn State’s evidence, he can join his handlers on the scaffold (assuming he is of adult age and sane). Pakistan’s terrorist training institutes, incidentally, will see a rapid decline in their admissions and recruitment figures once there are some well-televised hangings at sea.

Subroto Roy

12. January 16, 2009 Memo to the Hon’ble Attorneys General of Pakistan & India: How to jointly prosecute the Mumbai massacre perpetrators most expeditiously

A criminal conspiracy was hatched within the Pakistan Republic by persons known and unknown affiliated with an unlawful organization. The plot was to commit kidnapping, murder, robbery and piracy on the high seas, to be followed by illegal entry, criminal trespass, mass-murder, kidnapping, grievous bodily harm, arson, robbery, dacoity and multiple similarly heinous crimes in the Indian Republic, amounting to waging war against the Indian Republic and the Indian people. The conspirators commissioned services of at least 10 identified persons to be trained and indoctrinated as willing instruments in these multiple crimes, inducing them with money and other incentives.

Nine of these 10 persons came to be killed by Indian law enforcement authorities during the execution of their crimes; their mortal remains have remained in a Mumbai morgue now for more than one month and a half.

The tenth person, one Kasab, was captured alive and is in custody. He has been a willing witness for the prosecution of these multiple crimes and it is principally due to his testimony that the precise sequence of events in the commission of these crimes has been able to be reconstructed by law enforcement authorities (as contained e.g. in the “dossier” submitted by the Indian Republic to the Pakistan Republic.)

Both the Pakistan Republic and the Indian Republic have jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes. The jurisdiction of the Indian Republic is obvious.

Pakistan’s jurisdiction arises from the Pakistan Penal Code which states

2. Punishment of offences committed within Pakistan: Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Pakistan.3. Punishment of offences committed beyond, but which by law may be tried within Pakistan: Any person liable, by any Pakistani Law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond Pakistan shall be dealt with according to the provision of this Code for any act committed beyond Pakistan in the same manner as if such act had been committed within Pakistan. 4. Extension of Code for extra-territorial offences: The provisions of this Code apply also to any offence committed by “[(1) any citizen of Pakistan or any person in the service of Pakistan in any place without and beyond Pakistan];…. (4) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in Pakistan wherever it may be. Explanation: In this section the word “offence” includes every act committed outside Pakistan which, if committed in Pakistan, would be punishable under this Code…”.

Furthermore, both the Pakistan Republic and the Indian Republic have jurisdiction from the Law of the Sea Treaty which both have signed and ratified and which states at Article 101

“Definition of piracy(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”

From Kasab’s testimony, it is clear he and his companions began their criminal activities within Pakistan (by training as terrorists and engaging in the conspiracy to commit mass-murder in India) and this continued outside Pakistan at sea:

“On November 23, the teams left from Azizabad in Karachi, along with Zaki-ur-Rehman and Kafa. We were taken to the nearby seashore… We boarded a launch. After travelling for 22 to 25 nautical miles we boarded a bigger launch. Again, after a journey of an hour, we boarded a ship, Al-Huseini, in the deep sea. While boarding the ship, each of us was given a sack containing eight grenades, an AK-47 rifle, 200 cartridges, two magazines and a cellphone. Then we started towards the Indian coast. When we reached Indian waters, the crew members of Al-Huseini hijacked an Indian launch. The crew of the launch was shifted to Al-Huseini. We then boarded the launch. An Indian seaman was made to accompany us at gunpoint; he was made to bring us to the Indian coast. After a journey of three days, we reached near Mumbai’s shore. While we were still some distance away from the shore, Ismail and Afadulla killed the Indian seaman … in the basement of the launch.”

Traditionally, pirates are Hostis humani generis or “enemies of mankind” in law (as are international terrorists).

In view of the competing jurisdictions to try and punish all these crimes, as well as in view of the regrettable historical circumstances of grave conflict and deep misunderstanding and mistrust between the Pakistan Republic and the Indian Republic, it may be most expeditious for there to be a joint investigation and prosecution under maritime law by the Pakistan Navy and Indian Navy of this entire set of crimes, assisted by civilian legal authorities in both countries. As signatories to the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Pakistan Republic and the Indian Republic may act jointly against the vessel Al-Huseini and all the others associated with the whole conspiracy including the acts of piracy and maritime murder of the Indian fishermen and the trawler-skipper Solanki preceding the massacres in Mumbai.

Both countries would hand over all the accused in their custody to their respective navies for trial and punishment as pirates who have or have conspired to violate the Law of the Sea. The Pakistan Navy Chief and the Indian Navy Chief can agree to have their admirals meet with their respective prisoners for a rendezvous at sea in international waters. A joint trial under maritime law can be conducted on board, say, a Pakistan naval vessel in international waters. The masterminds who conceived and plotted these crimes and who are presently in the custody of the Pakistan Republic can be hanged at sea on a scaffold aboard a Pakistan Navy vessel in international waters for piracy, murder and conspiracy. Kasab, if he turns State’s evidence, can plea-bargain for a lesser sentence; if he does not turn State’s evidence, he can join his handlers on the scaffold. The remains of the nine dead criminals presently in a Mumbai morgue can be buried at sea in international waters by whatever funeral procedure is due to dishonourable sailors and pirates.

Incidental consequences may be that future admissions and recruitment figures of terrorist training institutes would decline, and of course Pakistan-India tensions would be reduced once clear justice is seen to have been done expeditiously in this complex case.

Subroto Roy

13. January 25, 2009 RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks by Subroto Roy Kolkata

The conspicuously good thing that can be said about the RAND Corporation’s study of the Mumbai massacres (”The Lessons of Mumbai”, RAND January 2009) is that there is no sign of it having been affected by the powerful Pakistan lobby. Far too many purported studies emerging from American or British “thinktanks” cannot say the same.

If anything, the ten American authors of the 25-pages of the RAND text have among them two prominent advocates of better US-India relations. This is helpful to truthfulness because of the simple fact India has been in this case a victim of aggression that originated in Pakistan. Whether elements of the Pakistan Government were involved is almost the wrong question – if some retired underemployed former soldier drawing a Pakistan Army pension helped the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s commando training of the Mumbai terrorists, the existence of Pakistani state involvement is proved. Commando training requires technical skills of a sort that can only originate with a military.

In Pakistan as in any other large populous country including India, the state tends to be a hydra-headed monster and it may be foolish to imagine instead a rational, unified, well-informed or even a benevolent political entity. State involvement in Pakistan, India, China or elsewhere is something hard to isolate when there is so much mixing of private and public property or misuse of resources arising from the public exchequer.

What Pakistan’s PR campaign has done after Mumbai is not so much raise the Kashmir dispute as to obfuscate things by shedding crocodile tears and pretending to share victimhood saying, oh we sympathise with you but please sympathise with us too as we have been victims of even bigger terrorist attacks by the same kind of people, we have lost Benazir, we have lost many more people than you have, therefore cooperate with us and we will try to do what we can to help you in this matter. English-speaking liberals educated at places like Karachi Grammar School have then appeared on Indian TV stations (owned by Delhi people from places like Doon School) purporting to represent Pakistan on “the Mumbai incident”; none of them can have much credibility because the real India-haters in Pakistan might cheerfully make them murder victims too given half a chance.

The RAND study deserves credit for avoiding all misleading Pakistani rhetoric about the Mumbai massacres and at least intending to try to get to the bottom of things in a systematic manner. Beyond that, unfortunately, it has made logical and factual and methodological errors which cause it to fail to do so.

The key logical error made by the RAND authors arises from combining a central front-page statement

“Evidence suggests Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group based in Pakistan, was responsible for the attack”

with assertive suggestions about Mumbai’s police being backward, incompetent, cowardly etc (”passive”). Yet how precisely did evidence about LeT culpability come to light? Only because Mumbai’s police and the Railway police engaged, injured and then captured Kasab using their antiquated equipment the best they could. There is no evidence of police cowardice at CST Station; to the contrary, it took courage to aim .303’s at adversaries firing back with assault rifles. Kasab received his first hand injury there. ATS Chief Karkare and his fellow-officers may seem foolhardy in hindsight to have been driving in the same vehicle but they did engage their unknown enemy immediately they could and died doing so, crippling Kasab badly enough that he could be captured in due course at Chowpatty. [Correction: it appears that though Kasab was fired upon by the police at CST Station he received both his hand injuries from the firing by the ATS squad.] And the Chowpatty police action showed obvious bravery in absorbing injury and death in order to kill Ishmail and capture Kasab. (Kasab, among the youngest, had been paired with Ishmail, the apparent leader of the group.)

Furthermore, Kasab upon capture was treated humanely and lawfully. His injuries were treated, he was produced before a magistrate within a week who asked him if he was being mistreated to which he said no. Slumdog millionaire may get undeserved Oscars portraying torture of a British actor by Mumbai police but it is ridiculous fiction – Kasab the captured Pakistani terrorist mass murderer was not tortured by Mumbai’s police.

Contrast such Indian police behaviour with the “enhanced interrogation techniques” the Bush Administration used with negative results in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib – which President Obama has now started to end. Kasab, an ignorant misguided youth, was grateful enough for the humane and civilized treatment to start singing like the proverbial canary. The result of that has been precisely all the evidence the Government of India has now presented to the world and Pakistan about the LeT’s culpability.

As for the anti-terrorist actions of the Indian Army, Navy and NSG, the RAND study is right to point to multitudinous errors and it is useful to have these listed in orderly fashion. But many of these errors were obvious to millions of lay Indian citizens who watched events on TV. The central fault was the scarcity of trained NSG officers and men, and the failure to apply standard emergency management protocols.

The RAND study, by relying overly on government sources, has failed to point to what ordinary Indian citizens already know – the NSG is being utterly wasted protecting our politicians. India has no proper equivalent of the US “Secret Service”, and even if we did, we would probably waste that by spreading it too thinly among politicians. As it happens if almost any politician in India today did happen to be unfortunately assassinated, the main mourners would be family-members and not the general Indian public. Despite politicians constituting rather “low-value targets” for terrorists, India’s scarce anti-terrorist and police resources have been misallocated to protecting them.

Finally, the RAND study makes the lazy-man’s methodological error of supposing outfits like the LeT think and behave in a manner explicable by American political science textbooks, or ought to do so. What Western analysts may need to do instead is learn from the old Arabist and Orientalist traditions of how to think and see the world from Eastern points of view. But that may require greater self-knowledge than the modern world tends to permit.

Postscript:

My December 6 2008 analysis here titled “A Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough)” is republished below. I have corrected “Rome Airport” with “Lod Airport” on the basis of reading the RAND report, though may not have received the courtesy of acknowledgment for the reminder of the Japanese Red Army attack….

14. February 9 2009, Pakistani expansionism: India and the world need to beware of “Non-Resident Pakistanis” ruled by Rahmat Ali’s ghost

The Government of Pakistan is said to be due to release its initial report on the involvement of Pakistanis in the Mumbai massacres. It is reportedly expected that the G o P will partly if not mainly or wholly attribute responsibility for the planning of the massacres to expatriate Pakistanis in other countries, perhaps in Europe and Britain. If so, a fact the Government of India might find prudent to recall is that the Government of Pakistan in bygone decades did deny citizenship to Rahmat Ali himself (who invented the acronym “P, A, K, I, S, T, A, N” ) and even deported him back to Britain from where he had carried out his vituperative and bigoted campaign against Hindus.

Rahmat Ali’s British grave has become a site of pilgrimage for expatriate Pakistani extremists and his ignorant hate-filled ideology from the 1930s has been inspiring their modern manifestos. I said this in an article published in Karachi’s Dawn newspaper in 2005, which also pointed to Iqbal and Jinnah’s disdain for Rahmat Ali’s views (see “Iqbal and Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali” republished here). American nationals and British subjects of Pakistani origin inspired by Rahmat Ali’s ghost are spreading theories of Pakistani territorial expansionism at the cost of the destruction of the Indian Republic and many other countries.

The fact that at one such website recently I myself, presumably because of my Hindu name and Indian nationality, have been referred to as a “monkey- or donkey-worshipper” may speak to the somewhat rabid nature of such ideologies. (Drat! And there I was expecting some elementary Pakistani courtesy and acknowledgment let alone gratitude for having created, at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago, the volume with WE James titled Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s with its mundane chapters on agriculture, macroeconomics, education etc!)

Incidentally, British newspapers are reporting today that America’s CIA has been deeply concerned about British subjects of Pakistani origin being a source of international terrorism. It may be pertinent to recall that terrorism in India’s Punjab had much support among numerous Sikh expatriates and immigrants in North America and Britain, and the same kind of thing may be true of Tamil expatriates from Sri Lanka. Being isolated and alienated as immigrants in a foreign country may lead to psychological conditions that contribute to such phenomena, whereby political and other events in the faraway country-of-origin take on exaggerated proportions in an individual’s mental make-up. Certainly Rahmat Ali himself was a rather tragic lonely figure who wasted his own potential to properly contribute to Pakistan’s political history through his own self-blinding hatred of Hindus.

SR

15. February 11, 2009 Kasab, the young misguided Pakistani mass-murdering terrorist, needs to be given political asylum in India! (Matt Damon, Will Smith: here’s a real-life case!)

Life imitates art or rather Hollywood again as young Kasab, the misguided primary-school dropout Pakistani mass-murdering terrorist caught by Indian police after the Mumbai massacres, becomes a kind of Jason-Bourne/Enemy-of-the-State character who is said to be being targeted now by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds for not being dead already! There have been all kinds of weird assassinations by and of government agents using poisoned umbrellas and radioactive pills etc in real life, and who is to say that young Kasab is not going to be given a small cyanide capsule along with a letter of farewell from his parents when His Excellency the High Commissioner’s consular agents receive access to him?

Shortly after Kasab’s remorseful confessions (which flowed from his natural gratitude at having survived and having been treated humanely by Mumbai’s police), I said here that if I was the judge trying him, I would send him to an Indian prison for 20 or 30 years (given his 20 or 30 murder victims), but I would add that he should be occasionally, say once a year, permitted to offer namaz at India’s grandest mosques. He could become a model prisoner, possibly a potent weapon against Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds who have ruined his life and now wish him dead.

(Message to Matt Damon, Will Smith and assorted Hollywood cinematic personalities: there is a confessed, remorseful mass-murdering 20-year old Pakistani terrorist in an Indian prison who is being targeted by the very people who sent him on his vile mission.)

In present circumstances, young Kasab needs to seek political asylum in the Indian Republic as his life in his own Pakistan Republic is as good as over for political reasons. He would become the first person ever in history to receive political asylum in a country that he attacked despite being a confessed terrorist mass-murderer. But Mahatma Gandhi would have approved and smiled at the irony of it all! Ahimsa paramo dharmaha in practice.

SR

16. February 12 2009, Thanks and well done Minister Rehman Malik and the Government of Pakistan

The Hon’ble Rehman Malik and the Government of Pakistan have done very well, all things considered, in taking forward the criminal investigation into the Mumbai massacres, based on the evidence provided by Indian authorities that arose from the cooperation and testimony of young Kasab, the captured Pakistani terrorist. I am hopeful the Government of India will provide a serious well-considered response too, though our private TV channels continue frequently to be rather juvenile, sensationalist and inflammatory caused by their overall lack of editorial competence.

As foreseen here over the last two months, a very serious problem of international law still arises due to the competing jurisdictions in the prosecution of this complex case, since both the Indian Republic and the Pakistan Republic have jurisdiction. I continue to believe that a joint prosecution by the Pakistan Navy and the Indian Navy under the Law of the Sea in international waters (conducted on board, say, a Pakistan Navy vessel) may be the most expeditious way to bring this whole tragic and awful matter to proper closure.

In the meantime, the Government of Pakistan has done well and deserves Indian thanks. Recall, by way of contrast, that investigations of many of Pakistan’s major political assassinations, from Liaquat Ali Khan and Dr Khan Sahib to Zia ul Haq and Nawab Bugti and Benazir Bhutto herself, still remain in the dark. We in India tend to solve our political assassinations better but in recent times our police have failed woefully to solve several ghastly and notorious personal murders.

Subroto Roy, Kolkata

17. March 18 2009. Pakistan’s progress

Nine months ago, on June 9 2008, I wrote but did not publish the op-ed article below “Pakistan’s progress” intended for an Indian newspaper. When the Mumbai massacres took place, I was rather glad I had not come to do so because its cheer and optimism contrasted too starkly with the vileness and viciousness of the massacres. Instead I turned to the legal, moral and political implications of the massacres, and several articles are to be found here on Kasab, competing jurisdictions in international law in prosecuting the crimes, and application of the Law of the Sea Treaty (which both countries have ratified) to jointly try and hang the masterminds at sea in international waters. Pakistan’s initial criminal investigation into the massacres received praise here, and I can only trust that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan will remain forensically focussed on that case of mass-murder and other heinous crimes until its appropriate conclusion.

Meanwhile, recent political events in Pakistan have made the article below relevant again; when it was written Pervez Musharraf had still not departed from office but the more abstract constitutional question raised in the article had to do with the relative powers of the Head of State and Head of Government in the new Pakistan. With the peaceful restoration of the Chief Justice to his high office, I am glad to say that the question I raised but did not publish nine months ago, namely, “A rare constitutional consensus might be developing – can it last long enough?”, seems to be headed at present to being answered in the affirmative.

Subroto Roy, Kolkata, India

“Pakistan’s progress: A rare constitutional consensus might be developing – can it last long enough? Subroto Roy, dated June 9 2008

The dynamic evolution of politics in Pakistan should be judged not against Indian politics (rotten or exemplary as our politics can be at different times) but against its own initial conditions. It is an unimaginable luxury that Pakistanis in recent months have been discussing such sweet constitutional questions as how to restore judges unseated by soldiers having entered the Supreme Court, what to do with judges who took an oath despite such an abomination, how to maintain diplomatic relations between the PPP and PML(N), and most important of all, whether the military with its nuclear assets should report to the PM or President – in other words, is the Head of Government or Head of State the Chief Executive? It is a luxury too that Pervez Musharraf has become almost a distraction in Pakistani politics, that he himself indicates he may be running out of dramatic lines and may be getting ready to exit his country’s political stage, that the Pakistan Army is shocked by its realisation of its loss of prestige in society, that the Ex-Servicemen’s Society thinks Musharraf deserves punishment for having caused such a state of affairs. Dr Ayesha Siddiqa has pointed out that every Pakistani military strongman has been eventually removed, and has been removed not by democratic forces alone but by intra-military pressure.

It is likely we are at present witnessing such a critical moment, and it is naturally fraught with danger for any civilian prime minister and parliament because any intra-military conflict can descend into mutiny or worse. Pakistan Army officers have been deeply divided for years over Islamicisation already — onto which is now compounded the issue of loyalty to Musharraf (mostly paid for in American dollars) versus the urge to remove him in the best future interests of the military. Musharraf himself, with his usual braggadocio, has been claiming fealty to constitutional principles as well; so at least there is agreement on all sides that matters should proceed in an orderly and dignified manner and not by nefarious means.

The relevant comparison of the present situation is with the recent past. Let us look back just a few years, say to the autumn of 2005 when the initial post 9/11 Western backlash against Pakistan had been renewed after the London Underground bombings. On 1 September 2005, during the scheduled Islamabad visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary, the PAF launched massive month-long war-games against an assumed Indian enemy. It involved “the entire fleet, including US-made F-16s, French Mirage fighter aircraft and Chinese-built jets” and “using all assets” in an exercise “closest to war you can get in peacetime”; from the Hindu Kush to the Arabian Sea “8,200 operational sorties” would be flown, Shaukat Aziz witnessing the start, Musharraf the finish. Hardly had this orgy of militarism concluded when northern Pakistan and parts of J&K were hit by the devastating earthquake; Musharraf visited quake-hit areas still dressed in battle gear down to his para wings.

Pakistanis of all classes were appalled at the ineptitude of their government in face of the earthquake and it was inevitable the military would be held responsible. What had been the opportunity cost in fungible resources of those “8,200 operational sorties”? The military’s extremely expensive “assets” were designed for war with India and had bankrupted the country but ordinary people had been left utterly helpless in a natural calamity. Future historians of Pakistan may well see the 2005 earthquake as a critical turning point in their political development just as the 12 November 1970 cyclone was in the history of Bangladesh.

A modern war between Pakistan and India, even a non-nuclear one, would be like a hundred earthquakes. Indians have not been so jingoistic as to contemplate such an exchange of destruction but less than a decade ago Gohar Ayub Khan, as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, was boasting how India would surrender within a few hours in the next war – which was presumably a threat to unleash missiles, even non-nuclear ones, as a first resort against Indian cities and civilian populations. That such abominable Pakistan-India tension has today come to vanish might have been indicated during the recent IPL cricket final when Kamran Akmal jumped onto Yusuf Pathan or crashed into Mohammad Kaif as commercially driven team-mates led by an Australian captain and associated with what used to be Hindu Rajputana. So much for the “Two Nations Theory” in the 21st Century. Maulana Azad seems to have been proven right and MA Jinnah proven wrong after all.

The Pakistani state had become an oppressive war-machine solely guided by anti-Indian paranoia even while ordinary Pakistanis, through modern communications and technology, knew fully well India and Indians were not nearly as bad as the Pakistan Government was making them out to be. From an official Pakistani point of view, a nuclear bomb (even a purchased and assembled one) was needed out of fear India intended to destroy what remained of West Pakistan – a theory that could arise only from the delusion that Bangladesh had been caused by Indian intrigues. The Pakistan Army has been reluctant for more than a generation to face up to the reality of its behaviour in East Pakistan and the consequences that resulted; it has been far easier to blame India instead.

Yet Pakistan’s national hero, AQ Khan himself, born in Bhopal and extremely bitter at modern India as many former Indian nationals tend to be, has now said “Never! Never!” will there be an exchange of destruction in nuclear warfare between India and Pakistan. It may be a wise Indian diplomatic move to invite Dr Khan, stricken with cancer as he is said to be, to make a quiet private visit to his place of birth if he wished to (perhaps followed by a courtesy luncheon at BARC on the way home).

Of course Indians cannot forget the destruction that has been wrought in this country in recent years by our old Bogeyman, the ISI. Yet it is a fair bet that not only do we not comprehend the workings of that particular bureaucracy, nor do Pakistanis themselves, indeed the ISI itself may not comprehend itself in the sense that different ISI sections have been and may remain at cross-purposes or conflict with each other as has become apparent in the ongoing official attempts to suppress the new “Taliban”. Proper civilian control of the ISI is part of the same process as the proper civilian control of the Pakistan military as a whole, and what we are witnessing is nothing less than the first serious constitutional attempt in Pakistan’s history for that to take place. The whole subcontinent is hopeful and watching Pakistan’s transition. In the meantime, a milestone was certainly reached on 25 May when Pakistan’s young and brilliant sufi rock band Junoon performed in beautiful Srinagar to the delight of thousands of Kashmiris. The “United Jehad Council” and Syed Ali Shah Geelani had denounced them; in reply the band’s lead guitarist Salman Ahmed had the courage to say: “I want them to join us in the musical jehad for peace and ring the bells of harmony.” For peace to break out will of course require India’s participation and willingness as well.”…

Posted in Ahimsa, BBC, Benazir Bhutto, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, India in international law, India's Land, India's Military Defence, India's Muslims, India's Rule of Law, Jews in India, Law, Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea applied to international terrorists, Laws of war applied to international terrorists, Life and death, Master and Servant Law, Mumbai massacres, Mumbai terrorist Kasab, Mumbai's Police, Mumbai/Bombay, Nariman House massacre, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's psychology, Pakistan's constitutional politics, Pakistan's history, Pakistan's military, Pakistan's murder of Indian POWs, Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Pakistan's politics, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism, RAND study of Mumbai attacks, Schizophrenia in international relations, Terrorist techniques. 2 Comments »

A Dozen Grown-Up Questions for Indian Politicians Dreaming of Becoming/Deciding India’s PM After the 2009 General Elections

April 28, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

The 2009 General Election campaign is supposed to elect a Parliament and a Head of Government for the Republic of India, not a Head Boy/Head Girl at an urban middle-class high school or the karta of a joint family. Unfortunately, our comprador national-level media seem to be docile and juvenile enough in face of power and privilege to want to ask only touchy-feely koochi-woochi pretty baby questions of the “candidates” for PM (several of whom are not even running as candidates for the Lok Sabha but still seem to want to be PM). Rival candidates themselves seem to want to hurl invective and innuendo at one another, as if all this was merely some public squabble between Delhi middle-class families.

So here are a set of grown-up adult questions instead:

1. Pakistan is politically and strategically our most important neighbour. Can you assure the country that a government headed by you will have a coherent policy on both war and peace with Pakistan? How would you achieve it?

2. Do you agree with the Reagan-Gorbachev opinion that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”? If so, what would your Government do about it?

3. If there are Indian citizens in Jammu & Kashmir presently governed by Article 370 who wish to renounce Indian nationality and remain stateless or become Pakistani/Afghan/Iranian citizens instead, would you consider letting them do so and giving them Indian “green cards” for peaceful permanent residence in J&K and India as a whole?

4. Do you know where Chumbi Valley is? If so, would your Government consider reviving the decades-old idea with China to mutually exchange permanent leases to Aksai Chin and Chumbi Valley respectively?

5. Nuclear power presently accounts as a source of about 4% of total Indian electricity; do you agree that even if nuclear power capacity alone increased by 100% over the next ten years and all other sources of electricity remained constant, nuclear power would still account for less than 8% of the total?

6. The public debt of the country may now amount to something like Rs 30 lakh crore (Rs 30 trillion); do you find that worrisome? If so, why so? If not, why not?

7. The Government of India may be paying something like Rs 3 lakh crore (Rs 3 trillion) annually on interest payments on its debt; do you agree that tends to suck dry every public budget even before it can try to do something worthwhile?

8. If our money supply growth is near 22% per annum, and the rate of growth of real income is near 7% per annum, would you agree the decline in the value of money (i.e., the rate of inflation) could be as high as 15% per annum?

9. Do you agree that giving poor people direct income subsidies is a far better way to help them than by distorting market prices for everybody? If not, why not?

10. How would you seek to improve the working of (and reduce the corruption in) the following public institutions: (1) the Army and paramilitary; (2) the Judiciary and Police; (3) Universities and technical institutes?

11. There has never been a Prime Minister in any parliamentary democracy in the world throughout the 20th Century who was also not an elected member of the Lower House; do you agree BR Ambedkar and Jawaharlal Nehru intended that for the Republic of India as well and thought it something so obvious as not necessary to specify in the 1950 Constitution? What will your Government do to improve the working of the Presidency, the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and State Assemblies?

12. What, personally, is your vision for India after a five-year period of a Government led by you?

Subroto Roy,

Citizen & Voter

Posted in 15th Lok Sabha, Academic research, Afghanistan, Air warfare, Aksai Chin, BR Ambedkar, China's expansionism, China-India Relations, Chumbi Valley, India's 2009 General Election, India's Army, India's Banking, India's Budget, India's bureaucracy, India's Constitution, India's constitutional politics, India's Democracy, India's Diplomacy, India's Economy, India's education, India's Election Commission, India's Electorate, India's Foreign Policy, India's Government Budget Constraint, India's Government Expenditure, India's higher education, India's History, India's inflation, India's Judiciary, India's Lok Sabha, India's Macroeconomics, India's Monetary & Fiscal Policy, India's nomenclatura, India's Personality Cults, India's political lobbyists, India's political parties, India's Politics, India's Polity, India's pork-barrel politics, India's poverty, India's Presidency, India's private TV channels, India's Public Finance, India's Rajya Sabha, India's Reserve Bank, India's Rule of Law, India's State Finances, India's Supreme Court, India's Union-State relations, India-China relations, India-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, India-Pakistan naval cooperation, India-Pakistan peace process, India-Tibet Border, India-United States business, India-US Nuclear Deal, International diplomacy, Iran, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Jawaharlal Nehru, Just war, Laddakh, Land and political economy, LK Advani, Manmohan Singh, Pakistan's murder of Indian POWs, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism, Press and Media, Sonia Gandhi, Stonewalling in politics, Voting, War. Leave a Comment »

What is Christine Fair referring to? Would the MEA kindly seek to address what she has claimed asap?

April 27, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

Almost three years ago when the Baloch leader Nawab Bugti was killed by bombardment during the Musharraf-regime, I was moved to research and write a short analysis of Balochistan for the first time. I said inter alia

“because there are two million Balochis in Iranian Balochistan, Pakistan’s Balochi nationalists have had a declared enemy to their west in the Iranian Government ~ the Pahlevi regime even provided Italian-made American Huey helicopter gunships with Iranian pilots to help Bhutto crush the Baloch rebellions of the early 1970s. In fact, Balochi rebels have had no military allies except the pre-communist Government of Afghanistan under Daud, who ‘ordered the establishment of a training camp at Qandahar for Baloch liberation fighters. Between 10,000 and 15,000 Baloch youths were trained and armed there’ (R Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan 1988, p. 78). The Governments of India or the United States lack motivation or capability to help, and Balochistan may be doomed to becoming a large human rights/genocidal disaster of the next decade. An independent Balochistan may be unviable, being overwhelmed by its riches while having too small, uneducated and backward a population of its own, and powerful greedy neighbours on either side… Today, the Pashtun of Pakistan and Afghanistan (as well as perhaps Sindhis of Baloch origin) may be the only interlocutors who can prevent a genocide and mediate a peace between Balochi nationalists and Musharraf’s ruthless Punjabi military-businessmen determined to colonize Balochistan completely with Chinese help, effectively subsidising their misgovernance elsewhere with Balochistan’s riches…”

Raja Anwar had been a close friend and associate of ZA Bhutto, the founder of Pakistan’s ruling party, and his book on Afghanistan published 20 years ago is required reading.

The wonders of the Internet sent me back to this subject a few days ago when a Pakistani website claimed that the American analyst Dr Christine Fair of RAND said she had visited an Indian consulate in Zahedan, Iran, and alleged to her interlocutors that the consulate was “not issuing visas as the main activity” .

Dr Fair’s reported words seemed to me to be surprising, so I wrote to her seeking a confirmation that she had been quoted correctly, when the Pakistani website very kindly sent me the link to her words at a recent gathering of American and British observers discussing Pakistan. This is what Dr Fair said at that gathering on this topic (emphasis added):

“I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organization to build sensitive parts of the Ring Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security. It is also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar–across from Bajaur. Kabul’s motivations for encouraging these activities are as obvious as India’s interest in engaging in them. Even if by some act of miraculous diplomacy the territorial issues were to be resolved, Pakistan would remain an insecure state. Given the realities of the subcontinent (e.g., India’s rise and its more effective foreign relations with all of Pakistan’s near and far neighbors), these fears are bound to grow, not lessen. This suggests that without some means of compelling Pakistan to abandon its reliance upon militancy, it will become ever more interested in using it — and the militants will likely continue to proliferate beyond Pakistan’s control.”

Now I have nothing to do with the Government of India and have no idea about the evidence relating to the precise facts being alleged here. But I do have some circumstantial evidence as well as a personal reason to be curious, as my father was an Indian diplomat in Tehran during 1954-1957 and I was in fact born there.

I recalled him having told me he had travelled in that region and today he confirmed that he had in fact, from the Tehran Embassy as part of his official duties as Commercial Secretary and Consul, visited what was then an Indian Vice-Consulate at Zahedan, peopled by a single Indian Vice-Consul with whom he had spent two days.

That was more than 50 years ago — so the “Indian mission” that Dr Fair said she visited in Zahedan is far from being anything new whatsoever. In fact, I would predict it was probably something that existed during British India too and that it was precisely an outpost of British India issuing visas for anyone headed towards Quetta in what was then British Baluchistan.

Could the Consulate be upto anything else? Hmmm, let’s see, how about assisting in the complex overall discussions, now apparently stalled or aborted, between Iran, Pakistan and India over the gas pipeline perhaps?

In other words, there might be any number of perfectly legitimate reasons for India to be represented in Zahedan as it has been for more than half a century — the allegation contained in the American discussion of India fomenting trouble for Pakistan in Balochistan may be entirely baseless.

Did India once support the Northern Alliance? Of course, as did Iran too, but that was all pre 9/11 during the extended Afghan civil war before the toppling of the Mullah Umar Government by the Northern Alliance allied with the United States! That is wholly a separate thing from any claim that India from Iranian soil has caused trouble in Balochistan.

Such an aspersion coming from such a source would be easily and delightedly picked up by those in Pakistan looking for exogenous explanations of their problems. For example, if you watch the video of the ghastly murder of the Polish engineer Piotr Stanczak by the Pakistani Taliban, you will find a demented Pakistani commentator in the background disclaiming any Pakistani responsibility for it saying instead it was all India’s fault and India has been financing the Pakistani Taliban with “billions”! (Postcript June 8 2009: Jemima Khan reported a few days ago: “Pakistan pulsates with conspiracy theories. One, which has made it into the local newspapers, is that the Taliban when caught and stripped were revealed to have been “intact, not Muslims”, a euphemism for uncircumcised. (Pakistanis are big on euphemisms.) Their beards were stuck on with glue. “Foreign elements” (India) are suspected.”)

Such is the extent of the psychosis. “Delta Dawn, what’s that flower you have on…?”

The Government of India obviously needs to address Dr Fair’s claim and seek to squarely refute what she has said in these remarks.

Subroto Roy, Kolkata

Posted in Balochistan, Britain in India, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, India's Diplomacy, India's Foreign Policy, India's Foreign Service, India-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, India-Pakistan peace process, Iran, Jemima Khan, Pakistan's psychology, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Poland, Psychology, US Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Espionage. 2 Comments »

Alfred Lyall on Christians, Muslims, India, China, Etc, 1908

April 6, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

“THE STATE IN ITS RELATION TO EASTERN AND WESTERN RELIGIONS”

By Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall (1835-1911)

Delivered as President of the Congress for the History of Religions, September 1908.—Fortnightly Review, November 1908.

“In considering the subject of my address, I have been confronted by this difficulty—that in the sections which regulate the order of our proceedings, we have a list of papers that range over all the principal religions, ancient and modern, that have existed and still exist in the world. They are to be treated and discussed by experts whose scholarship, particular studies, and close research entitle them all to address you authoritatively. I have no such special qualifications; and in any case it would be most presumptuous in me to trespass upon their ground. All that I can venture to do, therefore, in the remarks which I propose to address to you to-day, is to attempt a brief general survey of the history of religions from a standpoint which may possibly not fall within the scope of these separate papers.

The four great religions now prevailing in the world, which are historical in the sense that they have been long known to history, I take to be—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Having regard to their origin and derivation, to their history and character, I may be permitted, for my present purpose only, to class the two former as the Religions of the West, and the two latter as the Religions of the East. These are the faiths which still maintain a mighty influence over the minds of mankind. And my object is to compare the political relations, the attitude, maintained toward them, from time to time, by the States and rulers of the people over which these religions have established their spiritual dominion.

The religion of the Jews is not included, though its influence has been incalculable, because it has been caught up, so to speak, into Christianity and Islam, and cannot therefore be counted among those which have made a partition of the religious world. For this reason, perhaps, it has retained to this day its ancient denomination, derived from the tribe or country of its origin; whereas the others are named from a Faith or a Founder. The word Nazarene, denoting the birthplace of Christianity, which is said to be still used in that region, was, as we know, very speedily superseded by its wider title, as the Creed broke out of local limits and was proclaimed universal. There has evidently been a foretime, though it is prehistorical, when, so far as we know, mankind was universally polytheistic; when innumerable rites and worships prevailed without restraint, springing up and contending with each other like the trees in a primeval forest, reflecting a primitive and precarious condition of human society.

I take polytheism to have been, in this earliest stage, the wild growth of superstitious imagination, varied indefinitely by the pressure of circumstance, by accident, by popular caprice, or by the good or evil fortunes of the community. In this stage it can now be seen among barbarous tribes—as, for instance, in Central Africa. And some traces of it still survive, under different pretexts and disguises, in the lowest strata of civilised nations, where it may be said to represent the natural reluctance of the vagrant human fancy to be satisfied with higher forms and purer conceptions that are always imperfectly assimilated by the multitude. Among primitive societies the spheres of human and divine affairs were intermixed and identical; they could not be disentangled. But with the growth of political institutions came gradual separation, or at any rate the subordination of religion to the practical necessities of orderly government and public morals.

That polytheism can exist and flourish in the midst of a highly intellectual and civilised society, we know from the history of Greece and Rome. But in ancient Greece its direct influence upon political affairs seems to have been slight; though it touched at some points upon morality. The function of the State, according to Greek ideas, was to legislate for all the departments of human life and to uphold the moral standard. The law prohibited sacrilege and profanity; it punished open impiety that might bring down divine wrath upon the people at large. The philosophers taught rational ethics; they regarded the popular superstitions with indulgent contempt; but they inculcated the duty of honouring the gods, and the observance of public ceremonial. Beyond these limits the practice of local and customary worship was, I think, free and unrestrained; though I need hardly add that toleration, as understood by the States of antiquity, was a very different thing from the modern principle of religious neutrality. Under the Roman government the connection between the State and religion was much closer, as the dominion of Rome expanded and its power became centralised. The Roman State maintained a strict control and superintendence over the official rituals and worships, which were regulated as a department of the administration, to bind the people together by established rites and worships, in order to cement political and social unity. It is true that the usages of the tribes and principalities that were conquered and annexed were left undisturbed; for the Roman policy, like that of the English in India, was to avoid giving offence to religion; and undoubtedly this policy, in both instances, materially facilitated the rapid building up of a wide dominion. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to draw in the worship toward a common centre. The deities of the conquered provinces were respected and conciliated; the Roman generals even appealed to them for protection and favour, yet they became absorbed and assimilated under Roman names; they were often identified with the gods of the Roman pantheon, and were frequently superseded by the victorious divinities of the new rulers—the strange deities, in fact, were Romanised as well as the foreign tribes and cities. After this manner the Roman empire combined the tolerance of great religious diversity with the supremacy of a centralised government. Political amalgamation brought about a fusion of divine attributes; and latterly the emperor was adored as the symbol of manifest power, ruler and pontiff; he was the visible image of supreme authority. This régime was easily accepted by the simple unsophisticated paganism of Europe. The Romans, with all their statecraft, had as yet no experience of a high religious temperature, of enthusiastic devotion and divine mysteries. But as their conquest and commerce spread eastward, the invasion of Asia let in upon Europe a flood of Oriental divinities, and thus Rome came into contact with much stronger and deeper spiritual forces. The European polytheism might be utilised and administered, the Asiatic deities could not be domesticated and subjected to regulation; the Oriental orgies and strange rites broke in upon the organised State worship; the new ideas and practices came backed by a profound and fervid spiritualism. Nevertheless the Roman policy of bringing religion under authoritative control was more or less successful even in the Asiatic provinces of the empire; the privileges of the temples were restricted; the priesthoods were placed under the general superintendence of the proconsular officials; and Roman divinities gradually found their way into the Asiatic pantheon. But we all know that the religion of the Roman empire was falling into multitudinous confusion when Christianity arose—an austere exclusive faith, with its army of saints, ascetics, and unflinching martyrs, proclaiming worship to be due to one God only, and sternly refusing to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor. Against such a faith an incoherent disorderly polytheism could make no better stand than tribal levies against a disciplined army. The new religion struck directly at the sacrifices that symbolised imperial unity; the passive resistance of Christians was necessarily treated as rebellion, the State made implacable war upon them. Yet the spiritual and moral forces won the victory, and Christianity established itself throughout the empire. Universal religion, following upon universal civil dominion, completed the levelling of local and national distinctions. The Churches rapidly grew into authority superior to the State within their own jurisdiction; they called in the temporal government to enforce theological decisions and to put down heresies; they founded a powerful hierarchy. The earlier Roman constitution had made religion an instrument of administration. When one religion became universal, the churches enlisted the civil ruler into the service of orthodoxy; they converted the State into an instrument for enforcing religion. The pagan empire had issued edicts against Christianity and had suppressed Christian assemblies as tainted with disaffection; the Christian emperors enacted laws against the rites and worships of paganism, and closed temples. It was by the supreme authority of Constantine that, for the first time in the religious history of the world, uniformity of belief was defined by a creed, and sanctioned by the ruler’s assent.

Then came, in Western Europe, the time when the empire at Rome was rent asunder by the inrush of barbarians; but upon its ruins was erected the great Catholic Church of the Papacy, which preserved in the ecclesiastical domain the autocratic imperial tradition. The primacy of the Roman Church, according to Harnack, is essentially the transference to her of Rome’s central position in the religions of the heathen world; the Church united the western races, disunited politically, under the common denomination of Christianity. Yet Christianity had not long established itself throughout all the lands, in Europe and Asia, which had once been under the Roman sovereignty, when the violent irruptions of Islam upset not only the temporal but also the spiritual dominion throughout Western Asia, and along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Eastern empire at Constantinople had been weakened by bitter theological dissensions and heresies among the Christians; the votaries of the new, simple, unswerving faith of Mohammed were ardent and unanimous.

In Egypt and Syria the Mohammedans were speedily victorious; the Latin Church and even the Latin language were swept out of North Africa. In Persia the Sassanian dynasty was overthrown, and although there was no immediate and total conversion of the people, Mohammedanism gradually superseded the ancient Zoroastrian cultus as the religion of the Persian State. It was not long before the armies of Islam had triumphed from the Atlantic coast to the Jaxartes river in Central Asia; and conversion followed, speedily or slowly, as the direct result of conquest. Moreover, the Mohammedans invaded Europe. In the south-west they subdued almost all Spain; and in the south-east they destroyed, some centuries later, the Greek empire, though not the Greek Church, and consolidated a mighty rulership at Constantinople. With this prolonged conflict between Islam and Christianity along the borderlands of Europe and Asia began the era of those religious wars that have darkened the history of the Western nations, and have perpetuated the inveterate antipathy between Asiatic and European races, which the spread of Christianity into both continents had softened and might have healed. In the end Christianity has fixed itself permanently in Europe, while Islam is strongly established throughout half Asia. But the sharp collision between the two faiths, the clash of armies bearing the cross and the crescent, generated fierce fanaticism on both sides. The Crusades kindled a fiery militant and missionary spirit previously unknown to religions, whereby religious propagation became the mainspring and declared object of conquest and colonisation.

Finally, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the great secession from the Roman Church divided the nations of Western Europe into hostile camps, and throughout the long wars of that period political jealousies and ambitions were inflamed by religious animosities. In Eastern Europe the Greek Church fell under almost complete subordination to the State. The history of Europe and Western Asia records, therefore, a close connection and community of interests between the States and the orthodox faiths; a combination which has had a very potent influence, during many centuries, upon the course of civil affairs, upon the fortunes, or misfortunes, of nations.

Up to the sixteenth century, at least, it was universally held, by Christianity and by Islam, that the State was bound to enforce orthodoxy; conversion and the suppression or expulsion of heretics were public duties. Unity of creed was thought necessary for national unity—a government could not undertake to maintain authority, or preserve the allegiance of its subjects, in a realm divided and distracted by sectarian controversies. On these principles Christianity and Islam were consolidated, in union with the States or in close alliance with them; and the geographical boundaries of these two faiths, and of their internal divisions respectively, have not materially changed up to the present day.

Let me now turn to the history of religion in those countries of further Asia, which were never reached by Greek or Roman conquest or civilisation, where the ancient forms of worship and conceptions of divinity, which existed before Christianity and Islam, still flourish. And here I shall only deal with the relations of the State to religion in India and China and their dependencies, because these vast and populous empires contain the two great religions, Hinduism and Buddhism, of purely Asiatic origin and character, which have assimilated to a large extent, and in a certain degree elevated, the indigenous polytheism, and which still exercise a mighty influence over the spiritual and moral condition of many millions. We know what a tremendous power religion has been in the wars and politics of the West. I submit that in Eastern Asia, beyond the pale of Islam, the history of religion has been very different. Religious wars—I mean wars caused by the conflict of militant faiths contending for superiority—were, I believe, unknown on any great scale to the ancient civilisations. It seems to me that until Islam invaded India the great religious movements and changes in that region had seldom or never been the consequence of, nor had been materially affected by, wars, conquests, or political revolutions. Throughout Europe and Mohammedan Asia the indigenous deities and their temples have disappeared centuries ago; they have been swept away by the forces of Church and State combined to exterminate them; they have all yielded to the lofty overruling ideal of monotheism.

But the tide of Mohammedanism reached its limit in India; the people, though conquered, were but partly converted, and eastward of India there have been no important Mohammedan rulerships. On this side of Asia, therefore, two great religions, Buddhism and Brahmanism, have held their ground from times far anterior to Christianity; they have retained the elastic comprehensive character of polytheism, purified and elevated by higher conceptions, developed by the persistent competition of diverse ideas and forms among the people, unrestrained by attempts of superior organised faiths to obliterate the lower and weaker species. In that region political despotism has prevailed immemorially; religious despotism, in the sense of the legal establishment of one faith or worship to the exclusion of all others, of uniformity imposed by coercion, of proselytism by persecution, is unknown to history: the governments have been absolute and personal; the religions have been popular and democratic. They have never been identified so closely with the ruling power as to share its fortunes, or to be used for the consolidation of successful conquest. Nor, on the other hand, has a ruler ever found it necessary, for the security of his throne, to conform to the religion of his subjects, and to abjure all others. The political maxim, that the sovereign and his subjects should be of one and the same religion, ‘Cujus regio ejus religio’, has never prevailed in this part of the world.

And although in India, the land of their common origin, Buddhism widely displaced and overlaid Brahmanism, while it was in its turn, after several centuries, overcome and ejected by a Brahmanic revival, yet I believe that history records no violent contests or collisions between them; nor do we know that the armed force of the State played any decisive part in these spiritual revolutions. I do not maintain that Buddhism has owed nothing to State influence. It represents certain doctrines of the ancient Indian theosophy, incarnate, as one might say, in the figure of a spiritual Master, the Indian prince, Sakya Gautama, who was the type and example of ascetic quietism; it embodies the idea of salvation, or emancipation attainable by man’s own efforts, without aid from priests or divinities. Buddhism is the earliest, by many centuries, of the faiths that claim descent from a personal founder. It emerges into authentic history with the empire of Asoka, who ruled over the greater part of India some 250 years before Christ, and its propagation over his realm and the countries adjacent is undoubtedly due to the influence, example, and authority of that devout monarch.

According to Mr. Vincent Smith, from whose valuable work on the Early History of India I take the description of Asoka’s religious policy, the king, renouncing after one necessary war all further military conquest, made it the business of his life to employ his autocratic power in directing the preaching and teaching of the Law of Piety, which he had learnt from his Buddhist priesthood. All his high officers were commanded to instruct the people in the way of salvation; he sent missions to foreign countries; he issued edicts promulgating ethical doctrines, and the rules of a devout life; he made pilgrimages to the sacred places; and finally he assumed the yellow robe of a Buddhist monk.

Asoka elevated, so Mr. Smith has said, a sect of Hinduism to the rank of a world-religion. Nevertheless, I think it may be affirmed that the emperor consistently refrained from the forcible conversion of his subjects, and indeed the use of compulsion would have apparently been a breach of his own edicts, which insist on the principle of toleration, and declare the propagation of the Law of Piety to be his sole object. Asoka made no attempt to persecute Brahmanism; and it seems clear that the extraordinary success of Buddhism in India cannot be attributed to war or to conquest. To imperial influence and example much must be ascribed, yet I think Buddhism owed much more to its spiritual potency, to its superior faculty of transmuting and assimilating, instead of abolishing, the elementary instincts and worships, endowing them with a higher significance, attracting and stimulating devotion by impressive rites and ceremonies, impressing upon the people the dogma of the soul’s transmigration and its escape from the miseries of sentient existence by the operation of merits. And of all great religions it is the least political, for the practice of asceticism and quietism, of monastic seclusion from the working world, is necessarily adverse to any active connection with mundane affairs.

I do not know that the mysterious disappearance of Buddhism from India can be accounted for by any great political revolution, like that which brought Islam into India. It seems to have vanished before the Mohammedans had gained any footing in the country.

Meanwhile Buddhism is said to have penetrated into the Chinese empire by the first century of the Christian era. Before that time the doctrines of Confucius and Laotze were the dominant philosophies; rather moral than religious, though ancestral worship and the propitiation of spirits were not disallowed, and were to a certain extent enjoined. Laotze, the apostle of Taoism, appears to have preached a kind of Stoicism—the observance of the order of Nature in searching for the right way of salvation, the abhorrence of vicious sensuality—and the cultivation of humility, self-sacrifice, and simplicity of life. He condemned altogether the use of force in the sphere of religion or morality; though he admitted that it might be necessary for the purposes of civil government. The system of Confucius inculcated justice, benevolence, self-control, obedience and loyalty to the sovereign—all the civic virtues; it was a moral code without a metaphysical background; the popular worships were tolerated, reverence for ancestors conduced to edification; the gods were to be honoured, though it was well to keep aloof from them; he disliked religious fervour, and of things beyond experience he had nothing to say.

Buddhism, with its contempt for temporal affairs, treating life as a mere burden, and the soul’s liberation from existence as the end and object of meditative devotion, must have imported a new and disturbing element into the utilitarian philosophies of ancient China. For many centuries Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are said to have contended for the patronage and recognition of the Chinese emperors. Buddhism was alternately persecuted and protected, expelled and restored by imperial decree. Priesthoods and monastic orders are institutions of which governments are naturally jealous; the monasteries were destroyed or rebuilt, sacerdotal orders and celibacy suppressed or encouraged by imperial decrees, according to the views and prepossessions of successive dynasties or emperors. Nevertheless the general policy of Chinese rulers and ministers seems not to have varied essentially. Their administrative principle was that religion must be prevented from interfering with affairs of State, that abuses and superstitious extravagances are not so much offences against orthodoxy as matters for the police, and as such must be put down by the secular arm. Upon this policy successive dynasties appear to have acted continuously up to the present day in China, where the relations of the State to religions are, I think, without parallel elsewhere in the modern world. One may find some resemblance to the attitude of the Roman emperors towards rites and worships among the population, in the Chinese emperor’s reverent observance and regulation of the rites and ceremonies performed by him as the religious chief and representative before Heaven of the great national interests. The deification of deceased emperors is a solemn rite ordained by proclamation. As the Ius sacrum, the body of rights and duties in the matter of religion, was regarded in Rome as a department of the Ius publicum, belonging to the fundamental constitution of the State, so in China the ritual code was incorporated into the statute books, and promulgated with imperial sanction. Now we know that in Rome the established ritual was legally prescribed, though otherwise strange deities and their worships were admitted indiscriminately. But the Chinese Government goes much further. It appears to regard all novel superstitions, and especially foreign worships, as the hotbed of sedition and disloyalty. Unlicensed deities and sects are put down by the police; magicians and sorcerers are arrested; and the peculiar Chinese practice of canonising deceased officials and paying sacrificial honours to local celebrities after death is strictly reserved by the Board of Ceremonies for imperial consideration and approval. The Censor, to whom any proposal of this kind must be entrusted, is admonished that he must satisfy himself by inquiry of its validity. An official who performs sacred rites in honour of a spirit or holy personage not recognised by the Ritual Code, was liable, under laws that may be still in force, to corporal punishment; and the adoration by private families of spirits whose worship is reserved for public ceremonial was a heinous offence. No such rigorous control over the multiplication of rites and deities has been instituted elsewhere. On the other hand, while in other countries the State has recognised no more than one established religion, the Chinese Government formally recognises three denominations. Buddhism has been sanctioned by various edicts and endowments, yet the State divinities belong to the Taoist pantheon, and their worship is regulated by public ordinances; while Confucianism represents official orthodoxy, and its precepts embody the latitudinarian spirit of the intellectual classes. We know that the Chinese people make use, so to speak, of all three religions indiscriminately, according to their individual whims, needs, or experience of results. So also a politic administration countenances these divisions and probably finds some interest in maintaining them. The morality of the people requires some religious sanction; and it is this element with which the State professes its chief concern. We are told on good authority that one of the functions of high officials is to deliver public lectures freely criticising and discouraging indolent monasticism and idolatry from the standpoint of rational ethics, as follies that are reluctantly tolerated. Yet the Government has never been able to keep down the fanatics, mystics, and heretical sects that are incessantly springing up in China, as elsewhere in Asia; though they are treated as pestilent rebels and law-breakers, to be exterminated by massacre and cruel punishments; and bloody repression of this kind has been the cause of serious insurrections. It is to be observed that all religious persecution is by the direct action of the State, not instigated or insisted upon by a powerful orthodox priesthood. But a despotic administration which undertakes to control and circumscribe all forms and manifestations of superstition in a vast polytheistic multitude of its subjects, is inevitably driven to repressive measures of the utmost severity. Neither Christianity nor Islam attempted to regulate polytheism, their mission was to exterminate it, and they succeeded mainly because in those countries the State was acting with the support and under the uncompromising pressure of a dominant church or faith. Some writers have noticed a certain degree of resemblance between the policy of the Roman empire and that of the Chinese empire toward religion. We may read in Gibbon that the Roman magistrates regarded the various modes of worship as equally useful, that sages and heroes were exalted to immortality and entitled to reverence and adoration, and that philosophic officials, viewing with indulgence the superstitions of the multitude, diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers. So far, indeed, his description of the attitude of the State toward polytheism may be applicable to China; but although the Roman and Chinese emperors both assumed the rank of divinity, and were supreme in the department of worships, the Roman administration never attempted to regulate and restrain polytheism at large on the Chinese system. The religion of the Gentiles, said Hobbes, is a part of their policy; and it may be said that this is still the policy of Oriental monarchies, who admit no separation between the secular and the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. They would agree with Hobbes that temporal and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. But while in Mohammedan Asia the State upholds orthodox uniformity, in China and Japan the mainspring of all such administrative action is political expediency. It may be suggested that in the mind of these far-Eastern people religion has never been conceived as something quite apart from human experience and the affairs of the visible world; for Buddhism, with its metaphysical doctrines, is a foreign importation, corrupted and materialised in China and Japan. And we may observe that from among the Mongolian races, which have produced mighty conquerors and founded famous dynasties from Constantinople to Pekin, no mighty prophet, no profound spiritual teacher, has arisen. Yet in China, as throughout all the countries of the Asiatic mainland, an enthusiast may still gather together ardent proselytes, and fresh revelations may create among the people unrest that may ferment and become heated up to the degree of fanaticism, and explode against attempts made to suppress it. The Taeping insurrection, which devastated cities and provinces in China, and nearly overthrew the Manchu dynasty, is a striking example of the volcanic fires that underlie the surface of Asiatic societies. It was quenched in torrents of blood after lasting some ten years. And very recently there has been a determined revolt of the Lamas in Eastern Tibet, where the provincial administration is, as we know, sacerdotal.

The imperial troops are said to be crushing it with unrelenting severity. These are the perilous experiences of a philosophic Government that assumes charge and control over the religions of some three hundred millions of Asiatics.

I can only make a hasty reference to Japan. In that country the relations of the State to religions appear to have followed the Chinese model. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, are impartially recognised. The emperor presides over official worship as high priest of his people; the liturgical ordinances are issued by imperial rescripts not differing in form from other public edicts. The dominant article of faith is the divinity of Japan and its emperor; and Shinto, the worship of the gods of nature, is understood to be patronised chiefly with the motive of preserving the national traditions. But in Japan the advance of modern science and enlightened scepticism may have diminished the importance of the religious department. Shinto, says a recent writer, still embodies the religion of the people; yet in 1877 a decree was issued declaring it to be no more than a convenient system of State ceremonial.[ The Development of Religion in Japan, G. W. Knox, 1907] And in 1889 an article of the constitution granted freedom of belief and worship to all Japanese subjects, without prejudice to peace, order, and loyalty.

In India the religious situation is quite different. I think it is without parallel elsewhere in the world. Here we are at the fountainhead of metaphysical theology, of ideas that have flowed eastward and westward across Asia. And here, also, we find every species of primitive polytheism, unlimited and multitudinous; we can survey a confused medley of divinities, of rites and worships incessantly varied by popular whim and fancy, by accidents, and by the pressure of changing circumstances. Hinduism permits any doctrine to be taught, any sort of theory to be held regarding the divine attributes and manifestations, the forces of nature, or the mysterious functions of mind or body. Its tenets have never been circumscribed by a creed; its free play has never been checked or regulated by State authority. Now, at first sight, this is not unlike the popular polytheism of the ancient world, before the triumph of Christianity. There are passages in St. Augustine’s Civitas Dei, describing the worship of the unconverted pagans among whom he lived, that might have been written yesterday by a Christian bishop in India. And we might ask why all this polytheism was not swept out from among such a highly intellectual people as the Indians, with their restless pursuit of divine knowledge, by some superior faith, by some central idea. Undoubtedly the material and moral conditions, and the course of events which combine to stamp a particular form of religion upon any great people, are complex and manifold; but into this inquiry I cannot go. I can only point out that the institution of caste has riveted down Hindu society into innumerable divisions upon a general religious basis, and that the sacred books separated the Hindu theologians into different schools, preventing uniformity of worship or of creed. And it is to be observed that these books are not historical; they give no account of the rise and spread of a faith. The Hindu theologian would say, in the words of an early Christian father, that the objects of divine knowledge are not historical, that they can only be apprehended intellectually, that within experience there is no reality. And the fact that Brahmanism has no authentic inspired narrative, that it is the only great religion not concentrated round the life and teachings of a person, may be one reason why it has remained diffuse and incoherent. All ways of salvation are still open to the Hindus; the canon of their scripture has never been authoritatively closed. New doctrines, new sects, fresh theological controversies, are incessantly modifying and superseding the old scholastic interpretations of the mysteries, for Hindus, like Asiatics everywhere, are still in that condition of mind when a fresh spiritual message is eagerly received. Vishnu and Siva are the realistic abstractions of the understanding from objects of sense, from observation of the destructive and reproductive operations of nature; they represent among educated men separate systems of worship which, again, are parted into different schools or theories regarding the proper ways and methods of attaining to spiritual emancipation. Yet the higher philosophy and the lower polytheism are not mutually antagonistic; on the contrary, they support each other; for Brahmanism accepts and allies itself with the popular forms of idolatry, treating them as outward visible signs of an inner truth, as indications of all-pervading pantheism. The peasant and the philosopher reverence the same deity, perform the same rite; they do not mean the same thing, but they do not quarrel on this account. Nevertheless, it is certainly remarkable that this inorganic medley of ideas and worships should have resisted for so many ages the invasion and influence of the coherent faiths that have won ascendancy, complete or dominant, on either side of India, the west and the east; it has thrown off Buddhism, it has withstood the triumphant advance of Islam, it has as yet been little affected by Christianity. Probably the political history of India may account in some degree for its religious disorganisation. I may propound the theory that no religion has obtained supremacy, or at any rate definite establishment, in any great country except with the active co-operation, by force or favour, of the rulers, whether by conquest, as in Western Asia, or by patronage and protection, as in China. The direct influence and recognition of the State has been an indispensable instrument of religious consolidation. But until the nineteenth century the whole of India, from the mountains to the sea, had never been united under one stable government; the country was for ages parcelled out into separate principalities, incessantly contending for territory. And even the Moghul empire, which was always at war upon its frontiers, never acquired universal dominion. The Moghul emperors, except Aurungzeb, were by no means bigoted Mohammedans; and their obvious interest was to abstain from meddling with Hinduism. Yet the irruption of Islam into India seems rather to have stimulated religious activity among the Hindus, for during the Mohammedan period various spiritual teachers arose, new sects were formed, and theological controversies divided the intellectual classes. To these movements the Mohammedan governments must have been for a long time indifferent; and among the new sects the principle of mutual toleration was universal. Towards the close of the Moghul empire, however, Hinduism, provoked by the bigotry of the Emperor Aurungzeb, became a serious element of political disturbance. Attempts to suppress forcibly the followers of Nanak Guru, and the execution of one spiritual leader of the Sikhs, turned the Sikhs from inoffensive quietists into fanatical warriors; and by the eighteenth century they were in open revolt against the empire. They were, I think, the most formidable embodiment of militant Hinduism known to Indian history. By that time, also, the Marathas in South-West India were declaring themselves the champions of the Hindu religion against the Mohammedan oppression; and to the Sikhs and Marathas the dislocation of the Moghul empire may be very largely attributed. We have here a notable example of the dynamic power upon politics of revolts that are generated by religious fermentation, and a proof of the strength that can be exerted by a pacific inorganic polytheism in self-defence, when ambitious rebels proclaim themselves defenders of a faith. The Marathas and the Sikhs founded the only rulerships whose armies could give the English serious trouble in the field during the nineteenth century. On the whole, however, when we survey the history of India, and compare it with that of Western Asia, we may say that although the Hindus are perhaps the most intensely religious people in the world, Hinduism has never been, like Christianity, Islam, and to some extent Buddhism, a religion established by the State. Nor has it suffered much from the State’s power. It seems strange, indeed, that Mohammedanism, a compact proselytising faith, closely united with the civil rulership, should have so slightly modified, during seven centuries of dominion, this infinitely divided polytheism. Of course, Mohammedanism made many converts, and annexed a considerable number of the population—yet the effect was rather to stiffen than to loosen the bonds that held the mass of the people to their traditional divinities, and to the institution of castes. Moreover the antagonism of the two religions, the popular and the dynastic, was a perpetual element of weakness in a Mohammedan empire. In India polytheism could not be crushed, as in Western Asia, by Islam; neither could it be controlled and administered, as in Eastern Asia; yet the Moghul emperors managed to keep on good terms with it, so long as they adhered to a policy of toleration. To the Mohammedan empire has succeeded another foreign dominion, which practises not merely tolerance but complete religious neutrality.

Looking back over the period of a hundred years, from 1757 to 1857, during which the British dominion was gradually extended over India, we find that the British empire, like the Roman, met with little or no opposition from religion. Hindus and Mohammedans, divided against each other, were equally willing to form alliances with, and to fight on the side of, the foreigner who kept religion entirely outside politics. And the British Government, when established, has so carefully avoided offence to caste or creed that on one great occasion only, the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, have the smouldering fires of credulous fanaticism broken out against our rule. I believe the British-Indian position of complete religious neutrality to be unique among Asiatic governments, and almost unknown in Europe. The Anglo-Indian sovereignty does not identify itself with the interests of a single faith, as in Mohammedan kingdoms, nor does it recognise a definite ecclesiastical jurisdiction in things spiritual, as in Catholic Europe. Still less has our Government adopted the Chinese system of placing the State at the head of different rituals for the purpose of controlling them all, and proclaiming an ethical code to be binding on all denominations. The British ruler, while avowedly Christian, ignores all religions administratively, interfering only to suppress barbarous or indecent practices when the advance of civilisation has rendered them obsolete. Public instruction, so far as the State is concerned, is entirely secular; the universal law is the only authorised guardian of morals; to expound moral duties officially, as things apart from religion, has been found possible in China, but not in India. But the Chinese Government can issue edicts enjoining public morality and rationalism because the State takes part in the authorised worship of the people, and the emperor assumes pontifical office. The British Government in India, on the other hand, disowns official connection with any religion. It places all its measures on the sole ground of reasonable expediency, of efficient administration; it seeks to promote industry and commerce, and material civilisation generally; it carefully avoids giving any religious colour whatever to its public acts; and the result is that our Government, notwithstanding its sincere professions of absolute neutrality, is sometimes suspected of regarding all religion with cynical indifference, possibly even with hostility. Moreover, religious neutrality, though it is right, just, and the only policy which the English in India could possibly adopt, has certain political disadvantages. The two most potent influences which still unite and divide the Asiatic peoples, are race and religion; a Government which represents both these forces, as, for instance, in Afghanistan, has deep roots in a country. A dynasty that can rely on the support of an organised religion, and stands forth as the champion of a dominant faith, has a powerful political power at its command. The Turkish empire, weak, ill-governed, repeatedly threatened with dismemberment, embarrassed internally by the conflict of races, has been preserved for the last hundred years by its incorporation with the faith of Islam, by the Sultan’s claim to the Caliphate. To attack it is to assault a religious citadel; it is the bulwark on the west of Mohammedan Asia, as Afghanistan is the frontier fortress of Islam on the east. A leading Turkish politician has very recently said: ‘It is in Islam pure and simple that lies the strength of Turkey as an independent State; and if the Sultan’s position as religious chief were encroached upon by constitutional reforms, the whole Ottoman empire would be in danger.’ We have to remember that for ages religious enthusiasm has been, and still is in some parts of Asia, one of the strongest incentives to military ardour and fidelity to a standard on the battlefield. Identity of creed has often proved more effective, in war, than territorial patriotism; it has surmounted racial and tribal antipathies; while religious antagonism is still in many countries a standing impediment to political consolidation. When, therefore, we survey the history of religions, though this sketch is necessarily very imperfect and inadequate, we find Mohammedanism still identified with the fortunes of Mohammedan rulers; and we know that for many centuries the relations of Christianity to European States have been very close. In Europe the ardent perseverance and intellectual superiority of great theologians, of ecclesiastical statesmen supported by autocratic rulers, have hardened and beat out into form doctrines and liturgies that it was at one time criminal to disregard or deny, dogmatic articles of faith that were enforced by law. By these processes orthodoxy emerged compact, sharply defined, irresistible, out of the strife and confusion of heresies; the early record of the churches has pages spotted with tears and stained with blood. But at the present time European States seem inclined to dissolve their alliance with the churches, and to arrange a kind of judicial separation between the altar and the throne, though in very few cases has a divorce been made absolute. No State, in civilised countries, now assists in the propagation of doctrine; and ecclesiastical influence is of very little service to a Government. The civil law, indeed, makes continual encroachments on the ecclesiastical domain, questions its authority, and usurps its jurisdiction. Modern erudition criticises the historical authenticity of the scriptures, philosophy tries to undermine the foundations of belief; the governments find small interest in propping up edifices that are shaken by internal controversies. In Mohammedan Asia, on the other hand, the connection between the orthodox faith and the States is firmly maintained, for the solidarity is so close that disruptions would be dangerous, and a Mohammedan rulership over a majority of unbelievers would still be perilously unstable. I have thus endeavoured to show that the historical relations of Buddhism and Hinduism to the State have been in the past, and are still in the present time, very different from the situation in the West. There has always existed, I submit, one essential distinction of principle. Religious propagation, forcible conversion, aided and abetted by the executive power of the State, and by laws against heresy or dissent, have been defended in the West by the doctors of Islam, and formerly by Christian theologians, by the axiom that all means are justifiable for extirpating false teachers who draw souls to perdition. The right and duty of the civil magistrate to maintain truth, in regard to which Bossuet declared all Christians to be unanimous, and which is still affirmed in the Litany of our Church, is a principle from which no Government, three centuries ago, dissented in theory, though in practice it needed cautious handling. I do not think that this principle ever found its way into Hinduism or Buddhism; I doubt, that is to say, whether the civil government was at any time called in to undertake or assist propagation of those religions as part of its duty. Nor do I know that the States of Eastern Asia, beyond the pale of Islam, claim or exercise the right of insisting on conformance to particular doctrines, because they are true. The erratic manifestations of the religious spirit throughout Asia, constantly breaking out in various forms and figures, in thaumaturgy, mystical inspiration, in orgies and secret societies, have always disquieted these Asiatic States, yet, so far as I can ascertain, the employment of force to repress them has always been justified on administrative or political grounds, as distinguishable from theological motives pure and simple. Sceptics and agnostics have been often marked out for persecution in the West, but I do not think that they have been molested in India, China, or Japan, where they abound, because they seldom meddle with politics.[ ‘Atheism did never disturb States’ (Bacon)]. It may perhaps be admitted, however, that a Government which undertakes to regulate impartially all rites and worship among its subjects is at a disadvantage by comparison with a Government that acts as the representative of a great church or an exclusive faith. It bears the sole undivided responsibility for measures of repression; it cannot allege divine command or even the obligation of punishing impiety for the public good. To conclude. In Asiatic States the superintendence of religious affairs is an integral attribute of the sovereignty, which no Government, except the English in India, has yet ventured to relinquish; and even in India this is not done without some risk, for religion and politics are still intermingled throughout the world; they act and react upon each other everywhere. They are still far from being disentangled in our own country, where the theory that a Government in its collective character must profess and even propagate some religion has not been very long obsolete. It was maintained seventy years ago by a great statesman who was already rising into prominence, by Mr. Gladstone. The text of Mr. Gladstone’s argument, in his book on the relations of the State with the Church, was Hooker’s saying, that the religious duty of kings is the weightiest part of their sovereignty; while Macaulay, in criticising this position, insisted that the main, if not the only, duty of a Government, to which all other objects must be subordinate, was the protection of persons and property. These two eminent politicians were, in fact, the champions of the ancient and the modern ideas of sovereignty; for the theory that a State is bound to propagate the religion that it professes was for many centuries the accepted theory of all Christian rulerships, though I think it now survives only in Mohammedan kingdoms. As the influence of religion in the sphere of politics declines, the State becomes naturally less concerned with the superintendence of religion; and the tendency of constitutional Governments seems to be towards abandoning it. The States that have completely dissolved connection with ecclesiastical institutions are the two great republics, the United States of America and France. We can discern at this moment a movement towards constitutional reforms in Mohammedan Asia, in Turkey, and Persia, and if they succeed it will be most interesting to observe the effect which liberal reforms will produce upon the relation of Mohammedan Governments with the dominant faith, and on which side the religious teachers will be arrayed. It is certain, at any rate, that for a long time to come religion will continue to be a potent factor in Asiatic politics; and I may add that the reconciliation of civil with religious liberty is one of the most arduous of the many problems to be solved by the promoters of national unity.”

The BBC needs to determine exactly where it thinks Pakistan is!

April 5, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

I have made clear my objections to the confusion the BBC has been sowing over months if not years through its purported maps of India and Jammu & Kashmir in particular — maps which have a subliminal effect as they are shown only for a split second before the start of some little reportage. As I said a few days ago there seems to have been progress in recent days in the BBC acknowledging the official UK Government/EU position that the Republic of India is de facto and de jure sovereign in J&K on the Indian sides of the LOC and LAC at least. I have said the dual national Pakistani moles who may have been pushing the hardline Pakistani viewpoint within the organisation may have found some opposition at last.

But today’s 0730 Indian Standard Time broadcast of the BBC’s purported “World News” should get Pakistanis perturbed as well! (Indians would be largely indifferent.)

In two separate reports from Pakistan during the same broadcast, two different maps of Pakistan were shown! The first map showed Pakistan to include Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, Skardu etc up to the LOC, while the second excluded these!

The organisation seems to be in process of thinking out the history and geography of the subcontinent and BBC staff may like to consult my articles “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice & J&K”, “History of Jammu & Kashmir” , “Pakistan’s Allies”, “A Brief History of Gilgit”, etc available elsewhere here for enlightenment.

Subroto Roy

Posted in BBC, Diplomatic recognition, Gilgit and Baltistan, India in international law, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism. Leave a Comment »

Progress! The BBC retracts its prevarication!

March 30, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

I have over several months had to severely criticize an institution I would much rather have not, namely the BBC. This had to do with pointing out that the BBC, probably under influence of its Pakistani staffers, had been deliberately distorting the history and geography of the subcontinent by portraying maps of India with Jammu & Kashmir entirely lopped off.

Imagine my surprise some minutes ago to see there seems to have been some real impact!

A few days ago, in a Damian Gramaticas story from a Gurgaon shopping-mall, a map of India was shown again with J&K lopped off — these people are hopeless, I felt. But then, wait, the next day there was a map of Pakistan too shown by the same BBC, with areas of Pakistani Jammu & Kashmir also not shown as part of it. Hmmmm, I thought, something’s going on at least within the BBC and some little bureaucratic debate must be taking place across a table somewhere by which some bureaucratic committee has finally decided that Jammu & Kashmir is going to be lopped off all BBC maps of both India and Pakistan in the BBC’s own new version of history and geography. At least that meant the Pakistani moles within the organisation were not going wholly unanswered (or that they were left satisfied with some kind of JKLF ideology).

And finally this morning, twenty minutes ago, success! There was another report by the same Mr Gramaticas allowing an Indian politician to get on with some spin, but wait, what preceded all this waffle? A map of India with J&K on the Indian side of the Line of Control within India — and perhaps even Aksai Chin on the other side of the Line of Actual Control with China too!

Hurray!

I had sent an email about all this to the nice man who is presently the UK’s diplomat in Kolkata (far nicer than his immediate predecessors). Perhaps someone at the British Foreign Office had finally picked up the phone and said to the bureaucrats at the BBC “Now now, look ye here, if the UK Government and the European Union recognize Indian de facto and de jure sovereignty in a certain manner in Jammu & Kashmir, corresponding to the LOC and LAC, you had better do so too, it seems to us, as you are a public British broadcaster and cannot really go about inventing your own history and geography as you please, no matter how badly you might want to. We don’t want to see you being asked by the Indians to pack your bags and leave after all, do we? Indians are rather sensitive about this whole Kashmir thing, or didn’t you know?”.

Anyway, BBC, however this has happened, well done with your progress, may you maintain it consistently and not retrogress backwards.

Subroto Roy

Posted in BBC, Britain, Britain in India, British foreign policy, India in international law, India's History, India's Land, International Law, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Mendacity, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's history, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism. Leave a Comment »

India is not a monarchy! We urgently need to universalize the French concept of “citoyen”! (2009)

March 28, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

Each of the two sons of Feroze and Indira Gandhi died tragically in his prime, years ago, and it is unbecoming to see their family successors squabble today. Everyone may need to be constantly reminded that this handful of persons are in fact ordinary citizens in our democratic polity, deserving India’s attention principally in such a capacity.

What did, indeed, Feroze Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sanjay Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi “live and die for”? It was not any one identifiable thing or any set of common things, that seems certain.

Feroze Gandhi from all accounts stood for integrity in Indian politics and journalism; it is not impossible his premature death was related to his wife’s negligence because she had returned to her father’s side instead. Jawaharlal Nehru did not do well as a father to promote his daughter so blatantly as his assistant either before 1947

or after.

Nehru did not achieve political power until well into middle age; his catastrophic misjudgment of communist ideology and intentions, especially Chinese communist ideology and intentions, contributed to an Indian defeat at war, and led soon thereafter to his health collapsing and his death. He and Indira somewhat nonchalantly made a visit to Ceylon even as the Chinese attack was commencing; a high point of my own childhood was saying namaste on October 13 1962 at Colombo airport when they arrived.

nehru

Feroze and Indira’s younger son evidently came to die in a self-inflicted aeronautical mishap of some sort. What did Sanjay Gandhi “live for”? The book Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s created twenty years ago in America

indvol

has a chapter titled “The State of Governance” by the political scientist James Manor which says:

“After 1973 or so, personal loyalty tended increasingly to become the main criterion for advancement in the Congress Party. People who appeared to be loyal often replaced skilled political managers who seemed too independent. Many of these new arrivals did not worry, as an earlier generation of Congress officials had done, that excessive private profiteering might earn the wrath of party leaders. In 1975, Sanjay Gandhi suddenly became the second most powerful figure in Indian politics. He saw that the parties of the left and right had strong organizations that could put large numbers of militants into the streets for demonstrations while Congress had no such capacity. In the belief that Congress should also have this kind of muscle, he began recruiting elements from urban centres including the criminal underworld. The problem of corruption was exacerbated by demands that State-level Congress leaders place large sums of money at the disposal not of the national party but of the persons who presided over it. Congress chief ministers realized that a fulsome response to these demands went a long way toward insulating them from interference from New Delhi, and a monumental system of fund-raising sprang up. When so many people were being drawn into semi-institutionalized malfeasance, which seemed to be condoned by higher authorities, it was inevitable many would skim off portions of the funds raised for personal benefit. Corruption soared. The problem was compounded by the tendency for people to be dismissed from public and party offices abruptly, leading many Congress politicians to fear that their time in power might be quite short.”

I do not have reason to disagree with this opinion contained in the book that I and WE James created at the University of Hawaii twenty years ago. If anything, Sanjay’s political model may have spread itself across other Indian political parties in one way or another.

What does strike me as odd in light of current political controversy is that several of Sanjay’s friends and colleagues are now part-and-parcel of the Sonia Congress – one must ask, were they such fair-weather friends that they never lent a hand or a shoulder to his young widow and her infant son especially against the cruelties Sanjay’s mother bestowed upon them? Did they offer help or guidance to Sanjay’s son, have they tried to guide him away from becoming the bigoted young politician he seems to wish to be today?

Indira’s major faults included playing favourites among her bahus and her grandchildren with as much gusto as any mother-in-law portrayed on the tackiest TV-serial today.

What were her good deeds? There was one, and it was an enormously large one, of paramount significance for the country and our subcontinent as a whole: her statesmanship before, during and to some extent after the war that created Bangladesh. My father has preserved a classic photograph over the years of Indira’s finest period as an international stateswoman, when she visited Paris and other foreign capitals including Washington in the autumn of 1971.

scan0024

She tried to prevent the Yahya Khan/Tikka Khan genocide in Bangladesh when many Bangladeshis came to be sacrificed at the altar of the Nixon-Kissinger visits to Mao and Zhou. She made a major diplomatic effort in world capitals to avert war with West Pakistan over its atrocities in East Pakistan. But war could not be averted, and within a few weeks, in December 1971, Bangladesh was born.

“Indira Gandhi’s one and paramount good deed as India’s leader and indeed as a world leader of her time was to have fought a war that was so rare in international law for having been unambiguously just. And she fought it flawlessly. The cause had been thrust upon her by an evil enemy’s behaviour against his own people, an enemy supported by the world’s strongest military power with pretensions to global leadership. Victims of the enemy’s wickedness were scores of millions of utterly defenceless, penniless human beings. Indira Gandhi did everything right. She practised patient but firm diplomacy on the world’s stage to avert war if it was at all possible to do. She chose her military generals well and took their professional judgment seriously as to when to go to war and how to win it. Finally, in victory she was magnanimous to the enemy that had been defeated. Children’s history-books in India should remember her as the stateswoman who freed a fraternal nation from tyranny, at great expense to our own people. As a war-leader, Indira Gandhi displayed extraordinary bravery, courage and good sense.” (From my review article of Inder Malhotra’s Indira Gandhi, first published in The Statesman May 7 2006.)

“She had indeed fought that rarest of things in international law: the just war. Supported by the world’s strongest military, an evil enemy had made victims of his own people. Indira tried patiently on the international stage to avert war, but also chose her military generals well and took their professional judgment seriously as to when to fight if it was inevitable and how to win. Finally she was magnanimous (to a fault) towards the enemy ~ who was not some stranger to us but our own estranged brother and cousin. It seemed to be her and independent India’s finest hour. A fevered nation was thus ready to forgive and forget her catastrophic misdeeds until that time….” (From “Unhealthy Delhi” first published in The Statesman June 11 2007).

What did Indira die for? I have said it was “blowback” from domestic and/or international politics, similar to what happened to Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in later years.

“Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s. Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war. Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces. Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.” From “An Indian Reply to President Zardari”.

And then there was Rajiv. He did not know me except in his last eight months. It has now emerged that Dr Manmohan Singh’s first bypass operation was in 1990-1991, coinciding precisely with the time I gave Rajiv the results of the perestroika-for-India project that I had led at the University of Hawaii since 1986, an encounter that sparked the 1991 economic reform as has been told elsewhere. Dr Singh was simply not in that loop, nor has he himself ever claimed to have been in it — regardless of what innumerable flatterers, sycophants and other straightforwardly mendacious characters in Delhi’s high power circles have been making out over the years since. Facts are rather stubborn things.

As a 35-year old newcomer to Delhi and a complete layman on security issues, I did what little I knew how to try to reduce the vulnerability that I felt Rajiv faced from unknown lists of assassins.

“That night KR dropped me at Tughlak Road where I used to stay with friends. In the car I told him, as he was a military man with heavy security cover for himself as a former Governor of J&K, that it seemed to me Rajiv’s security was being unprofessionally handled, that he was vulnerable to a professional assassin. KR asked me if I had seen anything specific by way of vulnerability. With John Kennedy and De Gaulle in mind, I said I feared Rajiv was open to a long-distance sniper, especially when he was on his campaign trips around the country. This was one of several attempts I made since October 1990 to convey my clear impression to whomever I thought might have an effect that Rajiv seemed to me extremely vulnerable. Rajiv had been on sadhbhavana journeys, back and forth into and out of Delhi. I had heard he was fed up with his security apparatus, and I was not surprised given it seemed at the time rather bureaucratized. It would not have been appropriate for me to tell him directly that he seemed to me to be vulnerable, since I was a newcomer and a complete amateur about security issues, and besides if he agreed he might seem to himself to be cowardly or have to get even closer to his security apparatus. Instead I pressed the subject relentlessly with whomever I could. I suggested specifically two things: (a) that the system in place at Rajiv’s residence and on his itineraries be tested, preferably by some internationally recognized specialists in counter-terrorism; (b) that Rajiv be encouraged to announce a shadow-cabinet. The first would increase the cost of terrorism, the second would reduce the potential political benefit expected by terrorists out to kill him. On the former, it was pleaded that security was a matter being run by the V. P. Singh and then Chandrashekhar Governments at the time. On the latter, it was said that appointing a shadow cabinet might give the appointees the wrong idea, and lead to a challenge to Rajiv’s leadership. This seemed to me wrong, as there was nothing to fear from healthy internal contests for power so long as they were conducted in a structured democratic framework. I pressed to know how public Rajiv’s itinerary was when he travelled. I was told it was known to everyone and that was the only way it could be since Rajiv wanted to be close to the people waiting to see him and had been criticized for being too aloof. This seemed to me totally wrong and I suggested that if Rajiv wanted to be seen as meeting the crowds waiting for him then that should be done by planning to make random stops on the road that his entourage would take. This would at least add some confusion to the planning of potential terrorists out to kill him. When I pressed relentlessly, it was said I should probably speak to “Madame”, i.e. to Mrs. Rajiv Gandhi. That seemed to me highly inappropriate, as I could not be said to be known to her and I should not want to unduly concern her in the event it was I who was completely wrong in my assessment of the danger. The response that it was not in Congress’s hands, that it was the responsibility of the V. P. Singh and later the Chandrashekhar Governments, seemed to me completely irrelevant since Congress in its own interests had a grave responsibility to protect Rajiv Gandhi irrespective of what the Government’s security people were doing or not doing. Rajiv was at the apex of the power structure of the party, and a key symbol of secularism and progress for the entire country. Losing him would be quite irreparable to the party and the country. It shocked me that the assumption was not being made that there were almost certainly professional killers actively out to kill Rajiv Gandhi — this loving family man and hapless pilot of India’s ship of state who did not seem to have wished to make enemies among India’s terrorists but whom the fates had conspired to make a target. The most bizarre and frustrating response I got from several respondents was that I should not mention the matter at all as otherwise the threat would become enlarged and the prospect made more likely! This I later realized was a primitive superstitious response of the same sort as wearing amulets and believing in Ptolemaic astrological charts that assume the Sun goes around the Earth — centuries after Kepler and Copernicus. Perhaps the entry of scientific causality and rationality is where we must begin in the reform of India’s governance and economy. What was especially repugnant after Rajiv’s assassination was to hear it said by his enemies that it marked an end to “dynastic” politics in India. This struck me as being devoid of all sense because the unanswerable reason for protecting Rajiv Gandhi was that we in India, if we are to have any pretensions at all to being a civilized and open democratic society, cannot tolerate terrorism and assassination as means of political change. Either we are constitutional democrats willing to fight for the privileges of a liberal social order, or ours is truly a primitive and savage anarchy concealed beneath a veneer of fake Westernization….. the news suddenly said Rajiv Gandhi had been killed. All India wept. What killed him was not merely a singular act of criminal terrorism, but the system of humbug, incompetence and sycophancy that surrounds politics in India and elsewhere. I was numbed by rage and sorrow, and did not return to Delhi. Eleven years later, on 25 May 2002, press reports said “P. V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh lost their place in Congress history as architects of economic reforms as the Congress High command sponsored an amendment to a resolution that had laid credit at the duo’s door. The motion was moved by…. Digvijay Singh asserting that the reforms were a brainchild of the late Rajiv Gandhi and that the Rao-Singh combine had simply nudged the process forward.” Rajiv’s years in Government, like those of Indira Gandhi, were in fact marked by profligacy and the resource cost of poor macroeconomic policy since bank-nationalisation may be as high as Rs. 125 trillion measured in 1994 rupees. Certainly though it was Rajiv Gandhi as Leader of the Opposition in his last months who was the principal architect of the economic reform that came to begin after his passing.”

(I have had to say that I do not think the policies pursued by Dr Singh thus far have been consistent with the direction I believe Rajiv, in a second term as PM, would have wished to take. See, for example, “India’s Macroeconomics”, “Fallacious Finance”, “Against Quackery”, “Mistaken Macroeconomics”, and other articles listed and linked at “Memo to Dr Kaushik Basu”. See also https://independentindian.com/2006/05/21/the-politics-of-dr-singh/ https://independentindian.com/2008/04/25/assessing-manmohan-the-doctor-of-deficit-finance-should-realise-the-currency-is-at-stake/ https://independentindian.com/2013/08/23/did-jagdish-bhagwati-originate-pioneer-intellectually-father-indias-1991-economic-reform-did-manmohan-singh-or-did-i-through-my-encounter-with-rajiv-gandhi-just-as-siddhartha-shan/)

The treatment of Indira or Rajiv or Sanjay or their family successors as royalty of any kind whatsoever in India was, is, and remains absurd, reflecting stunted growth of Indian democracy. I remember well the obsequiousness I witnessed on the part of old men in the presence of Rajiv Gandhi.

Tribal and mansabdari political cultures still dominate Northern and Western regions of the Indian subcontinent (descending from the Sikhs, Muslims, Rajputs, Mahrattas etc).

Nehru in his younger days was an exemplary democrat, and he had an outstanding democratically-minded young friend in Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

But Nehru and Abdullah as Westernized political liberals were exceptions in the autocratic/monarchical political cultures of north India (and Pakistan) which continue today and stunt the growth of any democratic mindset.

What we may urgently need is some French Liberté, égalité, fraternité ! to create a simple ordinary citoyen universally in the country and the subcontinent as a whole! May we please import a Marquis de Lafayette?

Bengal and parts of Dravidian India have long lost fondness for monarchy and autocracy — Western political liberalism began to reach Kolkata almost two centuries ago after all (see e.g. Tapan Raychaudhuri’s fine study Europe Reconsidered). Both Nepal and Pakistan have been undergoing radical transformation towards democracy in recent months, as Bengali Pakistanis had done 40 years earlier under Sheikh Mujib. I said last year and say again that there may be a dangerous intellectual vacuum around the throne of Delhi.

Subroto Roy

Posted in 1962 War, Bangladesh, Benazir Bhutto, Blowback, Democracy, Feroze Gandhi, France, India's 1991 Economic Reform, India's Bangladesh liberation war, India's corruption, India's Democracy, India's Families, India's mob violence, India's Nationalism, India's nomenclatura, India's Personality Cults, India's political lobbyists, India's Politics, India's Polity, India's pork-barrel politics, Indira Gandhi, Indira Gandhi's assassination, Jawaharlal Nehru, Liberalism/Libertarianism, Life and death, Mao Zedong, Monarchy vs Republicanism, Mujibur Rahman, Nepal, New Delhi, Pakistan's history, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Political assassinations, Political corruption, Political cynicism, Political Economy, Political mendacity, Political Philosophy, Politics, Power-elites and nomenclatura, Rajiv Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, Sheikh Abdullah, Sonia Gandhi, US Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Espionage, War, Zhou Enlai. 1 Comment »

Pakistan’s progress (June 2008)

March 18, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

Nine months ago, on June 9 2008, I wrote but did not publish the op-ed article below “Pakistan’s progress” intended for an Indian newspaper. When the Mumbai massacres took place, I was rather glad I had not come to do so because its cheer and optimism contrasted too starkly with the vileness and viciousness of the massacres. Instead I turned to the legal, moral and political implications of the massacres, and several articles are to be found here on Kasab, competing jurisdictions in international law in prosecuting the crimes, and application of the Law of the Sea Treaty (which both countries have ratified) to jointly try and hang the masterminds at sea in international waters. Pakistan’s initial criminal investigation into the massacres received praise here, and I can only trust that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan will remain forensically focussed on that case of mass-murder and other heinous crimes until its appropriate conclusion.

Meanwhile, recent political events in Pakistan have made the article below relevant again; when it was written Pervez Musharraf had still not departed from office but the more abstract constitutional question raised in the article had to do with the relative powers of the Head of State and Head of Government in the new Pakistan. With the peaceful restoration of the Chief Justice to his high office, I am glad to say that the question I raised but did not publish nine months ago, namely, “A rare constitutional consensus might be developing – can it last long enough?”, seems to be headed at present to being answered in the affirmative.

Subroto Roy
March 18, 2009

Pakistan’s progress: A rare constitutional consensus might be developing – can it last long enough? Subroto Roy, dated June 9 2008

The dynamic evolution of politics in Pakistan should be judged not against Indian politics (rotten or exemplary as our politics can be at different times) but against its own initial conditions. It is an unimaginable luxury that Pakistanis in recent months have been discussing such sweet constitutional questions as how to restore judges unseated by soldiers having entered the Supreme Court, what to do with judges who took an oath despite such an abomination, how to maintain diplomatic relations between the PPP and PML(N), and most important of all, whether the military with its nuclear assets should report to the PM or President – in other words, is the Head of Government or Head of State the Chief Executive? It is a luxury too that Pervez Musharraf has become almost a distraction in Pakistani politics, that he himself indicates he may be running out of dramatic lines and may be getting ready to exit his country’s political stage, that the Pakistan Army is shocked by its realisation of its loss of prestige in society, that the Ex-Servicemen’s Society thinks Musharraf deserves punishment for having caused such a state of affairs. Dr Ayesha Siddiqa has pointed out that every Pakistani military strongman has been eventually removed, and has been removed not by democratic forces alone but by intra-military pressure.

It is likely we are at present witnessing such a critical moment, and it is naturally fraught with danger for any civilian prime minister and parliament because any intra-military conflict can descend into mutiny or worse. Pakistan Army officers have been deeply divided for years over Islamicisation already — onto which is now compounded the issue of loyalty to Musharraf (mostly paid for in American dollars) versus the urge to remove him in the best future interests of the military. Musharraf himself, with his usual braggadocio, has been claiming fealty to constitutional principles as well; so at least there is agreement on all sides that matters should proceed in an orderly and dignified manner and not by nefarious means.

The relevant comparison of the present situation is with the recent past. Let us look back just a few years, say to the autumn of 2005 when the initial post 9/11 Western backlash against Pakistan had been renewed after the London Underground bombings. On 1 September 2005, during the scheduled Islamabad visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary, the PAF launched massive month-long war-games against an assumed Indian enemy. It involved “the entire fleet, including US-made F-16s, French Mirage fighter aircraft and Chinese-built jets” and “using all assets” in an exercise “closest to war you can get in peacetime”; from the Hindu Kush to the Arabian Sea “8,200 operational sorties” would be flown, Shaukat Aziz witnessing the start, Musharraf the finish. Hardly had this orgy of militarism concluded when northern Pakistan and parts of J&K were hit by the devastating earthquake; Musharraf visited quake-hit areas still dressed in battle gear down to his para wings.

Pakistanis of all classes were appalled at the ineptitude of their government in face of the earthquake and it was inevitable the military would be held responsible. What had been the opportunity cost in fungible resources of those “8,200 operational sorties”? The military’s extremely expensive “assets” were designed for war with India and had bankrupted the country but ordinary people had been left utterly helpless in a natural calamity. Future historians of Pakistan may well see the 2005 earthquake as a critical turning point in their political development just as the 12 November 1970 cyclone was in the history of Bangladesh.

A modern war between Pakistan and India, even a non-nuclear one, would be like a hundred earthquakes. Indians have not been so jingoistic as to contemplate such an exchange of destruction but less than a decade ago Gohar Ayub Khan, as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, was boasting how India would surrender within a few hours in the next war – which was presumably a threat to unleash missiles, even non-nuclear ones, as a first resort against Indian cities and civilian populations. That such abominable Pakistan-India tension has today come to vanish might have been indicated during the recent IPL cricket final when Kamran Akmal jumped onto Yusuf Pathan or crashed into Mohammad Kaif as commercially driven team-mates led by an Australian captain and associated with what used to be Hindu Rajputana. So much for the “Two Nations Theory” in the 21st Century. Maulana Azad seems to have been proven right and MA Jinnah proven wrong after all.

The Pakistani state had become an oppressive war-machine solely guided by anti-Indian paranoia even while ordinary Pakistanis, through modern communications and technology, knew fully well India and Indians were not nearly as bad as the Pakistan Government was making them out to be. From an official Pakistani point of view, a nuclear bomb (even a purchased and assembled one) was needed out of fear India intended to destroy what remained of West Pakistan – a theory that could arise only from the delusion that Bangladesh had been caused by Indian intrigues. The Pakistan Army has been reluctant for more than a generation to face up to the reality of its behaviour in East Pakistan and the consequences that resulted; it has been far easier to blame India instead.

Yet Pakistan’s national hero, AQ Khan himself, born in Bhopal and extremely bitter at modern India as many former Indian nationals tend to be, has now said “Never! Never!” will there be an exchange of destruction in nuclear warfare between India and Pakistan. It may be a wise Indian diplomatic move to invite Dr Khan, stricken with cancer as he is said to be, to make a quiet private visit to his place of birth if he wished to (perhaps followed by a courtesy luncheon at BARC on the way home).

Of course Indians cannot forget the destruction that has been wrought in this country in recent years by our old Bogeyman, the ISI. Yet it is a fair bet that not only do we not comprehend the workings of that particular bureaucracy, nor do Pakistanis themselves, indeed the ISI itself may not comprehend itself in the sense that different ISI sections have been and may remain at cross-purposes or conflict with each other as has become apparent in the ongoing official attempts to suppress the new “Taliban”. Proper civilian control of the ISI is part of the same process as the proper civilian control of the Pakistan military as a whole, and what we are witnessing is nothing less than the first serious constitutional attempt in Pakistan’s history for that to take place. The whole subcontinent is hopeful and watching Pakistan’s transition. In the meantime, a milestone was certainly reached on 25 May when Pakistan’s young and brilliant sufi rock band Junoon performed in beautiful Srinagar to the delight of thousands of Kashmiris. The “United Jehad Council” and Syed Ali Shah Geelani had denounced them; in reply the band’s lead guitarist Salman Ahmed had the courage to say: “I want them to join us in the musical jehad for peace and ring the bells of harmony.” For peace to break out will of course require India’s participation and willingness as well.

Posted in Afghanistan, Air warfare, anarchy and governance, Bangladesh, Constitutional law, Constitutional Politics, Good and Evil, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, India's Bangladesh liberation war, India-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, India-Pakistan naval cooperation, India-Pakistan peace process, Jammu & Kashmir, Law, Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea applied to international terrorists, Laws of war applied to international terrorists, MA Jinnah, Maulana Azad, Mumbai massacres, Mumbai terrorist Kasab, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's 2005 earthquake, Pakistan's constitutional politics, Pakistan's diplomacy, Pakistan's history, Pakistan's judiciary, Pakistan's military, Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Pakistan's politics, Pakistan's Rule of Law, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pervez Musharraf, RAND study of Mumbai attacks, September 11 attacks, War. Leave a Comment »

An Academic Database of Doctoral & Other Postgraduate Research Done at UK Universities on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Other Asian Countries Over 100 Years

March 13, 2009 — drsubrotoroy

British universities have in the last one hundred years produced a vast and unsurpassable body of doctoral and other postgraduate research relating to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Afghanistan, Malaysia and other Asian countries.

The first table below contains almost 3,300 entries, each beginning with the date of award and the degree, followed by the University (and College), followed by the title of the thesis, followed by the AUTHOR in capital letters, followed by the name of the thesis supervisor where provided.

NB: There is a second table that follows containing a further 78 77 entries — these latter are, however, incomplete in that either the year or the degree appears not to be available.

If you are an author or thesis-supervisor or other academic representative and you are able to correct any inadvertent error or omission, please feel free to write to me promptly by email and I shall seek to account for it. For omissions, please also identify yourself clearly and send a comment to the post along with the necessary data that you believe should be accounted for. Numerous typos existed in the original transcription, several of which have been corrected though many might remain. In several cases, it is not impossible the original transcription has mis-spelt a name but authentication could require the original thesis to be checked.

This database has been created from public data and is published below with the aim of encouraging further research and reflection. It may be of special interest to notice the choice and quality of subjects in the context of particular times.

Subroto Roy

Postscript: More than one grateful reader has called this document someone’s “labour of love”. I agree though I have to say it was not mine — my contribution has been merely to transform a confused spreadsheet into HTML, editing it very slightly, removing some but not all typos yet, and publishing it. The spreadsheet was one of a million files on my computer, which must mean I downloaded it from some public source at some time though I am afraid I have no record where, most probably in British academia.

Degree University & College Title AUTHOR Supervisor

1909   MA   Liverpool   The interaction of England and India during the early years of George III   Dorothy DUDLEY
1917   BLitt   Oxford   The history of the occupation and rural administration of Bengal by the English Company from the time of Clive to the permanent settlement under Cornwallis   W K FIRMINGER
1917   MA   Liverpool   The constitutional relations of the Marquess Wellesley with the home authorities   Beatrice L FRAZER
1917   BLitt   Oxford   Agricultural cooperation in British India   J MATTHAI
1921   BA   Cambridge   Relations between the Bombay government and the Marathi powers up to the year 1774   W S DESI
1921   MA   Manchester   The movement of opinion in England as regards Indian affairs, 1757-1773   E EMMETT   Prof Muir
1921   MA   Manchester   The relations of the Mahrattas with the British power   I Kathleen WALKER   Prof Muir
1922   BLitt   Oxford   The history of Burma to 1824   G E HARVEY
1922   PhD   London   Commercial relations between India and England, 1600-1757   B KRISHNA
1922   MSc   London   Agricultural problems and conditions in the Bombay Presidency, 1870-1914   M A TATA
1922   BLitt   Oxford   The Indian calico trade and its influence on English history   P J THOMAS
1922   MSc   London   The cotton industry in India to 1757   J N VARMA   Prof Sargeant
1922   PhD   Manchester   The administration of Bengal under Warren Hastings   Sophia WEITZMAN   Prof Muir
1923   MA   Manchester   The administrative and judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal (excluding the permanent settlement)   A ASPINALL   Mr Higham
1923   MA   Manchester   The Residency of Oudh during the administration of Warren Hastings   C C BRACEWELL   Prof Davis
1923   MLitt   Cambridge   Industrial evolution of India in recent times   D R GADGIL
1923   PhD   London   The Punjab as a sovereign state, 1799-1839   GULSHAM LALL   Prof Dodwell
1924   BLitt   Oxford   Development of the cotton industry in Indian from the early 19th century   S DESOUANDE
1925   MA   Liverpool   Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1784-1800   Dorothy THORNTON   Prof Veitch
1926   PhD   Cambridge   The North West Frontier of India, 1890-1909, with a survey of policy since 1849   C C DAVIES
1927   PhD   Leeds   A study of the development of agriculture in the Punjab and its economic effects   K S BAJWA
1927   BLitt   Oxford   The military system of the Mahrattas: its origin and development from the time of the Shivaji to the fall of the Mahratta empire   S SEN
1928   MA   Birmingham   The East India Company crisis, 1770-1773   R BEARD
1928   PhD   Edinburgh   A comparative study of the woollen industry in Scotland and the Punjab   J W SIRAJUDDIN   Dr Rankin
1929   PhD   London   The relations of the Governor-General and council with the Governor and council of Madras under the Regulating Act of 1773   A Das GUPTA   Prof Dodwell
1929   PhD   London, LSE   The evolution of Indian income tax, 1860-1922: a historical, critical and comparative study   J P NIYOGI
1929   PhD   London   Development of Indian ralways, 1842-1928   N SANYAL   Prof Foxwell; Dr Slater
1930   PhD   London   Financial history of Mysore, 1799-1831   M H GOPAL   Dr Slater; Prof Dodwell
1930   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s Soc   The development of political institutions in the state of Travancore, 1885-1924   V M ITTYERAH
1930   BLitt   Oxford   Sir Charles Crosthwaite and the consolidation of Burma   Mys J MAY-OUNG
1930   PhD   London, SOAS   Revenue administration of the Sirkars under the East India Company down to 1802   Lanka SUNDERAM
1930   PhD   London, LSE   Hastings’ experiments in the judicial administration   N J M YUSUF
1931   PhD   London   State policy and economic development in Mysore State since 1881   UDAYAM ABHAYAMBAL   Miss Anstey
1931   PhD   London   The origin and early history of public debt in India   P DATTA   Prof Coatman
1931   MA   London   Lord Macaulay and the Indian Legislative Council   C D DHARKAR   Prof Dodwell
1931   MA   London   The bilingual problem in Ceylon   T D JAYASURIYA
1931   PhD   London; LSE   Study of agricultural cooperation in India based upon foreign experience   H L PASRICHA   Prof Gregory
1931   PhD   London, UC   The administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon. 1834-1861   K N V SASTRI   Prof Dodwell

1931 PhD London, SOAS Administrative beginnings in British Burma, 1826-1843 Barbara J STEWART

1931/32    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    English social life in India in the 18th century    T G P SPEAR
1932    PhD    London    The growth and development of the Indian tea industry and trade    S M AKHTAR    Dr Anstey
1932    PhD    London    Anglo-Sikh relations, 1839-1849    K C KHANNA    Prof Dodwell
1932    PhD    London, LSE    Indian commodity market speculation    L N MISRA    Prof Coatman
1932    PhD    London, LSE    Indian foreign trade, 1870-1930    Parimal RAY    Prof Sargent
1932    PhD    London, King’s    Ceylon under the British occupation: its political and economic development, 1795-1833    C R de SILVA    Prof Newton
1932    PhD    London    Post-war labour legislation in India – a comparison with Japan    Sasadhar SINHA    Dr Anstey
1932    PhD    London    Local finance in India    G C VARMA    Prof Coatman
1933    PhD    Leeds    Historical survey of the financial policy of the government of India from 1857 to 1900 and of its economic and other consequences    H S BHAI
1933    PhD    London    The relations between the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India and the Court of Directors, 1784-1816    P CHANDRA    Prof Coatman
1934    PhD    London    The influence of the home government on land revenue and judicial administration in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal from 1807-1822    B S BALIGA    Prof Dodwell
1934    MSc    Leeds    A survey of the resources of tanning materials and the leather industry of Bhopal State, India    G W DOUGLAS
1934    PhD    Edinburgh    Human geography of Bengal    Arthur GEDDES
1934    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    A study of the legal and administrative records of Dacca as illustrating the policy of Warren Hastings in East Bengal    F M SACHSE
1934    BLitt    Oxford    Biography of Maharaja DalipSingh    K S THAPER
1935    DPhil    Oxford    The development of the Indian administrative and financial system, 1858-1905, with special reference to the relations    F J THOMAS
1936    MSc    London    British Indian administration: a historical study    K R Ramaswami AIYANGAR
1936    MA    London    Lord Ellenborough’s ideas on Indian policy    Kathleen I GARRETT    Dr Morrell
1936    MA    London    British public opinion regarding Indian policy at the time of the mutiny    Jessie HOLMES    Dr Morrell
1936    PhD    London, SOAS    The rise and fall of the Rohilla power in Hindustan, 1707-1774 AD    A F M K RAHMAN
1936/37    PhD    Edinburgh    Indian foreign trade, 1900-1931, and its economic background: a study    W B RAGHAVIAH
1937    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville    The national income of British India, 1931-1932    V K R V RAO
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Culture change in South-Western India    A AIYAPPAN
1937    PhD    London, UC    Banks and industrial finance in India    R BAGCHI
1937    PhD    London    Development of social and political ideas in Bengal, 1858-1884    B C BHATTACHARYA    Prof Dodwell
1937    MSc    Leeds    An interpretation of the distribution of the population within the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh    Nora Y BOYDELL
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Rise and growth of Indian liberalism    M A BUCH
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Industrial finance and management in India    N DAS
1937    MSc    London, LSE    The effect of the breakdown of the international gold standard on India    R DORAISWAMY
1937    PhD    London, LSE    The problem of rural indebtedness in Indian economic life    B G GHATE
1937    MSc    London, LSE    Indian coal trade    J GUHATHAKURTA
1937    PhD    London SOAS    Reorganisation of the Punjab government (1847-1857)    R C LAI

1937   PhD   London, External   An economic and regional geography of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh   S M T RIZVI
1937   PhD   Wales   Purposes and methods of recording and accounting as applied to agriculture, with special reference to provision and use of economic data relating to agriculture in India   Arjan SINGH
1938   PhD   London, SOAS   The relations between Oudh and the East India Company from 1785-1801   P BASU
1938   PhD   London, SOAS   East India Company’s relations with Assam, 1771-1826   S K BHUYAN
1938   PhD   London, LSE   Discretionary powers in the Indian Government with special reference to district administration   B CHAND
1938   MA   London, SOAS   The British conquest of Sind   K A CHISHTI
1938   PhD   Cambridge, Christ’s   The working of the Bengal legislative council under the Government of India Act, 1919   J G DRUMMOND
1938   MA   London   British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840   E R KAPADIA
1938   PhD   London, SOAS   The East India interest and the British government, 1784-1833   C H PHILIPS
1938   PhD   London, LSE   The position of the Viceroy and Governor General of India   A RUDRA
1938   MA   London   British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840   Charles WADE
1938/39   PhD   Edinburgh   Agricultural geography of the United Provinces   B N MUKERJI
1939   PhD   London, LSE   Industrial development of Mysore   R BALAKRISHNA
1939   MA   London, LSE   A general geographical account of the North West Frontier Province of India   M A K DURRANI
1939   PhD   Wales   The international production and exchange of rice with special reference to the production, market demand and consumption of rice in India and Burma   Ahmas KHAN
1939   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s Soc   The Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, 1793-1798   A W MAHMOOD
1939   PhD   London, LSE   Indian provincial finance (1919-1937) with special reference to the United Provinces   B R MISRA
1940   PhD   London, LSE   Recent economic depression in India with reference to agriculture and rural life   R K BHAN
1940   PhD   Wales   The future of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces (with an examination of the cooperative experience)with special reference to the problems of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces, India   H R CHATURVEDI
1940   PhD   London, LSE   An administrative study of the development of the civil service in India during the Company’s regime   A K GHOSAL
1940   PhD   Wales   The production, marketing and consumption of the chief oilseeds in India and the supply and use of oilseeds in the United Kingdom   A S KHAN
1940   PhD   Wales   Principles of agricultural planning with reference to relationships of natural resources, populations and dietaries in India and with further reference to rural development in certain provinces of India   Jaswant SINGH
1941   PhD   London, LSE   Financing of local authorities in British India   A N BANERJI
1941   PhD   London   The political and cultural history of the Punjab including the North West Frontier Province in its earliest period   L CHANDRA   Prof Barnett
1941   PhD   London, LSE   Capital development of India, 1860-1913   A KRISHNASAWMI
1941   PhD   London, LSE   Influence of European political doctrines upon the evolution of the Indian governmental institutions and practice, 1858-1938   G PRASAD
1942   MLitt   Cambridge, Fitzwilliam   Economic and political relations of India with Iran and Afghanistan since 1900   T BASU
1942   PhD   Edinburgh   A study of missionary policy and methods in Bengal from 1793 to 1905   W B S DAVIS   Prof Watt; Prof Buleigh
1943   PhD   London, LSE   Development of large scale industries in India and their localisation   N S SASTRI
1944   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s   Communal representation and Indian self-government   I J BAHADOORSINGH
1944   MA   London, External   The physiographic evolution of Ceylon   K KULARATNAM
1946   MA   London, SOAS   The origins and development to 1892 of the Indian National Congress   Iris M JONES
1947   PhD   London, LSE   The agricultural geography of Bihar   P DAYAL
1947   PhD   Cambridge, King’s   Consumer expenditure in India, 1931/32 to 1940/41   R L DESAI
1947   MA   London, LSE   Power resources and utilisation in the United Provinces   P K DUTT
1947   PhD   London, LSE   Cultural change with special reference to the hill tribes of Burma and Assam   Edmund Ronald LEACH
1947   PhD   London, SOAS   The judicial administration of the East India Company in Bengal, 1765-1982   B B MISRA
1947   PhD   London, LSE   The monetary policy of the Reserve Bank of India with special reference to the structural and institutional factors in the economy   K N RAJ
1948   PhD   Wales   The principles and practice of health insurance as applied to India   J AGRAWALA
1948   MSc   London, LSE   International monetary policy since 1919 with special reference to India   D C GHOSE
1948   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   British policy on the North East Frontier of India, 1826-1886   S GUPTA
1948   DPhil   Oxford, St Cath’s   Local self-government in the Madras Presidency, 1850-1919   K K PILLAY
1948   PhD   London, LSE   The problem of the standards of the Indian currency   A SADEQUE
1948   DPhil   Oxford, Exeter   The social function of religion in a south India community   Mysore Narasimhashar SRINIVAS
1948   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s Society   Some aspects of agricultural marketing in India with reference to developments in western marketing systems   R S SRIVASTAVA
1948   PhD   London,. SOAS   Muslims in India: a political analysis (from 1885-906)   Rafiq ZAKARIA
1949   PhD   London, LSE   Settlements in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh   E AHMAD
1949   PhD   London, SOAS   The growth of self-government in Assam, 1984-1919   A K BARKAKOTY
1949   PhD   London, SOAS   British administration in Assam (1825-1845)with special reference to the hill tribes on the frontier   H BARPUJARI
1949   MA   London   An enquiry into the development of training of teachers in the Punjab during the British period   Aquila B BERLAS
1949   PhD   London, LSE   The problem of federation in India with special reference to economic relations   J N BHAN
1949   PhD   London, LSE   A study of methods of national income measurements with special reference to the problems of India   V K CHOPRA
1949   PhD   London, LSE   An analysis of the Indian price structure from 1861   A K GHOSH
1949   DPhil   Oxford, Keble   The achievement of Christian missionaries in India, 1794-1833   Kenneth INGHAM
1949   PhD   Wales   The organization and methods of agricultural cooperation in the British Isles and the possibility of their application in the Central Province of India   N Y KHER
1949   PhD   London, LSE   Industrial geography of Bihar   S A MAJID
1949   PhD   London, LSE   Development of Indian public finance during the war, April 1939-March 1946   S MISRA
1949   PhD   London, LSE   A study of the methods of state regulation of wages with special reference to their possible applications in India   S B L NIGAM
1949   PhD   London, SOAS   The development of marriage in ancient India   B C PAUL
1949   PhD   St Andrews   The social and administrative reforms of Lord William Bentinck   G SEED
1950   PhD   London, LSE   Jails and borstals with special reference to West Bengal   B BHATTACHARYYA   Dr Mannheim
1950   PhD   London   The growth of local self-government in Assam, 1874-1919   A K BORKAKOTY   Prof C R Philips; Prof Hall
1950   DPhil   Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall   The problem of the Indian immigrant in British colonial policy after 1834   I Mary CUMPSTON
1950   PhD   London, LSE   Underemployment and industrialisation: a study of the basic problems with special reference to India   B DATTA
1950   PhD   London, UC   The agriculture of Mysore   G K GHORI
1950   PhD   London, SOAS   The influence of western, particularly English, political ideas on Indian political thought, with special reference to the political ideas of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919   Sailesh C GHOSH
1950   PhD   London, LSE   Principles of unemployment insurance and assistance with special reference to their application to India   D GUPTA
1950   PhD   Newcastle   Anglo-Afghan relations, 1798-1878, with particular reference to British policy in Central Asia and on the North West Frontier of India   M KHAN
1950   PhD   London, LSE   The social consequences of imperialism with special reference to Ceylon   P R PIERIS
1950   PhD   London, LSE   An experiment in the estimation of national income and the in the construction of social accounts of India, 1945-1946   D N SAXENA   Mr Booker
1950   PhD   London, SOAS   The relations between the home and Indian governments, 1858-1870   Zahinuddin Husain ZOBERI
1951   PhD   London, External   Memoir of the geology and mineral resources of the neighbourhood of Bentong, Pahang and adjoining portions of Selangor and Negri Sembilan, incorporating an account of the prospecting and mining activities of the Bentong District   J B ALEXANDER
1951   BLitt   Oxford, Exeter   The political organization of the plains Indians   Frederick George BAILEY
1951   BLitt   Oxford, Corpus   Southern India under Wellesley, 1798-1805   A S BENNELL   Mr C C Davies
1951   PhD   London, LSE   Problems of the Indian foreign exchanges since 1927   D GHOSH
1951   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884   S GOPAL   Mr R C Davies
1951   MA   Wales   The problem of the Straits, 1896-1936   E W GRIFFITHS
1951   PhD   London, LSE   Sources of Indian official statistics relating to production   O P GUPTA   Dr Rhodes
1951   MA   Manchester   The administration and financial control of municipalities and district boards in the UP   N K KATHIA
1951   PhD   Glasgow   The legal and constitutional implications of the evolution of Indian independence   R KEMAL
1951   PhD   Cambridge, Jesus   An analysis of the Hindu caste system in its interactions with the total social structure in certain parts of the Malabar coast   E J MILLER   Prof Hutton
1951   PhD   Cambridge, Girton   Changes in matrilineal kinship on th Malabar coast   E K MILLER   Prof Hutton
1951   PhD   Bristol   Agriculture and horticulture in India – sundry papers   K C NAIK
1951   MA   Manchester   An economic survey of West Pakistan   A SHARIF
1951   PhD   Cambridge   The interpretation of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935   S D SHARMA
1951   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s Society   Religion and society among some of the tribes of Chota Nagpur   H N C STEVENSON
1951       London, SOAS   The political development of Burma during the period 1918-1935   OHN TIN
1951   PhD   London, LSE   The working of the Donoughmore constitution of Ceylon, 1931-1947: a study of a colonial central government by executive committees   Irripitwebadalge don Samaradasa WEERAWARDANA   Mr W H Morris-Jones
1952   PhD   London SOAS   The career of Mir Jafar Khan, 1757-1765 AD   Raya ATULA-CHANDRA   Prof C H Philips
1952   PhD   London, LSE   The development of Calcutta: a study in urban geography   M GUHA   Prof L D Stamp; Prof O H K Spate
1952   PhD   London, LSE   The East India Company’s land policy and management in Bengal from 1698 to 1784   Mazharul HUQ   Dr Anstey
1952   MA   Leeds   The social accounts relating to Ceylon   E L P JAYTILAKA
1952   MSc   London, LSE   Rural industries in India: a study in rural economic development with special reference to Madras   C K KAUSUKUTTY   Dr Anstey
1952   MSc   London, LSE   India’s balance of international payments with special reference to her food and agricultural conditions   G B KULKARNI   Dr Anstey; Dr Raeburn
1952   PhD   Cambridge   Utilitarian influence and the formation of Indian policy, 1820-1840   E T STOKES
1952   PhD   London, SOAS   Local government in India and Burma, 1908-1937: a comparative study of the evolution and working of local authorities in Bombay, the United Provinces and Burma   Hugh R TINKER   Prof Hall
1953   PhD   London, LSE   Economic geography of East Pakistan   N AHMAD   Prof Stamp
1953   MSc   London, UC   the changing pattern of India’s foreign trade, with special reference to the impact of large scale industrial development since 1919   A ALAGAPPAN
1953   PhD   London, SOAS   The East India Company and the economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740   Sukumar BHATTACHARYYA   Prof C H Philips
1953   MA   Wales   National income of Pakistan for the year 1948-49   Z ul H CHAUDRI
1953   MLitt   Cambridge, Fitzwilliam   The influence of Western thought on social, educational, political and cultural development of India, 1818-1840   V DATTA   Dr T G P Spear
1953   MSc   Belfast   The growth of trade unions in India   S DAYAL
1953   PhD   London   The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1658    K W GOONEWARDENA   Prof Hall
1953   PhD   London, LSE   The submontane region of North West Pakistan: a geographical study of its economic development   Maryam KARAM-ELAHI   Prof Buchanan; Prof Stamp
1953   PhD   London, LSE   A study of rhe measurement of national product and its distribution, with special reference to Pakistan   A H KHANDKER
1953   PhD   Edinburgh   A regional study of survival, mortality and disease in British India in relation to the geographic factors, 1921-1940   A T A LEARMONTH
1953   PhD   London, SOAS   Development of the Muslims of Bengal and Bihar, 1819-1856, with special reference to their education   A R MAALICK   Prof Philips
1953   DPhil   Oxford, Jesus   The study of the economy of self-subsisting rural communities: the methods of investigation, economic conditions and economic relations, with specific reference to India   P K MUKHOPADHYAY
1953   PhD   London, LSE   The relationship of land tenure to the economic modernization of Uttar Pradesh   W C NEALE
1953   PhD   London, Bedford   Social status of women during the past fifty years (1900=1950)   T N PATEL   Mrs B Wootton
1953   PhD   London, LSE   The state in relation to trade unions and trade disputes in India   Anand PRAKASH   Mr W H Morris-Jones; Mr Roberts
1953   MA   London, SOAS   The tribal village in Bihar   SACHCHIDANANDA   Prof C Haimendorf
1953   PhD   London, UC   Delegated legislation in India   V N SHULKA   Prof Keeton
1953   PhD   London, SOAS   The internal policy of the Indian government, 1885-1898   H L SINGH   Prof C H Philips
1953   PhD   London, SOAS   The internal policy of Lord Auckland in British India, 1836-1842, with special reference to education   D P SINHA   Prof C H Philips
1953/54   MA   Leeds   Demand for certain exports of Ceylon   K THARMARATNAM
1954   MA   London   The administration of Sir Henry Ward,Governor of Ceylon, 1855-1860   S V BALASINGHAM   Prof Graham
1954   PhD   London, SOAS   Social policy and social change in Western India, 1817-1830   Kenneth A BALLHATCHET   Prof C H Philips
1954   Dphil   Oxford, St Hilda’s   Lord William Bentinck in Bengal, 1828-1835   C E BARRETT   Dr C C Davies
1954   MA   London   A historical survey of the training of teachers in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries   S BHATTACHARYA
1954   MA   London, SOAS   Evolution of representative government in India, 1884-1909   Sasadhar CHAKRAVARTY   Prof C H Philips

1954    PhD    London, LSE    Consumption levels in India    T P CHAUDHURI
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The forests of Assam: a study in economic geography    H DAS
1954    MSc    Leeds    A study of price fixing for agricultural products with special reference to milk in Great Britain and Bombay    N K DESAI
1954    BLitt    St Andrews    Eldred Pottinger and the North West Frontier, 1838-1842    D W F GOURLAY    Sir C Ogilvie
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The Korean crisis and the Indian Union    K GUPTA
1954    MA    Manchester    Some aspects of the development of Pakistan’s financial structure    M HOSSAIN
1954    MSc    London, LSE    Financing economic development in Ceylon    A T JAYAKODDY    Prof Paish; Dr Anstey
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Measurement of profits: a study of methods with special reference to India    R K NIGAM
1954    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    A study of communal representation in constitutional systems of the British Commonwealth with specific reference to Ceylon, Kenya and Fiji    Carl Gustav ROSBERG    Mr K E Robinson
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Land utilization in Eastern Uttar Pradesh (comprising the districts of Jaunpur, Banares, Guezipur, Azamgarh and Baldea)    M SHAFI    Prof Stamp; Mr R R Rawson
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Representation and representative government in the Indian Republic    Irene C TINKER    Mr W H Morris-Jones
1954    PhD    London, SOAS    Trade and finance in the Bengal Presidency, 1793-1833    Amales TRIPATHY    Prof C H Phillips
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of the history of the coffee industry in Ceylon with specific reference to 1823-1885    I H VAN DEN DRIESEN    Mr Fisher
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The Manning constitution of Ceylon, 1924-1931    Alfred Jeyaretnam WILSON    Mr R Bassett; Mr W H Morris-Jones
1955    MSC    London, LSE    Some aspects of the history of British investments in the private sector of the Indian economy, 1876-1914    N Z AHMED    Dr Ashworth; F J Fisher
1955    PhD    Manchester    The social organisation of a village on the Hindu frontier of Orissa    Frederick George BAILEY
1955    LLM    London, LSE    Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in India: a comparative study    B N BANERJEE
1955    PhD    London    The administration of criminal justice in Bengal from 1773 to 1861    T K BANERJEE    S A de Smith; Prof A Gledhill
1955    MA    London    The East India Company in Madras, 1707-1744    R N BANERJI
1955    PhD    London    The factory of the English East India Company at bantam, 1602-1682    D K BASSETT    Prof D G E Hall
1955    PhD    London, LSSE    Pressure of population on land in India: a regional approach    B S BHIR
1955    MA    London, SOAS    The economic policy of the Government of India, 1898-1905    Edna BONNER    Prof C R Philips
1955    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The educational policy of the East India Company, 1781-1854    J G BOWEN    Mr C C Davies
1955    BLitt    Oxford, Magdalen    Indian labour migration to Malaya, 1867-1910    D A CALMAN    Dr A F Madden
1955    PhD    London, LSE    Consumption levels in India    T P CHOUDHURY
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The Malay family in Singapore    J DJAMOUR
1955    PhD    Edinburgh    The abolition of the East India Company’s monopoly, 1833    D EYLES    Prof Pares
1955    MLitt    Cambridge. Fitzwilliam House    The mongoloids and their contributions to the growth of Assamese culture    M C GOSWAMI    Dr J E Lindgren
1955    PhD    London, SOAS    The administration of the Delhi Territory, 1803-1832    Jessie HOLMES    Prof C H Philips
1955    MSc (Econ)    London, LSE    Taxation and saving in India    D JHA
1955    MSc    London, LSE    A comparison of the federal aspects of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the constitution of 1950    S KHAN
1955    MA    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the social history of Bengal with special reference to the Muslims, 1854-1884    L KHATOON    Prof Philips
1955    PhD    Aberdeen    Ports of the Indian ocean: an historical geography    W KIRK    A C O’Dell
1955    PhD    Cambridge, Peterhouse    British investment in Indian guaranteed railways, 1845-1875    W J MACPHERSON    Mr K E Berrill
1955    PhD    London, UC    Fundamental freedoms, with particular reference to the Indian constitution    J C MEHDI    Prof G W Keeton
1955    PhD    Birmingham    The educational ideas of Mahatma Gandhi    N P PILLAI
1955    MA    Manchester    Cottage industries in Bihar    S B SAXENA
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The Indian jute industry: a study of agricultural geography    P SENGUPTA
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi in relation to the English liberal tradition    Bishan Sarup SHARMA
1955    LLM    London, SOAS    Distribution of legislative power under the India constitution    R P SHARMA
1955    PhD    London , SOAS    The Council of India, 1858-1919    S SINGH    Prof C H Philips
1955    PhD    London LSE    The origin and development of left wing movements and ideas in India, 1919-1947    Lalan Prasad SINHA    R Mikband; W H Morris-Jones
1955    PhD    London; SOAS    British interest in trans-Burma trade routes to China, 1826-1876    Ma THAUNG
1955    MA    London    The training of teachers in the Bombay Presidency during the British period: a historical survey    N L VAIDYA
1955    PhD    Edinburgh    Save there, eat here: a cultural study of labour migration from a Pakhtun village    Francis Philip WATKINS
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The southeast quadrant of Ceylon: a study of the geographical aspects of land use    W A R WIKKRAMATILEKE
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    The Dutch power in Ceylon, 1658-1687    S ARASARATNAM    Prof D Hall
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Land use and soil erosion problems of Bist Jullundur Doab, Punjab, India    O P BHARDWAJA
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    British rule in Assam, 1845-1858    B CHAUDHURI    Prof C R Philips
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Josiah Child and the East India Company at the end of the 17th century    A L CROWE    Prof C Philips
1956    MSc    London, LSE    Scope and method of agricultural economic surveys in India    N Y Z FARUQI    Dr Raeburn
1956    PhD    London, LSE    A study of capital taxation and its scope in India    I S GULATI
1956    PhD    London, LSE    An analysis of the monetary experience of Ceylon    H A de S GUNASEKERA    Prof Sayers; Mr Wilson
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Federal finance and economic development with special reference to Pakistan    M HOSSAIN
1956    PhD    London, LSE    The demand for Indian exports and imports: an econometric study of selected commodities    A K MUKERJI    Prof Allen; Dr Norton
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Capital development in India with special reference to recent trends in investments    Dinanath Kashinath RANGNEKAR    Prof Paish; Dr Anstey
1956    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    A study of India’s balance of payments, 1901-1913 and 1924-1936    B S RAO    Prof E A G Robinson
1956    MA    London, SOAS    The relations between the Indian central and provincial governments with special reference to the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, 1858-1882    D N SINGH    Prof C H Philips
1957    MA    Birmingham    An examination in disposal and treatment of juvenile delinquents in Bombay State in relation to practice in England    A D ATTAR
1957    MA    London    The development and reconstruction of university education in Pakistan since 1854    S M A AZIZ
1957    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Social organisation of the Jaffna Tamils of North Ceylon with special reference to kinship, marriage and inheritance    M Y BANKS    Mr E R Leach
1957    PhD    London, LSE    West Midnapore: a study of land use    S C CHAKRABORTI
1957    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    The place of agricultural development in India’s first two Five-Year Plans    A CORREIA-AFONSO
1957    PhD    London, SOAS    Studies in the economic and social development of Inida, 1848-1856    M N DAS    Prof C Philips
1957    MA    London, LSE    The population of Chota Nagpur    H P DEVI    Prof L D Stamp
1957    MSc    London, LSE    Small scale and cottage industries as a means of providing better opportunities for labour in India    Q H FAROOQUEE    Prof A Plant; Mr Foldes
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Fiscal policy and inflation in post-war India, 1945-1954    K V G GOWDA
1957    DPhil    Oxford    Anglo Sikh relations, 1799-1849    B J HASRAT    C C Davies
1957    MLitt    Cambridge, Girton    Indian constitutional development, 1927-1935    M B HASSEN    Dr T G P Spear
1957    PhD    London, LSE    The commitee system in British and Indian local authorities    C JHA    Prof W A Robbins
1957    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    The development of money and banking in Ceylon    J B KELEGAMA
1957    PhD    London, LSE    The civil service in independent India: the All India and Union Civil Services    B S KHANNA    Prof W A Robson
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Urbanization in West Pakistan    K KURESHY
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Hinduism and economic growth: a study of the nature of the impact of Hinduism on India’s economic growth with special emphasis on theperiod since the mid 18th century    B B MISHRA    Dr Anstey
1957    PhD    London, External    Large scale sampling surveys in agriculture in the Punjab (Pakistan)    D M QURESHI
1957    PhD    London, SOAS    British land policy in Oudh    j RAJ    Prof C H Philips
1957    DPhil    Oxford    The Dutch in Coromandel, 1605-1690    Tapan RAYCHAUDHURI
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Geomorphological evolution of the highaland of Chota Nagpur and the adjoining districts of Bihar    R P SINGH
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Credit problems of small farmers in Ceylon    Wijetunga Mudianselagadera TILAKARATNA    Mr A D Knox
1957    PhD    London    The urban geography of Agra    A R TIWARI    Prof A E Smailes
1957/58    PhD    London, SOAS    The life and career of Jonathan Duncan, 1756-1795    V NARAIN
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    A comparative study of informal relationships in a Chinese village in Malaya and north India    W H NEWELL
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    The history of the Arghuns and Tarkhans of Sind    M H SIDDIQI
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    An analysis of the demand for, and the supply of, food in India    R P SINHA
1958    MA    London, Inst Ed    The missionary activities of the CMS and CZEMS in Kashmir during the second half of the 19th century    S Z AHMED SAH    Prof J A Lauwerys
1958    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The political organisation of the Swat Pathans    T F W BARTH    Mr E R Leach
1958    MA    London, Inst Ed    A historical survey of the languages problem in Bengal from the Muslim period to the end of the British period    K BHATTACHARYYA
1958    MSc    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The financing of planned economic development in India    S R DATTA GUPTA    Dr A R Prest
1958    MA    London, LSE    Sociology of marriage rituals in India: a study of Sanskritisation and de-Sanskritisation    B DATTAGUPTA
1958    MSc    Londond, LSE    Some aspects of Indo-British trade during the 20th century with special reference to capital goods    V P DHITAL
1958    MA    London, SOAS    The political system of the Rajputs    Sylvia J DUTRA    Dr Bauley; Prof C von Furer-Haimendorf
1958    MSc    London, LSE    The economics of the tea industry in Ceylon    J M F G FERNANDO    Dr V Anstey
1958    PhD    London    The development of the Indian National Congress, 1892-1909    Pansy C GHOSH    Dr K Balhatchet
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Inflation in India, 1939-1952: a study of inflation in an underdeveloped economy    S K GHOSH    Dr Anstey; Mr Day
1958    PhD    London,SOAS    The internal administration of Lord Lytton, with special reference to social and economic policy, 1876-1880    L M GUJRAL
1958    MLitt    Cambridge, King’s    Sir Richard Jenkins and the Residency at Nagpur, 1807-1818    F A HAGAR    Dr T G P Spear
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Agrarian problems in Bihar based, primarily, on surveys in five villages    F Tomasson JANNUZI    Dr V Anstey
1958    BLitt    Oxford, Campion Hall    An economic and historical study of food grain controls in India during the second world war and after    S C JOSEPH
1958    MSc    London, LSE    Union-state administrative cooperation in India (1937-1952)    M KAMAL    Prof W A Robson
1958    MSc    London, LSE    Problems of the agricultural labourers in India    R P KAMAT
1958    MSc    Cambridge, Newnham    The employment problem in Ceylon    I KANNANGARA    Mrs J V Robinson
1958    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The commercial and diplomatic relations between India and Tibet in the nineteenth century    H A LAMB    Dr V W W S Purcell
1958    PhD    Cambridge, St Catharine’s    The Dutch East India Company and Mysore, 1762-1790    J van LOHUIZEN    Dr T G P Spear
1958    MA    London, LSE    Social and economic geography of the Mathura District (western Uttar Pradash)    S D MISRA    Mr R R Rawson
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Economics of nutritional problems in India    R N MITRA    Dr Raeburn
1958    PhD    Cambridge, Peterhouse    The analysis of Kandyan marriage: landlords, labourers and aristocrats    OSMAN YALMAN NUR
1958    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Elijah Impey in India, 1774-1783    Bishwa Nath PANDEY    Prof C H Philips
1958    MA    London, LSE    A geography of the Peshawar region    M Z SAHIBZADA
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Indian monetary policy and debt management since 1939    J C D SETHI    Dr V Anstey; Mr R Turvey
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Strategic aspects of India’s foreign policy    V B L SHARMA
1958    BLitt    Oxford, St Antony’s    The rise and growth of the Praja Socialist Party of India (1934-1935)    H K SINGH    Mr F G Carnell
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Allahabad: a study in urban geography    Ujaqir SINGH    Prof D L Stamp

1958 PhD London, SOAS Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas Romila THAPAR Prof A.L.Basham [viz., note from Prof Thapar dated 4 March 2016]

1958    MA    London, SOAS    History of the development of Rangoon    TUN THET    Prof Hall
1958    PhD    London, LSE    India’s membership of the sterling area    Jai Dev VARMA
1958    PhD    Cambridge    The present situation and the probably future of cotton in West Pakistan’s economy    S B WHITEHILL
1958    PhD    Edinburgh    The economic geography of Madhya Pradesh (formerly Central Provinces and Behar)    R H ZAIDI
1959    MSc(Econ)    London, LSE    The industrial worker in East Pakistan: a study in the adaptation of an industrial labour force    A K AHMADULLAH    Prof Phelps
1959    MA    Manchester    The recruitment of Indians into the covenanted civil service, 1853-1892    M R ANWAR
1959    PhD    Manchester    Britain and Muslim India: a study of British public opinion vis-a-vis the development of Muslim nationalism in India, 1905-1947    K K AZIZ
1959    MSc    London, LSE    Problems in corporation taxation with special reference to India    M P BHATT    Mr Turvey
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Applications of linear programming to the development plans of India    B BHATTACHARYYA
1959    MA    London    Trincocmalee and the East Indies Squadron, 1746-1844    H A COLGATE    Prof Graham
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Economic development of Assam with special reference to the 20th century    P GOSWAMI    Dr Anstey
1959    PhD    London    The nationalist movement in Ceylon betweem 1910 and 1931, with special reference to communal and elective problems    D K GREENSTREET    Dr Miliband
1959    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    Land tenure in the Kandyan provinces of Ceylon    U A GUNASEKERA    Dr D F Pocock
1959    BLitt    Oxford, St Anne’s    The analysis of external trade and economic structure of Ceylon, 1900-1955    O E B GUNEWARDENA    Miss P H Ady
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Some problems of the organisation and administration of public enterprise with special reference to India    L N GUPTA    Prof Robson; Dr Anstey
1959    PhD    Edinburgh    The collection of agricultural statistics and the use of data in the United Kingdom and Pakistan: an objective study to explore possibilities of improvement in Pakistan    Muhammed Altaf HUSSAIN
1959    MA    London, SOAS    Social and administrative policy of the Government of Bengal, 1877-1890    Rokeya KABEER    Prof Basham
1959    PhD    London, External    Industrial relations in India    C B KUMAR
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of the problem of implementing agricultural planning in India    Gouri NAG    Mr Knox; Mr Lancaster
1959    PhD    Edinburgh    Early English travellers in India. A study in the travel literature of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods with particular reference to India    R C PRASAD    Prof W L Renwick; Mr G A Shepperson
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Judicial review in India: a study in constitutional theory and judicial practice    V R RAVIKANTI    Mr S de Smith
1959    MA    London, LSE    The position of women in Hinayana Buddhist countries (Burma, Ceylon, Thailand)    S SEIN    Mr F Freedman
1959    PhD    London , LSE    British opinion and Indian neutralism: an analysis of India’s foreign policy in the light of British public reactions, 1947-1957    Shri Ram SHARMA    Prof Manning
1959/60    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The cottage industries of India: an enquiry into their economics with special reference to developmental planning    Kedarnath PRASAD
1959/60    PhD    Cambridge, Queen’s    The role of transport and foreign trade in the economic development of Burma under British rule, 1885-1914    Maung SHEIN
1959/60    PhD    London, External    North east Baluchistan, Quetta Division: a critical evaluation of the land and its resources    A H SIDDIQI
1959/60    MA    Manchester    An analysis of the principal factors affecting India’s policy toward her Himalayan border    J TOOMRE
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the history of the Muslim community in Bengal, 1884-1912    Sufia AHMED    Prof C H Philips
1960    MA    London    Aspects of the economic development of the Assam valley, 1858-1884    A C BARUA    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    Cambridge    Thomas Munro and the development of administrative policy in Madras, 1791-1818: the origins of “the Munro system”    T H BEAGLEHOLE    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    London, LSE    Measurements of production and productivity in Indian industry with special reference to methodological aspects    G C BERI
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    The state and the cooperative movement in the Bombay Presidency, 1880-1930    I J CATANACH    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    London, LSE    The centrally recruited services in Pakistan    M A CHAUDHURI    Prof P Robson
1960    DPhil    Oxford, Lincoln    Portuguese society in India in the sixteenth and seveteenth centuries    K J CROWTHER
1960    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Cottage industries of Ceylon    H D DIAS    Mr B H Farmer
1960    MSc (Econ)    London    Someproblems of agriculture in the Vale of Peshawar (West Pakistan)    Lloyd Suttor EDMONDS
1960    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Malabar in Asian trade, 1740-1800    Asin Ranjan Das GUPTA

1960   MA   Wales, Swansea   Indian international transactions 1948 to 1958   C GURUPRASAD
1960   PhD   London, SOAS   British policy on the North West Frontier Province of India, 1889-1901   L HARRIS   Prof K Ballhatchet
1960   PhD   London, External   Agricultural geography of East Pakistan   B L C JOHNSON
1960   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   The Indian National Congress, 1918-1923   G KKRISHNA   Dr G F Hudson
1960   PhD   London   The growth of the idea of Commonwealth in India. 1900-1929   S R MEHROTRA   Prof Philips
1960   PhD   London   The Burma-China boundary since 1886   Khin Maung NYUNT
1960   PhD   London, Birkbeck   Colombo: a study in urban geography   D B L PANDITARATNA   Prof A L Basham
1960   PhD   London, LSE   The law and the banker in Ceylon   M J L RAJANAYAGAM   Prof Gower
1960   PhD   London, LSE   Land reforms and some allied agrarian problems in Madras State since independence   Arungiri RAMASWAMI
1960   PhD   London LSE   Economic aspects of the sugar industry in India   Saraswathi RAU   Dr Raeburn
1960   PhD   London, LSE   Industrial injuries schemes in India and Britain: a comparative study   B RAYCHAUDHURI
1960   MSc   London, LSE   Wage boards in British and the application of their proceedings in India   C J N SAXENA   Prof Phelps Brown
1960   PhD   London, LSE   Recent changes in land use in the Upper Damodar Basin, India   A SHARAN   Mr Rawson
1960   PhD   London, SOAS   English relations with Haidar Ali, 1760-1782   B SHEIK ALI
1960   MA   London, Inst Ed   A comparative study of the language problem at the university level in India   R K YADAVA
1960   PhD   London, SOAS   Anglo-Chinese diplomacy regarding Burma, 1885-1897   Nancy Iu YAN-KIT
1960/61   PhD   Cambridge, King’s   Surplus manpower in agriculture and economic development with special reference to India   P S SANGHVI   Dr M R Fisher
1960/61   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   A critique of surplus labour doctrine as applied to the Pakistan in 1947-1957   Rehana TANWIR
1961   PhD   London   Constitutional and political aspects of the public corporation in Britain and India   R S ARORA
1961   BLitt   Oxford, Exeter   Some aspects of change in the structure of the Muslim family in the Punjab under British rule   T ASAD   Dr D F Pocock
1961   PhD   London, SOAS   The structure and organisatioin of the Bengal Native Infantry with special reference to the problems of discipline (1796-1852)   Amiya BARAT   Dr K Ballhatchet
1961   PhD   London, LSE   Howrah: an urban study   A CHATTOPADHYAY   Dr E Jones
1961   PhD   Leeds   India, Britain and Russia: a study of British opinion   V K CHAVDA   Prof Briggs
1961   DPhil   Oxford, Magdalen   Muslim politics in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, 1858-1916   M CHUGHTAI   Dr C C Davies
1961   DPhil   Oxford, Nuffield   Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1773-1801   B DE   Mr Davies
1961   PhD   London, SOAS   Some aspects of the development of social policy in Ceylon, 1840-1955 with special reference to the influence of missionary organisations   K M DE SILVA   Dr K Ballhatchet
1961   MSc   London   The economics, organisation and administration of the Indian paper industry   B N DHAR
1961   PhD   London   The administration of Guntur District with special reference to local influences on revenue policy, 1837-1848   Robert Eric FRYKENBERG   Dr K Ballhatchet
1961   PhD   Cambridge   Sir Richard Temple and the government of India 1868-1880: some trends in Indian administrative policy   G R G HAMBLY
1961   PhD   London, SOAS   Tribal unrest on the south-west frontier of the Bengal Presidency, 1831-1833   J C JHA
1961   MA   London, SOAS   Changing values in the Naga Hills and Manipur State   M KALABOVA   Prof C Von Furer Haimerdorf
1961   PhD   London, External   Financial administration in Ceylon since independence   V KANESALINGHAM
1961   MSc   London, LSE   Government of India policy towards Portuguese possessions in India from 1947 to 1957   R A KHAN
1961   PhD   London, SOAS   The development of nationalist ideas and tactics and the policies of the government of India   J R McLANE
1961   PhD   London, SOAS   The Kurumas of Malabar   Richard Lionel ROOKSBY
1961   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity Hall   The Ceylon economy, 1920-1938: a national accounts study   M R P SALGADO   Dr B B Das Gupta
1961   MA   London, SOAS   The social and political organisation of the Kandyan Kingdom (Ceylon)   S B W WICKREMASEKERA
1961/62   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   The growth of agricultural labour in the Madras Presidency in the nineteenth century   Dharma KUMAR   Mr J Gallagher
1962   MA   London, LSE   Population changes in West Bengal, 1872-1951   A BHATTACHARYYA   Prof Jones
1962   MA   London, Inst Ed   Policies regarding higher education in Ceylon during the 19th and 20th centuries with special reference to the establishment of the University of Ceylon   P CHANDRASEGARAM   Mr B Holmes
1962   PhD   London   The development of the English East India Company with special reference to its trade and organization, 1600-1640   K N CHAUDHURI
1962   PhD   Edinburgh   The control of public expenditure in less-developed countries with special reference to India   usha DAR
1962   PhD   London, LSE   Investment and economic growth in Ceylon   S B D DE SILVA   Prof Paish
1962   PhD   Londond, Birkbeck   The North West frontier of West Pakistan: a study in regional geography   D DICHTER   Prof East
1962   PhD   London   Social institutions in Ceylon 5th century BC to 4th century AD   H ELLAWALLA   Prof Basham; Dr de Casparia
1962   MLitt   Durham   The political ideas of Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall   P HASSAN   Prof W H Morris Jones
1962   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   Some aspects of the social and political thought of Mahatma Gandhi   Raghavan Narasimhan IYER   Mr J P Plamenatz
1962   PhD   London, SOAS   Murshid Quli Khan and his times   Abdul KARIM   Mr Harrison
1962   PhD   London   Indo-Ceylon relations since independence   Shelton Upatissa KODIKARA
1962   PhD   London   The fiscal policy of the central government of India since independence and its economic effects   J MADHAB
1962   DPhil   Oxford, Wadham   The impeachment of Warren Hastings   Peter James MARSHALL   Principal of Lady Margeret Hall
1962   PhD   London, External   Social geography of Himachal Pradesh   S D MISRA
1962   PhD   London, LSE   Public administration aspects of community development in India (with special reference to Rajasthan)   D C POTTER
1962   PhD   London, LSE   The development of the Indian capital market with special reference to the managing agent system   B PRASAD   Dr Paish; Dr Anstey
1962   PhD   London, LSE   A study of productivity problems in the cotton textile industries of the UK (Lancashire) and India (Bombay and Ahmedabad) since the Second World War   S P S PRUTHI   Mr Roberts
1962   PhD   London   The political and constitutional evolution of Burma from 1923-1936   Asha RAM
1962   PhD   London, Inst Ed   Education in colonial Ceylon, being a research study on the history of education in Ceylon for the period 1796 to 1834    T R A RUBERU
1962   PhD   Edinburgh   Scottish experience in the impact of farm mechanisation on the employment and use of man labour with observatioins on possible Indian problems in this field   Kalyan Kumar SARKAR
1962   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity Hall   The emergence of Indian nationalism, 1885-1915   A SEAL   Mr J Gallagher
1962   PhD   Manchester   A comparative study of the central administrative organisation in India and in some other Commonwealth countries   S C SETH
1962   DPhil   Oxford, Nuffield   India’s export performance, 1951-1960, export prospects and policy implications   M V SINGH   Dr I M D Little
1962   PhD   Manchester   Some aspects of the administration of community projects in India   T N SRIVASTAVA
1962   PhD   London, QMC   Aspects of the urban geography of new Delhi   M P THAKORE   Prof Smailes
1962   PhD   London   Family planning in India: a field study of attitudes and behaviour in a population of Delhi compared with results of existing research in India and elsewhere   S THAPER
1962   PhD    London, SOAS   Lord Minto and the Indian nationalist movement with special reference to the political activities of the Indian Muslims, 1905-1910   S R WASTI
1962   DPhil   Oxford, New   The formation of policy in the India Office, 1858-1866, with special reference to the Political, Judicial, Revenue and Public Works Departments   D WILLIAMS   Mr C C Davies
1962/63   MA   London, Inst Ed   Education in the Roman Catholic missions in Ceylon in the second half of the 19th century (1842-1905)   C N V FERNANDO   Dr Weitzman
1962/63   PhD   London, External   Sterling tea and rubber companies in Ceylon, 1889-1958   N RAMACHANDRAN
1963   DPhil   Oxford, St Cath’s   Land systems in the Punjab (including North West Frontier Province)as affected by British rule between 1849 and 1901   R AHMAD   Mrs U K Hicks
1963   PhD   London, SOAS   The Bengali reaction to Christian missionary activities, 1833-1957   M M ALI
1963   PhD   Manchester   Economic ideas and Indian economic policies in the nineteenth century   S AMBIRAJAN
1963   PhD   London, UC   The development of the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir   A S ANAND   Mr Holland
1963   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   Private investment and partial planning in India   Amiya Kumar BAGCHI
1963   PhD   London   The law of parliamentary elections in India and the United Kingdom   R K BAHL
1963   PhD   London, SOAS   British policy towards the Panjab, 1844-1849   S S BAL   Dr K Ballhatchet
1963   PhD   London   Estimates of the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments of India, 1921/22 to 1938/39, incorporating also the estimates of the government of India   A K BANERJI
1963   MS   London   The governorship of Sir William Gregory in Ceylon   B E St J BASTIAMPILLAI   Prof G S Graham
1963   PhD   Manchester   The industrial growth and technological pluralism in India with special reference to the cotton textile industry   AS BHALLA
1963   PhD   London, LSE   Financial administration of nationalised industries in UK and India   G S BHALLA
1963   MA   London, Inst Ed   A cross-cultural study of interests and attitudes of British and Indian university students   J K BHATNAGAR
1963   MSc   London, LSE   American attitudes towards foreign aid with special reference to the Indian sub continent   E I BRODKIN   Mr Chambers
1963   PhD   London, SOAS   Lord Curzon and the Indian states. 1899-1905   I A BUTT   Dr K A Ballhatchet

1963    MsC    London, UC    A comparative study of the nature and effectiveness of selective credit controls in the UK, India and Australia since 1951    J G CHAPATWALA    Dr Cramp
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Slavery in the Bengal Presidency under East India Company rule, 1772-1843    A K CHATTOPADHYAY    Major Harrison
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    The rice industry of Burma, 1852-1940    Siok-hwa CHENG    Prof C D Cowan
1963    MA    London, Inst Ed    The effects of diarchy upon educational developments in Bengal, 1919-1953    S K DUTTA GUPTA
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Colonisation of the dry zone of Ceylon    H N C FONSECA
1963    PhD    London    British relations with Kashmir, 1885-1893    D K GHOSE    Dr K Ballhatchet
1963    PhD    Sheffield    The Marquis of Dalhousie and education in India, 1848-1956    Kamala GHOSH
1963    PhD    Manchester    The British Conservative Party and Indian problems. 1927-1935    S C GHOSH
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    British historical writing from Alexander Dow to Mountstuart Elphinstone on Muslim India    J S GREWAL    Dr Hardy
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian politics and the British right, 1914-1922    M R HASSAN    Dr K Ballhatchet
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Ritual pollution and social structure in Hindu Assam    T T S HAYLEY
1963    MSc    London, LSE    English, German, Spanish relations in the Sulu question, 1987-1877    S C HUNTER
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Rainfall, rice fields and irrigation needs in West Bengal    P HUR    Mr Rawson
1963    MSc    London, LSE    Ideological influences in the foreign policy of Pakistan    A HUSSAIN    Dr Manning
1963    MA    Sheffield    The industrial geography of Madras State    Iyer Balasubramanyan HYMA
1963    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The supply of Sinhalese labour to Ceylon plantations, 1830-1930: a study of imperial policy in a peasant society    L R U JAYAWARDENA    Mr K E Berrill
1963    PhD    London, External    Caste and class in pre-Muslim Bengal: studies in social history of Bengal    N KUNDU
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Jesus    The role and limits of state authority in northern India in the early historical period: an empirical examination of the administration of government    Ian W MABBETT    Prof T Borrow
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Lady Margaret    Lord Minto’s administration in India (1807-1813)with special reference to his foreign policy    Amita MAJUMDAR    Mr C C Davies
1963    DPhil    Oxford, St Hugh’s    Imperial policy in India, 1905-1910    V MAZUMDAR    Dr C C Davies
1963    PhD    London, LSE    The origin, development and problems of village (“community”) projects in India    Vindhyeshwari Prasad PANDE
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Constitutional protection of property in India: a critical and comparative study    P P PANDIT
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Regent’s Park    British Baptist missions and missionaries in India, 1793-1837    E D POTTS    Mr C C Davis
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Land revenue administration in the ceded and conquered provinces and its economic background, 1819-1833    Asiya SIDDIQI    Mr C C Davis
1963    MA    London, SOAS    British administration in Upper Burma, 1885-1897    Jagjit Singh SIDHU
1963    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    The Jats: an ethnographic survey    Gunter TIEMANN    Dr D F Pocock
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The development and significance of transport in India (1834-1882)    K E VERGHESE    Mr C C Davies
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of Indian society as depicted in the Pali Canon    N K WAGLE
1963    MA    London, LSE    Magic in Malaya    W D WILDER
1963    PhD    London, UC    Basic democracies in Pakistan    M S K YOUSUFZAI    Prof Holland
1964    LlM    London, UC    The origin and nature of presidential powers in Pakistan    M ARIF    Mr Holland
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The ideological differences between moderates and extremists in the Indian national movement with special reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, 1882-1919    D ATGOV    Prof H Tinker
1964    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The Indian Constituent Assembly and the framing of the Indian constitution    G S AUSTIN    Mr F G Carnell
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The role of Shaikh Ahmad of Sarhind in Islam in India    M Q BAIG    Prof Basham
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    David Scott on the North East Frontier of India and in Assam    N K BAROOAH    Mr Harrison
1964    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    An examination of marriage ritual among selected groups in South India    B E F BECK
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The mobilisation of savings and the role of financial institutions with special reference to India    M Q M S DALVI    Dr Anstey
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Producers’ rationality and technical changes in agriculture with special reference to India    S DASGUPTA    Dr Anstey; Mr Joy
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy towards the Pathans and Pindaris in central India, 1805-1818    B GHOSH    Dr K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    Cambridge. Newnham    Service centres in Southern Ceylon    K A GUNAWARDENA    Mr B H Farmer

1964 PhD London, UCL, A Comparative Study of Pakistani Bilingual and Monoglot School Children’s Performance in Verbal and Non Verbal Tests Rafia HASAN Dr Charlotte Banks (added thanks to information of Naveed Hasan Henderson, PhD London 1995, in a comment below, and confirmed by the University of London Library)

1964    PhD    London, External    An appraisal of public investment policy in India, 1951-1961    J M HEALEY
1964    PhD    London    The formation of British land revenue policy in the ceded and conquered provinces of northern India. 1801-1833    M I HUSAIN    Dr K A Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Soviet Russia’s policy towards India and its effect on Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917-1928    Z IMAM    Mr Schapiro
1964    PhD    London, Wye    Efficiency in agricultural production; its meaning, measurement and improvement in peasant agriculture with special reference to Pakistan    M S ISLAM
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The urban labour movement in Ceylon with reference to political factors, 1893-1947    V K JAYAWARDENA    Prof Roberts
1964    PhD    London, External    A study of the current trends in the industrial development of Ceylon    V KANAPATHY
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The modern Muslim political elite in Bengal    Abdul Khair Nazmul KARIM
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Iron and steel prices in India since independence    S S MENSINKAI
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Charles Wood’s Indian policy, 1953-1866    R J MOORE    Prof Basham
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    Lord Northwood’s Indian administration, 1872-1876    E C MOULTON    Dr K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of agrarian reorganizationin India with special reference to size of holding    B MUKHERJEE    D Anstey
1964    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    British commercial interests and the expansion of the Bombay Presidency, 1784-1806    P NIGHTINGALE    Dr T G P Spear
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The rise of the Muslim middle class as a political factor in India and Pakistan    A H M NOORUZZAMAN    Prof H Tinker
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The rev. James Long and Protestant missionary policy in Bengal, 1840-1872    G A ODDIE    Prof K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Some issues between the church and state in Ceylon in the education of the people from 1870 to 1901    A RAJAINDRAN    Dr Holmes
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Rural development in India with special reference to agriculture, education and administration    K RAJARATNAM    Dr Anstey
1964    PhD    Durham    The central legislature in British India, 1921-1947    Md RASHIDUZZAMAN    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Land tenure as related to agricultural efficiency and rural welfare in India    Paramahansa RAY    Dr Anstey; Mr Joy
1964    PhD    London    The revenue administration of Chittagong from 1761 to1784    Alamgir Muhammad SERAJUDDIN    Mr Harrison
1964    BLitt    Oxford, St Hilda’s    A study of representation in multi-lateral communities with special reference to Ceylon and Trinidad from 1946-1961    A SPACKMAN    Dr A F Madden
1964    MSc    London, LSE    Trends in the pattern of distribution of consumer goods in India    B K VADEHRA
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    British administration in the maritime provinces of Ceylon, 1796-1802    U C WICKREMERATNE    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1964    MA    Nottingham    British policy and the defence of Asia, 1903-1905: with special reference to China and India    B WILLCOCK    Dr J A S Grenville
1964/65    PhD    Manchester    Revolution and counter-revolution: a study of British colonial policy as a factor in the growth and disintegration of national liberation movements in Burma and Malaya    F NEMENZO
1964/65    PhD    Nottingham    Impact of the size of the organization on the personnel management function: a comparative study of personnel departments in some British and Indian industrial firms    B P SINGH
1965    DPhil    Oxford, New College    Life and conditions of the people of Bengal (1765-1785)    Z AHMA    Mr C C Davies
1965    PhD    London, External    The commercial progress and administrative development of the East India company on the Coromandel coast during the first half of the 18th century    R N BANERJI
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The minorities of Southern Asia and public policy with special reference to India (mainly since 1919)    J H BEAGLEHOLE    Prof H Tinker
1965    PhD    Manchester    Urban unemployment in India    RC BHARDWAJ
1965    DPhl    Oxford, Balliol    The governor-generalship of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823, with special reference to the Supreme Council and Secretariat…Palmer Company    Richard J BINGLE    Mr C C Davies
1965    MSc    London, SOAS    Ministerial government under the dyarchical reforms with special reference to Bengal and Madras    K A CHOWDHURY
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The idea of freedom in the political thought of Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Gandhi and Tagore    D G DALTON
1965    MA    London, LSE    Irrigation and winter crops in East Pakistan    O HUQ    Mr Rawson
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Conditions of employment and industrial disputes in Pakistan    A HUSAIN    Prof A Gledhill
1965    PhD    London, LSE    Democratic decentralization and planning in rural India    A C S ILCHMAN    Dr Anstey; Prof Self
1965    MSc    London, King’s    A social geography of Chitral State    ISRAR-UD-DIN    Prof Jones
1965    MSc (Econ)    London, LSE    Economic problems and organisation of public enterprise in Ceylon, 1931-1963    A S JAYAWARDENE    Mr Foldes
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The rights and liabilities of the Bengal raiyats under tenancy legislation from 1885 to 1947    L KABIR
1965    MA    Manchester    The failure of parliamentary system of government in Pakistan    M A KHAN
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Curzon, Kitchener and the problem of India army administration, 1899-1909    J E LYDGATE    Prof Robinson
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of urban centres and industries in the central provinces of the Mughal Empire between 1556 and 1803    H K NAQVI    Mr Harrison
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Charles Metcalfe’s administration and administrative ideas in India, 1806-1835    D N PANIGRAHI    Prof C H Philips
1965    PhD    Birmingham    Peasant farming past and present in the wet zone of Ceylon    P D A PERERA    Prof H Thorpe; Dr W B Morgan
1965    DPhil    Oxford, Merton    Some aspects of British economic and social policy in Ceylon, 1840-1871    M W ROBERTS    Prof J A Gallagher
1965    PhD    London    The rise of business corporations in India and their development during 1851-1900    R S RUNGTA    Prof Paish; Dr V Ansty
1965    PhF    London, SOAS    The Sultanate of Jaunpur    Mian Muhhammad SAEED    Prof Basham
1965    BLitt    Oxford, Lady Margaret    Agricultural policy and economic development in India    K N V SASTRI    Mr G R Allen
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    A comparative study of the traditional political organisation of Kerala and Punjab    S J SHAHANI    Dr Mayer
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The joint Hindiu family: its evolution as a legal institution    Gunther-Dietz SONTHEIMER    Dr Derrett
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Nullity of marriage in modern Hindu law    S K TEWARI    Dr J D M Derrett
1965    MA    London, Inst Ed    The social and political significance of Anglo-Indian schools in India    Rosalind TIWARI    Dr King
1965    MA    Manchester    Federalism in south-East Asia with special reference to Burma    Margaret YIYI
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The partition of Bengal and its annulment: a survey of the schemes of territorial redistribution of Bengal, 1902-1911    S Z H ZAIDI    Prof Basham
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Economic geography of rubber production in Ceylon    G H PEIRIS    Mr B H Farmer
1965/66    PhD    Leeds    Impact of money supply on the Indian economy, 1950/51 – 1963/64    K PRASAD
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    The structure and working of the commercial banking system in Ceylon, 1945-1963    A J A N SILVA    Miss P M Deane
1965/66    PhD    Durham    Aspects of hte administration of the Punjab, judicial, revenue and political, 1849-1858    S K SONI
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity House    The public finances of Ceylon, 1948-1961    G USWATTE-ARATCHI    Dr A R Prest

1966 PhD Manchester University Ramgopal AGARWALA An econometric model of India, 1948-49 to 1960-61 Mr R.J. Ball

1966    PhD    London, LSE    Expenditure classification and investment planning with special reference to Pakistan    K U AHMAD    Dr Anstey
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The methodology of studying fertility differentials with reference to East Pakistan    M AHMAD    Prof Glass; Mr Carrier
1966    PhD    Bristol    The role of a higher civil service in Pakistan    A AHMED
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Conditions of employment and industrial disputed in Pakistan    H AHMED
1966    MScEcon    London, SOAS    Political parties and the Labour Movement in India in the 1920s    N BEGAM
1966    MLitt    Edinburgh    Patronage and education in the East India Company civil service, 1800-1857    J T BEYER
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Regional cooperation for development in South Asia with special reference to India and Pakistan    S R BOSE    Mr W B Reddaway
1966    PhD    London    The constitutional history of Malaya with special reference toe Malay states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahong, 1874-1914    P L BURNS    Prof C D Cowan
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The impact of planning upon federalism in India, 1951-1964    A CHATTERJI    Prof Sir Ivor Jennings
1966    PhD    London, UC    Industrial conciliation and arbitration in India    R L CHAUDHARY
1966    PhD    London, UC    Lahore: a geographical study    M M CHAUDHURY
1966    PhD    Manchester    The approach to planning in Pakistan    M K CHOWDHURY
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Jamshedpur – the growth of the city and its region    M DUTT    Prof Jones
1966    DPhil    Oxford, Campion Hall    The Tana Bhagats:a study in social change    P EKKA    Mr K O L Burridge
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The scope for wage policy as an instrument of planning in early stages of national economic development: a comparative study of the USSR, India and the UAR    M A ELLEISI    Prof Phelps Brown; Dr Ozga
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The social condition of the British community in Bengal, 1757-1800    S C GHOSH    Prof A L Basham
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The transfer of power to Pakistan and its consequences (1946-1951)    M HASAN    Prof N Mansergh
1966    PhD    London, UC    The Indian Supreme Court and the constitution    M IMAM    Dr D C Holland
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Cotton futures markets in India: some economic studies    T ISLAM    Prof Yamey
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The extensions of the franchise in Ceylon with some consideration of the their political and social consequences    K H JAYASINGHE    Mr Pickles
1966    MA    London, External    The control of education in Ceylon: the last fifty years of British rule and after (1900-1962)    C S V JAYAWAWEERA
1966    PhD    London, External    A comparative study of British and American colonial educational policy in Ceylon and the Philippines from 1900 to 1948]    S JAYAWEERA
1966    PhD    Manchester    Import substitution in relations to industrial growth and balance of payments iof Pakistan, 1965-1970    A H KADRI
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Origins of Indian foreign policy: a study of Indian nationalist attitudes to foreign affairs, 1927-1939    T A KEENLEYSIDE    Prof H Tinker
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The transition in Bengal, 1756-1775: a study of Muhammad Reza Khan    Abdul Majed KHAN    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The British administration of Sind between 1843 and 1865: a study in social and economic development    Hamida KHUHRO    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The internal administration of Lord Elgin in India, 1984-1898    P L MALHOTRA    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of Murshidabad Distrrict, 1765-1793    K M MOHSIN    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905-1911    M K U MOLLA    Dr Hardy; Dr Pandey
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The early history of the East Indian Railways, 1845-1879    Hena MUKHERJEE    Dr Chaudhuri
1966    PhD    London, King’s    British military policy and the defence of India: a study of British military policy, plans and preparations during the Russian crisis, 1876-1880    A W PRESTON    Prof M E Howard
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Changes in caste in rural Kumaon    R D SANWAL    Dr Freedman
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The Christian missionaries in Bengal. 1793-1833    K SENGUPTA    Prof Basham
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Central control and supervision of capital expenditure in the public sector in the UK and India    Ram Parkash SETH    Prof Greaves; Prof Self
1966    PhD    London, King’s    Surveying and charting the Indian Ocean    W A SPRAY    Prof G S Graham
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Politics and change in the Madras Presidency, 1884-1894: a regional study of Indian nationalism    R SUNTHARALINGAM    Prof H R Tinker
1966    PhD    London, External    The law relating to directors and managing agents of companies limited by shares in Pakistan    Muhammad ZAHIR    Prof Gledhill
1966/67    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Planning and regional development: the application of a multi-sectoral programming model to inter-regional planning in Pakistan    A R KHAN    Dr J A Mirrlees
1966/67    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    The impact of the creation of Pakistan on Muslim education in Pakistan    G NABI
1966/67    PhD    Manchester    A study of fiscal policy in Pakistan, 1950-51, with special reference to its contribution to economic development    M NAYIMUDDIN
1966/67    PhD    Edinburgh    The fisheries of Pakistan: their present position and potentialities    R NIAZI
1966/67    PhD    Leeds    An evaluation of the human impact on the nature and distribution of wild plant communities in the Ceylon Highlands    N P PERERA
1966/67    PhD    Reading    Intra-party relationships and federalism: a comparative study of the Indian Congress Party and the Australian political parties    Y A RAFEEK
1966/67    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    The share of labour in value added during the inflation in the modern sector in under-developed economies: a comparative study of the experience of India, Peru and Turkey between 1939 and 1958    W M WARREN    Mr J A C Bowen
1967    LLM    Queen’s, Belfast    A comparative study of the provisions for emergency powers in the constitutions of the Indian, Australian, Nigerian and Malaysian federations with special emphasis on the Malaysian constitution    A ABIDIN
1967    PhD    Edinburgh    The peasant family and social status in East Pakistan    Nizam Uddin AHMED
1967    BLitt    Glasgow    Foreign trade policy of India    N M AMIN
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    English educated Ceylonese in the official life of Ceylon from 1865 to 1883    W M D D ANDRADI    Mr J B Harrison
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the relationship of political and constitutional theories to the constitutional evolution of India and Pakistan with special reference to the period 1919-1956    B P BARUA    Prof H Tinker
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Indian education and politics,1898-1920    A BASU    Prof J A Gallagher

1967   MA   Sussex   Choice of technique: an activity analysis approach with special reference to the Indian cotton textiles industry   C L BELL
1967   PhD   Cambridge, Selwyn   Anglo-Afghan relations, 1870-1880   S CHAKRAVARTY   Dr T G Spear
1967   PhD   Cambridge, Clare   The relations of the Court of Directors, the India Board, the India Office and the Government of India, 1853-1865   P K CHATTARJI   Dr T G Spear
1967   MA   Sussex   The regulation of communal disturbances in West Bengal and East Pakistan in 1950   M CHAUDHURY
1967   MSc   London, SOAS   Political parties in the Bombay Presidency, 1920-1929   D S CHAVDA   Prof H Tinker
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   Oil prices and the Indian market, 1886-1964   Biplab Kumar DASGUPTA   Prof Penrose
1967   MPhil   London, LSE   Some aspects of stratificatioin in Indian rural communities   K S DASGUPTA   Prof Glass
1967   DPhil   Oxford, Lady Margaret   The growth of urban leadership n Western India with special reference to Bombay City, 1845-1885   C E DOBBIN   Prof J A Gallagher
1967   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   Judicial control of administrative action in India and Pakistan   A FAZAL   Prof H W R Wade
1967   DPhil   Oxford, Linacre House   Patterns of investment, political stability and rates of growth: an analysis of central government expenditure of Ceylon, 1930-1963   S T G FERNANDO   Lady Hicks
1967   MA   Sussex   Development administration and Calcutta metropolitan government   R FOGEL
1967   PhD   London, QMC   Peasant production of tea in Sri Lanka   R S GUNAWARDENA   Dr Hodder; Prof Smailes
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   The policy of Sir James Fergusson as Governor of Bombay Presidency, 1880-1885   A GUPTA   Prof K Ballhatchet
1967   PhD   Cambridge, Sidney   The effect of a change in the terms of trade on the economic growth of Pakistan: a study of the third five year plan   I U HAQUE   Mr W B Reddaway
1967   PhD   London, LSE   Agricultural taxation in a newly developing country: the case of Pakistan   A HASHEM   Prof Peston
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   A price stabilisation model for Pakistan: jute   A K M S HUQ   Prof Penrose
1967   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   The failure of parliamenary politics in Pakistan, 1953-1958   I HUSAIN   Prof M Beloff
1967   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   The development of Indian politics, 1888-1909   G JOHNSON   Dr A Seal
1967   MA   Sussex   Language as an issue in Indian politics   J KABANGO
1967   MA   London, LSE   The changing distribution of cash crops in East Pakistan, 1945-1962   A K M KALIMULLAH   Dr Board
1967   PhD   Aberdeen   The development of transport in East Pakistan   Abul Fazal Muhammed KAMALUDDIN
1967   MPhil   London, SOAS   The advent of the British in Ceylon, 1762-1803   V L B MENDIS   Dr Bastin
1967   MPhil   Leeds   The linguistic world of Anglo-India   K MUSA
1967   MPhil   London, SOAS   Some aspects of the Hindu-Muslim relationship in India, 1876-1892   Shamsun NAHAR   Dr B N Pandey
1967   PhD   Edinburgh   The contribution of Scottish missions to the rise and growth of responsible churches in India   James McMichael ORR   Dr H Watt; Prof A C Cheyne
1967   PhD   London, LSE   The impact of industrialisation on urban growth: a case study of Chotanagpur   P PANDEYA   Prof Jones
1967   DPhil   Oxford, Jesus   British relations with Pakistan, 1947-1962: a study of British policy towards Pakistan   M A QURESHI   Mr G Wint
1967   PhD   London   The evolution for civil procedure in Bengal from 1772 to 1806   Z RAHMAN
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   Local government services in India: a case study of Punjab, 1860-1960   D R SACHDEVA   Prof H Tinker
1967   PhD   London, UC   Judicial interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935   H SAHARAY
1967   MA   London, SOAS   Political conflict in selected villages of India, Pakistan and Ceylon   M J SHEPPERSDSON   Prof Mayer
1967   PhD   Leicester   Some early tertiary ostracods from West Pakistan   Qadeer Ahmad SIDDIQUI
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   Evolution of the structure of civil judiciary in Bengal, 1800-1831   C SINHA   Dr Pandey
1967   PhD   London, External   The social structure of an Indian-Jewish community   S STRIZOWER
1967   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   Education and international understanding between the East and the West with special reference to the UK and Pakistan   Q J SURI   Prof Lauwery; Mr Goodings
1967   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   Education in Kerala and the missionary contribtion to it during the first half of the nineteenth century   Joseph THAIKOODAN
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   Customs and institutions connected with the domestic life of the Sinhalese in the Kandyan period:   Miniwan P TILLAKARATNE
1967   PhD   London, SOAS   Trends in and prospectsof Pakistan’s exports to the UK and the European Economic Community, 1951-1970   Z A VAINCE   Prof Penrose
1967   DPhil   Oxford, Merton   The policies of the government of Ceylon concerning education and religion, 1865-1885   L A WICKREMERATNE   Mr K A Ballhatchet
1967   BLitt   Oxford, Somerville   The sociological implications of educational policies in Ceylon since 1947   C K WICKREMESINGHE   Dr D F Pocock
1967   BLitt   Oxford, St Hilda’s   Henry Russell’s activities in Hyderabad, 1811-1820   Z YAZDANI   Mr K A Ballhatchet
1967/68   PhD   Cambridge, Corpus   The causes and consequence of trade fluctuations in Ceylon, 1948-1960   M A FERNANDO   Mr H H Leisner
1967/68   PhD   London, External   British relations with Tanjore (1748-1799)   C S RAMANUJAM
1967/68   PhD   Edinburgh   The agricultural geography of Hissar District   Jasbur SINGH
1967-68   PhD   Cambridge, Christ’s   Anglo-Mughal relations in western India and the development of Bombay, 1662-1690   G Z REFAI
1968   MA   Durham   The influence of religion on politics in Pakistan, 1947-1956   S R AHMAD
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   The administration of the North West Frontier,1901-1919   L BAHA   Dr Hardy
1968   MSc   Cambridge, Christ’s   Industrial expansion and regional cooperation in South Asia: a study of selected industries   Peter Douglas BALACS
1968   MLitt   Cambridge, Trinity Hall   The working of the supreme government of India and its constitutional relations with the home authorities, 1833-1853   A G BANERJEE   Dr T G P Spear
1968   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   On price relationships in Indian agriculture   K BARDHAN   P M Deane
1968   DPhil   Oxford, Somerville   Social and conceptual order in Kongu: a region of South India   B E F BECK   Dr R K Jain
1968   PhD   London   The urban geography of Lyallpur   M H BOKHARI   Prof A E Smailes
1968   PhD   Cambridge   Rohilkhand from conquest to revolt, 1774-1858: a study in the origins of the Indian Mutiny uprising   E I BRODKIN   Dr E T Stokes
1968   PhD   Cam,bridge, Girton   Gandhi in India, 1915-1920: his emergence as a leader and the transformation of politics   J M BROWN   Dr A Seal
1968   MPhil   London   The development of education in India under Lord Curzon, 1899-1905   Hamida I BUTT
1968   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   Bengali political unrest (1905-1918)with special reference to terrorism   H CHAKRABARTI   Prof K Ballhatchet
1968   MPhil   London, King’s   The development of mountain warfare in India in the 19th century   S CHANDRA   Prof M E Howard
1968   DPhil   Oxford, St Cath’s   American policy towards India, 1941-1947, with emphasis on the Phillips mission to India, 1943   F L CHASE   Prof J A Gallagher
1968   DPHil   Oxford, Linacre   The agrarian economy and agrarian relations in Bengal, 1859-1885   B B CHAUDHURI   Dr K A Ballhatchet
1968   BLitt   Oxford, Linacre   Some aspects of English Protestant missionary activities in Bengal, 1857-1885   T CHAUDHURI   Dr S Gopal
1968   DPhil   Oxford, University   British government and society in the residency of Bengal, 1858-1880: an examination of certain aspects of British policy in relation to the changing nature of society   J M COMPTON   Mr K A Ballhatchet
1968   DPhil   Oxford, Magdalen   British reform policy and Indian politics on the eve of the rise of Gandhi   R J DANZIG   Dr S Gopal
1968   PhD   Cambridge, Magdalen   Optimum investment decisions with special reference to the Indian fertilizer industry   A K DAS GUPTA   Dr J A Mirrlees
1968   DPhil   Oxford, Somerville   Public opinion and Indian policy, 1872-1880   U DAS GUPTA   Dr S Gopal
1968   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   The contribution of the Wesleyan missionaries to southern India   P W DE SILVA
1968   PhD   York   The verbal piece in spoken Hindi: a morpho-syntactic study   Hans DUA
1968   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   An enquiry into the purpose and development of Catholic education in Madras. 1850-1950   M A DUNNE   Prof Lauwerys
1968   PhD   London, LSE   Some political aspects of foreign aid in India, 1947-1966   P J ELDRIDGE   Prof Goodwin
1968   DPhil   Oxford, Linacre House   The development of a new elite in Ceylon with special reference to educational and occupational background, 1910-1931   P T M FERNANDO   Dr A H Halsey
1968   BLitt   Oxford, Exeter   An historical survey and assessment of the ecclesiastical and missionary policy of the East India Company   I J GASH   Mr C C Davies
1968   MLitt   Bristol   The civil servant and contemporary government in India   B GIRI
1968   PhD   Birmingham   Consumption patterns in India: a regional analysis   D B GUPTA
1968   DPhil   Oxford, St Edmund Hall   The debts of the Nawab of Arcot, 1763-1776   J D GURNEY   Dame L Sutherland
1968   PhD   London, LSE   Econometrics of import planning in India (1947-1965): a case study of selected commodities   M L HANDA   Prof Sargan; De Desai
1968   DPhil   Oxford, Nuffield   Moral and religious changes in an urban village of Bangalore, South India   M N HOLSTROM   Dr D P Pocock
1968   MPhil   London SOAS   Lord Mayo’s Viceroyalty (1869-1872) with special reference to problems of external security and internal stability   M A HOSSAIN   Dr Zaidi
1968   PhD   London, LSE   British policy towards Persia and the defence of British India, 1798-1807   R INGRAM ELLIS   Miss H Lee
1968   PhD   London, LSE   Karachi: a pre-industrial city in transition   M Z KHAN   Prof Jones
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   The Dutch in Ceylon, 1743-1766   D A KOTELAWEL   Dr Bastin
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   The contribution of Christian missionaries to education in Bengal, 1793-1837   M A LAIRD   Prof K Ballhatchet

1968   PhD   London, LSE   Socio-economic determinants of infant and child mortality in Sri Lanka: an analysis of post-war experience    S A MEEGAMA   Prof Glass
1968   MPhil   London, UC   Higher judiciary in Pakistan   M Y MIRZA   Mr Holland
1968   BLitt   Oxford, St Cath’s   Funeral ritual in South India   M M MOFFATT   Dr R K Jain
1968   MPhil   London, LSE   Land use and nutrition in Lucknow District   I MOHIUDDIN   Mr R Rawson
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   Political relations between India and Nepal, 1877-1923   K MOJUMDAR   Prof K Ballhatchet
1968   MPhil   London, Bedford   The cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad with special reference to their industrial development   K B MUSTAFA   Mr Mountjoy
1968   MPhil   London, LSE   Concepts of purity and pollution in Indian religion   Judith Ann OSTROW
1968   PhD   Lancaster   The evolution and history of the Buddhist monastic order with special reference to the Sangha in Ceylon   Gunaratne PANABOKKE
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   The invasion of Nepal: John Company at war, 1814-1816   J C PEMBLE   Dr Moore
1968   PhD   London, SOAS   The All-India Muslim League in Indian politics, 1906-1912   M RAHMAN   Dr Moore
1968   MPhil   London, SOAS   The reform of local self-government in India under Lord Ripon, 1880-1884: a study in the formation of policy   Q RAHMAN
1968   PhD   Wales, Bangor   An economic appraisal of agricultural marketing in Pakistan   Abdur RASHID
1968   PhD   Edinburgh   A geographical analysis of the historical development of towns in Ceylon   L K RATNAYAKE   Prof J W Watson; Dr R Jones
1968   MA   Sussex   Constitutional change and the depressed classes: the representations from the depressed classes in the United Provinces to the Indian Statutory Commission, 1928, and their outcome   L SEN-GUPTA
1968   PhD   London, External   The role of railway transport in Ceylon: present problems and future prospects   K SUNDERALINGAM
1968   PhD   London, Inst Ed   A critical study of the history and development of university education in modern India, with special reference to problems and patterns of growth since 1847   C TICKOO
1968   DPhil   Oxford, St Cath’s   Kinship and marriage among the Jat of Haryana in northern India   Gunter TIEMANN   Dr R K Jain
1968   PhD   Edinburgh   The strategy of Christian missions to the Muslims: Anglican and reformed contributions in India and the Near East from Henry Martyn to Samuel Zwemmer, 1800-1938   Lyle L VANDER WERFF   Prof M Watt; Prof AC Cheyne
1968   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   Indian historical writing in English, 1870-1920, with special reference to the influence of nationalism   Johannes H VOIGT   Mr K A Ballhatchet
1968   MPhil   London, LSE   The hierarchy of towns in Vidarbha, India, and its significance for regional planning   Sudhir Vyankatesh WANMALI. Prof MJ Wise
1968   MA   Manchester   The relevance of land reform to economic progress in Pakistan   M A ZAMAN
1968/69   PhD   Glasgow   Planning for economic development: a comparative case study of Indian and Egyptian experience, 1946-1966, with special reference to planning strategy and effectiveness   A El- H H EL-GHAZALI
1968/69   PhD   Cambridge, Girton   Muslim politics and government policy: studies in the development of Muslim organisation and its social background in North India and Bengal, 1885-1917   Janetr Mary RIZVI
1969   PhD   Durham   The working of district administration in Pakistan, 1947-1964   N ABEDIN   Prof W H Morris-Jones
1969   PhD   Cambridge, Fitzwilliam   The formation of the Government of India Act, 1935   W AHMAD   Dr T G P Sper
1969   MPhil   London, SOAS   Ideological factors in selected fields of policy making in India   Zoe F ALLEN
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   British famine and agricultural policies in India with special reference to the administration of Lord George Hamilton   S K BANDYOPADHYAY   Dr R J Moore
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   The political and economic conditions of Indians in Burma, 1900-1941   N R CHAKRAVARTI
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   The amending process in the Indian constitution   H CHAND
1969   PhD   London   Trade and commercial organisation in Bengal with special reference to the English East India Company, 1650-1720   S CHAUDHURY   Dr K N Chaudhuri
1969   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   The Bombay political service, 1863-1924   I F S COPLAND   Prof J A Gallagher
1969   PhD   London, Birkbeck   The Colonial Office and political problems in Ceylon and Mauritius, 1907-1921   L B L CROOK   Dr I M Cumpston
1969   DPhil   Oxford, Nuffield   British defence policy in the Indian Ocean region between the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the British defence review, 1966   P G C DARBY   Prof N H Gibbs
1969   DPhil   Oxford   An evaluation of the Eastern bloc assistance to India (1956-57 to 1965-66)   DATARHA
1969   PhD   London, LSE   The effect of international labour migration on trade and real income: a case study of Ceylon, 1920 to 1938   A DUTTA   Prof Johnson
1969   PhD   London, Bedford   The development of the sugar industry in Nizamabad, Andhra Pradesh   A H FAROOQI
1969   PhD   London   Lord William Bentinck in Madras, 1803-1807   M GUPTA   Dr B M Pandey
1969   PhD   London, External   A study of the planning techniques in India: India’s five year plans   S GUPTA
1969   PhD   Manchester   A typical support structure of leadership in Punjab – the faction   J J M HAUDHRI
1969   PhD   Manchester   A structural study of Pakistan’s monetary sector   K A IMAN
1969   PhD   London, LSE   Regional development in Pakistan with special reference to the effects of import licensing and exchange control   A I A ISLAM
1969   PhD   London   Social aspects of the historical geography of East Pakistan, 1608-1857   Bilquis JAHAN   Miss E M J Campbell
1969   PhD   London, External   The sources and development of the customary laws of the Sinhalese up to 1835   M L S JAYASEKERA
1969   MSocSc   Birmingham   Industrial development and organization in Ceylon – a case study of the Ceylon cement industry   G W JAYSURIYA
1969   PhD   London   Dutch rule in maritime Ceylon, 1766-1796   V KAMAPATHYPILLAI   Dr J S Bastin
1969   PhD   London, LSE   Domestic instability as a factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy, 1952-1958   M KAMLIN   Dr Lyon
1969   PhD   London, LSE   A study of import control, with special reference to India   H KUSARI
1969   PhD   London, LSE   Britain and the termination of the India-China opium trade, 1905-1913   Margaret J B-C LIM   Prof Medlicott; Mr Dilks
1969   BLitt   Oxford, Linacre   Financing agricultural development with special reference to the place of agricultural credit in West Pakistan after 1947   A M MALIK   Mr R G Opie
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   Election laws in Pakistan   M D MALIK
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   The development of the jurisdiction and powers of the superior courts in Pakistan   M A MANNAN   Prof Gledhill
1969   MA   Sussex   Th Krishak Praja Party and the Bengal provincial elections, 1937   H MOMEN
1969   BPhil   St Andrews   Muslim politics in India, 1858-1918   S NAZ   D G Seed
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   Jury and police reform during the Indian Vice-Royalty of Lord Lansdowne, 1888-1894   R RAHMAN   Dr P Hardy
1969   PhD   London, LSE   Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy   S M M RAZVI   Dr P H Lyon
1969   DPhil   Oxford, Merton   The Commission of Eastern Inquiry in Ceylon, 1829-1837: a study of a Royal Commission of Colonial Inquiry   V K SAMARAWEERA   Dr A F Madden
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   Hinduism in a Kangra village   U M SHARMA   Pror Mayer
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   The reorganization of the Indian armies, 1858-1879   A H SHIBLEY   Dr Moore
1969   PhD   London, SOAS   Land resumption in Bengal, 1819-1846   A M WAHEEDUZZAMA   Dr Zaidi
1969   PhD   London, External   Methodism in north Ceylon: its history and influences, 1814-1890   D K WILSON
1969/70   PhD   Bristol   On the construction and implementation of a planning model for Ceylon   S NARAPALASINGAM
1969/70   PhD   Durham   Some aspects of central banking in Pakistan, 1948-1966   A K NIAZI
1969/70   PhD   Edinburgh   Settlement geography of the Indian desert (Rajasthan area)   Ram C SHARMA
1969/70   PhD   Bristol   The relations between central and provincial governments in Pakistan   M A TAYYEB   Prof Bromhead
1969/70   PhD   London, SOAS   Some legal aspects of agrarian reform in India   Namgi Lal UPADHYAYA
1970   MPhil   London, LSE   Production and trade in the raw cotton and cotton textile industries of Pakistan,1948-1966   Q K AHMAD   Prof H Myint
1970   PhD   Edinburgh   Regionalism and political integration in Pakistan: a case study in political geography   Masood ALI
1970   MPhil   London, SOAS   The urban geography of Kanpur   S A ALI
1970   MPhil   London, LSE   Peasant agriculture in Ceylon, 1933-1893   A C L AMEER ALI   Prof F J Fisher
1970   PhD   Edinburgh   Possible developments in building technology in relations to low cost housing in Pakistan   Mohammed M BAJWA
1970   DPhil   Oxford, St Anthony’s   The growth of political organization inthe Allahabad locality, 1880-1925   C A BAYLY   Prof J A Gallgher
1970   PhD   Cambridge, Gonville     Spatial organizationof some villages in Northern India   P M BLAIKIE   Mr B H Farmer
1970   PhD   Cambridge   British impact on the Indian cotton textile industry, 1757-1865   J G BORPUJARI   Dr W J Macpherson
1970   MPhil   London, UC   Some problems of physical planning in Ceylon   S W P BULANKULAME
1970   PhD   London, LSE   The behaviour of prices in India, 1952-1966: an empirical study   S K CHAKRABARTI   Prof Walters
1970   MSc   Bristol   The long-term outlook for the consumption of tea in India – a quantitative analysis   B M CHAMBERS
1970   MA   Manchester   Social change in Indian towns   M K CHATERJEE
1970   PhD   Cambridge, St Cath’s   Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall: a study of the Anglo-Indian official mind   E C T CHEW   Dr E T Stokes
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   British policy on the North East frontier of India, 1865-1914   D P CHOUDHURY   Prof K Ballhatchet
1970   MA   Kent   Recent trends in Indian federalism   S DAS
1970   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   Development of adult education in India since independence with special reference to rural reconstruction   B DUTTA
1970   BLitt   Oxford, Keble   Identity amongst Muslims in West Bengal, India, and its relationship with political, social and economic change   P J K EADE   Dr R K Jain
1970   BLitt   Oxford, St Edmund Hall   Aspects of history of the Indian National Congress with special reference to the Swarajya Party, 1919-1927   R A GORDON   Prof J A Gallagher
1970   PhD   Wales, Swansea   A study of the social and economic geography of the coastal fishing industry of Ceylon   Suniti Danissari GUNASEKERA
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   British policy and Baluchistan, 1854-1876   T A HEATHCOTE   Dr M E Yapp
1970   MPhil   London, King’s   Selected aspects of agricultural development in West Pakistan   J HUSSAIN
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   Social and political change in Ceylon, 1900-1919 with special reference to the disturbances of 1915    p v i JAYASEKERA   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1970   MSc   Edinburgh   Language and politics in modern India   P KARAT
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   Protection of minority interests under the Indian constitution   G T LUIS   Prof Derrett
1970   DPhil   Oxford, Wadham   Sociological aspects of revival and change in Buddhism in nineteenth century Ceylon   Kitsiri MALALGODA   Mr B R Wilson
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   The administration of British Burma, 1852-1885   J A MILLS   Prof C D Cowan
1970   DPhil   Oxford, St John’s   Renewable natural resources planning for regional development with special reference to Kashmir   Maharaj K MUTHOO   Mr J J Macgregor
1970   DPhil   Sussex   Labour organisation in the Bombay textile industry, 1918-1929   R NEWMAN   Dr Reeves
1970   PhD   London, QMC   Land development in the Sinharaja foothill of Ceylon   M P PERERA   Mr B W Hodder
1970   PhD   London, SOAS   Shareholders’ control of public companies in Pakistan   A K RANJHA
1970   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   The politics of U.P. Muslims   Francis Christopher Rowland ROBINSON   Dr Seal
1970   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   Urbanisation – its educational implications in India   P SAJNANI
1970   PhD   York   Predicate complement constructions in Hindi and English   Anil SINHA
1970   PhD   London, LSE   Water supply and irrigation in the dry zone of Ceylon   K U SIRINANDA   Mr P Rawson; Dr Chandler
1970   PhD   Cambridge, Jesus   Ceylon’s export trends and prospects   M P S SURIAARACHCHI   Mr H Leisner
1970   MA   London, Inst Ed   The t rainingof teachers in Bombay Province (including Gujerat) since 1947   M N UPADHYAYA
1970   MSc   Wales   Britain’s forgotten war: the British role in the confrontation of Malaysia by Indonesia   Michael R WAGSTAFF
1970   MPhil   London, SOAS   A structural analysis of myths from the North east frontier of India   James Mackie WILSON
1970   PhD   Leeds   The role of the Ceylon civil service before and after independence   Watareke Aratchchige WISWA WARNAPALA
1970/71   PhD   St Andrews   The theory, practice and administration of Waqf with special reference to the Malayan state of Kadah   M Z B H OTHMAN   Dr J Burton
1970/71   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   The politics of U P muslims   M A ROWLANDS
1970/71   PhD   London, LSHTM   Dynamics of malaria in Ceylon   C SIVAGNANASUNDRAM
1971   MPhil   London, SOAS   A comparative study of social heirarchies in selected areas of India and Pakistan   Makhdum Tasadduq AHMAD   Dr Mayer
1971   PhD   Lancaster   Technical change and economic development of agriculture: the case of Bangladesh   M ALAMGIR
1971   MPhil   London, UC   A select bibliography of periodical literature published in English, German, French, Sanskrit, Hindi, Pali and Bengali during 1951-1966 on some aspects of Indian culture (philosophy, religion, linguistics, literature)from the post-Vedic to the pre-Kalidasa era   P BISWAS
1971   MPhil   London, SOAS   Symbolic and material aspects of institutions in political process: analysis of two North Indian villages   Bengt-Erik Per Gustaf BORGSTROM
1971   MLitt   Cambridge, Firtzwilliam   Metropolitan dominance in South India   R W BRADNOCK   Mr B H Farmer
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   Social change of marriage patterns in the North Western Himalayas (Churah, Pangi and Ladakh)   Bharpur Singh BRAR
1971   PhD   Cambridge, King’s   Political alliances in rural Western Maharashtra   Anthony Thomas CARTER
1971   PhD   London, External   Culture conflicts and education in Ceylon after independence   Ida W DESILVA
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   The internal politics of the Kandyan kingdom, 1707-1760   Lorna S DEWARAJA
1971   PhD   Durham   Patterns of population structure and growth in East Pakistan   K Maudood ELAHI
1971   PhD   London, LSE   An econometric growth model for Pakistan   A FAROOQUI   Mr J M Desai
1971   DPhil   Sussex   Municipal politics in Calcutta: elite groups and the Calcutta corporation, 1875-1900    C P M FUREDY   Prof A Low
1971   BLitt   Oxford, St John’s   Statutory provisions for the settlement of collective industrial disputes in England and Australia and India   S T GOH
1971   MA   Exeter   A study of the authority structure of an industrial organisation in a transitional setting: case study of a Ceylon industrial plant   S GOONATILAKE
1971   MSc   Hull   The impact of foreign aid on India’s international trade, 1951-1965   C P HALLWOOD
1971   PhD   Nottingham   Pakistan’s external relations   A K M A HAQUE   Prof Pear
1971   PhD   Durham   The working of parliamentary government in Pakistan, 1947-1958   S C HARUN
1971   MLitt   Glasgow   Government expenditure: a study with reference to economic development in Pakistan   M HUQ
1971   PhD   London, King’s   Freedom of interstate trade in India   C K M JARIWALA
1971   DPhil   Oxford, St Hilda’s   Government policy and economic and social change in western India,1850-1875   J F M JHIRAD   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971   MSc   Strathclyde   Administrative aspects of social security programmes for factory labourers in East Pakistan   M KABIR
1971   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   Nationalism n Bengal, 1903-1911: a study of Bengali reactions to the partition of the province with special reference to the social groups involved   A P KANNANGARA   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   Some aspects of society and politics in Bengal, 1927 to 1936   B R KHAN   Mr J B Harrison
1971   MPhil   London, SOAS   The tripartite countries [Iran, Pakistan and Turkey]of the regional cooperation for development: a geographical study of a regional grouping   Durray S KURESHI
1971   DPhil   Sussex   Administrative structures, economic change and problems of rural development in Aligarh District, Uttar Pradesh, India   Bismarck U MWANSASU
1971   PhD   London, King’s   A comparative study of the executive in Australia and India   J D OJO
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   Some aspects of the Indian Viceroyalty of Lord Elgin, 1862-1863   J A RAHMAN   Dr Harrison
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   Legal aspects of the “doctrine of pleasure” in relation to public servants in India   U R RAI
1971   MPhil   London, LSE   A comparative study of manpower in selected industries with similar technologies in India and the UK   S F RICHARDS   Prof Wise
1971   MPhil   Leeds   The military in politics in India and Pakistan since 1947   A H RIZVI   Prof Hanson; Dr O A Hartley
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   The government of India under Lord Chelmsford, 1916-1921, with special reference to the policies adopted towards constitutional change and political agitation in British India   P G ROBB   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971   PhD   York   A generative semantic treatment of some aspects of English and Hindigrammar   Prajapati SAH
1971   PhD   London, LSE   The problem of economic holdings in the peasant agriculture of the dry zone of Ceylon   Somasundaram SELVANAYAGAM
1971   PhD   London, SOAS   Status, power and resources: the study of a Sinhalese village   S P F SENATATNE
1971   MPhil   London. LSE   British opinion and Indian independence: a study of some British pressure groups which advanced the cause of Indian independence   Kumar Indra VIJAY
1971   MLitt   Edinburgh   David Livingstone and India   rOSINA g VISRAM   Prof G A Shepperson
1971   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   Employment incomes in Ceylon: an inquiry into the structure and determination of wage and salary earnings in Ceylon, 1949-1969   Pabawathie C WICKREMASINGHE
1971   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   A critical analysis of the problems of higher education in Pakistan since independence (1947) with special reference to student unrest   U S ZAMAN
1971/72   PhD   Liverpool   British opinion and Indian reform, 1858-1876   Nilima SAHA   Mr P J N Tuck
1972   DPhil   Oxford, Christ Church   Economic aspects of some peasant colonizations in Ceylon   G M ABAYARATNA   Miss M R Haswell
1972   PhD   Leeds   Economic, political and administrative aspects of planning for development in a divided country: a study of relationships between East Bengal and West Pakistan, 1947-1971   Shaikh Magsood ALI
1972   MSc   Bristol   Capital finance in a developing economy – Ceylon   Bernard V ANTHONISZ
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Clare Hall   Communal conflict in Ceylon politics and the advance towards self-government   Rupasinghe A ARIYARATNE
1972   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   A comparative study of language policies and problems in Ceylon and India since independence   V ARUMUGAM
1972   MPhil   London, SOAS   Judicial control of the machinery of government in Pakistan   Chaudhary M Y ASIM
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Queens   Politics in South India. 1917-1947   Christopher J BAKER
1972   PhD   Durham   The hierarchy of central places in Northern Ceylon   P BALASUNDARAMPILLAI
1972   PhD   London, LSE   Some aspects of the strains and stresses in Indo-British relations, 1947-1965: an analysis of the causes and course of gradual decline in Britain’s importance to India   A R BANERJI   Mr J B L Mayall
1972   PhD   London, QMC   Fiscal policy in India (with reference to taxation)over three five year plans   S BHADURI   Prof M H Peston
1972   DPhil   Sussex   Political change in Rohilkhand, 1932-1952: a study of the rleationships between provincial and district level politicans   L BRENNAN
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   An examination of the development and structure of the legal profession at Allahabad, 1866-1935   Gilliam F BUCKEE
1972   MPhil   Sussex   Educational administration in Bombay Presidency, 1913-1937   J L BUTLER
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Extra-constitutional actions in Pakistan   Z I CHOUDHURY
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   The politics and functioning of the East Bengal legislature, 1947-1958   Najma CHOWDHURY
1972   MEd   Manchester   The social and educational changes brought about in some South Indian villages by the Saruodaya movement   A G CLARK
1972   DPhil   Oxford   Decentralisation and political change in the United Provinces, 1880-1921   W F CRAWLEY
1972   PhD   Aberdeen   The development and influence of British missionary movements toward India, 1786-1830   Allan K DAVIDSON   Mr A F Walls
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Emmanuel   The official mind and the problem of agrarian indebtedness in India, 1870-1910   Clive J DEWEY
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Juristic techniques in the Supreme Court of India (195-1971)in some selected areas of public and personal law   Rajeev DHAVAN

1972   MA   Hull   Resource allocation in the public sector in Malaysia with special reference to the Muda River irrigation scheme   CHEW CHAI DOAN
1972   PhD   Hull   Some aspects of private foreign enterprise in Ceylon   L E N FERNANDO
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Rural money markets in India   Subrata GHATAK
1972   MA   Manchester   Traditional India and the meaning of caste   Beth GOLDBLATT
1972   DPhil   Sussex   Optimum location of paddy improvement schemes in Ceylon   J M GUNADESA
1972   MA    Exeter   Industrialization and protective tariffs in Pakistan   A M A HAKIM
1972   PhD   Cambridge,St John’s   The place of India in the strategic and political consideration of the Axis powers, 1939-1942   Milan HAUNER   Prof F H Hinsley
1972   MA   Exeter   Foreign capital and economic development: the case of Pakistan   M E HOSSAIN
1972   PhD   London, LSE   Rural society and leadership in Malaya with special reference to three selected communities   Syed HUSIN ALI
1972   BLitt   Oxford, Lady Margaret   Some aspects of religion and culture in Bengal   H K ION
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Agricultural development of Bengal: a quantitative study, 1920-1946   M M ISLAM   Dr Chaudhuri
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Bengali Moslem public opinion as reflected in the vernacular press between 1901 and 1930   Mustafa N ISLAM
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   The permanent settlement and the landed interests in Bengal from 1793 to 1819   M S ISLAM   Mr G B Harrison
1972   BLitt   Oxford, Somerville   A social anthropological study of Jainism in Northern India   S JAIN   Dr R G Leinhardt
1972   DPhil   Sussex   Techno-economic survey of industrial potential in Sri Lanka   N D KARUNARATNE
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Constitutional protection of the freedom of association in Pakistan   Hamiduddin KHAN
1972   PhD   London, UC   Kowloon: a factorial study of urban land use and retail structure   Chi-sen LIANG   Prof P Wood
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   The rajas and nawabs of Bengal, 1911-1919   Pronoy Chand MEHTAB
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Fitzwilliam   Income distribution and savings in Pakistan: an appraisal of development strategy   T E NULTY   Prof W B Reddaway
1972   DPhil   Oxford   The organisational basis of Indian agriculture with special reference to the development of capitalistic farming (ie based on wage-labour and following economic criteria for investment) in selected regions in recent years   U PATNAIK
1972   PhD   York   A systematic treatment of certain aspects of Telugu phonology   Vennelakanti PRAKASAM
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   Regional disparities in the growth of incomes and population in India, 1951-1965   Siripurapu Kesava RAO   Dr A K Bagchi
1972   PhD   Exeter   The impact of devaluation on prices and production in Pakistan   M M SHAIKH
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   The study of inflation in Pakistan, 1955-1968   Qamarul H SIDDIQI   Prof E Penrose
1972   PhD   London, UC   Functions of international conflict: a case study of Pakistan   K SIDDIQUI   Dr J W Burton
1972   PhD   London   The home government of India, 1834-1853   Robert F S TATE   Mr Harrison
1972   PhD   London, SOAS   Indian politics and the elections of 1937   D D TAYLOR   Prof H Tinker
1972   PhD   Wales, Aberystwyth   Economic integration and development with special reference to four Asian countries [India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaysia]   Ransit Corneille WANIGATUNGA   Prof G L Rees
1972   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   The development and function of the transport system in Ceylon: a network analysis   Poonanulkarange C H WEERASURIYA   Dr B T Robson
1972   MPhil   London, SOAS   Tribal identity among the Santals, 1770-1857   Michael Piers YORKE
1972/73   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   Social conflict and political unrest in Bengal, 1875-1908   Rajat K RAY
1972/73   PhD   Reading   The applicability of linear programming to resource allocation in an irrigated agriculture with special reference to the Punjab of Pakistan   T U REHMAN
1973   BLitt   Oxford, Balliol   A study of Bengal peasants, 1765-1812   S U AHMED   Dr C C Davies
1973   PhD   London   The role of the Zamindars in Bengal, 1707-1772   Shirin AKHTAR   J B Harrison
1973   DPhil   Sussex   Political structure and economic development in rural West Pakistan   H ALAVI
1973   MPhil   London, Inst Ed   The impact of British educational thought onthe concept of university education in Sri Lanka   Chandra Lilian AMARASEKERA
1973   PhD   London, Wye   A study of economic resource use and production possibilities on settlement schemes in Sri Lanka (with special reference to the Minipe Colonisation Scheme)   Nihal St Michael Aloysius AMERASINGHE
1973   DPhil   Sussex   Nationalism and the regional politics: Tamiland, India, 1920-1937   D J ARNOLD   Prof D A Low
1973   PhD   London, QMC   Functions and status of urban settlement in West Bengal   Mira DAS
1973   DPhil   Sussex   Peasant movements in India,c.1920-1950   D N DHANAGARE
1973   PhD   London, LSE   The development of the port of Colombo, 1860-1939   K DHARMASENA   Prof F J Fisher
1973   MPhil   York   Male nurses in Ceylon: a study of the career problems of male nurses in the Ceylon health service, 1972   Malsiri K DIAS
1973   BLitt   Oxford, Campion Hall   Some aspects of agricultural policy in Ceylon since independence with special reference to youth resettlement schemes   B W DISSANAYAKE   Miss M R Haswell
1973   PhD   Exeter   Orgnisational forms in post traditional society with special reference to South Asia   P D S GOONATILAKE
1973   PhD   London, SOAS   A study of the revenue administration of Sylhet District in Bengal, 1765-1792   Kusha HARAKSINGH   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1973   DPhil   Sussex   Revolutionary networks in Northern Indian politics, 1907-1935: a case study of the terrorist movement in Delhi, the Punjab, the United Provinces and adjacent princely states   M HARCOURT
1973   PhD   London, LSE   Indian population policy and the family planning programme   Edward C HARRIMAN
1973   BLitt   Oxford, Jesus   The role of law in the politics of Pakistan from 1947 to 1956   S F A HASSAN   Prof H W R Wade
1973   DPhil   Oxford, St Catharine’s   Foreign aid in the economic development of Ceylon   W HETTIARACHI   Miss P H Ady
1973   MSc   Lancaster   Monetary management, commercial bank credit expansion and economic development in Pakistan   Rafiqul ISLAM
1973   PhD   London, External   Economic development in Ceylon   Halwalage N S KARUNATILAKE
1973   MSocSc   Birmingham   Distribution of rate of suicide according to age and sex on the basis on caste in Gujerat State   H KAZI
1973   PhD   Hull   Some economic aspects of the oil palm industry of West Malaysia   Hacharan Singh KHERA
1973   DPhil   Oxford   Terms of trade, public policy and economic development of Ceylon, 1948-1958   W D LAKSHMAN
1973   PhD   Wales   An economic analysis of recent developments in the production and marketing of jute with particular reference to their implications for the economy of Pakistan   Saidur R LASKER
1973   PhD   London, LSE   Local government and administration in Ceylon   Genevieve R LEITAN
1973   PhD   York   Some aspects of Bhartrhari’s linguistic theory as represented in the Vakyapadiya   Kaluwachchimule MAHANAMA
1973   PhD   London, SOAS   The changing position and functions of the Rajahs and Nawabs of Bengal, 1911-1919   P C MAHTAB   Prof K Ballhatchet
1973   DPhil   Oxford, Nuffield   Private corporate industrial investment in India, 1947/1967: factors affecting its size, fluctuations and sectoral distribution   P PATNAIK   Mr P P Streeten
1973   PhD   London, King’s   The legal framework for the settlement of industrial disputes in Ceylon   Stanislaus Edward PULLE   Mr A Hughes
1973       London, SOAS   The minorities of Ceylon,, 1926-1931 with special reference to the Donoughmore Commission   G QUINTUS
1973   PhD   London, SOAS   The covenanted civil servant and the government of India, 1858-1883: a study of his part in the decision-making and decision implementing process in India   Muhammad A RAHIM   Mr J B Harrison
1973   MPhil   London, QMC   The markets of Calcutta: an analysis of the evolution of indigenous marketing systems and shopping facilities   Mondira Sinha RAY
1973   DPhil   Sussex   Poverty and policy: the impact of rural public works in the Kosi area of Bihar, India   Gerry RODGERS   L Joy
1973   PhD   Cambridge, Lucy    Polarization on Colombo in the economic geography of Ceylon   Liyanage Kundali Vidyamali SAMARASINGHE   Mr B H Farmer
1973   PhD   Birmingham   A quantitative analysis of the patterns of export: a case study of India   M L SETH
1973   MA   Sussex   A multisectoral model of production for Sri Lanka   Paran SIRISENA
1973   MSc   Cambridge, Girton   Underutilized industrial capacity in India   Nancy SLOCUM
1973   MPhil   London, QMC   External aspects of Pakistan’s political geography   A H SYED
1973   PhD   London, SOAS   Extradition in the light of the Indian constitution   Madan M TEWARI
1973   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   The Vice-royalty of Lord Irwin in 1926/31 with special reference to political and constitutional developments   James Frederick Caleb WATTS   Dr A F Madden
1973   PhD   Cambridge, Clare Hall   Some aspects of prodcution and market surplus in the rice sector of Ceylon   Piyasiri WICKRAMASEKARA
1973   PhD   Exeter   A theory of multiple exchange rates and exchange rate management in Ceylon   G W P WICKRAMASINGHE
1973/74   PhD   London, Wye   The marketing of tea with special reference to India’s share of thew world market   N C NANDA
1973/74   PhD   East Anglia   Constraints on optimum resource use in an irrigated land settlement scheme in Ceylon   D H R J PERERA
1973/74   PhD   Cambridge, Newnham   Locational analysis and government sponsored large-scale industries in Ceylon   Y RASANAYAGAM

1973/74   DPhil   Sussex   A multisectoral model of production for Sri Lanka   N L SIRISENA
1973/74   PhD   Cambridge, King’s   The kinship and social organization of a Roman Catholic fishing village in Ceylon   Roderick Lennox STIRRAT
1974   PhD   Brunel   Defence expenditure and economic growth with reference to India   V AGARWAL
1974   MSc   London, LSHTM   Current patterns of food administration in the West and their application to Pakistan   A AHMED
1974   DTPH   London, LSHTM   Some problems in family planning in rural Sri Lanka   E R AMARASEKERA
1974   PhD   London, Inst Comm   Trotskyism in Ceylon: a study of the development, ideology and political role of Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935-1964   Y R AMARASINGHE   Prof W H Morris-Jones
1974   PhD   London, SOAS   Changes in patterns and practices of wheat farming since the introduction of the new high yielding varieties. A study of six villages in the Bulandshahr District, Uttar Pradesh, Northern India   Kathleen May BAKER
1974   PhD   London   Urban society in Bengal, 1850-1872,with special reference to Calcutta   Ranu BASU   Prof K Ballhatchet
1974   MPhil   London, Wye   Some economic aspects of rubber production in Sri Lanka   Gamlath Rallage CHADRASIRI
1974   PhD   Cambridge, Pembroke   Agrarian society and British administration in Western India, 1847-1920   Neil Rex Foster CHARLESWORTH
1974   DPhil   Sussex   Innovation, inequality and rural planning: the economics of Tubewell irrigation in the Kosi region, Bihar, India   Edward J CLAY
1974   PhD   Kent   Money and monetary policy in a lerss developed economy: the case of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)1950-1970   E CONTOGIANNIS
1974   DPhil   Sussex   A study of wages of the coal miners in India (with special reference ot the Raniganj and Jharia coalfields)   A DASGUPTA
1974   MSc   Wales, Aberystwyth   The factor shares of Indian international trade, 1947-1948 to 1967-1968   Mazumdar D DATT
1974   MPhil   Nottingham   A Marxist analysis of the economic development of India   Brian DAVEY   Prof Parkinson
1974   PhD   London   The intrigues of the German government and the Ghadr Party against British rule in India, 1914-1918   T G FRASER   Mr D N Dilks
1974   DTPH   London, LSHTM   Some public health problems of the labour force in Sri Lanka   A N HANIFFA
1974   MPhil   London, SOAS   The role of “reasonable restrictions” under the Indian constitution   Tirukattupali Kalyana Krishnamurthy IYER
1974   PhD   London   Buddhist-Christian relationships in British Ceylon, 1797-1948   C W KARUNARATNA   E G S Parrinder
1974   MSc   London, LSHTM   Growth study of the preschool children of Pakistan   M M R KHAN
1974   MPhil   Edinburgh   Implementation of development plans in Pakistan   S J KHAWAJA
1974   DPhil   Oxford, St Hugh’s   The movement towards constitutional reform in Ceylon, 1880-1910   N N LABROOY
1974   DPhil   Oxford   Social and political attitudes of British expatriates in India, 1880-1920   Margaret O MACMILLAN   Prof Gallagher
1974   PhD   Queen’s, Belfast   Allahabad: a study in social structure and urban morphology   L MALVIYA
1974   DPhil   Oxford   The Donoughmore Commission in Ceylon, 1927-1931   Tilaka Piyaseeli METHTHANANDA
1974   DPhil   Oxford, Balliol   India’s exports and export policies in the sixties   D NAYYAR   Mr P P Streeten
1974   DPhil   Oxford   Prelude to partition: all-India moslem politics, 1920-1932   D J H PAGE
1974   PhD   London, King’s   The social background, motivation and training of missionaries to India, 1789-1858   Frederic S PIGGIN
1974   PhD   York   Some aspects of the Vanni dialect of Sinhalese as contrasted with the dialect of the western region of Sri Lanka   Pushpakumara PREMARATNE
1974   PhD   Manchester   The commercial pressure on the British government policy towards Indian nationalist movement, 1919-1935   M R PREST
1974   PhD   Cambridge, Clare Hall   Change in Bengal agrarian society c.1760-1850: a study of selected districts   Ratnalekha RAY   Prof E G Stokes
1974   PhD   London, SOAS   Education and society in the Bombay Presidency, 1840-1858   A J ROBERTS   Prof K S Ballhatchet
1974   PhD   Bradford   Pakistani villages in a British city: the world of the Mirpuri villager in Bradford and in his village of origin   Verity J SAIFULLAH-KHAN
1974   DPhil   Oxford   Labour and industrial organization in the Indian coal-mining industry, 1900-1939   Colin P SIMMONS   Prof P Mathias
1974   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   Nationalism and Indian politics: the Indian National Congress, 1934-1942   B R TOMLINSON   Dr A Seal
1974   PhD   Hull   The European plantation rubber industry in South East Asia, 1876-1921   Phin Keong VOON
1974   PhD   London, SOAS   British scholarship and Muslim rule in India: the work of William Erskine, Sir Henry Elliot, John Dowson, Edwards Thomas, J Talboys Wheeler and Henry J Keene   Tripta WAHI   Dr P Hardy
1974   PhD   Cambridge, Tinity   The society and politics of the Madras Presidency, 1880-1920   D A WASHBROOK   Dr A Seal
1974   PhD   Hull   The Saribas Malays of Sarawak: their social and economic organisation and system of values   BIN kLING ZAINAL
1974/75   PhD   Cambridge, Darwin   Landlords, planters and colonial rule: a study of tensions in Bengal rural society, c. 1830-1860   Chittabrata PALIT   Prof E T Stokes
1974/75   PhD   London, SOAS   The Khilafat movement in India, 1919-1924   M Naeem QURESHI   SDr Moore
1974/75   PhD   Birmingham   A multisectoral model for manpower and educational planning in Sri Lanka   T W Y RANAWEERA
1974/75   MSc   Cambridge Trinity   The extraction and use of surplus in India and China, 1950-1960   Chiranjivi Shumshere THAPA
1975   MSc   Strathclyde   Foreign indebtedness and debt servicing capacity of Pakistan, 1955-1970   M K ACHIGZAI
1975   MSc   London, LSHTM   Mortality and fertility trends in Orissa, 1951-1972   V AHMAD
1975   PhD   Edinburgh   Industrialisation and the problems of access to finance of small and medium sized forms in Ceylon   C A BALASURIYA
1975   MA   Ulster   Bangladesh: a divided Pakistan   N J BEST
1975   PhD   Manchester   Science and politics in India: accountability of scientific research policy structures, 1952-1970   B BHANEJA
1975   MSc   Salford   Factionalism and party building in India with special reference to the State of Rajasthan   R BHARGAVA
1975   MSc   Wales, Swansea   Population planning in Bangladesh   A R BHUIYAN   Mr J Whetton
1975   PhD   Lancaster   As assessment of the economic effects of a customs union among the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka   M A R BHUYAN
1975   PhD   London   The East India Company and its army, 1600-1778   G J BRYANT   Dr P J Marshall
1975   DPhil   sussex   The effects of external assistance on economic development: the case of Sri Lanka   A CHANDRA-RANDENI
1975   PhD   Leeds   The marketing of cotton in Pakistan   I U CHAUDHRY
1975   MSc   Wales, Swansea   Social welfare services in Pakistan: the integration of state and welfare activity   A CHOUDRY   Jim Whetton
1975   PhD   Londond, Wye   Factors influencing India’s exports since 1950   Kashmir Singh DHINDSA
1975   DPhil   Oxford   The journals and memoirs of British travellers and residents in India in the late 18th century and the 19th century prior to the Mutiny   Ketaki K DYSON   Dr C M Ing
1975   PhD   London, SOAS   The structure of politics in South India, 1918-1939: conflict and adjustment in Madras City   J A ELLIS
1975   MA   Sussex   The Vidhan Sabha election, Uttar Pradash, India, of February 1974   J GOODMAN
1975   MPhil   London, UC   Problems of port development in Sri Lanka, with special reference to Colombo   Daya Somalatha GUNATILLAKE
1975   DPhil   Sussex   Peasant agitations in Kheder District, Gujerat, 1917-1934   D R HARDIMAN   Mr P K Chaudhuri
1975   MSc   Wales, Swansea   Organisation and staffing needs in four state social services departments in Malaysia   Kamariah Mohd ISMAIL   Mr C Gore
1975   MScEcon   Wales   Economic development and the problem of unemployment with special reference to Bangladesh   Halim JAHANGIR
1975   PhD   Edinburgh   Public sector investment in the direct development of urban housing in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)   M E JOACHIM
1975   DPhil   Sussex   The relation between land settlement and party politics in Uttar Pradesh, India, 1950-69, with special reference to the formulation of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal   M H JOHNSON
1975   PhD   London, SOAS   Business, labour and opposition movements in the politics of Ahmedabad City, 1960-1972   Bharti KANSARA   Prof W H Morris-Jones
1975   MLitt   Aberdeen   South Asian international relations since rthe emergence of Bangladesh   A KHAN
1975   MA   Sussex   The Congress split of 1969: a study in factional and ideological conflicts   H KINASE-LEGGETT
1975   PhD   London   Legal aspects of stage carriage licensing in India   P LEELAKRISHNAN
1975   PhD   London, SOAS   Economics of higher yielding varieties of rice with special reference to a south Indian district…West Godavari (Andhra Pradesh)   S MADHAVAN   Mr T J Byres
1975   DPhil   Sussex   Political change in an Indian state: Mysore, 1910-1952   James G MANOR   Prof A Low; Dr Reeves
1975   PhD   Leeds   Financial institutions and private investment in Pakistan, 1955/56 to 1969/70   A M M MASIH   Finance
1975   MPhil   London, UC   Self-help in Hyderabad’s urban development   Catherine Anne MEDE
1975   PhD   London, LSE   An analysis of the economy and social organisation of the the Malapantara – a south Indian hunting and gathering people   Brian MORRIS
1975   DPhil   Oxford, Wolfson   The Indian National Congress and political mobilization in the United Provinces, 1926-1934   G PANDEY

Mr D K Fieldhouse
1975   PhD   Edinburgh   A prototype system for the control of land use and settlements in the planned development of Bangladesh   A M A QUAZI
1975   PhD   London, Inst Comm   The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state   Mizanur RAHMAN
1975   DPhil   Oxfird, Linacre House   Some aspects of the Indian government’s policy of state railways, 1869-1884   V SHANMUGASUNDARAM   Prof K Ballhatchet
1975   PhD   Edinburgh   Changing patterns of cropland use in Bist Doab, Punjab, 1951-1968   Gurjeet SINGH
1975   PhD   London, LSE   A demographic analysis of the sterilization programme in the Indian states, 1957-1973   Veena SONI   Prof D Glass
1975   MLitt   St Andrews   Tax revenue forecasting in a developing economy with special reference to India   D K SRIVASTAVA
1975   DPhil   Sussex   The British in Malabar, 1792-1806   B S W SWAI   Prof D A Low; Dr P Reeves
1975   PhD   London, SOAS   The cotton trade and the commercial development of Bombay, 1855-1875   Antonia M VICZIANY   Dr K N Chaudhuri
1975   PhD   London, SOAS   The Moplah rebellion of 1921-1922 and its genesis   Conrad WOOD
1975/76   PhD   Birmingham   Significance of size in Indian public limited companies   N P NAYAR
1975/76   DPhil   Oxford, Trinity   British policy and the political impasse in India during the viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow   Gowher RIZVI
1976   MPhil   London, UC   Development of printing in Urdu, 1743-1857   Nazir AHMAD   Mr R Staveley
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   The beginnings of British rule in Upper Burma: the study of British policy and Burmese reaction, 1885-1890   Muhammad S ALI   Prof C D Cowan
1976   MLitt   Glasgow   Jute in the agrarian history of Bengal, 1870-1914: a study in primary production   M W ALI   Prof S Checkland; Mr J F Munro
1976   PhD   Cambridge, Queen’s   Private industrial investment in Pakistan   Rashid AMJAD   Mr M A King
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   The Tamil renaissance and Dravidian nationalism, 1905-1944, with special reference to the works of Maraimalai Atikal   K Nambi AROORAN   Prof K Ballhatchet
1976   PhD   Lancaster   Regional dualism: a case study of Pakistan, 1947/48 to 1969/70   M AZHAR-UD-DIN
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Patterns of rural development in Tamil Nadu   Robert Wilfred BRADNOCK
1976   DPhil   Sussex   Patterns of tractorization in the major rice growing areas of Sri Lanka   M N CARR
1976   DPhil   Oxford, St John’s   Aspects of the registration and legal control of trade unions in India with some comparative observations   B K CHANDRASHEKAR
1976   MSc   Heriot-Watt   The development of tourism in Sri Lanka(Ceylon)with special reference to Nuwara Elyia   E G DHARMASIRIWARANDE
1976   MPhil   Edinburgh   Some guidelines for a spatial framework for regional planning in Sri Lnaka   N D DICKSON
1976   PhD   London, UC   Some problems relating to constitutional amendments in India   Bhubaneswar DUTTA
1976   MA   Sheffield   An examination of the letters and papers of a Wesleyan missionary (the Rev. James John Ellis of India, 1883-1962   J ELLIS   Prof J Atkinson; Dr J C G Binfield
1976   DPhil   Sussex   Caste and Christianity: a study of the development and influence of attitudes and policies concerning caste held by Protetsant Anglo-Saxon missions in India   D B FORRESTER
1976   DPhil   Sussex   Sri Lanka and the powers: an investigation into Sri Lanka’s relations with Britain, India, US, Soviet Union and China, 1948-1974   Birty GAJAMERAGEDARA   Coral Bell
1976   PhD   Cambridge, Selwyn   Bombay city businessmen and politics, 1918-1933: the politics of indigenous colonial businessmen in relation to rising nationalism and a modernising economy   A D D GORDON   Prof J A Gallagher
1976   MSc   Wales, UWIST   The impact of the Central Freight Bureau of Sri Lanka on liner conferences and trade patterns   M H GUNARATNE
1976   PhD   Wales, Aberystwyth   Programming for a balanced development of modern industries in Bangladesh   A K Md HABIBULLAH   Prof P N Mathur
1976   MPhil   East Anglia   Techniques and management of annual planning with reference to Bangladesh   Shamsul HAQUE
1976   MSc   Wales, Swansea   Employment planning in Sri Lanka   Nimal HETTIARATCHY
1976   PhD   Cambridge, Christ’s   Agrarian structure and land productivity in Bangladesh: an analysis of farm level data   Mahabub HOSSAIN   Mrs S Paine
1976   PhD   Glasgow   Factor price distortions in Bangladesh   M M HUQ
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   A quantitative study of price movements in Bengal during the 18th and 19th centuries   A S M A HUSSAIN   Dr K N Chaudhuri
1976   MPhil   London   A study of 19th century historical work on Muslim rule in Bengal: Charles Stewart to Henry Beveridge   Muhammad D HUSSAIN   Dr P Hardy
1976   MSc   Wales   Construction and use of new system of national accounts for Sri Lanka   Siripala IPALAWATTE   Prof P N Mathur
1976   PhD   London, LSE   Factor intensity and labour absorption in manufacturing industries: the case of Bangladesh   R ISLAM   Prof A Sen; Dr Dasgupta
1976   PhD   Wales, Aberystwyth   An investigation into the effect of farm structure on resource productivitiy in selected areas of Bangladesh   Md Abdul JABBAR
1976   PhD   London, Inst Comm   India in the British Commonwealth: the problem of diplomatic representation 1917-1947   James L KEMBER   Dr T Reese
1976   PhD   Aberdeen   International relations in the South Asian sub-continent since the emergence of Bangladesh: conflict or co-operation ?   Ataur Rahman KHAN
1976   MSc   Strathclyde   Indian decision making and the Sino-Indian boundary conflict   R LOUDIS
1976   PhD   Glasgow   Regional disparities and structural change in an underdeveloped economy: a case study of India   M MAJMUDAR
1976   DPhil   Oxford, St Antony’s   Radical nationalism in India, 1930-1942: the role of the All India Congress Socialist Party   Z M MASANI
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Political leadership among the Hindu community in Calcutta, 1857-1885   John G McGUIRE   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1976   MPhil   Leeds   Public enterprise and the economic development of Pakistan: a study of the relationship between industrial finance corporations and the development of the private sector   I MEHDI
1976   PhD   Manchester   Marketing of social products: family planning in Bangladesh   M A MIYAN
1976   PhD   London, UC   History of printing in Bengali characters up to 1866   Hussain Khan MOFAKHKHAR
1976   PhD   Cambridge, Christ’s   An Indian rural society: aspects of the structure of rural society in the United Provinces, 1860-1920   P J MUSGRAVE   Prof E T Stokes
1976   PhD   Cambridge, St John’s   The British in India, 1740-1763: a study in imperial expansion into Bengal   J B NICHOL   Prof E T Stokes
1976   PhD   London, LSE   Education and educated manpower in Bangladesh: a study of development after the 1947 partition   M NURUZZAMAN   Dr C M Phillips
1976   PhD   Manchester   The sensitivity of the demand for Indian exports to world prices: a study of particular commodities   N G PEERA
1976   PhD   Glasgow   Some methodological aspects of the cost benefit analysis of irrigation projcts: a case study of the Telegana region of India   Gautam PINGLE   Mr E RAdo; Dr R P Sinha
1976   DPhil   Oxford, St John’s   The role of India in imperial defence beyond its frontiers and home waters, 1919-1939   J O RAWSON   Prof N H Gibbs
1976   PhD   London, LSE   Towards a spatial strategy for Indian development   L R SATIN
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Municipal markets of Calcutta: three case studies   Mondira SINHA RAY
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Munda religion and social structure   Hilary STANDING
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Pakistan: a geopolitical analysis, 1947-1974   Arif Hassan SYED
1976   MSc   Wales, Swansea   Child welfare planning in India   Kalyani Sarojini THADI
1976   PhD   Aston   Techno-economic aspects of the competitive position of natural rubber with special reference to the natural rubber industry in Sri Lanka   G VARATHUNGARAJAN
1976   PhD   Cambridge, Sidney   The impact of tariff protection on Indian industrial growth, 1918-1939, with special reference to the steel, cotton mill and sugar industries   D M WAGLE   Dr W J Macpherson
1976   DPhil   Sussex   The use of project appraisal techniques in the Indian public sector: a case study of the fertiliser industry   John WEISS
1976   PhD   London, SOAS   Decisions and analogy: political structure and discourse among the Ho tribes of India   Michael Piers YORKE
1976/77   PhD   Cambridge, Darwin   Living saints and their devotees: a study of guru cults in urban Orissa   Deborah Anne SWALLOW   Prof E R Leach
1977   PhD   London, LSE   The jute manufacturing industry of Bangladesh, 1947-1974   Q K AHMAD
1977   DPhil   Oxford   The Bengal Muslims, circa 1871-1906: the re-definition of identity   R AHMED
1977   PhD   Hull   The Boria: a study of a Malay theatre in its socio-cultural context   RAHMAN AZMAN
1977   PhD   London,SOAS   Guardianship in South Asia with special reference to alienation and limitation   M BADARUDDIN
1977   PhD   Lancaster   The image of Gandhi in the Indo-Anglican nove   D CHATTERJEE
1977   PhD   Cambridge, Selwyn   Lancashire cotton trade and British policy in India, 1919-1939   Basudev CHATTERJI
1977   PhD   Aberdeen   Doctrinal and exegetical issues in the Hindu-Christian debate during the nineteenth century Bengal renaissance with special reference to St Paul’s teaching on the religions of the nations   Chee Pang CHOONG
1977   PhD   Glasgow   Technological change in agriculture: the development experience of Tamil Nadu   M D’SA
1977   PhD   Cambridge, Selwyn   Indigo plantations and agrarian society in North Bihar in the 19th and early 20th centuries   C M FISHER   Prof E Stokes
1977   PhD   Edinburgh   Some aspects of the colonial administration in Ceylon, 1855-1865   Alison C FORBES   Dr T J Barron
1977   PhD   Manchester   A model of manpower planning for India   R D GAIHA
1977   PhD   East Anglia   Paddy and rice marketing in Northern Tamil Nadu, India   Barbara HARRISS
1977   PhD   East Anglia   Technological change in agriculture and agrarian social structure in Northern Tamil Nadu   John Charles HARRISS
1977   PhD   Cambridge, Trinity   Indian National congress and the Indian Muslims (1916-1928)   M HASAN   Dr A Seal
1977   MEd   Wales, Aberystwyth   Television strategies for health education in Pakistan   Muhammad Anwar HASSAN
1977   PhD   London, UC   The tax burden on Bangladeshi agriculture – a welfare economics approach   M HUQ
1977   PhD   Durham   Differentiation, polarisation and confrontation in rural Bangladesh   B K JAHANGIR
1977   DPhil   Oxford, St Hugh’s   Gangaguru: the public and private life of a Brahmin community of North India   A S JAMESON
1977   PhD   Edinburgh   A Bangladeshi town’s elite: a sociological study   F KHAN
1977   MPhil   London, King’s   South Asia Muslims and the ocncept of equality with reference to the 20th century   M LAHLOU   Dr P Hardy
1977   PhD   London, SOAS   Evaluation of integrated rural development project in Pakistan   W E LOVETT
1977   PhD   London   Depression kills more than a self: concepts of mental distress among Pakistanis   R MALIK
1977   PhD   London, SOAS   The origins and early years of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1907   Margot I MORROW   Prof K A Ballhatchet
1977   MPhil   London, SOAS   Caste, rituals and strategies   Rina NAYAR
1977   PhD   Edinburgh   The directors of the East India Company, 1754-1790   J G PARKER   Dr J N M Maclean; Prof V G Kiernan
1977   PhD   Hull   Anglo-Burmese relations, 1795-1826   Gandadharan Padmanabhan RAMACHANDRA
1977   PhD   Leicester   The development of local transport in Bangladesh   Abu REZA
1977   DPhil   Sussex   An analysis of the export performance and policies of Bangladesh since 1950 with special reference to the income and employment implications of trade in manufactures   S A L REZA
1977   DPhil   Sussex   A study of political elites in Bangladesh, 1947-1970   Rangalal SEN   Prof T B Bottomore
1977   PhD   Leeds   Organisation and leadership of industrial labour in Karachi, Pakistan   Z A SHAHEED
1977   PhD   Kent   A monetary macro-economic model for India, 1951/52-1965/66   M A SHAHI
1977   MLitt   Cambridge, Girton   The Congress ministry in Bombay, 1937-1939   Rani SHANKAREDASS   Prof J Gallagher
1977   mpHIL   Edinburgh   A comparative study of development policies in Pakistan, 1955-1970   S H SYED
1977   MPhil   London, Birkbeck   Diffe

Bibliography, Books, Public Lectures, Memoranda, Memoirs

Some Recent Work

My Recent Tweets

Index of Names and Subjects

The most important of these are in the newspapers and/or at this site too. I will try to have everything reproduced here.

00) https://independentindian.com/2015/03/03/pakistans-indias-illusions-of-power-psychosis-vs-vanity/

0) India-Pakistan Diplomacy During the 1965 War: the MK Roy Files, at this site

1) https://independentindian.com/2011/11/22/pakistans-point-of-view-or-points-of-view-on-kashmir-my-as-yet-undelivered-lahore-lecture-part-i/

2) Law, Justice and Jammu & Kashmir (2006)

Monday, October 5, 2009

3) Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason (2005) https://independentindian.com/2005/12/03/solving-kashmir-on-an-application-of-reason/

Monday, October 5, 2009

4) My (armchair) experience of the 1999 Kargil war (Or, How the Kargil effort got a little help from a desktop)

Thursday, April 29, 2010

5) Understanding Pakistan (2006)

Monday, October 5, 2009

6) Pakistan’s Allies (2006)

Monday, October 5, 2009

7) History of Jammu & Kashmir

Monday, October 5, 2009

8) from 30 years ago, now in pdf

9) Talking to my student and friend Amir Malik about Pakistan and its problems

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

10) My thanks to Mr Singh for seeing the optimality of my Kashmir solution

Sunday, September 4, 2011

11) Zafrullah, my father, and the three frigates: there was no massacre of the Hindu Sindhi refugees in Karachi in 1947

Saturday, August 27, 2011

12) Conversation with Mr Birinder R Singh about my Kashmir solution

Saturday, August 20, 2011

13) On the Hurriyat’s falsification of history

Friday, August 19, 2011

14) Letter from a young Pashtun whose grandfathers were in the 1947 invasion of Kashmir (which the Hurriyat says never happened)

Friday, August 19, 2011

15) More on my solution

Thursday, August 18, 2011

16 ) A Hurriyat/Taliban Islamist emirate in the Valley subject to an Indian blockade would likely face famine.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

17) There is no Kashmiri nationality and there never has been in the modern era of international law

18) Of the Flag of Pakistan, and the Union Jack, and the Flag of India — August 14-15 1947

Sunday, August 14, 2011

19) Talking about Kashmir in 1947 to Ralph Coti

Saturday, August 13, 2011

20) Conversation with Prof. Bhim Singh about 1947

Saturday, August 13, 2011

21) The LOC represents the division of ownerless, sovereignless territory won by military conquest by either side…

Monday, August 1, 2011

22) Talking to Mr Tauseef

Monday, August 1, 2011

23) J&K had ceased to exist as an entity in international law by August 15 1947, at most by October 22 1947

Sunday, July 31, 2011

24) Would someone be kind enough to tell me which freedoms Indian Kashmiris are being deprived of?

Friday, July 29, 2011

25) Kunan Poshpora: I would say the evidence reported by the Verghese Committee itself was enough to indicate there had been rape 28 July 2011

26) Talking to Mr Rameez Makhdoomi about Kashmir

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

27) And, as you well know, General Hasnain is both Muslim and Kashmiri, besides being the Commanding Officer of 15 Corps.

Friday, July 22, 2011

28) Kashmir needs a Coroner’s Office!

Friday, July 22, 2011

29) A slogan for Kashmir: No exaggerations, no hallucinations, no cover-ups please: Just the plain facts & accountability

Friday, July 22, 2011

30) Towards a Spatial Model of Kashmir’s Political History

Sunday, July 17, 2011

31) Why did Allama Iqbal say “India is the greatest Muslim country in the world…”?

Friday, July 15, 2011

32) Conversation with Mr Arif

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

33) Omar Qayoom Bhat: A Victim of State Repression in J&K

Monday, July 11, 2011

34) Good and evil in Kashmir over more than a millennium…

Sunday, June 26, 2011

35) Letter to Mr Zargar (Continued)

June 23, 2011

36) From the Official Indian Army website re Human Rights Violations

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

37) A Facebook Discussion on Kashmir with the Lahore Oxford & Cambridge Society

Sunday, June 19, 2011

38) Answering two central questions on the Kashmir Problem

Friday, June 10, 2011

39) Some articles on Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan

3) Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason (2005)
https://independentindian.com/2005/12/03/solving-kashmir-on-an-application-of-reason/