How the India-Bangladesh Enclaves Problem Was Jump-Started in 2007 Towards its 2015 Solution: A Case Study of Academic Impact on Policy

How the India-Bangladesh Enclaves Problem Was Jump-Started in 2007 Towards its 2015 Solution: A Case Study of Academic Impact on Policy

by

Subroto Roy, with Brendan Whyte

Progress on the complex problem of India-Bangladesh enclaves started slightly in 1958 and especially 1974, then came to be stalled completely.  In May 2007 press reports said a joint delegation was doing some survey work.

That same month, I as Contributing Editor at The Statesman newspaper (biding my time away from a corrupted academia) stumbled on the excellent doctoral work done by a young researcher in Australia on what seemed at the time the impossibly intractable problem of India-Bangladesh enclaves.

I wrote to the newspaper’s Editor on 9 May 2007,

Dear Ravi, You may know that there is an incredibly complex problem between India and Bangladesh relating to enclaves between them, some dating back to Cooch Behar and Mughal enclaves 200 years ago. An Australian researcher named Brendan Whyte at the Univ of Melbourne has done the definitive study of the problem. I think we should invite him to produce a 2000-2500 word two parter on his work which would be very helpful to both governments and to public discussion. If you agree, I can write to him and invite him or you can do so directly. I will have to find his email. Regards Suby

I enclosed a published abstract of Whyte’s work:

“Waiting for the Esquimo: An historical and documentary study of the Cooch Behar enclaves of India and Bangladesh. Whyte, Dr Brendan (2002) “Waiting for the Esquimo: An historical and documentary study of the Cooch Behar enclaves of India and Bangladesh” School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne

“Enclaves are defined as a fragment of one country totally surrounded by one other. A list of the world’s current enclaves and a review of the literature about them reveals a geographical bias that has left enclaves outside western Europe almost untouched. This bias is particularly noticeable in the almost complete absence of information on the Cooch Behar enclaves, along Bangladesh’s northern border with India. The Cooch Behar enclaves number almost 200. This total includes about two dozen counter-enclaves (enclaves within enclaves), and the world’s only counter-counter-enclave. Together, these enclaves represent 80% of the total number of enclaves existing in the world since the 1950s, and have been at the centre of Indo-East Pakistani and then Indo-Bangladeshi boundary disputes since Cooch Behar acceded to India in 1949.

The incredibly complex Cooch Behar sector of the Indo-Bangladesh boundary is investigated in detail for the first time, from historical, political and geographical perspectives. The history of the enclaves is traced, from their origin c.1713 until the present, in an attempt to understand their genesis and survival under a succession of states, from the Kingdom of Cooch Behar and the Mughal Empire in the 1700s, to Bangladesh and the Republic of India today. The difficulties of the enclaves’ existence for their residents and the two countries today is contrasted with their peaceful, albeit administratively inconvenient, existence until 1947, to prove that the enclaves themselves are not the cause of border tensions in the area, but are rather a focus for other cross-border disputes.

The current situation of the enclaves is described, highlighting the abandonment of the enclave residents by each country, which refuse to allow the other to administer its exclaves. India’s inability to implement a 1958 treaty with Pakistan, and its continued delay in ratifying a subsequent 1974 treaty with Bangladesh to exchange the enclaves is highlighted as the major factor impeding resolution of the enclave dispute. That the delays have been rooted in Indian internal politics is demonstrated. Highly disparate official and media reports as to the number, area and population of the enclaves are analysed to determine the true extent of the enclave problem, and the first ever large-scale map of the enclaves is published, locating and naming each enclave.”

The Statesman‘s Editor agreed, and I went about trying to locate Dr Whyte. I think I phoned Australia, asked after him, and learnt he was a New Zealander teaching at a university in Thailand.  On 10 May, I wrote to his former department head, Ian Rutherfurd:

Dear Dr Rutherfurd, I am Contributing Editor at The Statesman of Calcutta and New Delhi, and would like to be in touch with your colleague Brendon Whyte but there is no email for him at your site. Please tell him we much wish him to write a two-part article on the editorial page (over two days) for us of less than 2500 words in total on his important research on the India-Bangladesh enclaves. There would be a relatively tiny honorarium probably from the Editor but a large impact on policy and public discussion in both countries. The Statesman is India’s oldest and most eminent newspaper. It may be seen at http://www.thestatesman.net and I am to be found at http://www.independentindian.com Many thanks,  Subroto Roy, PhD (Cantab.), BScEcon (London), Contributing Editor

Brendan Whyte replied the same day:

Dear Dr Roy, I have received your message, and am honoured to be asked to write a piece for your paper. I now work in Thailand. Are there any further details regarding this assignment in addition to your information below? For example, is there a deadline, and if so, when? Do you want/can you accept maps/photos and if so how to send them to you? Can the text be sent to you be email or do you prefer a printed version instead of/in addition to an email? Regarding email should the text be in the body of an email or do you prefer an attachment in Word/RTF or other format? Do you prefer a Word document, or should the text be in the body of an email Thank you very much Brendan Whyte, PhD, Faculty of Management Science,Ubon Ratchathani University, THAILAND

I wrote back the same day

Dear Dr Whyte, Many thanks for the quick reply, and our thanks to your colleagues for locating you. The Statesman’s editorial page is as influential a place as there can be in serious Indian public discussion, though I have to say there is far too little such discussion in the country. At my suggestion, the Editor has invited a 2500 word two-part article (over two days); I have said you may have done the definitive work in the area. I know nothing of the subject and am reluctant to suggest any further guidelines, and leave to you to say what you wish once you get a sense of the audience and likely impact. I have in recent months published numerous special articles in The Statesman, and these may be seen at http://www.independentindian.com to give you a sense of the kind of quality you may aim at — though certainly we are a newspaper and not a technical journal. Regarding graphs, each article would have an illustration a few inches square and if you felt you could squeeze the relevant data into two such articles for the two days it would be excellent. Do drop by Calcutta when you can. The honorarium will be a few thousand rupees I expect though the Editor has not specified it yet. No there is no time rush; I accidentally found your work through a wordpress.com blog on strange maps. On second thoughts, if your articles generated invitations from geography departments in India or other invitations to give lectures on the subject, that too would be a worthwhile aim. Best regards Suby Roy

Brendan sent his proposed article a month later in June.

I replied:

Hello, I have reduced it by 300 words without reducing any substance. I hope you may agree. Can you please try to reduce another 200 words, eg of the Belgian/Dutch case? I normally don’t allow anyone to touch my stuff so if you would like to try to reduce it all yourself, that’s fine. Also, 198 is not equal to 106+91+3+1. Please send all the graphics you may think suitable, and people here will try to figure out what to use. It may all go on one day on the Op-Ed page, I have no iodea what the Editor may decide. Also add your PhD University Thanks for this. The work is excellent and I hope it brings you the publicity you deserve. Suby Roy

Brendan sent his final draft on 16 July 2007

Hi Suby, My apologies that this has taken me so long, but the teaching year has been so busy! I have reduced it to 2274 words, about 10% below your limit of 2500. It is attached as a Word file, and appended below as plain text. I hope to send some illustrations separately in the next day or two. Let me know if the revised article is ok or not. Thanks, Brendan

I wrote to the Editor again the same day:

Subject: India-Bangladesh Enclaves: A Major Foreign Policy Problem Solved

Dear Ravi, Apropos our correspondence two months ago, Dr Brendan Whyte has at our request produced an excellent analysis of one of the trickiest and longest-standing problems between India and Bangladesh, viz. enclaves. Dr Whyte is a political geographer from New Zealand who worked on this subject for his doctoral thesis at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He apparently teaches in Thailand at present. By publishing this, we will be doing the MEA a very big favour, besides of course contributing to an important yet neglected public problem relevant to Eastern India. I recommend it for a Saturday night-Sunday night two-parter, rather than the Perspective page, given its close factual basis. Sincerely, Suby.

I wrote to Brendan:

Hello, Your article looks to me first-rate. The basis of a Government White Paper on this side or that. I have forwarded it to the Editor with my recommendation. Please send me any illustrations asap, as he may go with it any day though likely not before the weekend. Best wishes SR

Brendan Whyte’s 16 July 2007 final draft was this:

“The Enclave Problem: India and Bangladesh can and must solve this 300 year problem!

There are 198 “enclaves” (chhit-mahals) between India and Bangladesh. Cooch Behar district has 106 enclaves in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh has 92 enclaves in India: 88 in Cooch Behar, 3 in Jalpaiguri, and 1 between Cooch Behar and Assam’s Dhubri district. The enclaves vary from clusters of villages to individual fields. The smallest Indian enclave may be Panisala, only 0.1093 ha; the smallest Bangladeshi enclave is Upan Chowki Bhajni #24 at 0.2870 ha. The largest are India’s Balapara Khagrabari at 25.95 sq. km, and Bangladesh’s 18.68 sq. km Dahagram-Angarpota. The 198 enclaves also include 3 Indian and 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves (enclaves within enclaves). India also possesses the world’s only counter-counter-enclave: a 0.69 ha jute field inside a Bangladeshi enclave inside an Indian enclave inside Bangladesh! Enclave populations-sizes are unknown. The last censuses to include enclaves were in 1951, although the Pakistani enumeration was incomplete. The population today is probably under 100,000 persons in total, 60% living in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh, the rest in Bangladeshi enclaves in India.

The enclaves are 300 years old, originating during the Mughal wars against Cooch Behar in the late 1600s. A treaty was concluded in 1711 in which the Mughals obtained three chaklas from Cooch Behar, but the Subahdar of Bengal rejected the treaty and forced Cooch Behar to cede further lands in 1713, reducing it to about its present borders. This second treaty is the origin of the enclaves: as in feudal Europe, the holdings of kings and their vassals were not contiguous wholes but rather a patchwork of land parcels, so the ceded chaklas included lands inside the unceded areas and vice versa. The East India Company fixed the Bengal-Cooch Behar boundary about 1773, and by 1814 noted that the enclaves were safe havens for bandits. Yet the Company itself created more enclaves in 1817 when it adjudicated a territorial dispute between Cooch Behar and Bhutan, creating Cooch Behari enclaves in then-Bhutanese territory (now Alipar Duar district of Jalpaiguri). These enclaves remained when the British annexed the Bhutanese lands in 1865.

The British quashed the bandit menace but proliferation of liquor, ganja and opium shops in the enclaves became an excise problem between Bengal and Cooch Behar. After discussions, the main boundary of Cooch Behar became the customs and excise boundary. All Cooch Behar enclaves in British India fell under British excise control while all British enclaves in Cooch Behar fell under Cooch Behari excise control. This practical solution to the problem in hand left the sovereignty of the enclaves intact.

A full exchange of enclaves was suggested by the British in the early 1930s, to reduce the costs of the upcoming survey and demarcation of the Cooch Behar boundary but the idea was dropped in face of strong local objections, and all the enclaves were surveyed and demarcated with pillars by the late 1930s.

Partition and independence in 1947, and the subsequent accession of Cooch Behar to India in 1949, elevated the enclaves to the international level. Initially this was unproblematic, with India and Pakistan concluding agreements on cross-border trade and movement in the enclave areas. Censuses in 1951 included the enclaves. But Pakistan’s unilateral 1952 introduction of visas requirements, and immediate Indian reciprocation sealed the fate of the enclave dwellers. High-level politics subordinated the needs of enclave dwellers on both sides.

Full exchange was again agreed upon by the 1958 Nehru-Noon Accord, and this was reiterated in modified form in the 1974 Indira-Mujib Agreement between India and Bangladesh (Bangladesh would keep its largest enclave, Dahagram-Angarpota, to guarantee access to which, India would lease it a short corridor. But a succession of mainly Indian legal challenges regarding the constitutionality of both accords prevented implementation until 1992, when the Tin Bigha corridor was finally opened. The exchange of the remaining enclaves, agreed in 1958 and 1974 and cleared of legal challenged by 1990 remains unimplemented, despite constant Bangladeshi calls for India to implement the agreements fully.

Meanwhile, since the 1950s the chhit mahalis, or enclave dwellers, have been effectively rendered stateless by the two governments abandoning responsibility for them.

India’s fencing of its border with Bangladesh has added a physical dimension to the political isolation of its own enclaves. The chhit mahalis on both sides are unable to vote, to attend schools or markets, to be helped by NGOs working in either country, or to seek police help or medical attention. Each country claims its original citizens have been forced out of their enclaves by the population of the other country surrounding them, and so each country refuses to extend its governmental responsibilities to the supposed invaders. Simultaneously each denies it can legally assist the populations of the other country’s enclaves inside its own territory. Abandoned by both sides, the chhit mahalis struggle to survive without the ability to protect their rights, homes or lives. Bandits once more make use of the enclaves to escape the jurisdiction of the surrounding state.

The problem is one of India and Bangladesh’s own making but it is not unique. Since 1996, when the Lithuanian enclave of Pogiry in Belarus (population: three) was exchanged for equivalent land, 259 enclaves have remained on the world map. Besides India-Bangladesh, there are 61 enclaves affecting 21 countries as owners or hosts. Most consist of a single farm, or a village and its surrounding farmland, inside a neighbouring country. Some approach the complexity of the Cooch Behar enclaves, such as 30 enclaves (including 8 counter-enclaves) belonging to Belgium and the Netherlands in the village of Baarle (population 8500).

The Belgian-Dutch enclaves originated in a feudal agreement c.1198, and emerged at the international level when Belgium declared independence from the Netherlands in 1830. The enclaves were an annoyance to customs, police and foreign ministry officials; but arrangements allowed goods to pass into and through the enclaves, paying tax only if they were destined for the other country or its enclaves. Nevertheless, smuggling brought prosperity to a village on the economic and political periphery of both countries. Today the village park boasts a statue honouring the smugglers. The economic union of Belgium and the Netherlands and the subsequent European Union have eliminated the profitabililty of smuggling without the need for policing or fences. Differences in tax rates and national laws remain, so that some types of business, such as sex or fireworks shops can only operate in one country and its enclaves, and not in the other. Yet the village happily contains both sorts of shops, each in the permitting country, but serving customers from both. Different planning laws, educational syllabii, post offices, town halls, and churches exist side by side. Several businesses and houses straddle the enclave boundaries, enjoying two postal address and two telephone connections. The policemen from each country share an office. The fire departments work together with special hose-coupling devices. Utilities, sewerage, road maintenance and rubbish collection are conducted by one country or  he other for the population of both. Where a national law unduly inconveniences the enclaves, an exception is granted. Thus while Sunday shopping is illegal in the Netherlands, the shops in Baarle’s Dutch enclaves may open on Sundays to compete with the Belgian shops, and the village has a thriving Sunday market, drawing crowds from both countries. Before the Euro was introduced, all shopkeepers and government offices accepted both national currencies. Overall the village has boomed as a border market, increasingly tourism-oriented, marketing its enclaves as a tourist attraction. Without the enclaves Baarle would be a small unimportant village. The enclaves have allowed it to surpass its neighbouring villages in size and prosperity.

Other enclaves are often placed inside the customs, postal or telephone jurisdiction of the surrounding country. Switzerland tolerates a casino in the Italian tax-haven enclave of Campione d’Italia, on condition that Swiss citizens have a daily betting limit. Germany’s village of Büsingen, also inside Switzerland, is inside the Swiss customs and currency area, not that of the EU. Passage from the UAE into the Omani enclave of Madha and into the UAE’s counter-enclave of Dahwa inside remain free of controls for locals and foreigners alike. On Cyprus, locals from two villages enclaved inside the British territory (and military base) of Dhekelia move about freely, and farm land under both British and Cypriot sovereignty.

What can India and Bangladesh learn from these foreign enclave cases? They have three main options. The worst is to maintain the status quo, each country refusing to properly govern its own enclaves while also forbidding the other to govern its enclaves across the intervening territory. This “dog-in-the-manger” attitude has reduced the enclaves to poverty and despair, countenanced violence and oppression, fostered corruption, and encourages the problems of criminal dens and drug-cultivation in the enclaves.

The second option is an enclave exchange. Inhabitants should be given two independent options concerning citizenship and relocation. For up to two years after the enclave exchange, they should have the option to choose whether to retain their current citizenship or to become citizens of the other country. They should also have the independent option to remain owning and farming the land they occupy after its tranfer to the other country, or of being resettled on land of equivalent value, size and productive capacity in their original country. There is no reason why they should not be able to choose to stay in situ and retain their old citizenship, nor why they could not hold both citizenships: dual nationality is an increasingly common occurrence worldwide.

The problems with this policy include a requirement for equivalent land for the resettlement of those wishing to relocate, and the need for each country to recognise the inhabitants of its enclaves as its own citizens before exchange. An imbalance in the numbers on each side desiring resettlement will cause difficulties. But it would only repeat the injustices of the 1947 partition if an exchange was made without addressing the needs of the enclave inhabitants, and allowing them some input into the process. The enclaves also form the world’s most complicated boundary, and include the world’s only counter-counter-enclave: so another problem with exchange is heritage loss. Finally, an exchange of enclaves is also an admittance of failure.

Enclave exchange will remove a cartographic anomaly but it will not solve the underlying tensions in bilateral relations. The enclaves are not a problem in themselves but are simply a focus point for distrust and tension created elsewhere. Exchange may not improve the lives of the chhit mahalis, who may end up marginalised, landless and dispossessed by the exchange process. Even if able to remain on their lands, they will still be living in an economically and politically peripheral location. Therefore any exchange should be entered into only with the will of, and in full consultation with, the people involved, so as not to become a further injustice.

A third policy is to retain the enclaves but improve their situation. The 30 enclaves of Belgium and the Netherlands at Baarle, along with other enclaves of Europe and the Middle East, are a good model for this. The advantages are many. It would put the enclave dwellers in charge of their own destiny, leaving them on their lands, but able to engage fully as citizens of their own country.

The distances between each country and its own enclaves are small, often less than one kilometre, rarely more than two or three. Designated access routes, for foot, cart and motorised traffic, could be easily set up and policed. This would allow enclave dwellers to traverse the intervening country to reach the nearest schools and markets of their own country. The local district commissioners should be granted authority to meet frequently and at will to discuss any problems and work out local solutions, without having to refer to New Delhi or Dhaka. Officials such as teachers, doctors, district officials, electoral officers, census enumerators and police should also be permitted visa-free access on demand. Which country’s currency, excise laws, and postal system, electricity and other services are used in an enclave should be based on principles of efficiency, not on chauvinistic nationalism.

There is no reason why exchange of enclaves for customs and excise purposes made in the 1930s could not be readopted. Indian enclaves could be alcohol-free like surrounding Bangladesh, and Bangladeshi enclaves could be prohibited from slaughtering cows as in India. This is no more a threat to the sovereignty of either country than is the differing alcohol and tax regimes of the Indian states and territories. The unique border situation of the enclaves would encourage tourism to this forgotten region in both countries, offering new economic possibilities to an area devoid of industrial capability and development.

India and Bangladesh are not alone in wrestling with the problem of enclaves. Similar problems have been solved in most other enclaves around the world. The long-delayed exchange of the Cooch Behar enclaves, mooted since 1910 and agreed upon in 1958 may simplify the border itself, but it is unlikely to improve bilateral relations, assist economic development of the area or improve the lives of the enclave dwellers. The needs and desires of the chhit-mahalis must be taken into account, but action must be taken to remove their current effective statelessness. The examples of successful enclaves elsewhere in the world suggest that even if relations between two countries are not completely harmonious, enclaves can exist and be beneficial to the economic potential of the area and the prosperity of its inhabitants. These two aspects are the raison d’etre of government, hence it behoves the governments concerned to ensure that any solution to the enclave problem addresses these issues and not merely cartographic simplification, which may only cement the 1947 division more firmly.”

Brendan’s article was published in two parts on Sunday and Monday  July 22 2007 &  July 23 2007 with very slight alteration –except the splendid maps he had sent failed to be published!

“The Enclave Problem India, Bangladesh can and must solve this 300-year-old issue! By BRENDANWHYTE

There are 198 “enclaves” (chhit-mahals) between India and Bangladesh. Cooch Behar district has 106 enclaves in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh has 92 enclaves in India: 88 in Cooch Behar, 3 in Jalpaiguri, and 1 between Cooch Behar and Assam’s Dhubri district. The enclaves vary from clusters of villages to individual fields. The smallest Indian enclave may be Panisala, only 0.1093 ha; the smallest Bangladeshi enclave is Upan Chowki Bhajni #24 at 0.2870 ha. The largest are India’s Balapara Khagrabari at 25.95 sq. km, and Bangladesh’s 18.68 sq. km Dahagram-Angarpota. The 198 enclaves also include 3 Indian and 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves (enclaves within enclaves). India also possesses the world’s only counter-counter-enclave: a 0.69 ha jute field inside a Bangladeshi enclave inside an Indian enclave inside Bangladesh! Enclave population-sizes are unknown. The last census to include enclaves was conducted in 1951, although the Pakistani enumeration was incomplete. The population today is probably under 100,000 in total, 60% living in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh, the rest in Bangladeshi enclaves in India. The enclaves are 300 years old, originating during the Mughal wars against Cooch Behar in the late 1600s. A treaty was concluded in 1711 in which the Mughals obtained three chaklas from Cooch Behar, but the Subahdar of Bengal rejected the treaty and forced Cooch Behar to cede further lands in 1713, reducing it to about its present borders. This second treaty is the origin of the enclaves: as in feudal Europe, the holdings of kings and their vassals were not contiguous wholes but rather a patchwork of land parcels, so the ceded chaklas included lands inside the unceded areas and vice versa. The East India Company fixed the Bengal-Cooch Behar boundary about 1773, and by 1814 noted that the enclaves were safe havens for bandits. Yet the Company itself created more enclaves in 1817 when it adjudicated a territorial dispute between Cooch Behar and Bhutan, creating Cooch Behari enclaves in then-Bhutanese territory (now Alipurduar district of Jalpaiguri). These enclaves remained when the British annexed the Bhutanese lands in 1865. The British quashed the bandit menace but proliferation of liquor, ganja and opium shops in the enclaves became an excise problem between Bengal and Cooch Behar. After discussions, the main boundary of Cooch Behar became the customs and excise boundary. All Cooch Behar enclaves in British India fell under British excise control, while all British enclaves in Cooch Behar fell under Cooch Behari excise control. This practical solution to the problem in hand left the sovereignty of the enclaves intact. A full exchange of enclaves was suggested by the British in the early 1930s, to reduce the costs of the upcoming survey and demarcation of the Cooch Behar boundary but the idea was dropped in face of strong local objections, and all the enclaves were surveyed and demarcated with pillars by the late 1930s. Partition and independence in 1947, and the subsequent accession of Cooch Behar to India in 1949, elevated the enclaves to the international level. Initially this was unproblematic, with India and Pakistan concluding agreements on cross-border trade and movement in the enclave areas. The 1951 census included the enclaves. But Pakistan’s unilateral 1952 introduction of visa requirements, and immediate Indian reciprocation sealed the fate of the enclave dwellers. High-level politics subordinated the needs of enclave dwellers on both sides. Full exchange was again agreed upon by the 1958 Nehru-Noon accord, and this was reiterated in a modified form in the 1974 Indira-Mujib agreement between India and Bangladesh (Bangladesh would keep its largest enclave, Dahagram-Angarpota, to guarantee access to which, India would lease it a short corridor). But a succession of mainly Indian legal challenges regarding the constitutionality of both accords prevented implementation until 1992, when the Tin Bigha corridor was finally opened. The exchange of the remaining enclaves, agreed in 1958 and 1974 and cleared of legal challenges by 1990 remains unimplemented, despite constant Bangladeshi calls for India to implement the agreements fully. Meanwhile, since the 1950s the chhit mahalis, or enclave dwellers, have been effectively rendered stateless by the two governments abandoning responsibility for them. India’s fencing of its border with Bangladesh has added a physical dimension to the political isolation of its own enclaves. The chhit mahalis on both sides are unable to vote, to attend schools or markets, to be helped by NGOs working in either country, or to seek police help or medical attention. Each country claims its original citizens have been forced out of their enclaves by the population of the other country surrounding them, and so each country refuses to extend its governmental responsibilities to the supposed invaders. Simultaneously each denies it can legally assist the populations of the other country’s enclaves inside its own territory. Abandoned by both sides, the chhit mahalis struggle to survive without the ability to protect their rights, homes or lives. Bandits once more make use of the enclaves to escape the jurisdiction of the surrounding state. The problem is one of India and Bangladesh’s own making but it is not unique. Since 1996, when the Lithuanian enclave of Pogiry in Belarus (population: three) was exchanged for equivalent land, 259 enclaves have remained on the world map. Besides India-Bangladesh, there are 61 enclaves affecting 21 countries as owners or hosts. Most consist of a single farm, or a village and its surrounding farmland, inside a neighbouring country. Some approach the complexity of the Cooch Behar enclaves, such as 30 enclaves (including 8 counter-enclaves) belonging to Belgium and the Netherlands in the village of Baarle (population 8500). The Belgian-Dutch enclaves originated in a feudal agreement c.1198, and emerged at the international level when Belgium declared independence from the Netherlands in 1830. The enclaves were an annoyance to customs, police and foreign ministry officials; but arrangements allowed goods to pass into and through the enclaves, paying tax only if they were destined for the other country or its enclaves. Nevertheless, smuggling brought prosperity to a village on the economic and political periphery of both countries. Today the village park boasts a statue honouring the smugglers. The economic union of Belgium and the Netherlands and the subsequent European Union have eliminated the profitabililty of smuggling without the need for policing or fences. Different town halls and churches exist side by side. Several businesses and houses straddle the enclave boundaries, enjoying two postal addresses and two telephone connections. The policemen from each country share an office. The fire departments work together with special hose-coupling devices. Utilities, sewerage, road maintenance and rubbish collection are conducted by one country or the other for the population of both. Where a national law unduly inconveniences the enclaves, an exception is granted. Thus while Sunday shopping is illegal in the Netherlands, the shops in Baarle’s Dutch enclaves may open on Sundays to compete with the Belgian shops, and the village has a thriving Sunday market, drawing crowds from both countries. Before the Euro was introduced, all shopkeepers and government offices accepted both national currencies. Overall the village has boomed as a border market, increasingly tourism-oriented, marketing its enclaves as a tourist attraction. Without the enclaves Baarle would be a small unimportant village. The enclaves have allowed it to surpass its neighbouring villages in size and prosperity. Other enclaves are often placed inside the customs, postal or telephone jurisdiction of the surrounding country. Switzerland tolerates a casino in the Italian tax-haven enclave of Campione d’Italia, on condition that Swiss citizens have a daily betting limit. Germany’s village of Büsingen, also inside Switzerland, is inside the Swiss customs and currency area, not that of the EU. Passage from the UAE into the Omani enclave of Madha and into the UAE’s counter-enclave of Dahwa inside remain free of controls for locals and foreigners alike. On Cyprus, locals from two villages enclaved inside the British territory (and military base) of Dhekelia move about freely, and farm land under both British and Cypriot sovereignty. (To be concluded)

The enclave problem~II What can India and Bangladesh learn from these foreign enclave cases? They have three main options. The worst is to maintain the status quo, each country refusing to properly govern its own enclaves while also forbidding the other to govern its enclaves across the intervening territory. This “dog-in-the-manger” attitude has reduced the enclaves to poverty and despair, countenanced violence and oppression, fostered corruption, and encouraged the problems of criminal dens and drug-cultivation in the enclaves. The second option is an enclave exchange. Inhabitants should be given two independent options concerning citizenship and relocation. For up to two years after the enclave exchange, they should have the option to choose whether to retain their current citizenship or to become citizens of the other country. They should also have the independent option to remain owning and farming the land they occupy after its transfer to the other country, or of being resettled on land of equivalent value, size and productive capacity in their original country.

Dual nationality There is no reason why they should not be able to choose to stay in situ and retain their old citizenship, nor why they could not hold both citizenships: dual nationality is an increasingly common occurrence worldwide. The problems with this policy include a requirement for equivalent land for the resettlement of those wishing to relocate, and the need for each country to recognise the inhabitants of its enclaves as its own citizens before exchange. An imbalance in the numbers on each side desiring resettlement will cause difficulties. But it would only repeat the injustices of the 1947 Partition if an exchange was made without addressing the needs of the enclave inhabitants, and allowing them some input into the process. The enclaves also form the world’s most complicated boundary, and include the world’s only counter-counter-enclave: so another problem with exchange is heritage loss. Finally, an exchange of enclaves is also an admittance of failure. Enclave exchange will remove a cartographic anomaly but it will not solve the underlying tensions in bilateral relations. The enclaves are not a problem in themselves but are simply a focus point for distrust and tension created elsewhere. Exchange may not improve the lives of the chhit mahalis, who may end up marginalised, landless and dispossessed by the exchange process. Even if able to remain on their lands, they will still be living in an economically and politically peripheral location. Therefore any exchange should be entered into only with the will of, and in full consultation with, the people involved, so as not to become a further injustice. A third policy is to retain the enclaves but improve their situation. The 30 enclaves of Belgium and the Netherlands at Baarle, along with other enclaves of Europe and the Middle East, are a good model for this. The advantages are many. It would put the enclave dwellers in charge of their own destiny, leaving them on their lands, but able to engage fully as citizens of their own country. The distances between each country and its own enclaves are small, often less than one kilometre, rarely more than two or three. Designated access routes, for foot, cart and motorised traffic, could be easily set up and policed. This would allow enclave dwellers to traverse the intervening country to reach the nearest schools and markets of their own country. The local district commissioners should be granted authority to meet frequently and at will to discuss any problems and work out local solutions, without having to refer to New Delhi or Dhaka. Officials such as teachers, doctors, district officials, electoral officers, census enumerators and police should also be permitted visa-free access on demand. Which country’s currency, excise laws, and postal system, electricity and other services are used in an enclave should be based on principles of efficiency, not on chauvanistic nationalism. There is no reason why exchange of enclaves for customs and excise purposes made in the 1930s could not be readopted. Indian enclaves could be alcohol-free like surrounding Bangladesh, and Bangladeshi enclaves could be prohibited from slaughtering cows as in India. This is no more a threat to the sovereignty of either country than is the differing alcohol and tax regimes of the Indian states and territories. The unique border situation of the enclaves would encourage tourism to this forgotten region in both countries, offering new economic possibilities to an area devoid of industrial capability and development.

Economic potential

India and Bangladesh are not alone in wrestling with the problem of enclaves. Similar problems have been solved in most other enclaves around the world. The long-delayed exchange of the Cooch Behar enclaves, mooted since 1910 and agreed upon in 1958 may simplify the border itself, but it is unlikely to improve bilateral relations, assist economic development of the area or improve the lives of the enclave dwellers. The needs and desires of the chhit-mahalis must be taken into account, but action must be taken to remove their current effective statelessness. The examples of successful enclaves elsewhere in the world suggest that even if relations between two countries are not completely harmonious, enclaves can exist and be beneficial to the economic potential of the area and the prosperity of its inhabitants. These two aspects are the raison d’etre of government, hence it behooves the governments concerned to ensure that any solution to the enclave problem addresses these issues and not merely cartographic simplification, which may only cement the 1947 division more firmly.

(Concluded)”

I wrote to him immediately Hello, You were published in yesterday’s Sunday Statesman and continued in this morning’s edition, as the special article on the editorial page. I am enclosing the text as it appears on the Internet edition. Through some apparent editorial mishap, the illustrattions you sent never got published, and two photographs were used. I think you could follow it up with an invited talk in Kolkata. If you wish, I can look into that possibility. Send me a cv if you are interested and I shall see what I can do. Re working with me on the China-India problem, a visit from you might enable us to talk further. I am introducing you separately to the Editor’s assistant who should help with copies, money etc. Best wishes Subroto Roy

All that was between May and July 2007.

On 6 September 2011, Dr Manmohan Singh as India’s PM on a visit to Bangladesh apparently signed what the India’s Foreign Ministry calls the “2011 Protocol”. And now a few days ago, Prime Minister Sheik Hasina, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, along with the agreement of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, have all signed a comprehensive landmark “Land Boundary Agreement” between India and Bangladesh, solving the 300 year problem!  All’s well that ends well…

And yes, Excellencies, PM Sheikha Hasina, PM Narendra Modi, former PM Manmohan Singh, CM Mamata Banerjee: re the Land Boundary Agreement, Dr Brendan Whyte and I and The Statesman newspaper may all take a bow after you…

Nota Bene:  The Statesman for some reason did not publish along with Dr Whyte’s excellent article these important maps which are now published here below for the first time:

Eastmainwest

A personal note: The words “enclave” and “No Man’s Land” entered my vocabulary due to my father back in January 1965 when we crossed from India through No Man’s Land into what was then East Pakistan. He was with India’s diplomatic post in Dhaka and during the 1965 war would be acting head while his friend G Parthasarathi was head of Mission in Karachi [Correction November 2015: Parthasarathi left shortly before the war, replaced in August 1965 by Kewal Singh]. Half a dozen years later in the summer of 1971, I was a schoolboy volunteer in West Dinajpur helping in small ways the innumerable refugees who had poured across the porous boundary with East Dinajpur during the tyranny West Pakistan had unleashed in East Pakistan; there was effectively no boundary distinction left then. I dedicate my part of this work to my late father MK Roy 1915-2012.

Did Jagdish Bhagwati “originate”, “pioneer”, “intellectually father” India’s 1991 economic reform? Did Manmohan Singh? Or did I, through my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi, just as Siddhartha Shankar Ray told Manmohan & his aides in Sep 1993 in Washington? Judge the evidence for yourself. And why has Amartya Sen misdescribed his work? India’s right path forward today remains what I said in my 3 Dec 2012 Delhi lecture!

Did Jagdish Bhagwati “originate”, “pioneer”, “intellectually father” India’s 1991 economic reform?  Did Manmohan Singh? Or did I, through my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi, just as Siddhartha Shankar Ray told Manmohan & his aides in Sep 1993 in Washington?  Judge the evidence for yourself.  And why has Amartya Sen misdescribed his work? India’s right path forward today remains what I said in my 3 Dec 2012 Delhi lecture!

[See also “I’m on my way out”: Siddhartha Shankar Ray (1920-2010)…An Economist’s Tribute”; “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”; “Three Memoranda to Rajiv Gandhi 1990-1991″ 

Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s edited by Subroto Roy & William E James, 1986-1992… pdf copy uploaded 2021

Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, edited by William E James & Subroto Roy, 1986-1993… pdf copy uploaded 2021

Critique of Amartya Sen: A Tragedy of Plagiarism, Fake News, Dissimulation

Contents

 

Part I:  Facts vs Fiction, Flattery, Falsification, etc

1. Problem

2.    Rajiv Gandhi, Siddhartha Shankar Ray, Milton Friedman & Myself

3.     Jagdish Bhagwati & Manmohan Singh?  That just don’t fly!

 4.    Amartya Sen’s Half-Baked Communism:  “To each according to his need”?

  Part II:    India’s Right Road Forward Now: Some Thoughtful Analysis for Grown Ups

5.   Transcending a Left-Right/Congress-BJP Divide in Indian Politics

6.   Budgeting Military & Foreign Policy

7.    Solving the Kashmir Problem & Relations with Pakistan

8.  Dealing with Communist China

9.   Towards Coherence in Public Accounting, Public Finance & Public Decision-Making

10.   India’s Money: Towards Currency Integrity at Home & Abroad

 

Part I:  Facts vs Fiction, Flattery, Falsification, etc

1. Problem


Arvind Panagariya says in the Times of India of 27 July 2013

 “…if in 1991 India embraced many of the Track-I reforms, writings by Sen played no role in it… The intellectual origins of the reforms are to be found instead in the writings of Bhagwati, both solely and jointly with Padma Desai and T N Srinivasan….”

Now Amartya Sen has not claimed involvement in the 1991 economic reforms so we are left with Panagariya claiming

“The intellectual origins of the reforms are to be found instead in the writings of Bhagwati…”

Should we suppose Professor Panagariya’s master and co-author Jagdish Bhagwati himself substantially believes and claims the same?  Three recent statements from Professor Bhagwati suffice by way of evidence:

(A)  Bhagwati said to parliamentarians in the Lok Sabha on 2 December 2010 about the pre-1991 situation:

“This policy framework had been questioned, and its total overhaul advocated, by me and Padma Desai in writings through the late 1960s which culminated in our book, India: Planning for Industrialization (Oxford University Press: 1970) with a huge blowback at the time from virtually all the other leading economists and policymakers who were unable to think outside the box. In the end, our views prevailed and the changes which would transform the economy began, after an external payments crisis in 1991, under the forceful leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who was the Finance Minister at the time….”

(B)  Bhagwati said to Economic Times on 28 July 2013:

“When finance minister Manmohan Singh was in New York in 1992, he had a lunch for many big CEOs whom he was trying to seduce to come to India. He also invited me and my wife, Padma Desai, to the lunch. As we came in, the FM introduced us to the invitees and said: ‘These friends of mine wrote almost a quarter century ago [India: Planning for Industrialisation was published in 1970 by Oxford] recommending all the reforms we are now undertaking. If we had accepted the advice then, we would not be having this lunch as you would already be in India’.”

(C)  And Bhagwati said in Business Standard of 9 August 2013:

“… I was among the intellectual pioneers of the Track I reforms that transformed our economy and reduced poverty, and witness to that is provided by the Prime Minister’s many pronouncements and by noted economists like Deena Khatkhate.. I believe no one has accused Mr. Sen of being the intellectual father of these reforms. So, the fact is that this huge event in the economic life of India passed him by…”

From these pronouncements it seems fair to conclude Professors Bhagwati and Panagariya are claiming Bhagwati has been the principal author of “the intellectual origins” of India’s 1991 reforms, has been their “intellectual father” or at the very least has been “among the intellectual pioneers” of the reform (“among” his own collaborators and friends, since none else is mentioned).  Bhagwati has said too his friend Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister participated in the process while quoting Manmohan as having said Bhagwati was the principal author. 

Bhagwati’s opponent in current debate,  Amartya Sen, has been in agreement with him that Manmohan, their common friend during college days at Cambridge in the 1950s, was a principal originating the 1991 reforms, saying to Forbes in 2006:

“When Manmohan Singh came to office in the early 1990s as the newly appointed finance minister, in a government led by the Congress Party, he knew these problems well enough, as someone who had been strongly involved in government administration for a long time.”

In my experience, such sorts of claims, even in their weakest form, have been, at best, scientifically sloppy and unscholarly,  at worst mendacious suppressio veri/suggestio falsi, and in between these best and worst interpretations, examples of academic self-delusion and mutual flattery.  We shall see Bhagwati’s opponent, Amartya Sen, has denied academic paternity of recent policies he has spawned while appearing to claim academic paternity of things he has not!  Everyone may have reasonably expected greater self-knowledge, wisdom and scholarly values of such eminent academics.  Their current spat has instead seemed to reveal something rather dismal and self-serving. 

You can decide for yourself where the truth, ever such an elusive and fragile thing, happens to be and what is best done about it.   Here is some evidence.

 

2.  Rajiv Gandhi, Siddhartha Shankar Ray,  Milton Friedman & Myself

Professor Arvind Panagariya is evidently an American economics professor of Indian national origin who holds the Jagdish Bhagwati Chair of Indian Political Economy at Columbia University.   I am afraid I had not known his name until he mentioned my name in Economic Times of  24 October 2001.   He said

panagariya

In mentioning the volume “edited by Subroto Roy and William E  James”,  Professor Panagariya did not appear to find the normal scientific civility to identify our work by name, date or publisher.  So here that is now:

indvol

This was a book published in 1992 by the late Tejeshwar Singh for Sage.  It resulted from the University of Hawaii Manoa perestroika-for-India project, that I and Ted James created and led between 1986 and 1992/93.   (Yes, Hawaii — not Stanford, Harvard, Yale, Columbia or even Penn, whose India-policy programs were Johnny-come-latelies a decade or more later…)   There is a sister-volume too on Pakistan, created by a parallel project Ted and I had led at the same time (both now in pdf):

pakvol

In 2004 from Britain, I wrote to the 9/11 Commission saying if our plan to study Afghanistan after India and Pakistan had not been thwarted by malign local forces among our sponsors themselves, we, a decade before the September 11 2001 attacks on the USA, may  just have come up with a pre-emptive academic analysis.   It was not to be.

Milton Friedman’s chapter that we published for the first time was a memorandum he wrote in November 1955 for the Government of India which the GoI had effectively suppressed.  I came to know of it while a doctoral student at Cambridge under Frank Hahn, when at a conference at Oxford about 1979-1980, Peter Tamas Bauer sat me down beside him and told me the story.  Later in Blacksburg about 1981, N. Georgescu-Roegen on a visit from Vanderbilt University told me the same thing.  Specifically, Georgescu-Roegen told me that leading Indian academics had almost insulted Milton in public which Milton had borne gamely; that after Milton had given a talk in Delhi to VKRV Rao’s graduate-students,  a talk Georgescu-Roegen had been present at, VKRV Rao had addressed the students and told them in all seriousness “You have heard what Professor Friedman has to say, if you repeat what he has said in your exams, you will fail”.

In 1981-1982 my doctoral thesis emerged, titled “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”,

phd

My late great master in economic theory, Frank Hahn (1925-2013), found what I had written to be a “good thesis” bringing “a good knowledge of economics and of philosophy to bear on the literature on economic planning”, saying I had  shown “a good knowledge of economic theory” and my “critique of Development Economics was powerful not only on methodological but also on economic theory grounds”.  

I myself said about it decades later “My original doctoral topic in 1976  ‘A monetary theory for India’ had to be altered not only due to paucity of monetary data at the time but because the problems of India’s political economy and allocation of resources in the real economy were far more pressing. The thesis that emerged in 1982 … was a full frontal assault from the point of view of microeconomic theory on the “development planning” to which everyone routinely declared their fidelity, from New Delhi’s bureaucrats and Oxford’s “development” school to McNamara’s World Bank with its Indian staffers.  Frank Hahn protected my inchoate liberal arguments for India; and when no internal examiner could be found, Cambridge showed its greatness by appointing two externals, Bliss at Oxford and Hutchison at Birmingham, both Cambridge men. “Economic Theory and Development Economics” was presented to the American Economic Association in December 1982 in company of Solow, Chenery, Streeten, and other eminences…” How I landed on that eminent AEA panel in December 1982 was because its convener Professor George Rosen of the University of Illinois recruited me overnight — as a replacement for Jagdish Bhagwati, who had had to return to India suddenly because of a parental death.  The results were published in 1983 in World Development.

Soon afterwards, London’s Institute of Economic Affairs published Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India.  This slim work (now in pdf)  was the first classical liberal critique of post-Mahalonobis Indian economic thought since BR Shenoy’s original criticism decades earlier.  It became the subject of The Times’ lead editorial on its day of publication 29 May 1984 — provoking the Indian High Commission in London to send copies to the Finance Ministry in Delhi where it apparently caused a stir, or so I was told years later by Amaresh Bagchi who was a recipient of it at the Ministry.

ppp19842
londonti

The Times had said

“When Mr. Dennis Healey in the Commons recently stated that Hongkong, with one per cent of the population of India has twice India’s trade, he was making an important point about Hongkong but an equally important point about India. If Hongkong with one per cent of its population and less than 0.03 per cert of India’s land area (without even water as a natural resource) can so outpace India, there must be something terribly wrong with the way Indian governments have managed their affairs, and there is. A paper by an Indian economist published today (Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India by Subroto Roy, IEA £1.80) shows how Asia’s largest democracy is gradually being stifled by the imposition of economic policies whose woeful effect and rhetorical unreality find their echo all over the Third World. As with many of Britain’s former imperial possessions, the rot set in long before independence. But as with most of the other former dependencies, the instrument of economic regulation and bureaucratic control set up by the British has been used decisively and expansively to consolidate a statist regime which inhibits free enterprise, minimizes economic success and consolidates the power of government in all spheres of the economy. We hear little of this side of things when India rattles the borrowing bowl or denigrates her creditors for want of further munificence. How could Indian officials explain their poor performance relative to Hongkong? Dr Roy has the answers for them. He lists the causes as a large and heavily subsidized public sector, labyrinthine control over private enterprise, forcibly depressed agricultural prices, massive import substitution, government monopoly of foreign exchange transactions, artificially overvalued currency and the extensive politicization of the labour market, not to mention the corruption which is an inevitable side effect of an economy which depends on the arbitrament of bureaucrats. The first Indian government under Nehru took its cue from Nehru’s admiration of the Soviet economy, which led him to believe that the only policy for India was socialism in which there would be “no private property except in a restricted sense and the replacement of the private profit system by a higher ideal of cooperative service.” Consequently, the Indian government has now either a full monopoly or is one of a few oligipolists in banking, insurance, railways, airlines, cement, steel, chemicals, fertilizers, ship-building, breweries, telephones and wrist-watches. No businessman can expand his operation while there is any surplus capacity anywhere in that sector. He needs government approval to modernize, alter his price-structure, or change his labour shift. It is not surprising that a recent study of those developing countries which account for most manufactured exports from the Third World shows that India’s share fell from 65 percent in 1953 to 10 per cent in 1973; nor, with the numerous restrictions on inter-state movement of grains, that India has over the years suffered more from an inability to cope with famine than during the Raj when famine drill was centrally organized and skillfully executed without restriction. Nehru’s attraction for the Soviet model has been inherited by his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi. Her policies have clearly positioned India more towards the Soviet Union than the West. The consequences of this, as Dr Roy states, is that a bias can be seen in “the antipathy and pessimism towards market institutions found among the urban public, and sympathy and optimism to be found for collectivist or statist ones.” All that India has to show for it is the delivery of thousands of tanks in exchange for bartered goods, and the erection of steel mills and other heavy industry which help to perpetuate the unfortunate obsession with industrial performance at the expense of agricultural growth and the relief of rural poverty.”…..

I felt there were inaccuracies in this and so replied  dated 4 June which The Times published on 16 June 1984:

timesletter-11

Milton and I met for the first time in the Fall of 1984 at the Mont Pelerin Society meetings at Cambridge when I gave him a copy of the IEA monograph, which he came to think extremely well of.   I told him I had heard of his 1955 document and asked him for it; he sent me the original blue/purple version of this soon thereafter.

[That original document was, incidentally,  in my professorial office among all my books, papers, theses and other academic items including my gown when I was attacked in 2003 by a corrupt gang at IIT Kharagpur —  all yet to be returned to me by IIT despite a High Court order during my present ongoing battle against corruption there over a USD 1.9 million scam !… Without having ever wished to, I have had to battle India’s notorious corruption first hand for a decade!]

I published Milton’s document for the first time on 21 May 1989 at the conference of the Hawaii project over the loud objection of assorted leftists… 

friedman-et-al-at-uh-india-conf-19891

Amartya Sen, Jagdish Bhagwati, Manmohan Singh or any of their acolytes will not be seen in this group photograph dated 21 May 1989 at the UH President’s House, because they were not there.  The Government of India was represented by the Ambassador to Washington, PK Kaul, as well as the Consul General in San Francisco, KS Rana (later Ambassador to Germany), besides the founding head of ICRIER who had invited himself.  

Manmohan Singh was not there as he precisely represented the Indian economic policy establishment I had been determined to reform!   In any case, he had left India about 1987 on his last assignment before retirement, with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania relating to the “South-South Commission”.  

I have said over more than a half dozen years now that there is no evidence whatsoever of Manmohan Singh having been a liberal economist in any sense of that word at any time before 1991, and scant evidence that he originated any liberal economic ideas since.  The widespread worldwide notion that he is to be credited for originating a sudden transformation of India from a path of pseudo-socialism to one of pseudo-liberalism has been without basis in evidence — almost entirely a political fiction, though an explicable one and one which has served, as such political fictions do, the purposes of those who invent them.

Jagdish Bhagwati and Amartya Sen were in their mid 50s and were two of the three senior-most Indians in US academic economics at the time.  I and Ted James, both in our 30s, decided to invite both Bhagwati and Sen to the Hawaii project-conference as distinguished guests but to do so somewhat insincerely late in the day, predicting they would decline, which is what they did, yet they had come to be formally informed of what we were doing.  We had a very serious attitude that was inspired a bit, I might say, by Oppenheimer’s secret “Manhattan project” and we wanted neither press-publicity nor anyone to become the star who ended up hogging the microphone or the limelight.

Besides, and most important of all, neither Bhagwati nor Sen had done work in the areas we were centrally interested in, namely, India’s macroeconomic and foreign trade framework and fiscal and monetary policies.   

Bhagwati, after his excellent 1970 work with Padma Desai for the OECD on Indian industry and trade, also co-authored with TN Srinivasan a fine 1975 volume for the NBER  Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India. 

TN Srinivasan was the third of the three senior-most Indian economists at the time in US academia; his work made us want to invite him as one of our main economic authors, and we charged him with writing the excellent chapter in Foundations that he came to do titled “Planning and Foreign Trade Reconsidered”.

The other main economist author we had hoped for was Sukhamoy Chakravarty from Delhi University and the Government of India’s Planning Commission, whom I had known since 1977 when I had been given his office at the Delhi School of Economics as a Visiting Assistant Professor while he was on sabbatical; despite my pleading he would not come due to ill health; he strongly recommended C Rangarajan, telling me Rangarajan had been the main author with him of the crucial 1985 RBI report on monetary policy; and he signed and gave me his last personal copy of that report dating it 14 July 1987.  Rangarajan said he could not come and recommended the head of the NIPFP, Amaresh Bagchi, promising to write jointly with him the chapter on monetary policy and public finance. 

Along with Milton Friedman’s suppressed 1955 memorandum which I was publishing for the first time in 1989, TN Srinivasan and Amaresh Bagchi authored the three main economic policy chapters that we felt we wanted. 

Other chapters we commissioned had to do with the state of governance (James Manor), federalism (Bhagwan Dua), Punjab and similar problems (PR Brass), agriculture (K Subbarao, as proposed by CH Hanumantha Rao), health (Anil Deolalikar, through open advertisement), and a historical assessment of the roots of economic policy (BR Tomlinson, as proposed by Anil Seal).  On the vital subject of education we failed to agree with the expert we wanted very much  (JBG Tilak, as proposed by George Psacharopolous) and so we had to cover the subject cursorily in our introduction mentioning his work.  And decades later, I apologised to Professor Dietmar Rothermund of Heidelberg University for having been so blinkered in the Anglo-American tradition at the time as to not having obtained his participation in the project.  

[The sister-volume we commissioned in parallel on Pakistan’s political economy had among its authors Francis Robinson, Akbar Ahmed, Shirin Tahir-Kehli, Robert La Porte, Shahid Javed Burki, Mohsin Khan, Mahmood Hasan Khan,  Naved Hamid, John Adams and Shahrukh Khan; this book came to be published in Pakistan in 1993 to good reviews but apparently was then lost by its publisher and is yet to be found; the military and religious clergy had been deliberately not invited by us though the name of Pervez Musharraf had I think arisen, and the military and religious clergy in fact came to rule the roost through the 1990s in Pakistan; the volume, two decades old, takes on fresh relevance with the new civilian governments of recent years.] [Postscript  27 November 2015: See my strident critique at Twitter of KM Kasuri, P Musharraf et al  e.g. at https://independentindian.com/2011/11/22/pakistans-point-of-view-or-points-of-view-on-kashmir-my-as-yet-undelivered-lahore-lecture-part-i/ passing off ideas they have taken from this volume without acknowledgement, ideas which have in any case become defunct  to their author, myself.]

Milton himself said this about his experience with me in his memoirs:

tlp

miltononmefinal

And Milton wrote on my behalf when I came to be attacked, being Indian, at the very University that had sponsored us:

m-friedman-on-roys-work

My obituary notice at his passing in 2006 said: “My association with Milton has been the zenith of my engagement with academic economics…. I was a doctoral student of his bitter enemy yet for over two decades he not only treated me with unfailing courtesy and affection, he supported me in lonely righteous battles: doing for me what he said he had never done before, which was to stand as an expert witness in a United States Federal Court. I will miss him much though I know that he, as a man of reason, would not have wished me to….”

In August 1990 in Delhi I came to tell Siddhartha Shankar Ray about the unpublished India-manuscript resulting from the Hawaii project that was in my possession as it headed to its publisher. 

Ray was a family-friend whose maternal grandfather CR Das led the Congress Party before MK Gandhi and had been a friend and colleague of my great grandfather SN Roy in Bengal’s politics in the 1920s;  Ray had also consented to stand on my behalf as Senior Counsel in a matter in the Supreme Court of India. 

Ray was involved in daily political parlays at his Delhi home with other Congress Party personages led by PV Narasimha Rao.  These senior regional figures seemed to me to be keeping their national leader, Rajiv Gandhi, aloof in splendid isolation at 10 Jan Path. 

Ray told me he and his wife had been in London in May 1984 on the day The Times had written its lead editorial on my work and they had seen it with excitement.  Upon hearing of the Hawaii project and the manuscript I had with me, Ray immediately insisted of his own accord that I must meet Rajiv Gandhi, and that he would be arranging a meeting. 

Hence it came to be a month later that a copy of the manuscript of the completed Hawaii project was be given by my hand on 18 September 1990 to Rajiv Gandhi, then Leader of the Opposition and Congress President, an encounter I have quite fully described elsewhere.  I offered to get a copy to the PM, VP Singh, too but a key aide of his showed no interest in receiving it.

Rajiv made me a senior adviser, and I have claimed principal authorship of the 22 March 1991 draft of the Congress manifesto that actually shook and changed the political thinking of the Congress on economic matters in the direction Rajiv had desired and as I had advised him at our initial 18 September 1990 meeting. 

“… He began by talking about how important he felt panchayati raj was, and said he had been on the verge of passing major legislation on it but then lost the election. He asked me if I could spend some time thinking about it, and that he would get the papers sent to me. I said I would and remarked panchayati raj might be seen as decentralized provision of public goods, and gave the economist’s definition of public goods as those essential for the functioning of the market economy, like the Rule of Law, roads, fresh water, and sanitation, but which were unlikely to appear through competitive forces.

I distinguished between federal, state and local levels and said many of the most significant public goods were best provided locally. Rajiv had not heard the term “public goods” before, and he beamed a smile and his eyes lit up as he voiced the words slowly, seeming to like the concept immensely. It occurred to me he had been by choice a pilot of commercial aircraft. Now he seemed intrigued to find there could be systematic ways of thinking about navigating a country’s governance by common pursuit of reasonable judgement. I said the public sector’s wastefulness had drained scarce resources that should have gone instead to provide public goods. Since the public sector was owned by the public, it could be privatised by giving away its shares to the public, preferably to panchayats of the poorest villages. The shares would become tradable, drawing out black money, and inducing a historic redistribution of wealth while at the same time achieving greater efficiency by transferring the public sector to private hands. Rajiv seemed to like that idea too, and said he tried to follow a maxim of Indira Gandhi’s that every policy should be seen in terms of how it affected the common man. I wryly said the common man often spent away his money on alcohol, to which he said at once it might be better to think of the common woman instead. (This remark of Rajiv’s may have influenced the “aam admi” slogan of the 2004 election, as all Congress Lok Sabha MPs of the previous Parliament came to receive a previous version of the present narrative.)

Our project had identified the Congress’s lack of internal elections as a problem; when I raised it, Rajiv spoke of how he, as Congress President, had been trying to tackle the issue of bogus electoral rolls. I said the judiciary seemed to be in a mess due to the backlog of cases; many of which seemed related to land or rent control, and it may be risky to move towards a free economy without a properly functioning judicial system or at least a viable system of contractual enforcement. I said a lot of problems which should be handled by the law in the courts in India were instead getting politicised and decided on the streets. Rajiv had seen the problems of the judiciary and said he had good relations with the Chief Justice’s office, which could be put to use to improve the working of the judiciary.

The project had worked on Pakistan as well, and I went on to say we should solve the problem with Pakistan in a definitive manner. Rajiv spoke of how close his government had been in 1988 to a mutual withdrawal from Siachen. But Zia-ul-Haq was then killed and it became more difficult to implement the same thing with Benazir Bhutto, because, he said, as a democrat, she was playing to anti-Indian sentiments while he had found it somewhat easier to deal with the military. I pressed him on the long-term future relationship between the countries and he agreed a common market was the only real long-term solution. I wondered if he could find himself in a position to make a bold move like offering to go to Pakistan and addressing their Parliament to break the impasse. He did not say anything but seemed to think about the idea. Rajiv mentioned a recent Time magazine cover of Indian naval potential, which had caused an excessive stir in Delhi. He then talked about his visit to China, which seemed to him an important step towards normalization. He said he had not seen (or been shown) any absolute poverty in China of the sort we have in India. He talked about the Gulf situation, saying he did not disagree with the embargo of Iraq except he wished the ships enforcing the embargo had been under the U.N. flag. The meeting seemed to go on and on, and I was embarrassed at perhaps having taken too much time and that he was being too polite to get me to go. V. George had interrupted with news that Sheila Dixit (as I recall) had just been arrested by the U. P. Government, and there were evidently people waiting. Just before we finally stood up I expressed a hope that he was looking to the future of India with an eye to a modern political and economic agenda for the next election, rather than getting bogged down with domestic political events of the moment. That was the kind of hopefulness that had attracted many of my generation in 1985. I said I would happily work in any way to help define a long-term agenda. His eyes lit up and as we shook hands to say goodbye, he said he would be in touch with me again…. The next day I was called and asked to stay in Delhi for a few days, as Mr. Gandhi wanted me to meet some people…..

… That night Krishna Rao dropped me at Tughlak Road where I used to stay with friends. In the car I told him, as he was a military man with heavy security cover for himself as a former Governor of J&K, that it seemed to me Rajiv’s security was being unprofessionally handled, that he was vulnerable to a professional assassin. Krishna Rao asked me if I had seen anything specific by way of vulnerability. With John Kennedy and De Gaulle in mind, I said I feared Rajiv was open to a long-distance sniper, especially when he was on his campaign trips around the country.  This was one of several attempts I made since October 1990 to convey my clear impression to whomever I thought might have an effect that Rajiv seemed to me extremely vulnerable. Rajiv had been on sadhbhavana journeys, back and forth into and out of Delhi. I had heard he was fed up with his security apparatus, and I was not surprised given it seemed at the time rather bureaucratized. It would not have been appropriate for me to tell him directly that he seemed to me to be vulnerable, since I was a newcomer and a complete amateur about security issues, and besides if he agreed he might seem to himself to be cowardly or have to get even closer to his security apparatus. Instead I pressed the subject relentlessly with whomever I could. I suggested specifically two things: (a) that the system in place at Rajiv’s residence and on his itineraries be tested, preferably by some internationally recognized specialists in counter-terrorism; (b) that Rajiv be encouraged to announce a shadow-cabinet. The first would increase the cost of terrorism, the second would reduce the potential political benefit expected by terrorists out to kill him. On the former, it was pleaded that security was a matter being run by the V. P. Singh and then Chandrashekhar Governments at the time. On the latter, it was said that appointing a shadow cabinet might give the appointees the wrong idea, and lead to a challenge to Rajiv’s leadership. This seemed to me wrong, as there was nothing to fear from healthy internal contests for power so long as they were conducted in a structured democratic framework. I pressed to know how public Rajiv’s itinerary was when he travelled. I was told it was known to everyone and that was the only way it could be since Rajiv wanted to be close to the people waiting to see him and had been criticized for being too aloof. This seemed to me totally wrong and I suggested that if Rajiv wanted to be seen as meeting the crowds waiting for him then that should be done by planning to make random stops on the road that his entourage would take. This would at least add some confusion to the planning of potential terrorists out to kill him. When I pressed relentlessly, it was said I should probably speak to “Madame”, i.e. to Mrs. Rajiv Gandhi. That seemed to me highly inappropriate, as I could not be said to be known to her and I should not want to unduly concern her in the event it was I who was completely wrong in my assessment of the danger. The response that it was not in Congress’s hands, that it was the responsibility of the VP Singh and later the Chandrashekhar Governments, seemed to me completely irrelevant since Congress in its own interests had a grave responsibility to protect Rajiv Gandhi irrespective of what the Government’s security people were doing or not doing. Rajiv was at the apex of the power structure of the party, and a key symbol of secularism and progress for the entire country. Losing him would be quite irreparable to the party and the country. It shocked me that the assumption was not being made that there were almost certainly professional killers actively out to kill Rajiv Gandhi — this loving family man and hapless pilot of India’s ship of state who did not seem to have wished to make enemies among India’s terrorists but whom the fates had conspired to make a target. The most bizarre and frustrating response I got from several respondents was that I should not mention the matter at all as otherwise the threat would become enlarged and the prospect made more likely! This I later realized was a primitive superstitious response of the same sort as wearing amulets and believing in Ptolemaic astrological charts that assume the Sun goes around the Earth — centuries after Kepler and Copernicus. Perhaps the entry of scientific causality and rationality is where we must begin in the reform of India’s governance and economy. What was especially repugnant after Rajiv’s assassination was to hear it said by his enemies that it marked an end to “dynastic” politics in India. This struck me as being devoid of all sense because the unanswerable reason for protecting Rajiv Gandhi was that we in India, if we are to have any pretensions at all to being a civilized and open democratic society, cannot tolerate terrorism and assassination as means of political change. Either we are constitutional democrats willing to fight for the privileges of a liberal social order, or ours is truly a primitive and savage anarchy concealed beneath a veneer of fake Westernization….. Proceedings began when Rajiv arrived. This elite audience mobbed him just as the farmers had mobbed him earlier. He saw me and beamed a smile in recognition, and I smiled back but made no attempt to draw near him in the crush. He gave a short very apt speech on the role the United Nations might have in the new post-Gulf War world. Then he launched the book, and left for an investiture at Rashtrapati Bhavan. We waited for our meeting with him, which finally happened in the afternoon. Rajiv was plainly at the point of exhaustion and still hard-pressed for time. He seemed pleased to see me and apologized for not talking in the morning. Regarding the March 22 draft, he said he had not read it but that he would be doing so. He said he expected the central focus of the manifesto to be on economic reform, and an economic point of view in foreign policy, and in addition an emphasis on justice and the law courts. I remembered our September 18 conversation and had tried to put in justice and the courts into our draft but had been over-ruled by others. I now said the social returns of investment in the judiciary were high but was drowned out again. Rajiv was clearly agitated that day by the BJP and blurted out he did not really feel he understood what on earth they were on about. He said about his own family, “We’re not religious or anything like that, we don’t pray every day.” I felt again what I had felt before, that here was a tragic hero of India who had not really wished to be more than a happy family man until he reluctantly was made into a national leader against his will. We were with him for an hour or so. As we were leaving, he said quickly at the end of the meeting he wished to see me on my own and would be arranging a meeting. One of our group was staying back to ask him a favour. Just before we left, I managed to say to him what I felt was imperative: “The Iraq situation isn’t as it seems, it’s a lot deeper than it’s been made out to be.” He looked at me with a serious look and said “Yes I know, I know.” It was decided Pitroda would be in touch with each of us in the next 24 hours. During this time Narasimha Rao’s manifesto committee would read the draft and any questions they had would be sent to us. We were supposed to be on call for 24 hours. The call never came. Given the near total lack of system and organization I had seen over the months, I was not surprised. Krishna Rao and I waited another 48 hours, and then each of us left Delhi. Before going I dropped by to see Krishnamurty, and we talked at length. He talked especially about the lack of the idea of teamwork in India. Krishnamurty said he had read everything I had written for the group and learned a lot. I said that managing the economic reform would be a critical job and the difference between success and failure was thin….”

543068_10151152270882285_835660216_n

28060_10151152260232285_1198018897_n

530942_10151152258747285_1492496235_n 382134_10151152256102285_1650952662_n

“… I got the afternoon train to Calcutta and before long left for America to bring my son home for his summer holidays with me. In Singapore, the news suddenly said Rajiv Gandhi had been killed. All India wept. What killed him was not merely a singular act of criminal terrorism, but the system of humbug, incompetence and sycophancy that surrounds politics in India and elsewhere. I was numbed by rage and sorrow, and did not return to Delhi….”

In December 1991, I visited Rajiv’s widow at 10 Jan Path to express my condolences, the only time I have met her, and I gave her for her records a taped copy of Rajiv’s long-distance telephone conversations with me during the Gulf War earlier that year.   She seemed an extremely shy taciturn figure in deep mourning, and I do not think the little I said to her about her late husband’s relationship with me was comprehended.  Nor was it the time or place for more to be said.

In September 1993, at a special luncheon at the Indian Ambassador’s Residence in Washington, Siddhartha Shankar Ray, then the Ambassador to Washington, pointed at me and declared to Manmohan Singh, then Finance Minister, in presence of Manmohan’s key aides accompanying him including MS Ahluwalia, NK Singh, C Rangarajan and others,

“Congress manifesto was written on his computer”.

This was accurate enough to the extent that the 22 March 1991 draft as asked for by Rajiv and that came to explicitly affect policy had been and remains on my then-new NEC laptop.

At the Ambassador’s luncheon, I gave Manmohan Singh a copy of the Foundations book as a gift.  My father who knew him in the early 1970s through MG Kaul, ICS, had sent him a copy of my 1984 IEA monograph which Manmohan had acknowledged.  And back in 1973, he had visited our then-home at 14 Rue Eugene Manuel in Paris to advise me about economics at my father’s request, and he and I had ended up in a fierce private debate for about forty minutes over the demerits (as I saw them) and merits (as he saw them) of the Soviet influence on Indian economic policy-making.  But in 1993 we had both forgotten the 1973 meeting.  

In May 2002, the Congress passed an official party resolution moved by Digvijay Singh in presence of PV Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh that the 1991 reforms had originated with Rajiv Gandhi and not with either Narasimha Rao or Manmohan; no one dissented.  It was intended to flatter Sonia Gandhi as the Congress President,  but there was truth in it too which all Congress MPs of the 13th Lok Sabha had come to know in a publication of mine they had received from me at IIT Kharagpur where since 1996 I had become Professor.  

Manmohan Singh himself, to his credit, has not at any point, except once during his failed Lok Sabha bid, claimed the reforms as his own invention and has said always he had followed what his Prime Minister had told him. However, he has not been averse to being attributed with all the credit by his flatterers, by the media, by businessmen and many many others around the world, and certainly he did not respond to Ambassador Siddhartha Shankar Ray telling him and his key aides how the Congress-led reform had come about through my work except to tell me at the 1993 luncheon that when Arjun Singh criticised the reforms in Cabinet, he, Manmohan, would mention the manifesto. 

On 28 December 2009, Rajiv’s widow in an official Congress Party statement finally declared her late husband

left his personal imprint on the (Congress) party’s manifesto of 1991.″ 

How Sonia Gandhi, who has never had pretensions to knowledge of economics or political economy or political science or governance or history, came to place Manmohan Singh as her prime ministerial candidate and the font of economic and political wisdom along with Pranab Mukherjee, when both men hardly had been favourites of her late husband, would be a story in its own right.  And how Amartya Sen’s European-origin naturalised Indian co-author Jean Drèze later came to have policy influence from a different direction upon Sonia Gandhi, also a naturalised Indian of European origin, may be yet another story in its own right,  perhaps best told by themselves.

I would surmise the same elderly behind-the-scenes figure, now in his late 80s, had a hand in setting up both sets of influences — directly in the first case (from back in 1990-1991),  and indirectly in the second case (starting in 2004) .  This was a man who in a November 2007 newspaper article literally erased my name and inserted that of Manmohan Singh as part of the group that Rajiv created on 25 September following his 18 September meeting with me!   Reluctantly, I had to call this very elderly man a liar; he has not denied it and knows he has not been libeled.

One should never forget the two traditional powers interested in the subcontinent, Russia and Britain, have been never far from influence in Delhi.  In 1990-1991 what worried vested bureaucratic and business interests and foreign powers through their friends and agents was that they could see change was coming to India but they wanted to be able to control it themselves to their advantage, which they then broadly proceeded to do over the next two decades.  The foreign weapons’ contracts had to be preserved, as did other big-ticket imports that India ends up buying needlessly on credit it hardly has in world markets.  There are similarities to what happened in Russia and Eastern Europe where many apparatchiks and fellow-travellers became freedom-loving liberals overnight;  in the Indian case more than one badly compromised pro-USSR senior bureaucrat promptly exported his children and savings to America and wrapped themselves in the American flag.

The stubborn unalterable fact remains that Manmohan Singh was not physically present in India and was still with the Nyerere project on 18 September 1990 when I met Rajiv for the first time and gave him the unpublished results of the UH-Manoa project.  This simple straightforward fact is something the Congress Party, given its own myths and self-deception and disinformation, has not been able to cope with in its recently published history.   For myself, I have remained loyal to my memory of my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi, and my understanding of him.  The Rajiv Gandhi I knew had been enthused by me in 1990-1991 carrying the UH-Manoa perestroika-for-India project that I had led since 1986, and he had loved my advice to him on 18 September 1990 that he needed to modernise the party by preparing a coherent agenda (as other successful reformers had done) while still in Opposition waiting for elections, and to base that agenda on commitments to improving the judiciary and rule of law, stopping the debauching of money, and focusing on the provision of public goods instead.    Rajiv I am sure wanted a modern and modern-minded Congress — not one which depended on him let aside his family, but one which reduced that dependence and let him and his family alone.

As for Manmohan Singh being a liberal or liberalising economist, there is no evidence publicly available of that being so from his years before or during the Nyerere project, or after he returned and joined the Chandrashekhar PMO and the UGC  until becoming,  to his own surprise as he told Mark Tully,  PV Narasimha Rao’s Finance Minister.  Some of his actions qua Finance Minister were liberalising in nature but he did not originate any basic idea of a change in a liberal direction of economic policy, and he has, with utmost honesty honestly, not claimed otherwise.  Innumerable flatterers and other self-interested parties have made out differently, creating what they have found to be a politically useful fiction; he has yet to deny them.

Siddhartha Shankar Ray and I met last in July 2009, when I gave him a copy of this 2005 volume I had created, which pleased him much. 

180651_497147822284_519449_n

I said to him Bengal’s public finances were in abysmal condition, calling for emergency measures financially, and that Mamata Banerjee seemed to me to be someone who knew how to and would dislodge the Communists from their entrenched misgovernance of decades but she did not seem quite aware that dislodging a bad government politically was not the same thing as knowing how to govern properly oneself.  He,  again of his own accord, said immediately, 

“I will call her and her people to a meeting here so you can meet them and tell them that directly”. 

It never transpired.  In our last phone conversation I mentioned to him my plans of creating a Public Policy Institute — an idea he immediately and fully endorsed as being essential though adding “I can’t be part of it,  I’m on my way out”.

“I’m on my way out”.   That was Siddhartha Shankar Ray — always intelligent, always good-humoured, always public-spirited, always a great Indian, my only friend among politicians other than the late Rajiv Gandhi himself.

18slide1

In March February 2010, my father and I called upon the new Bengal Governor, MK Narayanan and gave him a copy of the Thatcher volume for the Raj Bhavan Library; I told him the story about my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi thanks to Siddhartha Shankar Ray and its result;  Narayanan within a few days made a visit to Ray’s hospital-bed, and when he emerged after several hours he made a statement, which in substance he repeated again when Ray died in November 2010:

“There are few people in post-Independence India who could equal his magnificent contribution to India’s growth and progress”.

To what facts did MK Narayanan, a former Intelligence Bureau chief, mean to refer with this extravagant praise of Ray?  Was Narayanan referring to Ray’s politics for Indira Gandhi?  To Ray’s Chief Ministership of Bengal?  To Ray’s Governorship of Punjab?  You will have to ask him but I doubt that was what he meant:  I surmise Narayanan’s eulogy could only have resulted after he confirmed with Ray on his hospital-bed the story I had told him, and that he was referring to the economic and political results that followed for the country once Ray had introduced me in September 1990 to Rajiv Gandhi. But I say again, you will have to ask MK Narayanan himself what he and Ray talked about in hospital and what was the factual basis of Narayanan’s precise words of praise. To what facts exactly was MK Narayanan, former intelligence chief, meaning to refer when he stated Siddhartha Shankar Ray had made a “magnificent contribution to India’s growth and progress”?

 

3.   Jagdish Bhagwati & Manmohan Singh?  That just don’t fly!

Now returning to the apparent desire of Professor Panagariya, the Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy at Columbia, to attribute to Jagdish Bhagwati momentous change for the better in India as of 1991, even if Panagariya had not the scientific curiosity to look into our 1992 book titled Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s or into Milton Friedman’s own 1998 memoirs, we may have expected him to at least turn to his co-author and Columbia colleague, Jagdish Bhagwati himself, and ask, “Master, have you heard of this fellow Subroto Roy by any chance?”

Jagdish would have had to say yes, since not only had he received a copy of the proofs of my 1984 IEA work Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India, he was kind enough to write in a letter dated 15 May 1984 that I had

“done an excellent job of setting out the problems afflicting our economic policies, unfortunately government-made problems!” 

1013586_10151543024792285_1764498590_n

Also Jagdish may or may not have remembered our only meeting, when he and I had had a long conversation on the sofas in the foyer of the IMF in Washington when I was a consultant there in 1993 and he had come to meet someone; he was surprisingly knowledgeable about my personal 1990 matter in the Supreme Court of India which astonished me until he told me his brother the Supreme Court judge had mentioned the case to him!

Now my 1984 work was amply scientific and scholarly in fully crediting a large number of works in the necessary bibliography, including Bhagwati’s important work with his co-authors.  Specifically, Footnote 1 listed the literature saying:

“The early studies notably include: B. R. Shenoy, `A note of dissent’, Papers relating to the formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan, Government of India Planning Commission, Delhi, 1955; Indian Planning and Economic Development, Asia Publishing, Bombay, 1963, especially pp. 17-53; P. T. Bauer, Indian Economic Policy and Development, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1961; M. Friedman, unpublished memorandum to the Government of India, November 1955 (referred to in Bauer, op. cit., p. 59 ff.); and, some years later, Sudha Shenoy, India : Progress or Poverty?, Research Monograph 27, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1971. Some of the most relevant contemporary studies are: B. Balassa, `Reforming the system of incentives in World Development, 3 (1975), pp. 365-82; `Export incentives and export performance in developing countries: a comparative analysis’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 114 (1978), pp. 24-61; The process of industrial development and alternative development strategies, Essays in International Finance No. 141, Princeton University, 1980; J. N. Bhagwati & P. Desai, India: Planning for Industrialisation, OECD, Paris : Oxford University Press, 1970; `Socialism and Indian Economic Policy’, World Development, 3 (1975), pp. 213-21; J. N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, Foreign-trade Regimes and Economic Development: India, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1975; Anne O. Krueger, `Indian planning experience’, in T. Morgan et al. (eds.), Readings in Economic Development, Wadsworth, California, 1963, pp. 403-20; `The political economy of the rent-seeking society, American Economic Review, 64 (June 1974); The Benefits and Costs of Import-Substitution in India: a Microeconomic Study, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1975; Growth, distortions and patterns of trade among many countries, Studies in International Finance, Princeton University, 1977; Uma Lele, Food grain marketing in India : private performance and public policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1971; T. W. Schultz (ed.), Distortions in agricultural incentives, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1978; V. Sukhatme, “The utilization of high-yielding rice and wheat varieties in India: an economic assessment”, University of Chicago PhD thesis, 1977….”

There were two specific references to Bhagwati’s work with Srinivasan:

“Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan put it as follows : `The allocation of foreign exchange among alternative claimants and users in a direct control system . . .would presumably be with reference to a well-defined set of principles and criteria based on a system of priorities. In point of fact, however, there seem to have been few such criteria, if any, followed in practice.’”

and

“But as Bhagwati and Srinivasan report, `. . . the sheer weight of numbers made any meaningful listing of priorities extremely difficult. The problem was Orwellian: all industries had priority and how was each sponsoring authority to argue that some industries had more priority than others? It is not surprising, therefore, that the agencies involved in determining allocations by industry fell back on vague notions of “fairness”, implying pro rata allocations with reference to capacity installed or employment, or shares defined by past import allocations or similar rules of thumb’”

and one to Bhagwati and Desai:

“The best descriptions of Indian industrial policy are still to be found in Bhagwati and Desai (1970)…”

Professors Bhagwati and Panagriya have not apparently referred to anything beyond these joint works of Bhagwati’s dated 1970 with Padma Desai and 1975 with TN Srinivasan.  They have not claimed Bhagwati did anything by way of either publication or political activity in relation to India’s economic policy between May 1984, when he read my soon-to-be-published-work and found I had

done an excellent job of setting out the problems afflicting our economic policies, unfortunately government-made problems”,

and September 1990 when I gave Rajiv the University of Hawaii perestroika-for-India project results developed since 1986, which came to politically spark the 1991 reform in the Congress’s highest echelons from months before Rajiv’s assassination.   

There may have been no such claim made by Bhagwati and Panagariya because there may be no such evidence.  Between 1984 and 1990,  Professor Bhagwati’s research interests were away from Indian economic policy while his work on India through 1970 and 1975 had been fully and reasonably accounted for as of 1984 by myself.

What is left remaining is Bhagwati’s statement :

“When finance minister Manmohan Singh was in New York in 1992, he had a lunch for many big CEOs whom he was trying to seduce to come to India. He also invited me and my wife, Padma Desai, to the lunch. As we came in, the FM introduced us to the invitees and said: ‘These friends of mine wrote almost a quarter century ago [India: Planning for Industrialisation was published in 1970 by Oxford] recommending all the reforms we are now undertaking. If we had accepted the advice then, we would not be having this lunch as you would already be in India’

Now this light self-deprecating reference by Manmohan at an investors’ lunch in New York “for many big CEOs” was an evident attempt at political humour written by his speech-writer.   It was clearly, on its face, not serious history.   If we test it as serious history, it falls flat so we may only hope Manmohan Singh, unlike Jagdish Bhagwati, has not himself come to believe his own reported joke as anything more than that.  

The Bhagwati-Desai volume being referred to was developed from 1966-1970.  India saw critical economic and political events  in 1969, in 1970, in 1971, in 1972, in 1975, in 1977, etc.

Those were precisely years during which Manmohan Singh himself moved from being an academic to becoming a Government of India official, working first for MG Kaul, ICS, and then in 1971 coming to the attention of  PN Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s most powerful bureaucrat between 1967 and 1974: Haksar himself was Manmohan Singh’s acknowledged mentor in the Government, as Manmohan told Mark Tully in an interview.  

After Manmohan visited our Paris home in 1973 to talk to me about economics, my father — who had been himself sent to the Paris Embassy by Haksar in preparation for Indira Gandhi’s visit in November 1971 before the Bangladesh war —

scan0024

had told me Manmohan was very highly regarded in government circles with economics degrees from both Cambridge and Oxford, and my father had added, to my surprise, what was probably a Haksarian governmental view that Manmohan was expected to be India’s Prime Minister some day.  That was 1973.

PN Haksar had been the archetypal Nehruvian Delhi intellectual of a certain era, being both a fierce nationalist and a fierce pro-USSR leftist from long before Independence.  I met him once on 23 March 1991, on the lawns of 10 Jan Path at the launch of General V Krishna Rao’s book on Indian defence which Rajiv was releasing, and Haksar gave a speech to introduce Rajiv (as if Rajiv needed introduction on the lawns of his own residence);  Haksar was in poor health but he seemed completely delighted to be back in favour with Rajiv,  after years of having been treated badly by Indira and her younger son.  

 Had Manmohan Singh in the early 1970s gone to Haksar — the architect of the nationalisation of India’s banking going on right then — and said “Sir, this OECD study by my friend Bhagwati and his wife says we should be liberalising foreign trade and domestic industry”, Haksar would have been astonished and sent him packing.  

There was a war on, plus a massive problem of 10 million refugees, a new country to support called Bangladesh, a railway strike, a bad crop, repressed inflation, shortages, and heaven knows what more, besides Nixon having backed Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan et al. 

nixon-note

Then after Bangladesh and the railway strike etc, came the rise of the politically odious younger son of Indira Gandhi and his friends (at least one of whom is today Sonia Gandhi’s gatekeeper) followed by the internal political Emergency, the grave foreign-fueled problem of Sikh separatism and its control, the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her own Sikh bodyguards, and the Rajiv Gandhi years as Prime Minister. 

Certainly it was Rajiv’s arrival in office and Benazir’s initial return to Pakistan, along with the rise of Michael Gorbachev in the changing USSR, that inspired me in far away Hawaii in 1986 to design with Ted James the perestroika-projects for India and Pakistan which led to our two volumes, and which, thanks to Siddhartha Shankar Ray, came to reach Rajiv Gandhi in Opposition in September 1990 as he sat somewhat forlornly at 10 Jan Path after losing office. “There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune….

My friend and collaborator Ted James died of cancer in Manila in May 2010; earlier that year he came to say publicly

“Seldom are significant reforms imposed successfully by international bureaucracies. Most often they are the result of indigenous actors motivated by domestic imperatives. I believe this was the case in India in 1991. It may have been fortuitous that Dr. Roy gained an audience with a receptive Rajiv Gandhi in 1990 but it was not luck that he was prepared with a well-thought out program; this arose from years of careful thought and debate on the matter.”

Changing the direction of a ship of state is very hard, knowing in which direction it should change and to what degree is even harder; it has rarely been something that can be done without random shocks arising let aside the power of vested interests. Had Rajiv Gandhi lived to form a new Government, I have little doubt I would have led the reform that I had chalked out for him and that he had approved of;  Sonia Gandhi would have remained the housewife, mother and grandmother that she had preferred to be and not been made into the Queen of India by the Congress Party; Manmohan Singh had left India in 1987 for the Nyerere project and it had been rumoured at the time that had been slightly to do with him protesting, to the extent that he ever has protested anything, the anti-Sikh pogrom that some of Rajiv’s friends had apparently unleashed after Indira’s killing; he returned in November 1990, joined Chandrashekhar in December 1990, left Chandrashekhar in March 1991 when elections were announced and was biding his time as head of the UGC; had Rajiv Gandhi lived, Manmohan Singh would have had a governor’s career path, becoming the governor of one state after another; he would not have been brought into the economic reform process which he had had nothing to do with originating; and finally Pranab Mukherjee, who left the Congress Party and formed his own when Rajiv took over, would have been likely rehabilitated slowly but would not have come to control the working of the party as he did. I said in my Lok Sabha TV interview on 5 9 December 2012 that there have been many microeconomic improvements arising from technological progress in the last 22 years but the macroeconomic and monetary situation is grim, because at root the fiscal situation remains incoherent and confused. I do not see anyone in Manmohan Singh’s entourage among all his many acolytes and flatterers and apologists who is able to get to these root problems.  We shall address these issues in Part II.

What Manmohan Singh said in self-deprecating humour at an investors’ lunch in New York in 1992 is hardly serious history as Jagdish Bhagwati has seemed to wish it to be.  Besides, it would have been unlike Manmohan,  being the devoted student of Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor as he told Mark Tully,  to have taken such a liberalising initiative at all.  Furthermore, the 1969 American Economic Review published asurvey of Indian economic policy authored by his Delhi University colleagues Jagdish Bhagwati and Sukhamoy Chakravarty which made little mention of his work, and it would have been unreasonable to expect him to have been won over greatly by theirs. Perhaps there is a generous review from the 1970s by Manmohan Singh of the Bhagwati-Desai volume hidden somewhere but if so we should be told where it is.  A list of Manmohan Singh’s publications as an economist do not seem easily available anywhere.  

Lastly and perhaps most decisively, the 1970 Bhagwati-Desai volume, excellent study that it was, was hardly the first of its genre by way of liberal criticism of modern Indian economic policy!   Bhagwati declared in his 2010 speech to the Lok Sabha

“This policy framework had been questioned, and its total overhaul advocated, by me and Padma Desai in writings through the late 1960s…”

But why has Bhagwati been forever silent about the equally if not more forceful and fundamental criticism of “the policy framework”, and advocacy of its “total overhaul”, by scholars in the 1950s, a decade and more earlier than him, when he and Manmohan and Amartya were still students?  Specifically, by BR Shenoy, Milton Friedman, and Peter Bauer?   The relevant bibliography from the mid 1950s is given in Footnote 1 of my 1984 work. 

 

topimg_15242_br_shenoy_300x400

baueronshenoy

Peter Tamas Bauer (1915-2002) played a vital role in all this as had he himself not brought the Friedman 1955 document to my attention I would not have known of it.

1902FN2

As undergraduates at the LSE, we had been petrified of him and I never spoke to him while there, having believed the propaganda that floated around about him; then while a Research Student at Cambridge, I happened to be a speaker with him at a conference at Oxford; he made me sit next to him at a meal and told me for the first time about Milton Friedman’s 1955 memorandum to the Government of India which had been suppressed.  I am privileged to say Peter from then on became a friend, and wrote, at my request, what became I am sure the kiss of death for me at the World Bank of 1982:

226258_10150168598862285_2325402_n

Later he may have been responsible for the London Times writing its lead editorial of 29 May 1984 on my work.

Now Milton had sent me in 1984, besides the original of his November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India, a confidential 1956 document also which seemed to have been written for US Government consumption.  I did not publish this in Hawaii in 1989 as I was having difficulty enough publishing the 1955 memorandum.  I gave it to be published on the Internet some years ago, and after Milton’s passing, I had it published in The Statesman  on the same day as my obituary of him. 

It makes fascinating reading, especially about Mahalanobis and Shenoy, of how what Bhagwati wishes to call “the policy framework” that, he claims, he and Desai called for a “total overhaul” of, came to be what it was in the decade earlier when he and Amartya and Manmohan were still students. 

Friedman’s 1956 document said

“I met PC Mahalanobis in 1946 and again at a meeting of the International Statistical Institute in September 1947, and I know him well by reputation. He was absent during most of my stay in New Delhi, but I met him at a meeting of the Indian Planning Commission, of which he is one of the strongest and most able members.   Mahalanobis began as a mathematician and is a very able one. Able mathematicians are usually recognized for their ability at a relatively early age. Realizing their own ability as they do and working in a field of absolutes, tends, in my opinion, to make them dangerous when they apply themselves to economic planning. They produce specific and detailed plans in which they have confidence, without perhaps realizing that economic planning is not the absolute science that mathematics is. This general characteristic of mathematicians is true of Mahalanobis but in spite of the tendency he is willing to discuss a problem and listen to a different point of view. Once his decision is reached, however, he has great confidence in it. Mahalanobis was unquestionably extremely influential in drafting the Indian five-year plan. There were four key steps in the plan. The first was the so-called “Plan Frame” drafted by Mahalanobis himself. The second was a tentative plan based on the “Plan Frame”. The third step was a report by a committee of economists on the first two steps, and the fourth was a minority report by BR Shenoy on the economists’ report. The economists had no intention of drafting a definitive proposal but merely meant to comment on certain aspects of the first two steps. Shenoy’s minority report, however, had the effect of making the economists’ report official. The scheme of the Five Year Plan attributed to Mahalanobis faces two problems; one, that India needs heavy industry for economic development; and two, that development of heavy industry uses up large amounts of capital while providing only small employment.  Based on these facts, Mahalanobis proposed to concentrate on heavy industry development on the one hand and to subsidize the hand production cottage industries on the other. The latter course would discriminate against the smaller manufacturers. In my opinion, the plan wastes both capital and labour and the Indians get only the worst of both efforts. If left to their own devices under a free enterprise system I believe the Indians would gravitate naturally towards the production of such items as bicycles, sewing machines, and radios. This trend is already apparent without any subsidy. The Indian cottage industry is already cloaked in the same popular sort of mist as is rural life in the US. There is an idea in both places that this life is typical and the backbone of their respective countries. Politically, the Indian cottage industry problem is akin to the American farm problem. Mohandas Gandhi was a proponent of strengthening the cottage industry as a weapon against the British. This reason is now gone but the emotions engendered by Gandhi remain. Any move to strengthen the cottage industry has great political appeal and thus, Mahalanobis’ plan and its pseudo-scientific support for the industry also has great political appeal.  I found many supporters for the heavy industry phase of the Plan but almost no one (among the technical Civil Servants) who really believes in the cottage industry aspects, aside from their political appeal. In its initial form, the plan was very large and ambitious with optimistic estimates. My impression is that there is a substantial trend away from this approach, however, and an attempt to cut down. The development of heavy industry has slowed except for steel and iron. I believe that the proposed development of a synthetic petroleum plant has been dropped and probably wisely so. In addition, I believe that the proposed five year plan may be extended to six years. Other than his work on the plan, I am uncertain of Mahalanobis’ influence. The gossip is that he has Nehru’s ear and potentially he could be very influential, simply because of his intellectual ability and powers of persuasion. The question that occurs to me is how much difference Mahalanobis’ plan makes. The plan does not seem the important thing to me. I believe that the new drive and enthusiasm of the Indian nation will surmount any plan, good or bad. Then too, I feel a wide diversity in what is said and what is done. I believe that much of Nehru’s socialistic talk is simply that, just talk. Nehru has been trying to undermine the Socialist Party by this means and apparently the Congress Party’s adoption of a socialistic idea for industry has been successful in this respect.  One gets the impression, depending on whom one talks with, either that the Government runs business, or that two or three large businesses run the government. All that appears publicly indicates that the first is true, but a case can also be made for the latter interpretation. Favour and harassment are counterparts in the Indian economic scheme. There is no significant impairment of the willingness of Indian capitalists to invest in their industries, except in the specific industries where nationalization has been announced, but they are not always willing to invest and take the risks inherent in the free enterprise system. They want the Government to support their investment and when it refuses they back out and cry “Socialism”..”

I look forward to seeing a fundamental classical liberal critique from India’s distinguished American friends at Columbia University, Professors Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai and Arvind Panagariya, if and when such a critique arises,  of the  “policy framework” in India as that evolved from the mid 1950s to become what exists across India in 2013 today.  Specifically:  Where is the criticism from Bhagwati of Mahalanobis and friends?  And where is Bhagwati’s defence of Shenoy, leave aside of Milton Friedman or Peter Bauer?   They seem not to exist. The most we get is a footnote again without the civility of any references, in the otherwise cogent 1975 Desai-Bhagwati paper “Socialism and Indian Economic Policy” alleging 

” Of these three types of impact of the Soviet example, the Plan-formulation approach was to be enthusiastically received by most commentators and, indeed, to lead to demands on the part of aid agencies for similar efforts by other developing countries. However, the shift to heavy industry was seen as a definite mistake by economic opinion of the Chicago school variety, reflecting their basic unfamiliarity with the structural models of growth and development planning of the Feldman-Mahalanobis variety-an ignorance which probably still persists. The detailed regulation was not quite noticed at the time, except by conservative commentators whose position however was extreme and precluded governmental planning of industrial investments on any scale.”

Desai and Bhagwati naturally found no apparent desire to locate any possible scientific truth or reasonableness among

“conservative commentators”

nor among the unnamed and undescribed

“economic opinion of the Chicago school variety”.   

Could Desai and Bhagwati have done anything different after all, even when talking about India to an American audience, without being at risk of losing their East Coast Limousine Liberal credentials?  Bhagwati used to routinely declare his “socialist” credentials, and even the other day on Indian TV emphatically declared he was not a “conservative” and scornfully dismissed “Thatcher and Reagan” for their “trickle down economics”…

Jagdish Bhagwati has evidently wanted to have his cake and eat it too…

 

 

4.    Amartya Sen’s Half-Baked Communism: “To each according to his need”? 

If I have been candid or harsh in my assessments of Jagdish Bhagwati and Manmohan Singh as they relate to my personal experience with the change of direction in Indian economic policy originating in 1990-1991, I am afraid I must be equally so with Bhagwati’s current opponent in debate, Amartya Sen. Certainly I have found the current spat between Bhagwati and Sen over India’s political economy to be dismal, unscholarly, unscientific and misleading (or off-base) except for it having allowed a burst of domestic policy-discussion in circumstances when India needs it especially much.  

None of this criticism is personal but based on objective experience and the record.  My criticism of Professor Bhagwati and Dr Manmohan Singh does not diminish in the slightest my high personal regard for both of them.

 

Similarly, Amartya Sen and I go back, momentarily, to Hindustan Park in 1964 when there was a faint connection as family friends from World War II  (as Naren Deb and Manindranath Roy were friends and neighbours, and we still have the signed copy of a book gifted by the former to the latter), and then he later knew me cursorily when I was an undergraduate at LSE and he was already a famous professor, and I greatly enjoyed his excellent lectures at the LSE on his fine book On Economic Inequality, and a few years later he wrote in tangential support of me at Cambridge for which he was thanked in the preface to my 1989 Philosophy of Economics — even though that book of mine also contained in its Chapter 10 the decisive criticism of his main contribution until that time to what used to be called “social choice theory”. Amartya Sen had also written some splendid handwritten letters, a few pages of which remain with me, which puzzled me at the time due to his expressing his aversion to what is normally called ‘price theory’, namely the Marshallian and/or Walrasian theory of value. 

Professor Sen and I met briefly in 1978, and then again in 2006 when I was asked to talk to him in our philosophical conversation which came to be published nicely.  In 2006 I told him of my experience with Rajiv Gandhi in initiating what became the 1991 reform on the basis of my giving Rajiv the results of the Hawaii project,  and Amartya was kind enough to say that he knew I had been arguing all this “very early on”, referring presumably to the 1984 London Times editorial which he would have seen in his Oxford days before coming to Harvard.

This personal regard on my part or personal affection on his part aside, I have been appalled to find Professor Sen not taking moral and intellectual responsibility for and instead disclaiming paternity of the whole so-called “Food Security” policy which Sonia Gandhi has been prevailed upon over the years by him and his acolytes and friends and admirers to adopt, and she in her ignorance of all political economy and governance has now wished to impose upon the Congress Party and India as a whole:

“Questioner: You are being called the creator of the Food Security Bill.

Amartya Sen: Yes, I don’t know why. That is indeed a paternity suit I’m currently fighting. People are accusing me of being the father”.

Amartya Sen has repeatedly over the years gone on Indian prime-time television and declared things like

If you don’t agree there’s hunger in the world, there’s something morally wrong with you”

besides over the decades publishing titles like Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Hunger and Public Action, The Political Economy of Hunger etc and ceaselessly using his immense power with the media, with book publishing houses, with US academic departments and the world development economics business,  to promote his own and his acolytes’ opinions around the world, no matter how ill-considered or incoherent these may be.   A passage from his latest book with Jean Drèze reportedly reads

“If development is about the expansion of freedom, it has to embrace the removal of poverty as well as paying attention to ecology as integral parts of a unified concern, aimed ultimately at the security and advancement of human freedom. Indeed, important components of human freedoms — and crucial ingredients of our quality of life — are thoroughly dependent on the integrity of the environment, involving the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the epidemiological surroundings in which we live….”

Had such a passage reached me in an undergraduate essay, I would have considered it incoherent waffle, and I am afraid I cannot see why merely because it is authored  by an eminence at Harvard and his co-author, the evaluation should be any different.   I am reminded of my encounter in 1976 with Joan Robinson, the great tutor in 1950s Cambridge of Amartya and Manmohan:  “Joan Robinson cornered me once and took me into the office she shared with EAG… She came at me for an hour or so wishing to supervise me, I kept declining politely… saying I was with Frank Hahn and wished to work on money… “What does Frankie know about India?” she said… I said I did not know but he did know about monetary theory and that was what I needed for India;  I also said I did not think much about the Indian Marxists she had supervised… and mentioned a prominent name… she said about him, “Yes most of what he does can go straight into the dustbin”…”  The Indian Marxist whom I had referred to in this conversation with Joan was not Amartya but someone else much younger, yet her candid “can go straight into the dustbin” still applies to all incoherent waffle, whomsoever may produce it.

Indeed, Amartya Sen, if anyone, really should get down to writing his memoirs, and candidly so in order to explain his own thinking and deeds over the decades to himself and to the world in order that needless confusions do not arise.  

Else it becomes impossible to explain how someone who was said to be proud to have been a Communist student on the run from the police in West Bengal, who was Joan Robinson’s star pupil at a time she was extolling Maoist China and who has seemingly nurtured a deep lifelong fascination and affection for Communist China despite all its misdeeds, who was feted by the Communist regime of West Bengal after winning the Bank of Sweden Prize (on the same day that same regime had tossed into jail one unfortunate young Mr Khemkha merely for having been rude to its leaders on the Internet), and who seemed to share some of those winnings on social causes like primary education at the behest of the Communist regime’s ministers, etc, how someone with that noble comradely leftist personal history as an economist allows a flattering interviewer with a Harvard connection to describe him in Business Standard of 25 July 2013  as having been all along really a

“neoclassical economist”

who also happens to be

“the greatest living scholar of the original philosopher of the free market, Adam Smith”

Amartya Sen a neoclassical economist and a great scholar of Adam Smith?  It is hilarious to suppose so. The question arises, Does Sen, having published about Adam Smith recently in a few newspapers and leftist periodicals, agree with such a description by his flattering admirer from Harvard at Business Standard?  “Neoclassical” economics originated with men like Jevons, Menger, Walras, Pareto, Marshall, Wicksell, and was marked by the theory of value being explained by a demand-side too, and not, like classical economics, merely by the cost of production alone on the supply side.  Indeed a striking thing about the list below published by the Scandinavian Journal of Economics of Amartya’s books following his 1998 Bank of Sweden Prize

1467-9442.00152_p1is how consistently these works display his avoidance of all neoclassical economics, and the absence of all of what is normally called ‘price theory’, namely the Marshallian and/or Walrasian theory of value.   No “neoclassical economics” anywhere here  for sure!  

It would be fair enough if Professor Sen says he is hardly responsible for an admirer’s ignorant misdescription of his work — except the question still arises why he has himself also evidently misdescribed his own work!  For example, in his 13 July 2013 letter to The Economist in response to the criticism of Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, he says he had always been keenly interested in

“the importance of economic growth as a means— not an end”

and that this

“has been one of the themes even in my earliest writings (including “Choice of Techniques” in 1960 and “Growth Economics” in 1970)”.

This is a very peculiar opinion indeed to have been expressed by Professor Sen about his own work because the 1970 volume Growth Economics listed above among his books hardly can be said at all to be one of his own “earliest writings” as he now describes it to have been!

What had happened back then was that Sen, as someone considered a brilliant or promising young Indian economist at the time, had been asked by the editors of the famous Penguin Modern Economics Readings series to edit the specific issue  devoted to growth-theory — a compendium of classic already-published essays including those of Roy Harrod, Evsey Domar, Robert Solow and many others, to which young Amartya was given a chance to write an editorial Introduction.   Every economist familiar with that literature knows too that the growth-theory contained in that volume and others was considered highly abstract and notoriously divorced from actual historical processes of economic growth in different countries.  Everyone also knew that the individual editors in that famous Penguin Modern Economics Series were of relative unimportance as they did not commission new papers but merely collected classics already published and wrote an introduction.

This is significant presently because neither Professor Sen nor Professor Bhagwati may be objectively considered on the evidence of his life’s work as an economist to have been a major scholar of economic growth, either in theory or in historical practice.  As of December 1989,  Amartya Sen himself described his own interests to the American Economic Association as

“social choice theory, welfare economics, economic development”

and Jagdish Bhagwati described his interests as

“theory of international trade and policy, economic development”. 

Neither Sen nor Bhagwati mentioned growth economics or economic history or even general economic theory, microeconomics, macroeconomics, monetary economics, public finance, etc.  Furthermore, Sen saying in his letter to The Economist  that he has been always interested in economic growth seems to be baseless in light of the list of his books above, other than the Penguin compendium already discussed.

Incidentally in the same American Economic Association volume of 1989, Padma Desai had described her interests as

“Soviet economy and comparative economic systems”; 

Arvind Panagariya had described his interests as

“economies of scale and trade; smuggling; parallel markets in planned economies”;

and one Suby Roy described his interests as

“foundations of monetary economics”.

Reflecting on Amartya Sen’s works over the 40 year period that I have known them

[and again, my personal copies of his books and those of Bhagwati and Desai, were all in my professorial office at IIT Kharagpur when I was attacked by a corrupt gang there in 2003; and IIT have been under a High Court order to return them but have not done so],

I wonder in fact if it might be fairly said that Sen has been on his own subjective journey over the decades around the world seeking to reinvent economics and political economy from scratch, and inventing his own terminology like “capabilities”, “functionings” and yes “entitlements” etc. to help him do so, while trying to assiduously avoid mention of canonical works of  modern world economics like Marshall’s Principles, Hicks’s Value and Capital, Debreu’s Theory of Value, or Arrow and Hahn’s General Competitive Analysis, all defining the central neoclassical tradition of the modern theory of value.  

But no contemporary science, economics and political economy included, is open to be re-invented from scratch, and what Amartya Sen has ended up doing instead is seeming to be continually trying to reinvent the wheel, possibly without having had the self-knowledge to realise this.  Wittgenstein once made a paradoxical statement that one may know another’s mind better than one knows one’s own…  

Here is a current example.  Professor Sen says

“First, unlike the process of development in Japan, China, Korea and other countries, which pursued what Jean Drèze and I have called “Asian economic development” in our book, India has not had enough focus on public spending on school education and basic healthcare, which these other countries have had….”

Does Sen really believes believe he and Drèze  have now in 2013 discovered and christened an economic phenomenon named “Asian economic development”?  Everyone, from Japan and Bangkok and Manila, to Hawaii and Stanford to the World Bank’s East Asia department, including  especially my Hawaii colleague Ted James, and many many others including especially Gerald M Meier at Stanford, were was publishing about all that every month — in the mid 1980s!  In fact, our project on India and Pakistan arose in the 1980s from precisely such a Hawaiian wave!  Everyone knows all that from back then or even earlier when the Japanese were talking about the “flying geese” model.  (And, incidentally,  Communist China did not at the time belong in the list.)  Where was Amartya Sen in the mid 1980s when all that was happening?  Jean Drèze was still a student perhaps. Is Professor Sen seeking to reinvent the wheel again with “Asian Economic Development” being claimed to be invented in 2013 by him and Drèze now? Oh please!  That just won’t fly either!

A second example may be taken from the year before Professor Sen was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize when he gave a lecture on “human capital” theory which was published as a survey titled “Human Capital and Human Capability” in World Development 1997 Vol. 25, No. 12, 

Can you see any reference in this 1997 survey to TW Schultz’s 1960 American Economic Association Presidential Address or to Schultz’s classic 1964 book Transforming Traditional Agriculture or to his 1979 Bank of Sweden Prize address?  I could not.   If one did not know better, one might have thought from Professor Sen’s 1997 survey that there was nothing done worth talking about on the subject of “human capital” from the time of Adam Smith and David Hume until Amartya Sen finally came to the subject himself. 

Thirdly,  one is told by Sen’s admirer and collaborator, Professor James Foster of George Washington University, that what  Sen means by his notion of

“effective freedom”

is that this is something

“enhanced when a marginally nourished family now has the capability to be sufficiently nourished due to public action”…

Are Amartya and his acolytes claiming he has invented or reinvented welfare economics ab initio?   That before Amartya Sen, we did not know the importance of the able-bodied members of a community assisting those who are not able-bodied? 

Where have they been? Amartya needed merely to have read Marshall’s Principles evenslightly to find Marshall himself, the master of Maynard Keynes and all of Cambridge and modern world economics, declaring without any equivocation at the very start 

“….the study of the causes of poverty is the study of the causes of the degradation of a large part of mankind…”

But Marshall was interested in study, serious study, of poverty and its causes and amelioration, which is not something as easy or trivial as pontification on modern television.  My 1984 article “Considerations on Utility, Benevolence and Taxation” which also became a chapter of my 1989 Philosophy of Economics surveyed some of Marshall’s opinion.

“From each according to his ability, to each according to his need” was a utopian slogan around 1875 from Karl Marx, which generations of passionate undergraduates have found impressive. Amartya Sen deserves to tell us squarely about his engagement with Marx or Marxist thought from his earliest days until now.  His commitment in recent decades to democracy and the open and free society is clear;  but has he also at the same time all along been committed to a kind of half-baked communist utopia as represented by Marx’s 1875 slogan? 

“To each according to his need” sounds to be the underlying premise that is seeing practical manifestation in the Sonia Congress’s imposition of a so-called “right to food”; “from each according to his ability” is its flip side in the so-called “rural employment guarantee”.  Leave aside the limitless resource-allocation and incentive and public finance problems created by such naive ideas being made into government policy, there is a grave and fundamental issue that Amartya and other leftists have been too blinkered to see:

Do they suppose the organised business classes have been weakly cooperative and will just allow such massive redistribution to occur without getting the Indian political system to pay them off as well?   And how do the organised business classes get paid off?  By their getting to take the land of the inhabitants of rural India.   And land in an environment of a debauching of money and other paper assets is as good as gold.

So the peasants will lose their land to the government’s businessman friends on the one hand while purportedly getting “guaranteed” employment and food from the government’s bureaucrats on the other!  A landless, asset-less slave population, free to join the industrial proletariat! Is that what Amartya wants to see in India?  It may become what results within a few decades from his and his acolytes’ words and deeds. 

Rajiv Gandhi once gave me his private phone numbers at 10 Jan Path.  I used them back in January 1991 during the Gulf war.  But I cannot do so now as Rajiv is gone.  Amartya can.  Let him phone Sonia and prevail upon her to put the brakes on the wild food and employment schemes he and his friends have persuaded her about until he reads and reflects upon what I said in January 2007 in “On Land-Grabbing” and in my July 2007 open letter to him, reproduced below:

“At a business meet on 12 January 2005, Dr Manmohan Singh showered fulsome praise on Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee as “dynamic”, “the Nation’s Best Chief Minister”, whose “wit and wisdom”, “qualities of head and heart”, “courage of conviction and passionate commitment to the cause of the working people of India” he admired, saying “with Buddhadeb Babu at the helm of affairs it appears Bengal is once again forging ahead… If today there is a meeting of minds between Delhi and Kolkata, it is because the ideas that I and Buddhadebji represent have captured the minds of the people of India. This is the idea of growth with equity and social justice, the idea that economic liberalization and modernization have to be mindful of the needs of the poor and the marginalized.”…. Dr Singh returned to the “needs of the poor and the marginalized” at another business meet on 8 January 2007 promising to “unveil a new Rehabilitation Policy in three months to increase the pace of industrialisation” which would be “more progressive, humane and conducive to the long-term welfare of all stakeholders”, while his businessman host pointedly stated about Singur “land for industry must be made available to move the Indian manufacturing sector ahead”. The “meeting of minds between Delhi and Kolkata” seems to be that agriculture allegedly has become a relatively backward slow-growing sector deserving to yield in the purported larger national interest to industry and services: what the PM means by “long-term welfare of all stakeholders” is the same as the new CPI-M party-line that the sons of farmers should not remain farmers (but become automobile technicians or IT workers or restaurant waiters instead).   It is a political viewpoint coinciding with interests of organised capital and industrial labour in India today, as represented by business lobbies like CII, FICCI and Assocham on one hand, and unions like CITU and INTUC on the other. Business Standard succinctly (and ominously) advocated this point of view in its lead editorial of 9 January as follows: “it has to be recognised that the world over capitalism has progressed only with the landed becoming landless and getting absorbed in the industrial/service sector labour force ~ indeed it is obvious that if people don’t get off the land, their incomes will rise only slowly”.  Land is the first and ultimate means of production, and the attack of the powerful on land-holdings or land-rights of the unorganised or powerless has been a worldwide phenomenon ~ across both capitalism and communism.  In the mid-19th Century, white North America decimated hundreds of thousands of natives in the most gargantuan land-grab of history. Defeated, Chief Red Cloud of the Sioux spoke in 1868 for the Apache, Navajo, Comanche, Cheyenne, Iroquois and hundreds of other tribes: “They made us many promises, more than I can remember, but they never kept any except one: they promised to take our land, and they took it.”  Half a century later, while the collapse of grain prices contributed to the Great Depression and pauperisation of thousands of small farmers in capitalist America in the same lands that had been taken from the native tribes, Stalin’s Russia embarked on the most infamous state-sponsored land-grab in modern history: “The mass collectivisation of Soviet agriculture (was) probably the most warlike operation ever conducted by a state against its own citizens…. Hundreds of thousands and finally millions of peasants… were deported… desperate revolts in the villages were bloodily suppressed by the army and police, and the country sank into chaos, starvation and misery… The object of destroying the peasants’ independence…was to create a population of slaves, the benefit of whose labour would accrue to industry. The immediate effect was to reduce Soviet agriculture to a state of decline from which it has not yet recovered… The destruction of the Soviet peasantry, who formed three quarters of the population, was not only an economic but a moral disaster for the entire country. Tens of millions were driven into semi-servitude, and millions more were employed as executants…” (Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism).   Why did Stalin destroy the peasants? Lenin’s wishful “alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry” in reality could lead only to the peasants being pauperised into proletarians. At least five million peasants died and (Stalin told Churchill at Yalta) another ten million in the resultant famine of 1932-1933. “Certainly it involved a struggle ~ but chiefly one between urban Communists and villagers… it enabled the regime to obtain much of the capital desired for industrialization from the defeated village… it was the decisive step in the building of Soviet totalitarianism, for it imposed on the majority of the people a subjection which only force could maintain” (Treadgold, 20th Century Russia).  Mr Bhattacharjee’s CPI-M is fond of extolling Chinese communism, and the current New Delhi establishment have made Beijing and Shanghai holiday destinations of choice. Dr Singh’s Government has been eager to create hundreds of “Special Economic Zones” run by organised capital and unionised labour, and economically privileged by the State. In fact, the Singur and Nandigram experiences of police sealing off villages where protests occur are modelled on creation of “Special Economic Zones” in China in recent years.  For example, Chinese police on 6 December 2005 cracked down on farmers and fishermen in the seaside village of Dongzhou, 125 miles North East of Hong Kong. Thousands of Dongzhou villagers clashed with troops and armed police protesting confiscation of their lands and corruption among officials. The police immediately sealed off the village and arrested protesters. China’s Public Security Ministry admitted the number of riots over land had risen sharply, reaching more than seventy thousand across China in 2004; police usually suppressed peasant riots without resort to firing but in Dongzhou, police firing killed 20 protesters. Such is the reality of the “emergence” of China, a totalitarian police-state since the Communist takeover in 1949, from its period of mad tyranny until Mao’s death in 1976, followed by its ideological confusion ever since.  Modern India’s political economy today remains in the tight grip of metropolitan “Big Business” and “Big Labour”. Ordinary anonymous individual citizens ~ whether housewife, consumer, student, peasant, non-union worker or small businessman ~ have no real voice or representation in Indian politics. We have no normal conservative, liberal or social democratic party in this country, as found in West European democracies where the era of land-grabbing has long-ceased. If our polity had been normal, it would have known that economic development does not require business or government to pauperise the peasantry but instead to define and secure individual property rights and the Rule of Law, and establish proper conditions for the market economy. The Congress and BJP in Delhi and CPI-M in Kolkata would not have been able to distract attention from their macroeconomic misdeeds over the decades ~ indicated, for example, by increasing interest-expenditure paid annually on Government debt as a fraction of tax revenues… This macroeconomic rot originated with the Indira Gandhi-PN Haksar capriciousness and mismanagement, which coincided with the start of Dr Singh’s career as India’s best known economic bureaucrat….”

“Professor Amartya Sen, Harvard University,  Dear Professor Sen,  Everyone will be delighted that someone of your worldwide stature has joined the debate on Singur and Nandigram; The Telegraph deserves congratulations for having made it possible on July 23.  I was sorry to find though that you may have missed the wood for the trees and also some of the trees themselves. Perhaps you have relied on Government statements for the facts. But the Government party in West Bengal represents official Indian communism and has been in power for 30 years at a stretch. It may be unwise to take at face-value what they say about their own deeds on this very grave issue! Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, and there are many candid communists who privately recognise this dismal truth about themselves. To say this is not to be praising those whom you call the “Opposition” ~ after all, Bengal’s politics has seen emasculation of the Congress as an opposition because the Congress and communists are allies in Delhi. It is the Government party that must reform itself from within sua sponte for the good of everyone in the State.  The comparisons and mentions of history you have made seem to me surprising. Bengal’s economy now or in the past has little or nothing similar to the economy of Northern England or the whole of England or Britain itself, and certainly Indian agriculture has little to do with agriculture in the new lands of Australia or North America. British economic history was marked by rapid technological innovations in manufacturing and rapid development of social and political institutions in context of being a major naval, maritime and mercantile power for centuries. Britain’s geography and history hardly ever permitted it to be an agricultural country of any importance whereas Bengal, to the contrary, has been among the most agriculturally fertile and hence densely populated regions of the world for millennia.  Om Prakash’s brilliant pioneering book The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal 1630-1720 (Princeton 1985) records all this clearly. He reports the French traveller François Bernier saying in the 1660s “Bengal abounds with every necessary of life”, and a century before him the Italian traveller Verthema saying Bengal “abounds more in grain, flesh of every kind, in great quantity of sugar, also of ginger, and of great abundance of cotton, than any country in the world”. Om Prakash says “The premier industry in the region was the textile industry comprising manufacture from cotton, silk and mixed yarns”. Bengal’s major exports were foodstuffs, textiles, raw silk, opium, sugar and saltpetre; imports notably included metals (as Montesquieu had said would always be the case).  Bengal did, as you say, have industries at the time the Europeans came but you have failed to mention these were mostly “agro-based” and, if anything, a clear indicator of our agricultural fecundity and comparative advantage. If “deindustrialization” occurred in 19th Century India, that had nothing to do with the “deindustrialization” in West Bengal from the 1960s onwards due to the influence of official communism.  You remind us Fa Hiaen left from Tamralipta which is modern day Tamluk, though he went not to China but to Ceylon. You suggest that because he did so Tamluk effectively “was greater Calcutta”. I cannot see how this can be said of the 5th Century AD when no notion of Calcutta existed. Besides, modern Tamluk at 22º18’N, 87º56’E is more than 50 miles inland from the ancient port due to land-making that has occurred at the mouth of the Hooghly. I am afraid the relevance of the mention of Fa Hiaen to today’s Singur and Nandigram has thus escaped me.  You say “In countries like Australia, the US or Canada where agriculture has prospered, only a very tiny population is involved in agriculture. Most people move out to industry. Industry has to be convenient, has to be absorbing”. Last January, a national daily published a similar view: “For India to become a developed country, the area under agriculture has to shrink, urban and industrial land development has to take place, and about 100 million workers have to move out from agriculture into industry and services. This is the only way forward for bringing prosperity to the rural population”.   Rice is indeed grown in Arkansas or Texas as it is in Bengal but there is a world of difference between the technological and geographical situation here and that in the vast, sparsely populated New World areas with mechanized farming! Like shoe-making or a hundred other crafts, agriculture can be capital-intensive or labour-intensive ~ ours is relatively labour-intensive, theirs is relatively capital-intensive. Our economy is relatively labour-abundant and capital-scarce; their economies are relatively labour-scarce and capital-abundant (and also land-abundant). Indeed, if anything, the apt comparison is with China, and you doubtless know of the horror stories and civil war conditions erupting across China in recent years as the Communist Party and their businessman friends forcibly take over the land of peasants and agricultural workers, e.g. in Dongzhou. All plans of long-distance social engineering to “move out” 40 per cent of India’s population (at 4 persons per “worker”) from the rural hinterlands must also face FA Hayek’s fundamental question in The Road to Serfdom: “Who plans whom, who directs whom, who assigns to other people their station in life, and who is to have his due allotted by others?”  Your late Harvard colleague, Robert Nozick, opened his brilliant 1974 book Anarchy, State and Utopia saying: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)”. You have rightly deplored the violence seen at Singur and Nandigram. But you will agree it is a gross error to equate violence perpetrated by the Government which is supposed to be protecting all people regardless of political affiliation, and the self-defence of poor unorganised peasants seeking to protect their meagre lands and livelihoods from state-sponsored pogroms. Kitchen utensils, pitchforks or rural implements and flintlock guns can hardly match the organised firepower controlled by a modern Government.   Fortunately, India is not China and the press, media and civil institutions are not totally in the hands of the ruling party alone. In China, no amount of hue and cry among the peasants could save them from the power of organised big business and the Communist Party. In India, a handful of brave women have managed to single-handedly organise mass movements of protest which the press and media have then broadcast that has shocked the whole nation to its senses.  You rightly say the land pricing process has been faulty. Irrelevant historical prices have been averaged when the sum of discounted expected future values in an inflationary economy should have been used. Matters are even worse. “The fear of famine can itself cause famine. The people of Bengal are afraid of a famine. It was repeatedly charged that the famine (of 1943) was man-made.” That is what T. W. Schultz said in 1946 in the India Famine Emergency Committee led by Pearl Buck, concerned that the 1943 Bengal famine should not be repeated following dislocations after World War II. Of course since that time our agriculture has undergone a Green Revolution, at least in wheat if not in rice, and a White Revolution in milk and many other agricultural products. But catastrophic collapses in agricultural incentives may still occur as functioning farmland comes to be taken by government and industry from India’s peasantry using force, fraud or even means nominally sanctioned by law. If new famines come to be provoked because farmers’ incentives collapse, let future historians know where responsibility lay.  West Bengal’s real economic problems have to do with its dismal macroeconomic and fiscal position which is what Government economists should be addressing candidly. As for land, the Government’s first task remains improving grossly inadequate systems of land-description and definition, as well as the implementation and recording of property rights.  With my most respectful personal regards, I remain, Yours ever, Suby”

How does India, as a state, treat its weakest and most vulnerable citizens? Not very well at all.  It is often only because families and society have not collapsed completely, as they have elsewhere, that the weakest survive.  Can we solve in the 21st Century, in a practical manner appropriate to our times, the problem Buddha raised before he became the Buddha some twenty six centuries ago?  Says Eliot,

“The legend represents him as carefully secluded from all disquieting sights and as learning the existence of old age, sickness and death only by chance encounters which left a profound impression”

It is to this list we add “the poor” too, especially if we want to include a slightly later and equally great reformer some miles west of the Terai in the Levant.  I said some years ago “As we as infants and children need to be helped to find courage to face the start of life, we when very elderly can need to be helped to find courage to face life’s end”.   Old age carries with it the fear of death, fear of the end of life and what that means, which raises the meaning of life itself, or at least of the individual life, because we can hardly grasp what the end of life is if we haven’t what it is supposed to be the end of in the first place. What the very elderly need, as do the dying and terminally ill, is to find courage within themselves to comprehend all this with as much equanimity as possible. Companionship and camaraderie — or perhaps let us call it love — go towards that courage coming to be found; something similar goes for the sick, whether a sick child missing school or the elderly infirm, courage that they are not alone and that they can and will recover and not have to face death quite yet, that life will indeed resume.  

As for the poor, I said in 2009 about the bizarre Indian scheme of “interrogating, measuring, photographing and fingerprinting them against their will” that “the poor have their privacy and their dignity. They are going to refuse to waste their valuable time at the margins of survival volunteering for such gimmickry.”

“What New Delhi’s governing class fails to see is that the masses of India’s poor are not themselves a mass waiting for New Delhi’s handouts: they are individuals, free, rational, thinking individuals who know their own lives and resources and capacities and opportunities, and how to go about living their lives best. What they need is security, absence of state or other tyranny, roads, fresh water, electricity, functioning schools for their children, market opportunities for work, etc, not handouts from a monarch or aristocrats or businessmen….” Or, to put it differently in Kant’s terms, the poor need to be treated as ends in themselves, and not as the means towards the ends of others…

 

Part II India’s Right Road Forward Now: Some Thoughtful Analysis for Grown Ups

5.   Transcending a Left-Right/Congress-BJP Divide in Indian Politics

6.   Budgeting Military & Foreign Policy

7.    Solving the Kashmir Problem & Relations with Pakistan

8.  Dealing with Communist China

9.   Towards Coherence in Public Accounting, Public Finance & Public Decision-Making

10.   India’s Money: Towards Currency Integrity at Home & Abroad

Posted in Academic research, Amartya Sen, Arvind Panagariya, Asia and the West, Bengal's Public Finances, Bhagwati-Sen spat, BJP, Britain in India, Cambridge Univ Economics, Cambridge University, Columbia University, Congress Party, Congress Party History, Credit markets, Economic inequality, Economic Policy, Economic quackery, Economic Theory, Economic Theory of Growth, Economic Theory of Interest, Economic Theory of Value, Economics of Public Finance, Financial Repression, Governance, Government accounting, Government of India, India's Big Business, India's Cabinet Government, India's Government economists, India's 1991 Economic Reform, India's balance of payments, India's Budget, India's bureaucracy, India's Capital Markets, India's constitutional politics, India's corruption, India's currency history, India's Economic History, India's Economy, India's Exports, India's Foreign Exchange Reserves, India's Government Budget Constraint, India's Industry, India's inflation, India's Macroeconomics, India's Monetary & Fiscal Policy, India's Polity, India's Public Finance, India's Reserve Bank, India's State Finances, Institute of Economic Affairs, Jagdish Bhagwati, Jean Drèze, LK Advani, Manmohan Singh, Margaret Thatcher's Revolution, Mihir Kumar Roy (MKRoy), Milton Friedman, Money and banking, Padma Desai, Paper money and deposits, Political Economy, Public Choice/Public Finance, Public property waste fraud, Rajiv Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, Reverse-Euro Model for India, Sen-Bhagwati spat, Siddhartha Shankar Ray, Sonia Gandhi, Subroto Roy, Sukhamoy Chakravarty, The Times (London), University of Hawaii, William E (Ted) James (1951-2010). Leave a Comment »

No magic wand, Professor Rajan? Oh but there is…2013 (Plus: 7 Jan 2016 “Professor Rajan stays or goes? My answer to a query”)

7 January 2016
rajan

3 June 2014

from World Economy & Central Banking Seminar at Facebook

Professor Rajan’s statement “I determine the monetary policy. I say what it is….ultimately the interest rate that is set is set by me” equates Indian monetary policy with the money interest rate; but monetary policy in India has always involved far more than that, namely, the bulk of Indian banking and insurance has been in government hands for decades, all these institutions have been willy-nilly compelled to hold vast stocks of government debt, both Union and State, on their asset-sides…and unlimited unending deficit finance has led to vast expansion of money supply, making it all rather fragile. My “India’s Money” in 2012 might be found useful. http://tinyurl.com/o9dhe8d

11 April 2014

from World Economy & Central Banking Seminar at Facebook

I have to wonder, What is Professor Rajan on about? Growth in an individual country is affected by the world monetary system? Everyone for almost a century has seen it being a real phenomenon affected by other real factors like savings propensities, capital accumulation, learning and productivity changes, innovation, and, broadly, technological progress… A “source country” needs to consult “recipient” countries before it starts or stops Quantitative Easing? Since when? The latter can always match policy such as to be more or less unaffected… unless of course it wants to ride along for free when the going is good and complain loudly when it is not…. Monetary policy may affect the real economy but as a general rule we may expect growth (a real phenomenon) to be affected by other real factors like savings propensities, capital accumulation, learning and productivity changes, innovation, and, broadly, technological progress..

22 September 2013

“Let us remember that the postponement of tapering is only that, a postponement. We must use this time to create a bullet proof national balance sheet and growth agenda, which creates confidence in citizens and investors alike…”

I will say the statement above is the first sensible thing I have heard Dr Rajan utter anywhere, cutting through all the hype…I should also think he may be underestimating the task at hand, so here’s some help as to what needs to be done from my 19 Aug 2013 Mint article “A wand for Raghuram Rajan” and my 3 Dec 2012 Delhi lecture:

“Rajan has apparently said, “We do not have a magic wand to make the problems disappear instantaneously, but I have absolutely no doubt we will deal with them.” Of course there are no magic wands but there is a scientific path forward. It involves system-wide improvements in public finance and accounting using modern information technology to comprehend government liabilities and expenditures and raise their productivity. It also involves institutional changes in public decision-making like separating banking and central banking from the treasury while making the planning function serve the treasury function rather than pretend to be above it. It is a road long and arduous but at its end both corruption and inflation will have been reduced to minimal levels. The rupee will have acquired sufficient integrity to become a hard currency of the world in the sense the average resident of, say, rural Madhya Pradesh or Mizoram may freely convert rupees and hold or trade foreign currencies or precious metals as he/she pleases. India signed the treaty of Versailles as a victor and was an original member of the League of Nations, the United Nations and the IMF. Yet sovereign India has failed to develop a currency universally acceptable as freely convertible world money. It is necessary and possible for India to aim to do so because without such a national aim, the integrity of the currency continues to be damaged regularly by governmental abuse. An RBI governor’s single overriding goal should be to try to bring a semblance of integrity to India’s money both domestically and worldwide.”

 

 

19 August 2013

A wand for Raghuram Rajan

9 August 2013

No magic wand, Professor Rajan? Oh but there is… read up all this over some hours and you will find it… (Of course it’s not from magic really,  just hard economic science & politics)

Professor Raghuram Govind Rajan of the University of Chicago Business School deserves everyone’s congratulations on his elevation to the Reserve Bank of India’s Governorship.  But I am afraid I cannot share the wild optimism in India’s business media over this.  Of course there are several positives to the appointment.  First, having a genuine PhD and that too from a top school is a rarity among India’s policy-makers; Rajan earned a 1991 PhD in finance at MIT’s management school for a thesis titled “Essays on banking” (having to do we are told “with the downside to cozy bank-firm relationships”).   Secondly, and related,  he has not been a career bureaucrat as almost all RBI Governors have been in recent decades.  Thirdly, he has been President of the American Finance Association, he won the first Fischer Black prize in finance of that Association, and during Anne Krueger’s 2001-2006 reign as First Deputy MD at the IMF, he was given the research role made well-known by the late Michael Mussa, that of “Economic Counselor” of the IMF.

Hence, altogether, Professor Rajan has come to be well-known over the last decade in the West’s financial media. Given the dismal state of India’s credit in world capital markets, that is an asset for a new RBI Governor to have.

On the negatives, first and foremost, if Professor Rajan has renounced at any time his Indian nationality, surrendered his Indian passport and sworn the naturalization oath of the USA, then he is a US citizen with a US passport and loyalty owed to that country, and by US law he will have to enter the USA using that and no other nationality.  If that happens to be the factual case, it will be something that comes out in India’s political cauldron for sure, and there will arise legal issues and court orders  barring him from heading the RBI or representing India officially, e.g. when standing in for India’s Finance Minister at the IMF in Washington or the BIS in Basle etc.   Was he an Indian national as Economic Counselor at the IMF?   The IMF has a tradition of only European MDs and at least one American First Deputy MD.   The Economic Counselor was always American too; did Rajan break that by having remained Indian, or conform to it by having become American?  It is a simple question of fact which needs to come out clearly.   Even if Rajan is an American, he and the Government of India could perhaps try to cite to the Indian courts the new precedent set by the venerable Bank of England which recently appointed a Canadian as Governor.

Secondly, does Professor Rajan know enough (or “have enough domain knowledge” in the modern term) to comprehend let aside confront India’s myriad monetary and public finance problems?  Much of his academic experience in the USA and his approach to Western financial markets may be quite simply divorced from the reality of Indian credit markets and India’s peculiar monetary and banking system as these have evolved over decades and centuries.  Mathematical finance is a relatively new, small specialised American sub-field of economic theory, and not a part of general economics. Rajan’s academic path of engineering and management in India followed by a finance thesis in the management department of a US engineering school may have exposed him to relatively little formal textbook micro- and macroeconomics, monetary economics, public finance, international economics, economic development etc, especially as these relate to Indian circumstances  “Growing up in India, I had seen poverty all around me. I had read about John Maynard Keynes and thought, wow, here’s a guy who managed to have an enormous influence on the world. Economics must be very important.”… He ran across Robert Merton’s paper on rational option pricing, and something clicked that set him on his own intellectual path. “It all came together. You didn’t have these touchy-feely ways of describing human behavior; there were neat arbitrage ways of pricing things. It just seemed so clever and sophisticated,” he said. “And I could use the math skills that I fancied I had, so I decided to get my PhD.”

Let me take two examples.  Does Rajan realise how the important Bottomley-Chandavarkar debates of the 1960s about India’s rural credit markets influenced George Akerlof’s “Market for Lemons” theory and prompted much work on “asymmetric information”, 325.extract signalling etc in credit-markets, insurance-markets, labour-markets and markets in general, as acknowledged in the awards of several Bank of Sweden prizes?  Or will he need a tutorial on the facts of rural India’s financial and credit markets, and their relationship with the formal sector?  What the Bottomley-Chandavarkar debate referred to half a century ago still continues in rural India insofar as large arbitrage profits are still made by trading across the artificially low rates of money interest caused by financial repression of India’s “formal” monetised sector with its soft inconvertible currency against the very high real rates of return on capital in the “informal” sector.   It is obvious to the naked eye that India is a relatively labour-abundant country.  It follows the relative price of labour will be low and relative price of capital high compared to, e.g. the Western or Middle Eastern economies, with mobile factors of production like labour and capital expected to flow accordingly across national boundaries.   Indian nominal interest-rates in organized credit markets have been for decades tightly controlled, making it necessary to go back to Irving Fisher’s data to obtain benchmark interest-rates, which, as expected, are at least 2%-3% higher in India than in Western capital markets. Joan Robinson once explained “the difference between 30% in an Indian village and 3% in London” saying “side by side with the industrial revolution went great technical progress in the provision of credit and the reduction of lender’s risk.”

What is logically certain is no country can have both relatively low world prices for labour and relatively low world prices for capital!  Yet that impossibility seems to have been what India’s purported economic “planners” have planned to engineer!  The effect of financial repression over decades may have been to artificially “reverse” or “switch” the risk-premium — making it lucrative for there to be capital flight out of India, with real rates of return on capital within India being made artificially lower than those in world markets!   Just as enough export subsidies and tariffs can make a country artificially “reverse” its comparative advantage with its structure of exports and imports becoming inverted, so a labour-rich capital-scarce country may, with enough financial repression, end up causing a capital flight.  The Indian elite’s capital flight out of India exporting their adult children and savings overseas may be explained as having been induced by government policy itself.

431314_10150617690307285_69226771_n

Secondly, Professor Rajan as a finance and banking specialist, will see at once the import of this graph above that has never been produced let aside comprehended by the RBI, yet which uses the purest RBI data.  It shows India’s mostly nationalised banks have decade after decade gotten weaker and weaker financially, being kept afloat by continually pumping in of new “capital” via “recapitalisation” from the government that owns them, using more and more of the soft inconvertible currency that has been debauched merrily by government planners.  The nationalised banks with their powerful pampered employee unions, like other powerful pampered employee unions in the government sector, have been the bane of India, where a mere 30 million privileged people in a vast population work with either the government or the organised private sector.  The RBI’s own workforce at last count was perhaps 75,000… the largest central bank staff in the world by far!

Will Rajan know how to bring some system out of the institutional chaos that prevails in Indian banking and central banking?  If not, he should start with the work of James Hanson “Indian Banking: Market Liberalization and the Pressures for Institutional and Market Framework Reform”, contained in the book created by Anne Krueger who brought him into the IMF, and mentioned in my 2012 article “India’s Money” linked below.

The central question for any 21st century RBI Governor worth the name really becomes whether he or she can stand up to the Finance Ministry and insist that the RBI stop being a mere department of it — even perhaps insisting on constitutional status for its head to fulfill the one over-riding aim of trying to bring a semblance of integrity to India’s currency both domestically and worldwide.  Instead it is the so-called “Planning Commission” which has been dominating the Treasury that needs to be made a mere department of the Finance Ministry, while the RBI comes to be hived off to independence!  

Professor Rajan has apparently said “We do not have a magic wand to make the problems disappear instantaneously, but I have absolutely no doubt we will deal with them.”  Of course there are no magic wands but my 3 December 2012 talk in Delhi  has described the right path forward, complex and difficult as this may be.

The path forward involves system-wide improvements in public finance and accounting using modern information technology to comprehend government liabilities and expenditures and raise their productivity, plus institutional changes in public decision-making like separating banking and central banking from the Treasury while making the planning function serve the Treasury function rather than pretend to be above it.  The road described is long and arduous but at its end both corruption and inflation will have been reduced to minimal levels, and the rupee would have acquired integrity enough to become a hard currency of the world in the sense the average resident of, say, rural Madhya Pradesh or Mizoram may freely convert rupees and hold or trade foreign currencies or precious metals as he/she pleases.

3dec

India signed the Treaty of Versailles as a victor and was an original member of the League of Nations, UN and IMF.  Yet sovereign India has failed to develop a currency universally acceptable as a freely convertible world money. It is necessary and possible for India to do so. Without such a national aim, the integrity of the currency continues to be damaged regularly by governmental abuse. 

Professor Rajan will not want to be merely an adornment for the GoI in world capital markets for a few  years, waiting to get back to his American career and life and perhaps to the IMF again.  As RBI Governor, he can find his magic wand if he reads and reflects hard enough using his undoubted academic acumen, and then acts to lead India accordingly.  Here is the basic reading list:

“India’s Money” (2012)

“Monetary Integrity and the Rupee” (2008)

“India’s Macroeconomics” (2007)

“Fiscal Instability” (2007)

“Fallacious Finance” (2007)

“Growth and Government Delusion” (2008)

“India in World Trade & Payments” (2007)

“Path of the Indian Rupee 1947-1993” (1993)

“Our Policy Process” (2007)

“Indian Money and Credit” (2006)

“Indian Money and Banking” (2006)

Indian Inflation

“Growth of Real Income, Money & Prices in India 1869-2004” (2005)

“How to Budget” (2008)

“Waffle but No Models of Monetary Policy: The RBI and Financial Repression (2005)”

“The Dream Team: A Critique” (2006)

“Against Quackery” (2007)

“Mistaken Macroeconomics” (2009)

“The Indian Revolution (2008)”

Some of My Works, Interviews etc on India’s Money, Public Finance, Banking, Trade, BoP, Land, etc (an incomplete list)

Enjoy!

Posted in Academic economics, Academic research, Asia and the West, asymmetric information, Banking, Big Business and Big Labour, Bretton Woods institutions, Britain in India, Capital and labour, Deposit multiplication, Economic Policy, Economic quackery, Economic Theory, Economic Theory of Growth, Economic Theory of Interest, Economic Theory of Value, Economics of exchange controls, Economics of Exchange Rates, Economics of Public Finance, Financial Management, Financial markets, Financial Repression, Foreign exchange controls, Governance, Government accounting, Government Budget Constraint, India's Big Business, India's credit markets, India's Government economists, India's interest rates, India's savings rate, India's stock and debt markets, India's 1991 Economic Reform, India's agriculture, India's balance of payments, India's Banking, India's Budget, India's bureaucracy, India's Capital Markets, India's currency history, India's Foreign Exchange Reserves, India's Foreign Trade, India's Government Budget Constraint, India's Government Expenditure, India's Macroeconomics, India's Monetary & Fiscal Policy, India's nomenclatura, India's Polity, India's poverty, India's Public Finance, India's Reserve Bank, India's State Finances, India's Union-State relations, Inflation, Inflation targeting, Interest group politics, Interest rates, International economics, International monetary economics, International Monetary Fund IMF, Land and political economy, Microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics, Monetary Theory, Money and banking, Paper money and deposits, Power-elites and nomenclatura, Public Choice/Public Finance, Public property waste fraud, Raghuram Govind Rajan, Raghuram Rajan, Rajiv Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, Statesmanship, Unorganised capital markets. Leave a Comment »

Pakistan’s Point of View (Or Points of View) on Kashmir: My As Yet Undelivered Lahore Lecture–Part I

Preface

27 April 2015 from Twitter: “My Pakistani hosts never managed to go thru w their 2010/11 invitation I speak in Lahore on Kashmir. After ‪#‎SabeenMahmud‬ s murder, I decline”

October 2015 from Twitter: I have started a quite thorough critique under #kasuri etc at Twitter of the extremely peculiar free publicity given in Delhi and  Mumbai power circles to the dressed up (and false) ISI/Hurriyat narrative of KM Kasuri; the Musharraf “demilitarisation/borderless” idea that Mr Kasuri promotes is originally mine from our Pakistan book in America in the 1980s, which I brought to the attention of both sides (and the USA) in Washington in 1993 but which I myself later rejected as naive and ignorant  after the Pakistani aggression in Kargil in 1999, especially the murder of Lt Kalia and his platoon as POWs. https://independentindian.com/2006/12/15/what-to-tell-musharraf-peace-is-impossible-without-non-aggressive-pakistani-intentions/  https://independentindian.com/2008/11/15/of-a-new-new-delhi-myth-and-the-success-of-the-university-of-hawaii-1986-1992-pakistan-project/ 

see too https://independentindian.com/2011/10/13/my-seventy-one-notes-at-facebook-etc-on-kashmir-pakistan-and-of-course-india-listed-thanks-to-jd/

I have also now made clear how and why my Lahore lecture (confirmed by the Pakistani envoy to Delhi personally phoning me of his own accord at home on 3 March 2011, followed the next day by the Indian Foreign Secretary phoning to give me an appointment to brief her about my talk upon my return) came to be sabotaged by two Pakistanis and two Indian politicians associated with them. (Both of the Indian politicians had bad karma catch up immediately afterwards!)

 

Original Preface  22 November 2011: Exactly a year ago, in late October-November 2010, I received a very kind invitation from the Lahore Oxford and Cambridge Society to speak there on this subject.  Mid March 2011 was a tentative date for this lecture from which the text below is dated.  The lecture has yet to take place for various reasons but as there is demand for its content, I am releasing the part which was due to be released in any case to my Pakistani hosts ahead of time — after all, it would have been presumptuous of me to seek to speak in Lahore on Pakistan’s viewpoint on Kashmir, hence I instead  planned to release my understanding of that point of view ahead of time and open it to the criticism of my hosts.  The structure of the remainder of the talk may be surmised too from the Contents.  The text and argument are mine entirely, the subject of more than 25 years of research and reflection,  and are under consideration of publication as a book by Continuum of London and New York.  If you would like to comment, please feel free to do so, if you would like to refer to it in an online publication, please give this link, if you would like to refer to it in a paper-publication, please   email me.  Like other material at my site, it is open to the Fair Use rule of normal scholarship.

 

On the Alternative Theories of Pakistan and India about Jammu & Kashmir (And the One and Only Way These May Be Peacefully Reconciled): An Exercise in Economics, Politics, Moral Philosophy & Jurisprudence

 by

Subroto (Suby) Roy

Lecture to the Oxford and Cambridge Society of Lahore

March 14, 2011 (tentative)

“What is the use of studying philosophy if all that does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?”  Wittgenstein, letter to Malcolm, 1944

“India is the greatest Muslim country in the world.”

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, 1930, Presidential Address to the Muslim League, Allahabad

 “Where be these enemies?… See, what a scourge is laid upon your hate,… all are punish’d.” Shakespeare

Dr Roy’s published works include Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (London & New York: Routledge, 1989, 1991); Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1984); and, edited with WE James, Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Hawaii MS 1989, Sage 1992)  &  Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Hawaii MS 1989, Sage 1992, OUP Karachi 1993); and, edited with John Clarke, Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant (London & New York: Continuum 2005).  He graduated in 1976 with a first from the London School of Economics in mathematical economics, and received the PhD in economics at Cambridge in 1982 under Professor Frank Hahn for the thesis “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”. In the United States for 16 years he was privileged to count as friends Professors James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, Max Black and Sidney Alexander.  From September 18 1990 he was an adviser to Rajiv Gandhi and contributed to the origins of India’s 1991 economic reform.  He blogs at http://www.independentindian.com.

CONTENTS

Part I

  1. Introduction

  2. Pakistan’s Point of View (or Points of View)

(a)    1930  Sir Muhammad Iqbal

(b)    1933-1948 Chaudhury Rahmat Ali

(c)    1937-1941 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan

(d)    1937-1947 Quad-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

(e)    1940s et seq  Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi

(f)     1947-1950 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 1966 President Ayub Khan, 2005 Govt of Pakistan, 2007 President Musharraf, 2008 FM Qureshi, 2011 Kashmir Day

Part II

  1. India’s Point of View: British Negligence/Indifference during the Transfer of Power, A Case of Misgovernance in the Chaotic Aftermath of World War II

(a)    Rhetoric: Whose Pakistan?  Which Kashmir?

(b)    Law: (i) Liaquat-Zafrullah-Abdullah-Nehru United in Error Over the Second Treaty of Amritsar! Dogra J&K subsists Mar 16 1846-Oct 22 1947. Aggression, Anarchy, Annexations: The LOC as De Facto Boundary by Military Decision Since Jan 1 1949.  (ii) Legal Error & Confusion Generated by 12 May 1946 Memorandum. (iii) War: Dogra J&K attacked by Pakistan, defended by India: Invasion, Mutiny, Secession of “Azad Kashmir” & Gilgit, Rape of Baramulla, Siege of Skardu.

  1. Politics: What is to be Done? Towards Truths, Normalisation, Peace in the 21st Century

The Present Situation is Abnormal & Intolerable. There May Be One (and Only One) Peacable Solution that is Feasible: Revealing Individual Choices Privately with Full Information & Security: Indian “Green Cards”/PIO-OCI status for Hurriyat et al: A Choice of Nationality (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran).  Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar & Gilgit etc: De Jure Recognition of the Boundary, Diplomatic Normalisation,  Economic & Military Cooperation.

  1. Appendices:

(a)    History of Jammu & Kashmir until the Dogra Native State

(b)    Pakistan’s Allies (including A Brief History of Gilgit)

(c)    India’s Muslim Voices

(d)    Pakistan’s Muslim Voices: An Excerpt from the Munir Report

Part I

1.  Introduction

For a solution to Jammu & Kashmir to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion across the subcontinent — in Pakistan, in India, among all people and parties in J&K, those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others — will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the principal known facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

I claim to have found such a solution, indeed I shall even say it is the only such solution (in terms of theoretical economics, it is the unique solution) and plan with your permission to describe its main outlines at this distinguished gathering.  I have not invented it overnight but it is something  developed over a quarter century, milestones along the way being the books emerging from the University of Hawaii “perestroika” projects for India and Pakistan that I and the late WE James led 25 years ago, and a lecture I gave at Washington’s Heritage Foundation in June 1998, as well as sets of newspaper articles published between 2005 and 2008, one in Dawn of Karachi and others in The Statesman of New Delhi and Kolkata.

Before I start, allow me for a moment to remind just how complex and intractable the problem we face has been, and, therefore, quite how large my ambition is in claiming today to be able to resolve it.

“Kashmir is in the Supreme National Interest of Pakistan”, says Pakistan.

“Kashmir is an Integral Part of India”, says India.

“Kashmir is an Integral Part of Pakistan”, says Pakistan.

“Kashmir is in the Supreme National Interest of India”, says India.

And so it goes, in what over the decades has been all too often a Dialogue of the Deaf.  How may such squarely opposed positions be reconciled without draining public resources even further through wasteful weaponry and confrontation of standing armies, or, what is worse, using these weapons and armies in war, plunging the subcontinent into an abyss of chaos and destruction for generations to come?  How is it possible?

I shall suggest a road can be found only when we realize Pakistan, India and J&K each have been and are going to remain integral to one another — in their histories, their geographies, their economies and their societies.  The only place they may need to differ, where we shall want them to differ, is their politics and political systems. We should not underestimate how much mutual hatred and mutual fear has arisen naturally on all sides over the decades as a result of bloodshed and suffering all around, and the fact must also be accounted for that people simply may not be in a calm-enough emotional state to want to be part of processes seeking resolution; at the same time, it bears to be remembered that although Pakistan and India have been at war more than once and war is always a very serious and awful thing, they have never actually declared war against the other nor have they ever broken diplomatic relations – in fact in some ways it has always seemed like some very long and protracted fraternal Civil War between us where we think we know one another so well and yet come to be surprised more by one another’s virtues than by one another’s vices.

Secondly, with any seemingly intractable problem, dialogue can stall or be aborted due to normal human failings of impatience or lack of good will or lack of good humour or lack of a scientific attitude towards finding facts, or plain mutual miscomprehension of one another’s points of view through ignorance or laziness or negligence.  In case of Pakistan and India over J&K, there has been the further critical complication that we of this generation did not cause this problem — it has been something inherited by us from not even our fathers but our grandfathers!  It is two generations old.  Each side must respect the words and deeds of its forebears but also may have to frankly examine in a scientific spirit where errors of fact or judgment may have occurred back then.  The antagonistic positions have changed only slightly over two generations, and one reason dialogue stalls or gets aborted today is because positions have become frozen for more than half a century and merely get repeated endlessly.  On top of such frozen positions have been piled pile upon pile of further vast mortal complications: the 1965 War, the 1971 secession of East Pakistan, the 1999 Kargil War, the 2008 Mumbai massacres.  Only cacophony results if we talk about everything at once, leaving the status quo of a dangerous expensive confrontation to continue.

I propose instead to focus as specifically and precisely as possible on how Jammu & Kashmir became a problem at all during those crucial decades alongside the processes of Indian Independence, World War II, the Pakistan Movement and creation of Pakistan, accompanied by the traumas and bloodshed of Partition.

Having addressed that — and it is only fair to forewarn this eminent Lahore audience that such a survey of words, deeds and events between the 1930s and 1950s tends to emerge in India’s favour — I propose to “fast-forward” to current times, where certain new facts on the ground appear much more adverse to India, and finally seek to ask what can and ought to be done, all things considered, today in the circumstances of the 21st Century.   There are four central facts, let me for now call them Fact A, Fact B, Fact C and Fact D, which have to be accepted by both countries in good faith and a scientific spirit.  Facts A and B are historical in nature; Pakistan has refused to accept them. Facts C and D are contemporary in nature; official political India and much of the Indian media too often have appeared wilfully blind to them. The moment all four facts come to be accepted by all, the way forward becomes clear.  We have inherited this grave mortal problem which has so badly affected the ordinary people of J&K in the most terrible and unacceptable manner, but if we fail to understand and resolve it, our children and grandchildren will surely fail even worse — we may even leave them to cope with the waste and destruction of further needless war or confrontation, indeed with the end of the subcontinent as we have received and known it in our time.

2. Pakistan’s Point of View (Or Points of View)

1930  Sir Muhammad Iqbal

This audience will need no explanation why I start with Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the poetic and spiritual genius who in the 20th Century inspired the notion of a Muslim polity in NorthWestern India, whose seminal 1930 presidential speech to the Muslim League in Allahabad lay the foundation stone of the new country that was yet to be.   He did not live to see Pakistan’s creation yet what may be called the “Pakistan Principle” was captured in his words:

“I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of Northwest India… India is the greatest Muslim country in the world.  The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory”.

He did not see such a consolidated Muslim state being theocratic and certainly not one filled with bigotry or “Hate-Hindu” campaigns:

“A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities… Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and my behaviour… Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states…. I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.”[1]

Though Kashmiri himself, in fact a founding member of the “All-India Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference of Lahore and Simla”, and a hero and role model for the young Sheikh Abdullah (1905-1982), Allama Iqbal was explicitly silent about J&K being part of the new political entity he had come to imagine.  I do not say he would not have wished it to be had he lived longer; what I am saying is that his original vision of the consolidated Muslim state which constitutes Pakistan today (after a Partitioned Punjab) did not include Jammu & Kashmir.  Rather, it was focused on the politics of British India and did not mention the politics of Kashmir or any other of the so-called “Princely States” or “Native States” of “Indian India” who constituted some 1/3rd of the land mass and 1/4th of the population of the subcontinent.  Twenty years ago I called this “The Paradox of Kashmir”, namely, that prior to 1947 J&K hardly seemed to appear in any discussion at all for a century, yet it has consumed almost all discussion and resources ever since.

Secondly, this audience will see better than I can the significance of Dr Iqbal’s saying the Muslim political state of his conception needed

“an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it”

and instead seek to

“mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times”.

Dr Iqbal’s Pakistan Principle appears here the polar opposite of Pakistan’s 18th & 19th Century pre-history represented by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762)[2] saying

“We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride”

 or Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi (1786-1831) saying

“We must repudiate all those Indian, Persian and Roman customs which are contrary to the Prophet’s teaching”.[3]

Some 25 years after the Allahabad address, the Munir Report in 1954 echoed Dr Iqbal’s thought when it observed about medieval military conquests

“It is this brilliant achievement of the Arabian nomads …that makes the Musalman of today live in the past and yearn for the return of the glory that was Islam… Little does he understand that the forces which are pitted against him are entirely different from those against which early Islam had to fight… Nothing but a bold reorientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic incongruity that he is today…” [4]

 

1933-1947  Chaudhury Rahmat Ali

Dr Iqbal’s young follower, the radical Cambridge pamphleteer Chaudhury Rahmat Ali (1895-1951) drew a picture not of Muslim tolerance and coexistence with Hindus in a peaceful India but of aggression towards Hindus and domination by Muslims over the subcontinent and Asia itself.  Rahmat Ali had been inspired by Dr Iqbal’s call for a Muslim state in Northwest India but found it vague and was disappointed Iqbal had not pressed it at the Third Round Table Conference.  In 1933, reportedly on the upper floor of a London omnibus, he invented for the then-imagined political entity the name “PAKSTAN”, P for his native Punjab, A for Afghania, K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and STAN for Balochistan.  He sought a meeting with Mr Jinnah in London — “Jinnah disliked Rahmat Ali’s ideas and avoided meeting him”[5] but did meet him.  There is a thesis yet to be written on how Europe’s inter-War ideologies affected political thinking on the subcontinent.  Rahmat Ali’s vituperative views about Hindus were akin to others about Jews (and Muslims too) at the time, all models or counterfoils for one another in the fringes of Nazism.  He referred to the Indian nationalist movement as a “British-Banya alliance”, declined to admit India had ever existed and personally renamed the subcontinent “Dinia” and the seas around it the “Pakian Sea”, the “Osmanian Sea” etc. He urged Sikhs to rise up in a “Sikhistan” and urged all non-Hindus to rise up in war against Hindus. Given the obscurity of his life before his arrival at Cambridge’s Emmanuel College, what experiences may have led him to such views are not known.

All this was anathema to Mr Jinnah, the secular constitutionalist embarrassed by a reactionary Muslim imperialism in that rapidly modernising era that was the middle of the 20th Century.  When Rahmat Ali pressed the ‘Pakstan’ acronym, Mr Jinnah said Bengal was not in it and Muslim minority regions were absent.  At this Chaudhury-Sahib produced a general scheme of Muslim domination all over the subcontinent: there would be “Pakstan” in the northwest including Kashmir, Delhi and Agra; “Bangistan” in Bengal; “Osmanistan” in Hyderabad; “Siddiquistan” in Bundelhand and Malwa; “Faruqistan” in Bihar and Orissa; “Haideristan” in UP; “Muinistan” in Rajasthan; “Maplistan” in Kerala; even “Safiistan” in “Western Ceylon” and “Nasaristan” in “Eastern Ceylon”, etc.  In 1934 he published and widely circulated such a diagram among Muslims in Britain at the time.  He was not invited to the Lahore Resolution which did not refer to Pakistan though came to be called the Pakistan Resolution.  When he landed in the new Pakistan, he was apparently arrested and deported back and was never granted a Pakistan passport.  From England, he turned his wrath upon the new government, condemning Mr Jinnah as treacherous and newly re-interpreting his acronym to refer to Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan (sic), Afghanistan, and Balochistan.  The word “pak” coincidentally meant pure, so he began to speak of Muslims as “the Pak” i.e. “the pure” people, and of how the national destiny of the new Pakistan was to liberate “Pak” people everywhere, including the new India, and create a “Pak Commonwealth of Nations” stretching from Arabia to the Indies.  The map he now drew placed the word “Punjab” over J&K, and saw an Asia dominated by this “Pak” empire. Shunned by officialdom of the new Pakistan, Chaudhury-Sahib was a tragic figure who died in poverty and obscurity during an influenza epidemic in 1951; the Master of Emmanuel College paid for his funeral and was apparently later reimbursed for this by the Government of Pakistan.  In recent years he has undergone a restoration, and his grave at Cambridge has become a site of pilgrimage for ideologues, while his diagrams and writings have been reprinted in Pakistan’s newspapers as recently as February 2005.

1937-1941 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan

Chaudhary Rahmat Ali’s harshest critic at the time was the eminent statesman and Premier of Punjab Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942), partner of the 1937 Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and an author of the Lahore Resolution.  His statement of 11 March 1941 in the Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates is a classic:

“No Pakistan scheme was passed at Lahore… As for Pakistan schemes, Maulana Jamal-ud-Din’s is the earliest…Then there is the scheme which is attributed to the late Allama Iqbal of revered memory.  He, however, never formulated any definite scheme but his writings and poems have given some people ground to think that Allama Iqbal desired the establishment of  some sort of  Pakistan.  But it is not difficult to explode this theory and to prove conclusively that his conception of  Islamic solidarity and universal brotherhood is not in conflict with Indian patriotism and is in fact quite different from the ideology now sought to be attributed to him by some enthusiasts… Then there is Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali’s scheme (*laughter*)…it was widely circulated in this country and… it was also given wide publicity at the time in a section of the British press.  But there is another scheme…it was published in one of the British journals, I think Round Table, and was conceived by an Englishman…..the word Pakistan was not used at the League meeting and this term was not applied to (the League’s Lahore) resolution by anybody until the Hindu press had a brain-wave and dubbed it Pakistan…. The ignorant masses  have now adopted the slogan provided by the short-sighted bigotry of the Hindu and Sikh press…they overlooked the fact that the word Pakistan might have an appeal – a strong appeal – for the Muslim masses.  It is a catching phrase and it has caught popular imagination and has thus made confusion worse confounded…. So far as we in the Punjab are concerned, let me assure you that we will not countenance or accept any proposal that does not secure freedom for all (*cheers*).  We do not desire that Muslims should domineer here, just as we do not want the Hindus to domineer where Muslims are in a minority. Now would we allow anybody or section to thwart us because Muslims happen to be in a majority in this province.  We do not ask for freedom that there may be a Muslim Raj here and Hindu Raj elsewhere.  If that is what Pakistan means I will have nothing to do with it.   If Pakistan means unalloyed Muslim Raj in the Punjab then I will have nothing to do with it (*hear, hear*)…. If you want real freedom for the Punjab, that is to say a Punjab in which every community will have its due share in the economic and administrative fields as partners in a common concern, then that Punjab will not be Pakistan but just Punjab, land of the five rivers; Punjab is Punjab and will always remain Punjab whatever anybody may say (*cheers*).  This, then, briefly is the future which I visualize for my province and for my country under any new constitution.

Intervention (Malik Barkat Ali): The Lahore resolution says the same thing.

Premier: Exactly; then why misinterpret it and try to mislead the  masses?…”

1937-1947  Quad-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

During the Third Round Table Conference, Dr Iqbal persuaded Mr Jinnah (1876-1948) to return to India; Mr Jinnah, from being settled again in his London law practice, did so in 1934.  But following the 1935 Govt of India Act, the Muslim League failed badly when British India held its first elections in 1937 not only in Bengal and UP but in Punjab (one seat), NWFP and Sind.

World War II, like World War I a couple of brief decades earlier, then changed the political landscape completely. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September.  The next day, India’s British Viceroy (Linlithgow) granted Mr Jinnah the political parity with Congress that he had sought.[6]  Professor Francis Robinson suggests that until 4 September 1939 the British

“had had little time for Jinnah and his League.  The Government’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September, however, transformed the situation. A large part of the army was Muslim, much of the war effort was likely to rest on the two Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The following day, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks on an equal footing with Gandhi…. As the Congress began to demand immediate independence, the Viceroy took to reassuring Jinnah that Muslim interests would be safeguarded in any constitutional change. Within a few months, he was urging the League to declare a constructive policy for the future, which was of course presented in the Lahore Resolution[7]…. In their August 1940 offer, the British confirmed for the benefit of Muslims that power would not be transferred against the will of any significant element in Indian life. And much the same confirmation was given in the Cripps offer nearly two years later…. Throughout the years 1940 to 1945, the British made no attempt to tease out the contradictions between the League’s two-nation theory, which asserted that Hindus and Muslims came from two different civilisations and therefore were two different nations, and the Lahore Resolution, which demanded that ‘Independent States’ should be constituted from the Muslim majority provinces of the NE and NW, thereby suggesting that Indian Muslims formed not just one nation but two. When in 1944 the governors of Punjab and Bengal urged such a move on the Viceroy, Wavell ignored them, pressing ahead instead with his own plan for an all-India conference at Simla. The result was to confirm, as never before in the eyes of leading Muslims in the majority provinces, the standing of Jinnah and the League. Thus, because the British found it convenient to take the League seriously, everyone had to as well—Congressmen, Unionists, Bengalis, and so on…”[8]

 Mr Jinnah was himself amazed by the new British attitude towards him:

“(S)uddenly there was a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi.”

Britain, threatened for its survival, faced an obdurate Indian leadership and even British socialists sympathetic to Indian aspirations grew cold (Gandhi dismissing the 1942 Cripps offer as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank”).  Official Britain’s loyalties had been consistently with those who had been loyal to them, and it was unsurprising there would be a tilt to empower Mr Jinnah soon making credible the real possibility of Pakistan.[9]  By 1946, Britain was exhausted, pre-occupied with rationing, Berlin, refugee resettlement and countless other post-War problems — Britain had not been beaten in war but British imperialism was finished because of the War.  Muslim opinion in British India had changed decisively in the League’s favour.   But the  subcontinent’s political processes were drastically spinning out of everyone’s control towards anarchy and blood-letting.  Implementing a lofty vision of a cultured progressive consolidated Muslim state in India’s NorthWest descended into “Direct Action” with urban mobs  shouting Larke lenge Pakistan; Marke lenge Pakistan; Khun se lenge Pakistan; Dena hoga Pakistan.[10]

We shall return to Mr Jinnah’s view on the legal position of the “Native Princes” of “Indian India” during this critical time, specifically J&K; here it is essential before proceeding only to record his own vision for the new Pakistan as recorded by the profoundly judicious report of Justice Munir and Justice Kayani a mere half dozen years later:

“Before the Partition, the first public picture of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam gave to the world was in the course of an interview in New Delhi with Mr. Doon Campbell, Reuter’s Correspondent. The Quaid-i-Azam said that the new State would be a modern democratic State, with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed.  When Pakistan formally appeared on the map, the Quaid-i-Azam in his memorable speech of 11th August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, while stating the principle on which the new State was to be founded, said:—‘All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations., there will be no end to the progress you will make.  “I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathana, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this (Applause). Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State (Hear, hear). As you know, history shows that in England conditions sometime ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (Loud applause). The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the Government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. “Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State’. The Quaid-i-Azam was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own people including non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new State was to devote all its energies. There are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future subject of the State is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective of colour, caste, creed or community. The word ‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to do with the business of the State and to be merely a matter of personal faith for the individual.”

1940s et seq  Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir Jama’at-i-Islami

The eminent theologian Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi (1903-1979), founder of the Jama’at-i-Islami, had been opposed to the Pakistan Principle but once Pakistan was created he became the most eminent votary of an Islamic State, declaring:

 “That the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to God Almighty alone and that the Government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent”.

 In such a view, Islam becomes

“the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Lawmaking is their prerogative and legislation must correspond to the mood and temper of their opinion… Islam… altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the viceregency (Khilafat) of man.”

Maulana Maudoodi was asked by Justice Munir and Justice Kayani:

 “Q.—Is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic State in the position of dar-ul-harb ?

A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.

“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?

A.—Yes.

Q.—Does it differ fundamentally from the modern International Law of war?

A.—These two systems are based on a fundamental difference.

Q.—What rights have non-Muslims who are taken prisoners of war in a jihad?

A.—The Islamic law on the point is that if the country of which these prisoners are nationals pays ransom, they will be released. An exchange of prisoners is also permitted. If neither of these alternatives is possible, the prisoners will be converted into slaves for ever. If any such person makes an offer to pay his ransom out of his own earnings, he will be permitted to collect the money necessary for the fidya (ransom).

Q.—Are you of the view that unless a Government assumes the form of an Islamic Government, any war declared by it is not a jihad?

A.—No. A war may be declared to be a jihad if it is declared by a national Government of Muslims in the legitimate interests of the State. I never expressed the opinion attributed to me in Ex. D. E. 12:— (translation)‘The question remains whether, even if the Government of Pakistan, in its present form and structure, terminates her treaties with the Indian Union and declares war against her, this war would fall under the definition of jihad? The opinion expressed by him in this behalf is quite correct. Until such time as the Government becomes Islamic by adopting the Islamic form of Government, to call any of its wars a jihad would be tantamount to describing the enlistment and fighting of a non-Muslim on the side of the Azad Kashmir forces jihad and his death martyrdom. What the Maulana means is that, in the presence of treaties, it is against Shari’at, if the Government or its people participate in such a war. If the Government terminates the treaties and declares war, even then the war started by Government would not be termed jihad unless the Government becomes Islamic’.

….

“Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion?

A—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India.”

.…

“Q.—What will be the duty of the Muslims in India in case of war between India and Pakistan?

A.—Their duty is obvious, and that is not to fight against Pakistan or to do anything injurious to the safety of Pakistan.”

1947-1950 PM Liaquat Ali Khan, 1966 Gen Ayub Khan, 2005 Govt of Pakistan et seq

In contrast to Maulana Maudoodi saying Islam was “the very antithesis of secular Western democracy”,  Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951)[11] during his first official visit in 1950 to North America was to say the new Pakistan, because it was Muslim, held Asia’s greatest democratic potential:

“At present there is no democracy in Asia which is more free and more unified than Pakistan; none so free from moral doubts and from strains between the various sections of the people.”

He told his audiences Pakistan was created because Hindus were people wedded to caste-differences where Pakistanis as Muslims had an egalitarian and democratic disposition:

“The Hindus, for example, believe in the caste system according to which some human beings are born superior to others and cannot have any social relations with those in the lower castes or with those who are not Hindus.   They cannot marry them or eat with them or even touch them without being polluted.   The Muslims abhor the caste system, as they are a democratic people and believe in the equality of men and equal opportunities for all, do not consider a priesthood necessary, and have economic laws and institutions which recognize the right of private ownership and yet are designed to promote the distribution of wealth and to put healthy checks on vast unearned accumulations… so the Hindus and the Muslims decided to part and divide British India into two independent sovereign states… Our demand for a country of our own had, as you see, a strong democratic urge behind it.  The emergence of Pakistan itself was therefore the triumph of a democratic idea.  It enabled at one stroke a democratic nation of eighty million people to find a place of its own in Asia, where now they can worship God in freedom and pursue their own way of life uninhibited by the domination or the influence of ways and beliefs that are alien or antagonistic to their genius.” [12]

President Ayub Khan would state in similar vein on 18 November 1966 at London’s Royal Institute of International Affairs:

“the root of the problem was the conflicting ideologies of India and Pakistan. Muslim Pakistan believed in common brotherhood and giving people equal opportunity.  India and Hinduism are based on inequality and on colour and race.  Their basic concept is the caste system… Hindus and Muslims could never live under one Government, although they might live side by side.”

Regarding J&K, Liaquat Ali Khan on November 4 1947 broadcast from here in Lahore that the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar was “infamous” in having caused an  “immoral and illegal” ownership of Jammu & Kashmir.  He, along with Mr Jinnah, had called Sheikh Abdullah a “goonda” and “hoodlum” and “Quisling” of India, and on February 4 1948 Pakistan formally challenged the sovereignty of the Dogra dynasty in the world system of nations.  In 1950 during his North American visit though, the Prime Minister allowed that J&K was a “princely state” but said

“culturally, economically, geographically and strategically, Kashmir – 80 per cent of whose peoples like the majority of the people in Pakistan are Muslims – is in fact an integral part of Pakistan”;

“(the) bulk of the population (are) under Indian military occupation”.

Pakistan’s official self-image, portrayal of India, and position on J&K may have not changed greatly since her founding Prime Minister’s statements.   For example, in June 2005 the website of the Government of Pakistan’s Permanent Mission at the UN stated:

“Q: How did Hindu Raja (sic) become the ruler of Muslim majority Kashmir?

A: Historically speaking Kashmir had been ruled by the Muslims from the 14th Century onwards.  The Muslim rule continued till early 19th Century when the ruler of Punjab conquered  Kashmir and gave Jammu to a Dogra Gulab Singh who purchased Kashmir from the British in 1846 for a sum of 7.5 million rupees.”

“India’s forcible occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 is the main cause of the dispute. India claims to have ‘signed’ a controversial document, the Instrument of Accession, on 26 October 1947 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which the Maharaja obtained India’s military help against popular insurgency.   The people of Kashmir and Pakistan do not accept the Indian claim.   There are doubts about the very existence of the Instrument of Accession.  The United Nations also does not consider Indian claim as legally valid: it recognises Kashmir as a disputed territory.   Except India, the entire world community recognises Kashmir as a disputed territory. The fact is that all the principles on the basis of which the Indian subcontinent was partitioned by the British in 1947 justify Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan:  the State had majority Muslim population, and it not only enjoyed geographical proximity with Pakistan but also had essential economic linkages with the territories constituting Pakistan.”

India, a country dominated by the hated-Hindus, has forcibly denied Srinagar Valley’s Muslim majority over the years the freedom to become part of Muslim Pakistan – I stand here to be corrected but, in a nutshell, such has been and remains Pakistan’s official view and projection of the Kashmir problem over more than sixty years.[13]

Part II

  1. India’s Point of View: British Negligence/Indifference during the Transfer of Power, A Case of Misgovernance in the Chaotic Aftermath of World War II

(a)    Rhetoric: Whose Pakistan?  Which Kashmir?

(b)    Law: (i) Liaquat-Zafrullah-Abdullah-Nehru United in Error Over the Second Treaty of Amritsar! Dogra J&K subsists Mar 16 1846-Oct 22 1947. Aggression, Anarchy, Annexations: The LOC as De Facto Boundary by Military Decision Since Jan 1 1949.  (ii) Legal Error & Confusion Generated by 12 May 1946 Memorandum. (iii) War: Dogra J&K attacked by Pakistan, defended by India: Invasion, Mutiny, Secession of “Azad Kashmir” & Gilgit, Rape of Baramulla, Siege of Skardu.

  1. Politics: What is to be Done? Towards Truths, Normalisation, Peace in the 21st Century

The Present Situation is Abnormal & Intolerable. There May Be One (and Only One) Peacable Solution that is Feasible: Revealing Individual Choices Privately with Full Information & Security: Indian “Green Cards”/PIO-OCI status for Hurriyat et al: A Choice of Nationality (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran).  Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar & Gilgit etc: De Jure Recognition of the Boundary, Diplomatic Normalisation,  Economic & Military Cooperation.

  1. Appendices:

(a)    History of Jammu & Kashmir until the Dogra Native State

(b)    Pakistan’s Allies (including A Brief History of Gilgit)

(c)    India’s Muslim Voices

(d)    Pakistan’s Muslim Voices: An Excerpt from the Munir Report

 


[1] EIJ Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, 1965, pp.196-197.

[2] A contemporary of Mohammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab of Nejd.

[3] Francis Robinson in  WE James & Subroto Roy, Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, 1993, p. 36.  Indeed Barelwi had created a proto-Pakistan in NorthWest India one hundred years before the Pakistan Movement. “In the later 1820s the movement became militant, regarding jihad as one of the basic tenets of faith.  Possibly encouraged by the British, with whom the movement did not feel powerful enough to come to grips at the outset, it chose as the venue of jihad the NW frontier of the subcontinent, where it was directed against the Sikhs.  Barelwi temporarily succeeded in carving out a small theocratic principality which collapsed owing to the friction between his Pathan and North Indian followers; and he was finally defeated and slain by the Sikhs in 1831″ (Aziz Ahmed, in  AL Basham (ed) A Cultural History of India 1976, p. 384).   Professor Robinson answered a query of mine in an email of 8 August 2005: “the fullest description of this is in Mohiuddin Ahmad, Saiyid Ahmad Shahid (Lucknow, 1975), although practically everyone who deals with the period covers it in some way. Barelwi was the Amir al-Muminin of a jihadi community which based itself north of Peshawar and for a time controlled Peshawar.  He called his fellowship the Tariqa-yi Muhammadiya.  Barelwi corresponded with local rulers about him.  After his death at the battle of Balakot, it survived in the region, at Sittana I think, down to World War One.”

[4] Rosenthal, ibid., p 235

[5] Germans

[6] Events remote from India’s history and geography, namely, the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, had contributed between 1937 and 1947 to the change of fortunes of the Muslim League and hence of all the people of the subcontinent.  The British had long discovered that mutual antipathy between Muslims and Hindus could be utilised in fashioning their rule; specifically that organisation and mobilisation of Muslim communal opinion was a useful counterweight to any pan-Indian nationalism emerging to compete with British authority. As early as 1874, long before Allan Octavian Hume ICS conceived the Indian National Congress, John Strachey ICS observed “The existence side by side of these (Hindu and Muslim) hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are a source of strength to us and not of weakness. They constitute a comparatively small but an energetic minority of the population whose political interests are identical with ours.” By 1906, when a deputation of Muslims headed by the Aga Khan first approached the British pleading for communal representation, Minto the Viceroy replied: “I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement, regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this Continent.” Minto’s wife wrote in her diary the effect was “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty two millions of (Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” (The true significance of Maulana Azad may have been that he, precisely at the same time, did indeed feel within himself the nationalist’s desire for freedom strongly enough to want to join the ranks of that seditious opposition.)

[7] “That geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”.

[8] Robinson ibid, pp. 43-44.

[9] In the “Indian India” of the Native Princes, Hari Singh and others who sent troops to fight as part of British armies (and who were nominal members of Churchill’s War Cabinet) would have their vanities flattered, while Sheikh Abdullah’s rebellion against Dogra rule would be ignored. See seq. And in British India, Mr Jinnah the conservative Anglophile and his elitist Muslim League would be backed, while the radicalised masses of the Gandhi-Bose-Nehru Congress suppressed as a nuisance.

[10] An anthology about Lahore reports memories of a murderous mob arriving at a wealthy man’s home to be placated  with words like  “They are Parsis not Hindus, no need to kill them…”

[11] An exact contemporary of Chaudhury Rahmat Ali.

[12] Pakistan, Harvard University Press, 1950.

[13] It is not far from this to a certain body of sentiments frequently found, for example, as recently as February 5 2011: “To observe the Kashmir Solidarity Day, various programs, rallies and protests will be held on Saturday (today) across the city to support the people of Kashmir in their struggle against the Indian occupation of their land.  Various religious, political, social and other organizations have arranged different programs to highlight the atrocities of Indian occupant army in held Jammu and Kashmir where about 800,000 Indian soldiers have been committing atrocities against innocent civilians; killing, wounding and maiming tens of thousands of people; raping thousands of women and setting houses, shops and crops on fire to break the Kashmiris’ will to fight for their freedom…Jamat-ud-Dawah…leaders warned that a ‘jihad’ would be launched if Kashmir was not liberated through civil agitation…the JuD leaders said first the former President, Pervez Musharraf, and now the current dispensation were extending the olive branch to New Delhi despite the atrocities on the Kashmiri people….the Pakistani nation would (never compromise on the issue of Kashmir and) would continue to provide political, moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri people.”

My Seventy Four Articles, Books (now in pdf 2021), Notes Etc on Kashmir, Pakistan, & of course, India (plus my undelivered Lahore lectures)

2) Law, Justice and Jammu & Kashmir (2006)

https://independentindian.com/2006/07/03/law-justice-and-jk/

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152464726125

Monday, October 5, 2009

3) Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason (2005)
https://independentindian.com/2005/12/03/solving-kashmir-on-an-application-of-reason/

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152462776125

Monday, October 5, 2009

4) My (armchair) experience of the 1999 Kargil war (Or, How the Kargil effort got a little help from a desktop)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=388161476125

Thursday, April 29, 2010

5) Understanding Pakistan (2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152348161125

Monday, October 5, 2009

6) Pakistan’s Allies (2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152345826125

Monday, October 5, 2009

7) History of Jammu & Kashmir

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=152343836125

Monday, October 5, 2009

8) from 30 years ago, now in pdf

Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s edited by Subroto Roy & William E James

indvol

Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s edited by William E James & Subroto Roy

pakvol

9) Talking to my student and friend Amir Malik about Pakistan and its problems

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150297082781126

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

10) My thanks to Mr Singh for seeing the optimality of my Kashmir solution

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150271489571126

Sunday, September 4, 2011

11) Zafrullah, my father, and the three frigates: there was no massacre of the Hindu Sindhi refugees in Karachi in 1947

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150265008366126

Saturday, August 27, 2011

12) Conversation with Mr Birinder R Singh about my Kashmir solution

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150259831611126

Saturday, August 20, 2011

13) On the Hurriyat’s falsification of history

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150258949946126

Friday, August 19, 2011

14) Letter from a young Pashtun whose grandfathers were in the 1947 invasion of Kashmir (which the Hurriyat says never happened)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150258851821126

Friday, August 19, 2011

15) More on my solution

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150258100876126

Thursday, August 18, 2011

16  ) A Hurriyat/Taliban Islamist emirate in the Valley subject to an Indian blockade would likely face famine.

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150257700231126

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

17) There is no Kashmiri nationality and there never has been in the modern era of international law

https://www.facebook.com/notes/subroto-roy/there-is-no-kashmiri-nationality-and-there-never-has-been-in-the-modern-era-of-i/10150255815456126

Monday, August 15, 2011

18) Of the Flag of Pakistan, and the Union Jack, and the Flag of India — August 14-15 1947

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150255301456126

Sunday, August 14, 2011

19) Talking about Kashmir in 1947 to Ralph Coti

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150254871116126

Saturday, August 13, 2011

20) Conversation with Prof. Bhim Singh about 1947

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150254495896126

Saturday, August 13, 2011

21) The LOC represents the division of ownerless, sovereignless territory won by military conquest by either side…

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150245816611126

Monday, August 1, 2011

22) Talking to Mr Tauseef

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150245521131126

Monday, August 1, 2011

23) J&K had ceased to exist as an entity in international law by August 15 1947, at most by October 22 1947

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150244867021126

Sunday, July 31, 2011

24) Would someone be kind enough to tell me which freedoms Indian Kashmiris are being deprived of?

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150243323381126

Friday, July 29, 2011

25) Kunan Poshpora: I would say the evidence reported by the Verghese Committee itself was enough to indicate there had been rape 28 July 2011

https://www.facebook.com/notes/subroto-roy/kunan-poshpora-i-would-say-the-evidence-reported-by-the-verghese-committee-itsel/10150242580476126

26) Talking to Mr Rameez Makhdoomi about Kashmir

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150241973371126

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

27) And, as you well know, General Hasnain is both Muslim and Kashmiri, besides being the Commanding Officer of 15 Corps.

http://www.facebook.com/subyroy?sk=notes&s=40

Friday, July 22, 2011

28) Kashmir needs a Coroner’s Office!

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150238284741126

Friday, July 22, 2011

29) A slogan for Kashmir: No exaggerations, no hallucinations, no cover-ups please: Just the plain facts & accountability

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150238136556126

Friday, July 22, 2011

30) Towards a Spatial Model of Kashmir’s Political History

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150234599731126

Sunday, July 17, 2011

31) Why did Allama Iqbal say “India is the greatest Muslim country in the world…”?

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150233148866126

Friday, July 15, 2011

32) Conversation with Mr Arif

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150230793806126

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

33) Omar Qayoom Bhat: A Victim of State Repression in J&K

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150229389496126

Monday, July 11, 2011

34) Good and evil in Kashmir over more than a millennium…

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150217168656126

Sunday, June 26, 2011

35) Letter to Mr Zargar (Continued)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150212034496126

June 23, 2011

36) From the Official Indian Army website re Human Rights Violations

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150210741356126

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

37) A Facebook Discussion on Kashmir with the Lahore Oxford & Cambridge Society

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150208871201126

Sunday, June 19, 2011

38) Answering two central questions on the Kashmir Problem

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150202054326126

Friday, June 10, 2011

39) Some articles on Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150201498846126

Friday, June 10, 2011

40) Lar ke lenge Pakistan? Khun se lenge Pakistan?

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150195065706126

Thursday, June 2, 2011

41) On Pakistan & Questions of the Nature & Jurisprudence of Polities

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150165301016126

Saturday, April 30, 2011

42) On “state involvement” (January 2009)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?

on Friday, April 22, 2011

43) My four main 2005-06 articles on the existence of a unique, stable solution to Kashmir

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150155305266126

Sunday, April 17, 2011

44) On the present state of the Pakistan-India dialogue

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150140448906126

Thursday, March 31, 2011

45) Mixed messages (from a Dec 2008 post on Pakistan just after the Mumbai massacres)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150117696731126

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

46) New Foreign Policy? “Kiss Up, Kick Down”? (October 2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150098854806126

Friday, March 4, 2011

47) Conversations with Kashmiris: An Ongoing Facebook Note

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=489267761125

Saturday, January 22, 2011

48) On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State, 1949, 1954

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=486039761125

Saturday, January 15, 2011

49) A Modern Military (2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=483556931125

Monday, January 10, 2011

50) India’s Muslim Voices: Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan (1892-1942), Punjab Prime Minister 1941

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=476020171125

Monday, December 27, 2010

51) Pre-Partition Indian Secularism Case-Study: Fuzlul Huq and Manindranath Roy

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=445015731125

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

52) A Brief Note on Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and the Pashtuns 1971-2010

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=414500306125

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

53) On the Existence of a Unique and Stable Solution to the Jammu & Kashmir Problem that is Lawful, Just and Economically Efficient

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=407478886125

Monday, July 5, 2010

54) Seventy Years Today (Sep 4 2009) Since the British Govt Politically Empowered MA Jinnah

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=407310716125

Monday, July 5, 2010

55) Justice & Afzal (Oct 14 2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=393914236125

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

56) A Brief History of Gilgit

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=336081356125

Monday, March 1, 2010

57)  India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy (2007)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=299902341125

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

58) Ambassador Holbrooke’s error of historical fact

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=259713446125

Sunday, January 17, 2010

59) Of a new New Delhi myth & the success of the Univ of Hawaii 1986-1992 Pakistan project (Nov 15 2008)

https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=247284116125

Sunday, 10 January 2010

60) Was Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah (1905-1982), Lion of Kashmir, the greatest Muslim political leader of the 20th Century?

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=244956301125

Friday, January 8, 2010

61) On Indian Nationhood: From Tamils To Kashmiris & Assamese & Mizos To Sikhs & Goans (2007)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=222511821125

Friday, December 25, 2009

62) India has never, not once, initiated hostilities against Pakistan (2009)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=194400926125

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

63) RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks (Jan 25 2009)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=189261716125

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

64) Memo to the Hon’ble Attorneys General of Pakistan & India (January 16 2009)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=189251816125

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

65) On Hindus and Muslims (2005)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=172649451125

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

66) Iqbal & Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali in Pakistan’s creation (2005)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=171039831125

Saturday, October 31, 2009

67) Have “mixed messages” caused a “double-bind” in the US-Pakistan relationship?

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=164051251125

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

68) Pakistan’s Kashmir obsession: Sheikh Abdullah Relied In Politics On The French Constitution, Not Islam (Feb 16 2008)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=154064436125

Thursday, October 8, 2009

69) Two cheers for Pakistan! (April 7 2008)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=154062896125

Thursday, October 8, 2009

70) What to tell Musharraf: Peace Is Impossible Without Non-Aggressive Pakistani Intentions (Dec 15 2006)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=153985256125

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

71) India’s Muslim Voices (Dec 4 2008)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=153977181125

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

72) Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times” (2007)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=153971996125

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

73) The Greatest Pashtun: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988)

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=153812126125

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

74) KashNFL

William E (Ted) James, Dec 21 1951- May 19 2010, friend & collaborator: How we made a little bit of history together

“Professor Roy?”, a smooth baritone asked me on the phone, within a week or so of my entering my Manoa office in the Fall of 1986. “Yes?”, I said, “My name is Ted James, and I was wondering if we could have lunch; I wanted to talk to you about working together on India”. “I thought I’d met everyone in the Department”, said I. “We at the East West Center are a bit of a mysterious bunch”, he joked. Oh so this is the US Govt calling, I said to myself, better watch out. “Well, I’ve published on India already”, I said referring to my IEA monograph which had attracted the leader of the London Times a year and a half earlier, and trying to indicate that I felt I had done my bit for India and did not see myself doing much more. “I know you have, your reputation precedes you, that’s why I thought we should meet”, he said.

 

So we met at a nondescript campus café for some stir-fry. Ted was an excessively handsome Southern Californian straight out of Hollywood central casting, and the most unlikely-looking American economist I have ever met. I am 6’ and I think he was perhaps 5’9” but slimmer and more muscular with long blond hair, bright blue eyes, a fabulous magnetic smile, someone who might easily have been a hero in a TV serial or an afternoon soap-opera.

 

He wasn’t a film-star though but an economist, though not a nerdy one like myself at the time, and he had a tremendous almost evangelical keenness to not merely comprehend the economic policy-making process of so-called developing countries, especially in Asia, but also change them for the better.

 

I was 31, Ted must have been about 34 when we first met for that stir-fry lunch. He did indeed know my 1984 work which was enough to win me over as London and Cambridge, or for that matter Blacksburg and Provo from where I had come, seemed very far away from Manoa at the time. Not only did he know my work, he had already referred to it in the references and index and perhaps the notes of a new book he had co-edited on Asian Development, which was remarkable as lags in publication and research were long.

 

Ted proposed at the lunch that he and I work together on “South Asia”, and that he would get funding from the East West Center. I suggested there was no such place, that “South Asia” was a State Department abstraction, but there were individual and complex countries, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh – and Afghanistan and Nepal too…. He agreed. We would start with working together on the theory of economic policy reform as applied to India and Pakistan first…

 

And so it began…

 

Legally speaking the funding came from the State of Hawaii and not the United States Government, from funds owed to the former by the latter.  Of the total budget of some $100,000 I was very miserly and returned 25% of it unspent, an unheard of thing.  Milton Friedman commanded a speaking fee at the time of $10,000, and agreed to our nominal $1,000 for a two-day visit on condition we told no one.:)  A Pakistani author was among several Pakistani scholars who thanked me for putting the volume together, as the first time Pakistan had been taken seriously in American academia; he asked me how much it cost, when I said $35,000 for the Pakistan book, he said the IMF would spend that over a  weekend at Bretton Woods and get nothing ….

 

As described elsewhere, the manuscript of the India-volume contributed to the origins of India’s 1991 economic reform during my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi in his last months; the Pakistan-volume came to contribute to the origins of the Pakistan-India peace process. (“In 2004 from Britain, I wrote to the 9/11 Commission stating that it was possible that had the vicious illegalities against me not occurred at Manoa starting in 1989, we may have gone on after India and Pakistan to study Afghanistan, and come up with a pre-emptive academic analysis a decade before September 11 2001.”)

 

friedman-et-al-at-uh-india-conf-19891

 

 

I came to know from Ted’s wife Tess in June that Ted had died of cancer in Manila on May 19 2010 aged 58.

 

I said to her and her family  that I do not weep for many but do weep for Ted.

(More to come… this will be a technology-consistent ongoing obituary for my friend and collaborator, which he would have found amusing for sure…)…

see also

See also https://independentindian.com/2013/08/23/did-jagdish-bhagwati-originate-pioneer-intellectually-father-indias-1991-economic-reform-did-manmohan-singh-or-did-i-through-my-encounter-with-rajiv-gandhi-just-as-siddhartha-shan/

On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State: An Excerpt from the Munir Report of 1954

On Pakistan and the Theory & Practice of the Islamic State: An Excerpt from the Munir Report of 1954

 

From REPORT of THE COURT OF INQUIRY constituted under PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954 to enquire into the PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953 “Munir Report”

 

“ISLAMIC STATE
It has been repeatedly said before us that implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic State. Some speeches of important leaders who were striving for Pakistan undoubtedly lend themselves to this construction. These leaders while referring to an Islamic State or to a State governed by Islamic laws perhaps had in their minds the pattern of a legal structure based on or mixed up with Islamic dogma, personal law, ethics and institutions. No one who has given serious thought to the introduction of a religious State in Pakistan has failed to notice the tremendous difficulties with which any such scheme must be confronted. Even Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, who must be considered to be the first thinker who conceived of the possibility of a consolidated North Western Indian Muslim State, in the course of his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 said:

“Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such States. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism”.

When we come to deal with the question of responsibility we shall have the occasion to point out that the most important of the parties who are now clamouring for the enforcement of the three demands on religious grounds were all against the idea of an Islamic State. Even Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi of Jama’at-i-Islami was of the view that the form of Government in the new Muslim State, if it ever came into existence, could only be secular.

Before the Partition, the first public picture of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam gave to the world was in the course of an interview in New Delhi with Mr. Doon Campbell, Reuter’s Correspondent. The Quaid-i-Azam said that the new State would be a modern democratic State, with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed. When Pakistan formally appeared on the map, the Quaid-i-Azam in his memorable speech of 11th August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, while stating the principle on which the new State was to be founded, said:—

 

“All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations., there will be no end to the progress you will make. “I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathana, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this (Applause). Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State (Hear, hear). As you know, history shows that in England conditions sometime ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (Loud applause). The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the Government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. “Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”.

The Quaid-i-Azam was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own people including non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new State was to devote all its energies. There are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future subject of the State is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective of colour, caste, creed or community. The word ‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to do with the business of the State and to be merely a matter of personal faith for the individual.

 

We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State was acceptable to them and everyone of them replied in an unhesitating negative, including the Ahrar and erstwhile Congressites with whom before the Partition this conception was almost a part of their faith.

 

If Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi’s evidence correctly represents the view of Jama’at-i-Islami, a State based on this idea is the creature of the devil, and he is confirmed in this by several writings of his chief, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the founder of the jama’at. None of the ulama can tolerate a State which is based on nationalism and all that it implies; with them millat and all that it connotes can alone be the determining factor in State activity.

 

The Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national State, it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949; but it has been freely admitted that this Resolution, though grandiloquent in words, phrases and clauses, is nothing but a hoax and that not only does it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic State but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic State.

 

 

FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC STATE

What is then the Islamic State of which everybody talks but nobody thinks? Before we seek to discover an answer to this question, we must have a clear conception of the scope and function of the State.

The ulama were divided in their opinions when they were asked to cite some precedent of an Islamic State in Muslim history. Thus, though Hafiz Kifayat Husain, the Shia divine, held out as his ideal the form of Government during the Holy Prophet’s time, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi also included in his precedent the days of the Islamic Republic, of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Salah-ud-Din Ayyubi of Damascus, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad Tughlaq and Aurangzeb and the present regime in Saudi Arabia. Most of them, however, relied on the form of Government during the Islamic Republic from 632 to 661 A. D., a period of less than thirty years, though some of them also added the very short period of Umar bin Abdul Aziz.

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni stated that the details of the ideal State would be worked out by the ulama while Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari’s confused notion of an Islamic State may be gathered from the following portion of his interrogation :—

“Q.—Were you also in the Khilafat movement ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—When did the Khilafat movement stop in India ?
A.—In 1923. This was after the Turks had declared their country to be a secular State.
Q.—If you are told that the Khilafat movement continued long after the Turks had abolished Khilafat, will that be correct?
A.—As far as I remember, the Khilafat movement finished with the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turks.
Q.—You are reported to have been a member of the Khilafat movement and having made speeches. Is it correct ?
A.—It could not be correct.
Q.—Was the Congress interested in Khilafat ?
A.— Yes.
Q.—Was Khilafat with you a matter of religious conviction or just a political movement ?
A.— It was purely a religious movement.
Q.— Did the Khilafat movement have the support of Mr Gandhi ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— What was the object of the Khilafat movement ?
A.— The Britisher was injuring the Khilafat institution in Turkey and the Musalman was aggrieved by this attitude of the Britisher.
Q.— Was not the object of the movement to resuscitate the Khilafat among the    Musalmans ?
A.—No.
Q.— Is Khilafat with you a necessary part of Muslim form of Government ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— Are you, therefore, in favour of having a Khilafat in Pakistan ?
A.—Yes.
Q.— Can there be more than one Khalifa of the Muslims ?
A.— No.
Q.— Will the Khalifa of Pakistan be the Khalifa of all the Muslims of the world ?
A.— He should be but cannot be.”

Throughout the three thousand years over which political thought extends, and such thought in its early stages cannot be separated from religion, two questions have invariably presented themselves for consideration : —

(1) what are the precise functions of the State ? and
(2) who shall control the State ?

If the true scope of the activities of the State is the welfare, temporal or spiritual or both of the individual, then the first question directly gives rise to the bigger question:

What is the object of human life and the ultimate destiny of man? On this, widely divergent views have prevailed, not at different times but at one and the same time. The pygmies of equatorial West Africa still believe that their God Komba has sent them into the forest to hunt and dance and sing. The Epicureans meant very much the same when they said that the object of human life is to drink and eat and be merry, for death denies such pleasures. The utilitarians base their institutions on the assumption that the object of human life is to experience pleasant sensations of mind and body, irrespective of what is to come hereafter. The Stoics believed in curbing and reducing all physical desires, and Diogenes found a tub good enough to live in. German philosophers think that the individual lives for the State and that therefore the object of life is service of the State in all that it might decide to undertake and achieve. Ancient Hindu philosophers believed in the logic of the fist with its natural consequence, the law of natural selection and the struggle for survival. The Semitic theory of State, whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic, has always held that the object of human life is to prepare ourselves for the next life and that, therefore, prayer and good works are the only object of life. Greek philosophers beginning with Socrates thought that the object of human life was to engage in philosophical meditation with a view to discovering the great truths that lie in nature and that the business of the others is to feed the philosophers engaged in that undertaking.

Islam emphasises the doctrine that life in this world is not the only life given to man but that eternal life begins after the present existence comes to an end, and that the status of a human being in the next world will depend upon his beliefs and actions in this world. As the present life is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end, not only the individual but also the State, as opposed to the secular theory which bases all political and economic institutions on a disregard of their consequences on the next life, should strive for human conduct which ensures for a person better status in the next world.

According to this theory Islam is the religion which seeks to attain that object. Therefore the question immediately arises : What is Islam and who is a momin or a Muslim ? We put this question to the ulama and we shall presently refer to their answers to this question. But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us that the ulama whose first duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were hopelessly disagreed among themselves.

Apart from how these learned divines have expressed themselves, we conceive of Islam as a system that covers, as every systematic religion must, the following five topics :—
(1) the dogma, namely, the essentials of belief ;
(2) the cult, namely, religious rites and observances which a person must
perform ;
(3) ethics, i. e. rules of moral conduct ;
(4) institutions, social, economic and political ; and
(5) law proper.

The essential basis of the rules on all these subjects is revelation and not reason, though both may coincide. This coincidence, however, is accidental because human reasoning may be faulty and ultimate reason is known only to God, Who sends His message to humanity through His chosen messengers for the direction and guidance of the people. One must, therefore, accept the dogma, observe the cult, follow the ethics, obey the law and establish institutions which God has revealed, though their reason may not be apparent—nay even if they be opposed to human reason. Since an error by God is an impossibility, anything that God has revealed, whether its subject be something occult or preternatural, history, finance, law, worship or something which according to human thought admits of scientific treatment as for instance, birth of man, evolution, cosmology, or astronomy, has got to be accepted as absolute truth. The test of reason is not the acid test and a denial of this amounts to a denial of the supreme wisdom and designs of Allah—it is kufr. Now God has revealed Himself from time to time to His favoured people of whom our Holy Prophet was the last. That revelation is contained in the Qur’an and covers the five topics mentioned above. The true business of a person who believes in Islam is therefore to understand, believe in and act upon that revelation. The people whom God chooses as medium for the transmission of His messages are rasuls (messengers) or nabis (prophets). Since every action or saying of a prophet is, in the case of our own Holy Prophet it certainly was, prompted by Allah, it has the same degree of inerrancy as the formal revelation itself, because prophets are ma’sum, incapable of doing or saying something which is opposed to Divine wishes. These sayings and actions are sunna having the same infallibility as the Qur’an. The record of this sunna is hadith which is to be found in several books which were compiled by Muslim scholars after long, laborious and careful research extending over several generations.

The word hadith means a record of actions or sayings of the Prophet and his companions. At first the sahaba. i. e. people who had lived in the society of the Prophet, were the best authority for a knowledge of the sunna. Later people had to be content with the communications of the tabi’un, i. e. successors, people of the first generation after the Holy Prophet who had received their information from the sahaba, and then in the following generations with the accounts of the so-called successors of the successors (tabi’ul-tabi’un), i.e. people of the second generation after the Holy Prophet, who had concerted with the successors. Marfu’ is a tradition which contains a statement about the Prophet ; mawquf, a tradition that refers only to the sayings or doings of the sahaba ; and maqtu’ a tradition which does not at most go further back than the first generation after the Holy Prophet and deals only with sayings or doings of tabi’un. In some of the ahadith the actual word of God is to be found. Any such tradition is designated Hadith-i-Qudsi or Ilahi as distinguished from an ordinary Hadith-i-Nabvi.

A very large portion of sayings ascribed to the Prophet deals with the ahkam (legal professions), religious obligations, halal and haram (what is allowed and forbidden), with ritual purity, laws regarding food and criminal and civil law. Further they deal with dogma, retribution at the Last Judgment, hell and paradise, angels, creation, revelations, the earlier prophets. Many traditions also contain edifying sayings and moral teachings by the Holy Prophet. The importance of ahadith was realised from the very beginning and they were not only committed to memory but in some cases were reduced to writing. The work of compilation of hadith began in the third century after the Hijra and the Sihah Sitta were all compiled in that century. These are the musannifs of —
(1) Al-Bukhari, died 256/870,
(2) Muslim, died 261/875,
(3) Abu Dawud, died 275/888,
(4) Al-Tirmizi, died 279/892,
(5) All Nasa’i, died 303/915, and
(6) Ibn-i-Maja, died 273/886.

According to modern laws of evidence, including our own, the ahadith are inadmissible evidence of sunna because each of them contains several links of hearsay, but as authority on law they are admissible pro prio vigore. The merit of these collections lies not so much in the fact that (as is often wrongly stated) their authors decided for the first time which of the numerous traditions in circulation were genuine and which false but rather in the fact that they brought together everything that was recognised as genuine in orthodox circles in those days.

The Shias judge hadith from their own stand-point and only consider such traditions reliable as are based on the authority of Ali and his adherents. They have, therefore, their own works on the subject and hold the following five works in particularly high esteem—
(1) Al-Kafi of Muhammad b. Yaqub Al-Kulini, died 328/939,
(2) Man La Yastahdiruhu’ul-Fakih of Muhammad b. Ali b. Babuya Al-Kummi,
died 381/991,
(3) Tahdib Al-Ahkam,
(4) Al-Istibsar Fi-Ma’khtalafa Fihi’l-Akhbar (extract from the preceding) of
Muhammad Altusi, died 459/1067, and
(5) Nahj Al-Balagha (alleged sayings of Ali) of Ali b. Tahir Al-Sharif Al-Murtaza, died 436/1044 (or of his brother Radi Al-Din Al-Baghdadi.)

After the ritual, the dogma and the most important political and social institutions had taken definite shape in the second and third centuries, there arose a certain communis opinio regarding the reliability of most transmitters of tradition and the value of their statement. The main principles of doctrine had already been established in the writings of Malik b. Anas, Al-Shafi’i and other scholars regarded as authoritative in different circles and mainly on the authority of traditional sayings of the Holy Prophet. In the long run no one dared to doubt the truth of these traditions and this almost conclusive presumption of truth has since continued to be attached to the ahadith compiled in the Sihah Sitta.

We have so far arrived at this result that any rule on any subject that may be derived from the Qur’an or the sunna of the Holy Prophet is binding on every Musalman. But since the only evidence of sunna is the hadith, the words sunna and hadith have become mixed up with, and indistinguishable from, each other with the result that the expression Qur’an and hadith is not infrequently employed where the intention is to refer to Qur’an and sunna.

At this stage another principle, equally basic, comes into operation, and that is that Islam is the final religion revealed by God, complete and exhaustive in all respects, and that God will not abrogate, detract from or add to this religion (din) any more than He will send a fresh messenger. The din having been perfected (Akmalto lakum dinokum, Sura V, verse 3), there remains no need for any new code repealing, modifying or amplifying the original code; nor for any fresh messenger or message. In this sense, therefore, prophethood ceased with the Holy Prophet and revelation stopped for ever. This is the doctrine of the cessation of wahi-i-nubuwwat.

If the proposition that Muslim dogma, ethics and institutions, etc., are all based on the doctrine of inerrancy, whether such inerrancy lies in the Qur’an, the sunna, ijma’ or ijtihad-i-mutlaq, is fully comprehended, the various deductions that follow from it will be easily understandable. As the ultimate test of truth, whether the matter be one of a ritual or political or social or economic nature, is revelation and revelation has to be gathered from the Qur’an, and the sunna carries almost the same degree of inerrancy as revelation and the only evidence of sunna is hadith, the first duty of those who desire to establish an Islamic State will be to discover the precise rule applicable to the existing circumstances whether that rule is to be found in the Qur’an or hadith. Obviously the persons most suited for the purpose would be those who have made the Qur’an and hadith their lifelong study, namely, among the Sunnies, the ulama, and among the Shias, the mujtahids who are the spokesmen of the hidden Imam, the ruler de jure divino. The function of these divines would be to engage themselves in discovering rules applicable to particular situations and they will be engaged in a task similar to that in which Greek philosophers were engaged, with only this difference that whereas the latter thought that all truth lay in nature which had merely to be discovered by individual effort, the ulama and the mujtahids will have to get at the truth that lies in the holy Book and the books of hadith.

The ulama Board which was recommended by the Basic Principles Committee was a logical recognition of this principle, and the true objection against that Board should indeed have been that the Board was too inadequate a mechanism to implement the principle which had brought that body into existence.

Ijma’ means concurrence of the mujtahids of the people, i.e., of those who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgment of their own, after the death of the Holy Prophet. The authority of ijma’ rests on the principle of a divine protection against error and is founded on a basal tradition of the Holy Prophet, “My people will never agree in error”, reported in Ibn Maja, By this procedure points which had been in dispute were fixed, and when fixed, they became an essential part of the faith and disbelief in them an act of unbelief (kufr). The essential point to remember about ijma’ is that it represents the agreement of the mujtahids and that the agreement of the masses is especially excluded.

Thus ijma’ has not only fixed unsettled points but has changed settled doctrines of the greatest importance.

The distinction between ijma’ and ijtihad is that whereas the former is collective, the latter is individual. Ijtihad means the exerting of one’s self to the utmost degree to form an opinion in a case or as to a rule of law. This is done by applying analogy to the Qur’an and the sunna. Ijtihad did not originally involve inerrancy, its result being always zann or fallible opinion. Only combined ijtihad led to ijma, and was inerrant. But this broad ijtihad soon passed into special ijtihad of those who had a peculiar right to form judgments. When later doctors looked back to the founding of the four legal schools, they assigned to their founders an ijtihad of the first rank (ijtihad-i-mutlaq). But from time to time individuals appeared who returned to the earliest meaning of ijtihad and claimed for themselves the right to form their own opinion from first principles. One of these was the Hanbalite Ibn Taimiya (died 728). Another was Suyuti (died 911) in whom the claim to ijtihad unites with one to be the mujaddid or renewer of religion in his century. At every time there must exist at least one mujtahid, was his contention, just as in every century there must come a mujaddid.

In Shia Islam there are still absolute mujtahids because they are regarded as the spokesmen of the hidden Imam. Thus collective ijtihad leads to ijma’, and the basis of ijma’ is divine protection against error—inerrancy.

 

 

ESSENTIALS OF ISLAMIC STATE
Since the basis of Islamic law is the principle of inerrancy of revelation and of the Holy Prophet, the law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna is above all man-made laws, and in case of conflict between the two, the latter, irrespective of its nature, must yield to the former. Thus, provided there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna on a matter which according to our conceptions falls within the region of Constitutional Law or International Law, the rule must be given effect to unless that rule itself permits a departure from it. Thus no distinction exists in Islamic law between Constitutional Law and other law, the whole law to be found in the Qur’an and the sunna being a part of the law of the land for Muslim subjects of the State. Similarly if there be a rule in the Qur’an or the sunna relating to the State’s relations with other States or to the relations of Muslim subjects of the State with other States or the subjects of those States, the rule will have the same superiority of sanction as any other law to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna.

Therefore if Pakistan is or is intended to be converted into an Islamic State in the true sense of the word, its Constitution must contain the following five provisions:—

(1) that all laws to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna shall be deemed to be a part of the law of the land for Muslims and shall be enforced accordingly;
(2) that unless the Constitution itself is framed by ijma’-i-ummat, namely, by the agreement of the ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status, any provision in the Constitution which is repugnant to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(3) that unless the existing laws of Pakistan are adapted by ijma’-i-ummat of the kind mentioned above, any provision in the existing law which is contrary to the Qur’an or sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
(4) that any provision in any future law which is repugnant to Qur’an or sunna shall be void;
(5) that no rule of International Law and no provision in any convention or treaty to which Pakistan is a party, which is contrary to the Qur’an or the sunna shall be binding on any Muslim in Pakistan.

 

 

SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAMIC STATE
That the form of Government in Pakistan, if that form is to comply with the principles of Islam, will not be democratic is conceded by the ulama. We have already explained the doctrine of sovereignty of the Qur’an and the sunna. The Objectives Resolution rightly recognised this position when it recited that all sovereignty rests with God Almighty alone. But the authors of that Resolution misused the words ‘sovereign’ and ‘democracy’ when they recited that the Constitution to be framed was for a sovereign State in which principles of democracy as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.

It may be that in the context in which they were used, these words could not be misunderstood by those who are well versed in Islamic principles, but both these words were borrowed from western political philosophy and in that sense they were both wrongly used in the Resolution. When it is said that a country is sovereign, the implication is that its people or any other group of persons in it are entitled to conduct the affairs of that country in any way they like and untrammelled by any considerations except those of expediency and policy. An Islamic State, however, cannot in this sense be sovereign, because it will not be competent to abrogate, repeal or do away with any law in the Qur’an or the sunna. Absolute restriction on the legislative power of a State is a restriction on the sovereignty of the people of that State and if the origin of this restriction lies elsewhere than in the will of the people, then to the extent of that restriction the sovereignty of the State and its people is necessarily taken away. In an Islamic State, sovereignty, in its essentially juristic sense, can only rest with Allah. In the same way, democracy means the rule of the demos, namely, the people, directly by them as in ancient Greece and Rome, or indirectly through chosen representatives as in modern democracies. If the power of the people in the framing of the Constitution or in the framing of the laws or in the sphere of executive action is subject to certain immutable rules, it cannot be said that they can pass any law that they like, or, in the exercise of executive functions, do whatever they like. Indeed if the legislature in an Islamic State is a sort of ijma’, the masses are expressly disqualified from taking part in it because ijma’-i-ummat in Islamic jurisprudence is restricted to ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status and does not at all extend, as in democracy, to the populace.

 

 

OTHER INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIC STATE ACCORDING TO ULAMA

In the preceding pages we have attempted to state as clearly as we could the principles on which a religious State must be built if it is to be called an Islamic State. We now proceed to state some incidents of such State, with particular reference to the ulamas’ conception of it.

 

 

LEGISLATURE AND LEGISLATION

Legislature in its present sense is unknown to the Islamic system. The religiopolitical system which is called din-i-Islam is a complete system which contains in itself the mechanism for discovering and applying law to any situation that may arise. During the Islamic Republic there was no legislature in its modern sense and for every situation or emergency that arose law could be discovered and applied by the ulama. The law had been made and was not to be made, the only function of those entrusted with the administration of law being to discover the law for the purposes of the particular case, though when enunciated and applied it formed a precedent for others to follow. It is wholly incorrect, as has been suggested from certain quarters, that in a country like Pakistan, which consists of different communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, and where representation is allowed to non-Muslims with a right to vote on every subject that comes up, the legislature is a form of ijma’ or ijtihad, the reason being that ijtihad is not collective but only individual, and though ijma’ is collective, there is no place in it for those who are not experts in the knowledge of the law. This principle at once rules out the infidels (kuffar) whether they be people of Scriptures (ahl-i-kitab) or idolators (mushrikeen).

Since Islam is a perfect religion containing laws, express or derivable by ijma’ or ijtihad, governing the whole field of human activity, there is in it no sanction for what may, in the modern sense, be called legislation.

Questioned on this point Maulana Abul Hasanat, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan says :—

“Q.—Is the institution of legislature as distinguished from the institution of a person or body of persons entrusted with the interpretation of law, an integral part of an Islamic State?
A.—No. Our law is complete and merely requires interpretation by those who are experts in it. According to my belief no question can arise the law relating to which cannot be discovered from the Qur’an or the hadith.
Q.—Who were Sahib-ul-hall-i-wal-aqd
A.—They were the distinguished ulama of the time. These persons attained their status by reason of the knowledge of the law. They were not in any way analogous or similar to the legislature in modern democracy.”

The same view was expressed by Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches reported in the ‘Azad’ of 22nd April, 1947, in the course of which he said that our din is complete and perfect and that it amounts to kufr to make more laws.

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, however, is of the opinion that legislation in the true sense is possible in an Islamic State on matters which are not covered by the Qur’an, the sunna, or previous ijma’ and he has attempted to explain his point by reference to the institution of a body of persons whom the Holy Prophet, and after him the khulafa consulted on all matters relating to affairs of State. The question is one of some difficulty and great importance because any institution of legislature will have to be reconciled with the claim put forward by Maulana Abul Hasanat and some other religious divines that Islam is a perfect and exhaustive code wide enough to furnish an answer to any question that may arise relating to any human activity, and that it does not know of any “unoccupied field” to be filled by fresh legislation. There is no doubt that Islam enjoins consultation and that not only the Holy Prophet but also the first four caliphs and even their successors resorted to consultation with the leading men of the time, who for their knowledge of the law and piety could well be relied upon.

In the inquiry not much has been disclosed about the Majlis-i-Shura except what is contained in Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s written statement which he supplied to the Court at its request. That there was a body of men who were consulted is true, but whether this was a standing body and whether its advice had any legal or binding force, seems somewhat doubtful. These men were certainly not elected in the modern way, though their representative character cannot be disputed. Their advice was certainly asked ad hoc, but that they were competent to make law as the modern legislatures make laws is certainly not correct. The decisions taken by them undoubtedly served as precedents and were in the nature of ijma’, which is not legislation but the application of an existing law to a particular case. When consulted in affairs of State, their functions were truly in the nature of an advice given by a modern cabinet but such advice is not law but only a decision.

Nor can the legislature in a modern State correspond to ijma’ because as we have already pointed out, the legislature legislates while the ulama of Majlis-i-Shura who were called upon to determine what should be the decision on a particular point which was not covered by the Qur’an and the sunna, merely sought to discover and apply the law and not to promulgate the law, though the decision when taken had to be taken not only for the purposes of the particular case but for subsequent occasions as a binding precedent.

An intriguing situation might arise if the Constitution Act provided that any provision of it, if it was inconsistent with the Qur’an or the sunna, would be void, and the intra vires of a law made by the legislature were questioned before the Supreme Court on the ground that the institution of legislature itself was contrary to the Qur’an and the sunna.

POSITION OF NON-MUSLIMS

The ground on which the removal of Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan and other Ahmadis occupying key positions in the State is demanded is that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims and that therefore like zimmies in an Islamic State they are not eligible for appointment to higher offices in the State. This aspect of the demands has directly raised a question about the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan if we are to have an Islamic Constitution.

According to the leading ulama the position of non-Muslims in the Islamic State of Pakistan will be that of zimmies and they will not be full citizens of Pakistan because they will not have the same rights as Muslims They will have no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.

A full statement of this position will be found in the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, Maulana Ahmad Ali, Mian Tufail Muhammad and Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni. Maulana Abul Hasanat on being questioned on the subject stated as follows :—

“Q.—If we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar (non-Muslims)? Will they have a voice in the making of laws, the right of administering the law and the right to hold public offices?
A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no voice in the making of laws, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.
Q.—In an Islamic State can the head of the State delegate any part of his powers to kuffar?
A.—No.”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, when questioned, said:—
“Q.—if we were to have an Islamic State in Pakistan, what will be the position of the kuffar? Will they have a hand in the making of the law, the right to administer the law and the right to hold public offices ?
A.—Their position will be that of zimmies. They will have no say in the making of law and no right to administer the law. Government may, however, permit them to hold any public office”.

Mian Tufail Muhammad stated as follows :—
“Q.—Read the article on minorities’ rights in the ‘Civil and Military Gazette’ of 13th October, 1953, and say whether it correctly represents your view of an Islamic State? (It was stated in the articles that minorities would have the same rights as Muslims).
A.—I have read this article and do not acknowledge these rights for the Christians or other non-Muslims in Pakistan if the State is founded on the ideology of the Jama’at”.

The confusion on this point in the mind of Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, is apparent from the following: —

“Q.—Have you ever read the aforesaid speech (the speech of the Quaid-i-Azam to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947)?
A.—Yes, I have read that speech.
Q.—Do you still agree with the conception of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam presented to the Constituent Assembly in this speech in which he said that thereafter there would be only one Pakistan nation, consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims, having equal civic rights, without any distinction of race, religion or creed and that religion would be merely a private affair of the individual ?
A.—I accept the principle that all communities, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, should have, according to their population, proper representation in the administration of the State and legislation, except that non-Muslims cannot be taken in the army or the judiciary or be appointed as Ministers or to other posts involving the reposing of confidence.
Q.—Are you suggesting that the position of non-Muslims would be that of zimmies or any better ?
A.—No. By zimmies are meant non-Muslim people of lands which have been conquered by an Islamic State, and the word is not applicable to non-Muslim minorities already living in an Islamic State. Such minorities are called mu’ahids, i.e. those people with whom some agreement has been made.
Q.—What will be their status if there is no agreement with them ?
A.—In that case such communities cannot have any rights of citizenship.
Q.—Will the non-Muslim communities inhabiting Pakistan be called by you as mu’ahids?
A.—No, not in the absence of an agreement with them. To my knowledge there is no such agreement with such communities in Pakistan.”

So, according to the evidence of this learned divine, the non-Muslims of Pakistan will neither be citizens nor will they have the status of zimmies or of mu’ahids. During the Islamic Republic, the head of the State, the khalifa, was chosen by a system of election, which was wholly different from the present system of election based on adult or any other form of popular suffrage. The oath of allegiance (ba’it) rendered to him possessed a sacramental virtue, and on his being chosen by the consensus of the people (ijma’-ul-ummat) he became the source of all channels of legitimate Government. He and he alone then was competent to rule, though he could delegate his powers to deputies and collect around him a body of men of outstanding piety and learning, called Majlis-i-Shura or Ahl-ul-Hall-i-wal-Aqd. The principal feature of this system was that the kuffar, for reasons which are too obvious and need not be stated, could not be admitted to this majlis and the power which had vested in the khalifa could not be delegated to the kuffar. The khalifa was the real head of the State, all power vesting in him and not a powerless individual like the President of a modern democratic State who is merely to sign the record of decisions taken by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. He could not appoint non-Muslims to important posts, and could give them no place either in the interpretation or the administration of the law, the making of the law by them, as already pointed out, being a legal impossibility.

This being the position, the State will have to devise some machinery by which the distinction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim may be determined and its consequences enforced. The question, therefore, whether a person is or is not a Muslim will be of fundamental importance, and it was for this reason that we asked most of the leading ulama, to give their definition of a Muslim, the point being that if the ulama of the various sects believed the Ahmadis to be kafirs, they must have been quite clear in their minds not only about the grounds of such belief but also about the definition of a Muslim because the claim that a certain person or community is not within the pale of Islam implies on the part of the claimant an exact conception of what a Muslim is. The result of this part of the inquiry, however, has been anything but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our ulama on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matters will be. Below we reproduce the definition of a Muslim given by each alim in his own words. This definition was asked after it had been clearly explained to each witness that he was required to give the irreducible minimum conditions which, a person must satisfy to be entitled to be called a Muslim and that the definition was to be on the principle on which a term in grammar is defined.

Here is the result : —

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulamai-
Pakistan —
“Q.— What is the definition of a Muslim ?
A — (1) He must believe in the Unity of God.
(2) He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet as well as in all other prophets who have preceded him,
(3) He must believe in the Holy Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets (khatam-un-nabiyin).
(4) He must believe in the Qur’an as it was revealed by God to the Holy
Prophet of Islam.
(5) He must believe as binding on him the injunctions of the Prophet of
Islam.
(6) He must believe in the qiyamat.
Q.—Is a tarik-us-salat a Muslim ?
A.—Yes, but not a munkir-us-salat”

Maulana Ahmad Ali, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Maghribi Pakistan —
“Q.— Please define a Muslim ?
A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet. Any person who possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim without his being required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir Jama’at-i-Islami —
“Q.—Please define a Muslim ?
A.—A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in tauheed, (2) in all the prophets (ambiya), (3) all the books revealed by God, (4) in mala’ika (angels), and (5) yaum-ul-akhira (the Day of Judgment).
Q.—Is a mere profession of belief in these articles sufficient to entitle a man
to call himself a Musalman and to be treated as a Musalman in an Islamic State ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—If a person says that he believes in all these things, does any one have a right to question the existence of his belief ?
A.—The five requisites that I have mentioned above are fundamental and any alteration in anyone of these articles will take him out of the pale of Islam.”

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir—
“Q.—Please define a Muslim ?
A.—I consider a man to be a Muslim if he professes his belief in the kalima, namely, La Ilaha Illalah-o-Muhammad-ur-Rasulullah, and leads a life in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet.”

Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jamia Ashrafia, Nila Gumbad, Lahore—
“Q.—Please give the definition of a Musalman ?
A.—The word ‘Musalman’ is a Persian one. There is a distinction between the word ‘Musalman’ which is a Persian word for Muslim and the word ‘momin’. It is impossible for me to give a complete definition of the word ‘momin’. I would require pages and pages to describe what a momin is. A person is a Muslim who professes to be obedient to Allah. He should believe in the Unity of God, prophethood of the ambiya and in the Day of Judgment. A person who does not believe in the azan or in the qurbani goes outside the pale of Islam. Similarly, there are a large number of other things which have been received by tavatir from our prophet. In order to be a Muslim, he must believe in all these things. It is almost impossible for me to give a complete list of such things.”

Hafiz Kifayat Hussain, Idara-i-Haquq-i-Tahaffuz-i-Shia—
“Q.—Who is a Musalman?
A.—A person is entitled to be called a Musalman if he believes in (1) tauheed, (2) nubuwwat and (3) qiyamat. These are the three fundamental beliefs which a person must profess to be called a Musalman. In regard to these three basic doctrines there is no difference between the Shias and the Sunnies. Besides the belief in these three doctrines, there are other things called ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ which a person must comply with in order to be entitled to be called a Musalman. These will take me two days to define and enumerate. But as an illustration I might state that the respect for the Holy Book, wajoob-i-nimaz, wajoob-i-roza, wajoob-i-hajj-ma’a-sharait, and other things too numerous to mention, are among the ‘zarooriyat-i-din’ ”

Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan :
“Q.—Who is a Musalman according to you ?
A.—A person who believes in the zarooriyat-i-din is called a momin and every momin is entitled to be called a Musalman.
Q.—What are these zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—A person who believes in the five pillars of Islam and who believes in the rasalat of our Holy Prophet fulfils the zarooriyat-i-din.
Q.—Have other actions, apart from the five arakan, anything to do with a man being a Muslim or being outside the pale of Islam?
(Note—Witness has been explained that by actions are meant those rules of moral conduct which in modern society are accepted as correct.)
A.—Certainly.
Q.—Then you will not call a person a Muslim who believes in arakan-ikhamsa and the rasalat of the prophet but who steals other peoples’ things, embezzles property entrusted to him, has an evil eye on his neighbour’s wife and is guilty of the grossest ingratitude to his benefector?
A.—Such a person, if he has the belief already indicated, will be a Muslim despite all this”.

Maulana Muhammad Ali Kandhalvi, Darush-Shahabia, Sialkot —
“Q.—Please define a Musalman?
A.—A person who in obedience to the commands of the prophet performs all the zarooriyat-i-din is a Musalman.
Q.—Can you define zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—Zarooriyat-i-din are those requirements which are known to every Muslim irrespective of his religious knowledge.
Q.—Can you enumerate zarooriyat-i-din ?
A.—These are too numerous to be mentioned. I myself cannot enumerate these zarooriyat. Some of the zarooriyat-i-din may be mentioned as salat, saum, etc.”

Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi —
“Q.—Who is a Musalman?
A.—There are two kinds of Musalmans, a political (siyasi) Musalman and a real (haqiqi) Musalman. In order to be called a political Musalman, a person must:
(1) believe in the Unity of God,
(2) believe in our Holy Prophet being khatam-un-nabiyin, i.e., ‘final
authority’ in all matters relating to the life of that person,
(3) believe that all good and evil comes from Allah,
(4) believe in the Day of Judgment,
(5) believe in the Qur’an to be the last book revealed by Allah,
(6) perform the annual pilgrimage to Mecca,
(7) pay the zaka’at,
(8) say his prayers like the Musalmans,
(9) observe all apparent rules of Islami mu’ashira, and
(10) observe the fast (saum).

If a person satisfies all these conditions he is entitled to the rights of a full citizen of an Islamic State. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the person concerned will not be a political Musalman. (Again said) It would be enough for a person to be a Musalman if he merely professes his belief in these ten matters irrespective of whether he puts them into practice or not. In order to be a real Musalman, a person must believe in and act on all the injunctions by Allah and his prophet in the manner in which they have been enjoined upon him.
Q.—Will you say that only the real Musalman is ‘mard-i-saleh’ ?
A.—Yes.
Q.—do we understand you aright that in the case of what you have called a political (siyasi) Musalman, belief alone is necessary, while in the case of a haqiqi Musalman there must not only be belief but also action?
A.—No, you have not understood me aright. Even in the case of a political (siyasi) Musalman action is necessary but what I mean to say is that if a person does not act upon the belief that is necessary in the case of such a Musalman, he will not be outside the pale of a political (siyasi) Musalman.
Q.—If a political (siyasi) Musalman does not believe in things which you
have stated to be necessary, will you call such a person be-din ?
A.—No, I will call him merely be-amal”.

The definition by the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiya, Rabwah, in its written statement
is that a Muslim is a person who belongs to the ummat of the Holy Prophet and professes belief in kalima-i-tayyaba.

Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else.

 

 

APOSTASY

Apostasy in an Islamic State is punishable with death. On this the ulama are practically unanimous (vide the evidence of Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Punjab; Maulana Ahmad Ali, Sadr Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, West Pakistan; Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, founder and ex-Amir-i-Jama’at-i-Islami, Pakistan; Mufti Muhammad Idris, Jami’Ashrafia, Lahore, and Member, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan; Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, President, Jami’at-i-Ahl-i-Hadith, Maghribi Pakistan; Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasimi, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Punjab; and Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti). According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis and Wahabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, Board of Talimat-i-Islami attached to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a beautiful tree in the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic State. And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State, he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come within the definition of murtadd, namely, if they have changed and not inherited their religious views.

The genuineness of the fatwa, Ex. D. E. 13, by the Deobandis which says that Asna Ashari Shias are kafirs and murtadds, was questioned in the course of enquiry, but Maulana Muhammad Shafi made an inquiry on the subject from Deoband, and received from the records of that institution the copy of a fatwa signed by all the teachers of the Darul Uloom including Maulana Muhammad Shafi himself which is to the effect that those who do not believe in the sahabiyyat of Hazrat Siddiq Akbar and who are qazif of Hazrat Aisha Siddiqa and have been guilty of tehrif of Qur’an are kafirs. This opinion is also supported by Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti who has studied and knows his subject. He thinks the Shias are kafirs because they believe that Hazrat Ali shared the prophethood with our Holy Prophet. He refused to answer the question whether a person who being a Sunni changes his view and agrees with the Shia view would be guilty of irtidad so as to deserve the death penalty. According to the Shias all Sunnis are kafirs, and Ahl-i-Qur’an; namely, persons who consider hadith to be unreliable and therefore not binding, are unanimously kafirs and so are all independent thinkers. The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim. If the constituents of each of the definitions given by the ulama are given effect to, and subjected to the rule of ‘combination and permutation’ and the form of charge in the Inquisition’s sentence on Galileo is adopted mutatis mutandis as a model, the grounds on which a person may be indicted for apostasy will be too numerous to count.

In an earlier part of the report we have referred to the proscription of the ‘Ashshahab’, a pamphlet written by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani who later became Sheikh-ul-Islam-i-Pakistan. In that pamphlet the Maulana had attempted to show from the Qur’an, the sunna, the ijma’ and qayas that in Islam the punishment for apostasy (irtidad) simpliciter is death. After propounding the theological doctrine the Maulana had made in that document a statement of fact that in the time of the Caliph Siddiq-i-Akbar and the subsequent Caliphs vast areas of Arabia became repeatedly red with the blood of apostates. We are not called upon to express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of this doctrine but knowing that the suggestion to the Punjab Government to proscribe this pamphlet had come from the Minister for the Interior we have attempted to inquire of ourselves the reasons for Government’s taking a step which ex hypothesi amounted to condemning a doctrine which the Maulana had professed to derive from the Qur’an and the sunna. The death penalty for irtidad has implications of a far-reaching character and stamps Islam as a religion of fanatics, which punishes all independent thinking. The Qur’an again and again lays emphasis on reason and thought, advises toleration and preaches against compulsion in religious matters but the doctrine of irtidad as enunciated in this pamphlet strikes at the very root of independent thinking when it propounds the view that anyone who, being born a Muslim or having embraced Islam, attempts to think on the subject of religion with a view, if he comes to that conclusion, to choose for himself any religion he likes, has the capital penalty in store for him. With this implication Islam becomes an embodiment of complete intellectual paralysis. And the statement in the pamphlet that vast areas of Arabia were repeatedly bespattered with human blood, if true, could only lend itself to this inference that even when Islam was at the height of its splendour and held absolute sway in Arabia there were in that country a large number of people who turned away from that religion and preferred to die than to remain in that system. It must have been some such reaction of this pamphlet on the mind of the Minister for the Interior which prompted him to advise the Punjab Government to proscribe the pamphlet. Further the Minister who was himself well-versed in religious matters must have thought that the conclusion drawn by the author of the pamphlet which was principally based on the precedent mentioned in paras. 26, 27 and 28 of the Old Testament and which is only partially referred to in the Qur’an in the 54th verse of the Second Sura, could not be applicable to apostasy from Islam and that therefore the author’s opinion was in fact incorrect, there being no express text in the Qur’an for the death penalty for apostasy. On the contrary each of the two ideas, one underlying the six brief verses of Surat-ul-Kafiroon and the other the La Ikrah verse of the second Sura, has merely to be understood to reject as erroneous the view propounded in the ‘Ash-Shahab’. Each of the verses in Surat-ul-Kafiroon which contains thirty words and no verse of which exceeds six words, brings out a fundamental trait in man engrained in him since his creation while the La Ikrah verse, the relevant portion of which contains only nine words, states the rule of responsibility of the mind with a precision that cannot be surpassed. Both of these texts which are an early part of the Revelation are, individually and collectively, the foundation of that principle which human society, after centuries of conflict, hatred and bloodshed, has adopted in defining one of the most important fundamental rights of man. But our doctors would never dissociate chauvinism from Islam.

 

 

PROPAGATION OF OTHER RELIGIONS

Closely allied to the punishment for apostasy is the right of non-Muslims publicly to preach their religion. The principle which punishes an apostate with death must be applicable to public preaching of kufr and it is admitted by Maulana Abul Hasanat, Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir and Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari, though the last subordinates his opinion to the opinion of the ulama, that any faith other than Islam will not be permitted publicly to be preached in the State. And Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, as will appear from his pamphlet ‘Punishment in Islam for an apostate’, has the same views on the subject.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir, when questioned on this point, replied :—
“Q.—What will you do with them (Ahmadis) if you were the head of the
Pakistan State ?
A.—I would tolerate them as human beings but will not allow them the right
to preach their religion”.

The prohibition against public preaching of any non-Muslim religion must logically follow from the proposition that apostasy will be punished with death and that any attack on, or danger to Islam will be treated as treason and punished in the same way as apostasy.

JIHAD
Earlier we have pointed out that one of the doctrines on which the Musalmans and Ahmadis are at variance is that of jihad. This doctrine at once raises a host of other allied matters such as the meanings of ghazi, shahid, jihad-bis-saif, jihad fi sabili’llah, dar-ul-Islam, dar-ul-harb, hijrat, ghanima, khums and slavery, and the conflict or reconciliation of these conceptions with modern international problems such as aggression, genocide, international criminal jurisdiction, international conventions and rules of public international law.

An Islamic State is dar-ul-Islam, namely, a country where ordinances of Islam are established and which is under the rule of a Muslim sovereign. Its inhabitants are Muslims and also non-Muslims who have submitted to Muslim control and who under certain restrictions and without the possibility of full citizenship are guaranteed their lives and property by the Muslim State. They must, however, be people of Scriptures and may not be idolaters. An Islamic State is in theory perpetually at war with the neighbouring non-Muslim country, which at any time may become dar-ul-harb, in which case it is the duty of the Muslims of that country to leave it and to come over to the country of their brethren in faith. We put this aspect to Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and reproduce his views :—

“Q.—is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic State in the position of dar-ul-harb ?
A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.

According to Ghias-ul-Lughat, dar-ul-harb is a country belonging to infidels which has not been subdued by Islam, and the consequences of a country becoming darul-harb are thus stated in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam :—

“When a country does become a dar-ul-harb, it is the duty of all Muslims to withdraw from it, and a wife who refuses to accompany her husband in this, is ipso facto divorced”.

Thus in case of a war between India and Pakistan, if the latter is an Islamic State, we must be prepared to receive forty million Muslims from across the border into Pakistan.

In fact, Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i- Pakistan, thinks that a case for hijrat already exists for the Musalmans of India. The following is his view on this subject :—
“Q.—Do yon call your migration to Pakistan as hijrat in the religious sense ?
A.—Yes”.

We shall presently point out why Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s version of the doctrine of jihad is relied on as a ground for his and his community’s kufr, but before we do that it is necessary first to state how jihad has been or is understood by the Musalmans. There are various theories about jihad which vary from the crude notion of a megalomaniac moved by religious frenzy going out armed with sword and indiscriminately slaughtering non-Muslims in the belief that if he dies in the combat he becomes a shahid and if he succeeds in killing attains the status of a ghazi, to the conception that a Musalman throughout his life is pitted against kufr, kufr here being used in the sense of evil and wrong, and that his principal activity in life is to strive by argument a where necessary by force to spread Islam until it becomes a world religion. In the latter case he fights not for any personal end but because he considers such strife as a duty and an obligation which he owes to Allah and the only recompense for which is the pleasure of Allah. The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam contains the following brief article on djihad :—
“DJIHAD (A), holy war. The spread of Islam by arms is a religious duty upon Muslims in general. It narrowly escaped being a sixth rukn, or fundamental duty, and is indeed still so regarded by the descendants of the Kharidjis. This position was reached gradually but quickly. In the Meccan Suras of the Qur’an patience under attack is taught ; no other attitude was possible. But at Medina the right to repel attack appears, and gradually it became a prescribed duty to fight against and subdue the hostile Meccans.

Whether Muhammad himself recognised that his position implied steady and unprovoked war against the unbelieving world until it was subdued to Islam may be in doubt. Traditions are explicit on the point ; but the Qur’anic passages speak always of the unbelievers who are to be subdued as dangerous or faithless. Still, the story of his writing to the powers around him shows that such a universal position was implicit in his mind, and it certainly developed immediately after his death, when the Muslim armies advanced out of Arabia. It is now a fard ala’l-kifaya, a duty in general on all male, free, adult Muslims, sane in mind and body and having means enough to reach the Muslim army, yet not a duty necessarily incumbent on every individual but sufficiently performed when done by a certain number. So it must continue to be done until the whole world is under the rule of Islam. It must be controlled or headed by a Muslim sovereign or imam. As the imam of the Shias is now invisible, they cannot have a djihad until he reappears. Further, the requirement will be met if such a sovereign makes an expedition once a year, or, even, in the later view, if he makes annual preparation for one. The people against whom the djihad is directed must first be invited to embrace Islam. On refusal they have another choice. They may submit to Muslim rule, become dhimmis (q. v.) and pay djizya and kharadj (q. v.) or fight. In the first case, their lives, families and property are assured to them, but they have a definitely inferior status, with no technical citizenship, and a standing only as protected wards. If they fight, they and their families may be enslaved and all their property seized as booty, four-fifths of which goes to the conquering army. If they embrace Islam, and it is open to them to do so even when the armies are face to face, they become part of the Muslim community with all its rights and duties. Apostates must be put to death. But if a Muslim country is invaded by unbelievers, the imam may issue a general summons calling all Muslims there to arms, and as the danger grows so may be the width of the summons until the whole Muslim world is involved. A Muslim who dies fighting in the path of Allah (fi sabil Allah) is martyr (shahid) and is assured of Paradise and of peculiar privileges there. Such a death was, in the early generations, regarded as the peculiar crown of a pious life. It is still, on occasions, a strong incitement, but when Islam ceased to conquer it lost its supreme value. Even yet, however, any war between Muslims and non-Muslims must be a djihad with its incitements and rewards. Of course, such modern movements as the so-called Mu’tazili in India and the Young Turk in Turkey reject this and endeavour to explain away its basis; but the Muslim masses still follow the unanimous voice of the canon lawyers. Islam must be completely made over before the doctrine of djihad can be eliminated”.

The generally accepted view is that the fifth verse to Sura-i-Tauba (Sura IX) abrogated the earlier verses revealed in Mecca which permitted the killing of kuffar only in self-defence. As against this the Ahmadis believe that no verso in the Qur’an was abrogated by another verse and that both sets of verses, namely, the Meccan verses and the relative verses in Sura-i-Tauba have different scopes and can stand together. This introduces the difficult controversy of nasikh and mansukh, with all its implications. It is argued on behalf of the Ahmadis that the doctrine of nasikh and mansukh is opposed to the belief in the existence of an original Scripture in Heaven, and that implicit in this doctrine is the admission that unless the verse alleged to be repealed was meant for a specific occasion and by the coming of that occasion fulfilled its purpose and thus spent itself, God did not know of the subsequent circumstances which would make the earlier verse inapplicable or lead to an undesired result.

The third result of this doctrine, it is pointed out, cuts at the very root of the claim that laws of Islam are immutable and inflexible because if changed circumstances made a new revelation necessary, any change in the circumstances subsequent to the completion of the revelation would make most of the revelation otiose or obsolete.

We are wholly incompetent to pronounce on the merits of this controversy but what has to be pointed out is the result to which the doctrine of jihad will lead if, as appears from the article in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam and other writings produced before us including one by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and another by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, it involves the spread of Islam by arms and conquest. ‘Aggression’ and ‘genocide’ are now offences against humanity for which under sentences pronounced by different International tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokio the war lords of Germany and Japan had to forfeit their lives, and there is hardly any difference between the offences of aggression and genocide on the one hand and the doctrine of spread of Islam by arms and conquest on the other. An International Convention on genocide is about to be concluded but if the view of jihad presented to us is correct, Pakistan cannot be a party to it. And while the following verses in the Mecca Suras :—

Sura II, verses 190 and 193 :190. “Fight in the Cause of God Those who fight you,
But do not transgress limits ;
For God loveth not transgressors”.
193. “And fight them on
Until there is no more
Tumult or oppression,
And there prevail
Justice and faith in God ;
But if they cease,
Let there be no hostility
Except to those
Who practise oppression”.
Sura XXII, verses 39 and 40:
39. “To those against whom
War is made, permission
Is given (to fight) because
They are wronged;— and verily,
God is most Powerful
For their aid;—”
40. “(They are) those who have
Been expelled from their homes
In defiance of right,—
(For no cause) except
That they say, ‘Our Lord
Is God.’ Did not God
Check one set of people
By means of another,
There would surely have been
Pulled down monasteries, churches,
Synagogues, and mosques, in which
The name of God is commemorated
In abundant measure. God will
Certainly aid those who
Aid His (cause);—for verily
God is Full of Strength,
Exalted in Might,
(Able to enforce His Will),”

contain in them the sublime principle which international jurists have only faintly begun to discover, we must go on preaching that aggression is the chief characteristic of Islam. The law relating to prisoners of war is another branch of Islamic law which is bound to come in conflict with International Law.

As for instance, in matters relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, we shall have to be governed by Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi’s view, assuming that view is based on the Qur’an and the sunna, which is as follows :—

“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Does it differ fundamentally from the modern International Law of war?
A.—These two systems are based on a fundamental difference.
Q.—What rights have non-Muslims who are taken prisoners of war in a jihad?
A.—The Islamic law on the point is that if the country of which these prisoners are nationals pays ransom, they will be released. An exchange of prisoners is also permitted. If neither of these alternatives is possible, the prisoners will be converted into slaves for ever. If any such person makes an offer to pay his ransom out of his own earnings, he will be permitted to collect the money necessary for the fidya (ransom).
Q.—Are you of the view that unless a Government assumes the form of an Islamic Government, any war declared by it is not a jihad?
A.—No. A war may be declared to be a jihad if it is declared by a national Government of Muslims in the legitimate interests of the State. I never expressed the opinion attributed to me in Ex. D. E. 12:—
“Raha yeh masala keh agar hukumat-i-Pakisten apni maujuda shukl-o-surat ke sath Indian Union ke sath apne mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke i’lan-i-jang bar bhi de to kya us-ki yeh jang jihad ke hukam men a-ja’egi ? Ap ne is bare men jo rae zahir ki hai woh bilkul darust hai – Jab-tak hukumat Islami nizam ko ikhtiyar kar-ke Islami nah ho jae us waqt tak us-ki kisi jang ko jihad kehna aisa hi hai jaisa kisi ghair Muslim ke Azad Kashmir ki fauj men bharti ho-kar larne ko jihad aur us-ki maut ko shahadat ka nam dediya jae – Maulana ka jo mudd’a hai woh yeh hai keh mu’ahadat ki maujudgi men to hukumat ya us-ke shehriyon ka is jang men sharik hona shar’-an ja’iz hi nahin – Agar hukumat mu’ahadat khatm kar-ke jang ka
i’lan kar-de to hukumat ki jang to jihad phir bhi nahin hogi ta-an keh hukumat Islami nah ho jae.’

(translation)

‘The question remains whether, even if the Government of Pakistan, in its present form and structure, terminates her treaties with the Indian Union and declares war against her, this war would fall under the definition of jihad? The opinion expressed by him in this behalf is quite correct. Until such time as the Government becomes Islamic by adopting the Islamic form of Government, to call any of its wars a jihad would be tantamount to describing the enlistment and fighting of a non-Muslim on the side of the Azad Kashmir forces jihad and his death martyrdom. What the Maulana means is that, in the presence of treaties, it is against Shari’at, if the Government or its people participate in such a war. If the Government terminates the treaties and declares war, even then the war started by Government would not be termed jihad unless the Government becomes Islamic’.

About the view expressed in this letter being that of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, there is the evidence of Mian Tufail Muhammad, the writer of the letter, who states: “Ex. D. E. 12 is a photostat copy of a letter which I wrote to someone whose name I do not now remember.”

Maulana Abul Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri’s view on this point is as
follows:—
“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Does it differ in fundamentals from the present International Law?
A.—Yes.
Q.—What are the rights of a person taken prisoner in war?
A.—He can embrace Islam or ask for aman, in which case he will be treated as a musta’min. If he does not ask for aman, he would be made a slave”.
Similar is the opinion expressed by Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jam’at-i-Islami who says:—
“Q.—Is there any law of war in Islamic laws?
A.—Yes.
Q.—If that comes into conflict with International Law, which will you follow?
A.—Islamic law.
Q.—Then please state what will be the status of prisoners of war captured by your
forces?
A.—I cannot reply to this off hand. I will have to study the point.”
Of course ghanima (plunder) and khums (one-fifth) if treated as a necessary incident of
jihad will be treated by international society as a mere act of brigandage.

REACTION ON MUSLIMS OF NON-MUSLIM STATES
The ideology on which an Islamic State is desired to be founded in Pakistan must have certain consequences for the Musalmans who are living in countries under non-Muslim sovereigns.

We asked Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ataullah Shah Bukhari whether a Muslim could be a faithful subject of a non-Muslim State and reproduce his answer:—
“Q.—In your opinion is a Musalman bound to obey orders of a kafir Government?
A.—It is not possible that a Musalman should be faithful citizen of a non-Muslim Government.
Q.—Will it be possible for the four crore of Indian Muslims to be faithful citizens of their State?
A—No.”

The answer is quite consistent with the ideology which has been pressed before us, but then if Pakistan is entitled to base its Constitution on religion, the same right must be conceded to other countries where Musalmans are in substantial minorities or if they constitute a preponderating majority in a country where sovereignty rests with a non-Muslim community. We, therefore, asked the various ulama whether, if non-Muslims in Pakistan were to be subjected to this discrimination in matters of citizenship, the ulama would have any objection to Muslims in other countries being subjected to a similar discrimination. Their reactions to this suggestion are reproduced below:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan:—
“Q.—You will admit for the Hindus, who are in a majority in India, the right to have a Hindu religious State?
A.—Yes.
Q.—Will you have any objection if the Muslims are treated under that form of Government as malishes or shudras under the law of Manu?
A.— No.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi :—
“Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion?
A—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India.”

Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ata Ullah Skak Bukhari :—
“Q.—How many crores of Muslims are there in India?
A.—Four crores.
Q.—Have you any objection to the law of Manu being applied to them according to which they will have no civil right and will be treated as malishes and shudras?
A.—I am in Pakistan and I cannot advise them.”

Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jama’at-i-Islami :—
“Q.—What is the population of Muslims in the world?
A.—Fifty crores.
Q.—If the total population of Muslims of the world is 50 crores, as you say, and the number of Muslims living in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Turkey and Iraq does not exceed 20 crores, will not the result of your ideology beto convert 30 crores of Muslims in the world into hewers of wood anddrawers of water?
A.—My ideology should not affect their position.
Q.—Even if they are subjected to discrimination on religious grounds and denied ordinary rights of citizenship ?
A.—Yes.”
This witness goes to the extent of asserting that even if a non-Muslim Government were to offer posts to Muslims in the public services of the country, it will be their duty to refuse such posts.

Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din Munir :—
“Q.—Do you want an Islamic State in Pakistan?
A.—Surely.
Q.—What will be your reaction if the neighbouring country was to found
their political system on their own religion?
A.—They can do it if they like.
Q.—Do you admit for them the right to declare that all Muslims in India, are shudras and malishes with no civil rights whatsoever?
A.—We will do our best to see that before they do it their political
sovereignty is gone. We are too strong for India. We will be strong enough to prevent India from doing this.
Q.—Is it a part of the religious obligations of Muslims to preach their religion?
A—Yes.
Q.—Is it a part of the duty of Muslims in India publicly to preach their religion?
A.—They should have that right.
Q.—What if the Indian State is founded on a religious basis and the right to preach religion is disallowed to its Muslim nationals?
A —If India makes any such law, believer in the Expansionist movement as I am, I will march on India and conquer her.”

So this is the reply to the reciprocity of discrimination on religious grounds.

Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari :—
“Q.—Would you like to have the same ideology for the four crores of Muslims in India as you are impressing upon the Muslims of
Pakistan?
A.—That ideology will not let them remain in India for one minute.
Q.—Does the ideology of a Muslim change from place to place and from time to time?
A.—No.
Q.—Then why should not the Muslims of India have the same ideology as you have?
A.—They should answer that question.”

The ideology advocated before us, if adopted by Indian Muslims, will completely
disqualify them for public offices in the State, not only in India but in other countries also which are under a non-Muslim Government. Muslims will become perpetual suspects everywhere and will not be enrolled in the army because according to this ideology, in case of war between a Muslim country and a non-Muslim country, Muslim soldiers of the non-Muslim country must either side with the Muslim country or surrender their posts.

The following is the view expressed by two divines whom we questioned on this point:—

Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, President, Jami’at-ul-
Ulama-i-Pakistan :—
“Q.—What will be the duty of Muslims in India in case of war between India
and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, namely, to side with us and not to fight against us
on behalf of India.”

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi : —
“Q.—What will be the duty of the Muslims in India in case of war between
India and Pakistan?
A.—Their duty is obvious, and that is not to fight against Pakistan or to do
anything injurious to the safety of Pakistan.”

OTHER INCIDENTS

Other incidents of an Islamic State are that all sculpture, playing of cards, portrait
painting, photographing human beings, music, dancing, mixed acting, cinemas and
theatres will have to be closed.

Thus says Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasimi, representative of Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan: —

“Q.—What are your views on tashbih and tamseel ?
A.—You should ask me a concrete question.
Q.—What are your views on lahw-o-la’b?
A.—The same is my reply to this question.
Q.—What are your views about portrait painting?
A.—There is nothing against it if any such painting becomes necessary.
Q.—What about photography?
A.—My reply to it is the same as the reply regarding portrait painting.
Q.—What about sculpture as an art?
A.—It is prohibited by our religion.
Q.—Will you bring playing of cards in lohw-o-la’b?
A.—Yes, it will amount to lahw-o-la’b.
Q.—What about music and dancing?
A.—It is all forbidden by our religion.
Q.—What about drama and acting?
A —It all depends on what kind of acting you mean. If it involves immodesty
and intermixture of sexes, the Islamic law is against it.
Q.—If the State is founded on your ideals, will you make a law stopping
portrait painting, photographing of human beings, sculpture, playing
of cards, music, dancing, acting and all cinemas and theatres?
A.—Keeping in view the present form of these activities, my answer is in the affirmative.”

Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni considers it to be a sin (ma’siyat) on the part of
professors of anatomy to dissect dead bodies of Muslims to explain points of anatomy to the students.

The soldier or the policeman will have the right, on grounds of religion, to disobey a command by a superior authority. Maulana Abul Hasanat’s view on this is as follows :—

“I believe that if a policeman is required to do something which we consider to be contrary to our religion, it should be the duty of the policeman to disobey the authority. The same would be my answer if ‘army’ were substituted for ‘police’.

Q.—You stated yesterday that if a policeman or a soldier was required by a
superior authority to do what you considered to be contrary to religion, it would be the duty of that policeman or the soldier to disobey such authority. Will you give the policeman or the soldier the right of himself determining whether the command he is given by his superior authority is contrary to religion ?
A.—Most certainly.
Q.—Suppose there is war between Pakistan and another Muslim country and the soldier feels that Pakistan is in the wrong; and that to shoot a soldier of other country is contrary to religion. Do you think he would be justified in disobeying his commanding officer ?
A.—In such a contingency the soldier should take a fatwa of the ‘ulama’.”

We have dwelt at some length on the subject of Islamic State not because we intended to write a thesis against or in favour of such State but merely with a view to presenting a clear picture of the numerous possibilities that may in future arise if true causes of the ideological confusion which contributed to the spread and intensity of the disturbances are not precisely located. That such confusion did exist is obvious because otherwise Muslim Leaguers, whose own Government was in office, would not have risen against it; sense of loyalty and public duty would not have departed from public officials who went about like maniacs howling against their own Government and officers; respect for property and human life would not have disappeared in the common man who with no scruple or compunction began freely to indulge in loot, arson and murder; politicians would not have shirked facing the men who had installed them in their offices; and administrators would not have felt hesitant or diffident in performing what was their obvious duty. If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense.

Pakistan is being taken by the common man, though it is not, as an Islamic State. This belief has been encouraged by the ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic State that is being heard from all quarters since the establishment of Pakistan. The phantom of an Islamic State has haunted the Musalman throughout the ages and is a result of the memory of the glorious past when Islam rising like a storm from the least expected quarter of the world—wilds of Arabia—instantly enveloped the world, pulling down from their high pedestal gods who had ruled over man since the creation, uprooting centuries old institutions and superstitions and supplanting all civilisations that had been built on an enslaved humanity. What is 125 years in human history, nay in the history of a people, and yet during this brief period Islam spread from the Indus to the Atlantic and Spain, and from the borders of China to Egypt, and the sons of the desert installed themselves in all old centres of civilisation—in Ctesiphon, Damascus, Alexandria, India and all places associated with the names of the Sumerian and the Assyrian civilisations. Historians have often posed the question : what would have been the state of the world today if Muawiya’s siege of Constantinople had succeeded or if the proverbial Arab instinct for plunder had not suddenly seized the mujahids of Abdur Rahman in their fight against Charles Martel on the plains of Tours in Southern France. May be Muslims would have discovered America long before Columbus did and the entire world would have been Moslemised; may be Islam itself would have been Europeanised. It is this brilliant achievement of the Arabian nomads, the like of which the world had never seen before, that makes the Musalman of today live in the past and yearn for the return of the glory that was Islam. He finds himself standing on the crossroads, wrapped in the mantle of the past and with the dead weight of centuries on his back, frustrated and bewildered and hesitant to turn one corner or the other. The freshness and the simplicity of the faith, which gave determination to his mind and spring to his muscle, is now denied to him. He has neither the means nor the ability to conquer and there are no countries to conquer. Little does he understand that the forces, which are pitted against him, are entirely different from those against which early Islam, had to fight, and that on the clues given by his own ancestors human mind has achieved results which he cannot understand. He therefore finds himself in a state of helplessness, waiting for some one to come and help him out of this morass of uncertainty and confusion. And he will go on waiting like this without anything happening. Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic in congruity that he is today. It is this lack of bold and clear thinking, the inability to understand and take decisions which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist and repeatedly create situations of the kind we have been inquiring into until our leaders have a clear conception of the goal and of the means to reach it. It requires no imagination to realise that irreconcilables remain irreconcilable even if you believe or wish to the contrary. Opposing principles, if left to themselves, can only produce confusion and disorder, and the application of a neutralising agency to them can only produce a dead result. Unless, in case of conflict between two ideologies, our leaders have the desire and the ability to elect, uncertainty must continue. And as long as we rely on the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog our steps. The sublime faith called Islam will live even if our leaders are not there to enforce it. It lives in the individual, in his soul and outlook, in all his relations with God and men, from the cradle to the grave, and our politicians should understand that if Divine commands cannot make or keep a man a Musalman, their statutes will not….

Posted in Academic freedom, Ahimsa, Ahmadis, Arabs, Asia and the West, Bangladesh, Bengal Constitutional Politics, Bhagavad Gita, Books, Britain in India, British imperialism, Caliphate, Christianity, Common Law and Equity, Comparative Government, Constitutional law, Constitutional Politics, Good and Evil, Government of Afghanistan, Government of India, Government of Pakistan, Ground Zero Mosque, Hindu political traditions, Hinduism, Hindus and Muslims, Imperialism, India's military doctrine, India's History, India's independence, India's Muslims, India's Partition, India's Politics, India's Polity, India's Rule of Law, India's secularism, India-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, Indian subcontinent, International diplomacy, International immigration, International Law, International politics, Iqbal, Iran, Iran's politics, Iran's modern history, Islam, Israel-Iran conflict-resolution, Jammu & Kashmir, Jammu & Kashmir in international law, Judaism, Jurisprudence, Just war, Law, Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea applied to international terrorists, Laws and customs of parliaments, Laws of war, Laws of war applied to international terrorists, Life and death, MA Jinnah, Master and Servant Law, Metaphysics (Ontology), Mob violence and behaviour, Monarchy vs Republicanism, Moral reasoning, Mumbai massacres, Munir Report, Muslim and Hindu communalism, Nationalism, Natural Justice, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's civil war, Pakistan's origins, Pakistan's constitutional politics, Pakistan's diplomacy, Pakistan's history, Pakistan's judiciary, Pakistan's military, Pakistan's murder of Indian POWs, Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Pakistan's politics, Pakistan's Rule of Law, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan's terrorist training institutes, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistani expansionism, Parliamentary Government, Parliamentary law, Pashtuns, Patriarchy, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Pervez Musharraf, Political assassinations, Political asylum, Political cynicism, Political legitimacy, Political mendacity, Political Philosophy, Political Science, Qadian, Racism, Rational decisions, Rationality, Reason, Religion, Rule of Law, Saudi Arabia, Scepticism and Dogmatism, Schizophrenia in international relations, Secular governance, Secularism in practice, September 11 attacks, Serendipity and international relations, Sikhs, Sindhis, Srinagar, Sunnis and Shias, Terrorist techniques, Terrorist-hostage situations, Turkey, Uighurs, Unconscious Mind, US AfPak policy, US Pakistan policy, US-Iran relations, War, War crimes, World War, Zionism. 2 Comments »

Reflections on Mr Zoellick’s reported claim

From Facebook:

Subroto Roy says that there are no viable macroeconomic models or time series data in the possession of the World Bank, IMF, the Govt of India’s Finance Ministry, Planning Commission, Reserve Bank etc, or any professor from Oxford, Cambridge, LSE, Harvard, Yale, MIT, Stanford to the University of Timbuctoo to justify the reported claim yesterday of World Bank President Robert Zoellick that India is headed to “8-9% growth”. Growth may be higher, may be lower or something else altogether, no one knows because national income measurements have yet to reach SNA standards (in any case it should be *per capita real GDP*… and *even then*, there is no adjustment for inequality...)…

What *is* clear though is that Indian public finance at Union and State level is a mess and paper money has been growing at more than 20% per annum…. (And if you happen to believe the Government of India’s apologists and propagandists about Indian inflation being in single digits, might I interest you in a marble structure in Agra, or a steel bridge over the Hooghly perhaps? Very nice, just like Brooklyn Bridge itself….)

Thoughts on Indian Governance

Subroto Roy believes the great optimism about the Indian Republic that he had felt as a 7-year old boy upon meeting Jawaharlal Nehru at Colombo Airport on Oct 13 1962 (the first days of the surprise Communist Chinese attack on India), has now dissipated, and apart from Nehru’s immediate successor (Lal Bahadur Shastri) all Indian Prime Ministers since then have been gravely, perhaps catastrophically, disappointing.

Subroto Roy thinks President Obama’s informed lawyerly academic approach to the Afghanistan decision, whether or not it has its intended good consequences, has a positive demonstration effect for other capital cities, e.g. New Delhi, where public policy decisions are too often made to appease special interest groups inside a cloud of meaningless rhetoric.

Subroto Roy says of India and China in summary discussion at Edward Hugh’s Wall: “Well, both have massive and energetic populations, each with relatively little capital per head; raising the capital per head with new production and exchange processes leads to growth. (But the nominal economies are weak, public finances are absymal and paper money is out of control.)”

Subroto Roy recalls again Pericles of Athens: “Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well; even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics- this is a peculiarity of ours:we do not say that a man who takes no inter…est in politics is a man who minds his own business;we say that he has no business here at all.”

On the Existence of a Unique and Stable Solution to the Jammu & Kashmir Problem that is Lawful, Just and Economically Efficient

P Chidambaram may recall our brief interaction at the residence of the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi in September-October 1990, and also my visit in July 1995 when he was a member of Narasimha Rao’s Government.

I am delighted to read in today’s paper that he believes a “unique solution” exists to the grave mortal problem of Jammu & Kashmir.   Almost four years ago, I published in The Statesman my discovery of the existence of precisely such a  unique solution in the three-part article “Solving Kashmir”.

This came to be followed by “Law, Justice and J&K”, “History of Jammu & Kashmir”, “Pakistan’s Allies”, “What to tell Musharraf” and a few others.  The purpose of this open letter is to describe that solution which provides, I believe, the only just and lawful  path available to the resolution of what has been known universally as the Kashmir problem.

Very briefly, it involves recognizing that the question of lawful territorial sovereignty in J&K is logically distinct from the question of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.   The solution requires

(a) acknowledging that the original legal entity in the world system  of nations known as Jammu & Kashmir arose on March 16 1846 and ceased to exist on or about October 22 1947; that the military contest that commenced on the latter date has in fact resulted, given all particular circumstances of history, in the lawful and just outcome in international law;

(b) offering all who may be Indian nationals or stateless and who presently live under Article 370, a formal choice of nationality between the Republics of India, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: citizen-by-citizen, without fear or favour, under conditions of full information, individual privacy and security; any persons who voluntarily choose to renounce Indian nationality in such private individual decisions would be nevertheless granted lawful permanent residence in the Indian Republic and J&K in particular.

In other words, the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by the entities known today as the Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India that occurred since October 22 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining democratic question has to do with free individual choice of nationality by inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who might wish to choose, for deeply personal individual reasons, not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead (or remain stateless).  Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed if Pakistan agreed to act similarly this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be resolved most appropriately. Pakistan and India are both wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused over decades by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

The full reasoning underlying this, which I believe to be the only lawful, just, efficient and stable solution that exists, is thoroughly explained in the following six articles. The first five, “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice & J&K”, “History of J&K”, and “Pakistan’s Allies”, “What to Tell Musharraf” were published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and are marked ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE below, and are also available elsewhere here. The sixth “An Indian Reply to President Zardari”, marked SIX, was published for the first time here following the Mumbai massacres.

I believe careful reflection upon this entire body of reasoning may lead all reasonable men and women to a practically unanimous consensus about this as the appropriate course of action; if such a consensus happened to arise, the implementation of the solution shall only be a matter of (relatively) uncomplicated procedural detail.

Subroto Roy
October 15 2009

ONE
SOLVING KASHMIR: ON AN APPLICATION OF REASON by Subroto Roy First published in three parts in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, December 1,2,3 2005, http://www.thestatesman.net

(This article has its origins in a paper “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir” which circulated in Washington DC in 1992-1995, including at the Indian and Pakistani embassies and the Carnegie Endowment, and was given as an invited lecture at the Heritage Foundation on June 23 1998. It should be read along with other articles also republished here, especially “History of J&K”, “Law, Justice and J&K” , “Understanding Pakistan”, “Pakistan’s Allies” and “What to Tell Musharraf”. The Washington paper and lecture itself originated from my ideas in the Introduction to Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, edited by WE James and myself in the University of Hawaii project on Pakistan 1986-1992.)

I. Give Indian `Green Cards’ to the Hurriyat et al

India, being a liberal democracy in its constitutional law, cannot do in Jammu & Kashmir what Czechoslovakia did to the “Sudeten Germans” after World War II. On June 18 1945 the new Czechoslovakia announced those Germans and Magyars within their borders who could not prove they had been actively anti-fascist before or during the War would be expelled — the burden of proof was placed on the individual, not the State. Czechoslovakia “transferring” this population was approved by the Heads of the USA, UK and USSR Governments at Potsdam on August 2 1945. By the end of 1946, upto two million Sudeten Germans were forced to flee their homes; thousands may have died by massacre or otherwise; 165,000 remained who were absorbed as Czechoslovak citizens. Among those expelled were doubtless many who had supported Germany and many others who had not — the latter to this day seek justice or even an apology in vain. Czechoslovakia punished none of its nationals for atrocities, saying it had been revenge for Hitler’s evil (”badla” in Bollywood terms) and the post Cold War Czech Government too has declined to render an apology. Revenge is a wild kind of justice (while justice may be a civilised kind of revenge).

India cannot follow this savage precedent in international law. Yet we must recognise there are several hundred and up to several hundred thousand persons on our side of the boundary in the State of Jammu & Kashmir who do not wish to be Indian nationals. These people are presently our nationals ius soli, having been born in territory of the Indian Republic, and/or ius sanguinis, having been born of parents who are Indian nationals; or they may be “stateless” whom we must treat in accordance with the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons. The fact is they may not wish to carry Indian passports or be Indian nationals.

In this respect their juridical persons resemble the few million “elite” Indians who have in the last few decades freely placed their hands on their hearts and solemnly renounced their Indian nationality, declaring instead their individual fidelity to other nation-states — becoming American, Canadian or Australian citizens, or British subjects or nationals of other countries. Such people include tens of thousands of the adult children of India’s metropolitan “elite”, who are annually visited abroad in the hot summer months by their Indian parents and relatives. They are daughters and sons of New Delhi’s Government and Opposition, of retired generals, air marshals, admirals, ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, public sector bureaucrats, private sector businessmen, university professors, journalists, doctors and many others. India’s most popular film-actress exemplified this “elite” capital-flight when, after a tireless search, she chose a foreign husband and moved to California.

The difference in Jammu & Kashmir would be that those wishing to renounce Indian nationality do not wish to move to any other place but to stay as and where they are, which is in Kashmir Valley or Jammu. Furthermore, they may wish, for whatever reason, to adopt, if they are eligible to do so, the nationality of e.g. the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

They may believe themselves descended from Ahmad Shah Abdali whose Afghans ruled or mis-ruled Kashmir Valley before being defeated by Ranjit Singh’s Sikhs in 1819. Or they may believe themselves of Iranian descent as, for example, are the Kashmiri cousins of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Or they may simply have wished to be, or are descended from persons who had wished to be on October 26 1947, citizens of the then-new British Dominion of Pakistan — but who came to be prevented from properly expressing such a desire because of the war-like conditions that have prevailed ever since between India and Pakistan. There may be even a few persons in Laddakh who are today Indian nationals but who wish to be considered Tibetans instead; there is, however, no Tibetan Republic and it does not appear there is going to be one.

India, being a free and self-confident country, should allow, in a systematic lawful manner, all such persons to fulfil their desires, and furthermore, should ensure they are not penalised for having expressed such “anti-national” desires or for having acted upon them. Sir Mark Tully, the British journalist, is an example of someone who has been a foreign national who has chosen to reside permanently in the Republic of India — indeed he has been an exemplary permanent resident of our country. There are many others like him. There is no logical reason why all those persons in Jammu & Kashmir who do wish not to be Indians by nationality cannot receive the same legal status from the Indian Republic as has been granted to Sir Mark Tully. There are already thousands of Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese nationals who are lawful permanent residents in the Indian Republic, and who travel back and forth between India and their home countries. There is no logical reason why the same could not be extended to several hundred or numerous thousand people in Jammu & Kashmir who may wish to not accept or to renounce their Indian nationality (for whatever personal reason) and instead become nationals, if they are so eligible, of the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, or, for that matter, to remain stateless. On the one hand, their renunciation of Indian nationality is logically equivalent to the renunciation of Indian nationality by the adult children of India’s “elite” settled in North America and Western Europe. On the other hand, their wish to adopt, if they are eligible, a foreign nationality, such as that of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, and yet remain domiciled in Indian territory is logically equivalent to that of many foreign nationals domiciled in India already like Sir Mark Tully.

Now if you are a permanent resident of some country, you may legally have many, perhaps most, but certainly not all the rights and duties of nationals of that country. e.g., though you will have to pay all the same taxes, you may not be allowed to (or be required to) vote in national or provincial elections but you may in local municipal elections. At the same time, permanently residing foreign nationals are supposed to be equal under the law and have equal access to all processes of civil and criminal justice. (As may be expected though from human frailty, even the federal courts of the USA can be notorious in their injustice and racism towards “Green Card” holders relative to “full” American citizens.) Then again, as a permanently resident foreigner, while you will be free to work in any lawful trade or profession, you may not be allowed to work in some or perhaps any Government agencies, certainly not the armed forces or the police. Many Indians in the USA were engineering graduates, and because many engineering jobs or contracts in the USA are related to the US armed forces and require US citizens only, it is commonplace for Indian engineers to renounce their Indian nationality and become Americans because of this. Many Indian-American families have one member who is American, another Indian, a third maybe Canadian, a fourth Fijian or British etc.

The same can happen in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir if it evolves peacefully and correctly in the future. It is quite possible to imagine a productive family in a peaceful Kashmir Valley of the future where one brother is an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, another brother a civil servant and a sister a police officer of the J&K State Government, another sister being a Pakistani doctor, while cousins are Afghan or Iranian or “stateless” businessmen. Each family-member would have made his/her choice of nationality as an individual given the circumstances of his/her life, his/her personal comprehension of the facts of history, his/her personal political and/or religious persuasions, and similar deeply private considerations. All would have their children going to Indian schools and being Indian citizens ius soli and/or ius sanguinis. When the children grow up, they would be free to join, if they wished, the existing capital flight of other Indian adult children abroad and there renounce their Indian nationality as many have come to do.

II Revealing Choices Privately with Full Information
For India to implement such a proposal would be to provide an opportunity for all those domiciled in Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Laddakh to express freely and privately as individuals their deepest wishes about their own identities, in a confidential manner, citizen by citizen, case by case. This would thereby solve the fundamental democratic problem that has been faced ever since the Pakistani attack on the original State of Jammu & Kashmir commenced on October 22 1947, which came to be followed by the Rape of Baramulla — causing the formal accession of the State to the then-new Dominion of India on October 26 1947.

A period of, say, 30 months may be announced by the Government of India during which full information would be provided to all citizens affected by this change, i.e. all those presently governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The condition of full information may include, for example, easy access to Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani newspapers in addition to access to Indian media. Each such person wishing to either remain with Indian nationality (by explicitly requesting an Indian passport if he/she does not have one already — and such passports can be printed in Kashmiri and Urdu too), or to renounce Indian nationality and either remain stateless or adopt, if he/she is so eligible, the nationality of e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan, should be administratively assisted by the Government of India to make that choice.

In particular, he/she should be individually, confidentially, and without fear or favour assured and informed of his/her new rights and responsibilities. For example, a resident of Kashmir Valley who chooses to become a Pakistani citizen, such as Mr Geelani, would now enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in the Indian Republic that Mr Tully enjoys, and at the same time no longer require a visa to visit Pakistan just as Mr Tully needs no visa to enter Britain. In case individual participants in the Hurriyat choose to renounce Indian nationality and adopt some other, they would no longer be able to legally participate in Indian national elections or J&K’s State elections. That is something which they say they do not wish to do in any case. Those members of the Hurriyat who chose e.g. Pakistani nationality while still residing in Jammu & Kashmir, would be free to send postal ballots or cross the border and vote in Pakistan’s elections if and when these occur. There are many Canadians who live permanently in the USA who cross home to Canada in order to cast a ballot.

After the period of 30 months, every person presently under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution would have received a full and fair opportunity to privately and confidentially reveal his/her preference or choice under conditions of full information. “Partition”, “Plebiscite”, and “Military Decision” have been the three alternatives under discussion ever since the National Conference of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his then-loyal Deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, helped the Indian Army and Air Force in 1947-1948 fight off the savage attack against Jammu & Kashmir State that had commenced from Pakistan on October 22 1947. When, during the Pakistani attack, the Sheikh and Bakshi agreed to the Muslim Conference’s demand for a plebiscite among the people, the Pakistanis balked — the Sheikh and Bakshi then withdrew their offer and decisively and irrevocably chose to accede to the Indian Union. The people of Jammu & Kashmir, like any other, are now bound by the sovereign political commitments made by their forebears. Even so, given the painful mortal facts of the several decades since, the solution here proposed if properly implemented would be an incomparably more thorough democratic exercise than any conceivable plebiscite could ever have been.

Furthermore, regardless of the outcome, it would not entail any further “Partition” or population “transfer” which inevitably would degenerate into a savage balkanization, and has been ruled out as an unacceptable “deal-breaker” by the Indian Republic. Instead, every individual person would have been required, in a private and confidential decision-making process, to have chosen a nationality or to remain stateless — resulting in a multitude of cosmopolitan families in Jammu & Kashmir. But that is something commonplace in the modern world. Properly understood and properly implemented, we shall have resolved the great mortal problem we have faced for more than half a century, and Jammu & Kashmir can finally settle into a period of peace and prosperity. The boundary between India and Pakistan would have been settled by the third alternative mentioned at the time, namely, “Military Decision”.

III. Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar and Gilgit
Pakistan has demanded its flag fly in Srinagar. This too can happen though not in the way Pakistan has been wishing to see it happen. A Pakistan flag might fly in the Valley just as might an Afghan and Iranian flag as well. Pakistan has wished its flag to fly as the sovereign over Jammu & Kashmir. That is not possible. The best and most just outcome is for the Pakistani flag to fly over a recognised Pakistani consular or visa office in Srinagar, Jammu and Leh. In diplomatic exchange, the Indian tricolour would have to fly over a recognised Indian consular or visa office in Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu.

Pakistan also may have to act equivalently with respect to the original inhabitants of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir that it has been controlling — allowing those people to become Indian nationals if they so chose to do in free private decisions under conditions of full information. In other words, the “Military Decision” that defines the present boundary between sovereign states must be recognised by Pakistan sincerely and permanently in a Treaty relationship with India — and all of Pakistan’s official and unofficial protégés like the Hurriyat and the “United Jehad Council” would have to do the same. Without such a sovereign commitment from the Government of Pakistan, as shown by decisive actions of lack of aggressive intent (e.g. as came to be implemented between the USA and USSR), the Government of India has no need to involve the Government of Pakistan in implementing the solution of enhancing free individual choice of nationality with regard to all persons on our side of the boundary.

The “Military Decision” regarding the sovereign boundary in Jammu & Kashmir will be so recognised by all only if it is the universally just outcome in international law. And that in fact is what it is.

The original Jammu & Kashmir State began its existence as an entity in international law long before the present Republics of India and Pakistan ever did. Pakistan commences as an entity on August 14 1947; India commences as an entity of international law with its signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 20 1918. Jammu & Kashmir began as an entity on March 16 1846 — when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh Dogra and the British, one week after the Treaty of Lahore between the British and the defeated Sikh regency of the child Daleep Singh.

Liaquat Ali Khan and Zafrullah Khan both formally challenged on Pakistan’s behalf the legitimacy of Dogra rule in Jammu & Kashmir since the Treaty of Amritsar. The Pakistani Mission to the UN does so even today. The Pakistanis were following Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru himself, who too had at one point challenged Dogra legitimacy in the past. But though the form of words of the Pakistan Government and the Nehru-Abdullah position were similar in their attacks on the Treaty of Amritsar, their underlying substantive reasons were as different as chalk from cheese. The Pakistanis attacked the Dogra dynasty for being Dogra — i.e. because they were Hindus and not Muslims governing a Muslim majority. Nehru and Abdullah denounced monarchic autocracy in favour of mass democracy, and so attacked the Dogra dynasty for being a dynasty. All were wrong to think the Treaty of Amritsar anything but a lawful treaty in international law.

Furthermore, in this sombre political game of great mortal consequence, there were also two other parties who were, or appeared to be, in favour of the dynasty: one because the dynasty was non-Muslim, the other, despite it being so. Non-Muslim minorities like many Hindus and Sikhs in the business and governmental classes, saw the Dogra dynasty as their protector against a feared communalist tyranny arising from the Sunni Muslim masses of Srinagar Valley, whom Abdullah’s rhetoric at Friday prayer-meetings had been inciting or at least awakening from slumber. At the same time, the communalists of the Muslim Conference who had broken away from Abdullah’s secular National Conference, sought political advantage over Abdullah by declaring themselves in favour of keeping the dynasty — even elevating it to become an international sovereign, thus flattering the already pretentious potentate that he would be called “His Majesty” instead of merely “His Highness”. The ancestry of today’s Hurriyat’s demands for an independent Jammu & Kashmir may be traced precisely to those May 21-22 1947 declarations of the Muslim Conference leader, Hamidullah Khan.

Into this game stumbled the British with all the mix of cunning, indifference, good will, impatience, arrogance and pomposity that marked their rule in India. At the behest of the so-called “Native Princes”, the 1929 Butler Commission had hinted that the relationship of “Indian India” to the British sovereign was conceptually different from that of “British India” to the British sovereign. This view was adopted in the Cabinet Mission’s 12 May 1946 Memorandum which in turn came to be applied by Attlee and Mountbatten in their unseemly rush to “Divide and Quit” India in the summer of 1947.

It created the pure legal illusion that there was such a thing as “Lapse of Paramountcy” at which Jammu & Kashmir or any other “Native State” of “Indian India” could conceivably, even for a moment, become a sovereign enjoying the comity of nations — contradicting Britain’s own position that only two Dominions, India and Pakistan, could ever be members of the British Commonwealth and hence members of the newly created UN. British pusillanimity towards Jammu & Kashmir’s Ruler had even extended to making him a nominal member of Churchill’s War Cabinet because he had sent troops to fight in Burma. But the legal illusion had come about because of a catastrophic misunderstanding on the part of the British of their own constitutional law.

The only legal scholar who saw this was B R Ambedkar in a lonely and brilliant technical analysis released to the press on June 17 1947. No “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Native Princes” of Indian India could occur in constitutional law. Paramountcy over Indian India would be automatically inherited by the successor state of British India at the Transfer of Power. That successor state was the new British Dominion of India as well as (when it came to be finalised by Partition from India) the new British Dominion of Pakistan (Postscript: the deleted words represent a mistake made in the original paper, corrected in “Law, Justice & J&K” in view of the fact the UN in 1947 deemed India alone the successor state of British India and Pakistan a new state in the world system). A former “Native Prince” could only choose to which Dominion he would go. No other alternative existed even for a single logical moment. Because the British had catastrophically failed to comprehend this aspect of their own constitutional law, they created a legal vacuum whereby between August 15 and October 22-26 1947, Jammu & Kashmir became a local and temporary sovereign recognised only by the Dominion of Pakistan (until October 22) and the Dominion of India (until October 26). But it was not a globally recognised sovereign and was never going to be such in international law. This was further proved by Attlee refusing to answer the J&K Prime Minister’s October 18 1947 telegram.

All ambiguity came to end with the Pakistani attack of October 22 1947, the Rape of Baramulla, the secession of an “Azad Kashmir”declared by Sardar Ibrahim, and the Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on October 31 1947 followed by the massacre of Sikh soldiers of the J&K Army at Bunji. With those Pakistani actions, Gulab Singh’s Jammu & Kashmir State, founded on March 16 1846 by the Treaty of Amritsar, ceased to logically exist as an entity in international law and fell into a state of ownerless anarchy. The conflict between Ibrahim’s Muslim communalists backed by the new Dominion of Pakistan and Abdullah’s secularists backed by the new Dominion of India had become a civil war within a larger intra-Commonwealth war that itself was almost a civil war between forces of the same military.

Jammu & Kashmir territory had become ownerless. The Roman Law which is at the root of all municipal and international law in the world today would declare that in the ownership of such an ownerless entity, a “Military Decision” was indeed the just outcome. Sovereignty over the land, waters, forests and other actual and potential resources of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir has become divided by “Military Decision” between the modern Republics of India and Pakistan. By the proposal made herein, the people and their descendants shall have chosen their nationality and their domicile freely across the sovereign boundary that has come to result.

TWO
LAW, JUSTICE AND J&K
by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, July 2 2006 and The Statesman July 3 2006 http://www.thestatesman.net Editorial Page Special Article

I.
For a solution to J&K to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion in Pakistan and India as well as all people and parties in J&K ~ those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others ~ will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

On August 14, 1947, the legal entity known as “British India”, as one of its final acts, and based on a sovereign British decision made only two months earlier, created out of some of its territory a new State defined in international law as the “Dominion of Pakistan”. British India extinguished itself the very next day, and the newly independent “Dominion of India” succeeded to all its rights and obligations in international law. As the legal successor of the “India” which had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the San Francisco Declaration of 1945, the Dominion of India was already a member of the new UN as well as a signatory to many international treaties. By contrast, the Dominion of Pakistan had to apply afresh to sign treaties and become a member of international organisations. The theory put forward by Argentina that two new States, India and Pakistan, had been created ab initio, came to be rejected and was withdrawn by Argentina. Instead, Pakistan with the wholehearted backing of India was made a member of the UN, with all except Afghanistan voting in favour. (Afghanistan’s exceptional vote signalled presence of conflict over the Durand Line and idea of a Pashtunistan; Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were imprisoned by the Muslim League regime of NWFP which later supported the tribesmen who attacked J&K starting October 22, 1947; that conflict remains unresolved to this day, even after the American attack on the Taliban, the restart of a constitutional process in Afghanistan, and the purported mediation of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.)

Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s distinguished first ambassador to the UN, claimed in September 1947: “Pakistan is not a new member of UNO but a successor to a member State which was one of the founders of the Organisation.” He noted that he himself had led India to the final session of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939, and he wished to say that Pakistan had been present “as part of India… under the latter name” as a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles. This was, however, logically impossible. The Treaty of Versailles long predated (1) Mohammad Iqbal’s Allahabad Address which conceptualised for the first time in the 20th Century a Muslim State in Northwest India; (2) Rahmat Ali’s invention of the word “PAKSTAN” on the top floor of a London omnibus; (3) M. A. Jinnah and Fazlul Haq’s Lahore Resolution; and (4) the final British decision of June 3, 1947 to create by Partition out of “British India” a Dominion named Pakistan. Pakistan could not have acted in international law prior to having come into being or been created or even conceived itself. Zafrullah Khan would have been more accurate to say that the history of Pakistanis until August 14, 1947 had been one in common with that of their Indian cousins ~ or indeed their Indian brothers, since innumerable North Indian Muslim families came to be literally partitioned, with some brothers remaining Indians while other brothers became Pakistanis.

Pakistan was created at the behest of Jinnah’s Muslim League though with eventual agreement of the Indian National Congress (a distant ancestor of the political party going by the same name today). Pakistan arose not because Jinnah said Hindus and Muslims were “two nations” but because he and his League wished for a State where Muslims would find themselves ruled by fellow-Muslims and feel themselves part of a pan-Islamic culture. Yet Pakistan was intended to be a secular polity with Muslim-majority governance, not an Islamic theocracy. That Pakistan failed to become secular was exemplified most poignantly in the persecution Zafrullah himself later faced in his personal life as an Ahmadiya, even while he was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. (The same happened later to Pakistan’s Nobel-winning physicist Abdus Salaam.) Pakistan was supposed to allow the genius of Indo-Muslim culture to flourish, transplanted from places like Lucknow and Aligarh which would never be part of it. In fact, the areas that are Pakistan today had in the 1937 provincial elections shown scant popular Muslim support for Jinnah’s League. The NWFP had a Congress Government in the 1946 elections, and its supporters boycotted the pro-Pakistan referendum in 1947. The imposition of Urdu culture as Pakistan’s dominant ethos might have come to be accepted later in West Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but it was not acceptable in East Bengal, and led inevitably to the Pakistani civil war and creation of Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujib in 1971.

In August 1947, the new Dominions of India and Pakistan were each supposed to protect their respective minority populations as their first political duty. Yet both palpably failed in this, and were reduced to making joint declarations pleading for peace and an end to communal killings and the abduction of women. The Karachi Government, lacking the wherewithal and administrative machinery of being a nation-state at all, and with only Liaquat and an ailing Jinnah as noted leaders, may have failed more conspicuously, and West Punjab, the Frontier and Sindh were soon emptied of almost all their many Sikhs and Hindus. Instead, the first act of the new Pakistan Government in the weeks after August 14, 1947 was to arrange for the speedy and safe transfer of the North Indian Muslim elite by air from Delhi using chartered British aeroplanes. The ordinary Muslim masses of UP, Delhi and East Punjab were left in danger from or were subjected to Sikh and Hindu mob attacks, especially as news and rumours spread of similar outrages against Pakistan’s departing minorities.

In this spiral of revenge attacks and counter-attacks, bloodshed inevitably spilled over from West and East Punjab into the northern Punjabi plains of Jammu, though Kashmir Valley remained conspicuously peaceful. Zafrullah and Liaquat would later claim it was this communal civil war which had caused thousands of newly decommissioned Mirpuri soldiers of the British Army, and thousands of Afridi and other Frontier tribesmen, to spontaneously act to “liberate” J&K’s Muslims from alleged tyranny under the Hindu Ruler or an allegedly illegal Indian occupation.

But the main attack on J&K State that began from Pakistan along the Manshera-Muzaffarabad road on October 22, 1947 was admittedly far too well-organised, well-armed, well-planned and well-executed to have been merely a spontaneous uprising of tribesmen and former soldiers. In all but name, it was an act of undeclared war of the new Dominion of Pakistan first upon the State of J&K and then upon the Indian Dominion. This became obvious to Field Marshall Auchinlek, who, as Supreme Commander of the armed forces of both India and Pakistan, promptly resigned and abolished the Supreme Command in face of the fact that two parts of his own forces were now at war with one another.

The invaders failed to take Srinagar solely because they lost their military purpose while indulging in the Rape of Baramula. Thousands of Kashmiri women of all communities ~ Muslim, Sikh and Hindu ~ were violated and transported back to be sold in markets in Peshawar and elsewhere. Such was standard practice in Central Asian tribal wars from long before the advent of Islam, and the invading tribesmen shared that culture. India’s Army and Air Force along with the militias of the secular democratic movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and those remaining loyal units of J&K forces, fought off the invasion, and liberated Baramula, Naushera, Uri, Poonch etc. Gilgit had a British-led coup détat against it bringing it under Pakistan’s control. Kargil was initially taken by the Pakistanis and then lost by them. Leh could have been but was not taken by Pakistani forces. But in seeking to protect Leh and to retake Kargil, the Indian Army lost the siege of Skardu ~ which ended reputedly with the infamous communication from the Pakistani commander to his HQ: “All Sikhs killed; all women raped.”

Legal theory
Now, in this grave mortal conflict, the legal theory to which both the Indian and Pakistani Governments have been wedded for sixty years is one that had been endorsed by the British Cabinet Mission in 1946 and originated with the Butler Commission of 1929. Namely, that “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Indian India” of the “Native States” could and did occur with the extinction of British India on August 15, 1947. By this theory, Hyderabad, J&K, Junagadh and the several other States which had not acceded to either Dominion were no longer subject to the Crown’s suzerainty as of that date. Both Dominions drew up “Instruments of Accession” for Rulers to sign upon the supposed “Lapse” of Paramountcy that was to occur with the end of British India.

Ever since, the Pakistan Government has argued that Junagadh’s Ruler acceded to Pakistan and Hyderabad’s had wished to do so but both were forcibly prevented by India. Pakistan has also argued the accession to India by J&K’s Ruler was “fraudulent” and unacceptable, and Sheikh Abdullah was a “Quisling” of India and it was not his National Conference but the Muslim Conference of Ibrahim, Abbas and the Mirwaiz (precursor of the Hurriyat) which represented J&K’s Muslims.

India argued that Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan or Hyderabad’s independence were legal and practical impossibilities contradicting the wills of their peoples, and that their integration into the Indian Dominion was carried out in an entirely legitimate manner in the circumstances prevailing.

On J&K, India has argued that not only had the Ruler requested Indian forces to fight off the Pakistani attack, and he acceded formally before Indian forces were sent, but also that democratic principles were fully adhered to in the unequivocal endorsement of the accession by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference and further by a duly called and elected J&K Constituent Assembly, as well as generations of Kashmiris since. In the Indian view, it is Pakistan which has been in illegal occupation of Indian territory from Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit to Skardu all the way to the Khunjerab Pass, Siachen Glacier and K2, some of which it illegally ceded to its Communist Chinese ally, and furthermore that it has denied the peoples of these areas any democratic voice.

Roman law
In June 1947, it was uniquely and brilliantly argued by BR Ambedkar in a statement to the Press that the British had made a catastrophic error in comprehending their own constitutional law, that no such thing as “Lapse” of Paramountcy existed, and that suzerainty over the “Native States” of “Indian India” would be automatically transferred in international law to the successor State of British India. It was a legal illusion to think any Native State could be sovereign even for a single logical moment. On this theory, if the Dominion of India was the sole successor State in international law while Pakistan was a new legal entity, then a Native State which acceded to Pakistan after August 15, 1947 would have had to do so with the consent of the suzerain power, namely, India, as may be said to have happened implicitly in case of Chitral and a few others. Equally, India’s behaviour in integrating (or annexing) Junagadh and Hyderabad, would become fully explicable ~ as would the statements of Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel before October 1947 that they would accept J&K going to Pakistan if that was what the Ruler and his people desired. Pakistan unilaterally and by surprise went to war against J&K on October 22, declared the accession to India “fraudulent”, and to this day has claimed the territory of the original State of J&K is “disputed”. Certainly, even if the Ambedkar doctrine is applied that no “Lapse” was possible under British law, Pakistan did not recognise India’s jurisdiction there as the suzerain power as of August 15, 1947. Altogether, Pakistan’s sovereign actions from October 22 onwards amounted to acting to annex J&K to itself by military force ~ acts which came to be militarily resisted (with partial success) by India allied with Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference and the remaining forces of J&K. By these military actions, Pakistan revealed that it considered J&K territory to have descended into a legal state of anarchy as of October 22, 1947, and hence open to resolution by “Military Decision” ~ as is indeed the just outcome under Roman Law, the root of all municipal and international law today, when there is a contest between claimants over an ownerless entity.

Choice of nationality
Hence, the present author concluded (“Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman December 1-3, 2005) that the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by India and Pakistan that has occurred since 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining “democratic” question described has to do with free individual choice of nationality by the inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who may choose not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead. Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of the Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed, if Pakistan agreed to act similarly, this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be peacefully resolved. Both countries are wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

THREE
HISTORY OF JAMMU & KASHMIR
by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29 2006 and The Statesman Oct 30 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

At the advent of Islam in distant Arabia, India and Kashmir in particular were being visited by Chinese Buddhist pilgrims during Harsha’s reign. The great “Master of Law” Hiuen Tsiang visited between 629-645 and spent 631-633 in Kashmir (”Kia-chi-mi-lo”), describing it to include Punjab, Kabul and Kandahar. Over the next dozen centuries, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and again Hindu monarchs came to rule the 85 mile long 40 mile wide territory on the River Jhelum’s upper course known as Srinagar Valley, as well as its adjoining Jammu in the upper plains of the Punjab and “Little Tibet” consisting of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit.

In 1344, a Persian adventurer from Swat or Khorasan by name of Amir or Mirza, who had “found his way into the Valley and in time gained great influence at the Raja’s court”, proclaimed himself Sultan Shamsuddin after the death of the last Hindu monarchs of medieval Kashmir. Twelve of his descendants formed the Shamiri dynasty including the notorious Sikander and the just and tolerant Zainulabidin. Sikander who ruled 1386-1410 “submitted himself” to the Uzbek Taimur the Lame when he approached Kashmir in 1398 “and thus saved the country from invasion”. Otherwise, “Sikander was a gloomy ferocious bigot, and his zeal in destroying temples and idols was so intense that he is remembered as the Idol-Breaker. He freely used the sword to propagate Islam and succeeded in forcing the bulk of the population to conform outwardly to the Muslim religion. Most of the Brahmins refused to apostatise, and many of them paid with their lives the penalty for their steadfastness. Many others were exiled, and only a few conformed.”

Zainulabidin who ruled 1417-1467 “was a man of very different type”. “He adopted the policy of universal toleration, recalled the exiled Brahmins, repealed the jizya or poll-tax on Hindus, and even permitted new temples to be built. He abstained from eating flesh, prohibited the slaughter of kine, and was justly venerated as a saint. He encouraged literature, painting and music, and caused many translations to be made of works composed in Sanskrit, Arabic and other languages.” During his “long and prosperous reign”, he “constructed canals and built many mosques; he was just and tolerant”.

The Shamiri dynasty ended in 1541 when “some fugitive chiefs of the two local factions of the Makri and the Chakk invited Mirza Haidar Dughlat, a relation of Babar, to invade Kashmir. The country was conquered and the Mirza held it (nominally in name of Humayan) till 1551, when he was killed in a skirmish. The line… was restored for a few years, until in 1559 a Chakk leader, Ghazi Shah, usurped the throne; and in the possession of his descendants it remained for nearly thirty years.” This dynasty marks the origins of Shia Islam in Srinagar though Shia influence in Gilgit, Baltistan and Laddakh was of longer standing. Constant dissensions weakened the Chakks, and in 1586, Akbar, then at Attock on the Indus, sent an army under Raja Bhagwan Das into Srinagar Valley and easily made it part of his Empire.

Shivaism and Islam both flourished, and Hindu ascetics and Sufi saints were revered by all. Far from Muslims and Hindus forming distinct nations, here they were genetically related kinsmen living in proximity in a small isolated area for centuries. Indeed Zainulabidin may have had a vast unspoken influence on the history of all India insofar as Akbar sought to attempt in his empire what Zainulabidin achieved in the Valley. Like Zainulabidin, Akbar’s governance of India had as its “constant aim” “to conciliate the Hindus and to repress Muslim bigotry” which in modern political parlance may be seen as the principle of secular governance ~ of conciliating the powerless (whether majority or minority) and repressing the bigotry of the powerful (whether minority or majority). Akbar had made the Valley the summer residence of the Mughals, and it was Jahangir, seeing the Valley for the first time, who apparently said the words agar behest baushad, hamee in hast, hamee in hast, hamee in hast: “if Heaven exists, it is here, it is here, it is here”. Yet like other isolated paradises (such as the idyllic islands of the Pacific Ocean) an accursed mental ether can accompany the magnificent beauty of people’s surroundings. As the historian put it: “The Kashmiris remained secure in their inaccessible Valley; but they were given up to internal weakness and discord, their political importance was gone…”

After the Mughals collapsed, Iran’s Turkish ruler Nadir Shah sacked Delhi in 1739 but the Iranian court fell in disarray upon his death. In 1747 a jirga of Pashtun tribes at Kandahar “broke normal tradition” and asked an old Punjabi holy man and shrine-keeper to choose between two leaders; this man placed young wheat in the hand of the 25 year old Ahmed Shah Saddozai of the Abdali tribe, and titled him “Durrani”. Five years later, Durrani took Kashmir and for the next 67 years the Valley was under Pashtun rule, a time of “unmitigated brutality and widespread distress”. Durrani himself “was wise, prudent and simple”, never declared himself king and wore no crown, instead keeping a stick of young wheat in his turban. Leaving India, he famously recited: “The Delhi throne is beautiful indeed, but does it compare with the mountains of Kandahar?”

Kashmir’s modern history begins with Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs who became a soldier at 12, and in 1799 at age 19 was made Lahore’s Governor by Kabul’s Zaman Shah. Three years later “he made himself master of Amritsar”, and in 1806 crossed the River Sutlej and took Ludhiana. He created a fine Sikh infantry and cavalry under former officers of Napoleon, and with 80,000 trained men and 500 guns took Multan and Peshawar, defeated the Pashtuns and overran Kashmir in 1819. The “cruel rule” of the Pashtuns ended “to the great relief of Kashmir’s inhabitants”.

The British Governor-General Minto (ancestor of the later Viceroy), seeing advantage in the Sikhs staying north of the Sutlej, sent Charles Metcalfe, “a clever young civilian”, to persuade the Khalsa; in 1809, Ranjit Singh and the British in the first Treaty of Amritsar agreed to establish “perpetual amity”: the British would “have no concern” north of the Sutlej and Ranjit Singh would keep only minor personnel south of it. In 1834 and 1838 Ranjit Singh was struck by paralysis and died in 1839, leaving no competent heir. The Sikh polity collapsed, “their power exploded, disappearing in fierce but fast flames”. It was “a period of storm and anarchy in which assassination was the rule” and the legitimate line of his son and grandson, Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh was quickly extinguished. In 1845 the Queen Regent, mother of the five-year old Dalip Singh, agreed to the Khalsa ending the 1809 Treaty. After bitter battles that might have gone either way, the Khalsa lost at Sobraon on 10 February 1846, and accepted terms of surrender in the 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore. The kingdom had not long survived its founder: “created by the military and administrative genius of one man, it crumbled into powder when the spirit which gave it life was withdrawn; and the inheritance of the Khalsa passed into the hands of the English.”

Ranjit Singh’s influence on modern J&K was even greater through his having mentored the Rajput Gulab Singh Dogra (1792-1857) and his brothers Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh. Jammu had been ruled by Ranjit Deo until 1780 when the Sikhs made it tributary to the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh, a great grand nephew of Ranjit Deo, had left home at age 17 in search of a soldierly fortune, and ended up in 1809 in Ranjit Singh’s army, just when Ranjit Singh had acquired for himself a free hand to expand his domains north of the River Sutlej.

Gulab Singh, an intrepid soldier, by 1820 had Jammu conferred upon him by Ranjit Singh with the title of Raja, while Bhimber, Chibal, Poonch and Ramnagar went to his brothers. Gulab Singh, “often unscrupulous and cruel, was a man of considerable ability and efficiency”; he “found his small kingdom a troublesome charge but after ten years of constant struggles he and his two brothers became masters of most of the country between Kashmir and the Punjab”, though Srinagar Valley itself remained under a separate Governor appointed by the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh extended Jammu’s rule from Rawalpindi, Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, across Laddakh and into Tibet. His General Zorawar Singh led six expeditions into Laddakh between 1834 and 1841 through Kishtwar, Padar and Zanskar. In May 1841, Zorawar left Leh with an army of 5000 Dogras and Laddakhis and advanced on Tibet. Defeating the Tibetans at Rudok and Tashigong, he reached Minsar near Lake Mansarovar from where he advanced to Taklakot (Purang), 15 miles from the borders of Nepal and Kumaon, and built a fort stopping for the winter. Lhasa sent large re-inforcements to meet him. Zorawar, deciding to take the offensive, was killed in the Battle of Toyu, on 11-12 December 1841 at 16,000 feet.

A Laddakhi rebellion resulted against Jammu, aided now by the advancing Tibetans. A new army was sent under Hari Chand suppressing the rebellion and throwing back the Tibetans, leading to a peace treaty between Lhasa and Jammu signed on 17 September 1842: “We have agreed that we have no ill-feelings because of the past war. The two kings will henceforth remain friends forever. The relationship between Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Lhasa (Dalai Lama) is now established. The Maharajah Sahib, with God (Kunchok) as his witness, promises to recognise ancient boundaries, which should be looked after by each side without resorting to warfare. When the descendants of the early kings, who fled from Laddakh to Tibet, now return they will not be stopped by Shri Maharajah. Trade between Laddakh and Tibet will continue as usual. Tibetan government traders coming into Laddakh will receive free transport and accommodations as before, and the Laddakhi envoy will, in turn, receive the same facilities in Lhasa. The Laddakhis take an oath before God (Kunchok) that they will not intrigue or create new troubles in Tibetan territory. We have agreed, with God as witness, that Shri Maharajah Sahib and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will live together as members of the same household.” The traditional boundary between Laddakh and Tibet “as recognised by both sides since olden times” was accepted by the envoys of Gulab Singh and the Dalai Lama.

An earlier 1684 treaty between Laddakh and Lhasa had said that while Laddakh would send tribute to Lhasa every three years, “the king of Laddakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngarees-khor-sum, that he may be independent there; and he sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kangree (Kailas), and the Holy Lakes of Mansarovar and Rakas Tal”. The area around Minsar village near Lake Mansarovar, held by the rulers of Laddakh since 1583, was retained by Jammu in the 1842 peace-treaty, and its revenue was received by J&K State until 1948.

After Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839, Gulab Singh was alienated from the Lahore Court where the rise of his brothers and a nephew aroused enough Khalsa jealousy to see them assassinated in palace intrigues. While the Sikhs imploded, Gulab Singh had expanded his own dominion from Rawalpindi to Minsar ~ everywhere except Srinagar Valley itself. He had apparently advised the Sikhs not to attack the British in breach of the 1809 Treaty, and when they did so he had not joined them, though had he done so British power in North India might have been broken. The British were grateful for his neutrality and also his help in their first misbegotten adventure in Afghanistan. It was Gulab Singh who was now encouraged by both the British and the Sikhs to mediate between them, indeed “to take a leading part in arranging conditions of peace”, and he formally represented the Sikh regency in the negotiations. The 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore “set forth that the British Government having demanded in addition to a certain assignment of territory, a payment of a crore and a half of rupees, and the Sikh Government being unable to pay the whole”, Dalip Singh “should cede as equivalent to one crore the hill country belonging to the Punjab between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and the Hazara”.

For the British to occupy the whole of this mountainous territory was judged unwise on economic and military grounds; it was not feasible to occupy from a military standpoint and the area “with the exception of the small Valley of Kashmir” was “for the most part unproductive”. “On the other hand, the ceded tracts comprised the whole of the hereditary possessions of Gulab Singh, who, being eager to obtain an indefeasible title to them, came forward and offered to pay the war indemnity on condition that he was made the independent ruler of Jammu & Kashmir.

A separate treaty embodying this arrangement was thus concluded between the British and Gulab Singh at Amritsar on 16 March 1846.” Gulab Singh acknowledged the British Government’s supremacy, and in token of it agreed to present annually to the British Government “one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed and three pairs of Kashmir shawls. This arrangement was later altered; the annual presentation made by the Kashmir State was confined to two Kashmir shawls and three romals (handkerchiefs).” The Treaty of Amritsar “put Gulab Singh, as Maharaja, in possession of all the hill country between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh and Gilgit; but excluding Lahoul, Kulu and some areas including Chamba which for strategic purposes, it was considered advisable (by the British) to retain and for which a remission of Rs 25 lakhs was made from the crore demanded, leaving Rs 75 lakhs as the final amount to be paid by Gulab Singh.” The British retained Hazara which in 1918 was included into NWFP. Through an intrigue emanating from Prime Minister Lal Singh in Lahore, Imamuddin, the last Sikh-appointed Governor of Kashmir, sought to prevent Gulab Singh taking possession of the Valley in accordance with the Treaty’s terms. By December 1846 Gulab Singh had done so, though only with help of a British force which included 17,000 Sikh troops “who had been fighting in the campaign just concluded”. (Contemporary British opinion even predicted Sikhism like Buddhism “would become extinct in a short time if it were not kept alive by the esprit de corps of the Sikh regiments”.)

The British in 1846 may have been glad enough to allow Gulab Singh take independent charge of the new entity that came to be now known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir”. Later, however. they and their American allies would grow keen to control or influence the region vis-à-vis their new interests against the Russian and Soviet Empires.

FOUR
PAKISTAN’S ALLIES
by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, June 4 2006, The Statesman June 5 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

From the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar creating the State of Jammu & Kashmir until the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Britain and later the USA became increasingly interested in the subcontinent’s Northwest. The British came to India by sea to trade. Barren, splendid, landlocked Afghanistan held no interest except as a home of fierce tribes; but it was the source of invasions into the Indian plains and prompted a British misadventure to install Shah Shuja in place of Dost Mohammad Khan leading to ignominious defeat. Later, Afghanistan was seen as the underbelly of the Russian and Soviet empires, and hence a location of interest to British and American strategic causes.

In November 1954, US President Dwight Eisenhower authorized 30 U-2 spy aircraft to be produced for deployment against America’s perceived enemies, especially to investigate Soviet nuclear missiles which could reach the USA. Reconnaissance balloons had been unsuccessful, and numerous Western pilots had been shot down taking photographs from ordinary military aircraft. By June 1956, U-2 were making clandestine flights over the USSR and China. But on May 1 1960, one was shot or forced down over Sverdlovsk, 1,000 miles within Soviet territory. The Americans prevaricated that it had taken off from Turkey on a weather-mission, and been lost due to oxygen problems. Nikita Kruschev then produced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, who was convicted of spying, though was exchanged later for a Soviet spy. Powers had been headed towards Norway, his task to photograph Soviet missiles from 70,000 ft, his point of origin had been an American base 20 miles from Peshawar.

America needed clandestine “forward bases” from which to fly U-2 aircraft, and Pakistan’s ingratiating military and diplomatic establishment was more than willing to offer such cooperation, fervently wishing to be seen as a “frontline state” against the USSR. “We will help you defeat the USSR and we are hopeful you will help us defeat India” became their constant refrain. By 1986, the Americans had been permitted to build air-bases in Balochistan and also use Mauripur air-base near Karachi.

Jammu & Kashmir and especially Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins the Pashtun regions whose capital has been Peshawar. In August-November 1947, a British coup d’etat against J&K State secured Gilgit-Baltistan for the new British Dominion of Pakistan.

The Treaty of Amritsar had nowhere required Gulab Singh’s dynasty to accept British political control in J&K as came to be exercised by British “Residents” in all other Indian “Native States”. Despite this, Delhi throughout the late 19th Century relentlessly pressed Gulab Singh’s successors Ranbir Singh and Partab Singh to accept political control. The Dogras acquiesced eventually. Delhi’s desire for control had less to do with the welfare of J&K’s people than with protection of increasing British interests in the area, like European migration to Srinagar Valley and guarding against Russian or German moves in Afghanistan. “Sargin” or “Sargin Gilit”, later corrupted by the Sikhs and Dogras into “Gilgit”, had an ancient people who spoke an archaic Dardic language “intermediate between the Iranian and the Sanskritic”. “The Dards were located by Ptolemy with surprising accuracy on the West of the Upper Indus, beyond the headwaters of the Swat River (Greek: Soastus) and north of the Gandarae (i.e. Kandahar), who occupied Peshawar and the country north of it. This region was traversed by two Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hsien, coming from the north about AD 400 and Hsuan Tsiang, ascending from Swat in AD 629, and both left records of their journeys.”

Gilgit had been historically ruled by a Hindu dynasty called Trakane; when they became extinct, Gilgit Valley “was desolated by successive invasions of neighbouring rulers, and in the 20 or 30 years ending with 1842 there had been five dynastic revolutions. The Sikhs entered Gilgit about 1842 and kept a garrison there.” When J&K came under Gulab Singh, “the Gilgit claims were transferred with it, and a boundary commission was sent” by the British. In 1852 the Dogras were driven out with 2,000 dead. In 1860 under Ranbir Singh, the Dogras “returned to Gilgit and took Yasin twice, but did not hold it. They also in 1866 invaded Darel, one of the most secluded Dard states, to the south of the Gilgit basin but withdrew again.”

The British appointed a Political Agent in Gilgit in 1877 but he was withdrawn in 1881. “In 1889, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British Government, acting as the suzerain power of Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency”. The Agency was re-established under control of the British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir. “It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas”. In 1935, the British demanded J&K lease to them for 60 years Gilgit town plus most of the Gilgit Agency and the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkuman. Hari Singh had no choice but to acquiesce. The leased region was then treated as part of British India, administered by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi, first through the Resident in J& K and later a British Agent in Peshawar. J& K State no longer kept troops in Gilgit and a mercenary force, the Gilgit Scouts, was recruited with British officers and paid for by Delhi. In April 1947, Delhi decided to formally retrocede the leased areas to Hari Singh’s J& K State as of 15 August 1947. The transfer was to formally take place on 1 August.

On 31 July, Hari Singh’s Governor arrived to find “all the officers of the British Government had opted for service in Pakistan”. The Gilgit Scouts’ commander, a Major William Brown aged 25, and his adjutant, a Captain Mathieson, planned openly to engineer a coup détat against Hari Singh’s Government. Between August and October, Gilgit was in uneasy calm. At midnight on 31 October 1947, the Governor was surrounded by the Scouts and the next day he was “arrested” and a provisional government declared.

Hari Singh’s nearest forces were at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, a few miles downstream from where the Indus is joined by Gilgit River. The 6th J& K Infantry Battalion there was a mixed Sikh-Muslim unit, typical of the State’s Army, commanded by a Lt Col. Majid Khan. Bunji controlled the road to Srinagar. Further upstream was Skardu, capital of Baltistan, part of Laddakh District where there was a small garrison. Following Brown’s coup in Gilgit, Muslim soldiers of the 6th Infantry massacred their Sikh brothers-at-arms at Bunji. The few Sikhs who survived escaped to the hills and from there found their way to the garrison at Skardu.

On 4 November 1947, Brown raised the new Pakistani flag in the Scouts’ lines, and by the third week of November a Political Agent from Pakistan had established himself at Gilgit. Brown had engineered Gilgit and its adjoining states to first secede from J&K, and, after some talk of being independent, had promptly acceded to Pakistan. His commander in Peshawar, a Col. Bacon, as well as Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary in the new Pakistan and later to lead the first military coup détat and become President of Pakistan, were pleased enough. In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat.

Gilgit’s ordinary people had not participated in Brown’s coup which carried their fortunes into the new Pakistan, and to this day appear to remain without legislative representation. It was merely assumed that since they were mostly Muslim in number they would wish to be part of Pakistan ~ which also became Liaquat Ali Khan’s assumption about J&K State as a whole in his 1950 statements in North America. What the Gilgit case demonstrates is that J&K State’s descent into a legal condition of ownerless anarchy open to “Military Decision” had begun even before the Pakistani invasion of 22 October 1947 (viz. “Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, 1-3 December 2005). Also, whatever else the British said or did with respect to J & K, they were closely allied to the new Pakistan on the matter of Gilgit.

The peak of Pakistan’s Anglo-American alliance came with the enormous support in the 1980s to guerrilla forces created and headquartered in Peshawar, to battle the USSR and Afghan communists directly across the Durand Line. It was this guerrilla war which became a proximate cause of the collapse of the USSR as a political entity in 1991. President Ronald Reagan’s CIA chief William J. Casey sent vast sums in 1985-1988 to supply and train these guerrillas. The Washington Post and New Yorker reported the CIA training guerrillas “in the use of mortars, rocket grenades, ground-to-air missiles”. 200 hand-held Stinger missiles were supplied for the first time in 1986 and the New Yorker reported Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s “Hizbe Islami” guerrillas being trained to bring down Soviet aircraft. “Mujahideen had been promised two Stingers for every Soviet aircraft brought down. Operators who failed to aim correctly were given additional training… By 1986, the United States was so deeply involved in the Afghan war that Soviet aircraft were being brought down under the supervision of American experts”. (Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 1988, p. 234).

The budding US-China détente brokered by Pakistan came into full bloom here. NBC News on 7 January 1980 said “for the first time in history (a senior State Department official) publicly admitted the possibility of concluding a military alliance between the United States and China”. London’s Daily Telegraph reported on 5 January 1980 “China is flying large supplies of arms and ammunition to the insurgents in Afghanistan. According to diplomatic reports, supplies have arrived in Pakistan from China via the Karakoram Highway…. A major build-up of Chinese involvement is underway ~ in the past few days. Scores of Chinese instructors have arrived at the Shola-e-Javed camps.”

Afghan reports in 1983-1985 said “there were eight training camps near the Afghan border operated by the Chinese in Sinkiang province” and that China had supplied the guerrillas “with a variety of weapons including 40,000 RPG-7 and 20,000 RPG-II anti tank rocket launchers.” Like Pakistan, “China did not publicly admit its involvement in the Afghan conflict: in 1985 the Chinese Mission at the UN distributed a letter denying that China was extending any kind of help to the Afghan rebels” (Anwar, ibid. p. 234). Support extended deep and wide across the Arab world. “The Saudi and Gulf rulers … became the financial patrons of the Afghan rebels from the very start of the conflict”. Anwar Sadat, having won the Nobel Peace Prize, was “keen to claim credit for his role in Afghanistan…. by joining the Afghanistan jihad, Sadat could re-establish his Islamic credentials, or so he believed. He could thus not only please the Muslim nations but also place the USA and Israel in his debt.” Sadat’s Defence Minister said in January 1980: “Army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels; they are being supplied with weapons from Egypt” and Sadat told NBC News on 22 September 1981 “that for the last twenty-one months, the USA had been buying arms from Egypt for the Afghan rebels. He said he had been approached by the USA in December 1979 and he had decided to `open my stores’. He further disclosed that these arms were being flown to Pakistan from Egypt by American aircraft. Egypt had vast supplies of SAM-7 and RPG-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons which Sadat agreed to supply to Afghanistan in exchange for new American arms. The Soviet weapons, being light, were ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. … the Mujahideen could easily claim to have captured them from Soviet and Afghan troops in battle.… Khomeini’s Iran got embroiled in war (against Iraq) otherwise Kabul would also have had to contend with the full might of the Islamic revolutionaries.” (Anwar ibid. p. 235).

Afghanistan had been occupied on 26-27 December 1979 by Soviet forces sent by the decrepit Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov to carry out a putsch replacing one communist, Hafizullah Amin, with a rival communist and Soviet protégé, Babrak Karmal. By 1985 Brezhnev and Andropov were dead and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had begun his attempts to reform the Soviet system, usher in openness, end the Cold War and in particular withdraw from Afghanistan, which by 1986 he had termed “a bleeding wound”. Gorbachev replaced Karmal with a new protégé Najibullah Khan, who was assigned the impossible task of bringing about national reconciliation with the Pakistan-based guerrillas and form a national government. Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 having lost 14,500 dead, while more than a million Afghans had been killed since the invasion a decade earlier.

Not long after Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, Gregory Zinoviev had said that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, `Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). Now instead, the Afghan misadventure had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire itself, the USSR ceasing to be a political entity by 1991, and even Gorbachev being displaced by Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin in a new Russia.

What resulted for the people of the USA and Britain and the West in general was that they no longer had to live under threat of hostile Soviet tanks and missiles, while the people of Russia, Ukraine and the other erstwhile Soviet republics as well as Eastern Europe were able to throw off the yoke of communism that had oppressed them since the Bolshevik Revolution and instead to breathe the air of freedom.

What happened to the people of Afghanistan, however, was that they were plunged into further ghastly civil war for more than ten years. And what happened to the people of Pakistan was that their country was left resembling a gigantic Islamist military camp, awash with airfields, arms, ammunition and trained guerrillas, as well as a military establishment enlivened as always by perpetual hope that these supplies, provisions and personnel of war might find alternative use in attacks against India over J& K. “We helped you when you wished to see the Soviet Union defeated and withdrawing in Afghanistan”, Pakistan’s generals and diplomats pleaded with the Americans and British, “now you must help us in our wish to see India defeated and withdrawing in Kashmir”. Pakistan’s leaders even believed that just as the Soviet Union had disintegrated afterwards, the Indian Union perhaps might be made to do the same. Not only were the two cases as different as chalk from cheese, Palmerstone’s dictum there are no permanent allies in the politics of nations could not have found more apt use than in what actually came to take place next.

Pakistan’s generals and diplomats felt betrayed by the loss of Anglo-American paternalism towards them after 1989.

Modern Pakistanis had never felt they subscribed to the Indian nationalist movement culminating in independence in August 1947. The Pakistani state now finally declared its independence in the world by exploding bombs in a nuclear arsenal secretly created with help purchased from China and North Korea. Pakistan’s leaders thus came to feel in some control of Pakistan’s destiny as a nation-state for the first time, more than fifty years after Pakistan’s formal creation in 1947. If nothing else, at least they had the Bomb.

Secondly, America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do. In response, America attacked and removed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, once again receiving the cooperative use of Pakistani manpower and real estate ~ except now there was no longer any truck with the Pakistani establishment’s wish for a quid pro quo of Anglo-American support against India on J&K. Pakistan’s generals and diplomats soon realised their Anglo-American alliance of more than a half-century ended on September 11 2001. Their new cooperation was in killing or arresting and handing over fellow-Muslims and necessarily lacked their earlier feelings of subservience and ingratiation towards the Americans and British, and came to be done instead under at least some duress. No benefit could be reaped any more in the fight against India over Jammu & Kashmir. An era had ended in the subcontinent.

FIVE

WHAT TO TELL MUSHARRAF: PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT NON-AGGRESSIVE PAKISTANI INTENTIONS by Subroto Roy, First published in The Statesman December 15 2006 Editorial Page Special Article, www.thestatesman.net

In June 1989 a project at an American university involving Pakistani and other scholars, including one Indian, led to the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s published in Karachi, New Delhi and elsewhere. The book reached Nawaz Sharif and the Islamabad elite, and General Musharraf’s current proposal on J&K, endorsed warmly by the US State Department last week, derives from the last paragraph of its editorial introduction: “Kashmir… must be demilitarised and unified by both countries sooner or later, and it must be done without force. There has been enough needless bloodshed on the subcontinent… Modern Pakistanis and Indians are free peoples who can voluntarily agree in their own interests to alter the terms set hurriedly by Attlee or Mountbatten in the Indian Independence Act 1947. Nobody but we ourselves keeps us prisoners of superficial definitions of who we are or might be. The subcontinent could evolve its political identity over a period of time on the pattern of Western Europe, with open borders and (common) tariffs to the outside world, with the free movement of people, capital, ideas and culture. Large armed forces could be reduced and transformed in a manner that would enhance the security of each nation. The real and peaceful economic revolution of the masses of the subcontinent would then be able to begin.”

The editors as economists decried the waste of resources involved in the Pakistan-India confrontation, saying it had “greatly impoverished the general budgets of both Pakistan and India. If it has benefited important sections of the political and military elites of  both countries, it has done so only at the expense of the general welfare of the masses.”

International law

Such words may have been bold in the early 1990s but today, a decade and a half later, they seem incomplete and rather naïve even to their author, who was myself, the only Indian in that project. Most significantly, the position in international law in the context of historical facts had been wholly neglected. So had been the manifest nature of the contemporary Pakistani state.

Jammu & Kashmir became an entity in international law when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh and the British on March 16 1846. British India itself became an entity in international law much later, possibly as late as June 1919 when it signed the Treaty of Versailles. As for Pakistan, it had no existence in world history or international law until August 14 1947, when the British created it as a new entity out of certain demarcated areas of British India and gave it the status of a Dominion. British India dissolved itself on August 15 1947 and the Dominion of India became its successor-state in international law on that date. As BR Ambedkar pointed out at the time, the new India automatically inherited British India’s suzerainty over any and all remaining “princely” states of so-called “Indian India”. In case of J&K in particular, there never was any question of it being recognised as an independent entity in global international law.

The new Pakistan, by entering a Standstill Agreement with J&K as of August 15 1947, did locally recognise J&K’s sovereignty over its decision whether to join Pakistan or India. But this Pakistani recognition lasted only until the attack on J&K that commenced from Pakistani territory as of October 22 1947, an attack in which Pakistani forces were complicit (something which, in different and mutating senses, has continued ever since). The Dominion of India had indicated it might have consented if J&K’s Ruler had decided to accede to Pakistan in the weeks following the dissolution of British India. But no such thing happened: what did happen was the descent of J&K into a condition of legal anarchy.

Beginning with the Pakistani attack on J&K as of October 22 upto and including the Rape of Baramulla and the British-led Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on one side, and the arrival of Indian forces as well as mobilization by Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad of J&K’s civilians to repel the Pakistani invaders on the other side, the State of Jammu & Kashmir became an ownerless entity in international law. In Roman Law, from which all modern international and municipal law ultimately derives, the ownership of an ownerless entity is open to be determined by “military decision”. The January 1949 Ceasefire Line that came to be renamed the Line of Control after the 1971 Bangladesh War, demarcates the respective territories that the then-Dominions and later Republics of India and Pakistan acquired by “military decision” of the erstwhile State of J&K which had come to cease to exist.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. It is only sheer ignorance on the part of General Musharraf’s Indian interviewer the other day which caused it to be said that Pakistan was willing to “give up” its claim on erstwhile J&K State territory which India has held: Pakistan has never had nor even made such a  claim in international law. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~  forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area.

Accordingly, the lawful solution proposed in these pages a year ago to resolve that matter, serious as it is, has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under Article 370, citizen-by- citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self- appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

Military de-escalation

Equally significant though in assessing whether General Musharraf’s proposal is an  anachronism, is Pakistan’s history since 1947: through Ayub’s 1965 attack, the civil war and secession of Bangladesh, the Afghan war and growth of the ISI, the Kargil incursion, the 1999 coup détat, and, once or twice removed, the 9/11 attacks against America. It is not a history that allows any confidence to arise in Indians that we are not dealing with a country misgoverned by a tiny arrogant exploitative military elite who remain hell-bent on aggression against us. Like the USA and USSR twenty years ago, what we need to negotiate about, and negotiate hard about, is an overall mutual military drawdown and de-escalation appropriate to lack of aggressive intent on both sides. Is General Musharraf willing to discuss that? It would involve reciprocal verifiable assessment of one another’s reasonable military requirements on the assumption that each was not a threatening enemy of the other. That was how the USA-USSR drawdown and de-escalation occurred successfully. If General Musharraf is unwilling to enter such a discussion, there is hardly anything to talk about with him. We should wait for democracy to return.

SIX

“AN INDIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT ZARDARI: REWARDING PAKISTAN FOR BAD BEHAVIOUR LEADS TO SCHIZOPHRENIC RELATIONSHIPS”

by Subroto Roy, December 17 2008

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani. Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

1. Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”. It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”. British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none. (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent. Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan. Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.) Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be. The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919. India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions. An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN. Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today. Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later. The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision. It succeeded only partially. Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949. After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India. The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947. Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts a fight does not get to finish it.

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem. The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan. This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law. BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India. It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~ forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

2. Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres
Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago. Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s. Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war. Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces. Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists. President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general. Rather, it serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

3. Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

This may be overly simplistic. As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”, Gregory Zinoviev himself after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism. Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback! The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own. Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over. Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

4. Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc – President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals, whether in thought, word or deed. Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships. (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory, an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons
“We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use
“We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India
“We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
“We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them
“We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way
“We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan
“We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies
“We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works
“We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past
“We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks
“We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks
“We do not harbour any terrorists
“We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons
“We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country
“We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons
“We hate India and do not want to become like India
“We love India and want to become like India
“We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere
“We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives
“We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems
“We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up
“We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.”

My Ten Articles on China, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan in relation to India (2007-2009)

nehru
I have had a close interest in China ever  since the “Peking Spring” more than thirty years ago (if not from when I gave all my saved pocket money to Nehru in 1962 to fight the Chinese aggression) but I had not published anything relating to China until 2007-2008 when I published the ten articles listed below:

“Understanding China”, The Statesman Oct 22 2007

“India-US interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy”, The Statesman Oct 30 2007

“China’s India Aggression”, The Statesman, Nov 5 2007,

“Surrender or Fight? War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must? “ The Statesman, Dec 4 2007

“China’s Commonwealth: Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang” The Statesman, December 17, 2007

“Nixon & Mao vs India: How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression”. The Statesman, January 7 2008.

“Lessons from the 1962 War: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended,” The Statesman, January 15, 2008

“China’s India Example: Tibet, Xinjiang May Not Be Assimilated Like Inner Mongolia, Manchuria”, The Statesman, March 25, 2008

“China’s force and diplomacy: The need for realism in India”, The Statesman, May 31, 2008

“Transparency and history” (with Claude Arpi), Business Standard, Dec 31 2008

With new tensions on the Tibet-India border apparently being caused by the Chinese military, these may be helpful for India to determine a Plan B, or even a Plan A, in its dealings with Communist China.

See also https://independentindian.com/1990/09/18/my-meeting-jawaharlal-nehru-2/

On the zenith and nadir of US-India relations

scan0010

Iran’s modern cinema — a must-see for those wishing to make war!

(Preface: This is a Note of mine at Facebook, based on my comment there on Avner Cohen’s link to a recent LA  Times article.)

“I wonder if Iran’s modern cinema has reached American and Israeli audiences easily. I am introduced to it quite recently myself on India’s cable TV — e.g. “White Balloon”, “The Circle”, “Song of Sparrows” etc… It seems to me to be compulsory viewing for anyone wishing to make war on Iran…It is surely among the best cinema there is. Nothing like it coming out of Hollywood, Bollywood etc.

The films reflect the society. “Offside”, about the six female soccer fans not allowed to enter the stadium, is especially brilliant in its candour. Nothing like it anywhere in the world at the moment. If society is so candid about itself, the politics cannot be all bad. I fear there is a massive cultural miscommunication between Iran and the rest of the world, caused of course by rather thick diplomacy on all sides. Is there not a master diplomat in the world who can get Iran and Israel to the point of diplomatic recognition? Zubin Mehta (an Indian of Iranian origin beloved in Israel) might be my choice as the initial/symbolic leader of such a diplomatic team!”

The BBC retrogresses once more in its knowledge of history & geography

On March 30 this year, I was finally able to congratulate the BBC for having retracted its prevarication about Jammu & Kashmir.  Unfortunately, it has retrogressed again!  Today’s broadcast at 1530 Indian Standard Time of purported world news showed a purported map of the Indian Republic without J&K.   Time for the GoI to make some phone calls again please!

Subroto Roy

 

On the curious pre-9/11 quaintness of current criticism of India’s 1998 nuclear tests

I said towards the end of my June 4-5 2006 article in The Statesman “Pakistan’s Allies”

“…America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do….”

Earlier, in The Statesman of October 26 2005,  I had outlined a series of recent US espionage failures

“There have been three or four enormous failures of American espionage (i.e. intelligence and counter-intelligence) in the last 20 years. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet communism were salubrious events but they had not been foreseen by the United States which was caught unawares by the speed and nature of the developments that took place. Other failures have been catastrophic.

First, there was the failure to prevent the attack that took place on the American mainland on September 11 2001. It killed several thousand civilians and caused vast, perhaps irreparable, psychological and physical destruction to the United States. The attack was without precedent. The December 7 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, though a surprise, was carried out by one military against another military and did not affect very many civilians (except that thousands of American civilians of Japanese ancestry came to be persecuted and placed in concentration camps for years by the US Government). And the last time the American mainland had been attacked before 2001 was in 1814 when British troops marched south from Canada and burnt down the Capitol and the US President’s house in Washington.

Secondly, there has been a failure to discover any reasonable justification for the American-led attack on Iraq and its invasion and occupation. Without any doubt, America has lost, at the very least, an incalculable amount of international goodwill as a result of this, let aside suffering two thousand young soldiers killed, fifteen thousand wounded, and an unending cost in terms of prestige and resources in return for the thinnest of tangible gains. India at great cost liberated East Pakistan from the brutal military tyranny of Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan in December 1971 but the average Bangladeshi today could hardly care less. Regardless of what form of government emerges in Iraq now, there is no doubt the mass of the Iraqi people will cheer the departure of the bulk of foreign troops and tanks from their country (even if a permanent set of a dozen hermetically sealed American bases remain there for ever, as appears to have been planned).

When things go wrong in any democracy, it is natural and healthy to set up a committee to investigate, and America has done that several times now. For such committees to have any use at all they must be as candid as possible and perhaps the most candid of the American committees has been the US Government’s 9/11 Commission. But it too has appeared no closer to finding out who was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks or who financed it and who, precisely, executed it. Osama Bin Laden may have been the ideological head of a movement allied to the perpetrators, and Bin Laden undoubtedly expressed his glee afterwards, but it beggars the imagination that Bin Laden could have been executive president in charge of this operation while crawling around Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If not him, then whom? Mossad the Israeli spy agency was supposed to have pointed to a super-secret invisible Lebanese terrorist but nobody really knows. The biggest modern mass murder remains unsolved.

As for solutions, the American 9/11 Commission went into the same politically correct formulae that came to be followed in 2005 by British PM Tony Blair’s New Labour Cabinet, namely, that “moderate” peace-loving Muslims must be encouraged and bribed not to turn to terrorism (indeed to expose those among them who do), while “extremist” Muslims must be stamped out with brute force. This rests on a mistaken premise that an economic carrot-and-stick policy can work in creating a set of external incentives and disincentives for Muslims, when in fact believing Muslims, like many other religious believers, are people who feel the power of their religion deep within themselves and so are unlikely to be significantly affected by external incentives or disincentives offered by non-believers.  Another committee has been the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence which reported in July 2004, and from whose findings have stemmed as an offshoot the current matter about whether high government officials broke the law that is being investigated by Special Prosecutor Patrick J. Fitzgerald.

Bertrand Russell said in his obituary of Ludwig Wittgenstein that he had once gone about looking under all the tables and chairs to prove to Wittgenstein that there was not a hippopotamus present in the room. In the present case, however, there is in fact a very large hippopotamus present in the room yet the entire American foreign policy establishment has seemed to refuse to wish to see it. Saddam Hussain and OBL are undoubtedly certifiable members of the international gallery of rogues – but the central fact remains they were rogues who were in alliance with America’s defined strategic interests in the 1980s. Saddam Hussain’s Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and gassed the Kurds in 1986; an Iraqi Mirage on May 17 1987 fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark killing 37 American sailors and injuring 21. The Americans did nothing. The reason was that Saddam was still in favour at the time and had not yet become a demon in the political mythology of the American state, and it was expedient for nothing to be done. Indeed Saddam’s Iraq was explicitly removed in 1982 from the US Government’s list of states sponsoring terrorism because, according to the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, it had “moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbours”.

The very large hippopotamus that is present in the room at the moment is April Glaspie, the highly regarded professional career diplomat and American Ambassador to Iraq at the time of the 1990 Gulf War. Saddam Hussein as President had a famous meeting with her on July 25 1990, eight days before he invaded Kuwait. The place was the Presidential Palace in Baghdad and the Iraqis videotaped the meeting:

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – “I have direct instructions from President (George Herbert Walker) Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship – not confrontation – regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?

Saddam Hussein – As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.

U. S. Ambassador Glaspie – What solutions would be acceptable?

Saddam Hussein – If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab – our strategic goal in our war with Iran – we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam’ s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States’ opinion on this?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – We have no opinion on your Arab – Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960’s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)

Saddam had seen himself fighting Islamic Iran on behalf of the Kuwaitis, Saudis and other Arabs, and Islamic Iran was of course the sworn adversary of the USA at least since Khomeini had deposed America’s ally, the Shah. Therefore Saddam could not be all bad in the eyes of the State Department. On August 2 1990, the Iraqi troops seen by American satellites amassed on the border, invaded and occupied Kuwait. On September 2 1990, the Iraqis released the videotape and transcript of the July 29 Saddam-Glaspie meeting and Glaspie was confronted by British journalists as she left the Embassy:

Journalist 1 – Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador? (No answer from Glaspie)

Journalist 2 – You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn’t warn him not to. You didn’t tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite – that America was not associated with Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You encouraged this aggression – his invasion. What were you thinking?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – Obviously, I didn’t think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed , he would give up his Iran(Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as a historic part of their country!

Journalist 1 – America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signalling Saddam that some aggression was okay – that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) – the territories claimed by Iraq?

Glaspie said nothing, the car door closed behind her, the car drove off. Nothing has been apparently heard from Glaspie ever since, and we may have to wait for her memoirs in 25 years when they are declassified to come to know what happened. It is astonishing, however, that the 521 page report of the US Senate’s Select Committee on espionage about Iraq before the 2003 war finds no cause whatsoever to mention Glaspie at all (at least in its public censored version). It is almost as if Glaspie has never existed and her conversation with Saddam never happened. Glaspie has disappeared down an Orwellian memory-hole. Yet her conversation with Saddam was the last official, recorded conversation between the Americans and Saddam while they were still on friendly terms.

There may be many causes explaining how such serious failures have come to occur in a country where billions of dollars have been annually spent on espionage. Among them must be that while America’s great strengths have included creation of the finest advanced scientific and technological base on earth, America’s great intellectual weaknesses in recent decades have included an impatience with historical and philosophical reflection of all sorts, and that includes reflection about her own as well as other cultures. This is exemplified too in the third palpable failure of intelligence of the last 20 years, which has been to have not foreseen or prevented atomic weapons from being developed by America and Britain’s Islamist ally and client-state, Pakistan, and thence to have failed to prevent the proliferation of such weapons in general. The consequences of that may yet turn out to be the most grave.”

Now as it happens, a couple of days ago, eleven years after the Government of India’s May 1998 underground nuclear tests at Pokhran, an Indian scientist who had something to do with them has engaged in a general discussion about the tests’ efficacy. Indian newspapers duly reported this as part of an ongoing domestic discussion about nuclear policy.

Oddly enough, there has been an instantaneous reaction from American critics of India’s nuclear activities – beginning with Dr Jeffrey Lewis:

“Yes, Virginia, India’s H-bomb fizzled.  K Santhanam (who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests… has admitted what everyone else has known for a long time — that India’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was unsuccessful.…”

Followed by Mark Hibbs:

“Is this cool or what? I remember what happened when I wrote that article in the fall of 1998 saying in the headline that the US had concluded that the Indian “H-Bomb failed.” Almost overnight after the article was published I got a huge bundle of papers from BARC and DAE sent to me by diplomatic pouch from Mumbai informing me with all kinds of numbers that I was wrong.  I gave the papers to laboratory geoscientists at several European countries and the US. One main CTBTO monitoring scientist told me explicitly: “Nope. The stuff in these papers is shitty science. They haven’t shown that you are wrong.” That having been said, please note however that, as PK Iyengar had made the case to me back a decade ago, once again this “news” is surfacing in India because their bomb makers want to keep testing. Some things in India are changing fast. Other things aren’t.”

Followed by Charles Mead:

“I got into a huge pissing match with the Indians on this issue as I was the principal author of Barker et. al. 1998 which had the yield estimates far below the Indian press releases. A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published.  On a related note, I saw the other day that wikipedia has a glowing description of the Indian 1998 tests, citing the inflated yields and saying the tests were a huge technical accomplishment. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokhran-II In the next day or so, I plan to submit a corrected analysis.”

Mark Hibbs:

“Charles, I recall one of your co-authors back then explained to me in nitty-gritty detail your frustration on this with these guys. Please do correct the record for posterity.”

Charles Meade:

“Their arguments at the time were quite remarkable. They said that our seismic data didn’t reflect the true yield because of a complex interference pattern caused by the simultaneous tests. Under these circumstances, they said that one could only obtain the correct yield from near field data. We said, “fine, show it to us”. They refused and that was the end of their paper.”

Yale Simkin:

“The Indian argument: ‘For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons.’ is a lot of hooey.  They claim to be building a deterrent force, not a war-fighting arsenal with a counter-force capability.  For the size and mass of their likely early-generation fusion designs, they can instead use basic fission bombs yielding in the multi-dekakiloton range – multiples of the hell weapons that incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  That should be sufficient to deter any rational adversary. And if they aren’t rational, then you have no deterrent.”

Hmmm.  The choice of terminology even within such a brief discussion might reveal a little of the mind-set: “shitty science”, “pissing match”, “a lot of hooey”…

Rather uncool, really.

Specifically:

“A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published…. Their arguments at the time were quite remarkable. They said that our seismic data didn’t reflect the true yield because of a complex interference pattern caused by the simultaneous tests. Under these circumstances, they said that one could only obtain the correct yield from near field data. We said, “fine, show it to us”. They refused and that was the end of their paper.

Hmmm — once more.  The words that I have placed in bold above might be prima facie evidence of incorrect and hence unfair editorial procedures having been followed at Science (distinguished as its general reputation may be as a journal).  Why were these here-unnamed “Indian scientists” not allowed to speak for themselves, rather than have their now-unknown statements be bowdlerised out of their critics’ memories a decade later (when these critics themselves had been the subject of the rebuttal)?  Perhaps the rebuttal should not have been refused publication even if it came with an editorial caveat that all the data deemed necessary had not been provided (which may have been the case, for example, due to a Government gag-order).  Readers today would have been able to judge for themselves.

I am happy to claim zero expertise in the field known rather sweetly as “Crater Morphology”; but post 9/11, post-Iraq war, it does seem to me a rather quaint form of prejudice to be using such words as those quoted above  in discussing the precise tonnage of the Indian explosions and how, really, India’s scientists were not up to it.  Perhaps,  when matters of public policy or international diplomacy become involved, science  everywhere is too important to be left to the scientists.

Are all the available data out there in the public domain on which to judge whether the Indian explosions in 1998 were or were not what was precisely claimed at the time?  Apparently not.

Does it matter to anything today?  Hardly.  Not even to the credibility of the Government of India (something on which I have had a lot to say over decades).

Do Governments lie?  Yes Virginia, they do.

Governments the world over, whether Indian, American, Russian, Chinese, British, French, Israeli, Arab, Pakistani or whatever, let aside inter-Governmental bodies constituted by these Governments, are prone to exaggeration, propaganda, self-delusion, self-deception as well as deliberate mendacity, perhaps routinely on a daily basis.

(For myself as an individual, I have had to battle the demonstrated and deliberate mendacity of the government of one of the fifty States in the US federal courts for two decades now, as told of elsewhere…)

An Age of Government Mendacity has seemed to descend upon the world — which makes the smugness expressed so quickly today by the critics of India’s 1998 explosions seem, as I have said, quaint.

Is the current Indian debate indicating something about keeping open the possibility of more tests and isn’t this related to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal?   It may well be, I do not know.  My position for what it is worth has been clear and described in several articles in The Statesman in recent years e.g.

1) Atoms for Peace (or War)  (March 5 2006)

“Atoms for Peace” was Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 speech to the UN (presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru’s sister) from which arose the IAEA. Eisenhower was the warrior par excellence, having led the Allies to victory over Hitler a few years earlier.

Yet he was the first to see “no sane member of the human race” can discover victory in the “desolation, degradation and destruction” of nuclear war. “Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the ‘great destroyers’, but the whole book of history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for peace and mankind’s God-given capacity to build.” Speaking of the atomic capacity of America’s communist adversary at the time, he said: “We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.” Rather, “if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind…. if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material… this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage”. Eisenhower’s IAEA would receive contributions from national “stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials”, and also impound, store and protect these and devise “methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.…to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world… to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.” When Eisenhower visited India he was greeted as the “Prince of Peace” and a vast multitude threw rose petals as he drove by in an open limousine.

Now, half a century later, Dr Manmohan Singh read a speech in Parliament on February 27 relating to our nuclear discussions with America. But it seems unclear even his speech-writers or technical advisers knew how far it was rhetoric and how far grounded in factual realities. There is also tremendous naivete among India’s media anchors and political leaders as to what exactly has been agreed by the Americans on March 2.

Churchill once asked what might have happened if Lloyd George and Clemenceau told Woodrow Wilson: “Is it not true that nothing but your fixed and expiring tenure of office prevents you from being thrown out of power?” The same holds for George W. Bush today. Wilson made many promises to the world that came to be hit for a six by US legislators. In December 2005, Edward Markey (Democrat) and Fred Upton (Republican) promised to scuttle Bush’s agreements with India, and once the pleasant memories of his India visit fade, Bush may quite easily forget most things about us. All the Americans have actually agreed to do is to keep talking.

It needs to be understood that submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the only ultimate military deterrent. Land and air forces are all vulnerable to a massive first-strike. Only submarines lurking silently for long periods in waters near their target, to launch nuclear warheads upon learning their homeland had been hit by the enemy, act as a deterrent preventing that same enemy from making his attack at all. Indeed, the problem becomes how a submarine commander will receive such information and his instructions during such a war. (For India to acquire an ICBM capability beyond the MRBM Agni rockets is to possess an expensive backward technology — as retrograde as the idea India should spend scarce resources sending manned moon missions half a century after it has already been done. The secret is to do something new and beneficial for mankind, not repeat what others did long ago merely to show we can now do it too.) A nuclear-armed submarine needs to be submerged for long periods and also voyage long distances at sea, and hence needs to be nuclear-powered with a miniature version of a civilian nuclear reactor aboard in which, e.g. rods of enriched uranium are bombarded to release enough energy to run hydroelectric turbines to generate power. Patently, no complete separation of the use of atomic power for peace and war may be practically possible. If India creates e.g. its own thorium reactors for civilian power (and we have vast thorium reserves, the nuclear fuel of the future), and then miniaturised these somehow to manufacture reactors for submarines, the use would be both civilian and military. In 1988 the old USSR leased India a nuclear-powered submarine for “training” purposes, and the Americans did not like it at all. In January 2002, Russia’s Naval Chief announced India was paying to build and then lease from 2004 until 2009 two nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarines, and Jaswant Singh reportedly said we were paying $1 thousand crore ($10 bn) for such a defence package. Whether the transaction has happened is not known. Once we have nuclear submarines permanently, that would be more than enough of the minimum deterrent sought.

Indeed, India’s public has been barely informed of civilian nuclear energy policy as well, and an opportunity now exists for a mature national debate to take place — both on what and why the military planning has been and what it costs (and whether any bribes have been paid), and also on the cost, efficiency and safety of the plans for greater civilian use of nuclear energy. Government behaviour after the Bhopal gas tragedy does not inspire confidence about Indian responses to a Three Mile Island/Chernobyl kind of catastrophic meltdown.

That being said, the central question remains why India or anyone else needs to be nuclear-armed at all. With Britain, France or Russia, there is no war though all three are always keen to sell India weapons. Indeed it has been a perennial question why France and Britain need their own deterrents. They have not fought one another for more than 100 years and play rugby instead. If Russia was an enemy, could they not count on America? Or could America itself conceivably become an enemy of Britain and France? America owes her origins to both, and though the Americans did fight the British until the early 1800s, they have never fought the French and love the City of Paris too much ever to do so.

Between China and India, regardless of what happened half a century ago, nuclear or any war other than border skirmishes in sparse barren lands is unlikely. Ever since Sun Yat-sen, China has been going through a complex process of self-discovery and self-definition. An ancient nation where Maoism despoiled the traditional culture and destroyed Tibet, China causes others to fear it because of its inscrutability. But it has not been aggressive in recent decades except with Taiwan. It has threatened nuclear war on America if the Americans stand up for Taiwan, but that is not a quarrel in which India has a cogent role. China (for seemingly commercial reasons) did join hands with Pakistan against India, but there is every indication the Chinese are quite bored with what Pakistan has become. With Pakistan, our situation is well-known, and there has been an implicit equilibrium since Pokhran II finally flushed out their capacity. Had India ever any ambition of using conventional war to knock out and occupy Pakistan as a country? Of course not. We are barely able to govern ourselves, let aside try to rule an ideologically hostile Muslim colony in the NorthWest. Pakistan’s purported reasons for acquiring nuclear bombs are spurious, and cruelly so in view of the abject failures of Pakistan’s domestic political economy. Could Pakistan’s Government use its bombs against India arising from its own self-delusions over J&K? Gohar Ayub Khan in 1998-1999 threatened to do so when he said the next war would be over in two hours with an Indian surrender. He thereby became the exception to Eisenhower’s rule requiring sanity. An India-Pakistan nuclear exchange is, unfortunately, not impossible, leaving J&K as Hell where Jahangir had once described it as Heaven on Earth.

America needs to end her recent jingoism and instead rediscover the legacy of Eisenhower. America can lead everyone in the world today including Russia, China, Israel, Iran and North Korea. But she can do so only by example. America can decommission many of her own nuclear weapons and then lead everyone else to the conference table to do at least some of the same. Like the UN, the IAEA (and its NPT) needs urgent reform itself. It is the right time for serious and new world parleys towards the safe use of atoms for peace and their abolition in war. But are there any Eisenhowers or Churchills to lead them?

2) Our  energy interests ( Aug 27-28 2006)

Americans are shrewd and practical people in commercial matters, and expect the same of people they do business with. Caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware”, is the motto they expect those on the other side of the table to be using. Let us not think they are doing us favours in the nuclear deal ~ they are grown-ups looking after their interests and naturally expect we shall look after our own and not expect charity while doing business. Equally, let us not blame the Americans if we find in later years (long after Manmohan Singh and Montek Ahluwalia have exited from India’s stage) that the deal has been implemented in a bad way for our masses of ordinary people.

That said, there is a remarkable disjoint between India’s national energy interests (nuclear interests in particular), and the manner in which the nuclear deal is being perceived and taken to implementation by the two sides. There may be a fundamental gap between the genuine positive benefits the Government of India says the deal contains, and the motivations American businessmen and through them Indian businessmen have had for lobbying American and Indian politicians to support it. An atmosphere of being at cross-purposes has been created, where for example Manmohan Singh is giving answers to questions different from the questions we may want to be asking Montek Ahluwalia. The fundamental gap between what is being said by our Government and what may be intended by the businessmen is something anyone can grasp, though first we shall need some elementary facts.

In 2004, the International Energy Agency estimated the new energy capacity required by rising economic growth in 2020 will derive 1400 GW from burning coal (half of it in China and India), 470 GW from burning oil, 430GW from hydro, and 400 GW from renewable sources like solar or wind power. Because gas prices are expected to remain low worldwide, construction of new nuclear reactors for electricity will be unprofitable. By 2030, new energy expected to be required worldwide is 4700GW, of which only 150GW is expected from new nuclear plants, which will be in any case replacing existing plants due to be retired. Rational choice between different energy sources depends on costs determined by history and geography. Out of some 441 civilian reactors worldwide, France has 59 and these generate 78 per cent of its electricity, the rest coming from hydro. Japan has 54 reactors, generating 34% of its electricity from them. The USA has 104 reactors but generates only 20 per cent of its electricity from them, given its vast alternative sources of power like hydro. In India as of 2003, installed power generating capacity was 107,533.3MW, of which 71 per cent came from burning fuels. Among India’s energy sources, the largest growth-potential is hydroelectric, which does not involve burning fuels ~ gravity moves water from the mountains to the oceans, and this force is harnessed for generation. Our hydro potential, mostly in the North and North-East, is some 150,000MW but our total installed hydro capacity with utilities was only 26,910MW (about 18 per cent of potential). Our 14 civilian nuclear reactors produced merely 4 per cent or less of the electricity being consumed in the country. Those 14 plants will come under “international safeguards” by 2014 under the nuclear deal.

It is extremely likely the international restrictions our existing nuclear plants have been under since the 1970s have hindered if not crippled their functioning and efficiency. At the same time, the restrictions may have caused us to be innovative too. Nuclear power arises from fission of radioactive uranium, plutonium or thorium. India has some 8 million tonnes of monazite deposits along the seacoast of which half may be mined, to yield 225,000 tonnes of thorium metal; we have one innovatively designed thorium reactor under construction. Almost all nuclear energy worldwide today arises from uranium of which there are practically unlimited reserves. Fission of a uranium atom produces 10 million times the energy produced by combustion of an atom of carbon from coal. Gas and fossil fuels may be cheap and in plentiful supply worldwide for generations to come but potential for cheap nuclear energy seems practically infinite. The uranium in seawater can satisfy mankind’s total electricity needs for 7 million years. There is more energy in the uranium impurity present in coal than can arise from actually burning the coal. There is plenty of uranium in granite. None of these become profitable for centuries because there is so much cheap uranium extractable from conventional ores. Design improvements in reactors will also improve productivity; e.g. “fast breeder” reactors “breed” more fissile material than they use, and may get 100 times as much energy from a kilogram of uranium as existing reactors do. India has about 95,000 tonnes of uranium metal that may be mined to yield about 61,000 tonnes net for power generation. Natural uranium is 99.3 per cent of the U-238 isotope and 0.7 per cent of the radioactive U-235 isotope. Nuclear power generation requires “enriched uranium” or “yellow cake” to be created in which U-235 has been increased from 0.7 per cent to 4 to 5 percent. (Nuclear bombs require highly enriched uranium with more than 90 per cent of U-235.) Yellow cake is broken into small pieces, put in metal rods placed in bundles, which are then bombarded by neutrons causing fission. In a reactor, the energy released turns water into steam, which moves turbines generating electricity. While there is no carbon dioxide “waste” as in burning fossil fuels, the “spent” rods of nuclear fuel and other products constitute grave radioactive waste, almost impossible to dispose of.

The plausible part of the Government of India’s official line on the Indo-US nuclear deal is that removing the international restrictions will ~ through importation of new technologies, inputs, fuel etc ~ improve functioning of our 14 existing civilian plants. That is a good thing. Essentially, the price being paid for that improvement is our willingness to commit that those 14 plants will not be used for military purposes. Fair enough: even if we might become less innovative as a result, the overall efficiency gains as a result of the deal will add something to India’s productivity. However, those purchasing decisions involved in enhancing India’s efficiency gains must be made by the Government’s nuclear scientists on technical grounds of improving the working of our existing nuclear infrastructure.

It is a different animal altogether to be purchasing new nuclear reactors on a turn-key basis from American or any other foreign businessmen in a purported attempt to improve India’s “energy security”. (Lalu Yadav has requested a new reactor for Bihar, plus of course Delhi will want one, etc.) The central question over such massive foreign purchases would no longer be the technical one of using the Indo-US deal to improve efficiency or productivity of our existing nuclear infrastructure. Instead it would become a question of calculating social costs and benefits of our investing in nuclear power relative to other sources like hydroelectric power. Even if all other sources of electricity remained constant, and our civilian nuclear capacity alone was made to grow by 100 per cent under the Manmohan-Montek deal-making, that would mean less than 8% of total Indian electricity produced.

This is where the oddities arise and a disjoint becomes apparent between what the Government of India is saying and what American and Indian businessmen have been doing. A “US-India Business Council” has existed for thirty years in Washington as “the premier business advocacy organization promoting US commercial interests in India.… the voice of the American private sector investing in India”. Before the nuclear or any other deals could be contemplated with American business, the USIBC insisted we pay up for Dabhol contracted by a previous Congress Government. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board ~ or rather, its sovereign guarantor the Government of India ~ duly paid out at least $140-$160 million each to General Electric and Bechtel Corporations in “an amicable settlement” of the Dabhol affair. Afterwards, General Electric’s CEO for India was kind enough to say “India is an important country to GE’s global growth. We look forward to working with our partners, customers, and State and Central Governments in helping India continue to develop into a leading world economy”.

Also, a new “US-India CEO Forum” then came about. For two Governments to sponsor private business via such a Forum was “unprecedented”, as noted by Washington’s press during Manmohan Singh’s visit in July 2005. America’s foreign ministry announced it saying: “Both our governments have agreed that we should create a high-level private sector forum to exchange business community views on key economic priorities…” The American side includes heads of AES Corporation, Cargill Inc., Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Honeywell, McGraw-Hill, Parsons Brinckerhoff Ltd, PepsiCo, Visa International and Xerox Corporation. The Indian side includes heads of Tata Group, Apollo Hospitals Group, Bharat Forge Ltd, Biocon India Group, HDFC, ICICI One Source, Infosys, ITC Ltd, Max India Group and Reliance Industries. Presiding over the Indian side has been Montek Ahluwalia, Manmohan’s trusted aide ~ and let it be remembered too that the Ahluwalias were Manmohan’s strongest backers in his failed South Delhi Lok Sabha bid. (Indeed it is not clear if the Ahluwalias have been US or Indian residents in recent years, and if it is the former, the onus is on them to clear any perception of conflict of interest arising in regard to roles regarding the nuclear deal or any other official Indo-US business.)

Also, before the Manmohan visit, the Confederation of Indian Industry registered as an official lobbyist in Washington, and went about spending half a million dollars lobbying American politicians for the nuclear deal. After the Manmohan visit, the US Foreign Commercial Service reportedly said American engineering firms, equipment suppliers and contractors faced a $1,000 billion (1 bn =100 crore) opportunity in India. Before President Bush’s visit to India in March 2006, Manmohan Singh signed vast purchases of commercial aircraft from Boeing and Airbus, as well as large weapons’ deals with France and Russia. After the Bush visit, the US Chamber of Commerce said the nuclear deal can cause $100 billion worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone. What is going on?

Finally, the main aspect of Manmohan Singh’s address to America’s legislature had to do with agreeing with President Bush “to enhance Indo-US cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology”. What precisely does this mean? If it means the Indo-US nuclear deal will help India improve or maintain its existing nuclear infrastructure, well and good. There may be legitimate business for American and other foreign companies in that cause, which also helps India make the efficiency and productivity gains mentioned. Or has the real motivation for the American businessmen driving the deal (with the help of the “CEO Forum” etc) been to sell India nuclear reactors on a turn-key basis (in collaboration with private Indian businessmen) at a time when building new nuclear reactors is unprofitable elsewhere in the world because of low gas prices? India’s citizens may demand to know from the Government whether the Manmohan-Montek deal-making is going to cause importation of new nuclear reactors, and if so, why such an expensive alternative is being considered (relative to e.g. India’s abundant hydroelectric potential) when it will have scant effect in satisfying the country’s energy needs and lead merely to a worsening of our macroeconomic problems. Both Manmohan Singh and Montek Ahluwalia have been already among those to preside over the growth of India’s macroeconomic problems through the 1980s and 1990s.

Lastly, an irrelevant distraction should be gotten out of the way. Are we a “nuclear weapons” state? Of course we are, but does it matter to anything but our vanity? Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had control over vastly more nuclear weapons and they declared together twenty years ago: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought”, which is how the Cold War started to come to an end. We need to remind ourselves that India and Pakistan are large, populous countries with hundreds of millions of materially poor, ill-informed citizens, weak tax-bases, humongous internal and external public debts (i.e. debt owed by the Government to domestic and foreign creditors), non-investment grade credit- ratings in world financial markets, massive annual fiscal deficits, inconvertible currencies, nationalized banks, and runaway printing of paper-money. Discussing nuclear or other weapon-systems to attack one other with is mostly a pastime of our cowardly, irresponsible and yes, corrupt, elites.

3) Need for Clarity A poorly drafted treaty driven by business motives is a recipe for international misunderstanding  (August 19 2007)

Confusion prevails over the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians, diplomats, scientists and now the public at large have all joined in the cacophony in the last two years. On Wednesday August 15, America’s foreign ministry made the clearest most unequivocal statement possible as to the official American Government interpretation of the Indo-US nuclear deal: “The proposed 123 agreement has provisions in it that in an event of a nuclear test by India, then all nuclear co-operation is terminated, as well as there is provision for return of all materials, including reprocessed material covered by the agreement” (Sean McCormack). Yet our Prime Minister had told Parliament two days earlier: “The agreement does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary”. What is going on? Our politics are in uproar, and it has been suggested in these pages that the country go to a General Election to allow the people to speak on the matter. Clearly, we need some clarity.

Let us start at the beginning. How did it all originate? The private US nuclear industry prevailed upon India’s government bureaucrats and businessmen over several years that nuclear power is the way forward to solving India’s “infrastructure” problems. They would sell us, in words of the Manmohan-Montek Planning Commission’s energy adviser, “six to eight lightwater reactors” (especially as they may not be able to sell these anywhere else). Our usual prominent self-seeking retired bureaucrats started their waffling about the importance of “infrastructure”.

Then Manmohan Singh felt his foreign travels as PM could be hardly complete without a fife-and-drum visit to the White House. But before he could do so, Dabhol would have to be cleared up since American business in India was on a self-moratorium until GE and Bechtel were paid settlements of some $140-160 million each by the Governments of India and Maharashtra. GE’s CEO for India kindly said afterwards “India is an important country to GE’s global growth. We look forward to working with our partners, customers, and State and Central Governments in helping India continue to develop into a leading world economy”.

Also, before Manmohan’s USA trip, the Confederation of Indian Industry registered as an official Washington lobbyist and spent half a million dollars lobbying American politicians for the deal. (”Why?” would be a good question.)

So Dr Singh was able to make his White House visit, accompanied by US business lobbies saying the nuclear deal can generate $100 billion worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone. It is only when business has lubricated politics in America that so much agreement about the India-deal could arise. The “bottom-line” is that six to eight reactors must be sold to India, whatever politics and diplomacy it takes.

Now Dr Singh is not a PM who is a Member of the Lower House of Parliament commanding its confidence. He says his Government constitutes the Executive and can sign treaties on India’s behalf. This is unwise. If he signs a treaty and then the Congress Party loses the next General Election, a new Executive Government can use his same words to rescind the same treaty. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. One reason we are so confused is that India has not signed very many bilateral treaties, and there is barely a noted specialist in international law anywhere in the country. Dr Singh’s original mentor, PN Haksar, had gone about getting a treaty signed with the USSR back in 1971 which tided us over a war, though the USSR itself collapsed before that treaty ended.

Signing a treaty is much more than signing an international MOU. It requires a national consensus or a least a wide and deep understanding on the part of the public and the political class as to what necessitates the treaty. That plainly does not exist at present. Most people in India do not even know how nuclear power is generated, nor how small and insignificant nuclear power has been in India.

Natural uranium is 99.3 per cent of the U-238 isotope and 0.7 per cent the radioactive U-235 isotope. Nuclear power generation requires “enriched uranium” or “yellow cake” to be created in which U-235 has been increased from 0.7 per cent to 4 to 5 percent. (Nuclear bombs require “highly enriched” uranium with more than 90 per cent of U-235.) Yellow cake is broken into small pieces, put in metal rods placed in bundles, which are then bombarded by neutrons causing fission. In a reactor, the energy released turns water into steam, which moves turbines generating electricity. While there is no carbon dioxide “waste” as in burning fossil fuels, the “spent” rods of nuclear fuel and other products constitute grave radioactive waste, almost impossible to dispose of.

India’s 14 “civilian” nuclear reactors presently produce less than 4% of our total power. 70% of our power arises from burning fossil fuels, mainly coal. Much of the rest arises from hydro. We have vast hydroelectric potential in the North and Northeast but it would take a lot of serious political, administrative and civil engineering effort to organise all that, and there would not be any nice visits to Washington or Paris involved for politicians and bureaucrats.

Simple arithmetic says that even if all our principal energy sources stayed constant and only our tiny nuclear power sector grew by 100%, that would still hardly increase by very much our energy output overall. Placing a couple of expensive modern lightwater reactors around Delhi, a couple around Mumbai and a few other metros will, however, butter already buttered bread quite nicely and keep all those lifts and ACs running.

The agreed text of the “treaty” looks, from a legal standpoint, quite sloppily and hurriedly written ~ almost as if each side has cut and paste its own preferred terms in different places with a nod to the other side. For example, there is mention of “WMD” initially which is repeated as “weapons of mass destruction” just a little later. There is solemn mention of the “Government of India” and “Government of the United States of America” as the “Parties”, but this suddenly becomes merely “United States” and “India” in the middle and then reverts again to the formal usage.

Through the sloppiness comes scope for different interpretations. The Americans have said: try not to test, you don’t need to, we don’t test any more, and you have to know that if you do test, this deal is over, in fact it gets reversed. We have said, okay, we won’t test, and if we do test we know it is over with you but that does not mean it is over with others. Given such sloppy diplomacy and treaty-making, the scope for mutual misunderstanding, even war, remains immense long after all the public Indian moneys have found their way into private pockets worldwide. Will a future President Jeb Bush or Chelsea Clinton send F-22 bombers to bomb India’s nuclear facilities because India has carried out a test yet declined to return American equipment? Riding a tiger is not something generally to be recommended.

The answer to our present conundrum must be patience and the fullest transparency. What is the rush? If it is good or bad for us to buy six or eight new American reactors now, it will remain good or bad to do so a year or two from now after everyone has had a thorough think about everything that is involved. What the Manmohan-Montek Planning Commission needed to do first of all was a thorough cost-benefit analysis of India’s energy requirements but such elementary professionalism has been sorely lacking among our economists for decades.”

Subroto Roy

Thoughts, words, deeds: My work 1973-2020

This is an incomplete bibliography of my writings, public lectures etc 1973-2020 including citations, reviews, comments. I have been mostly an academic economist who by choice or circumstance over 47 years has had to venture also into science, philosophy, public policy, law, jurisprudence, practical politics, history, international relations, military strategy, financial theory, accounting, management, journalism, literary criticism, psychology, psychoanalysis, theology, aesthetics, biography, children’s fables, etc. If anything unites the seemingly diverse work recorded below it is that I have tried to acquire a grasp of the nature of human reason and then apply this comprehension in practical contexts as simply and clearly as possible. Hence I have ended up following the path of Aristotle, as described in modern times (via Wittgenstein and John Wisdom) by Renford Bambrough. The 2004 public lecture in England, “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, also my 2017 “Is ‘Cambridge Philosophy’ dead, in Cambridge? Can it be resurrected, there? Case Study: Renford Bambrough (& Subroto Roy) preceded by decades Cheryl Misak’s thesis on Wittgenstein being linked with Peirce via Ramsey…”

may explain and illustrate all this best. A friend has been kind enough to call me an Academician, which I probably am, though one who really needs his own Academy because the incompetence, greed and mendacity encountered too often in the modern professoriat is dispiriting.

Besides writings and publications printed on paper, there are writings or items not printed on paper — as new media break space, cost and other constraints of traditional publishing. A little repetition and overlap has occurred too. Also in a few cases, e.g., Aldous Huxley’s essay on DH Lawrence, nothing has been done except discover and republish. Several databases have been created and released in the public interest, as have been some rare maps. There is also some biographical and autobiographical material. Several inconsequential errors remain in the text, which shall take time to be rectified as documents come to be rediscovered and collated.

1973

1. “Behavioural study of mus musculus”, Haileybury College, Supervised by J de C Ford-Robertson MA (Oxon). (Due to be published here 2010).

2. “Chemistry at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73” (Due to be published here 2010).

3. “Biology at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).

4. “Physics at Advanced Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).

5. “Revolution: theoria and praxis”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

6. “Gandhi vs Marx”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

1974

7. “Relevance of downward money-wage rigidity to the problem of maintaining full-employment in the classical and Keynesian models of income determination”, London School of Economics, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

8. “Testing aircraft fuels at Shell Finland”.

1975

9. “Oxford Street experiences: down and out in London town”.

10. “SE Region Bulk Distribution Survey”, Unilever, Basingstoke.

11. “Four London poems”, in JCM Paton (ed) New Writing (London, Great Portland Street: International Students House). (Due to be republished here 2010)

12. “On economic growth models and modellers”, London School of Economics, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

1976

13. “World money: system or anarchy?”, lecture to Professor ACL Day’s seminar, London School of Economics, Economics Department, April. (Due to be published here 2010).

14. “A beginner’s guide to some recent developments in monetary theory”, lecture to Professor FH Hahn’s seminar, Cambridge University Economics Department, November 17 (Due to be published here 2010). See also “Announcement of My “Hahn Seminar”, published here June 14 2008.

1977

15. “Inflation and unemployment: a survey”, mimeo, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. (Due to be published here 2010).

16. “On short run theories of dual economies”, Cambridge University Economics Department “substantial piece of work” required of first year Research Students. Examiner: DMG Newbery, FBA. (Due to be published here 2010).

1978

17. “Pure theory of developing economies 1 and 2”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

18. “Introduction to some market outcomes under uncertainty”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

19. “On money and development”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo, September. (Due to be published here 2010)

20. “Notes on the Newbery-Stiglitz model of sharecropping”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo November. (Due to be published here 2010).

1979

21. “A theory of rights and economic justice”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

22. “Monetary theory and economic development”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

23. “Foundations of the case against ‘development planning’”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo, November. (Due to be published here 2010).

1979-1989

24. Correspondence with Renford Bambrough (1926-1999), philosopher of St John’s College, Cambridge (Due to be published here 2010).

1980

25. “Models before the monetarist storm”, New Statesman letters

26. “Disciplining rulers and experts”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

1981

27. “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”, Cambridge University doctoral thesis, supervisor FH Hahn, FBA; examiners CJ Bliss, FBA; TW Hutchison, FBA (Due to be published here 2010). 27a Response of FA Hayek on a partial draft February 18 1981. 27b Response of Peter Bauer, 1982. 27c Response of Theodore W Schultz, 1983. 27d. Response of Frank Hahn 1985.

1982

28. “Knowledge and freedom in economic theory Parts 1 and 2”, Centre for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Working Papers.

29. “Economic Theory and Development Economics”. Lecture to American Economic Association, New York, Dec 1982. Panel: RM Solow, HB Chenery, T Weisskopf, P Streeten, G Rosen, S Roy. Published in 29a.

1983

29a “Economic Theory and Development Economics: A Comment”. World Development, 1983. [Citation: Stavros Thefanides “Metamorphosis of Development Economics”, World Development 1988.]

30. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy (Comment on J. Michael Finger)”, Washington DC: Cato Journal, Winter 1983/84. See also 000 “Risk-aversion explains resistance to freer trade”, 2008.

1984

31. “Considerations on Utility, Benevolence and Taxation”, History of Political Economy, 1984. 31a Response of Professor Sir John Hicks May 1 1984.

[Citations: P. Hennipman, “A Tale of Two Schools”, De Economist 1987, “A New Look at the Ordinalist Revolution”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; P. Rappoport, “Reply to Professor Hennipman”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; Eugene Smolensky et al “An Application of A Dynamic Cost-of-Living Index to the Evaluation of Changes in Social Welfare”, J. Post-Keynesian Econ.IX.3. 1987.]

32. Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1984.

[Citations: Lead editorial of The Times of London May 29 1984, “India’s economy”, Times letters June 16 1984. John Toye “Political Economy & Analysis of Indian Development”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 1, 1988; John Toye, Dilemmas of Development; D. Wilson, “Privatization of Asia”, The Banker Sep. 1984 etc]. See also 370 “Silver Jubilee of ‘Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India’” 2009.

33. Review of Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds) Public Choice.

34. Review of Limits of Utilitarianism, HB Miller & WH Williams (eds.), Public Choice.

35. Deendayal Upadhyaya lecture “On Government and the Individual in India” (one of four invited lecturers), Washington DC, October 1984.

1987

36. (with one other) “Does the Theory of Logical Types Inform the Theory of Communication?”, Journal of Genetic Psychology., 148 (4), Dec. 1987 [Citation:

37. “Irrelevance of Foreign Aid”, India International Centre Quarterly, Winter 1987.

38. Review of Development Planning by Sukhamoy Chakravarty for Economic Affairs, London 1987.

1988

39. (with Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada) “Introduction” to Lessons in Development: A Comparative Study of Asia and Latin America. San Francisco: Inst. of Economic Growth.

40. “A note on the welfare economics of regional cooperation”, lecture to Asia-Latin America conference, East West Center Honolulu, published 2009.

1989

41. Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, London & New York: Routledge (International Library of Philosophy) 1989, paperback 1991. Internet edition 2007. [Reviews & Citations: Research in Economics, 1992; De Economist 1991 & 1992; Manch.Sch. Econ.Studs. 59, 1991; Ethics 101.88 Jul. 1991; Kyklos 43.4 1990; Soc. Science Q. 71.880. Dec.1990; Can. Phil. Rev. 1990; J. Econ. Hist. Sep. 1990; Econ. & Phil. Fall 1990; Econ. Affairs June-July 1990; TLS May 1990; Choice March 1990; J. App.Phil. 1994, M. Blaug: Methodology of Economics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1992; Hist. Methods. 27.3, 1994; J. of Inst. & Theoretical Econ.,1994; Jahrbucker fur Nationaleconomie 1994, 573:574. Mark A Lutz in Economics for the Common Good, London: Routledge, 1999, et al]. See also 339 “Apropos Philosophy of Economics”, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al.

42. Foreword to Essays on the Political Economy by James M. Buchanan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1989.

43. “Modern Political Economy of India”, edited by Subroto Roy & William E James, Hawaii mimeo May 21 1989. This published for the first time a November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India by Milton Friedman. See also 43a, 53.

43a. Preface to “Milton Friedman’s extempore comments at the 1989 Hawaii conference: on India, Israel, Palestine, the USA, Debt and its uses, Erhardt abolishing exchange controls, Etc”, May 22 1989, published here for the first time October 31 2008.

44. Milton Friedman’s defence of my work in 1989.

45. Theodore W. Schultz’s defence of Philosophy of Economics

1990

46. “Letter to Judge Evelyn Lance: On A Case Study in Private International Law” (Due to be published here in 2010).

47-49. Selections from advisory work on economic policy etc for Rajiv Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament of India, published in 47a-49a.

1991

41b Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, Paperback edition.

50. “Conversations and correspondence with Rajiv Gandhi during the Gulf war, January 1991” (Due to be published here 2010).

47a. A Memo to Rajiv I: Stronger Secular Middle”, The Statesman, Jul 31 1991.

48a “A Memo to Rajiv II: Saving India’s Prestige”, The Statesman, Aug 1 1991.

49a “A Memo to Rajiv III: Salvation in Penny Capitalism”, The Statesman, Aug 2 1991 47b-49b “Three Memoranda to Rajiv Gandhi 1990-91”, 2007 republication here.

51. “Constitution for a Second Indian Republic”, The Saturday Statesman, April 20 1991. Republished here 2009.

52. “On the Art of Government: Experts, Party, Cabinet and Bureaucracy”, New Delhi mimeo March 25 1991, published here July 00 2009.

1992

53. Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & William E. James New Delhi, London, Newbury Park: Sage: 1992. Citation: Milton and Rose Friedman Two Lucky People (Chicago 1998), pp. 268-269.

54. Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by William E. James & Subroto Roy, Hawaii MS 1989, Sage: 1992, Karachi: Oxford 1993.

Reviews of 53 & 54 include: Bus. Today, Mar-Apr 1992; Political Studies March 1995; Econ Times 21 March 1993; Pakistan Development Review 1992. Hindustan Times 11 July 1992. Pacific Affairs 1993; Hindu 21 March 1993, 15 June 1993; Pakistan News International 12 June 1993. Book Reviews March 1993; Deccan Herald 2 May 1993; Pol.Econ.J. Ind. 1992. Fin Express 13 September 1992; Statesman 16 Jan. 1993. J. Royal Soc Asian Aff. 1994, J. Contemporary Asia, 1994 etc.

55. “Fundamental Problems of the Economies of India and Pakistan”, World Bank, Washington, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

56.“The Road to Stagflation: The Coming Dirigisme in America, or, America, beware thy economists!, or Zen and Clintonomics,” Washington DC, Broad Branch Terrace, mimeo, November 17.

1993

57. “Exchange-rates and manufactured exports of South Asia”, IMF Washington DC mimeo. Published in part in 2007-2008 as 58-62:

58. “Path of the Indian Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.

59. “Path of the Pakistan Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.

60. “Path of the Sri Lankan Rupee 1948-1993”, 2008.

61. “Path of the Bangladesh Taka 1972-1993”, 2008.

62. “India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Manufactured Exports, IMF Washington DC mimeo”, published 2007.

63. “Economic Assessment of US-India Merchandise Trade”, Arlington, Virginia, mimeo, published in slight part in Indo-US Trade & Economic Cooperation, ICRIER New Delhi, 1995, and in whole 2007.

64. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, mimeo, Arlington, Virginia, circulated in Washington DC 1993-1995, cf 82, 111 infra. Comment of Selig Harrison.

1994

65. “Comment on Indonesia”, in The Political Economy of Policy Reform edited by John Williamson, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

66a “Gold reserves & the gold price in anticipation of Central Bank behaviour”, Greenwich, Connecticut, mimeo. 67b. “Portfolio optimization and foreign currency exposure hedging” Greenwich, Connecticut mimeo.

1995

68. “On the logic and commonsense of debt and payments crises: How to avoid another Mexico in India and Pakistan”, Scarsdale, NY, mimeo, May 1.

69. “Policies for Young India”, Scarsdale, NY, pp. 350, manuscript.

1996

70. US Supreme Court documents, published in part in 2008 as “Become a US Supreme Court Justice!” 70a, 70b (Due to be published in full here in 2010 as Roy vs University of Hawaii, 1989- including the expert testimonies of Milton Friedman and Theodore W Schultz.).

71. “Key problems of macroeconomic management facing the new Indian Government”, May 17. Scarsdale, New York, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

72. “Preventing a collapse of the rupee”, IIT Kharagpur lecture July 16 1996.

73. “The Economist’s Representation of Technological Knowledge”, Vishvesvaraya lecture to the Institution of Engineers, September 15 1996, IIT Kharagpur.

1997

74. “Union and State Budgets in India”, lecture at the World Bank, Washington DC, May 00.

75. “State Budgets in India”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, June 6.

1998

76. “Transparency and Economic Policy-Making: An address to the Asia-Pacific Public Relations Conference” (panel on Transparency chaired by CR Irani) Jan 30 1998, published here 2008.

77. Theodore W. Schultz 1902-1998, Feb 25.

78. “The Economic View of Human Resources”, address to a regional conference on human resources, IIT Kharagpur.

79. “Management accounting”, lecture at Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy, Mussourie,

80a “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Jan 23 1998

81. “Recent Developments in Modern Finance”, IIM Bangalore Review, 10, 1 & 2, Jan.-Jun 1998. Reprinted as “From the Management Guru’s Classroom”: 81a “An introduction to derivatives”, Business Standard/Financial Times, Bombay 18 Apr 1999; 81b “Options in the future, Apr 25 1999; 81c “What is hedging?”, May 2 1999; 81d “Teaching computers to think”, May 9 1999.

82. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, Jun 22 1998, lecture at Heritage Foundation, Washington DC. Cf 111 Dec 2005.

83. “Sixteen Currencies for India: A Reverse Euro Model for Monetary & Fiscal Efficacy”, Lecture at the Institute of Economic Affairs, London, June 29 1998. Due to be published here 2010.

84. “Fable of the Fox, the Farmer, and the Would-Be Tailors”, October (Published here July 27 2009).

85. “A Common Man’s Guide to Pricing Financial Derivatives”, Lecture to “National Seminar on Derivatives”, Xavier Labour Research Institute, Jamshedpur, Dec. 16 1998. See 98.

1999

86. “An Analysis of Pakistan’s War-Winning Strategy: Are We Ready for This?”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, published in part as 86a.“Was a Pakistani Grand Strategy Discerned in Time by India?” New Delhi: Security & Political Risk Analysis Bulletin, July 1999, Kargil issue. See also 000

80b. “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Sep 13 1999.

2000

87. “On Freedom & the Scientific Point of View”, SN Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Feb 17 2000. Cf 100 below.

88. “Liberalism and Indian economic policy”, lecture at IIM Calcutta, Indian Liberal Group Meetings Devlali, Hyderabad; also Keynote address to UGC Seminar Guntur, March 30 2002. (Due to be published here 2010).

89. “Towards a Highly Transparent Fiscal & Monetary Framework for India’s Union & State Governments”, Invited address to Conference of State Finance Secretaries, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, April 29, 2000. Published 2008.

90. “On the Economics of Information Technology”, two lectures at the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, Nov 10-11, 2000.

91. Review of A New World by Amit Chaudhuri in Literary Criterion, Mysore.

2001

92. Review of AD Shroff: Titan of Finance and Free Enterprise by Sucheta Dalal, Freedom First., January.

93. “Encounter with Rajiv Gandhi: On the Origins of the 1991 Economic Reform”, Freedom First, October. See also 93a in 2005 and 93b in 2007.

94. “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, a keynote address to the Council for Asian Liberals & Democrats, Manila, Philippines, 16 Nov. 2001. Published as 91a.

95. “The Case for and against The Satanic Verses: Diatribe and Dialectic as Art”, Dec 22 republished in print 95a The Statesman Festival Volume, 2006.

2002

94a “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, in September 11 & Political Freedom in Asia, eds. Johannen, Smith & Gomez, Singapore 2002.

2002-2010

96. “Recording vivid dreams: Freud’s advice in exploring the Unconscious Mind” (Due to be published here in 2010).

2003

97. “Key principles of government accounting and audit”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo.

98. “Derivative pricing & other topics in financial theory: a student’s complete lecture notes” (Due to be published here in 2010).

2004

99. TV Interview by BBC, Oxford, after May 2004 General Election in India.

100. “Collapse of the Global Conversation”, International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Netherlands, Jul 2004.

101. “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, a public lecture, University of Buckingham, UK, August 24 2004. Published here 2007.

2005

93a Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform (this was the full story; it appeared in print for the first time in The Statesman Festival Volume 2007).

102. “Can India become an economic superpower (or will there be a monetary meltdown)?” Cardiff University Institute of Applied Macroeconomics Monetary Economics Seminar, April 13, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, April 27, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, Chief Economist’s Seminar on Monetary Economics, May 5.

103. Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant, Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & John Clarke, London & New York: Continuum, 2005; paperback 2006; French translation by Florian Bay, 2007.

104. “Iqbal & Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali in Pakistan’s Creation”, Dawn, Karachi, Sep 3.

105. “The Mitrokhin Archives II from an Indian Perspective: A Review Article”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 11 .

106. “After the Verdict”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 20.

107. “US Espionage Failures”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 26

108. “Waffle But No Models of Monetary Policy”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 30.

109. “On Hindus and Muslims”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Nov 6.

110. “Assessing Vajpayee: Hindutva True and False”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Nov 13-14″.

111. “Fiction from the India Economic Summit”, The Statesman, Front Page, Nov 29.

112. “Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason”, The Statesman Editorial Page

I. “Give the Hurriyat et al Indian Green Cards”, Dec 1

II. “Choice of Nationality under Full Information”, Dec 2

III. “Of Flags and Consulates in Gilgit etc”, Dec 3.

2006

113. “The Dream Team: A Critique”, The Statesman Editorial Page

I : New Delhi’s Consensus (Manmohantekidambaromics), Jan 6

II: Money, Convertibility, Inflationary Deficit Financing, Jan 7

III: Rule of Law, Transparency, Government Accounting, Jan 8.

114. “Unaccountable Delhi: India’s Separation of Powers’ Doctrine”, The Statesman, Jan 13.

115. “Communists and Constitutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 22.

116. “Diplomatic Wisdom”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 31.

117. “Mendacity & the Government Budget Constraint”, The Statesman, Front Page Feb 3.

118. “Of Graven Images”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb5.

119. “Separation of Powers, Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Pages Feb 12-13.

120. “Public Debt, Government Fantasy”, The Statesman, Front Page Editorial Comment, Feb 22.

121. “War or Peace Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 23-24.

122. “Can You Handle This Brief, Mr Chidambaram?” The Statesman, Front Page Feb 26.

123. “A Downpayment On the Taj Mahal Anyone?”, The Statesman, Front Page Comment on the Budget 2006-2007, Mar 1.

124. “Atoms for Peace (or War)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Mar 5.

125. “Imperialism Redux: Business, Energy, Weapons & Foreign Policy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 14.

126. “Logic of Democracy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 30.

127. “Towards an Energy Policy”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 2.

128. “Iran’s Nationalism”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 6.

129. “A Modern Military”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 16.

130. “On Money & Banking”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 23.

131. “Lessons for India from Nepal’s Revolution”, The Statesman, Front Page Apr 26.

132. “Revisionist Flattery (Inder Malhotra’s Indira Gandhi: A Review Article)”, The Sunday Statesman, May 7.

133. “Modern World History”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, May 7.

134. “Argumentative Indians: A Conversation with Professor Amartya Sen on Philosophy, Identity and Islam,” The Sunday Statesman, May 14 2006. “A Philosophical Conversation between Professor Sen and Dr Roy”, 2008. Translated into Bengali by AA and published in 00.

135. “The Politics of Dr Singh”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, May 21.

136. “Corporate Governance & the Principal-Agent Problem”, lecture at a conference on corporate governance, Kolkata May 31. Published here 2008.

137. “Pakistan’s Allies Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jun 4-5.

138. “Law, Justice and J&K Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 2, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 3.

139. “The Greatest Pashtun (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 16.

140. “Understanding Pakistan Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 30, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 31.

141. “Indian Money and Credit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 6.

142. “India’s Moon Mission”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 13.

143. “Jaswant’s Journeyings: A Review Article”, The Sunday Statesman Magazine, Aug 27.

144. “Our Energy Interests, Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 27, The Statesman Editorial Page Aug 28.

145. “Is Balochistan Doomed?”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 3 2006.

146. “Racism New and Old”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 8 2006

147. “Political Economy of India’s Energy Policy”, address to KAF-TERI conference, Goa Oct 7, published in 147a.

148. “New Foreign Policy? Seven phases of Indian foreign policy may be identifiable since Nehru”, Parts 1-2, The Sunday Statesman, Oct 8, The Statesman Oct 9.

149. “Justice & Afzal: There is a difference between law and equity (or natural justice). The power of pardon is an equitable power. Commuting a death-sentence is a partial pardon”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 14

150. “Non-existent liberals (On a Liberal Party for India)”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 22.

151. “History of Jammu & Kashmir Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29, The Statesman Oct 30, Editorial Page.

152. “American Democracy: Does America need a Prime Minister and a longer-lived Legislature?”, The Sunday Statesman Nov 5.

153. “Milton Friedman A Man of Reason 1912-2006”, The Statesman Perspective Page, Nov 22.

154. “Postscript to Milton Friedman Mahalanobis’s Plan (The Mahalanobis-Nehru “Second Plan”) The Statesman Front Page Nov 22.

155. “Mob Violence and Psychology”, Dec 10, The Statesman, Editorial Page.

156. “What To Tell Musharraf: Peace Is Impossible Without Non-Aggressive Pakistani Intentions”, The Statesman Editorial Page Dec 15.

157. “Land, Liberty and Value: Government must act in good faith treating all citizens equally – not favouring organised business lobbies and organised labour over an unorganised peasantry”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Dec 31.

2007

158. “Hypocrisy of the CPI-M: Political Collapse In Bengal: A Mid-Term Election/Referendum Is Necessary”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 9.

159. “On Land-Grabbing: Dr Singh’s India, Buddhadeb’s Bengal, Modi’s Gujarat have notorious US, Soviet and Chinese examples to follow ~ distracting from the country’s real economic problems,” The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Jan 14.

160. “India’s Macroeconomics: Real growth has steadily occurred because India has shared the world’s technological progress. But bad fiscal, monetary policies over decades have led to monetary weakness and capital flight” The Statesman Editorial Page Jan 20.

161. “Fiscal Instability: Interest payments quickly suck dry every year’s Budget. And rolling over old public debt means that Government Borrowing in fact much exceeds the Fiscal Deficit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 4.

162. “Our trade and payments Parts 1-2” (“India in World Trade and Payments”),The Sunday Statesman, Feb 11 2007, The Statesman, Feb 12 2007.

163. “Our Policy Process: Self-Styled “Planners” Have Controlled India’s Paper Money For Decades,” The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 20.

164. “Bengal’s Finances”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 25.

165. “Fallacious Finance: Congress, BJP, CPI-M may be leading India to Hyperinflation” The Statesman Editorial Page Mar 5.

166. “Uttar Pradesh Polity and Finance: A Responsible New Govt May Want To Declare A Financial Emergency” The Statesman Editorial Page, Mar 24

167. “A scam in the making” in The Sunday Statesman Front Page Apr 1 2007, published here in full as “Swindling India”.

168. “Maharashtra’s Money: Those Who Are Part Of The Problem Are Unlikely To Be A Part Of Its Solution”, The Statesman Editorial Page Apr 24.

147a. “Political Economy of Energy Policy” in India and Energy Security edited by Anant Sudarshan and Ligia Noronha, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi 2007.

169. “Presidential Qualities: Simplicity, Genuine Achievement Are Desirable; Political Ambition Is Not”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 8.

170. “We & Our Neighbours: Pakistanis And Bangladeshis Would Do Well To Learn From Sheikh Abdullah”, The Statesman, Editorial Page May 15.

171. “On Indian Nationhood: From Tamils To Kashmiris And Assamese And Mizos To Sikhs And Goans”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 25.

172. A Current Example of the Working of the Unconscious Mind, May 26.

173. Where I would have gone if I was Osama Bin Laden, May 31.

174. “US election ’08:America’s Presidential Campaign Seems Destined To Be Focussed On Iraq”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 1.

175. “Home Team Advantage: On US-Iran talks and Sunni-Shia subtleties: Tehran must transcend its revolution and endorse the principle that the House of Islam has many mansions”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, June 3

176. “Unhealthy Delhi: When will normal political philosophy replace personality cults?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 11.

177. “American Turmoil: A Vice-Presidential Coup – And Now a Grassroots Counterrevolution?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 18

178. “Political Paralysis: India has yet to develop normal conservative, liberal and socialist parties. The Nice-Housing-Effect and a little game-theory may explain the current stagnation”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, June 24.

179. “Has America Lost? War Doctrines Of Kutusov vs Clausewitz May Help Explain Iraq War”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 3.

180. “Lal Masjid ≠ Golden Temple: Wide differences are revealed between contemporary Pakistan and India by these two superficially similar military assaults on armed religious civilians”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page July 15

181. “Political Stonewalling: Only Transparency Can Improve Institutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page July 20.

182. “Gold standard etc: Fixed versus flexible exchange rates”, July 21.

183. “US Pakistan-India Policy: Delhi & Islamabad Still Look West In Defining Their Relationship”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 27.

184. “Works of DH Lawrence” July 30

185. “An Open Letter to Professor Amartya Sen about Singur etc”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 31.

186. “Martin Buber on Palestine and Israel (with Postscript)”, Aug 4.

187. “Auguste Rodin on Nature, Art, Beauty, Women and Love”, Aug 7.

188. “Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 13.

189. Letter to Forbes.com 16 Aug.

190. “Need for Clarity: A poorly drafted treaty driven by business motives is a recipe for international misunderstanding”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 19.

191. “No Marxist MBAs? An amicus curiae brief for the Hon’ble High Court”, The Statesman, FrontPage, Aug 29.

192. On Lawrence, Sep 4.

193. Dalai Lama’s Return: In the tradition of Gandhi, King, Mandela, Sep 11.

194. Of JC Bose, Patrick Geddes & the Leaf-World, Sep 12.

195. “Against Quackery: Manmohan and Sonia have violated Rajiv Gandhi’s intended reforms; the Communists have been appeased or bought; the BJP is incompetent Parts 1-2”, in The Sunday Statesman and The Statesman, Editorial Pages of Sep 23-24.

196. Karl Georg Zinn’s 1994 Review of Philosophy of Economics, Sep 26.

197. DH Lawrence’s Phoenix, Oct 3.

93b. “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”, Statesman Festival Volume.

198. “Iran, America, Iraq: Bush’s post-Saddam Saddamism — one flip-flop too many?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 16.

199. “Understanding China: The World Needs to Ask China to Find Her True Higher Self”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 22.

200. “India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 30.

201. “China’s India Aggression : German Historians Discover Logic Behind Communist Military Strategy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, Nov 5.

202. Sonia’s Lying Courtier (with Postscript), Nov 25. See also 2014

203. “Surrender or Fight? War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must?” The Statesman, Dec 4, Editorial Page.

204. Hutton and Desai: United in Error Dec 14

205. “China’s Commonwealth: Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang”, The Statesman, Dec 17.

2008

206. “Nixon & Mao vs India: How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression. The Government of India should publish its official history of the 1962 war.” The Sunday Statesman, Jan 6, The Statesman Jan 7 Editorial Page.

207. “Lessons from the 1962 War: Beginnings of a solution to the long-standing border problem: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended”, The Sunday Statesman, January 13 2008.

208. “Our Dismal Politics: Will Independent India Survive Until 2047?”, The Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 1.

209. Median Voter Model of India’s Electorate Feb 7.

210. “Anarchy in Bengal: Intra-Left bandh marks the final unravelling of “Brand Buddha””, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 10.

211. Fifty years since my third birthday: on life and death.

212. “Pakistan’s Kashmir obsession: Sheikh Abdullah Relied In Politics On The French Constitution, Not Islam”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 16.

213. A Note on the Indian Policy Process Feb 21.

214. “Growth & Government Delusion: Progress Comes From Learning, Enterprise, Exchange, Not The Parasitic State”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 22.

215. “How to Budget: Thrift, Not Theft, Needs to Guide Our Public Finances”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 26.

216. “India’s Budget Process (in Theory)”, The Statesman, Front Page Feb 29.

217. “Irresponsible Governance: Congress, BJP, Communists, BSP, Sena Etc Reveal Equally Bad Traits”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 4.

218. “American Politics: Contest Between Obama And Clinton Affects The World”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 11.

219. “China’s India Example: Tibet, Xinjiang May Not Be Assimilated Like Inner Mongolia And Manchuria”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 25.

220. “Taxation of India’s Professional Cricket: A Proposal”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 1.

221. “Two cheers for Pakistan!”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 7.

222. “Indian Inflation: Upside Down Economics From The New Delhi Establishment Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 15-16.

223. “Assessing Manmohan: The Doctor of Deficit Finance should realise the currency is at stake”, The Statesman, Editorial Page Apr 25.

224. John Wisdom, Renford Bambrough: Main Philosophical Works, May 8.

225. “All India wept”: On the death of Rajiv Gandhi, May 21.

226. “China’s force and diplomacy: The need for realism in India” The Statesman, Editorial Page May 31.

227. Serendipity and the China-Tibet-India border problem June 6

228. “Leadership vacuum: Time & Tide Wait For No One In Politics: India Trails Pakistan & Nepal!”, The Statesman Editorial Page June 7.

229. My meeting Jawaharlal Nehru Oct13 1962

230. Manindranath Roy 1891-1958

231. Surendranath Roy 1860-1929

232. The Roys of Behala 1928.

233. Sarat Chandra visits Surendranath Roy 1927

234. Nuksaan-Faida Analysis = Cost-Benefit Analysis in Hindi/Urdu Jun 30

235. One of many reasons John R Hicks was a great economist July 3

236. My father, Indian diplomat, in the Shah’s Tehran 1954-57 July 8

237 Distribution of Govt of India Expenditure (Net of Operational Income) 1995 July 27

238. Growth of Real Income, Money & Prices in India 1869-2008, July 28.

239. Communism from Social Democracy? But not in India or China! July 29

240. Death of Solzhenitsyn, Aug. 3

240a. Tolstoy on Science and Art, Aug 4.

241. “Reddy’s reckoning: Where should India’s real interest rate be relative to the world?” Business Standard Aug 10

242. “Rangarajan Effect”, Business Standard Aug 24

243. My grandfather’s death in Ottawa 50 years ago today Sep 3

244. My books in the Library of Congress and British Library Sep 12

245. On Jimmy Carter & the “India-US Nuclear Deal”, Sep 12

246. My father after presenting his credentials to President Kekkonen of Finland Sep 14 1973.

247. “October 1929? Not!”, Business Standard, Sep 18.

248. “MK Gandhi, SN Roy, MA Jinnah in March 1919: Primary education legislation in a time of protest”

249. 122 sensible American economists Sept 26

250. Govt of India: Please call in the BBC and ask them a question Sep 27

251. “Monetary Integrity and the Rupee: Three British Raj relics have dominated our macroeconomic policy-making” Business Standard Sep 28.

252a. Rabindranath’s daughter writes to her friend my grandmother Oct 5

252b. A Literary Find: Modern Poetry in Bengal, Oct 6.

253. Sarat writes to Manindranath 1931, Oct 12

254. Origins of India’s Constitutional Politics 1913

255. Indira Gandhi in Paris, 1971

256. How the Liabilities/Assets Ratio of Indian Banks Changed from 84% in 1970 to 108% in 1998, October 20

257a. My Subjective Probabilities on India’s Moon Mission Oct 21

258. Complete History of Mankind’s Moon Missions: An Indian Citizen’s Letter to ISRO’s Chairman, Oct 22.

259. Would not a few million new immigrants solve America’s mortgage crisis? Oct 26

260. “America’s divided economists”, Business Standard Oct 26

261. One tiny prediction about the Obama Administration, Nov 5

262. Rai Bahadur Umbika Churn Rai, 1827-1902, Nov 7 2008

263. Jawaharlal Nehru invites my father to the Mountbatten Farewell Nov 7 2008

70a. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America) Preface” Nov 9

70b. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America)” Nov 9.

257b. Neglecting technological progress was the basis of my pessimism about Chandrayaan, Nov 9.

264. Of a new New Delhi myth and the success of the University of Hawaii 1986-1992 Pakistan project Nov 15

265. Pre-Partition Indian Secularism Case-Study: Fuzlul Huq and Manindranath Roy Nov 16

266. Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists suppose Maulana Azad, Dr Zakir Hussain, Sheikh Abdullah were Pakistanis (or that Sheikh Mujib wanted to remain one)? Nov 18

267. Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until this sad day, Nov 28.

268. In international law, Pakistan has been the perpetrator, India the victim of aggression in Mumbai, Nov 30.

269. The Indian Revolution, Dec 1.

270Habeas Corpus: a captured terrorist mass-murderer tells a magistrate he has not been mistreated by Mumbai’s police Dec 3

271. India’s Muslim Voices (Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent), Dec 4

272. “Anger Management” needed? An Oxford DPhil recommends Pakistan launch a nuclear first strike against India within minutes of war, Dec 5.

273. A Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough), Dec 6

274. Dr Rice finally gets it right (and maybe Mrs Clinton will too) Dec 7

275. Will the Government of India’s new macroeconomic policy dampen or worsen the business-cycle (if such a cycle exists at all)? No one knows! “Where ignorance is bliss, ‘Tis folly to be wise.” Dec 7

276. Pump-priming for car-dealers: Keynes groans in his grave (If evidence was needed of the intellectual dishonesty of New Delhi’s new macroeconomic policy, here it is) Dec 9.

277. Congratulations to Mumbai’s Police: capturing a terrorist, affording him his Habeas Corpus rights, getting him to confess within the Rule of Law, sets a new world standard Dec 10

278. Two cheers — wait, let’s make that one cheer — for America’s Justice Department, Dec 10

279. Will Pakistan accept the bodies of nine dead terrorists who came from Pakistan to Mumbai? If so, let there be a hand-over at the Wagah border, Dec 11.

280. Kasab was a stupid, ignorant, misguided youth, manufactured by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds into becoming a mass-murdering robot: Mahatma Gandhi’s India should punish him, get him to repent if he wishes, then perhaps rehabilitate him as a potent weapon against Pakistani terrorism Dec 12.

281. Pakistan’s New Delhi Embassy should ask for “Consular Access” to nine dead terrorists in a Mumbai morgue before asking to meet Kasab, Dec 13

282. An Indian Reply to President Zardari: Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationships Dec 19

283. Is my prediction about Caroline Kennedy becoming US Ambassador to Britain going to be correct? Dec 27

284. Chandrayaan adds a little good cheer! Well done, ISRO!, Dec 28

285. How sad that “Slumdog millionaire” is SO disappointing! Dec 31

289. (with Claude Arpi) “Transparency & history: India’s archives must be opened to world standards” Business Standard New Delhi Dec 31, 2008, published here Jan 1 .

2009

290. A basis of India-Pakistan cooperation on the Mumbai massacres: the ten Pakistani terrorists started off as pirates and the Al-Huseini is a pirate ship Jan 1.

291. India’s “pork-barrel politics” needs a nice (vegetarian) Hindi name! “Teli/oily politics” perhaps? (And are we next going to see a Bill of Rights for Lobbyists?) Jan 3

292. My (armchair) experience of the 1999 Kargil war (Or, “Actionable Intelligence” in the Internet age: How the Kargil effort got a little help from a desktop) Jan 5

293. How Jammu & Kashmir’s Chief Minister Omar Abdullah can become a worthy winner of the Nobel Peace Prize: An Open Letter, Jan 7

294. Could the Satyam/PwC fraud be the visible part of an iceberg? Where are India’s “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”? Isn’t governance rather poor all over corporate India? Bad public finance may be a root cause Jan 8

295. Satyam does not exist: it is bankrupt, broke, kaput. Which part of this does the new “management team” not get? The assets belong to Satyam’s creditors. Jan 8

296. Jews are massacred in Mumbai and now Jews commit a massacre in Gaza! Jan 9

297. And now for the Great Satyam Whitewash/Cover-Up/Public Subsidy! The wrong Minister appoints the wrong new Board who, probably, will choose the wrong policy Jan 12

298. Letter to Wei Jingsheng Jan 14

299. Memo to the Hon’ble Attorneys General of Pakistan & India: How to jointly prosecute the Mumbai massacre perpetrators most expeditiously Jan 16

300. Satyam and IT-firms in general may be good candidates to become “Labour-Managed” firms Jan 18

301. “Yes we might be able to do that. Perhaps we ought to. But again, perhaps we ought not to, let me think about it…. Most important is Cromwell’s advice: Think it possible we may be mistaken!” Jan 20.

302. RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks Jan 25

303. Didn’t Dr Obama (the new American President’s late father) once publish an article in Harvard’s Quarterly Journal of Economics? (Or did he?) Jan 25.

304. “A Dialogue in Macroeconomics” 1989 etc: sundry thoughts on US economic policy discourse Jan 30

305. American Voices: A Brief Popular History of the United States in 20 You-Tube Music Videos Feb 5

306. Jaladhar Sen writes to Manindranath at Surendranath’s death, Feb 23

307. Pakistani expansionism: India and the world need to beware of “Non-Resident Pakistanis” ruled by Rahmat Ali’s ghost, Feb 9

308. My American years Part One 1980-90: battles for academic integrity & freedom Feb 11.

309. Thanks and well done Minister Rehman Malik and the Govt of Pakistan Feb 12

310. Can President Obama resist the financial zombies (let alone slay them)? His economists need to consult Dr Anna J Schwartz Feb 14

311. A Brief History of Gilgit, Feb 18

312. Memo to UCLA Geographers: Commonsense suggests Mr Bin Laden is far away from the subcontinent Feb 20

313. The BBC gets its history and geography deliberately wrong again Feb 21

314. Bengal Legislative Council 1921, Feb 28

315. Carmichael visits Surendranath, 1916, Mar 1

316. Memo to GoI CLB: India discovered the Zero, and 51% of Zero is still Zero Mar 10

317. An Academic Database of Doctoral & Other Postgraduate Research Done at UK Universities on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Other Asian Countries Over 100 Years, Mar 13

318. Pakistan’s progress, Mar 18

319. Risk-aversion explains resistance to free trade, Mar 19

320. India’s incredibly volatile inflation rate! Mar 20

321. Is “Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona” referring to an emasculation of (elite) American society?, Mar 21

322. Just how much intellectual fraud can Delhi produce? Mar 26

323. India is not a monarchy! We urgently need to universalize the French concept of “citoyen”! Mar 28

324. Could this be the real state of some of our higher education institutions? Mar 29

325. Progress! The BBC retracts its prevarication! Mar 30

326. Aldous Huxley’s Essay “DH Lawrence” Mar 31

327. Waffle not institutional reform is what (I predict) the “G-20 summit” will produce, April 1

328. Did a full cricket team of Indian bureaucrats follow our PM into 10 Downing Street? Count for yourself! April 3

329. Will someone please teach the BJP’s gerontocracy some Economics 101 on an emergency basis? April 5

330. The BBC needs to determine exactly where it thinks Pakistan is!, April 5

331. Alfred Lyall on Christians, Muslims, India, China, Etc, 1908, April 6

332. An eminent economist of India passes away April 9

333. Democracy Database for the Largest Electorate Ever Seen in World History, April 12

334. Memo to the Election Commission of India April 14 2009, 9 AM, April 14

335. Caveat emptor! Satyam is taken over, April 14

336. India’s 2009 General Elections: Candidates, Parties, Symbols for Polls on 16-30 April Phases 1,2,3, April 15

337. On the general theory of expertise in democracy: reflections on what emerges from the American “torture memos” today, April 18

338. India’s 2009 General Elections: 467 constituencies (out of 543) for which candidates have been announced as of 1700hrs April 21, April 21

339. Apropos Philosophy of Economics, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al., April 22.

340. India’s 2009 General Elections: Names of all 543 Constituencies of the 15th Lok Sabha, April 22.

341. India’s 2009 General Elections: How 4125 State Assembly Constituencies comprise the 543 new Lok Sabha Constituencies, April 23.

342. Why has America’s “torture debate” yet to mention the obvious? Viz., sadism and racism, April 24

343. India’s 2009 General Elections: the advice of the late “George Eliot” (Mary Ann Evans, 1819-1880) to India’s voting public, April 24.

344. India’s 2009 General Elections: Delimitation and the Different Lists of 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies in 2009 and 2004, April 25

345. Is “Slumdog Millionaire” the single worst Best Picture ever?

346. India’s 2009 General Elections: Result of Delimitation — Old (2004) and New (2009) Lok Sabha and Assembly Constituencies, April 26

347. India’s 2009 General Elections: 7019 Candidates in 485 (out of 543) Constituencies announced as of April 26 noon April 26

348. What is Christine Fair referring to? Would the MEA kindly seek to address what she has claimed asap? April 27

349. Politics can be so entertaining 🙂 Manmohan versus Sonia on the poor old CPI(M)!, April 28

350. A Dozen Grown-Up Questions for Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, LK Advani, Sharad Pawar, Km Mayawati and Anyone Else Dreaming of Becoming/Deciding India’s PM After the 2009 General Elections, April 28

351. India’s 2009 General Elections: How drastically will the vote-share of political parties change from 2004? May 2

352. India’s 2009 General Elections: And now finally, all 8,070 Candidates across all 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies, May 5

353. India’s 2009 General Elections: The Mapping of Votes into Assembly Segments Won into Parliamentary Seats Won in the 2004 Election, May 7

354. Will Messrs Advani, Rajnath Singh & Modi ride into the sunset if the BJP comes to be trounced? (Corrected), May 10

355. India’s 2009 General Elections: 543 Matrices to Help Ordinary Citizens Audit the Election Commission’s Vote-Tallies May 12

356. Well done Sonia-Rahul! Two hours before polls close today, I am willing to predict a big victory for you (but, please, try to get your economics right, and also, you must get Dr Singh a Lok Sabha seat if he is to be PM) May 13

357. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee must dissolve the West Bengal Assembly if he is an honest democrat: Please try to follow Gerard Schröder’s example even slightly! May 16

358. India’s 2009 General Elections: Provisional Results from the EC as of 1400 hours Indian Standard Time May 16

359. Memo to the Hon’ble President of India: It is Sonia Gandhi, not Manmohan Singh, who should be invited to our equivalent of the “Kissing Hands” Ceremony May 16

360. Time for heads to roll in the BJP/RSS and CPI(M)!, May 17.

361. Inviting a new Prime Minister of India to form a Government: Procedure Right and Wrong May 18

362. Starting with Procedural Error: Why has the “Cabinet” of the 14th Lok Sabha been meeting today AFTER the results of the Elections to the 15th Lok Sabha have been declared?! May 18

363. Why has the Sonia Congress done something that the Congress under Nehru-Indira-Rajiv would not have done, namely, exaggerate the power of the Rajya Sabha and diminish the power of the Lok Sabha? May 21

364. Shouldn’t Dr Singh’s Cabinet begin with a small apology to the President of India for discourtesy? May we have reviews and reforms of protocols and practices to be followed at Rashtrapati Bhavan and elsewhere? May 23

365. Parliament’s sovereignty has been diminished by the Executive: A record for future generations to know May 25

366. How tightly will organised Big Business be able to control economic policies this time? May 26

367. Why does India not have a Parliament ten days after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected? Nehru and Rajiv would both have been appalled May 27

368. Eleven days and counting after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected and still no Parliament of India! (But we do have 79 Ministers — might that be a world record?) May 28

369. Note to Posterity: 79 Ministers in office but no 15th Lok Sabha until June 1 2009! May 29

370. Silver Jubilee of Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India May 29

371. How to Design a Better Cabinet for the Government of India May 29

372. Parliament is supposed to control the Government, not be bullied or intimidated by it: Will Rahul Gandhi be able to lead the Backbenches in the 15th Lok Sabha? June 1

373. Mistaken Macroeconomics: An Open Letter to Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, June 12

374. Why did Manmohan Singh and LK Advani apologise to one another? Is Indian politics essentially collusive, not competitive, aiming only to preserve and promote the post-1947 Dilli Raj at the expense of the whole of India? We seem to have no Churchillian repartee (except perhaps from Bihar occasionally) June 18

375. Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer June 22

376. My March 25 1991 memo to Rajiv (which never reached him) is something the present Government seems to have followed: all for the best of course! July 12

377. Disquietude about France’s behaviour towards India on July 14 2009 July 14

378. Does the Govt. of India assume “foreign investors and analysts” are a key constituency for Indian economic policy-making? If so, why so? Have Govt. economists “learnt nothing, forgotten everything”? Some Bastille Day thoughts July 14

379. Letter to the GoI’s seniormost technical economist, May 21.July 19

380. Excuse me but young Kasab in fact confessed many months ago, immediately after he was captured – he deserves 20 or 30 years in an Indian prison, and a chance to become a model prisoner who will stand against the very terrorists who sent him on his vile mission July 20

381. Finally, three months late, the GoI responds to American and Pakistani allegations about Balochistan July 24

382. Thoughts, words, deeds: My work 1973-2010

2012

383.  Life of my father 1915-2012

384. India’s Money” in the Cayman Financial Review, July 2012

385. Towards Making the Indian Rupee a Hard Currency of the World Economy: An analysis from British times until the present day, lecture at India International Centre, Delhi, 3 Dec 2012

386. 5 December 2012 interview by Mr Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, on Lok Sabha TV, the channel of India’s Lower House of Parliament, broadcast for the first time on 9 December 2012 on Lok Sabha TV, is here and here  in two parts.

387. Interview by GDI Impuls banking quarterly of  Zürich  published on 6 Dec 2012 is here.

388. My interview by Ragini Bhuyan of Delhi’s Sunday Guardian published on 16 Dec 2012  is here.

2013

389. “I have a student called Suby Roy…”: Reflections on Frank Hahn (1925-2013), my master in economic theory

390. Cambridge Economics & the Disputation in India’s Economic Policy, Revised 15 July 2013

391. Critical assessment dated 19 August 2013 of Raghuram Rajan is here (Live Mint 19 Aug) and here

392.  “Did Jagdish Bhagwati “originate”, “pioneer”, “intellectually father” India’s 1991 economic reform? Did Manmohan Singh? Or did I, through my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi, just as Siddhartha Shankar Ray told Manmohan & his aides in Sep 1993 in Washington? Judge the evidence for yourself. And why has Amartya Sen misdescribed his work? India’s right path forward today remains what I said in my 3 Dec 2012 Delhi lecture! 23 August 2013 here

393. My Recent Works, Interviews etc on India’s Money, Public Finance, Banking, Trade, BoP, Land, etc (an incomplete list) Nov 23, 2013

2014

394.  1) My 13 Sep 2019 Advice to PM Modi’s Adviser: Let PM address each State Legislature, get all India Govt Accounting & Public Decision Making to have integrity (2) 16 May 2014 Advice from Rajiv Gandhi’s Adviser to Narendra Modi: Do not populate the “Planning Commission” with worthies, scrap it, integrate its assets with the Treasury. And get the nationalised banks & RBI out of the Treasury. Tell them to read my 3 Dec 2012 Delhi lecture with care. Clean Government Accounting & Audit is the Key to Clean Public Finances & a Proper Indian Currency for the First Time Ever May 16, 2014. 

395.  “On India’s Education Policy”, published as “Mrs Irani’s New Job”/”Task Cut Out For Smriti Irani”  http://www.newindianexpress.com/opinion/Task-Cut-Out-for-Smriti-Irani/2014/06/16/article2282316.ece

396. Much as I might love Russia, England, France, America, I despise their spies & local agents affecting poor India’s policies: Memo to PM Modi, Mr Jaitley, Mr Doval & the new Govt. of India: Beware of Delhi’s sleeper agents, lobbyists & other dalals

397. “Haksar, Manmohan and Sonia” New Indian Express http://t.co/bRnQI1hrwy

2015

398.  Free India’s Foreign Policy & Economy in One Chart: Weapons Imports 1950-2013 by Country of Origin

399.  Delhi can never be improved — until the rest of India improves! February 13, 2015

400. Pakistan’s & India’s Illusions of Power (Psychosis vs Vanity) March 3, 2015

401.  How the India-Bangladesh Enclaves Problem Was Jump-Started in 2007 Towards its 2015 Solution: A Case Study of Academic Impact on Policy June 8, 2015

402.  On being reunited with Arrow Hahn after a dozen years July 3, 2015

403.  Fixing Washington: On Improving Institutional Design in the United States November 24, 2016

404.  Modi & Monetary Theory: Economic Consequences of the Prime Minister of India December 9, 2016.

405.  Physics & Reasoning (An Ongoing Tract) by Subroto Roy DRAFT 01.12.2017 September 26, 2017

406. Is “Cambridge Philosophy” dead, in Cambridge? Can it be resurrected, there? Case Study: Renford Bambrough (& Subroto Roy) preceded by decades Cheryl Misak’s thesis on Wittgenstein being linked with Peirce via Ramsey… October 27, 2017

407. S N Roy hears from Lytton: A 1922 case of British imperial racism in Indian governance (with lessons for today) [Draft text 12 August 2018] February 8, 2018

408.  Solving a Problem of State Tyranny: Director General Siddhanta Das: Have Forest Service Officers been threatening ordinary citizens, seizing their property, then threatening them with arrest if they complain? If so, how many cases of wrongful seizure and wrongful imprisonment have WCCB caused among India’s villagers and forest dwellers since 1994? There is immediate need for an Ombudsman to independently review all cases in each of your Five Zones! May 4,

409.  Critique of Monetary Ideas of Manmohan & Modi: the Roy Model explaining to Bimal Jalan, Nirmala Sitharaman, RBI etc what it is they are doing (Drafts 4 August, 7 August 2019; 27 August, 28 August, 30 August, 31 August, 1 September 2019) August 4, 2019

410. 1 May 2020 Statement of Dr. Subroto Roy, Economist & Citizen, Proposing PM Narendra Modi & Home Minister Amit Shah Apologize to India’s People, Create Remedy, and Resign to Do Prayaschit/Atonement; 9 May: A New Cabinet for President Kovind May 1, 2020

See also:

My Recent Works, Interviews etc on India’s Money, Public Finance, Banking, Trade, BoP, etc (an incomplete list)

My Seventy-One Articles, Notes Etc on Kashmir, Pakistan, & of course, India (plus my undelivered Lahore lectures)

My Ten Articles on China, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan in relation to India

M1. Map of Asia c. 1900

M2. Map of Chinese Empire c. 1900

M3. Map of Sinkiang, Tibet and Neighbours 1944

M4. China’s Secretly Built 1957 Road Through India’s Aksai Chin

M5. Map of Kashmir to Sinkiang 1944

M6. Map of India-Tibet-China-Mongolia 1959

M7. Map of India, Afghanistan, Russia, China, 1897

M8. Map of Xinjiang/Sinkiang/E Turkestan

M9. Map of Bombay/Mumbai 1909

M10-M13. Himalayan Expedition, West Sikkim 1970 – 1,2,3,4

Thoughts, words, deeds

My work 1973-2014

Subroto Roy

This is an incomplete bibliography of my writings, public lectures etc 1973-2014 including citations, reviews, comments. I have been mostly an academic economist who by choice or circumstance over 41 years has had to venture also into science, philosophy, public policy, law, jurisprudence, practical politics, history, international relations, military strategy, financial theory, accounting, management, journalism, literary criticism, psychology, psychoanalysis, theology, aesthetics, biography, children’s fables, etc. If anything unites the seemingly diverse work recorded below it is that I have tried to acquire a grasp of the nature of human reason and then apply this comprehension in practical contexts as simply and clearly as possible. Hence I have ended up following the path of Aristotle, as described in modern times (via Wittgenstein and John Wisdom) by Renford Bambrough. The 2004 public lecture in England, “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, may explain and illustrate all this best. A friend has been kind enough to call me an Academician, which I probably am, though one who really needs his own Academy because the incompetence, greed and mendacity encountered too often in the modern professoriat is dispiriting.
Besides writings and publications printed on paper, there are writings or items not printed on paper — as new media break space, cost and other constraints of traditional publishing. A little repetition and overlap has occurred too. Also in a few cases, e.g., Aldous Huxley’s essay on DH Lawrence, nothing has been done except discover and republish. Several databases have been created and released in the public interest, as have been some rare maps. There is also some biographical and autobiographical material. Several inconsequential errors remain in the text, which shall take time to be rectified as documents come to be rediscovered and collated.
1973

1. “Behavioural study of mus musculus”, Haileybury College, Supervised by J de C Ford-Robertson MA (Oxon). (Due to be published here 2010).
2. “Chemistry at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73” (Due to be published here 2010).
3. “Biology at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).
4. “Physics at Advanced Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).
5. “Revolution: theoria and praxis”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
6. “Gandhi vs Marx”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
1974
7. “Relevance of downward money-wage rigidity to the problem of maintaining full-employment in the classical and Keynesian models of income determination”, London School of Economics, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
8. “Testing aircraft fuels at Shell Finland”.
1975
9. “Oxford Street experiences: down and out in London town”.
10. “SE Region Bulk Distribution Survey”, Unilever, Basingstoke.
11. “Four London poems”, in JCM Paton (ed) New Writing (London, Great Portland Street: International Students House). (Due to be republished here 2010)
12. “On economic growth models and modellers”, London School of Economics, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).
1976
13. “World money: system or anarchy?”, lecture to Professor ACL Day’s seminar, London School of Economics, Economics Department, April. (Due to be published here 2010).
14. “A beginner’s guide to some recent developments in monetary theory”, lecture to Professor FH Hahn’s seminar, Cambridge University Economics Department, November 17 (Due to be published here 2010). See also “Announcement of My “Hahn Seminar”, published here June 14 2008.
1977
15. “Inflation and unemployment: a survey”, mimeo, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. (Due to be published here 2010).
16. “On short run theories of dual economies”, Cambridge University Economics Department “substantial piece of work” required of first year Research Students. Examiner: DMG Newbery, FBA. (Due to be published here 2010).
1978
17. “Pure theory of developing economies 1 and 2”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
18. “Introduction to some market outcomes under uncertainty”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
19. “On money and development”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo, September. (Due to be published here 2010)
20. “Notes on the Newbery-Stiglitz model of sharecropping”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo November. (Due to be published here 2010).
1979
21. “A theory of rights and economic justice”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).
22. “Monetary theory and economic development”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
23. “Foundations of the case against ‘development planning’”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo, November. (Due to be published here 2010).
1979-1989
24. Correspondence with Renford Bambrough (1926-1999), philosopher of St John’s College, Cambridge (Due to be published here 2010).
1980
25. “Models before the monetarist storm”, New Statesman letters
26. “Disciplining rulers and experts”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).
1981
27. “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”, Cambridge University doctoral thesis, supervisor FH Hahn, FBA; examiners CJ Bliss, FBA; TW Hutchison, FBA (Due to be published here 2010). 27a Response of FA Hayek on a partial draft February 18 1981. 27b Response of Peter Bauer, 1982. 27c Response of Theodore W Schultz, 1983. 27d. Response of Frank Hahn 1985.
1982
28. “Knowledge and freedom in economic theory Parts 1 and 2”, Centre for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Working Papers.
29. “Economic Theory and Development Economics”. Lecture to American Economic Association, New York, Dec 1982. Panel: RM Solow, HB Chenery, T Weisskopf, P Streeten, G Rosen, S Roy. Published in 29a.
1983
29a “Economic Theory and Development Economics: A Comment”. World Development, 1983. [Citation: Stavros Thefanides “Metamorphosis of Development Economics”, World Development 1988.]
30. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy (Comment on J. Michael Finger)”, Washington DC: Cato Journal, Winter 1983/84. See also “Did Donald Trump & Bernie Sanders get their Trade Policy from my 1983 Cato talk?”  2009/2017.
1984
31. “Considerations on Utility, Benevolence and Taxation”, History of Political Economy, 1984. 31a Response of Professor Sir John Hicks May 1 1984.
[Citations: P. Hennipman, “A Tale of Two Schools”, De Economist 1987, “A New Look at the Ordinalist Revolution”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; P. Rappoport, “Reply to Professor Hennipman”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; Eugene Smolensky et al “An Application of A Dynamic Cost-of-Living Index to the Evaluation of Changes in Social Welfare”, J. Post-Keynesian Econ.IX.3. 1987.]
32. Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1984.
[Citations: Lead editorial of The Times of London May 29 1984, “India’s economy”, Times letters June 16 1984. John Toye “Political Economy & Analysis of Indian Development”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 1, 1988; John Toye, Dilemmas of Development; D. Wilson, “Privatization of Asia”, The Banker Sep. 1984 etc]. See also 370 “Silver Jubilee of ‘Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India’” 2009.
33. Review of Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds) Public Choice.
34. Review of Limits of Utilitarianism, HB Miller & WH Williams (eds.), Public Choice.
35. Deendayal lecture (one of four invited lecturers), Washington DC, May October “On Government and the Individual in India”

1987
36. (with one other) “Does the Theory of Logical Types Inform the Theory of Communication?”, Journal of Genetic Psychology., 148 (4), Dec. 1987 [Citation:
37. “Irrelevance of Foreign Aid”, India International Centre Quarterly, Winter 1987.
38. Review of Development Planning by Sukhamoy Chakravarty for Economic Affairs, London 1987.
1988
39. (with Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada) “Introduction” to Lessons in Development: A Comparative Study of Asia and Latin America. San Francisco: Inst. of Economic Growth.
40. “A note on the welfare economics of regional cooperation”, lecture to Asia-Latin America conference, East West Center Honolulu, published 2009.
1989
41. Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, London & New York: Routledge (International Library of Philosophy) 1989, paperback 1991. Internet edition 2007. [Reviews & Citations: Research in Economics, 1992; De Economist 1991 & 1992; Manch.Sch. Econ.Studs. 59, 1991; Ethics 101.88 Jul. 1991; Kyklos 43.4 1990; Soc. Science Q. 71.880. Dec.1990; Can. Phil. Rev. 1990; J. Econ. Hist. Sep. 1990; Econ. & Phil. Fall 1990; Econ. Affairs June-July 1990; TLS May 1990; Choice March 1990; J. App.Phil. 1994, M. Blaug: Methodology of Economics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1992; Hist. Methods. 27.3, 1994; J. of Inst. & Theoretical Econ.,1994; Jahrbucker fur Nationaleconomie 1994, 573:574. Mark A Lutz in Economics for the Common Good, London: Routledge, 1999, et al]. See also 339 “Apropos Philosophy of Economics”, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al.
42. Foreword to Essays on the Political Economy by James M. Buchanan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1989.
43. “Modern Political Economy of India”, edited by Subroto Roy & William E James, Hawaii mimeo May 21 1989. This published for the first time a November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India by Milton Friedman. See also 43a, 53.
43a. Preface to “Milton Friedman’s extempore comments at the 1989 Hawaii conference: on India, Israel, Palestine, the USA, Debt and its uses, Erhardt abolishing exchange controls, Etc”, May 22 1989, published here for the first time October 31 2008.
44. Milton Friedman’s defence of my work in 1989.
45. Theodore W. Schultz’s defence of Philosophy of Economics
1990
46. “Letter to Judge Evelyn Lance: On A Case Study in Private International Law” (Due to be published here in 2010).
47-49. Selections from advisory work on economic policy etc for Rajiv Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament of India, published in 47a-49a.
1991
41b Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, Paperback edition.
50. “Conversations and correspondence with Rajiv Gandhi during the Gulf war, January 1991” (Due to be published here 2010).
47a. A Memo to Rajiv I: Stronger Secular Middle”, The Statesman, Jul 31 1991.
48a “A Memo to Rajiv II: Saving India’s Prestige”, The Statesman, Aug 1 1991.
49a “A Memo to Rajiv III: Salvation in Penny Capitalism”, The Statesman, Aug 2 1991 47b-49b “Three Memoranda to Rajiv Gandhi 1990-91”, 2007 republication here.
51. “Constitution for a Second Indian Republic”, The Saturday Statesman, April 20 1991. Republished here 2009.
52. “On the Art of Government: Experts, Party, Cabinet and Bureaucracy”, New Delhi mimeo March 25 1991, published here July 00 2009.
1992
53. Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & William E. James New Delhi, London, Newbury Park: Sage: 1992. Citation: Milton and Rose Friedman Two Lucky People (Chicago 1998), pp. 268-269.
54. Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by William E. James & Subroto Roy, Hawaii MS 1989, Sage: 1992, Karachi: Oxford 1993.
Reviews of 53 & 54 include: Bus. Today, Mar-Apr 1992; Political Studies March 1995; Econ Times 21 March 1993; Pakistan Development Review 1992. Hindustan Times 11 July 1992. Pacific Affairs 1993; Hindu 21 March 1993, 15 June 1993; Pakistan News International 12 June 1993. Book Reviews March 1993; Deccan Herald 2 May 1993; Pol.Econ.J. Ind. 1992. Fin Express 13 September 1992; Statesman 16 Jan. 1993. J. Royal Soc Asian Aff. 1994, J. Contemporary Asia, 1994 etc.
55. “Fundamental Problems of the Economies of India and Pakistan”, World Bank, Washington, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).
56.“The Road to Stagflation: The Coming Dirigisme in America, or, America, beware thy economists!, or Zen and Clintonomics,” Washington DC, Broad Branch Terrace, mimeo, November 17.
1993
57. “Exchange-rates and manufactured exports of South Asia”, IMF Washington DC mimeo. Published in part in 2007-2008 as 58-62:
58. “Path of the Indian Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.
59. “Path of the Pakistan Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.
60. “Path of the Sri Lankan Rupee 1948-1993”, 2008.
61. “Path of the Bangladesh Taka 1972-1993”, 2008.
62. “India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Manufactured Exports, IMF Washington DC mimeo”, published 2007.
63. “Economic Assessment of US-India Merchandise Trade”, Arlington, Virginia, mimeo, published in slight part in Indo-US Trade & Economic Cooperation, ICRIER New Delhi, 1995, and in whole 2007.
64. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, mimeo, Arlington, Virginia, circulated in Washington DC 1993-1995, cf 82, 111 infra. Comment of Selig Harrison.
1994
65. “Comment on Indonesia”, in The Political Economy of Policy Reform edited by John Williamson, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
66a “Gold reserves & the gold price in anticipation of Central Bank behaviour”, Greenwich, Connecticut, mimeo. 67b. “Portfolio optimization and foreign currency exposure hedging” Greenwich, Connecticut mimeo.
1995
68. “On the logic and commonsense of debt and payments crises: How to avoid another Mexico in India and Pakistan”, Scarsdale, NY, mimeo, May 1.
69. “Policies for Young India”, Scarsdale, NY, pp. 350, manuscript.
1996
70. US Supreme Court documents, published in part in 2008 as “Become a US Supreme Court Justice!” 70a, 70b (Due to be published in full here in 2010 as Roy vs University of Hawaii, 1989- including the expert testimonies of Milton Friedman and Theodore W Schultz.).
71. “Key problems of macroeconomic management facing the new Indian Government”, May 17. Scarsdale, New York, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).
72. “Preventing a collapse of the rupee”, IIT Kharagpur lecture July 16 1996.
73. “The Economist’s Representation of Technological Knowledge”, Vishvesvaraya lecture to the Institution of Engineers, September 15 1996, IIT Kharagpur.
1997
74. “Union and State Budgets in India”, lecture at the World Bank, Washington DC, May 00.
75. “State Budgets in India”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, June 6.
1998
76. “Transparency and Economic Policy-Making: An address to the Asia-Pacific Public Relations Conference” (panel on Transparency chaired by CR Irani) Jan 30 1998, published here 2008.
77. Theodore W. Schultz 1902-1998, Feb 25.
78. “The Economic View of Human Resources”, address to a regional conference on human resources, IIT Kharagpur.
79. “Management accounting”, lecture at Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy, Mussourie,
80a “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Jan 23 1998
81. “Recent Developments in Modern Finance”, IIM Bangalore Review, 10, 1 & 2, Jan.-Jun 1998. Reprinted as “From the Management Guru’s Classroom”: 81a “An introduction to derivatives”, Business Standard/Financial Times, Bombay 18 Apr 1999; 81b “Options in the future, Apr 25 1999; 81c “What is hedging?”, May 2 1999; 81d “Teaching computers to think”, May 9 1999.
82. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, Jun 22 1998, lecture at Heritage Foundation, Washington DC. Cf 111 Dec 2005.
83. “Sixteen Currencies for India: A Reverse Euro Model for Monetary & Fiscal Efficacy”, Lecture at the Institute of Economic Affairs, London, June 29 1998. Due to be published here 2010.
84. “Fable of the Fox, the Farmer, and the Would-Be Tailors”, October (Published here July 27 2009).
85. “A Common Man’s Guide to Pricing Financial Derivatives”, Lecture to “National Seminar on Derivatives”, Xavier Labour Research Institute, Jamshedpur, Dec. 16 1998. See 98.
1999
86. “An Analysis of Pakistan’s War-Winning Strategy: Are We Ready for This?”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, published in part as 86a.“Was a Pakistani Grand Strategy Discerned in Time by India?” New Delhi: Security & Political Risk Analysis Bulletin, July 1999, Kargil issue. See also 000
80b. “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Sep 13 1999.
2000
87. “On Freedom & the Scientific Point of View”, SN Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Feb 17 2000. Cf 100 below.
88. “Liberalism and Indian economic policy”, lecture at IIM Calcutta, Indian Liberal Group Meetings Devlali, Hyderabad; also Keynote address to UGC Seminar Guntur, March 30 2002. (Due to be published here 2010).
89. “Towards a Highly Transparent Fiscal & Monetary Framework for India’s Union & State Governments”, Invited address to Conference of State Finance Secretaries, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, April 29, 2000. Published 2008.
90. “On the Economics of Information Technology”, two lectures at the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, Nov 10-11, 2000.
91. Review of A New World by Amit Chaudhuri in Literary Criterion, Mysore.
2001
92. Review of AD Shroff: Titan of Finance and Free Enterprise by Sucheta Dalal, Freedom First., January.
93. “Encounter with Rajiv Gandhi: On the Origins of the 1991 Economic Reform”, Freedom First, October. See also 93a in 2005 and 93b in 2007.
94. “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, a keynote address to the Council for Asian Liberals & Democrats, Manila, Philippines, 16 Nov. 2001. Published as 91a.
95. “The Case for and against The Satanic Verses: Diatribe and Dialectic as Art”, Dec 22 republished in print 95a The Statesman Festival Volume, 2006.
2002
94a “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, in September 11 & Political Freedom in Asia, eds. Johannen, Smith & Gomez, Singapore 2002.
2002-2010
96. “Recording vivid dreams: Freud’s advice in exploring the Unconscious Mind” (Due to be published here in 2010).
2003
97. “Key principles of government accounting and audit”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo.
98. “Derivative pricing & other topics in financial theory: a student’s complete lecture notes” (Due to be published here in 2010).
2004
99. TV Interview by BBC, Oxford, after May 2004 General Election in India.
100. “Collapse of the Global Conversation”, International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Netherlands, Jul 2004.
101. “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, a public lecture, University of Buckingham, UK, August 24 2004. Published here 2007.
2005
93a Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform (this was the full story; it appeared in print for the first time in The Statesman Festival Volume 2007).
102. “Can India become an economic superpower (or will there be a monetary meltdown)?” Cardiff University Institute of Applied Macroeconomics Monetary Economics Seminar, April 13, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, April 27, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, Chief Economist’s Seminar on Monetary Economics, May 5.
103. Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant, Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & John Clarke, London & New York: Continuum, 2005; paperback 2006; French translation by Florian Bay, 2007.
104. “Iqbal & Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali in Pakistan’s Creation”, Dawn, Karachi, Sep 3.
105. “The Mitrokhin Archives II from an Indian Perspective: A Review Article”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 11 .
106. “After the Verdict”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 20.
107. “US Espionage Failures”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 26
108. “Waffle But No Models of Monetary Policy”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 30.
109. “On Hindus and Muslims”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Nov 6.
110. “Assessing Vajpayee: Hindutva True and False”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Nov 13-14″.
111. “Fiction from the India Economic Summit”, The Statesman, Front Page, Nov 29.
112. “Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason”, The Statesman Editorial Page
I. “Give the Hurriyat et al Indian Green Cards”, Dec 1
II. “Choice of Nationality under Full Information”, Dec 2
III. “Of Flags and Consulates in Gilgit etc”, Dec 3.
2006
113. “The Dream Team: A Critique”, The Statesman Editorial Page
I : New Delhi’s Consensus (Manmohantekidambaromics), Jan 6
II: Money, Convertibility, Inflationary Deficit Financing, Jan 7
III: Rule of Law, Transparency, Government Accounting, Jan 8.
114. “Unaccountable Delhi: India’s Separation of Powers’ Doctrine”, The Statesman, Jan 13.
115. “Communists and Constitutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 22.
116. “Diplomatic Wisdom”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 31.
117. “Mendacity & the Government Budget Constraint”, The Statesman, Front Page Feb 3.
118. “Of Graven Images”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb5.
119. “Separation of Powers, Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Pages Feb 12-13.
120. “Public Debt, Government Fantasy”, The Statesman, Front Page Editorial Comment, Feb 22.
121. “War or Peace Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 23-24.
122. “Can You Handle This Brief, Mr Chidambaram?” The Statesman, Front Page Feb 26.
123. “A Downpayment On the Taj Mahal Anyone?”, The Statesman, Front Page Comment on the Budget 2006-2007, Mar 1.
124. “Atoms for Peace (or War)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Mar 5.
125. “Imperialism Redux: Business, Energy, Weapons & Foreign Policy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 14.
126. “Logic of Democracy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 30.
127. “Towards an Energy Policy”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 2.
128. “Iran’s Nationalism”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 6.
129. “A Modern Military”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 16.
130. “On Money & Banking”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 23.
131. “Lessons for India from Nepal’s Revolution”, The Statesman, Front Page Apr 26.
132. “Revisionist Flattery (Inder Malhotra’s Indira Gandhi: A Review Article)”, The Sunday Statesman, May 7.
133. “Modern World History”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, May 7.
134. “Argumentative Indians: A Conversation with Professor Amartya Sen on Philosophy, Identity and Islam,” The Sunday Statesman, May 14 2006. “A Philosophical Conversation between Professor Sen and Dr Roy”, 2008. Translated into Bengali by AA and published in 00.
135. “The Politics of Dr Singh”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, May 21.
136. “Corporate Governance & the Principal-Agent Problem”, lecture at a conference on corporate governance, Kolkata May 31. Published here 2008.
137. “Pakistan’s Allies Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jun 4-5.
138. “Law, Justice and J&K Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 2, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 3.
139. “The Greatest Pashtun (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 16.
140. “Understanding Pakistan Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 30, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 31.
141. “Indian Money and Credit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 6.
142. “India’s Moon Mission”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 13.
143. “Jaswant’s Journeyings: A Review Article”, The Sunday Statesman Magazine, Aug 27.
144. “Our Energy Interests, Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 27, The Statesman Editorial Page Aug 28.
145. “Is Balochistan Doomed?”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 3 2006.
146. “Racism New and Old”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 8 2006
147. “Political Economy of India’s Energy Policy”, address to KAF-TERI conference, Goa Oct 7, published in 147a.
148. “New Foreign Policy? Seven phases of Indian foreign policy may be identifiable since Nehru”, Parts 1-2, The Sunday Statesman, Oct 8, The Statesman Oct 9.
149. “Justice & Afzal: There is a difference between law and equity (or natural justice). The power of pardon is an equitable power. Commuting a death-sentence is a partial pardon”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 14
150. “Non-existent liberals (On a Liberal Party for India)”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 22.
151. “History of Jammu & Kashmir Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29, The Statesman Oct 30, Editorial Page.
152. “American Democracy: Does America need a Prime Minister and a longer-lived Legislature?”, The Sunday Statesman Nov 5.
153. “Milton Friedman A Man of Reason 1912-2006”, The Statesman Perspective Page, Nov 22.
154. “Postscript to Milton Friedman Mahalanobis’s Plan (The Mahalanobis-Nehru “Second Plan”) The Statesman Front Page Nov 22.
155. “Mob Violence and Psychology”, Dec 10, The Statesman, Editorial Page.
156. “What To Tell Musharraf: Peace Is Impossible Without Non-Aggressive Pakistani Intentions”, The Statesman Editorial Page Dec 15.
157. “Land, Liberty and Value: Government must act in good faith treating all citizens equally – not favouring organised business lobbies and organised labour over an unorganised peasantry”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Dec 31.
2007
158. “Hypocrisy of the CPI-M: Political Collapse In Bengal: A Mid-Term Election/Referendum Is Necessary”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 9.
159. “On Land-Grabbing: Dr Singh’s India, Buddhadeb’s Bengal, Modi’s Gujarat have notorious US, Soviet and Chinese examples to follow ~ distracting from the country’s real economic problems,” The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Jan 14.
160. “India’s Macroeconomics: Real growth has steadily occurred because India has shared the world’s technological progress. But bad fiscal, monetary policies over decades have led to monetary weakness and capital flight” The Statesman Editorial Page Jan 20.
161. “Fiscal Instability: Interest payments quickly suck dry every year’s Budget. And rolling over old public debt means that Government Borrowing in fact much exceeds the Fiscal Deficit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 4.
162. “Our trade and payments Parts 1-2” (“India in World Trade and Payments”),The Sunday Statesman, Feb 11 2007, The Statesman, Feb 12 2007.
163. “Our Policy Process: Self-Styled “Planners” Have Controlled India’s Paper Money For Decades,” The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 20.
164. “Bengal’s Finances”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 25.
165. “Fallacious Finance: Congress, BJP, CPI-M may be leading India to Hyperinflation” The Statesman Editorial Page Mar 5.
166. “Uttar Pradesh Polity and Finance: A Responsible New Govt May Want To Declare A Financial Emergency” The Statesman Editorial Page, Mar 24
167. “A scam in the making” in The Sunday Statesman Front Page Apr 1 2007, published here in full as “Swindling India”.
168. “Maharashtra’s Money: Those Who Are Part Of The Problem Are Unlikely To Be A Part Of Its Solution”, The Statesman Editorial Page Apr 24.
147a. “Political Economy of Energy Policy” in India and Energy Security edited by Anant Sudarshan and Ligia Noronha, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi 2007.
169. “Presidential Qualities: Simplicity, Genuine Achievement Are Desirable; Political Ambition Is Not”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 8.
170. “We & Our Neighbours: Pakistanis And Bangladeshis Would Do Well To Learn From Sheikh Abdullah”, The Statesman, Editorial Page May 15.
171. “On Indian Nationhood: From Tamils To Kashmiris And Assamese And Mizos To Sikhs And Goans”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 25.
172. A Current Example of the Working of the Unconscious Mind, May 26.
173. Where I would have gone if I was Osama Bin Laden, May 31.
174. “US election ’08:America’s Presidential Campaign Seems Destined To Be Focussed On Iraq”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 1.
175. “Home Team Advantage: On US-Iran talks and Sunni-Shia subtleties: Tehran must transcend its revolution and endorse the principle that the House of Islam has many mansions”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, June 3
176. “Unhealthy Delhi: When will normal political philosophy replace personality cults?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 11.
177. “American Turmoil: A Vice-Presidential Coup – And Now a Grassroots Counterrevolution?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 18
178. “Political Paralysis: India has yet to develop normal conservative, liberal and socialist parties. The Nice-Housing-Effect and a little game-theory may explain the current stagnation”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, June 24.
179. “Has America Lost? War Doctrines Of Kutusov vs Clausewitz May Help Explain Iraq War”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 3.
180. “Lal Masjid ≠ Golden Temple: Wide differences are revealed between contemporary Pakistan and India by these two superficially similar military assaults on armed religious civilians”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page July 15
181. “Political Stonewalling: Only Transparency Can Improve Institutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page July 20.
182. “Gold standard etc: Fixed versus flexible exchange rates”, July 21.
183. “US Pakistan-India Policy: Delhi & Islamabad Still Look West In Defining Their Relationship”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 27.
184. “Works of DH Lawrence” July 30
185. “An Open Letter to Professor Amartya Sen about Singur etc”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 31.
186. “Martin Buber on Palestine and Israel (with Postscript)”, Aug 4.
187. “Auguste Rodin on Nature, Art, Beauty, Women and Love”, Aug 7.
188. “Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 13.
189. Letter to Forbes.com 16 Aug.
190. “Need for Clarity: A poorly drafted treaty driven by business motives is a recipe for international misunderstanding”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 19.
191. “No Marxist MBAs? An amicus curiae brief for the Hon’ble High Court”, The Statesman, FrontPage, Aug 29.
192. On Lawrence, Sep 4.
193. Dalai Lama’s Return: In the tradition of Gandhi, King, Mandela, Sep 11.
194. Of JC Bose, Patrick Geddes & the Leaf-World, Sep 12.
195. “Against Quackery: Manmohan and Sonia have violated Rajiv Gandhi’s intended reforms; the Communists have been appeased or bought; the BJP is incompetent Parts 1-2”, in The Sunday Statesman and The Statesman, Editorial Pages of Sep 23-24.
196. Karl Georg Zinn’s 1994 Review of Philosophy of Economics, Sep 26.
197. DH Lawrence’s Phoenix, Oct 3.
93b. “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”, Statesman Festival Volume.
198. “Iran, America, Iraq: Bush’s post-Saddam Saddamism — one flip-flop too many?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 16.
199. “Understanding China: The World Needs to Ask China to Find Her True Higher Self”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 22.
200. “India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 30.
201. “China’s India Aggression : German Historians Discover Logic Behind Communist Military Strategy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, Nov 5.
202. Sonia’s Lying Courtier (with Postscript), Nov 25. See also 2014
203. “Surrender or Fight? War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must?” The Statesman, Dec 4, Editorial Page.
204. Hutton and Desai: United in Error Dec 14
205. “China’s Commonwealth: Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang”, The Statesman, Dec 17.
2008
206. “Nixon & Mao vs India: How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression. The Government of India should publish its official history of the 1962 war.” The Sunday Statesman, Jan 6, The Statesman Jan 7 Editorial Page.
207. “Lessons from the 1962 War: Beginnings of a solution to the long-standing border problem: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended”, The Sunday Statesman, January 13 2008.
208. “Our Dismal Politics: Will Independent India Survive Until 2047?”, The Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 1.
209. Median Voter Model of India’s Electorate Feb 7.
210. “Anarchy in Bengal: Intra-Left bandh marks the final unravelling of “Brand Buddha””, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 10.
211. Fifty years since my third birthday: on life and death.
212. “Pakistan’s Kashmir obsession: Sheikh Abdullah Relied In Politics On The French Constitution, Not Islam”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 16.
213. A Note on the Indian Policy Process Feb 21.
214. “Growth & Government Delusion: Progress Comes From Learning, Enterprise, Exchange, Not The Parasitic State”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 22.
215. “How to Budget: Thrift, Not Theft, Needs to Guide Our Public Finances”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 26.
216. “India’s Budget Process (in Theory)”, The Statesman, Front Page Feb 29.
217. “Irresponsible Governance: Congress, BJP, Communists, BSP, Sena Etc Reveal Equally Bad Traits”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 4.
218. “American Politics: Contest Between Obama And Clinton Affects The World”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 11.
219. “China’s India Example: Tibet, Xinjiang May Not Be Assimilated Like Inner Mongolia And Manchuria”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 25.
220. “Taxation of India’s Professional Cricket: A Proposal”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 1.
221. “Two cheers for Pakistan!”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 7.
222. “Indian Inflation: Upside Down Economics From The New Delhi Establishment Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 15-16.
223. “Assessing Manmohan: The Doctor of Deficit Finance should realise the currency is at stake”, The Statesman, Editorial Page Apr 25.
224. John Wisdom, Renford Bambrough: Main Philosophical Works, May 8.
225. “All India wept”: On the death of Rajiv Gandhi, May 21.
226. “China’s force and diplomacy: The need for realism in India” The Statesman, Editorial Page May 31.
227. Serendipity and the China-Tibet-India border problem June 6
228. “Leadership vacuum: Time & Tide Wait For No One In Politics: India Trails Pakistan & Nepal!”, The Statesman Editorial Page June 7.
229. My meeting Jawaharlal Nehru Oct13 1962
230. Manindranath Roy 1891-1958
231. Surendranath Roy 1860-1929
232. The Roys of Behala 1928.
233. Sarat Chandra visits Surendranath Roy 1927
234. Nuksaan-Faida Analysis = Cost-Benefit Analysis in Hindi/Urdu Jun 30
235. One of many reasons John R Hicks was a great economist July 3
236. My father, Indian diplomat, in the Shah’s Tehran 1954-57 July 8
237 Distribution of Govt of India Expenditure (Net of Operational Income) 1995 July 27
238. Growth of Real Income, Money & Prices in India 1869-2008, July 28.
239. Communism from Social Democracy? But not in India or China! July 29
240. Death of Solzhenitsyn, Aug. 3
240a. Tolstoy on Science and Art, Aug 4.
241. “Reddy’s reckoning: Where should India’s real interest rate be relative to the world?” Business Standard Aug 10
242. “Rangarajan Effect”, Business Standard Aug 24
243. My grandfather’s death in Ottawa 50 years ago today Sep 3
244. My books in the Library of Congress and British Library Sep 12
245. On Jimmy Carter & the “India-US Nuclear Deal”, Sep 12
246. My father after presenting his credentials to President Kekkonen of Finland Sep 14 1973.
247. “October 1929? Not!”, Business Standard, Sep 18.
248. “MK Gandhi, SN Roy, MA Jinnah in March 1919: Primary education legislation in a time of protest”
249. 122 sensible American economists Sept 26
250. Govt of India: Please call in the BBC and ask them a question Sep 27
251. “Monetary Integrity and the Rupee: Three British Raj relics have dominated our macroeconomic policy-making” Business Standard Sep 28.
252a. Rabindranath’s daughter writes to her friend my grandmother Oct 5
252b. A Literary Find: Modern Poetry in Bengal, Oct 6.
253. Sarat writes to Manindranath 1931, Oct 12
254. Origins of India’s Constitutional Politics 1913
255. Indira Gandhi in Paris, 1971
256. How the Liabilities/Assets Ratio of Indian Banks Changed from 84% in 1970 to 108% in 1998, October 20
257a. My Subjective Probabilities on India’s Moon Mission Oct 21
258. Complete History of Mankind’s Moon Missions: An Indian Citizen’s Letter to ISRO’s Chairman, Oct 22.
259. Would not a few million new immigrants solve America’s mortgage crisis? Oct 26
260. “America’s divided economists”, Business Standard Oct 26
261. One tiny prediction about the Obama Administration, Nov 5
262. Rai Bahadur Umbika Churn Rai, 1827-1902, Nov 7 2008
263. Jawaharlal Nehru invites my father to the Mountbatten Farewell Nov 7 2008
70a. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America) Preface” Nov 9
70b. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America)” Nov 9.
257b. Neglecting technological progress was the basis of my pessimism about Chandrayaan, Nov 9.
264. Of a new New Delhi myth and the success of the University of Hawaii 1986-1992 Pakistan project Nov 15
265. Pre-Partition Indian Secularism Case-Study: Fuzlul Huq and Manindranath Roy Nov 16
266. Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists suppose Maulana Azad, Dr Zakir Hussain, Sheikh Abdullah were Pakistanis (or that Sheikh Mujib wanted to remain one)? Nov 18
267. Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until this sad day, Nov 28.
268. In international law, Pakistan has been the perpetrator, India the victim of aggression in Mumbai, Nov 30.
269. The Indian Revolution, Dec 1.
270. Habeas Corpus: a captured terrorist mass-murderer tells a magistrate he has not been mistreated by Mumbai’s police Dec 3
271. India’s Muslim Voices (Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent), Dec 4
272. “Anger Management” needed? An Oxford DPhil recommends Pakistan launch a nuclear first strike against India within minutes of war, Dec 5.
273. A Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough), Dec 6
274. Dr Rice finally gets it right (and maybe Mrs Clinton will too) Dec 7
275. Will the Government of India’s new macroeconomic policy dampen or worsen the business-cycle (if such a cycle exists at all)? No one knows! “Where ignorance is bliss, ‘Tis folly to be wise.” Dec 7
276. Pump-priming for car-dealers: Keynes groans in his grave (If evidence was needed of the intellectual dishonesty of New Delhi’s new macroeconomic policy, here it is) Dec 9.
277. Congratulations to Mumbai’s Police: capturing a terrorist, affording him his Habeas Corpus rights, getting him to confess within the Rule of Law, sets a new world standard Dec 10
278. Two cheers — wait, let’s make that one cheer — for America’s Justice Department, Dec 10
279. Will Pakistan accept the bodies of nine dead terrorists who came from Pakistan to Mumbai? If so, let there be a hand-over at the Wagah border, Dec 11.
280. Kasab was a stupid, ignorant, misguided youth, manufactured by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds into becoming a mass-murdering robot: Mahatma Gandhi’s India should punish him, get him to repent if he wishes, then perhaps rehabilitate him as a potent weapon against Pakistani terrorism Dec 12.
281. Pakistan’s New Delhi Embassy should ask for “Consular Access” to nine dead terrorists in a Mumbai morgue before asking to meet Kasab, Dec 13
282. An Indian Reply to President Zardari: Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationships Dec 19
283. Is my prediction about Caroline Kennedy becoming US Ambassador to Britain going to be correct? Dec 27
284. Chandrayaan adds a little good cheer! Well done, ISRO!, Dec 28
285. How sad that “Slumdog millionaire” is SO disappointing! Dec 31
289. (with Claude Arpi) “Transparency & history: India’s archives must be opened to world standards” Business Standard New Delhi Dec 31, 2008, published here Jan 1 .
2009
290. A basis of India-Pakistan cooperation on the Mumbai massacres: the ten Pakistani terrorists started off as pirates and the Al-Huseini is a pirate ship Jan 1.
291. India’s “pork-barrel politics” needs a nice (vegetarian) Hindi name! “Teli/oily politics” perhaps? (And are we next going to see a Bill of Rights for Lobbyists?) Jan 3
292. My (armchair) experience of the 1999 Kargil war (Or, “Actionable Intelligence” in the Internet age: How the Kargil effort got a little help from a desktop) Jan 5
293. How Jammu & Kashmir’s Chief Minister Omar Abdullah can become a worthy winner of the Nobel Peace Prize: An Open Letter, Jan 7
294. Could the Satyam/PwC fraud be the visible part of an iceberg? Where are India’s “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”? Isn’t governance rather poor all over corporate India? Bad public finance may be a root cause Jan 8
295. Satyam does not exist: it is bankrupt, broke, kaput. Which part of this does the new “management team” not get? The assets belong to Satyam’s creditors. Jan 8
296. Jews are massacred in Mumbai and now Jews commit a massacre in Gaza! Jan 9
297. And now for the Great Satyam Whitewash/Cover-Up/Public Subsidy! The wrong Minister appoints the wrong new Board who, probably, will choose the wrong policy Jan 12
298. Letter to Wei Jingsheng Jan 14
299. Memo to the Hon’ble Attorneys General of Pakistan & India: How to jointly prosecute the Mumbai massacre perpetrators most expeditiously Jan 16
300. Satyam and IT-firms in general may be good candidates to become “Labour-Managed” firms Jan 18
301. “Yes we might be able to do that. Perhaps we ought to. But again, perhaps we ought not to, let me think about it…. Most important is Cromwell’s advice: Think it possible we may be mistaken!” Jan 20.
302. RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks Jan 25
303. Didn’t Dr Obama (the new American President’s late father) once publish an article in Harvard’s Quarterly Journal of Economics? (Or did he?) Jan 25.
304. “A Dialogue in Macroeconomics” 1989 etc: sundry thoughts on US economic policy discourse Jan 30
305. American Voices: A Brief Popular History of the United States in 20 You-Tube Music Videos Feb 5
306. Jaladhar Sen writes to Manindranath at Surendranath’s death, Feb 23
307. Pakistani expansionism: India and the world need to beware of “Non-Resident Pakistanis” ruled by Rahmat Ali’s ghost, Feb 9
308. My American years Part One 1980-90: battles for academic integrity & freedom Feb 11.
309. Thanks and well done Minister Rehman Malik and the Govt of Pakistan Feb 12
310. Can President Obama resist the financial zombies (let alone slay them)? His economists need to consult Dr Anna J Schwartz Feb 14
311. A Brief History of Gilgit, Feb 18
312. Memo to UCLA Geographers: Commonsense suggests Mr Bin Laden is far away from the subcontinent Feb 20
313. The BBC gets its history and geography deliberately wrong again Feb 21
314. Bengal Legislative Council 1921, Feb 28
315. Carmichael visits Surendranath, 1916, Mar 1
316. Memo to GoI CLB: India discovered the Zero, and 51% of Zero is still Zero Mar 10
317. An Academic Database of Doctoral & Other Postgraduate Research Done at UK Universities on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Other Asian Countries Over 100 Years, Mar 13
318. Pakistan’s progress, Mar 18
319. Risk-aversion explains resistance to free trade, Mar 19
320. India’s incredibly volatile inflation rate! Mar 20
321. Is “Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona” referring to an emasculation of (elite) American society?, Mar 21
322. Just how much intellectual fraud can Delhi produce? Mar 26
323. India is not a monarchy! We urgently need to universalize the French concept of “citoyen”! Mar 28
324. Could this be the real state of some of our higher education institutions? Mar 29
325. Progress! The BBC retracts its prevarication! Mar 30
326. Aldous Huxley’s Essay “DH Lawrence” Mar 31
327. Waffle not institutional reform is what (I predict) the “G-20 summit” will produce, April 1
328. Did a full cricket team of Indian bureaucrats follow our PM into 10 Downing Street? Count for yourself! April 3
329. Will someone please teach the BJP’s gerontocracy some Economics 101 on an emergency basis? April 5
330. The BBC needs to determine exactly where it thinks Pakistan is!, April 5
331. Alfred Lyall on Christians, Muslims, India, China, Etc, 1908, April 6
332. An eminent economist of India passes away April 9
333. Democracy Database for the Largest Electorate Ever Seen in World History, April 12
334. Memo to the Election Commission of India April 14 2009, 9 AM, April 14
335. Caveat emptor! Satyam is taken over, April 14
336. India’s 2009 General Elections: Candidates, Parties, Symbols for Polls on 16-30 April Phases 1,2,3, April 15
337. On the general theory of expertise in democracy: reflections on what emerges from the American “torture memos” today, April 18
338. India’s 2009 General Elections: 467 constituencies (out of 543) for which candidates have been announced as of 1700hrs April 21, April 21
339. Apropos Philosophy of Economics, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al., April 22.
340. India’s 2009 General Elections: Names of all 543 Constituencies of the 15th Lok Sabha, April 22.
341. India’s 2009 General Elections: How 4125 State Assembly Constituencies comprise the 543 new Lok Sabha Constituencies, April 23.
342. Why has America’s “torture debate” yet to mention the obvious? Viz., sadism and racism, April 24
343. India’s 2009 General Elections: the advice of the late “George Eliot” (Mary Ann Evans, 1819-1880) to India’s voting public, April 24.
344. India’s 2009 General Elections: Delimitation and the Different Lists of 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies in 2009 and 2004, April 25
345. Is “Slumdog Millionaire” the single worst Best Picture ever?
346. India’s 2009 General Elections: Result of Delimitation — Old (2004) and New (2009) Lok Sabha and Assembly Constituencies, April 26
347. India’s 2009 General Elections: 7019 Candidates in 485 (out of 543) Constituencies announced as of April 26 noon April 26
348. What is Christine Fair referring to? Would the MEA kindly seek to address what she has claimed asap? April 27
349. Politics can be so entertaining 🙂 Manmohan versus Sonia on the poor old CPI(M)!, April 28
350. A Dozen Grown-Up Questions for Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, LK Advani, Sharad Pawar, Km Mayawati and Anyone Else Dreaming of Becoming/Deciding India’s PM After the 2009 General Elections, April 28
351. India’s 2009 General Elections: How drastically will the vote-share of political parties change from 2004? May 2
352. India’s 2009 General Elections: And now finally, all 8,070 Candidates across all 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies, May 5
353. India’s 2009 General Elections: The Mapping of Votes into Assembly Segments Won into Parliamentary Seats Won in the 2004 Election, May 7
354. Will Messrs Advani, Rajnath Singh & Modi ride into the sunset if the BJP comes to be trounced? (Corrected), May 10
355. India’s 2009 General Elections: 543 Matrices to Help Ordinary Citizens Audit the Election Commission’s Vote-Tallies May 12
356. Well done Sonia-Rahul! Two hours before polls close today, I am willing to predict a big victory for you (but, please, try to get your economics right, and also, you must get Dr Singh a Lok Sabha seat if he is to be PM) May 13
357. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee must dissolve the West Bengal Assembly if he is an honest democrat: Please try to follow Gerard Schröder’s example even slightly! May 16
358. India’s 2009 General Elections: Provisional Results from the EC as of 1400 hours Indian Standard Time May 16
359. Memo to the Hon’ble President of India: It is Sonia Gandhi, not Manmohan Singh, who should be invited to our equivalent of the “Kissing Hands” Ceremony May 16
360. Time for heads to roll in the BJP/RSS and CPI(M)!, May 17.
361. Inviting a new Prime Minister of India to form a Government: Procedure Right and Wrong May 18
362. Starting with Procedural Error: Why has the “Cabinet” of the 14th Lok Sabha been meeting today AFTER the results of the Elections to the 15th Lok Sabha have been declared?! May 18
363. Why has the Sonia Congress done something that the Congress under Nehru-Indira-Rajiv would not have done, namely, exaggerate the power of the Rajya Sabha and diminish the power of the Lok Sabha? May 21
364. Shouldn’t Dr Singh’s Cabinet begin with a small apology to the President of India for discourtesy? May we have reviews and reforms of protocols and practices to be followed at Rashtrapati Bhavan and elsewhere? May 23
365. Parliament’s sovereignty has been diminished by the Executive: A record for future generations to know May 25
366. How tightly will organised Big Business be able to control economic policies this time? May 26
367. Why does India not have a Parliament ten days after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected? Nehru and Rajiv would both have been appalled May 27
368. Eleven days and counting after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected and still no Parliament of India! (But we do have 79 Ministers — might that be a world record?) May 28
369. Note to Posterity: 79 Ministers in office but no 15th Lok Sabha until June 1 2009! May 29
370. Silver Jubilee of Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India May 29
371. How to Design a Better Cabinet for the Government of India May 29
372. Parliament is supposed to control the Government, not be bullied or intimidated by it: Will Rahul Gandhi be able to lead the Backbenches in the 15th Lok Sabha? June 1
373. Mistaken Macroeconomics: An Open Letter to Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, June 12
374. Why did Manmohan Singh and LK Advani apologise to one another? Is Indian politics essentially collusive, not competitive, aiming only to preserve and promote the post-1947 Dilli Raj at the expense of the whole of India? We seem to have no Churchillian repartee (except perhaps from Bihar occasionally) June 18
375. Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer June 22
376. My March 25 1991 memo to Rajiv (which never reached him) is something the present Government seems to have followed: all for the best of course! July 12
377. Disquietude about France’s behaviour towards India on July 14 2009 July 14
378. Does the Govt. of India assume “foreign investors and analysts” are a key constituency for Indian economic policy-making? If so, why so? Have Govt. economists “learnt nothing, forgotten everything”? Some Bastille Day thoughts July 14
379. Letter to the GoI’s seniormost technical economist, May 21.July 19
380. Excuse me but young Kasab in fact confessed many months ago, immediately after he was captured – he deserves 20 or 30 years in an Indian prison, and a chance to become a model prisoner who will stand against the very terrorists who sent him on his vile mission July 20
381. Finally, three months late, the GoI responds to American and Pakistani allegations about Balochistan July 24
382. Thoughts, words, deeds: My work 1973-2010
2012
383. Life of my father 1915-2012
384. India’s Money” in the Cayman Financial Review, July 2012
385. Towards Making the Indian Rupee a Hard Currency of the World Economy: An analysis from British times until the present day, lecture at India International Centre, Delhi, 3 Dec 2012
386. 5 December 2012 interview by Mr Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, on Lok Sabha TV, the channel of India’s Lower House of Parliament, broadcast for the first time on 9 December 2012 on Lok Sabha TV, is here and here in two parts.
387. Interview by GDI Impuls banking quarterly of Zürich published on 6 Dec 2012 is here.
388. My interview by Ragini Bhuyan of Delhi’s Sunday Guardian published on 16 Dec 2012 is here.
2013
389. “I have a student called Suby Roy…”: Reflections on Frank Hahn (1925-2013), my master in economic theory
390. Cambridge Economics & the Disputation in India’s Economic Policy, Revised 15 July 2013
391. Critical assessment dated 19 August 2013 of Raghuram Rajan is here (Live Mint 19 Aug) and here
392. 23 August 2013 of Professors Jagdish Bhagwati & Amartya Sen and Dr Manmohan Singh is here…
2014
393. “Mrs Irani’s New Job”/”Task Cut Out For Smriti Irani” June 16, 2014http://www.newindianexpress.com/opinion/Task-Cut-Out-for-Smriti-Irani/2014/06/16/article2282316.ece
394. Much as I might love Russia, England, France, America, I despise their spies & local agents affecting poor India’s policies: Memo to PM Modi, Mr Jaitley, Mr Doval & the new Govt. of India: Beware of Delhi’s sleeper agents, lobbyists & other dalals
395. “Haksar, Manmohan and Sonia” August 7, 2014 New Indian Express http://t.co/bRnQI1hrwy
396. Free India’s Foreign Policy & Economy in One Chart: Weapons Imports 1950-2013 by Country of Origin
See also:
My Recent Works, Interviews etc on India’s Money, Public Finance, Banking, Trade, BoP, etc (an incomplete list)
My Seventy-One Articles, Notes Etc on Kashmir, Pakistan, & of course, India (plus my undelivered Lahore lectures)
My Ten Articles on China, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan in relation to India
M1. Map of Asia c. 1900
M2. Map of Chinese Empire c. 1900
M3. Map of Sinkiang, Tibet and Neighbours 1944
M4. China’s Secretly Built 1957 Road Through India’s Aksai Chin
M5. Map of Kashmir to Sinkiang 1944
M6. Map of India-Tibet-China-Mongolia 1959
M7. Map of India, Afghanistan, Russia, China, 1897
M8. Map of Xinjiang/Sinkiang/E Turkestan
M9. Map of Bombay/Mumbai 1909
M10-M13. Himalayan Expedition, West Sikkim 1970 – 1,2,3,4

2010 version:

This an incomplete bibliography of my writings, public lectures etc 1973-2010 including citations, reviews, comments.  I have been mostly an academic economist who by choice or circumstance over 36 years has had to venture also into science, philosophy, public policy, law, jurisprudence, practical politics, history, international relations, military strategy, financial theory, accounting, management, journalism, literary criticism, psychology, psychoanalysis, theology, aesthetics, biography, children’s fables, etc.   If anything unites the seemingly diverse work recorded below it is that I have tried to acquire a grasp of the nature of human reason and then apply this comprehension in practical contexts as simply and clearly as possible. Hence I have ended up following the path of Aristotle, as described in modern times (via Wittgenstein and John Wisdom) by Renford Bambrough.  The 2004 public lecture in England, “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, may explain and illustrate all this best.  A friend has been kind enough to call me an Academician, which I probably am, though one who really needs his own Academy because the incompetence, greed and mendacity encountered too often in the modern professoriat is dispiriting.

1-289 refer mostly to writings and publications printed on paper; 290-382 refer to  writings or items not printed on paper — as new media break space, cost and other  constraints of traditional publishing, a little repetition and overlap has occurred too. Also in a few cases, e.g., Aldous Huxley’s essay on DH Lawrence, nothing has been done except discover and republish.  Several databases have been created and released in the public interest, as have been some rare maps.  There is also some biographical and autobiographical material.  Several inconsequential errors remain in the text, which shall take time to be rectified as documents come to be rediscovered and collated.

1973

1. “Behavioural study of mus musculus”, Haileybury College, Supervised by J de C Ford-Robertson MA (Oxon). (Due to be published here 2010).

2. “Chemistry at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73” (Due to be published here 2010).

3. “Biology at Advanced & Special Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).

4.  “Physics at Advanced Level: Student Notes 1972-73”, (Due to be published here 2010).

5. “Revolution: theoria and praxis”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

6. “Gandhi vs Marx”, London, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

1974

7. “Relevance of downward money-wage rigidity to the problem of maintaining full-employment in the classical and Keynesian models of income determination”, London School of Economics, mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

8. “Testing aircraft fuels at Shell Finland”.

1975

9. “Oxford Street experiences: down and out in London town”.

10. “SE Region Bulk Distribution Survey”, Unilever, Basingstoke.

11. “Four London poems”, in JCM Paton (ed)  New Writing (London, Great Portland Street: International Students House).  (Due to be republished here 2010)

12. “On economic growth models and modellers”, London School of Economics, mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

1976

13. “World money: system or anarchy?”, lecture to Professor ACL Day’s seminar, London School of Economics, Economics Department, April. (Due to be published here 2010).

14. “A beginner’s guide to some recent developments in monetary theory”, lecture to Professor FH Hahn’s seminar, Cambridge University Economics Department, November 17 (Due to be published here 2010). See also “Announcement of My “Hahn Seminar”,  published here June 14 2008.

1977

15. “Inflation and unemployment: a survey”, mimeo, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. (Due to be published here 2010).

16. “On short run theories of dual economies”, Cambridge University Economics Department “substantial piece of work” required of first year Research Students.  Examiner: DMG Newbery, FBA. (Due to be published here 2010).

1978

17. “Pure theory of developing economies 1 and 2”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

18. “Introduction to some market outcomes under uncertainty”, Delhi School of Economics mimeo (Due to be published here 2010).

19. “On money and development”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo, September.  (Due to be published here 2010)

20. “Notes on the Newbery-Stiglitz model of sharecropping”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo November.  (Due to be published here 2010).

1979

21. “A theory of rights and economic justice”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge mimeo. (Due to be published here 2010).

22. “Monetary theory and economic development”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo  (Due to be published here 2010).

23. “Foundations of the case against ‘development planning’”, Corpus Christi College Cambridge, mimeo, November.   (Due to be published here 2010).

1979-1989

24. Correspondence with Renford Bambrough (1926-1999), philosopher of St John’s College, Cambridge (Due to be published here 2010).

1980

25. “Models before the monetarist storm”, New Statesman letters

26. “Disciplining rulers and experts”, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, mimeo.  (Due to be published here 2010).

1981

27. “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”, Cambridge University doctoral thesis, supervisor FH Hahn, FBA; examiners CJ Bliss, FBA; TW Hutchison, FBA  (Due to be published here 2010). 27a Response of FA Hayek on a partial draft February 18 1981.  27b Response of Peter Bauer, 1982.  27c Response of Theodore W Schultz, 1983.  27d. Response of Frank Hahn 1985.

1982

28. “Knowledge and freedom in economic theory Parts 1 and 2”, Centre for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Working Papers.

29. “Economic Theory and Development Economics”. Lecture to American Economic Association, New York, Dec 1982.  Panel: RM Solow, HB Chenery, T Weisskopf, P Streeten, G Rosen, S Roy. Published in 29a.

1983

29a “Economic Theory and Development Economics: A Comment”. World Development, 1983. [Citation: Stavros Thefanides “Metamorphosis of Development Economics”, World Development 1988.]

30. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy (Comment on J. Michael Finger)”, Washington DC: Cato Journal, Winter 1983/84. See also 000 “Risk-aversion explains resistance to freer trade”, 2008.

1984

31. “Considerations on Utility, Benevolence and Taxation”, History of Political Economy, 1984.   31a Response of Professor Sir John Hicks May 1 1984.

[Citations: P. Hennipman, “A Tale of Two Schools”, De Economist 1987, “A New Look at the Ordinalist Revolution”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; P. Rappoport, “Reply to Professor Hennipman”, J. Econ. Lit. Mar 1988; Eugene Smolensky et al “An Application of A Dynamic Cost-of-Living Index to the Evaluation of Changes in Social Welfare”, J. Post-Keynesian Econ.IX.3. 1987.]

32. Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1984.

[Citations: Lead editorial of The Times of London May 29 1984, “India’s economy”, Times letters June 16 1984. John Toye “Political Economy & Analysis of Indian Development”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 1, 1988; John Toye, Dilemmas of Development; D. Wilson, “Privatization of Asia”, The Banker Sep. 1984 etc].  See also 370 “Silver Jubilee of ‘Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India’” 2009.

33. Review of Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds) Public Choice.

34. Review of Limits of Utilitarianism, HB Miller & WH Williams (eds.), Public Choice.

35. Deendayal lecture (one of four invited lecturers), Washington DC, May.

1987

36. (with one other) “Does the Theory of Logical Types Inform the Theory of Communication?”, Journal of Genetic Psychology., 148 (4), Dec. 1987 [Citation:

37. “Irrelevance of Foreign Aid”, India International Centre Quarterly, Winter 1987.

38. Review of Development Planning by Sukhamoy Chakravarty for Economic Affairs, London 1987.

1988

39. (with two others) “Introduction” to Lessons in Development: A Comparative Study of Asia and Latin America. San Francisco: Inst. of Economic Growth.

40. “A note on the welfare economics of regional cooperation”, lecture to Asia-Latin America conference, East West Center Honolulu, published 2009.

1989

41. Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, London & New York: Routledge (International Library of Philosophy) 1989, paperback 1991. Internet edition 2007.   [Reviews & Citations: Research in Economics, 1992; De Economist 1991 & 1992; Manch.Sch. Econ.Studs. 59, 1991; Ethics 101.88 Jul. 1991; Kyklos 43.4 1990; Soc. Science Q. 71.880. Dec.1990; Can. Phil. Rev. 1990; J. Econ. Hist. Sep. 1990; Econ. & Phil. Fall 1990; Econ. Affairs June-July 1990; TLS May 1990; Choice March 1990; J. App.Phil. 1994, M. Blaug: Methodology of Economics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1992;  Hist. Methods. 27.3, 1994; J. of Inst. & Theoretical Econ.,1994;  Jahrbucker fur Nationaleconomie 1994, 573:574. Mark A Lutz in Economics for the Common Good, London: Routledge, 1999, et al].  See also 339 “Apropos Philosophy of Economics”, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al.

42. Foreword to Essays on the Political Economy by James M. Buchanan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1989.

43. “Modern Political Economy of India”, edited by Subroto Roy & William E James,  Hawaii mimeo May 21 1989.  This published for the first time a November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India by Milton Friedman.  See also 43a, 53.

43a. Preface to “Milton Friedman’s extempore comments at the 1989 Hawaii conference: on India, Israel, Palestine, the USA, Debt and its uses, Erhardt abolishing exchange controls, Etc”,  May 22 1989, published here for the first time October 31 2008.

44. Milton Friedman’s defence of my work  in 1989.

45. Theodore W. Schultz’s defence of Philosophy of Economics

1990

46. “Letter to Judge Evelyn Lance: On A Case Study in Private International Law” (Due to be published here in 2010).

47-49. Selections from advisory work on economic policy etc for Rajiv Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament of India,  published in 47a-49a.

1991

41b Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, Paperback edition.

50. “Conversations and correspondence with Rajiv Gandhi during the Gulf war, January 1991”   (Due to be published here 2010).

47a. A Memo to Rajiv I:  Stronger Secular Middle”, The Statesman, Jul 31 1991.

48a “A Memo to Rajiv II: Saving India’s Prestige”, The Statesman, Aug 1 1991.

49a “A Memo to Rajiv III: Salvation in Penny Capitalism”, The Statesman, Aug 2 1991  47b-49b “Three Memoranda to Rajiv Gandhi 1990-91”, 2007 republication here.

51. “Constitution for a Second Indian Republic”, The Saturday Statesman, April 20 1991.  Republished here 2009.

52. “On the Art of Government: Experts, Party, Cabinet and Bureaucracy”, New Delhi mimeo March 25 1991, published here July 00 2009.

1992

53. Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & William E. James New Delhi, London, Newbury Park: Sage: 1992.   Citation: Milton and Rose Friedman Two Lucky People (Chicago 1998), pp. 268-269.

54. Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s Edited and with an Introduction by William E. James & Subroto Roy, Hawaii MS 1989, Sage: 1992, Karachi: Oxford 1993.

Reviews of 53 & 54 include: Bus. Today, Mar-Apr 1992; Political Studies March 1995; Econ Times 21 March 1993; Pakistan Development Review 1992. Hindustan Times 11 July 1992. Pacific Affairs 1993; Hindu 21 March 1993, 15 June 1993; Pakistan News International 12 June 1993. Book Reviews March 1993; Deccan Herald 2 May 1993; Pol.Econ.J. Ind. 1992. Fin Express 13 September 1992;  Statesman 16 Jan. 1993.  J. Royal Soc Asian Aff. 1994, J. Contemporary Asia, 1994 etc.

55. “Fundamental Problems of the Economies of India and Pakistan”, World Bank, Washington, mimeo  (Due to be published here 2010).

56.“The Road to Stagflation: The Coming Dirigisme in America, or, America, beware thy economists!, or Zen and Clintonomics,” Washington DC, Broad Branch Terrace, mimeo, November 17.

1993

57. “Exchange-rates and manufactured exports of South Asia”, IMF Washington DC mimeo.  Published in part in 2007-2008 as 58-62:

58. “Path of the Indian Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.

59.  “Path of the Pakistan Rupee 1947-1993”, 2008.

60. “Path of the Sri Lankan Rupee 1948-1993”, 2008.

61. “Path of the Bangladesh Taka 1972-1993”, 2008.

62. “India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Manufactured Exports, IMF Washington DC mimeo”, published 2007.

63. “Economic Assessment of US-India Merchandise Trade”, Arlington, Virginia, mimeo, published in slight part in Indo-US Trade & Economic Cooperation, ICRIER New Delhi, 1995, and in whole 2007.

64. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, mimeo, Arlington, Virginia, circulated in Washington DC 1993-1995, cf 82, 111 infra. Comment of Selig Harrison.

1994

65. “Comment on Indonesia”, in The Political Economy of Policy Reform edited by John Williamson, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

66a “Gold reserves & the gold price in anticipation of Central Bank behaviour”, Greenwich, Connecticut, mimeo. 67b. “Portfolio optimization and foreign currency exposure hedging” Greenwich, Connecticut mimeo.

1995

68. “On the logic and commonsense of debt and payments crises: How to avoid another Mexico in India and Pakistan”, Scarsdale, NY, mimeo, May 1.

69. “Policies for Young India”, Scarsdale, NY, pp. 350, manuscript.

1996

70. US Supreme Court documents, published in part in 2008 as  “Become a US Supreme Court Justice!” 70a, 70b (Due to be published in full here in 2010 as Roy vs University of Hawaii, 1989- including the expert testimonies of Milton Friedman and Theodore W Schultz.).

71. “Key problems of macroeconomic management facing the new Indian Government”, May 17.  Scarsdale, New York, mimeo.  (Due to be published here 2010).

72. “Preventing a collapse of the rupee”, IIT Kharagpur lecture July 16 1996.

73. “The Economist’s Representation of Technological Knowledge”, Vishleshlaya lecture to the Institution of Engineers, September 15 1996, IIT Kharagpur.

1997

74. “Union and State Budgets in India”, lecture at the World Bank, Washington DC, May 00.

75. “State Budgets in India”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, June 6.

1998

76. “Transparency and Economic Policy-Making:  An address to the Asia-Pacific Public Relations Conference” (panel on Transparency chaired by CR Irani) Jan 30 1998, published here 2008.

77. Theodore W. Schultz 1902-1998,  Feb 25.

78. “The Economic View of Human Resources”, address to a regional conference on human resources, IIT Kharagpur.

79.  “Management accounting”, lecture at Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy, Mussourie,

80a “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Jan 23 1998

81. “Recent Developments in Modern Finance”, IIM Bangalore Review, 10, 1 & 2, Jan.-Jun 1998. Reprinted as “From the Management Guru’s Classroom”: 81a “An introduction to derivatives”, Business Standard/Financial Times, Bombay 18 Apr 1999; 81b “Options in the future, Apr 25 1999; 81c “What is hedging?”, May 2 1999; 81d “Teaching computers to think”, May 9 1999.

82. “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir”, Jun 22 1998, lecture at Heritage Foundation, Washington DC.  Cf 111 Dec 2005.

83. “Sixteen Currencies for India: A Reverse Euro Model for Monetary & Fiscal Efficacy”, Lecture at the Institute of  Economic Affairs, London, June 29 1998.  Due to be published here 2010.

84. “Fable of the Fox, the Farmer, and the Would-Be Tailors”, October  (Published here July 27 2009).

85. “A Common Man’s Guide to Pricing Financial Derivatives”, Lecture to “National Seminar on Derivatives”, Xavier Labour Research Institute, Jamshedpur, Dec. 16 1998.   See 98.

1999

86. “An Analysis of Pakistan’s War-Winning Strategy: Are We Ready for This?”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo, published in part as 86a.“Was a Pakistani Grand Strategy Discerned in Time by India?” New Delhi:  Security & Political Risk Analysis Bulletin, July 1999, Kargil issue.  See also 000

80b. “The Original Reformer”, Outlook letters, Sep 13 1999.

2000

87. “On Freedom & the Scientific Point of View”, SN Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Feb 17 2000.  Cf 100 below.

88. “Liberalism and Indian economic policy”, lecture at IIM Calcutta,  Indian Liberal Group Meetings Devlali, Hyderabad; also Keynote address to UGC Seminar Guntur, March 30 2002.  (Due to be published here 2010).

89. “Towards a Highly Transparent Fiscal & Monetary Framework for India’s Union & State Governments”, Invited address to Conference of State Finance Secretaries, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, April 29, 2000.  Published 2008.

90. “On the Economics of Information Technology”, two lectures at the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, Nov 10-11, 2000.

91. Review of A New World by Amit Chaudhuri in Literary Criterion, Mysore.

2001

92. Review of AD Shroff: Titan of Finance and Free Enterprise by Sucheta Dalal, Freedom First., January.

93. “Encounter with Rajiv Gandhi: On the Origins of the 1991 Economic Reform”, Freedom First, October. See also 93a in 2005 and  93b in 2007.

94. “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, a keynote address to the Council for Asian Liberals & Democrats, Manila, Philippines, 16 Nov. 2001.  Published as 91a.

95. “The Case for and against The Satanic Verses: Diatribe and Dialectic as Art”, Dec 22 republished in print 95a The Statesman Festival Volume, 2006.

2002

94a “A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11”, in September 11 & Political Freedom in Asia, eds. Johannen, Smith & Gomez, Singapore 2002.

2002-2010

96. “Recording vivid dreams: Freud’s advice in exploring the Unconscious Mind” (Due to be published here in 2010).

2003

97. “Key principles of government accounting and audit”, IIT Kharagpur mimeo.

98. “Derivative pricing & other topics in financial theory: a student’s complete lecture notes” (Due to be published here in 2010).

2004

99. “Collapse of the Global Conversation”, International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Netherlands, Jul 2004.

100. “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”, a public lecture, University of Buckingham, UK, August 24 2004.  Published here 2007.

2005

93a Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform (this was the full story; it appeared in print for the first time in The Statesman Festival Volume 2007).

101. “Can India become an economic superpower (or will there be a monetary meltdown)?” Cardiff University Institute of Applied Macroeconomics Monetary Economics Seminar, April 13, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, April 27, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, Chief Economist’s Seminar on Monetary Economics, May 5.

102. Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant, Edited and with an Introduction by Subroto Roy & John Clarke, London & New York: Continuum, 2005; paperback 2006; French translation by Florian Bay, 2007.

103. “Iqbal & Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali in Pakistan’s Creation”, Dawn, Karachi, Sep 3.

104. “The Mitrokhin Archives II from an Indian Perspective: A Review Article”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 11 .

105. “After the Verdict”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 20.

106.   “US Espionage Failures”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 26

107.  “Waffle But No Models of Monetary Policy”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Oct 30.

108. “On Hindus and Muslims”, The Statesman, Perspective Page, Nov 6.

109. “Assessing Vajpayee: Hindutva True and False”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Nov  13-14″.

110. “Fiction from the India Economic Summit”, The Statesman, Front Page, Nov 29.

111. “Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason”, The Statesman Editorial Page

I.  “Give the Hurriyat et al Indian Green Cards”, Dec 1

II.  “Choice of Nationality under Full Information”, Dec 2

III.  “Of Flags and Consulates in Gilgit etc”, Dec 3.

2006

112. “The Dream Team: A Critique”, The Statesman Editorial Page

I : New Delhi’s Consensus (Manmohantekidambaromics), Jan 6

II: Money, Convertibility, Inflationary Deficit Financing, Jan 7

III:  Rule of Law, Transparency, Government Accounting, Jan 8.

113. “Unaccountable Delhi: India’s Separation of Powers’ Doctrine”, The Statesman, Jan 13.

114. “Communists and Constitutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 22.

115. “Diplomatic Wisdom”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 31.

116.  “Mendacity & the Government Budget Constraint”, The Statesman, Front Page  Feb 3.

117. “Of Graven Images”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb5.

118. “Separation of Powers, Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Pages Feb 12-13.

119. “Public Debt, Government Fantasy”, The Statesman, Front Page Editorial Comment, Feb 22.

120. “War or Peace Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 23-24.

121. “Can You Handle This Brief, Mr Chidambaram?” The Statesman, Front Page  Feb 26.

122. “A Downpayment On the Taj Mahal Anyone?”, The Statesman, Front Page  Comment on the Budget 2006-2007, Mar 1.

123. “Atoms for Peace (or War)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Mar 5.

124. “Imperialism Redux: Business, Energy, Weapons & Foreign Policy”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 14.

125.  “Logic of Democracy”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, Mar 30.

126. “Towards an Energy Policy”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 2.

127. “Iran’s Nationalism”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 6.

128. “A Modern Military”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 16.

129.  “On Money & Banking”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Apr 23.

130.  “Lessons for India from Nepal’s Revolution”, The Statesman, Front Page Apr 26.

131. “Revisionist Flattery (Inder Malhotra’s Indira Gandhi: A Review Article)”, The Sunday Statesman, May 7.

132. “Modern World History”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, May 7.

133. “Argumentative Indians: A Conversation with Professor Amartya Sen on Philosophy, Identity and Islam,” The Sunday Statesman,  May 14 2006.  “A Philosophical Conversation between Professor Sen and Dr Roy”,  2008.  Translated into Bengali by AA and published in 00.

134. “The Politics of Dr Singh”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, May 21.

135. “Corporate Governance & the Principal-Agent Problem”, lecture at a conference on corporate governance, Kolkata May 31.  Published here 2008.

136. “Pakistan’s Allies Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jun 4-5.

137. “Law, Justice and J&K Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 2, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 3.

138. “The Greatest Pashtun (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan)”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 16.

139. “Understanding Pakistan Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Jul 30, The Statesman Editorial Page Jul 31.

140.  “Indian Money and Credit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 6.

141.  “India’s Moon Mission”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page,  Aug 13.

142. “Jaswant’s Journeyings: A Review Article”, The Sunday Statesman Magazine, Aug 27.

143. “Our Energy Interests, Parts 1-2”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 27, The Statesman Editorial Page Aug 28.

144. “Is Balochistan Doomed?”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 3 2006.

145. “Racism New and Old”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Sep 8 2006

146. “Political Economy of India’s Energy Policy”, address to KAF-TERI conference, Goa Oct 7, published in 146a.

147. “New Foreign Policy? Seven phases of Indian foreign policy may be identifiable since Nehru”, Parts 1-2, The Sunday Statesman, Oct 8, The Statesman Oct 9.

148. “Justice & Afzal:  There is a difference between law and equity (or natural justice). The power of pardon is an equitable power. Commuting a death-sentence is a partial pardon”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 14

149. “Non-existent liberals (On a Liberal Party for India)”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Oct 22.

150. “History of Jammu & Kashmir Parts 1-2”,  The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29, The Statesman Oct 30, Editorial Page.

151. “American Democracy: Does America need a Prime Minister and a longer-lived Legislature?”, The Sunday Statesman Nov 5.

152. “Milton Friedman A Man of Reason 1912-2006”, The Statesman Perspective Page,  Nov 22.

153. “Postscript to Milton Friedman Mahalanobis’s Plan  (The Mahalanobis-Nehru “Second Plan”) The Statesman Front Page Nov 22.

154.  “Mob Violence and Psychology”, Dec 10,  The Statesman, Editorial Page.

155. “What To Tell Musharraf: Peace Is Impossible Without Non-Aggressive Pakistani Intentions”, The Statesman Editorial Page Dec 15.

156. “Land, Liberty and Value: Government must act in good faith treating all citizens equally – not favouring organised business lobbies and organised labour over an unorganised peasantry”,  The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Dec 31.

2007

157. “Hypocrisy of the CPI-M: Political Collapse In Bengal: A Mid-Term Election/Referendum Is Necessary”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Jan 9.

158. “On Land-Grabbing: Dr Singh’s India, Buddhadeb’s Bengal, Modi’s Gujarat have notorious US, Soviet and Chinese examples to follow ~ distracting from the country’s real economic problems,” The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Jan 14.

159. “India’s Macroeconomics:  Real growth has steadily occurred because India has shared the world’s technological progress. But bad fiscal, monetary policies over decades have led to monetary weakness and capital flight” The Statesman Editorial Page Jan 20.

160. “Fiscal Instability: Interest payments quickly suck dry every year’s Budget. And rolling over old public debt means that Government Borrowing in fact much exceeds the Fiscal Deficit”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 4.

161. “Our trade and payments Parts 1-2”  (“India in World Trade and Payments”),The Sunday Statesman, Feb 11 2007, The Statesman, Feb 12 2007.

162. “Our Policy Process: Self-Styled “Planners” Have Controlled India’s Paper Money For Decades,” The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 20.

163. “Bengal’s Finances”, The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 25.

164. “Fallacious Finance: Congress, BJP, CPI-M may be leading India to Hyperinflation” The Statesman Editorial Page Mar 5.

165. “Uttar Pradesh Polity and Finance: A Responsible New Govt May Want To Declare A Financial Emergency” The Statesman Editorial Page, Mar 24

166. “A scam in the making” in The Sunday Statesman Front Page Apr 1 2007, published here in full as “Swindling India”.

167. “Maharashtra’s Money: Those Who Are Part Of The Problem Are Unlikely To Be A Part Of Its Solution”, The Statesman Editorial Page Apr 24.

146a. “Political Economy of Energy Policy” in India and Energy Security edited by Anant Sudarshan and Ligia Noronha, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi 2007.

168.  “Presidential Qualities: Simplicity, Genuine Achievement Are Desirable; Political Ambition Is Not”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 8.

169. “We & Our Neighbours: Pakistanis And Bangladeshis Would Do Well To Learn From Sheikh Abdullah”, The Statesman, Editorial Page May 15.

170. “On Indian Nationhood: From Tamils To Kashmiris And Assamese And Mizos To Sikhs And Goans”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, May 25.

171. A Current Example of the Working of the Unconscious Mind, May 26.

172. Where I would have gone if I was Osama Bin Laden, May 31.

173. “US election ’08:America’s Presidential Campaign Seems Destined To Be Focussed On Iraq”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 1.

174. “Home Team Advantage: On US-Iran talks and Sunni-Shia subtleties: Tehran must transcend its revolution and endorse the principle that the House of Islam has many mansions”,  The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, June 3

175. “Unhealthy Delhi: When will normal political philosophy replace personality cults?”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 11.

176. “American Turmoil: A Vice-Presidential Coup – And Now a Grassroots Counterrevolution?”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, June 18

177.  “Political Paralysis: India has yet to develop normal conservative, liberal and socialist parties. The Nice-Housing-Effect and a little game-theory may explain the current stagnation”,  The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, June 24.

177. “Has America Lost? War Doctrines Of Kutusov vs Clausewitz May Help Explain Iraq War”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 3.

178. “Lal Masjid ≠ Golden Temple: Wide differences are revealed between contemporary Pakistan and India by these two superficially similar military assaults on armed religious civilians”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page July 15

179 “Political Stonewalling: Only Transparency Can Improve Institutions”, The Statesman, Editorial Page July 20.

180. “Gold standard etc: Fixed versus flexible exchange rates”, July 21.

181. “US Pakistan-India Policy: Delhi & Islamabad Still Look West In Defining Their Relationship”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, July 27.

182. “Works of DH Lawrence” July 30

183. “An Open Letter to Professor Amartya Sen about Singur etc”, The Statesman, Editorial Page,  July 31.

184.  “Martin Buber on Palestine and Israel (with Postscript)”, Aug 4.

185. “Auguste Rodin on Nature, Art, Beauty, Women and Love”,  Aug 7.

186. “Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 13.

187. Letter to Forbes.com  16 Aug.

188. “Need for Clarity: A poorly drafted treaty driven by business motives is a recipe for international misunderstanding”, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Aug 19.

189. “No Marxist MBAs? An amicus curiae brief for the Hon’ble High Court”,  The Statesman, FrontPage, Aug 29.

190. On Lawrence, Sep 4.

191. Dalai Lama’s Return: In the tradition of Gandhi, King, Mandela, Sep 11.

192. Of JC Bose, Patrick Geddes & the Leaf-World, Sep 12.

193. “Against Quackery: Manmohan and Sonia have violated Rajiv Gandhi’s intended reforms; the Communists have been appeased or bought; the BJP is incompetent  Parts 1-2”, in The Sunday Statesman and The Statesman, Editorial Pages of Sep 23-24.

194. Karl Georg Zinn’s 1994 Review of Philosophy of Economics, Sep 26.

195. DH Lawrence’s Phoenix, Oct 3.

93b. “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”, Statesman Festival Volume.

196. “Iran, America, Iraq: Bush’s post-Saddam Saddamism — one flip-flop too many?”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 16.

197. “Understanding China: The World Needs to Ask China to Find Her True Higher Self”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 22.

198. “India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, Oct 30.

199. “China’s India Aggression : German Historians Discover Logic Behind Communist Military Strategy”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, Nov 5.

200. Sonia’s Lying Courtier (with Postscript), Nov 25.

201. “Surrender or Fight? War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must?” The Statesman, Dec 4, Editorial Page.

202. Hutton and Desai: United in Error Dec 14

203. “China’s Commonwealth: Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang”,  The Statesman, Dec 17.

2008

204. “Nixon & Mao vs India: How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression. The Government of India should publish its official history of the 1962 war.”  The Sunday Statesman, Jan 6, The Statesman Jan 7  Editorial Page.

205. “Lessons from the 1962 War:  Beginnings of a solution to the long-standing border problem: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended”, The Sunday Statesman, January 13 2008.

206. “Our Dismal Politics: Will Independent India Survive Until 2047?”, The Statesman Editorial Page, Feb 1.

207. Median Voter Model of India’s Electorate Feb 7.

208. “Anarchy in Bengal: Intra-Left bandh marks the final unravelling of “Brand Buddha””, The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 10.

209. Fifty years since my third birthday: on life and death.

210. “Pakistan’s Kashmir obsession: Sheikh Abdullah Relied In Politics On The French Constitution, Not Islam”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 16.

211.  A Note on the Indian Policy Process  Feb 21.

212. “Growth & Government Delusion: Progress Comes From Learning, Enterprise, Exchange, Not The Parasitic State”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 22.

213.  “How to Budget: Thrift, Not Theft, Needs to Guide Our Public Finances”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, Feb 26.

214. “India’s Budget Process (in Theory)”, The Statesman, Front Page Feb 29.

215.  “Irresponsible Governance: Congress, BJP, Communists, BSP, Sena Etc Reveal Equally Bad Traits”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 4.

216. “American Politics: Contest Between Obama And Clinton Affects The World”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 11.

217. “China’s India Example: Tibet, Xinjiang May Not Be Assimilated Like Inner Mongolia And Manchuria”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, March 25.

218. “Taxation of India’s Professional Cricket: A Proposal”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 1.

219. “Two cheers for Pakistan!”,  The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 7.

220. “Indian Inflation: Upside Down Economics From The New Delhi Establishment Parts 1-2”, The Statesman, Editorial Page, April 15-16.

221. “Assessing Manmohan: The Doctor of Deficit Finance should realise the currency is at stake”, The Statesman, Editorial Page Apr 25.

222. John Wisdom, Renford Bambrough: Main Philosophical Works, May 8.

223.  “All India wept”: On the death of Rajiv Gandhi,  May 21.

224. “China’s force and diplomacy: The need for realism in India” The Statesman, Editorial Page May 31.

226. Serendipity and the China-Tibet-India border problem  June 6

227. “Leadership vacuum: Time & Tide Wait For No One In Politics: India Trails Pakistan & Nepal!”, The Statesman Editorial Page June 7.

228. My meeting Jawaharlal Nehru Oct13 1962

229.  Manindranath Roy 1891-1958

230. Surendranath Roy 1860-1929

231.  The Roys of Behala 1928.

232. Sarat Chandra visits Surendranath Roy 1927

233. Nuksaan-Faida Analysis = Cost-Benefit Analysis in Hindi/Urdu Jun 30

234.  One of many reasons John R Hicks was a great economist July 3

236.  My father, Indian diplomat, in the Shah’s Tehran 1954-57  July 8

237 Distribution of Govt of India Expenditure (Net of Operational Income) 1995 July 27

238. Growth of Real Income, Money & Prices in India 1869-2008, July 28.

239. Communism from Social Democracy? But not in India or China!  July 29

240. Death of Solzhenitsyn, Aug. 3

240a. Tolstoy on Science and Art, Aug 4.

241. “Reddy`s reckoning: Where should India’s real interest rate be relative to the world?” Business Standard Aug 10

242. “Rangarajan Effect”, Business Standard Aug 24

243. My grandfather’s death in Ottawa 50 years ago today  Sep 3

244. My books in the Library of Congress and British Library Sep 12

245. On Jimmy Carter & the “India-US Nuclear Deal”, Sep 12

246. My father after presenting his credentials to President Kekkonen of Finland Sep 14 1973.

247. “October 1929?  Not!”, Business Standard, Sep 18.

248. “MK Gandhi, SN Roy, MA Jinnah in March 1919: Primary education legislation in a time of protest”

249. 122 sensible American economists Sept 26

250. Govt of India: Please call in the BBC and ask them a question Sep 27

251. “Monetary Integrity and the Rupee:  Three British Raj relics have dominated our macroeconomic policy-making” Business Standard Sep 28.

252a.  Rabindranath’s daughter writes to her friend my grandmother Oct 5

252b.  A Literary Find: Modern Poetry in Bengal, Oct 6.

253. Sarat writes to Manindranath 1931,  Oct 12

254. Origins of India’s Constitutional Politics 1913

255. Indira Gandhi in Paris, 1971

256. How the Liabilities/Assets Ratio of Indian Banks Changed from 84% in 1970 to 108% in 1998, October 20

257a. My Subjective Probabilities on India’s Moon Mission Oct 21

258. Complete History of Mankind’s Moon Missions: An Indian Citizen’s Letter to ISRO’s Chairman, Oct 22.

259. Would not a few million new immigrants solve America’s mortgage crisis? Oct 26

260. “America’s divided economists”, Business Standard Oct 26

261. One tiny prediction about the Obama Administration, Nov 5

262. Rai Bahadur Umbika Churn Rai, 1827-1902,  Nov 7 2008

263. Jawaharlal Nehru invites my father to the Mountbatten Farewell  Nov 7 2008

70a. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America) Preface” Nov 9

70b. “Become a US Supreme Court Justice! (Explorations in the Rule of Law in America) Password protected.” Nov 9.

257b. Neglecting technological progress was the basis of my pessimism about Chandrayaan,  Nov 9.

264. Of a new New Delhi myth and the success of the University of Hawaii 1986-1992 Pakistan project Nov 15

265. Pre-Partition Indian Secularism Case-Study: Fuzlul Huq and Manindranath Roy Nov 16

266. Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists suppose Maulana Azad, Dr Zakir Hussain, Sheikh Abdullah were Pakistanis (or that Sheikh Mujib wanted to remain one)?  Nov 18

267. Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until this sad day, Nov 28.

268. In international law, Pakistan has been the perpetrator, India the victim of aggression in Mumbai,  Nov 30.

269. The Indian Revolution, Dec 1.

270. Habeas Corpus: a captured terrorist mass-murderer tells a magistrate he has not been mistreated by Mumbai’s police Dec 3

271. India’s Muslim Voices (Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent), Dec 4

272. “Anger Management” needed? An Oxford DPhil recommends Pakistan launch a nuclear first strike against India within minutes of war, Dec 5.

273. A Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough), Dec 6

274. Dr Rice finally gets it right (and maybe Mrs Clinton will too) Dec 7

275. Will the Government of India’s new macroeconomic policy dampen or worsen the business-cycle (if such a cycle exists at all)? No one knows! “Where ignorance is bliss, ‘Tis folly to be wise.”  Dec 7

276. Pump-priming for car-dealers: Keynes groans in his grave (If evidence was needed of the intellectual dishonesty of New Delhi’s new macroeconomic policy, here it is) Dec 9.

277. Congratulations to Mumbai’s Police: capturing a terrorist, affording him his Habeas Corpus rights, getting him to confess within the Rule of Law, sets a new world standard  Dec 10

278. Two cheers — wait, let’s make that one cheer — for America’s Justice Department, Dec 10

279. Will Pakistan accept the bodies of nine dead terrorists who came from Pakistan to Mumbai? If so, let there be a hand-over at the Wagah border, Dec 11.

280. Kasab was a stupid, ignorant, misguided youth, manufactured by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds into becoming a mass-murdering robot: Mahatma Gandhi’s India should punish him, get him to repent if he wishes, then perhaps rehabilitate him as a potent weapon against Pakistani terrorism Dec 12.

281. Pakistan’s New Delhi Embassy should ask for “Consular Access” to nine dead terrorists in a Mumbai morgue before asking to meet Kasab, Dec 13

282. An Indian Reply to President Zardari: Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationships Dec 19

283. Is my prediction about Caroline Kennedy becoming US Ambassador to Britain going to be correct?  Dec 27

284. Chandrayaan adds a little good cheer! Well done, ISRO!, Dec 28

285. How sad that “Slumdog millionaire” is SO disappointing! Dec 31

289. (with Claude Arpi) “Transparency & history: India’s archives must be opened to world standards” Business Standard New Delhi Dec 31, 2008, published here Jan 1 .

2009

290. A basis of India-Pakistan cooperation on the Mumbai massacres: the ten Pakistani terrorists started off as pirates and the Al-Huseini is a pirate ship Jan 1.

291. India’s “pork-barrel politics” needs a nice (vegetarian) Hindi name! “Teli/oily politics” perhaps? (And are we next going to see a Bill of Rights for Lobbyists?) Jan 3

292. My (armchair) experience of the 1999 Kargil war (Or, “Actionable Intelligence” in the Internet age: How the Kargil effort got a little help from a desktop)  Jan 5

293. How Jammu & Kashmir’s Chief Minister Omar Abdullah can become a worthy winner of the Nobel Peace Prize: An Open Letter,  Jan 7

294. Could the Satyam/PwC fraud be the visible part of an iceberg? Where are India’s “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”? Isn’t governance rather poor all over corporate India? Bad public finance may be a root cause Jan 8

295. Satyam does not exist: it is bankrupt, broke, kaput. Which part of this does the new “management team” not get? The assets belong to Satyam’s creditors. Jan 8

296. Jews are massacred in Mumbai and now Jews commit a massacre in Gaza!  Jan 9

297. And now for the Great Satyam Whitewash/Cover-Up/Public Subsidy! The wrong Minister appoints the wrong new Board who, probably, will choose the wrong policy Jan 12

298. Letter to Wei Jingsheng  Jan 14

299. Memo to the Hon’ble Attorneys General of Pakistan & India: How to jointly prosecute the Mumbai massacre perpetrators most expeditiously Jan 16

300. Satyam and IT-firms in general may be good candidates to become “Labour-Managed” firms Jan 18

301. “Yes we might be able to do that. Perhaps we ought to. But again, perhaps we ought not to, let me think about it…. Most important is Cromwell’s advice: Think it possible we may be mistaken!” Jan 20.

302. RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks Jan 25

303. Didn’t Dr Obama (the new American President’s late father) once publish an article in Harvard’s Quarterly Journal of Economics? (Or did he?) Jan 25.

304. “A Dialogue in Macroeconomics” 1989 etc: sundry thoughts on US economic policy discourse Jan 30

305. American Voices: A Brief Popular History of the United States in 20 You-Tube Music Videos Feb 5

306. Jaladhar Sen writes to Manindranath at Surendranath’s death, Feb 23

307. Pakistani expansionism: India and the world need to beware of “Non-Resident Pakistanis” ruled by Rahmat Ali’s ghost, Feb 9

308. My American years Part One 1980-90: battles for academic integrity & freedom Feb 11.

309. Thanks and well done Minister Rehman Malik and the Govt of Pakistan Feb 12

310. Can President Obama resist the financial zombies (let alone slay them)? His economists need to consult Dr Anna J Schwartz Feb 14

311. A Brief History of Gilgit, Feb 18

312. Memo to UCLA Geographers: Commonsense suggests Mr Bin Laden is far away from the subcontinent Feb 20

313. The BBC gets its history and geography deliberately wrong again Feb 21

314. Bengal Legislative Council 1921, Feb 28

315. Carmichael visits Surendranath, 1916, Mar 1

316. Memo to GoI CLB: India discovered the Zero, and 51% of Zero is still Zero Mar 10

317. An Academic Database of Doctoral & Other Postgraduate Research Done at UK Universities on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Other Asian Countries Over 100 Years, Mar 13

318. Pakistan’s progress, Mar 18

319. Risk-aversion explains resistance to free trade, Mar 19

320. India’s incredibly volatile inflation rate!  Mar 20

321. Is “Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona” referring to an emasculation of (elite) American society?,  Mar 21

322. Just how much intellectual fraud can Delhi produce? Mar 26

323. India is not a monarchy! We urgently need to universalize the French concept of “citoyen”!  Mar 28

324. Could this be the real state of some of our higher education institutions? Mar 29

325. Progress! The BBC retracts its prevarication! Mar 30

326. Aldous Huxley’s Essay “DH Lawrence” Mar 31

327. Waffle not institutional reform is what (I predict) the “G-20 summit” will produce, April 1

328. Did a full cricket team of Indian bureaucrats follow our PM into 10 Downing Street? Count for yourself! April 3

329. Will someone please teach the BJP’s gerontocracy some Economics 101 on an emergency basis?  April 5

330. The BBC needs to determine exactly where it thinks Pakistan is!, April 5

331. Alfred Lyall on Christians, Muslims, India, China, Etc, 1908, April 6

332. An eminent economist of India passes away April 9

333. Democracy Database for the Largest Electorate Ever Seen in World History, April 12

334. Memo to the Election Commission of India April 14 2009, 9 AM, April 14

335. Caveat emptor! Satyam is taken over, April 14

336. India’s 2009 General Elections: Candidates, Parties, Symbols for Polls on 16-30 April Phases 1,2,3, April 15

337. On the general theory of expertise in democracy: reflections on what emerges from the American “torture memos” today, April 18

338. India’s 2009 General Elections: 467 constituencies (out of 543) for which candidates have been announced as of 1700hrs April 21, April 21

339. Apropos Philosophy of Economics, Comments of Sidney Hook, KJ Arrow, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, SS Alexander, Max Black, Renford Bambrough, John Gray et al., April 22.

340. India’s 2009 General Elections: Names of all 543 Constituencies of the 15th Lok Sabha, April 22.

341. India’s 2009 General Elections: How 4125 State Assembly Constituencies comprise the 543 new Lok Sabha Constituencies, April 23.

342. Why has America’s “torture debate” yet to mention the obvious? Viz., sadism and racism, April 24

343. India’s 2009 General Elections: the advice of the late “George Eliot” (Mary Ann Evans, 1819-1880) to India’s voting public, April 24.

344. India’s 2009 General Elections: Delimitation and the Different Lists of 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies in 2009 and 2004, April 25

345. Is “Slumdog Millionaire” the single worst Best Picture ever?

346. India’s 2009 General Elections: Result of Delimitation — Old (2004) and New (2009) Lok Sabha and Assembly Constituencies, April 26

347. India’s 2009 General Elections: 7019 Candidates in 485 (out of 543) Constituencies announced as of April 26 noon April 26

348. What is Christine Fair referring to? Would the MEA kindly seek to address what she has claimed asap? April 27

349. Politics can be so entertaining 🙂 Manmohan versus Sonia on the poor old CPI(M)!, April 28

350. A Dozen Grown-Up Questions for Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, LK Advani, Sharad Pawar, Km Mayawati and Anyone Else Dreaming of Becoming/Deciding India’s PM After the 2009 General Elections, April 28

351. India’s 2009 General Elections: How drastically will the vote-share of political parties change from 2004? May 2

352. India’s 2009 General Elections: And now finally, all 8,070 Candidates across all 543 Lok Sabha Constituencies, May 5

353. India’s 2009 General Elections: The Mapping of Votes into Assembly Segments Won into Parliamentary Seats Won in the 2004 Election, May 7

354. Will Messrs Advani, Rajnath Singh & Modi ride into the sunset if the BJP comes to be trounced? (Corrected), May 10

355. India’s 2009 General Elections: 543 Matrices to Help Ordinary Citizens Audit the Election Commission’s Vote-Tallies  May 12

356. Well done Sonia-Rahul! Two hours before polls close today, I am willing to predict a big victory for you (but, please, try to get your economics right, and also, you must get Dr Singh a Lok Sabha seat if he is to be PM) May 13

357. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee must dissolve the West Bengal Assembly if he is an honest democrat: Please try to follow Gerard Schröder’s example even slightly! May 16

358. India’s 2009 General Elections: Provisional Results from the EC as of 1400 hours Indian Standard Time May 16

359. Memo to the Hon’ble President of India: It is Sonia Gandhi, not Manmohan Singh, who should be invited to our equivalent of the “Kissing Hands” Ceremony May 16

360. Time for heads to roll in the BJP/RSS and CPI(M)!, May 17.

361. Inviting a new Prime Minister of India to form a Government: Procedure Right and Wrong  May 18

362. Starting with Procedural Error: Why has the “Cabinet” of the 14th Lok Sabha been meeting today AFTER the results of the Elections to the 15th Lok Sabha have been declared?!  May 18

363. Why has the Sonia Congress done something that the Congress under Nehru-Indira-Rajiv would not have done, namely, exaggerate the power of the Rajya Sabha and diminish the power of the Lok Sabha? May 21

364. Shouldn’t Dr Singh’s Cabinet begin with a small apology to the President of India for discourtesy? May we have reviews and reforms of protocols and practices to be followed at Rashtrapati Bhavan and elsewhere?  May 23

365. Parliament’s sovereignty has been diminished by the Executive: A record for future generations to know May 25

366. How tightly will organised Big Business be able to control economic policies this time? May 26

367. Why does India not have a Parliament ten days after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected? Nehru and Rajiv would both have been appalled May 27

368. Eleven days and counting after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected and still no Parliament of India! (But we do have 79 Ministers — might that be a world record?) May 28

369. Note to Posterity: 79 Ministers in office but no 15th Lok Sabha until June 1 2009! May 29

370. Silver Jubilee of Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India May 29

371. How to Design a Better Cabinet for the Government of India May 29

372. Parliament is supposed to control the Government, not be bullied or intimidated by it: Will Rahul Gandhi be able to lead the Backbenches in the 15th Lok Sabha? June 1

373. Mistaken Macroeconomics: An Open Letter to Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, June 12

374. Why did Manmohan Singh and LK Advani apologise to one another? Is Indian politics essentially collusive, not competitive, aiming only to preserve and promote the post-1947 Dilli Raj at the expense of the whole of India? We seem to have no Churchillian repartee (except perhaps from Bihar occasionally) June 18

375. Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer Are Iran’s Revolutionaries now Reactionaries? George Orwell would have understood. A fresh poll may be the only answer  June 22

376. My March 25 1991 memo to Rajiv (which never reached him) is something the present Government seems to have followed: all for the best of course! July 12

377. Disquietude about France’s behaviour towards India on July 14 2009 July 14

378. Does the Govt. of India assume “foreign investors and analysts” are a key constituency for Indian economic policy-making? If so, why so? Have Govt. economists “learnt nothing, forgotten everything”? Some Bastille Day thoughts July 14

379. Letter to the GoI’s seniormost technical economist, May 21.July 19

380. Excuse me but young Kasab in fact confessed many months ago, immediately after he was captured – he deserves 20 or 30 years in an Indian prison, and a chance to become a model prisoner who will stand against the very terrorists who sent him on his vile mission  July 20

381. Finally, three months late, the GoI responds to American and Pakistani allegations about Balochistan July 24

382.  Thoughts, words, deeds: My work 1973-2010

M1. Map of Asia c. 1900

M2. Map of Chinese Empire c. 1900

M3. Map of Sinkiang, Tibet and Neighbours 1944

M4. China’s Secretly Built 1957 Road Through India’s Aksai Chin

M5. Map of Kashmir to Sinkiang 1944

M6. Map of India-Tibet-China-Mongolia 1959

M7. Map of India, Afghanistan, Russia, China, 1897

M8. Map of Xinjiang/Sinkiang/E Turkestan

M9. Map of Bombay/Mumbai 1909

M10-M13. Himalayan Expedition, West Sikkim 1970 – 1,2,3,4

Schoolboys exchanging fisticuffs in a school playground or elderly men battling over power and policy? Why did Manmohan Singh and LK Advani apologize to one another? Is Indian politics essentially collusive, not competitive, aiming only to preserve and promote the post-1947 Dilli Raj at the expense of the whole of India? We seem to have no Churchillian repartee (except perhaps from Bihar occasionally)

Yesterday the PM is reported to have been asked by someone travelling on his aeroplane from Moscow “whether he had forgiven Advani for calling him a ‘weak Prime Minister’”.

The question was absurd, almost ridiculous, typical of our docile ingratiating rather juvenile English-language press and media, as if any issue of forgiveness arises at all about what one politician says during an election campaign about another politician’s performance in office.

Dr Manmohan Singh’s answer was surprising too: “I was compelled to reply to what Advani said…On May 16 when (Advani) telephoned me, he told me that he was hurt by some of my statements. He said he was hurt and regretted his statements… I apologised to him if I have hurt him. I am looking forward to a close relationship with the Leader of the Opposition.”

So LK Advani appears to have apologised to Manmohan Singh and Manmohan Singh to LK Advani for what they said about each other during the recent general election campaign! What is going on? Were they schoolboys exchanging fisticuffs in a school playground or elderly men battling over power and policy in modern Indian politics?

What would we have done if there was a Churchill in Indian politics today – hurling sarcastic insults at domestic opponents and foreign leaders while guiding a nation on its right course during turbulent times?

Churchill once famously said his parents had not shown him “The Boneless Wonder” in PT Barnum’s circus because it was too horrible a sight but now he had finally seen such a “Boneless Wonder” in his opponent on the Treasury Benches, namely, Ramsay MacDonald. Of the same opponent he said later “He has the gift of compressing the largest number of words into the smallest amount of thought”.

When accused of being drunk by a woman MP he replied “And you are very ugly, but tomorrow I’ll be sober”. Today’s politically correct world would scream at far less. Field Marshall Montgomery told Churchill, “I neither drink nor smoke and am 100% fit,” to which Churchill replied, “I drink and smoke and I am 200% fit”. That too would be politically incorrect today.

Churchill described Prime Minister Clement Attlee as “a modest man with much to be modest about”; also about Attlee: “If any grub is fed on Royal Jelly it turns into a Queen Bee”. Yet Attlee had enough dignity and self-knowledge and self-confidence to brush it all off and instead respect and praise him. In the 1954 volume Winston Spencer Churchill Servant of Crown and Commonwealth Attlee added his own tribute to his great opponent: “I recall…the period when he was at odds with his own party and took a seat on the Bench below the Gangway on the Government side. Here he was well placed to fire on both parties. I remember describing him as a heavily armed tank cruising in No Man’s Land. Very impressive were the speeches he delivered as the international horizon grew darker. He became very unpopular with the predominant group in his own party, but he never minded fighting a lone battle.”

Stanley Baldwin, who as PM first appointed Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, once said “There comes Winston with his hundred horsepower mind”. Yet Churchill was to later say harshly “I wish Stanley Baldwin no ill, but it would have been much better had he never lived.”

Of Lenin, Churchill said, he was “transported in a sealed truck like a plague bacillus from Switzerland into Russia”. Of Molotov: “I have never seen a human being who more perfectly represented the modern concept of a robot.” Of Hitler, “If [he] invaded hell I would at least make a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons”. Of De Gaulle, “He was a man without a country yet he acted as if he was head of state”.” Of John Foster Dulles, “[He] is the only bull who carries his china shop with him”. Of Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to the USSR, “…a lunatic in a country of lunatics”; and also “There but for the Grace of God, goes God”.

Decades later, that great neo-Churchillian Margaret Thatcher was on the receiving end of a vast amount of sarcasm. “President Mitterrand once famously remarked that Thatcher had ‘the eyes of Caligula and the lips of Marilyn Monroe’. Rather less flatteringly, Dennis Healey described her as Attila the Hen. She probably took both descriptions as compliments.” (Malcolm Rifkind in Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant edited by Subroto Roy and John Clarke, 2005).

Politics is, and should be, grown up stuff because it deals with human lives and national destinies, and really, if you can’t take the heat please do not enter the kitchen. The slight Churchillian sarcasm that does arise within modern Indian politics comes very occasionally from Bihar but nowhere else, e.g. about the inevitability of aloo in samosas and of bhaloos in the jungle but no longer of Laloo being in the seat of power. In general, everyone seems frightfully sombre and self-important though may be in fact short of self-knowledge and hence self-confidence.

What had Manmohan Singh said about LK Advani that he felt he had to apologise for? That Advani had no substantial political achievement to his credit and did not deserve to be India’s PM. Manmohan was not alone in making the charge – Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi and numerous other spokesmen and representatives of their party said the same. Has Manmohan’s apology to Advani been one on behalf of the whole Congress Party itself?

Was Advani’s apology to Manmohan one on behalf of the whole BJP too?

What had the BJP charged Manmohan with that Advani felt he had to apologise for?  Being a “weak PM”.

Hmmm. Frankly, thinking about it, it is hard to count who has not been weak as a PM in India’s modern history.

Certainly Vallabhai Patel as a kind of co-PM was decisive and far from weak back in 1947-48.

Lal Bahadur Shastri was not weak when he told Pakistan that a Pakistani attack on Kashmir would result in an Indian attack on Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi was not weak when she resisted the Yahya Khan-Tikka Khan tyranny against Bangladesh.

Had he not been assassinated, Rajiv Gandhi in a second term would have been decisive and not weak in facing up to and tackling the powerful lobbies and special interest groups that have crippled our domestic economic policy for decades.

But the number of such examples may be counted by hand.  Perhaps VP Singh might count, riding in an open jeep to Amritsar, as might AB Vajpayee’s Pokhran II and travelling on a bus to Lahore. In general, the BJP’s charge that Manmohan was “weak” may have constructively led to serious discussion in the country about the whole nature of the Prime Ministership in modern India, which means raising a whole gamut of issues about Indian governance – about India being the softest of “soft states”, with the softest of “soft government budget constraints” (i.e., endless deficit finance and paper money creation) etc.

Instead, what we have had thus far is apologies being exchanged for no real political reason between the leaderships of the Government and the Opposition. If two or three sellers come to implicitly carve up a market between themselves they are said by economic theory to be colluding rather than being in competition. Indian politics may be revealing such implicit collusive behaviour. The goal of this political oligopoly would seem to be to preserve and promote the status quo of the post-1947 Dilli Raj with its special hereditary nomenclatura, at the expense of anonymous diffused teeming India.

Subroto Roy

Postscript July 15 2009: Churchill’s mature opinion of Baldwin was one of the fullest praise at the 20 May 1950 unveiling of a memorial to him.  See his In the Balance, edited by Randolph S Churchill, 1951, p. 281

Parliament is supposed to control the Government, not be bullied or intimidated by it: Will Rahul Gandhi be able to lead the Backbenches in the 15th Lok Sabha?

Any Lok Sabha MP who neither sits with the Opposition nor is a sworn-in member of the Government is a Backbench MP of the Government party or its coalition.

Shrimati Sonia Gandhi is the most prominent of such Backbench MPs in the 15th Lok Sabha, just as she was of the 14th Lok Sabha, and has chosen to be in a most peculiar position from the point of view of parliamentary law. As the leader of the largest parliamentary party, she could have been not merely a member of the Government but its Prime Minister. She has in fact had a decisive role in determining the composition of the Manmohan Government as well as its policies. She in fact sits on the Frontbenches in the Lok Sabha along with the Manmohan Government. But she is not a member of the Government and is, formally speaking, a Backbench MP who is choosing to sit in the Frontbenches.

(Dr Manmohan Singh himself, not being a member of the Lok Sabha, may, formally speaking, sit or speak from among the Frontbenches of his own Government only by invitation of the Lok Sabha Speaker as a courtesy – such would have been the cardinal reason why Alec Douglas-Home resigned from being Lord Home and instead stood for a House of Commons seat when he was appointed British Prime Minister.)

Sonia Gandhi’s son, Mr Rahul Gandhi, is also a Backbench MP. From all accounts, including that of Dr Singh himself, he could have been a member of Dr Singh’s Government but has specifically chosen not to be. He has appeared to have had some much lesser role than Sonia Gandhi in determining the composition of the Government and its policies but he is not a member of it. He is, formally speaking, a Backbench MP, indeed the most prominent to actually sit in the Backbenches, as he had done in the 14th Lok Sabha, which, it is to be hoped, he does in the 15th Lok Sabha too.

Now Rahul Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi and their 541 other fellow 15th Lok Sabha MPs were declared winners by May 16 2009 having won the Indian people’s vote.

(Incidentally, I predicted the outcome here two hours before polls closed on May 13 – how I did so is simply by having done the necessary work of determining that some 103 million people had voted for Congress in 2004 against some 86 million for the BJP; in my assessment Congress had done more than enough by way of political rhetoric and political reality to maintain if not extend that difference in 2009, i.e., the BJP had not done nearly enough to even begin to get enough of a net drift in its favour. I expect when the data are out it shall be seen that the margin of the raw vote between them has been much enlarged from 2004.)

As I have pointed out here over the last fortnight, there was no legal or logical reason why the  whole 15th Lok Sabha could not have been sworn in latest by May 18 2009.

Instead, Dr Manmohan Singh on May 18 held a purported “Cabinet” meeting of the defunct 14th Lok Sabha – an institution that had been automatically dissolved when Elections had been first announced! The Government then went about forming itself over two weeks despite the 15th Lok Sabha, on whose confidence it depended for its political legitimacy, not having been allowed to meet. Everyone – the Congress Party’s Supreme Court advocates, the Lok Sabha Secretariat, the Election Commission, Rashtrapati Bhavan too –  seems to have gotten it awfully wrong by placing the cart before the horse.

In our system it is Parliament that is sovereign, not the Executive Government. In fact the Executive is accountable to Parliament, specifically the Lok Sabha, and is supposed to be guided by it as well as hold its confidence at all times.

What has happened instead this time is that Government ministers have been busy taking oaths and entering their offices and making policy-decisons days before they have taken their oaths and their seats as Lok Sabha MPs!  The Government has thus started off by diminishing Parliament’s sovereignty and this should not be allowed to happen again.

(Of course why it took place is because of the peculiarity of the victory relative to our experience in recent decades – nobody could remember parliamentary traditions from Nehru’s time in the 1950s.  Even so, someone, e.g. the former Speaker, should have known and insisted upon explaining the relevant aspect of parliamentary law and hence avoided this breach.)

A central question now is whether a Government which has such a large majority, and which is led by someone in and has numerous ministers from the Rajya Sabha, is going to be adequately controlled and feel itself accountable to the Lok Sabha.

Neither of the Lok Sabha’s most prominent Backbenchers, Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi, have thus far distinguished themselves as Parliamentarians on the floor of the Lok Sabha. In the 14th Lok Sabha, Sonia Gandhi, sitting in the Frontbenches, exercised the  enormous control that she did over the Government not on the floor of the House itself but  from outside it.

It would be best of all if she chose in the 15th Lok Sabha to actually physically sit in the Congress’s Backbenches because that would ensure best that the Government Party’s ministers in the Frontbenches will keep having to seek to be accountable to the  Backbenches!

But this seems unlikely to happen in view of the fact she herself seems to have personally influenced the choice of a Speaker for the 15th Lok Sabha and it may be instead expected that she continues to sit on the Frontbenches with the Government without being a member of it.

That leaves Rahul Gandhi. If he too comes to be persuaded by the sycophants to sit on the Frontbenches with the Government, that will not be a healthy sign.

On the other hand, if he continues to sit on the Backbenches, he may be able to have a salubrious influence on the 15th Lok Sabha fulfilling its responsibility of seeking to seriously control and hold accountable the Executive Government,  and not be bullied or intimidated by it. His paternal grandfather, Feroze Gandhi, after all, may have been India’s most eminent and effective Backbench MP yet.

Subroto Roy, Kolkata

Eleven days and counting after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected and still no Parliament of India! (But we do have 79 Ministers — might that be a world record?)

A lawyer friend tells me she thinks it a “technicality” that there is no Lok Sabha or Parliament in India today despite eleven long days and nights having passed since the 15th Lok Sabha came to be elected by the people of India.  “At least we did not get Advani and Modi to rule”, is how she sought to justify the current circumstance.   I am afraid I think she has produced a non sequitur, and also forgotten the constitutional law she would have read as a student.

The best argument that I think the Government of India shall be able to give justifying their legal error in not having the 15th Lok Sabha up and running yet 11 days after India’s people have spoken would run something like this:

(1) The President of India invites a Council of Ministers led by a PM to form the government and has done so.

(2) The President must be satisfied that the PM commands a majority in the Lok Sabha, and the President has been satisfied by the 322  “letters of support” that the PM produced.

(3) The Government of the day calls parliamentary sessions and does so at its discretion, and the Government of the day headed by this PM has announced when it shall call the 15th Lok Sabha which will be in a few days yet.

Any such argument, I am afraid, would be specious because it simply puts the cart before the horse.

Parliament is sovereign in India, to repeat what I have said several times before.

Parliament is sovereign in India — not even the President who is the symbol of that sovereignty.  We do not follow the British quite exactly in this because we are a republic and not a monarchy.  In Britain sovereignty rests with “The King in Parliament”.  With us, Parliament is sovereign and the President is the symbol of that sovereignty.  In all matters of state, our President must act in a manner that Parliament and parliamentary law says.

Parliament is sovereign in India — not the Executive Government, certainly not its largest political party or its leader.

Parliament is sovereign in India because the people of India have chosen it to be so within the Constitution of India.

Parliament is sovereign in India and the people of India have elected the 15th Lok Sabha which has still not been allowed to meet eleven days later.

To the contrary, as noted days ago, the purported “Cabinet” of the 14th Lok Sabha, a dead institution, met on May 18 2009, some 48 hours after the 15th Lok Sabha had already been declared!   The 14th Lok Sabha in fact stood automatically dissolved in law when General Elections came to be announced.

Is all this merely a “technicality” as my friend believes?  I think not.

Executive Government in India derives its political legitimacy from being elected  by Parliament,  i.e., from holding the confidence of Parliament, and that means the Lok Sabha.

The Government of the day might  for sake of convenience have a prerogative of calling sessions of the 15th Lok Sabha once it has been constituted but the Government of the day cannot logically constitute a Lok Sabha after a General Election because it itself receives legitimacy from such a Lok Sabha.

If the 15th Lok Sabha has not met, confidence in any Executive has yet to be recorded, and hence any such Government has yet to receive legitimacy.

Do “322 letters of support” suffice?  Hardly.  They are signed after all by persons who have yet to take their seats in the Lok Sabha!  (Let us leave aside the fact that the PM, not being a member of the Lok Sabha, is in this case unable to be one of those 322 himself!)

Yet we have 79 “Ministers” of this new “Government” holding press-conferences and giving out free-bees and favours etc already.  As I have said before, Ambedkar, Nehru and others of their generation, plus Indira and Rajiv too, would all have been appalled.

Because the incompetence of the fascists and communists in the Opposition may continue to  be expected, it will be up to ordinary citizens and voters of India to point out such  simple truths whenever the Emperor is found to be naked.  (Our docile juvenile ingratiating media may well remain mostly hopeless.)

Subroto Roy

Why does India not have a Parliament ten days after the 15th Lok Sabha was elected? Nehru and Rajiv would both have been appalled (2009)

see too

Why has the Sonia Congress done something that the Congress under Nehru-Indira-Rajiv would not have done, namely, exaggerate the power of the Rajya Sabha and diminish the power of the Lok Sabha?

There are at least three Supreme Court lawyers, all highly voluble, among the higher echelons of Congress Party politicians; it is surprising that not one of them has been able to get the top Party leadership of Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh to see the apparent breach of normal constitutional law in Parliament not having met more than 10 days after it was elected.

A Government has been formed, Ministers have entered their offices and have been holding press-conferences and taking executive decisions,  wannabe-Ministers continue to be wrangling night-and-day for the plums of office — BUT THERE IS NO PARLIAMENT!

Today is the death-anniversary of Jawaharlal Nehru and last week was the death anniversary of  Rajiv Gandhi.

Nehru, whatever his faults and infirmities, was an outstanding parliamentarian and a believer in the Westminster model in particular.  He was intimately familiar with its  unpoken customs and unwritten laws.   He would have been completely appalled by the situation today where luminaries of the party that goes by the  same name as the one he had led are paying obeisance to his memory 45 years after his death but have failed to see the absurdity in having a Government in office with no new Parliament ten days after a month-long General Election was over!  (Incidentally, had he not left explicit instructions against any hero-worship  taking place of himself too?)

Rajiv knew his grandfather and had acquired a sense of noblesse oblige from him.  He too would have been appalled that the procedural business of government  had been simply  procrastinated over like this.

It surprises me that Dr Manmohan Singh, having been a post-graduate of Cambridge, having earned a doctorate from Oxford, and more recently having been awarded honorary doctorates from both Ancient Universities, should seem so unaware of the elements of the Westminster model of  constitutional jurisprudence which guides our polity too.

It is too late now and the mistakes have been made.   I hope his  new Government will  come to realise at some point and then keep in mind that our Executive receives political legitimacy from Parliament, not vice versa.   An Executive can hardly be legitimately in office until the  Parliament that is supposed to elect it has been sworn in.

As for our putative Opposition in the Parliament-yet-to-meet, it seems to have drawn a blank too, and eo ipso revealed its own constitutional backwardness and lethargy.

Subroto Roy

How tightly will organised Big Business be able to control economic policies this time?

The power of organised Big Business over New Delhi’s economic policies (whether Congress-led or BJP-led) was signalled by the presence in the audience at Rashtrapati Bhavan last week of several prominent lobbyists when Dr Manmohan Singh and his senior-most Cabinet colleagues were being sworn-in by the President of India. Why were such witnesses needed at such an auspicious national occasion?

Organised Big Business (both private sector and public sector) along with organised Big Labour (whose interests are represented most ably by New Delhi’s official communist parties like the CPI-M and CPI), are astutely aware of how best to advance their own economic interests; this usually gets assisted nicely enough through clever use of our comprador English-language TV, newspaper and magazine media. Shortly after the election results, lobbyists were all over commercial TV proposing things like FDI in insurance and airports etc– as if that was the meaning of the Sonia-Rahul mandate or were issues of high national priority. A typical piece of such “pretend-economics” appears in today’s business-press from a formerly Leftist Indian bureaucrat: “With its decisive victory, the new Manmohan Singh government should at last be able to implement the required second generation reforms. Their lineaments (sic) are well known and with the removal of the Left’s veto, many of those stalled in the legislature as well as those which were forestalled can now be implemented. These should be able to put India back on a 9-10 per cent per annum growth rate…”

Today’s business-press also reports that the new Government is planning to create a fresh “Disinvestment Ministry” and Dr Singh’s chief economic policy aide is “a frontrunner among the names short-listed to head the new ministry” with Cabinet rank.

Now if any enterprising doctoral student was to investigate the question, I think the evidence would show that I, and I alone – not even BR Shenoy or AD Shroff or Jagdish Bhagwati — may have been the first among Indian economists to have argued in favour of the privatisation of India’s public sector. I did so precisely 25 years ago in Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India, which was so unusual for its time that it attracted the lead editorial of The Times of London on the day it was published May 29 1984, and had its due impact on Indian economic policy then and since, as has been described elsewhere here.  In 1990-1991 while with Rajiv Gandhi, I had floated an idea of literally giving away shares of the public sector to the public that owned it (as several other countries had been doing at that time), specifically perhaps giving them to the poorest panchayats in aid of their development.  In 2004-2005, upon returning to Britain after many years, I helped create the book Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant, and Margaret Thatcher if anyone was a paragon of privatisation.

That being said, I have to say I think a new Indian policy of creating a Ministry to privatise India’s public sector is probably a very BAD idea indeed in present circumstances — mainly because it will be driven by the interests of the organised Big Business lobbies that have so profoundly and subtly been able to control the New Delhi Government’s behaviour in recent decades.

Such lobbyist control is exercised often without the Government even realising or comprehending its parameters. For example, ask yourself: Is there any record anywhere of Dr Manmohan Singh, in his long career as a Government economist and then as a Rajya Sabha MP, having ever proposed before 2004-2005 that nuclear reactors were something vitally important to India’s future? And why do you suppose the most prominent Indian business lobby spent a million dollars and registered itself as an official lobbyist in Washington DC to promote the nuclear deal among American legislators? Because Big Business was feeling generous and altruistic towards the “energy security” of the ordinary people of India? Hardly.  Indian Big Business calculates and acts in its own interests, as is only to be expected under economic assumptions; those interests are frequently camouflaged by their lobbyist and media friends into seeming to be economic policy for the country as a whole.

Now our Government every year produces paper rupees and bank deposits in  practically unlimited amounts to pay for its practically unlimited deficit financing, and it has behaved thus over decades. Why we do not hear about this at all is because the most prominent Government economists themselves remain clueless — sometimes by choice, mostly by sheer ignorance — about the nature of the macroeconomic process that they are or have been part of.  (See my  “India’s Macroeconomics”, “The Dream Team: A Critique” etc elsewhere here). As for the Opposition’s economists, the less said about the CPI-M’s economists the better while the BJP, poor thing, has absolutely no economists at all!

Briefly speaking, Indian Big Business has acquired an acute sense of this long-term nominal/paper expansion of India’s economy, and as a result acts towards converting wherever possible its own hoards of paper rupees and rupee-denominated assets into more valuable portfolios for itself of real or durable assets, most conspicuously including hard-currency denominated assets, farm-land and urban real-estate, and, now, the physical assets of the Indian public sector. Such a path of trying to transform local domestic paper assets – produced unlimitedly by Government monetary and fiscal policy and naturally destined to depreciate — into real durable assets, is a privately rational course of action to follow in an inflationary economy.  It is not rocket-science  to realise the long-term path of the Indian rupee is downwards in comparison to the hard-currencies of the world – just compare our money supply growth and inflation rates with those of the rest of the world.

The Statesman of November 15 2006 had a lead editorial titled Government’s land-fraud: Cheating peasants in a hyperinflation-prone economy. It said:

“There is something fundamentally dishonourable about the way the Centre, the state of West Bengal and other state governments are treating the issue of expropriating peasants, farm-workers, petty shop-keepers etc of their small plots of land in the interests of promoters, industrialists and other businessmen. Singur may be but one example of a phenomenon being seen all over the country: Hyderabad, Karnataka, Kerala, Haryana, everywhere. So-called “Special Economic Zones” will merely exacerbate the problem many times over. India and its governments do not belong only to business and industrial lobbies, and what is good for private industrialists may or may not be good for India’s people as a whole. Economic development does not necessarily come to be defined by a few factories or high-rise housing complexes being built here or there on land that has been taken over by the Government, paying paper-money compensation to existing stakeholders, and then resold to promoters or industrialists backed by powerful political interest-groups on a promise that a few thousand new jobs will be created. One fundamental problem has to do with inadequate systems of land-description and definition, implementation and recording of property rights. An equally fundamental problem has to do with fair valuation of land owned by peasants etc. in terms of an inconvertible paper-money. Every serious economist knows that “land” is defined as that specific factor of production and real asset whose supply is fixed and does not increase in response to its price. Every serious economist also knows that paper-money is that nominal asset whose price can be made to catastrophically decline by a massive increase in its supply, i.e. by Government printing more of the paper it holds a monopoly to print. For Government to compensate people with paper-money it prints itself by valuing their land on the basis of an average of the price of the last few years, is for Government to cheat them of the fair present-value of the land. That present-value of land must be calculated in the way the present-value of any asset comes to be calculated, namely, by summing the likely discounted cash-flows of future values. And those future values should account for the likelihood of a massive future inflation causing decline in the value of paper-money in view of the fact we in India have a domestic public debt of some Rs. 30 trillion (Rs. 30 lakh crore) and counting, and money supply growth rates averaging 16-17% per annum. In fact, a responsible Government would, given the inconvertible nature of the rupee, have used foreign exchange or gold as the unit of account in calculating future-values of the land. India’s peasants are probably being cheated by their Government of real assets whose value is expected to rise, receiving nominal paper assets in compensation whose value is expected to fall.”

Mamata Banerjee started her famous protest fast-unto-death in Kolkata not long afterwards, riveting the nation’s attention in the winter of 2006-2007.

What goes for the government buying land on behalf of its businessman friends also goes, mutatis mutandis, for the public sector’s real assets being bought up by the private sector using domestic paper money in a potentially hyperinflationary economy.  If Dr Singh’s new Government wishes to see real public sector assets being sold, let the Government seek to value these assets not in inconvertible rupees which the Government itself has been producing in unlimited quantities but rather in forex or gold-units instead!

Today’s headline says “Short of cash, govt. plans to revive disinvestment ministry”. Big Business’s powerful lobbies will suggest  that real public assets must be sold  (to whom? to organised Big Business of course!) in order to solve the grave fiscal problems in an inflationary economy caused precisely by those grave  fiscal problems! What I said in 2002 at IndiaSeminar may still be found to apply: I said the BJP’s privatisation ideas “deserve to be condemned…because they have made themselves believe that the proceeds of selling the public sector should merely go into patching up the bleeding haemorrhage which is India’s fiscal and monetary situation… (w)hile…Congress were largely responsible for that haemorrhage to have occurred in the first place.”

If the new Government would like to know how to proceed more wisely, they need to read and grasp, in the book edited by myself and Professor John Clarke in 2004-2005, the chapter by Professor Patrick Minford on Margaret Thatcher’s fiscal and monetary policy (macroeconomics) before they read the chapter by Professor Martin Ricketts on Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation (microeconomics).  India’s fiscal and monetary or macroeconomic problems are far worse today than Britain’s were when Thatcher came in.

During the recent Election Campaign, I contrasted Dr Singh’s flattering praise in 2005 of the CPI-M’s Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee with Sonia Gandhi’s pro-Mamata line in 2009 saying the CPI-M had taken land away from the poor.  This may soon signal a new fault-line in the new Cabinet too on economic policy with respect to not only land but also public sector privatisation – with Dr Singh’s pro-Big Business acolytes on one side and Mamata Banerjee’s stance in favour of small-scale unorganised business and labour on the other.  Party heavyweights like Dr Singh himself and Sharad Pawar and Pranab Mukherjee will weigh in one side or the other with Sonia being asked in due course to referee.

I personally am delighted to see the New Rahul Gandhi deciding not to be in Government and to instead reflect further on the “common man” and “common woman” about whom I had described his father talking to me on September 18 1990 at his home. Certainly the “aam admi” is not someone to be found among India’s organised Big Business or organised Big Labour nor their paid lobbyists in the big cities.

Subroto Roy

Posted in Academic research, AD Shroff, Asia and the West, Big Business and Big Labour, BR Shenoy, Britain, Britain in India, British history, Economic Policy, Economic quackery, Economic Theory, Economics of exchange controls, Economics of Public Finance, Economics of real estate valuation, Financial Management, Financial markets, Foreign exchange controls, Government Budget Constraint, Government of India, India's Big Business, India's Banking, India's bureaucracy, India's Capital Markets, India's corporate finance, India's corporate governance, India's corruption, India's currency history, India's Economic History, India's Economy, India's Government Budget Constraint, India's Government Expenditure, India's Industry, India's inflation, India's Macroeconomics, India's Monetary & Fiscal Policy, India's nomenclatura, India's peasants, India's political lobbyists, India's Politics, India's pork-barrel politics, India's poverty, India's Public Finance, Inflation, Land and political economy, Macroeconomics, Mamata Banerjee, Manmohan Singh, Margaret Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher's Revolution, Martin Ricketts, Mendacity in politics, Microeconomics, Monetary Theory, Money and banking, Mumbai financial world, New Delhi, Patrick Minford, Political cynicism, Political Economy, Political mendacity, Political Science, Politics, Pork-barrel politics, Power-elites and nomenclatura, Practical wisdom, Principal-agent problem, Privatisation, Public Choice/Public Finance, Public property waste fraud, Rajiv Gandhi, Rational decisions, Singur and Nandigram, Sonia Gandhi, Statesmanship, The Statesman, The Times (London), University of Buckingham. Leave a Comment »

Parliament’s sovereignty has been diminished by the Executive: A record for future generations to know (2009)

Sad to say, Parliament’s sovereignty has been diminished, indeed usurped, by the new Executive Government.

Here is a brief record for future generations to know.

India’s people completed their voting in the 15th General Elections on Wednesday May 13 2009.

The results of how they had spoken, what was their will, were known and declared by Saturday May 16 2009.

There was no legal or logical reason why the 543 members of the 15th Lok Sabha could not have been sworn in as new MPs by the close-of-business on Monday May 18 at the latest.

On Tuesday May 19 the 15th Lok Sabha could have and should have met to elect itself a pro tem or even a permanent Speaker.

The Speaker would have divided the new House into its Government Party and its Opposition.

There would have been a vote of confidence on the floor of the House, which in the circumstances would have been in favour of the Government Party.

Observing this to have taken place, the Hon’ble President of India as the Head of State would have sent for the leader of the Government Party and invited her to form the new Government.

In this particular case, the leader of the largest political party, namely Sonia Gandhi, would have been accompanied perhaps by the Leader of the Lok Sabha, Pranab Mukherjee, as well as her personal nominee for the position of PM, namely, Manmohan Singh.

Sonia Gandhi would have respectfully declined the invitation of the President to be the new Prime Minister, and she would have also explained that she wanted Manmohan Singh to have the position instead.

The President would have said “Very well, Dr Singh, can you please form the Government?”

He would have said, “Yes Madame President it shall be a privilege and an honour to do so”.

The President would have added, “Thank you, and I notice you are not a member of the Lok Sabha at the moment but I am sure you are taking steps towards becoming one.”

End of visit.

Manmohan Singh would have been sworn in as PM and would have gone about adding Ministers at a measured pace.   Later, he would have resigned his Rajya Sabha seat and sought election to the Lok Sabha on the parliamentary precedent set by Alec Douglas-Home.

What has happened instead?

On May 18 2009, instead of 543 members of the 15th Lok Sabha taking their oaths as required by parliamentary law and custom, Dr Singh held a purported “Cabinet”  meeting of the 14th Lok Sabha — a long-since dead institution!

Some of the persons attending this  meeting as purported “Cabinet ministers” had even lost their seats in the elections decided a few days earlier and so had absolutely zero democratically legitimate status left. All these persons then submitted their purported resignations which Dr Singh carried to the President, stating his Government had resigned. The President then appointed him a caretaker PM and he, along with Sonia Gandhi, then went about “staking claim” to form the next Government — turning up at the President’s again with “letters of support” signed by some 322 persons  who were MP-elects but were yet to become MPs formally by not having been sworn in.

The President appeared satisfied the party Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh belonged to would command a majority in prospect in the Lok Sabha and invited him to be PM.   Some major public wrangling then took place with at least one of his allies about cabinet berths — and that is the situation as of the present moment except that Dr Singh and several others have been sworn in as the Council of Ministers even though the  new 15th Lok Sabha of 543 members has still not convened!  It has been all rather sloppy and hardly uplifting.

Parliament is supposed to be sovereign in India.

Not the Executive Government or the largest political party or its leader.

The sovereignty of Parliament required Sonia Gandhi and Dr Singh to have realised

first, that the 14th Lok Sabha stood automatically dissolved when elections were announced;

secondly, that the 15th Lok Sabha could have and should have been sworn in by Monday May 18;

thirdly, that there should have been a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha immediately which would have gone in favour of the Government Party;

fourthly, that only then should the Executive Government have been sought to be formed;

and of course fifthly, that if that Executive Government was to be led by someone who happened to be a member of the Rajya Sabha and not the Lok Sabha, parliamenary law and custom required him to follow the Douglas-Home precedent of resigning from the former and seeking election to the latter at the earliest opportunity.

Let future generations know that as of today, May 25, the 543 persons whom the people of India voted to constitute the 15th Lok Sabha still remain in limbo without having been sworn in though we already have an Executive Government appointed!

The sovereignty of Parliament, specifically that of the Lok Sabha, has come to be diminished, indeed usurped, by the Executive.   It is the Executive that receives its political legitimacy from Parliament, not vice versa.  Nehru and his generation knew all this intimately well and would have been appalled at where we in the present have been taking it.

Subroto Roy

Why has the Sonia Congress done something that the Congress under Nehru-Indira-Rajiv would not have done, namely, exaggerate the power of the Rajya Sabha and diminish the power of the Lok Sabha?

We in India did not invent the idea of Parliament, the British did.  Even the British did not invent the idea of a “Premier Ministre”, the French did that, though the British came to develop its meaning most.  Because these are not our own inventions, when something unusual happens in contemporary India to political entities and offices known as “Parliament”, “Prime Minister” etc, contrast and comparison is inevitable with standards and practices that have prevailed around the world in other parliamentary democracies.

Indeed we in India did not even fully invent the idea of our own Parliament though the national struggle led by the original Indian National Congress caused it to come to be invented.  The Lok Sabha is the outcome of a long and distinguished constitutional and political history from the Morley-Minto reforms a century ago to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and Government of India Act of 1919 to the Government of India Act of 1935 and the first general elections of British India in 1937 (when Jawaharlal Nehru briefly became PM for the first time) and in due course the 1946 Constituent Assembly.   Out of all this emerged the 1950 Constitution of India, drafted by that brilliant jurist BR Ambedkar as well as other sober intelligent well-educated and dedicated men and women of his time, and thence arose our first Lok Sabha following the 1951 General Elections.

About the Lok Sabha’s duties, I said in my March 30 2006 article “Logic of Democracy” in The Statesman

“What are Lok Sabha Members and State MLAs legitimately required to be doing in caring for their constituents? First of all, as a body as a whole, they need to elect the Government, i.e. the Executive Branch, and to hold it accountable in Parliament or Assembly. For example, the Comptroller and Auditor General submits his reports directly to the House, and it is the duty of individual legislators to put these to good use in controlling the Government’s waste, fraud or abuse of public resources.   Secondly, MPs and MLAs are obviously supposed to literally represent their individual constituencies in the House, i.e. to bring the Government and the House’s attention to specific problems or contingencies affecting their constituents as a whole, and call for the help, funds and sympathy of the whole community on their behalf.  Thirdly, MPs and MLAs are supposed to respond to pleas and petitions of individual constituents, who may need the influence associated with the dignity of their office to get things rightly done. For example, an impoverished orphan lad once needed surgery to remove a brain tumour; a family helping him was promised the free services of a top brain surgeon if a hospital bed and operating theatre could be arranged. It was only by turning to the local MLA that the family were able to get such arrangements made, and the lad had his tumour taken out at a public hospital. MPs and MLAs are supposed to vote for and create public goods and services, and to use their moral suasion to see that existing public services actually do get to reach the public.”

What about the Rajya Sabha?  I said in the same article:

“Rajya Sabha Members are a different species altogether. Most if not all State Legislative Councils have been abolished, and sadly the present nature of the Rajya Sabha causes similar doubts to arise about its utility. The very idea of a Rajya Sabha was first mooted in embryo form in an 1888 book A History of the Native States of India, Vol I. Gwalior, whose author also advocated popular constitutions for the “Indian India” of the “Native States” since “where there are no popular constitutions, the personal character of the ruler becomes a most important factor in the government… evils are inherent in every government where autocracy is not tempered by a free constitution.”  When Victoria was declared India’s “Empress” in 1877, a “Council of the Empire” was mooted but had remained a non-starter even until the 1887 Jubilee. An “Imperial Council” was now designed of the so-called “Native Princes”, which came to evolve into the “Chamber of Princes” which became the “Council of the States” and the Rajya Sabha.  It was patterned mostly on the British and not the American upper house except in being not liable to dissolution, and compelling periodic retirement of a third of members. The American upper house is an equal if not the senior partner of the lower house. Our Rajya Sabha follows the British upper house in being a chamber which is duty-bound to oversee any exuberance in the Lok Sabha but which must ultimately yield to it if there is any dispute.  Parliament in India’s democracy effectively means the Lok Sabha — where every member has contested and won a direct vote in his/her constituency. The British upper house used to have an aristocratic hereditary component which Tony Blair’s New Labour Government has now removed, so it has now been becoming more like what the Rajya Sabha was supposed to have been like.”

The Canadian upper house is similar to ours in intent: a place for “sober second thought” intended to curb the “democratic excesses” of the lower house.   In the Canadian, British, Australian, Irish and our own cases, the Prime Minister, as the chief executive of the lower house has immense indirect power over the upper house, whether in appointing members or even, in the Australian case, dissolving the entire upper house if he/she wishes.

Now yesterday apparently Shrimati Sonia Gandhi, as the duly elected leader of the largest political party in the 15th Lok Sabha, accompanied by Dr Manmohan Singh, as her party’s choice for the position of Prime Minister, went to see the President of India where the Hon’ble President apparently appointed Dr Singh to be the Prime Minister of India – meaning the Prime Minister of the 15th Lok Sabha, except that Dr Singh is not a member of the Lok Sabha and apparently has had no intent of becoming one.

In 2004 Shrimati Gandhi had declined to accept an invitation to become PM and instead effectively recommended Dr Singh to be PM despite his not being a member of the Lok Sabha nor intending to be so.   This exploited a constitutional loophole to the extent that the drafters of our 1950 Constitution happened not to have explicitly stated that the PM must be from the Lok Sabha.  But the reason the founders of our democratic polity such as BR Ambedkar and Jawaharlal Nehru did not specify that the PM must be from the Lok Sabha was quite simply that it was a matter of complete obviousness to them and to their entire generation that this must be so — it would have been  appalling to them and something beyond their wildest imagination that a later generation, namely our own, would exploit such a loophole and allow a PM to be appointed who is not a member of the Lok Sabha and intends not to be so.

Ambedkar, Nehru and all others of their time knew fully well that the history and intended purpose of the Lok Sabha was completely different from the history and intended purpose of the Rajya Sabha.  They knew too fully well that Lord Curzon had been explicitly denied the leadership of Britain’s Tory Party in 1922 because that would have made him a potential PM  when he was not prepared to be a member of the House of Commons.  That specific precedent culminated a centuries’-old  democratic trend of  political power flowing from monarchs to lords to commoners, and has governed all parliamentary democracies  worldwide ever since — until Dr Singh’s appointment in 2004.

When such an anomalous situation once arose in Britain, Lord Home resigned his membership of the House of Lords to contest a House of Commons seat as Sir Alec Douglas Home so that he could be PM in a manner consistent with parliamentary law.

Dr Singh instead for five years remained PM of India while not being a member of the Lok Sabha.  Even if reasons and exigencies of State could have been cited for such an anomalous situation during his first term, there was really no such reason for him not to contest the 2009 General Election if he wished to be the Congress Party’s prime ministerial candidate a second time.  Numerous Rajya Sabha members alongside him have contested Lok Sabha seats this time, and several have won.

As of today, Dr Singh is due to be sworn in tomorrow as Prime Minister for a second term while still having no declared intention of resigning from the Rajya Sabha and contesting a Lok Sabha seat instead.   What the present-day Congress has done is elect him the leader of the “Congress Parliamentary Party” and claim that it is in such a capacity that he received the invitation to be Prime Minister of India.   But surely if the question had been asked to the Congress Party under Nehru or Indira or Rajiv: “Can you foresee a circumstance ever in which the PM of India is not a member of the Lok Sabha?” their answer in each case would have been a categorical and resounding  “no”.

So the question does arise why the Congress under Sonia Gandhi has with deliberation allowed such an anomalous situation to develop.  Its effect is to completely distort the trends of relative political power between the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.  On the one hand, the Lok Sabha’s power is deliberately made to diminish as the chief executive of the Government of India shall not be from the Lok Sabha but from “the other place” despite the Lok Sabha having greater political legitimacy by having been directly elected by India’s people.   This sets a precedent that  might  get repeated in India  in the future but which contradicts the worldwide trend in parliamentary democracies over decades and centuries in precisely the opposite direction –  of power flowing in the direction of the people not away from them.   On the other hand, the fact this anomalous idea has been pioneered by the elected leader of the largest political party in the Lok Sabha while her PM is in the Rajya Sabha causes a member of the lower house to have unexpected control over the upper house when the latter is supposed to be something of an independent check on the former!

It all really seems an unnecessary muddle and a jumbling up of normal constitutional law and parliamentary procedure.  The Sonia-Manmohan Government at the outset of its second term should hardly want to be seen by history as having set a poor precedent using brute force.  The situation can be corrected with the utmost ease by following the Alec Douglas Home example, with Dr Singh being given a relatively safe seat to contest as soon as possible, if necessary by some newly elected Congress MP resigning and allowing a bye-election to be called.

Subroto Roy

Memo to the Election Commission of India April 14 2009, 9 AM

The Hon’ble Election Commission, Government of India
Dear Sirs,
I am glad to see the information your website has been providing to India’s public has improved slightly.    But it remains woefully inadequate as a whole.    Here is a list of the 382 constituencies for which you have, as of 0800 this morning, declared candidates.  It is a list that merely required you to use Excel worksheets in an efficient manner.   May we have a firm date by which all candidates for all 543 constituencies shall have been announced?

There are innumerable improvements to the working of our democracy that are possible to be discussed.  For example, I see no logical reason why candidates for the 16th Lok Sabha may not seek to register themselves the day after the results of the 15th Lok Sabha come to be declared.

Once your staff have checked the processed data below against the raw data  you provide, you are welcome to use my tables, preferably with acknowledgment. For convenience, a full list of all 543 constituencies follows the list of 382 constituencies you have announced as of this morning.

Sincerely

Subroto Roy

Constituency No        Poll Date    State/UT    Constituency Name
S01    1    16-Apr-09    AP    ADILABAD
S01    2    16-Apr-09    AP    PEDDAPALLE
S01    3    16-Apr-09    AP    KARIMNAGAR
S01    4    16-Apr-09    AP    NIZAMABAD
S01    5    16-Apr-09    AP    ZAHIRABAD
S01    6    16-Apr-09    AP    MEDAK
S01    7    16-Apr-09    AP    MALKAJGIRI
S01    8    16-Apr-09    AP    SECUNDRABAD
S01    9    16-Apr-09    AP    HYDERABAD
S01    10    16-Apr-09    AP    CHELVELLA
S01    11    16-Apr-09    AP    MAHBUBNAGAR
S01    12    16-Apr-09    AP    NAGARKURNOOL
S01    13    16-Apr-09    AP    NALGONDA
S01    14    16-Apr-09    AP    BHONGIR
S01    15    16-Apr-09    AP    WARANGAL
S01    16    16-Apr-09    AP    MAHABUBABAD
S01    17    16-Apr-09    AP    KHAMMAM
S01    18    16-Apr-09    AP    ARUKU
S01    19    16-Apr-09    AP    SRIKAKULAM
S01    20    16-Apr-09    AP    VIZIANAGARAM
S01    21    16-Apr-09    AP    VISAKHAPATNAM
S01    22    16-Apr-09    AP    ANAKAPALLI
S01    23    23-Apr-09    AP    KAKINADA
S01    24    23-Apr-09    AP    AMALAPURAM
S01    25    23-Apr-09    AP    RAJAHMUNDRY
S01    26    23-Apr-09    AP    NARSAPURAM
S01    27    23-Apr-09    AP    ELURU
S01    28    23-Apr-09    AP    MACHILIPATNAM
S01    29    23-Apr-09    AP    VIJAYAWADA
S01    30    23-Apr-09    AP    GUNTUR
S01    31    23-Apr-09    AP    NARASARAOPET
S01    32    23-Apr-09    AP    BAPATLA
S01    33    23-Apr-09    AP    ONGOLE
S01    34    23-Apr-09    AP    NANDYAL
S01    35    23-Apr-09    AP    KURNOOL
S01    36    23-Apr-09    AP    ANANTAPUR
S01    37    23-Apr-09    AP    HINDUPUR
S01    38    23-Apr-09    AP    KADAPA
S01    39    23-Apr-09    AP    NELLORE
S01    40    23-Apr-09    AP    TIRUPATI
S01    41    23-Apr-09    AP    RAJAMPET
S01    42    23-Apr-09    AP    CHITTOOR
S02    1    16-Apr-09    AR    ARUNACHAL WEST
S02    2    16-Apr-09    AR    ARUNACHAL EAST
S03    1    16-Apr-09    AS    KARIMGANJ
S03    2    16-Apr-09    AS    SILCHAR
S03    3    16-Apr-09    AS    AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT
S03    4    23-Apr-09    AS    DHUBRI
S03    5    23-Apr-09    AS    KOKRAJHAR
S03    6    23-Apr-09    AS    BARPETA
S03    7    23-Apr-09    AS    GAUHATI
S03    8    23-Apr-09    AS    MANGALDOI
S03    9    23-Apr-09    AS    TEZPUR
S03    10    23-Apr-09    AS    NOWGONG
S03    11    23-Apr-09    AS    KALIABOR
S03    12    23-Apr-09    AS    JORHAT
S03    13    23-Apr-09    AS    DIBRUGARH
S03    14    23-Apr-09    AS    LAKHIMPUR
S04    1    23-Apr-09    BR    VALMIKI NAGAR
S04    2    23-Apr-09    BR    PASCHIM CHAMPARAN
S04    3    23-Apr-09    BR    PURVI CHAMPARAN
S04    4    23-Apr-09    BR    SHEOHAR
S04    5    23-Apr-09    BR    SITAMARHI
S04    6    23-Apr-09    BR    MADHUBANI
S04    7    23-Apr-09    BR    JHANJHARPUR
S04    11    30-Apr-09    BR    KATIHAR
S04    12    30-Apr-09    BR    PURNIA
S04    13    30-Apr-09    BR    MADHEPURA
S04    14    23-Apr-09    BR    DARBHANGA
S04    15    23-Apr-09    BR    MUZAFFARPUR
S04    16    23-Apr-09    BR    VAISHALI
S04    17    16-Apr-09    BR    GOPALGANJ
S04    18    16-Apr-09    BR    SIWAN
S04    19    16-Apr-09    BR    MAHARAJGANJ
S04    20    16-Apr-09    BR    SARAN
S04    21    23-Apr-09    BR    HAJIPUR
S04    22    23-Apr-09    BR    UJIARPUR
S04    23    23-Apr-09    BR    SAMASTIPUR
S04    25    30-Apr-09    BR    KHAGARIA
S04    27    30-Apr-09    BR    BANKA
S04    28    30-Apr-09    BR    MUNGER
S04    32    16-Apr-09    BR    ARRAH
S04    33    16-Apr-09    BR    BUXAR
S04    34    16-Apr-09    BR    SASARAM
S04    35    16-Apr-09    BR    KARAKAT
S04    36    16-Apr-09    BR    JAHANABAD
S04    37    16-Apr-09    BR    AURANGABAD
S04    38    16-Apr-09    BR    GAYA
S04    39    16-Apr-09    BR    NAWADA
S04    40    16-Apr-09    BR    JAMUI
S05    1    23-Apr-09    GA    NORTH GOA
S05    2    23-Apr-09    GA    SOUTH GOA
S06    1    30-Apr-09    GJ    KACHCHH
S06    2    30-Apr-09    GJ    BANASKANTHA
S06    3    30-Apr-09    GJ    PATAN
S06    4    30-Apr-09    GJ    MAHESANA
S06    5    30-Apr-09    GJ    SABARKANTHA
S06    6    30-Apr-09    GJ    GANDHINAGAR
S06    7    30-Apr-09    GJ    AHMEDABAD EAST
S06    8    30-Apr-09    GJ    AHMEDABAD WEST
S06    9    30-Apr-09    GJ    SURENDRANAGAR
S06    10    30-Apr-09    GJ    RAJKOT
S06    11    30-Apr-09    GJ    PORBANDAR
S06    12    30-Apr-09    GJ    JAMNAGAR
S06    13    30-Apr-09    GJ    JUNAGADH
S06    14    30-Apr-09    GJ    AMRELI
S06    15    30-Apr-09    GJ    BHAVNAGAR
S06    16    30-Apr-09    GJ    ANAND
S06    17    30-Apr-09    GJ    KHEDA
S06    18    30-Apr-09    GJ    PANCHMAHAL
S06    19    30-Apr-09    GJ    DAHOD
S06    20    30-Apr-09    GJ    VADODARA
S06    21    30-Apr-09    GJ    CHHOTA UDAIPUR
S06    22    30-Apr-09    GJ    BHARUCH
S06    23    30-Apr-09    GJ    BARDOLI
S06    24    30-Apr-09    GJ    SURAT
S06    25    30-Apr-09    GJ    NAVSARI
S06    26    30-Apr-09    GJ    VALSAD
S07    2    7-May-09    HR    KURUKSHETRA
S07    6    7-May-09    HR    SONIPAT
S07    9    7-May-09    HR    GURGAON
S07    10    7-May-09    HR    FARIDABAD
S09    5    23-Apr-09    JK    UDHAMPUR
S09    6    16-Apr-09    JK    JAMMU
S10    1    23-Apr-09    KA    CHIKKODI
S10    2    23-Apr-09    KA    BELGAUM
S10    3    30-Apr-09    KA    BAGALKOT
S10    4    23-Apr-09    KA    BIJAPUR
S10    5    23-Apr-09    KA    GULBARGA
S10    6    23-Apr-09    KA    RAICHUR
S10    7    23-Apr-09    KA    BIDAR
S10    8    23-Apr-09    KA    KOPPAL
S10    9    23-Apr-09    KA    BELLARY
S10    10    30-Apr-09    KA    HAVERI
S10    11    30-Apr-09    KA    DHARWAD
S10    12    23-Apr-09    KA    UTTARA KANNADA
S10    13    30-Apr-09    KA    DAVANAGERE
S10    14    30-Apr-09    KA    SHIMOGA
S10    15    30-Apr-09    KA    UDUPI CHIKMAGALUR
S10    16    30-Apr-09    KA    HASSAN
S10    18    23-Apr-09    KA    CHITRADURGA
S10    19    23-Apr-09    KA    TUMKUR
S10    20    30-Apr-09    KA    MANDYA
S10    21    30-Apr-09    KA    MYSORE
S10    22    30-Apr-09    KA    CHAMARAJANAGAR
S10    23    23-Apr-09    KA    BANGALORE RURAL
S10    24    23-Apr-09    KA    BANGALORE NORTH
S10    25    23-Apr-09    KA    BANGALORE CENTRAL
S10    26    23-Apr-09    KA    BANGALORE SOUTH
S10    27    23-Apr-09    KA    CHIKKBALLAPUR
S10    28    23-Apr-09    KA    KOLAR
S11    1    16-Apr-09    KL    KASARAGOD
S11    2    16-Apr-09    KL    KANNUR
S11    3    16-Apr-09    KL    VADAKARA
S11    4    16-Apr-09    KL    WAYANAD
S11    5    16-Apr-09    KL    KOZHIKODE
S11    6    16-Apr-09    KL    MALAPPURAM
S11    7    16-Apr-09    KL    PONNANI
S11    8    16-Apr-09    KL    PALAKKAD
S11    9    16-Apr-09    KL    ALATHUR
S11    10    16-Apr-09    KL    THRISSUR
S11    11    16-Apr-09    KL    CHALAKUDY
S11    12    16-Apr-09    KL    ERNAKULAM
S11    13    16-Apr-09    KL    IDUKKI
S11    14    16-Apr-09    KL    KOTTAYAM
S11    15    16-Apr-09    KL    ALAPPUZHA
S11    16    16-Apr-09    KL    MAVELIKKARA
S11    17    16-Apr-09    KL    PATHANAMTHITTA
S11    18    16-Apr-09    KL    KOLLAM
S11    19    16-Apr-09    KL    ATTINGAL
S11    20    16-Apr-09    KL    THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
S12    1    30-Apr-09    MP    MORENA
S12    2    30-Apr-09    MP    BHIND
S12    3    30-Apr-09    MP    GWALIOR
S12    4    30-Apr-09    MP    GUNA
S12    7    30-Apr-09    MP    DAMOH
S12    8    23-Apr-09    MP    KHAJURAHO
S12    9    23-Apr-09    MP    SATNA
S12    10    23-Apr-09    MP    REWA
S12    11    23-Apr-09    MP    SIDHI
S12    12    23-Apr-09    MP    SHAHDOL
S12    13    23-Apr-09    MP    JABALPUR
S12    14    23-Apr-09    MP    MANDLA
S12    15    23-Apr-09    MP    BALAGHAT
S12    16    23-Apr-09    MP    CHHINDWARA
S12    17    23-Apr-09    MP    HOSHANGABAD
S12    18    23-Apr-09    MP    VIDISHA
S12    19    23-Apr-09    MP    BHOPAL
S12    22    30-Apr-09    MP    UJJAIN
S12    23    30-Apr-09    MP    MANDSOUR
S12    25    30-Apr-09    MP    DHAR
S12    27    30-Apr-09    MP    KHARGONE
S12    29    23-Apr-09    MP    BETUL
S13    1    23-Apr-09    MH    NANDURBAR
S13    2    23-Apr-09    MH    DHULE
S13    3    23-Apr-09    MH    JALGAON
S13    4    23-Apr-09    MH    RAVER
S13    5    16-Apr-09    MH    BULDHANA
S13    6    16-Apr-09    MH    AKOLA
S13    7    16-Apr-09    MH    AMRAVATI
S13    8    16-Apr-09    MH    WARDHA
S13    9    16-Apr-09    MH    RAMTEK
S13    10    16-Apr-09    MH    NAGPUR
S13    11    16-Apr-09    MH    BHANDARA – GONDIYA
S13    12    16-Apr-09    MH    GADCHIROLI-CHIMUR
S13    13    16-Apr-09    MH    CHANDRAPUR
S13    14    16-Apr-09    MH    YAVATMAL-WASHIM
S13    15    16-Apr-09    MH    HINGOLI
S13    16    16-Apr-09    MH    NANDED
S13    17    16-Apr-09    MH    PARBHANI
S13    18    23-Apr-09    MH    JALNA
S13    19    23-Apr-09    MH    AURANGABAD
S13    20    23-Apr-09    MH    DINDORI
S13    21    23-Apr-09    MH    NASHIK
S13    22    30-Apr-09    MH    PALGHAR
S13    23    30-Apr-09    MH    BHIWANDI
S13    25    30-Apr-09    MH    THANE
S13    27    30-Apr-09    MH    MUMBAI NORTH WEST
S13    30    30-Apr-09    MH    MUMBAI SOUTH CENTRAL
S13    31    30-Apr-09    MH    MUMBAI SOUTH
S13    32    23-Apr-09    MH    RAIGAD
S13    33    23-Apr-09    MH    MAVAL
S13    34    23-Apr-09    MH    PUNE
S13    35    23-Apr-09    MH    BARAMATI
S13    36    23-Apr-09    MH    SHIRUR
S13    37    23-Apr-09    MH    AHMADNAGAR
S13    38    23-Apr-09    MH    SHIRDI
S13    39    23-Apr-09    MH    BEED
S13    40    23-Apr-09    MH    OSMANABAD
S13    41    23-Apr-09    MH    LATUR
S13    42    23-Apr-09    MH    SOLAPUR
S13    43    23-Apr-09    MH    MADHA
S13    44    23-Apr-09    MH    SANGLI
S13    45    23-Apr-09    MH    SATARA
S13    46    23-Apr-09    MH    RATNAGIRI – SINDHUDURG
S13    47    23-Apr-09    MH    KOLHAPUR
S13    48    23-Apr-09    MH    HATKANANGLE
S14    1    22-Apr-09    MN    INNER MANIPUR
S14    2    16-Apr-09    MN    OUTER MANIPUR
S15    1    16-Apr-09    ML    SHILLONG
S15    2    16-Apr-09    ML    TURA
S16    1    16-Apr-09    MZ    MIZORAM
S17    1    16-Apr-09    NL    NAGALAND
S18    1    16-Apr-09    OR    BARGARH
S18    2    16-Apr-09    OR    SUNDARGARH
S18    3    16-Apr-09    OR    SAMBALPUR
S18    4    23-Apr-09    OR    KEONJHAR
S18    5    23-Apr-09    OR    MAYURBHANJ
S18    6    23-Apr-09    OR    BALASORE
S18    7    23-Apr-09    OR    BHADRAK
S18    8    23-Apr-09    OR    JAJPUR
S18    9    23-Apr-09    OR    DHENKANAL
S18    10    16-Apr-09    OR    BOLANGIR
S18    11    16-Apr-09    OR    KALAHANDI
S18    12    16-Apr-09    OR    NABARANGPUR
S18    13    16-Apr-09    OR    KANDHAMAL
S18    14    23-Apr-09    OR    CUTTACK
S18    15    23-Apr-09    OR    KENDRAPARA
S18    16    23-Apr-09    OR    JAGATSINGHPUR
S18    17    23-Apr-09    OR    PURI
S18    18    23-Apr-09    OR    BHUBANESWAR
S18    19    16-Apr-09    OR    ASKA
S18    20    16-Apr-09    OR    BERHAMPUR
S18    21    16-Apr-09    OR    KORAPUT
S19    10    7-May-09    PB    FEROZPUR
S19    11    7-May-09    PB    BATHINDA
S19    12    7-May-09    PB    SANGRUR
S20    3    7-May-09    RJ    CHURU
S20    5    7-May-09    RJ    SIKAR
S20    6    7-May-09    RJ    JAIPUR RURAL
S20    7    7-May-09    RJ    JAIPUR
S20    11    7-May-09    RJ    DAUSA
S20    12    7-May-09    RJ    TONK-SAWAI MADHOPUR
S20    15    7-May-09    RJ    PALI
S20    18    7-May-09    RJ    JALORE
S20    21    7-May-09    RJ    CHITTORGARH
S20    23    7-May-09    RJ    BHILWARA
S20    25    7-May-09    RJ    JHALAWAR-BARAN
S23    1    23-Apr-09    TR    TRIPURA WEST
S23    2    23-Apr-09    TR    TRIPURA EAST
S24    2    7-May-09    UP    KAIRANA
S24    3    7-May-09    UP    MUZAFFARNAGAR
S24    15    7-May-09    UP    ALIGARH
S24    17    7-May-09    UP    MATHURA
S24    19    7-May-09    UP    FATEHPUR SIKRI
S24    21    7-May-09    UP    MAINPURI
S24    22    7-May-09    UP    ETAH
S24    30    30-Apr-09    UP    SITAPUR
S24    33    30-Apr-09    UP    UNNAO
S24    34    30-Apr-09    UP    MOHANLALGANJ
S24    35    30-Apr-09    UP    LUCKNOW
S24    37    23-Apr-09    UP    AMETHI
S24    38    23-Apr-09    UP    SULTANPUR
S24    39    23-Apr-09    UP    PRATAPGARH
S24    40    7-May-09    UP    FARRUKHABAD
S24    42    7-May-09    UP    KANNAUJ
S24    43    30-Apr-09    UP    KANPUR
S24    44    30-Apr-09    UP    AKBARPUR
S24    45    30-Apr-09    UP    JALAUN
S24    47    30-Apr-09    UP    HAMIRPUR
S24    48    23-Apr-09    UP    BANDA
S24    49    30-Apr-09    UP    FATEHPUR
S24    50    23-Apr-09    UP    KAUSHAMBI
S24    51    23-Apr-09    UP    PHULPUR
S24    52    23-Apr-09    UP    ALLAHABAD
S24    53    30-Apr-09    UP    BARABANKI
S24    54    23-Apr-09    UP    FAIZABAD
S24    55    23-Apr-09    UP    AMBEDKAR NAGAR
S24    57    23-Apr-09    UP    KAISERGANJ
S24    58    23-Apr-09    UP    SHRAWASTI
S24    59    23-Apr-09    UP    GONDA
S24    60    23-Apr-09    UP    DOMARIYAGANJ
S24    61    23-Apr-09    UP    BASTI
S24    62    23-Apr-09    UP    SANT KABIR NAGAR
S24    63    16-Apr-09    UP    MAHARAJGANJ
S24    64    16-Apr-09    UP    GORAKHPUR
S24    65    16-Apr-09    UP    KUSHI NAGAR
S24    66    16-Apr-09    UP    DEORIA
S24    67    16-Apr-09    UP    BANSGAON
S24    68    16-Apr-09    UP    LALGANJ
S24    69    16-Apr-09    UP    AZAMGARH
S24    70    16-Apr-09    UP    GHOSI
S24    71    16-Apr-09    UP    SALEMPUR
S24    72    16-Apr-09    UP    BALLIA
S24    73    23-Apr-09    UP    JAUNPUR
S24    74    16-Apr-09    UP    MACHHLISHAHR
S24    75    16-Apr-09    UP    GHAZIPUR
S24    76    16-Apr-09    UP    CHANDAULI
S24    77    16-Apr-09    UP    VARANASI
S24    78    23-Apr-09    UP    BHADOHI
S24    79    16-Apr-09    UP    MIRZAPUR
S24    80    16-Apr-09    UP    ROBERTSGANJ
S25    1    30-Apr-09    WB    COOCH BEHAR
S25    2    30-Apr-09    WB    ALIPURDUARS
S25    3    30-Apr-09    WB    JALPAIGURI
S25    4    30-Apr-09    WB    DARJEELING
S25    5    30-Apr-09    WB    RAIGANJ
S25    6    30-Apr-09    WB    BALURGHAT
S25    7    30-Apr-09    WB    MALDAHA UTTAR
S25    8    30-Apr-09    WB    MALDAHA DAKSHIN
S25    9    7-May-09    WB    JANGIPUR
S25    10    7-May-09    WB    BAHARAMPUR
S25    11    7-May-09    WB    MURSHIDABAD
S25    13    7-May-09    WB    RANAGHAT
S25    27    7-May-09    WB    SRERAMPUR
S25    29    7-May-09    WB    ARAMBAGH
S25    32    30-Apr-09    WB    GHATAL
S25    33    30-Apr-09    WB    JHARGRAM
S25    34    30-Apr-09    WB    MEDINIPUR
S25    35    30-Apr-09    WB    PURULIA
S25    36    30-Apr-09    WB    BANKURA
S25    37    30-Apr-09    WB    BISHNUPUR
S25    41    7-May-09    WB    BOLPUR
S26    1    16-Apr-09    CG    SARGUJA
S26    2    16-Apr-09    CG    RAIGARH
S26    3    16-Apr-09    CG    JANJGIR-CHAMPA
S26    4    16-Apr-09    CG    KORBA
S26    5    16-Apr-09    CG    BILASPUR
S26    6    16-Apr-09    CG    RAJNANDGAON
S26    7    16-Apr-09    CG    DURG
S26    8    16-Apr-09    CG    RAIPUR
S26    9    16-Apr-09    CG    MAHASAMUND
S26    10    16-Apr-09    CG    BASTAR
S26    11    16-Apr-09    CG    KANKER
S27    1    23-Apr-09    JH    RAJMAHAL
S27    2    23-Apr-09    JH    DUMKA
S27    3    23-Apr-09    JH    GODDA
S27    4    16-Apr-09    JH    CHATRA
S27    5    16-Apr-09    JH    KODARMA
S27    6    23-Apr-09    JH    GIRIDIH
S27    7    23-Apr-09    JH    DHANBAD
S27    8    23-Apr-09    JH    RANCHI
S27    9    23-Apr-09    JH    JAMSHEDPUR
S27    10    23-Apr-09    JH    SINGHBHUM
S27    11    16-Apr-09    JH    KHUNTI
S27    12    16-Apr-09    JH    LOHARDAGA
S27    13    16-Apr-09    JH    PALAMAU
S27    14    16-Apr-09    JH    HAZARIBAGH
U01    1    16-Apr-09    AN    ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS
U03    1    30-Apr-09    DN    DADAR & NAGAR HAVELI
U04    1    30-Apr-09    DD    DAMAN & DIU
U06    1    16-Apr-09    LD    LAKSHADWEEP

Full list of all 543 Constituencies
S01 1 AP ADILABAD
S01 2 AP PEDDAPALLE
S01 3 AP KARIMNAGAR
S01 4 AP NIZAMABAD
S01 5 AP ZAHIRABAD
S01 6 AP MEDAK
S01 7 AP MALKAJGIRI
S01 8 AP SECUNDRABAD
S01 9 AP HYDERABAD
S01 10 AP CHELVELLA
S01 11 AP MAHBUBNAGAR
S01 12 AP NAGARKURNOOL
S01 13 AP NALGONDA
S01 14 AP BHONGIR
S01 15 AP WARANGAL
S01 16 AP MAHABUBABAD
S01 17 AP KHAMMAM
S01 18 AP ARUKU
S01 19 AP SRIKAKULAM
S01 20 AP VIZIANAGARAM
S01 21 AP VISAKHAPATNAM
S01 22 AP ANAKAPALLI
S01 23 AP KAKINADA
S01 24 AP AMALAPURAM
S01 25 AP RAJAHMUNDRY
S01 26 AP NARSAPURAM
S01 27 AP ELURU
S01 28 AP MACHILIPATNAM
S01 29 AP VIJAYAWADA
S01 30 AP GUNTUR
S01 31 AP NARASARAOPET
S01 32 AP BAPATLA
S01 33 AP ONGOLE
S01 34 AP NANDYAL
S01 35 AP KURNOOL
S01 36 AP ANANTAPUR
S01 37 AP HINDUPUR
S01 38 AP KADAPA
S01 39 AP NELLORE
S01 40 AP TIRUPATI
S01 41 AP RAJAMPET
S01 42 AP CHITTOOR
S02 1 AR ARUNACHAL WEST
S02 2 AR ARUNACHAL EAST
S03 1 AS KARIMGANJ
S03 2 AS SILCHAR
S03 3 AS AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT
S03 4 AS DHUBRI
S03 5 AS KOKRAJHAR
S03 6 AS BARPETA
S03 7 AS GAUHATI
S03 8 AS MANGALDOI
S03 9 AS TEZPUR
S03 10 AS NOWGONG
S03 11 AS KALIABOR
S03 12 AS JORHAT
S03 13 AS DIBRUGARH
S03 14 AS LAKHIMPUR
S04 1 BR VALMIKI NAGAR
S04 2 BR PASCHIM CHAMPARAN
S04 3 BR PURVI CHAMPARAN
S04 4 BR SHEOHAR
S04 5 BR SITAMARHI
S04 6 BR MADHUBANI
S04 7 BR JHANJHARPUR
S04 8 BR SUPAUL
S04 9 BR ARARIA
S04 10 BR KISHANGANJ
S04 11 BR KATIHAR
S04 12 BR PURNIA
S04 13 BR MADHEPURA
S04 14 BR DARBHANGA
S04 15 BR MUZAFFARPUR
S04 16 BR VAISHALI
S04 17 BR GOPALGANJ
S04 18 BR SIWAN
S04 19 BR MAHARAJGANJ
S04 20 BR SARAN
S04 21 BR HAJIPUR
S04 22 BR UJIARPUR
S04 23 BR SAMASTIPUR
S04 24 BR BEGUSARAI
S04 25 BR KHAGARIA
S04 26 BR BHAGALPUR
S04 27 BR BANKA
S04 28 BR MUNGER
S04 29 BR NALANDA
S04 30 BR PATNA SAHIB
S04 31 BR PATALIPUTRA
S04 32 BR ARRAH
S04 33 BR BUXAR
S04 34 BR SASARAM
S04 35 BR KARAKAT
S04 36 BR JAHANABAD
S04 37 BR AURANGABAD
S04 38 BR GAYA
S04 39 BR NAWADA
S04 40 BR JAMUI
S05 1 GA NORTH GOA
S05 2 GA SOUTH GOA
S06 1 GJ KACHCHH
S06 2 GJ BANASKANTHA
S06 3 GJ PATAN
S06 4 GJ MAHESANA
S06 5 GJ SABARKANTHA
S06 6 GJ GANDHINAGAR
S06 7 GJ AHMEDABAD EAST
S06 8 GJ AHMEDABAD WEST
S06 9 GJ SURENDRANAGAR
S06 10 GJ RAJKOT
S06 11 GJ PORBANDAR
S06 12 GJ JAMNAGAR
S06 13 GJ JUNAGADH
S06 14 GJ AMRELI
S06 15 GJ BHAVNAGAR
S06 16 GJ ANAND
S06 17 GJ KHEDA
S06 18 GJ PANCHMAHAL
S06 19 GJ DAHOD
S06 20 GJ VADODARA
S06 21 GJ CHHOTA UDAIPUR
S06 22 GJ BHARUCH
S06 23 GJ BARDOLI
S06 24 GJ SURAT
S06 25 GJ NAVSARI
S06 26 GJ VALSAD
S07 1 HR AMBALA
S07 2 HR KURUKSHETRA
S07 3 HR SIRSA
S07 4 HR HISAR
S07 5 HR KARNAL
S07 6 HR SONIPAT
S07 7 HR ROHTAK
S07 8 HR BHIWANI-MAHENDRAGARH
S07 9 HR GURGAON
S07 10 HR FARIDABAD
S08 1 HP KANGRA
S08 2 HP MANDI
S08 3 HP HAMIRPUR
S08 4 HP SHIMLA
S09 1 JK BARAMULLA
S09 2 JK SRINAGAR
S09 3 JK ANANTNAG
S09 4 JK LADAKH
S09 5 JK UDHAMPUR
S09 6 JK JAMMU
S10 1 KA CHIKKODI
S10 2 KA BELGAUM
S10 3 KA BAGALKOT
S10 4 KA BIJAPUR
S10 5 KA GULBARGA
S10 6 KA RAICHUR
S10 7 KA BIDAR
S10 8 KA KOPPAL
S10 9 KA BELLARY
S10 10 KA HAVERI
S10 11 KA DHARWAD
S10 12 KA UTTARA KANNADA
S10 13 KA DAVANAGERE
S10 14 KA SHIMOGA
S10 15 KA UDUPI CHIKMAGALUR
S10 16 KA HASSAN
S10 17 KA DAKSHINA KANNADA
S10 18 KA CHITRADURGA
S10 19 KA TUMKUR
S10 20 KA MANDYA
S10 21 KA MYSORE
S10 22 KA CHAMARAJANAGAR
S10 23 KA BANGALORE RURAL
S10 24 KA BANGALORE NORTH
S10 25 KA BANGALORE CENTRAL
S10 26 KA BANGALORE SOUTH
S10 27 KA CHIKKBALLAPUR
S10 28 KA KOLAR
S11 1 KL KASARAGOD
S11 2 KL KANNUR
S11 3 KL VADAKARA
S11 4 KL WAYANAD
S11 5 KL KOZHIKODE
S11 6 KL MALAPPURAM
S11 7 KL PONNANI
S11 8 KL PALAKKAD
S11 9 KL ALATHUR
S11 10 KL THRISSUR
S11 11 KL CHALAKUDY
S11 12 KL ERNAKULAM
S11 13 KL IDUKKI
S11 14 KL KOTTAYAM
S11 15 KL ALAPPUZHA
S11 16 KL MAVELIKKARA
S11 17 KL PATHANAMTHITTA
S11 18 KL KOLLAM
S11 19 KL ATTINGAL
S11 20 KL THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
S12 1 MP MORENA
S12 2 MP BHIND
S12 3 MP GWALIOR
S12 4 MP GUNA
S12 5 MP SAGAR
S12 6 MP TIKAMGARH
S12 7 MP DAMOH
S12 8 MP KHAJURAHO
S12 9 MP SATNA
S12 10 MP REWA
S12 11 MP SIDHI
S12 12 MP SHAHDOL
S12 13 MP JABALPUR
S12 14 MP MANDLA
S12 15 MP BALAGHAT
S12 16 MP CHHINDWARA
S12 17 MP HOSHANGABAD
S12 18 MP VIDISHA
S12 19 MP BHOPAL
S12 20 MP RAJGARH
S12 21 MP DEWAS
S12 22 MP UJJAIN
S12 23 MP MANDSOUR
S12 24 MP RATLAM
S12 25 MP DHAR
S12 26 MP INDORE
S12 27 MP KHARGONE
S12 28 MP KHANDWA
S12 29 MP BETUL
S13 1 MH NANDURBAR
S13 2 MH DHULE
S13 3 MH JALGAON
S13 4 MH RAVER
S13 5 MH BULDHANA
S13 6 MH AKOLA
S13 7 MH AMRAVATI
S13 8 MH WARDHA
S13 9 MH RAMTEK
S13 10 MH NAGPUR
S13 11 MH BHANDARA – GONDIYA
S13 12 MH GADCHIROLI-CHIMUR
S13 13 MH CHANDRAPUR
S13 14 MH YAVATMAL-WASHIM
S13 15 MH HINGOLI
S13 16 MH NANDED
S13 17 MH PARBHANI
S13 18 MH JALNA
S13 19 MH AURANGABAD
S13 20 MH DINDORI
S13 21 MH NASHIK
S13 22 MH PALGHAR
S13 23 MH BHIWANDI
S13 24 MH KALYAN
S13 25 MH THANE
S13 26 MH MUMBAI NORTH
S13 27 MH MUMBAI NORTH WEST
S13 28 MH MUMBAI NORTH EAST
S13 29 MH MUMBAI NORTH CENTRAL
S13 30 MH MUMBAI SOUTH CENTRAL
S13 31 MH MUMBAI SOUTH
S13 32 MH RAIGAD
S13 33 MH MAVAL
S13 34 MH PUNE
S13 35 MH BARAMATI
S13 36 MH SHIRUR
S13 37 MH AHMADNAGAR
S13 38 MH SHIRDI
S13 39 MH BEED
S13 40 MH OSMANABAD
S13 41 MH LATUR
S13 42 MH SOLAPUR
S13 43 MH MADHA
S13 44 MH SANGLI
S13 45 MH SATARA
S13 46 MH RATNAGIRI – SINDHUDURG
S13 47 MH KOLHAPUR
S13 48 MH HATKANANGLE
S14 1 MN INNER MANIPUR
S14 2 MN OUTER MANIPUR
S15 1 ML SHILLONG
S15 2 ML TURA
S16 1 MZ MIZORAM
S17 1 NL NAGALAND
S18 1 OR BARGARH
S18 2 OR SUNDARGARH
S18 3 OR SAMBALPUR
S18 4 OR KEONJHAR
S18 5 OR MAYURBHANJ
S18 6 OR BALASORE
S18 7 OR BHADRAK
S18 8 OR JAJPUR
S18 9 OR DHENKANAL
S18 10 OR BOLANGIR
S18 11 OR KALAHANDI
S18 12 OR NABARANGPUR
S18 13 OR KANDHAMAL
S18 14 OR CUTTACK
S18 15 OR KENDRAPARA
S18 16 OR JAGATSINGHPUR
S18 17 OR PURI
S18 18 OR BHUBANESWAR
S18 19 OR ASKA
S18 20 OR BERHAMPUR
S18 21 OR KORAPUT
S19 1 PB GURDASPUR
S19 2 PB AMRITSAR
S19 3 PB KHADOOR SAHIB
S19 4 PB JALANDHAR
S19 5 PB HOSHIARPUR
S19 6 PB ANANDPUR SAHIB
S19 7 PB LUDHIANA
S19 8 PB FATEHGARH SAHIB
S19 9 PB FARIDKOT
S19 10 PB FEROZPUR
S19 11 PB BATHINDA
S19 12 PB SANGRUR
S19 13 PB PATIALA
S20 1 RJ GANGANAGAR
S20 2 RJ BIKANER
S20 3 RJ CHURU
S20 4 RJ JHUNJHUNU
S20 5 RJ SIKAR
S20 6 RJ JAIPUR RURAL
S20 7 RJ JAIPUR
S20 8 RJ ALWAR
S20 9 RJ BHARATPUR
S20 10 RJ KARAULI-DHOLPUR
S20 11 RJ DAUSA
S20 12 RJ TONK-SAWAI MADHOPUR
S20 13 RJ AJMER
S20 14 RJ NAGAUR
S20 15 RJ PALI
S20 16 RJ JODHPUR
S20 17 RJ BARMER
S20 18 RJ JALORE
S20 19 RJ UDAIPUR
S20 20 RJ BANSWARA
S20 21 RJ CHITTORGARH
S20 22 RJ RAJSAMAND
S20 23 RJ BHILWARA
S20 24 RJ KOTA
S20 25 RJ JHALAWAR-BARAN
S21 1 SK SIKKIM
S22 1 TN THIRUVALLUR
S22 2 TN CHENNAI NORTH
S22 3 TN CHENNAI SOUTH
S22 4 TN CHENNAI CENTRAL
S22 5 TN SRIPERUMBUDUR
S22 6 TN KANCHEEPURAM
S22 7 TN ARAKKONAM
S22 8 TN VELLORE
S22 9 TN KRISHNAGIRI
S22 10 TN DHARMAPURI
S22 11 TN TIRUVANNAMALAI
S22 12 TN ARANI
S22 13 TN VILUPPURAM
S22 14 TN KALLAKURICHI
S22 15 TN SALEM
S22 16 TN NAMAKKAL
S22 17 TN ERODE
S22 18 TN TIRUPPUR
S22 19 TN NILGIRIS
S22 20 TN COIMBATORE
S22 21 TN POLLACHI
S22 22 TN DINDIGUL
S22 23 TN KARUR
S22 24 TN TIRUCHIRAPPALLI
S22 25 TN PERAMBALUR
S22 26 TN CUDDALORE
S22 27 TN CHIDAMBARAM
S22 28 TN MAYILADUTHURAI
S22 29 TN NAGAPATTINAM
S22 30 TN THANJAVUR
S22 31 TN SIVAGANGA
S22 32 TN MADURAI
S22 33 TN THENI
S22 34 TN VIRUDHUNAGAR
S22 35 TN RAMANATHAPURAM
S22 36 TN THOOTHUKKUDI
S22 37 TN TENKASI
S22 38 TN TIRUNELVELI
S22 39 TN KANNIYAKUMARI
S23 1 TR TRIPURA WEST
S23 2 TR TRIPURA EAST
S24 1 UP SAHARANPUR
S24 2 UP KAIRANA
S24 3 UP MUZAFFARNAGAR
S24 4 UP BIJNOR
S24 5 UP NAGINA
S24 6 UP MORADABAD
S24 7 UP RAMPUR
S24 8 UP SAMBHAL
S24 9 UP AMROHA
S24 10 UP MEERUT
S24 11 UP BAGHPAT
S24 12 UP GHAZIABAD
S24 13 UP GAUTAM BUDDH NAGAR
S24 14 UP BULANDSHAHR
S24 15 UP ALIGARH
S24 16 UP HATHRAS
S24 17 UP MATHURA
S24 18 UP AGRA
S24 19 UP FATEHPUR SIKRI
S24 20 UP FIROZABAD
S24 21 UP MAINPURI
S24 22 UP ETAH
S24 23 UP BADAUN
S24 24 UP AONLA
S24 25 UP BAREILLY
S24 26 UP PILIBHIT
S24 27 UP SHAHJAHANPUR
S24 28 UP KHERI
S24 29 UP DHAURAHRA
S24 30 UP SITAPUR
S24 31 UP HARDOI
S24 32 UP MISRIKH
S24 33 UP UNNAO
S24 34 UP MOHANLALGANJ
S24 35 UP LUCKNOW
S24 36 UP RAE BARELI
S24 37 UP AMETHI
S24 38 UP SULTANPUR
S24 39 UP PRATAPGARH
S24 40 UP FARRUKHABAD
S24 41 UP ETAWAH
S24 42 UP KANNAUJ
S24 43 UP KANPUR
S24 44 UP AKBARPUR
S24 45 UP JALAUN
S24 46 UP JHANSI
S24 47 UP HAMIRPUR
S24 48 UP BANDA
S24 49 UP FATEHPUR
S24 50 UP KAUSHAMBI
S24 51 UP PHULPUR
S24 52 UP ALLAHABAD
S24 53 UP BARABANKI
S24 54 UP FAIZABAD
S24 55 UP AMBEDKAR NAGAR
S24 56 UP BAHRAICH
S24 57 UP KAISERGANJ
S24 58 UP SHRAWASTI
S24 59 UP GONDA
S24 60 UP DOMARIYAGANJ
S24 61 UP BASTI
S24 62 UP SANT KABIR NAGAR
S24 63 UP MAHARAJGANJ
S24 64 UP GORAKHPUR
S24 65 UP KUSHI NAGAR
S24 66 UP DEORIA
S24 67 UP BANSGAON
S24 68 UP LALGANJ
S24 69 UP AZAMGARH
S24 70 UP GHOSI
S24 71 UP SALEMPUR
S24 72 UP BALLIA
S24 73 UP JAUNPUR
S24 74 UP MACHHLISHAHR
S24 75 UP GHAZIPUR
S24 76 UP CHANDAULI
S24 77 UP VARANASI
S24 78 UP BHADOHI
S24 79 UP MIRZAPUR
S24 80 UP ROBERTSGANJ
S25 1 WB COOCH BEHAR
S25 2 WB ALIPURDUARS
S25 3 WB JALPAIGURI
S25 4 WB DARJEELING
S25 5 WB RAIGANJ
S25 6 WB BALURGHAT
S25 7 WB MALDAHA UTTAR
S25 8 WB MALDAHA DAKSHIN
S25 9 WB JANGIPUR
S25 10 WB BAHARAMPUR
S25 11 WB MURSHIDABAD
S25 12 WB KRISHNANAGAR
S25 13 WB RANAGHAT
S25 14 WB BANGAON
S25 15 WB BARRACKPORE
S25 16 WB DUM DUM
S25 17 WB BARASAT
S25 18 WB BASIRHAT
S25 19 WB JOYNAGAR
S25 20 WB MATHURAPUR
S25 21 WB DIAMOND HARBOUR
S25 22 WB JADAVPUR
S25 23 WB KOLKATA DAKSHIN
S25 24 WB KOLKATA UTTAR
S25 25 WB HOWRAH
S25 26 WB ULUBERIA
S25 27 WB SRERAMPUR
S25 28 WB HOOGHLY
S25 29 WB ARAMBAGH
S25 30 WB TAMLUK
S25 31 WB KANTHI
S25 32 WB GHATAL
S25 33 WB JHARGRAM
S25 34 WB MEDINIPUR
S25 35 WB PURULIA
S25 36 WB BANKURA
S25 37 WB BISHNUPUR
S25 38 WB BARDHAMAN PURBA
S25 39 WB BURDWAN – DURGAPUR
S25 40 WB ASANSOL
S25 41 WB BOLPUR
S25 42 WB BIRBHUM
S26 1 CG SARGUJA
S26 2 CG RAIGARH
S26 3 CG JANJGIR-CHAMPA
S26 4 CG KORBA
S26 5 CG BILASPUR
S26 6 CG RAJNANDGAON
S26 7 CG DURG
S26 8 CG RAIPUR
S26 9 CG MAHASAMUND
S26 10 CG BASTAR
S26 11 CG KANKER
S27 1 JH RAJMAHAL
S27 2 JH DUMKA
S27 3 JH GODDA
S27 4 JH CHATRA
S27 5 JH KODARMA
S27 6 JH GIRIDIH
S27 7 JH DHANBAD
S27 8 JH RANCHI
S27 9 JH JAMSHEDPUR
S27 10 JH SINGHBHUM
S27 11 JH KHUNTI
S27 12 JH LOHARDAGA
S27 13 JH PALAMAU
S27 14 JH HAZARIBAGH
S28 1 UK TEHRI GARHWAL
S28 2 UK GARHWAL
S28 3 UK ALMORA
S28 4 UK NAINITAL-UDHAMSINGH NAGAR
S28 5 UK HARDWAR
U01 1 AN ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS
U02 1 CH CHANDIGARH
U03 1 DN DADAR & NAGAR HAVELI
U04 1 DD DAMAN & DIU
U05 1 DL CHANDNI CHOWK
U05 2 DL NORTH EAST DELHI
U05 3 DL EAST DELHI
U05 4 DL NEW DELHI
U05 5 DL NORTH WEST DELHI
U05 6 DL WEST DELHI
U05 7 DL SOUTH DELHI
U06 1 LD LAKSHADWEEP
U07 1 PY PUDUCHERRY

Democracy Database for the Largest Electorate Ever Seen in World History

In four days, on April 16 2009, one thousand seven hundred and seven officially recognized candidates, representing 161 political parties and including 770 Independents, are contesting the polls in 124 constituencies (out of a total of 543 constituencies), across 15 States and two Union Territories  in Phase 1 of the General Election to India’s 15th Lok Sabha.   Between 16 April and 7 May in Phases 2, 3 and 4, that number of candidates contesting  India’s  General Elections rises to at least 4,637, average age 46.1, from 261 political parties, including 291 women and 2118  Independents across more than 150 further constituencies.  By 13 May, Phase 5 will be over and all 543 constituencies shall have been covered.  The size of the registered electorate of potential voters under adult franchise is 383,566,479, the largest in human history.

Did you know that? Of course not. None of our juvenile TV stations and only-slightly-less-juvenile newspapers would have been able to give you such numbers even if they had tried to; they would barely know where to begin. Besides, our Election Commission too has become a  sclerotic bureaucracy like everything else to do with India’s governance; its website — now updated and improving slightly every day — provides a lot of irrelevancies along with providing  the very least modicum of  raw data logically necessary for the conduct of the election.

Ten years ago, just prior to the 13th Lok Sabha Elections, I, as part of my academic research as a “full professor” at an “Institution of National Importance”, created an Excel spreadsheet containing every single Lok Sabha constituency at the time. I later sent it on to the EC for its free use and distribution. (Some of my academic colleagues were surprised and suspicious as one of their principal goals in life was to obtain lucrative government “consulting” contracts wherever possible — doing things for free set a worrisome example despite the slogan of being supposedly “dedicated to the service of the nation”!). Nothing happened because the EC in particular and the Government of India in general did not then and have not now appeared keen to know how to use spreadsheets  like Excel properly, despite our claims of  India  being  an information-technology powerhouse!

I have now had to re-create that 1999 spreadsheet again for the 15th Lok Sabha Elections because there has been a major parliamentary exercise of what is called “redistricting” in some countries and “delimitation” here in India. Many constituencies have been merged or have disappeared while new ones have appeared.  Plus  numerous innovative techniques  and formulae have had to be used by me with vital free help from Excel Forum users as well as providers of free add-ins around the world, to whom grateful acknowledgment is made.

The processed data below is based entirely on the raw data available from the EC as of April 11 2009.  As the EC updates its raw data, so shall I seek to update this processed data.   There are definite errors in the EC data (e.g. one Independent candidate has been listed 3 times, while 19 people have been listed as being99 years old; more significantly there seems to be at least one constituency in which there is only one candidate, etc etc.)   Whatever errors exist in the raw data must be carried over to these data here, I am afraid.  But I will as I have said update this as the EC updates its raw data.  If there are errors in my processing, I do not know of them, so please check and recheck against the EC’s data if you wish to use these data operationally.  [Update 1800 hours Sunday April 12: the EC has reduced the number of candidates from 4637 to 4631 which presumably means some obvious slight errors have been corrected; it is still far short of having announced all candidates for all 543 constituencies, so the overall number is destined to rise and drastically quite soon — I hope before the first polls open on Thursday!].

The first two indicators are the EC’s way of identifying a constituency; then there is the name of the State or Union Territory in a two-digit code followed by the name of the constituency  in capitals, the date that polling is due to take place, and the list of the candidates and their parties.   I have made every effort to see no error has been added by me in addition to any errors that might exist in the EC’s data.  But please check and double check yourself, and I cannot  take responsibility for the accuracy of the information, especially as it is being done in “real time”.

This is being provided as a free public service for India’s ordinary people, citizens, candidates, students, observers etc.   Any broadcast or republication or academic use must acknowledge it appeared first at this site in my work: just link to this post or quote “Democracy Database for the Largest Electorate Ever Seen in World History by Dr Subroto Roy”, and use away.

Why do I think it is important for every candidate in every constituency in India’s 2009 General Elections to have his/her name known and to receive due respect and a small salute in HTML even for a brief moment?

Because that is what democracy in a free republic is supposed to be about. India is not a monarchy or a mansabdari of some sort, no matter what the many corrupt people inhabiting our Government and our capital cities might have made themselves believe.

Our juvenile, sensationalist, irresponsible  Delhi-centred media might realize someday that there are thousands of real people all over  this country that is India contesting these elections  seriously and trying to thus participate in the political process as best they can.  The Delhi-centred media  remain focused on the few dozen fake celebrities that they flatter,  cultivate and pander to. (We must wait to see what depths of journalistic depravity our  TV stations reach in  covering the so-called IPL in South Africa more seriously than they cover India’s 2009 General Elections!  What would MK Gandhi, who, a century ago, was still in South Africa, have said about such a twist of India’s fate?)

Here instead are India’s names and India’s lives and India’s places and India’s peoples and India’s political parties for all of us to see and understand and hence  see and understand ourselves better.

Here’s a cheer to all those party-political symbols for or  against which India’s hundreds of millions of voters will make their decisions:

A lady farmer carrying paddy on her head,

Aeroplane,

Almirah

Arrow

Axe

Balloon

Banana

Basket

Bat

Batsman

Battery Torch

Bead Necklace

Bell

Bicycle

Black Board

Boat

Book

Bow & Arrow

Boy & Girl

Bread

Brick

Bridge

Brief Case

Brush

Bungalow

Bus

Cake

Camera

Candles

Car

Carrot

Cart

Ceiling Fan

Chair

Clock

Coat

Cock

Coconut

Comb

Conch

Cot

Cup & Saucer

Diesel Pump

Dolli

Drum

Ears of Corn And Sickle

Electric Pole

Elephant

Flag with Three Stars

Flowers and Grass

Fork

Frock

Frying Pan

Gas Cylinder

Gas Stove

Glass Tumbler

Haldhar Within Wheel (Chakra Haldhar)

Hammer, Sickle and Star

Hand

Hand Pump

Harmonium

Hat

Hurricane Lamp

Hut

Ice Cream

Ink Pot & Pen

Iron

Jug

Kettle

Kite

Ladder

Lady Purse

Letter Box

Lion

Lock and Key

Lotus

Maize

Nagara

Not Alloted

Pressure Cooker

Railway Engine

Ring

Rising Sun

Road Roller

Saw

Scissors

Sewing Machine

Shuttle

Slate

Spade & Stoker

Spoon

Stool

Table

Table Lamp

Television

Tent

Two Daos Intersecting

Two Leaves

Violin

Walking Stick

Whistle….

Here’s a cheer then to all the thousands of candidates, average age 46.1, including those Independents, and the hundreds of political parties who go to the contest  beginning  April 16:

Aadivasi Sena Party

A-Chik National Congress(Democratic)

Adarsh Lok Dal

Advait Ishwasyam Congress

Ajeya Bharat Party

AJSU Party

Akhand Bharti

Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

Akhil Bharatiya Ashok Sena

Akhil Bharatiya Congress Dal (Ambedkar)

Akhil Bharatiya Hind Kranti Party

Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

Akhil Bhartiya Manavata Paksha

Akhil Bhartiya Sindhu Samajwadi Party

Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

All India Forward Bloc

All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen

All India Minorities Front

All India Trinamool Congress

All Jharkhand Students Union

Alpjan Samaj Party

Ambedkar National Congress

Ambedkar Samaj Party

Ambedkarist Republican Party

Amra Bangalee

Apna Dal

Arunachal Congress

Asom Gana Parishad

Assam United Democratic Front

Autonomous State Demand Committee

Awami Party

B. C. United Front

Backward Classes Democratic Party, J&K

Bahujan Republican Ekta Manch

Bahujan Samaj Party

Bahujan Samaj Party(Ambedkar-Phule)

Bahujan Sangharsh Party (Kanshiram)

Bahujan Shakty

Bahujan Uday Manch

Bajjikanchal Vikas Party

Bharat Punarnirman Dal

Bharat Vikas Morcha

Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

Bharatiya Bahujan Party

Bharatiya Eklavya Party

Bharatiya Grameen Dal

Bharatiya Jagaran Party

Bharatiya Jan Berojgar Chhatra Dal

Bharatiya Jan Shakti

Bharatiya Janata Party

Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

Bharatiya Lok Kalyan Dal

Bharatiya Loktantrik Party(Gandhi-Lohiawadi)

Bharatiya Minorities Suraksha Mahasangh

Bharatiya Momin Front

Bharatiya Natiional Janta Dal

Bharatiya Peoples Party

Bharatiya Pichhra Dal

Bharatiya Praja Paksha

Bharatiya Rashtriya Bahujan Samaj Vikas Party

Bharatiya Republican Paksha

Bharatiya Sadbhawna Samaj Party

Bharatiya Samaj Dal

Bharatiya Samta Samaj Party

Bharatiya Sarvodaya Kranti Party

Bharatiya Subhash Sena

Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

Biju Janata Dal

Bira Oriya Party

Bodaland Peoples Front

Buddhiviveki Vikas Party

Chandigarh Vikas Party

Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

Chhattisgarhi Samaj Party

Communist Party of India

Communist Party of India (Marxist)

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

Democratic Party of India

Democratic Secular Party

Dharam Nirpeksh Dal

Duggar Pradesh Party

Eklavya Samaj Party

Gondvana Gantantra Party

Gondwana Mukti Sena

Great India Party

Hill State People’s Democratic Party

Hindustan Janta Party

Indian Christian Secular Party

Indian Justice Party

Indian National Congress

Indian Peace Party

Indian Peoples Forward Block

Indian Union Muslim League

Jaganmay Nari Sangathan

Jago Party

Jai Bharat Samanta Party

Jai Chhattisgarh Party

Jai Vijaya Bharathi Party

Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party

Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party

Jan Samanta Party

Jan Surajya Shakti

Jana Hitkari Party

Janata Dal (Secular)

Janata Dal (United)

Janata Party

Janvadi Party(Socialist)

Jawan Kisan Morcha

Jharkhand Disom Party

Jharkhand Jan Morcha

Jharkhand Janadikhar Manch

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

Jharkhand Party

Jharkhand Party (Naren)

Jharkhand PeopleÂ’S Party

Jharkhand Vikas Dal

Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

Kalinga Sena

Kamtapur Progressive Party

Kannada Chalavali Vatal Paksha

Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha

Karnataka Thamizhar Munnetra Kazhagam

Kerala Congress

Kerala Congress (M)

Kosal Kranti Dal

Kosi Vikas Party

Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

Krantikari Samyavadi Party

Krantisena Maharashtra

Laghujan Samaj Vikas Party

Lal Morcha

Lok Bharati

Lok Dal

Lok Jan Shakti Party

Lok Jan Vikas Morcha

Lok Satta Party

Lok Vikas Party

Lokpriya Samaj Party

Loksangram

Loktanrik Sarkar Party

Loktantrik Samajwadi Party

Loktantrik Samata Dal

Mahagujarat Janta Party

Maharashtra Navnirman sena

Maharashtrawadi Gomantak

Mahila Adhikar Party

Mana Party

Manav Mukti Morcha

Manipur People’s Party

Marxist Communist Party of India (S.S. Srivastava)

Marxist Co-Ordination

Maulik Adhikar Party

Meghalaya Democratic Party

Moderate Party

Momin Conference

Muslim League Kerala State Committee

Muslim Majlis Uttar Pradesh

Nagaland Peoples Front

National Development Party

National Lokhind Party

National Loktantrik Party

National Secular Party

National Youth Party

Nationalist Congress Party

Navbharat Nirman Party

Nelopa(United)

Orissa Mukti Morcha

Party for Democratic Socialism

Paschim Banga Rajya Muslim League

Peace Party

Peoples Democratic Alliance

Peoples Democratic Forum

People’s Democratic Front

Peoples Guardian

People’s Party of Arunachal

Peoples Republican Party

Prabuddha Republican Party

Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party

Praja Bharath Party

Praja Rajyam Party

Prajatantrik Samadhan Party

Proutist Sarva Samaj

Proutist Sarva Samaj Party

Purvanchal Rajya Banao Dal

Pyramid Party of India

Rajyadhikara Party

Rashtra Sewa Dal

Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

Rashtravadi Communist Party

Rashtravadi Janata Party

Rashtrawadi Sena

Rashtriya Agraniye Dal

Rashtriya Bahujan Congress Party

Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

Rashtriya Gondvana Party

Rashtriya Janata Dal

Rashtriya Jan-Jagram Morcha

Rashtriya Jan-vadi Party (Krantikari)

Rashtriya Kranti Party

Rashtriya Krantikari Janata Party

Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

Rashtriya Lok Dal

Rashtriya Lokhit Party

Rashtriya Lokwadi Party

Rashtriya Machhua Samaj Party

Rashtriya Mazdoor Ekta Party

Rashtriya Pragati Party

Rashtriya Praja Congress (Secular)

Rashtriya Raksha Dal

Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

Rashtriya Samajwadi Party (United)

Rashtriya Samanta Dal

Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

Rayalaseema Rashtra Samithi

Republican Paksha (Khoripa)

Republican Party of India

Republican Party of India (A)

Republican Party of India (Democratic )

Republican Party of India (Khobragade)

Republican Presidium Party of India

Republician Party of India Ektawadi

Revolutionary Communist Party of India (Rasik Bhatt)

Revolutionary Socialist Party

Samajik Jantantrik Party

Samajtantric Party of India

Samajwadi Jan Parishad

Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

Samajwadi Party

Samata Party

Samruddha Odisha

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Party

Sarvodaya Karnataka Paksha

Sarvodaya Party

Savarn Samaj Party

Save Goa Front

Shakti Sena (Bharat Desh)

Shivrajya Party

Shivsena

Shoshit Samaj Dal

Socialist Party (Lohia)

Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

Sunder Samaj Party

Swabhimani Paksha

Swarajya Party Of India

Swatantra Bharat Paksha

Telangana Rashtra Samithi

Telugu Desam

The Humanist Party of India

Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

United Communist Party of India

United Democratic Party

United Goans Democratic Party

United Women Front

Uttar Pradesh Republican Party

Vanchit Jamat Party

Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch

Vikas Party

Vishva Hindustani Sangathan

Yuva Vikas Party … and many many more….

S01    1    AP    ADILABAD    16-Apr-09    1    ADE TUKARAM    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    KOTNAK RAMESH    M    39    Indian National Congress

3    RATHOD RAMESH    M    43    Telugu Desam

4    RATHOD SADASHIV NAIK    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    MESRAM NAGO RAO    M    59    Praja Rajyam Party

6    ATHRAM LAXMAN RAO    M    47    Independent

7    GANTA PENTANNA    M    36    Independent

8    NETHAVAT RAMDAS    M    39    Independent

9    BANKA SAHADEVU    M    55    Independent

S01    2    AP    PEDDAPALLE    16-Apr-09    1    GAJJELA SWAMY    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    GOMASA SRINIVAS    M    41    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

3    MATHANGI NARSIAH    M    64    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DR.G.VIVEKANAND    M    51    Indian National Congress

5    AREPELLI DAVID RAJU    M    36    Praja Rajyam Party

6    KRISHNA SABBALI    M    39    Marxist Communist Party of India (S.S. Srivastava)

7    AMBALA MAHENDAR    M    38    Independent

8    A. KAMALAMMA    F    36    Independent

9    GORRE RAMESH    M    42    Independent

10    NALLALA KANUKAIAH    M    39    Independent

11    B. MALLAIAH    M    32    Independent

12    K. RAJASWARI    F    38    Independent

13    D. RAMULU    M    51    Independent

14    G.VINAY KUMAR    M    51    Independent

15    S.LAXMAIAH    M    33    Independent

S01    3    AP    KARIMNAGAR    16-Apr-09    1    CHANDUPATLA JANGA REDDY    M    75    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PONNAM PRABHAKAR    M    41    Indian National Congress

3    VINOD KUMAR BOINAPALLY    M    49    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

4    VIRESHAM NALIMELA    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    RAGULA RAMULU    M    40    Republican Party of India (A)

6    LINGAMPALLI SRINIVAS REDDY    M    39    Marxist Communist Party of India (S.S. Srivastava)

7    VELICHALA RAJENDER RAO    M    46    Praja Rajyam Party

8    T. SRIMANNARAYANA    M    68    Pyramid Party of India

9    K. PRABHAKAR    M    43    Independent

10    KORIVI VENUGOPAL    M    46    Independent

11    BARIGE GATTAIAH YADAV    M    32    Independent

12    GADDAM RAJI REDDY    M    48    Independent

13    PANAKANTI SATISH KUMAR    M    46    Independent

14    PEDDI RAVINDER    M    29    Independent

15    B. SURESH    M    32    Independent

S01    4    AP    NIZAMABAD    16-Apr-09    1    DR. BAPU REDDY    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BIGALA GANESH GUPTA    M    39    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

3    MADHU YASKHI GOUD    M    50    Indian National Congress

4    YEDLA RAMU    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    DUDDEMPUDI SAMBASIVA RAO CHOUDARY    M    62    Lok Satta Party

6    P.VINAY KUMAR    M    51    Praja Rajyam Party

7    DR. V.SATHYANARAYANA MURTHY    M    51    Pyramid Party of India

8    S. SUJATHA    F    43    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

9    AARIS MOHAMMED    M    46    Independent

10    KANDEM PRABHAKAR    M    44    Independent

11    GADDAM SRINIVAS    M    47    Independent

12    RAPELLY SRINIVAS    M    34    Independent

S01    5    AP    ZAHIRABAD    16-Apr-09    1    CHENGAL BAGANNA    M    66    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    M.VISHNU MUDIRAJ    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SYED YOUSUF ALI    M    54    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

4    SURESH KUMAR SHETKAR    M    46    Indian National Congress

5    BENJAMIN RAJU    M    39    Indian Justice Party

6    MALKAPURAM SHIVA KUMAR    M    43    Praja Rajyam Party

7    MALLESH RAVINDER REDDY    M    39    Lok Satta Party

8    CHITTA RAJESHWAR RAO    M    45    Independent

9    POWAR SINGH HATTI SINGH    M    36    Independent

10    BASAVA RAJ PATIL    M    39    Independent

S01    6    AP    MEDAK    16-Apr-09    1    NARENDRANATH .C    M    45    Indian National Congress

2    P. NIROOP REDDY    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    VIJAYA SHANTHI .M    F    43    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

4    Y. SHANKAR GOUD    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KOVURI PRABHAKAR    M    51    Pyramid Party of India

6    KHAJA QUAYUM ANWAR    M    43    Praja Rajyam Party

7    D. YADESHWAR    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party(Ambedkar-Phule)

8    K. SUDHEER REDDY    M    37    Lok Satta Party

9    KUNDETI RAVI    M    32    Independent

S01    7    AP    MALKAJGIRI    16-Apr-09    1    NALLU INDRASENA REDDY    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    M.BABU RAO PADMA SALE    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BHEEMSEN.T    M    60    Telugu Desam

4    SARVEY SATYANARAYANA    M    54    Indian National Congress

5    S.D.KRISHNA MURTHY    M    51    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

6    T.DEVENDER GOUD    M    56    Praja Rajyam Party

7    NARENDER KUMBALA    M    39    Bharat Punarnirman Dal

8    PRATHANI RAMAKRISHNA    M    42    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

9    LION C FRANCIS MJF    M    56    Samajwadi Party

10    N V RAMA REDDY    M    54    Pyramid Party of India

11    DR.LAVU RATHAIAH    M    56    Lok Satta Party

12    KANTE KANAKAIAH GANGAPUTHRA    M    63    Independent

13    KOYAL KAR BHOJARAJ    M    35    Independent

14    CHENURU VENKATA SUBBA RAO    M    52    Independent

15    JAJULA BHASKAR    M    34    Independent

16    LT.COL. (RETD). DUSERLA PAPARAIDU    M    62    Independent

17    MD.MANSOORALI    M    31    Independent

18    S.VICTOR    M    40    Independent

19    K.SRINIVASA RAJU    M    44    Independent

S01    8    AP    SECUNDRABAD    16-Apr-09    1    ANJAN KUMAR YADAV M    M    47    Indian National Congress

2    BANDARU DATTATREYA    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    M. D. MAHMOOD ALI    M    55    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

4    M. VENKATESH    M    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SRINIVASA SUDHISH RAMBHOTLA    M    40    Telugu Desam

6    ABDUS SATTAR MUJAHED    M    41    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

7    IMDAD JAH    M    64    Ambedkar National Congress

8    P. DAMODER REDDY    M    48    Pyramid Party of India

9    DR. DASOJU SRAVAN KUMAR    M    41    Praja Rajyam Party

10    S. DEVAIAH    M    59    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

11    C.V.L. NARASIMHA RAO    M    51    Lok Satta Party

12    DR .POLISHETTY RAM MOHAN    M    57    Samata Party

13    MOHD. OSMAN QURESHEE    M    35    Ajeya Bharat Party

14    SHIRAZ KHAN    F    39    United Women Front

15    ASEERVADAM LELLAPALLI    M    51    Independent

16    AMBATI KRISHNA MURTHY    M    50    Independent

17    B. GOPALA KRISHNA    M    42    Independent

18    DEVI DAS RAO GHODKE    M    63    Independent

19    BABER ALI KHAN    M    51    Independent

20    M. BHAGYA MATHA    F    38    Independent

21    CH. MURAHARI    M    49    Independent

22    G. RAJAIAH    M    48    Independent

23    K. SRINIVASA CHARI    M    49    Independent

S01    9    AP    HYDERABAD    16-Apr-09    1    ZAHID ALI KHAN    M    66    Telugu Desam

2    P. LAXMAN RAO GOUD    M    55    Indian National Congress

3    SATISH AGARWAL    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SAMY MOHAMMED    M    29    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ASADUDDIN OWAISI    M    41    All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen

6    S. GOPAL SINGH    M    34    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

7    TAHER KAMAL KHUNDMIRI    M    52    Janata Dal (Secular)

8    FATIMA .A    F    41    Praja Rajyam Party

9    P. VENKATESWARA RAO    M    58    Pyramid Party of India

10    D. SURENDER    M    36    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

11    AL-KASARY MOULLIM MOHSIN HUSSAIN    M    33    Independent

12    ALTAF AHMED KHAN    M    43    Independent

13    M.A. QUDDUS GHORI    M    43    Independent

14    ZAHID ALI KHAN    M    26    Independent

15    M.A. BASITH    M    55    Independent

16    MD. OSMAN    M    43    Independent

17    B. RAVI YADAV    M    33    Independent

18    N.L. SRINIVAS    M    31    Independent

19    M.A. SATTAR    M    29    Independent

20    D. SADANAND    M    45    Independent

21    SYED ABDUL GAFFTER    M    51    Independent

22    SARDAR SINGH    M    62    Independent

23    M.A. HABEEB    M    31    Independent

S01    10    AP    CHELVELLA    16-Apr-09    1    JAIPAL REDDY SUDINI    M    67    Indian National Congress

2    A.P.JITHENDER REDDY    M    54    Telugu Desam

3    BADDAM BAL REDDY    M    64    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    C.SRINIVAS RAO    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KASANI GNANESHWAR    M    54    Mana Party

6    KUMMARI GIRI    M    28    Pyramid Party of India

7    DASARA SARALA DEVI    F    39    Marxist Communist Party of India (S.S. Srivastava)

8    DR.B.RAGHUVEER REDDY    M    42    Lok Satta Party

9    SAMA SRINIVASULU    M    34    Great India Party

10    S.MALLA REDDY    M    43    Independent

11    G.MALLESHAM GOUD    M    32    Independent

12    RAMESHWARAM JANGAIAH    M    58    Independent

13    LAXMINARAYANA    M    27    Independent

14    VENKATRAM NAIK    M    27    Independent

15    SAYAMOOLA NARSIMULU    M    30    Independent

S01    11    AP    MAHBUBNAGAR    16-Apr-09    1    KUCHAKULLA YADAGIRI REDDY    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    K. CHANDRASEKHAR RAO    M    55    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

3    DEVARAKONDA VITTAL RAO    M    57    Indian National Congress

4    PALEM SUDARSHAN GOUD    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ABDUL KAREEM KHAJA MOHAMMAD    M    50    Lok Satta Party

6    ASIRVADAM    M    35    Great India Party

7    KOLLA VENKATESH MADIGA    M    37    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

8    GUNDALA VIJAYALAKSHMI    F    61    Pyramid Party of India

9    B. BALRAJ GOUD    M    44    Mana Party

10    MUNISWAMY.C.R    M    32    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

11    USHAN SATHYAMMA    F    32    Independent

12    USAIN RANGAMMA    F    50    Independent

13    YETTI CHINNA YENKAIAH    M    47    Independent

14    YETTI LINGAIAH    M    52    Independent

15    KANDUR KURMAIAH    M    56    Independent

16    KARRE JANGAIAH    M    29    Independent

17    GANGAPURI RAVINDAR GOUD    M    28    Independent

18    GAJJA NARSIMULU    M    35    Independent

19    CHENNAMSETTY DASHARATHA RAMULU HOLEA DASARI    M    31    Independent

20    M.A. JABBAR    M    39    Independent

21    DEPALLY MAISAIAH    M    27    Independent

22    DEPALLY SAYANNA    M    47    Independent

23    K. NARSIMULU    M    52    Independent

24    NAGENDER REDDY. K    M    49    Independent

25    PANDU    M    29    Independent

26    BUDIGA JANGAM LAXMAMMA    F    30    Independent

27    MOHAMMAD GHOUSE MOINUDDIN    M    76    Independent

28    MALA JANGILAMMA    F    50    Independent

29    RAJESH NAIK    M    29    Independent

30    RAIKANTI RAMADAS MADIGA    M    40    Independent

31    V. VENKATESHWARLU    M    32    Independent

32    B. SEENAIAH GOUD    M    62    Independent

S01    12    AP    NAGARKURNOOL    16-Apr-09    1    GUVVALA BALARAJU    M    31    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

2    TANGIRALA PARAMJOTHI    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR. MANDA JAGANNATH    M    57    Indian National Congress

4    DR. T. RATNAKARA    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DEVANI SATYANARAYANA    M    39    Praja Rajyam Party

6    S.P.FERRY ROY    M    27    Pyramid Party of India

7    G. VIDYASAGAR    M    60    Lok Satta Party

8    ANAPOSALA VENKATESH    M    27    Independent

9    N. KURUMAIAH    M    27    Independent

10    BUDDULA SRINIVAS    M    35    Independent

11    A.V. SHIVA KUMAR    M    42    Independent

12    SIRIGIRI MANNEM    M    36    Independent

13    HANUMANTHU    M    28    Independent

S01    13    AP    NALGONDA    16-Apr-09    1    GUTHA SUKENDER REDDY    M    55    Indian National Congress

2    NAZEERUDDIN    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    VEDIRE SRIRAM REDDY    M    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SURAVARAM SUDHAKAR REDDY    M    67    Communist Party of India

5    A. NAGESHWAR RAO    M    59    Pyramid Party of India

6    PADURI KARUNA    F    58    Praja Rajyam Party

7    DAIDA LINGAIAH    M    51    Independent

8    MD. NAZEEMUDDIN    M    40    Independent

9    BOLUSANI KRISHNAIAH    M    45    Independent

10    BOLLA KARUNAKAR    M    33    Independent

11    MARRY NEHEMIAH    M    55    Independent

12    YALAGANDULA RAMU    M    41    Independent

13    K.V.SRINIVASA CHARYULU    M    30    Independent

14    SHAIK AHMED    M    57    Independent

S01    14    AP    BHONGIR    16-Apr-09    1    KOMATIREDDY RAJ GOPAL REDDY    M    41    Indian National Congress

2    CHINTHA SAMBA MURTHY    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    NOMULA NARSIMHAIAH    M    49    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    SIDDHARTHA PHOOLEY    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    CHANDRA MOULI GANDAM    M    48    Praja Rajyam Party

6    PALLA PRABHAKAR REDDY    M    64    Pyramid Party of India

7    RACHA SUBHADRA REDDY    F    59    Lok Satta Party

8    GUMMI BAKKA REDDY    M    75    Independent

9    POOSA BALA KISHAN BESTA    M    35    Independent

10    PERUKA ANJAIAH    M    46    Independent

11    MAMIDIGALLA JOHN BABU    M    40    Independent

12    MEDI NARSIMHA    M    31    Independent

13    RUPANI RAMESH VADDERA    M    31    Independent

14    SANGU MALLAYYA    M    66    Independent

15    SIRUPANGI RAMULU    M    55    Independent

S01    15    AP    WARANGAL    16-Apr-09    1    JAYAPAL. V    M    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DOMMATI SAMBAIAH    M    45    Telugu Desam

3    RAJAIAH SIRICILLA    M    55    Indian National Congress

4    RAMAGALLA PARAMESHWAR    M    55    Telangana Rashtra Samithi

5    LALAIAH P    M    65    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    ONTELA MONDAIAH    M    58    Pyramid Party of India

7    DR. CHANDRAGIRI RAJAMOULY    M    49    Praja Rajyam Party

8    BALLEPU VENKAT NARSINGA RAO    M    37    Lok Satta Party

9    KANNAM VENKANNA    M    32    Independent

10    KRISHNADHI SRILATHA    F    33    Independent

11    SOMAIAH GANAPURAM    M    39    Independent

12    DAMERA MOGILI    M    34    Independent

13    DUBASI NARSING    M    46    Independent

14    PAKALA DEVADANAM    M    74    Independent

15    D. SREEDHAR RAO    M    37    Independent

S01    16    AP    MAHABUBABAD    16-Apr-09    1    KUNJA SRINIVASA RAO    M    31    Communist Party of India

2    GUMMADI PULLAIAH    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    B. DILIP    M    35    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    P. BALRAM    M    45    Indian National Congress

5    D.T. NAIK    M    61    Praja Rajyam Party

6    PODEM SAMMAIAH    M    31    Pyramid Party of India

7    BANOTH MOLCHAND    M    60    Lok Satta Party

8    KALTHI VEERASWAMY    M    52    Independent

9    KECHELA RANGA REDDY    M    44    Independent

10    DATLA NAGESWAR RAO    M    42    Independent

11    PADIGA YERRAIAH    M    64    Independent

12    P. SATYANARAYANA    M    32    Independent

S01    17    AP    KHAMMAM    16-Apr-09    1    KAPILAVAI RAVINDER    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    THONDAPU VENKATESWARA RAO    M    30    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    NAMA NAGESWARA RAO    M    50    Telugu Desam

4    RENUKA CHOWDHURY    F    54    Indian National Congress

5    JALAGAM HEMAMALINI    F    40    Praja Rajyam Party

6    JUPELLI SATYANARAYANA    M    61    Lok Satta Party

7    MANUKONDA RAGHURAM PRASAD    M    55    Pyramid Party of India

8    SHAIK MADAR SAHEB    M    40    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

9    AVULA VENKATESWARLU    M    45    Independent

10    CHANDA LINGAIAH    M    58    Independent

11    DANDA LINGAIAH    M    59    Independent

12    BANOTH LAXMA NAIK    M    52    Independent

13    MALLAVARAPU JEREMIAH    M    63    Independent

S01    18    AP    ARUKU    16-Apr-09    1    KISHORE CHANDRA SURYANARAYANA DEO VYRICHERLA    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    KURUSA BOJJAIAH    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    GADUGU BALLAYYA DORA    M    38    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    MIDIYAM BABU RAO    M    58    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    LAKE RAJA RAO    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    MEENAKA SIMHACHALAM    M    43    Praja Rajyam Party

7    VADIGALA PENTAYYA    M    56    Lok Satta Party

8    APPA RAO KINJEDI    M    48    Independent

9    ARIKA GUMPA SWAMY    M    60    Independent

10    ILLA RAMI REDDY    M    54    Independent

11    JAYALAKSHMI SHAMBUDU    F    39    Independent

S01    19    AP    SRIKAKULAM    16-Apr-09    1    YERRNNAIDU KINJARAPU    M    50    Telugu Desam

2    KILLI KRUPA RANI    F    47    Indian National Congress

3    TANKALA SUDHAKARA RAO    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    DUPPALA RAVINDARA BABU    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KALYANI VARUDU    F    29    Praja Rajyam Party

6    NANDA PRASADA RAO    M    37    Pyramid Party of India

S01    20    AP    VIZIANAGARAM    16-Apr-09    1    APPALA NAIDU KONDAPALLI    M    41    Telugu Desam

2    GOTTAPU CHINAMNAIDU    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    JHANSI LAXMI BOTCHA    F    45    Indian National Congress

4    SANYASI RAJU PAKALAPATI    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KIMIDI GANAPATHI RAO    M    52    Praja Rajyam Party

6    LUNKARAN JAIN    M    60    Pyramid Party of India

7    DATTLA SATYA APPALA SIVANANDA RAJU    M    34    Lok Satta Party

8    VENKATA SATYA NARAYANA RAGHUMANDA    M    28    Bharatiya Sadbhawna Samaj Party

9    MAHESWARA RAO VARRI    M    35    Independent

S01    21    AP    VISAKHAPATNAM    16-Apr-09    1    I.M.AHMED    M    41    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DAGGUBATI PURANDESWARI    F    49    Indian National Congress

3    DR.M.V.V.S.MURTHI    M    70    Telugu Desam

4    D.V.SUBBARAO    M    76    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    PALLA SRINIVASA RAO    M    40    Praja Rajyam Party

6    BETHALA KEGIYA RANI    F    26    Bahujan Samaj Party(Ambedkar-Phule)

7    D.BHARATHI    F    53    Pyramid Party of India

8    D.V.RAMANA (VASU MASTER)    M    37    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

9    RAMESH LANKA    M    49    Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

10    M.T.VENKATESWARALU    M    42    Lok Satta Party

11    APPARAO GOLAGANA    M    46    Independent

12    BANDAM VENKATA RAO YADAV    M    32    Independent

13    YADDANAPUDI RANGARAO    M    78    Independent

14    YALAMANCHILI PRASAD    M    54    Independent

15    RANGARAJU KALIDINDI    M    46    Independent

S01    22    AP    ANAKAPALLI    16-Apr-09    1    APPA RAO KIRLA    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    NOOKARAPU SURYA PRAKASA RAO    M    50    Telugu Desam

3    BHEEMISETTI NAGESWARARAO    M    41    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    VENKATA RAMANA BABU PILLA    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SABBAM HARI    M    55    Indian National Congress

6    ALLU ARAVIND    M    62    Praja Rajyam Party

7    PULAMARASETTI VENKATA RAMANA    M    28    Pyramid Party of India

8    BOYINA NAGESWARA RAO    M    52    Janata Dal (United)

9    NANDA GOPAL GANDHAM    M    60    Independent

10    PATHALA SATYA RAO    M    46    Independent

S02    1    AR    ARUNACHAL WEST    16-Apr-09    1    KIREN RIJIJU    M    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    TAKAM SANJOY    M    42    Indian National Congress

3    TABA TAKU    M    25    Lok Bharati

4    SUBU KECHI    M    36    Independent

S02    2    AR    ARUNACHAL EAST    16-Apr-09    1    LOWANGCHA WANGLAT    M    66    Arunachal Congress

2    NINONG ERING    M    50    Indian National Congress

3    TAPIR GAO    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DR. SAMSON BORANG    M    33    People’s Party of Arunachal

S03    1    AS    KARIMGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    RAJESH MALLAH    M    43    Assam United Democratic Front

2    LALIT MOHAN SUKLABAIDYA    M    68    Indian National Congress

3    SUDHANGSHU DAS    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    UTTAM NOMOSUDRA    M    34    Independent

5    JOY DAS    M    37    Independent

6    DEBASISH DAS    M    36    Independent

7    PROBHASH CH. SARKAR    M    36    Independent

8    BIJON ROY    M    35    Independent

9    BIJOY MALAKAR    M    42    Independent

10    MALATI ROY    F    42    Independent

11    MILON SINGHA    M    42    Independent

12    RANJAN NAMASUDRA    M    41    Independent

13    RAJESH CHANDRA ROY    M    29    Independent

14    SITAL PRASAD DUSAD    M    55    Independent

15    HIMANGSHU KUMAR DAS    M    28    Independent

S03    2    AS    SILCHAR    16-Apr-09    1    KABINDRA PURKAYASTHA    M    74    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DIPAK BHATTACHARJEE    M    69    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    BADRUDDIN AJMAL    M    54    Assam United Democratic Front

4    SONTOSH MOHAN DEV    M    75    Indian National Congress

5    KANTIMOY DEB    M    60    Independent

6    CHANDAN RABIDAS    M    34    Independent

7    JAYANTA MALLICK    M    36    Independent

8    JOY SUNDAR DAS    M    38    Independent

9    NAGENDRA CHANDRA DAS    M    28    Independent

10    NAZRUL HAQUE MAZARBHUIYAN    M    36    Independent

11    NABADWIP DAS    M    58    Independent

12    PIJUSH KANTI DAS    M    38    Independent

13    MANISH BHATTACHARJEE    M    62    Independent

14    YOGENDRA KUMAR SINGH    M    40    Independent

15    SUBIR DEB    M    41    Independent

16    SUMIT ROY    M    33    Independent

S03    3    AS    AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT    16-Apr-09    1    KULENDRA DAULAGUPU    M    36    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BIREN SINGH ENGTI    M    64    Indian National Congress

3    HIDDHINATH RONGPI    M    45    Nationalist Congress Party

4    ELWIN TERON    M    48    Autonomous State Demand Committee

5    DR. JAYANTA RONGPI    M    54    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    KABON TIMUNGPI    F    56    Independent

S04    17    BR    GOPALGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    ANIL KUMAR    M    41    Rashtriya Janata Dal

2    JANAK RAM    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PURNMASI RAM    M    52    Janata Dal (United)

4    RAMAI RAM    M    66    Indian National Congress

5    MADHU BHARTI    F    39    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    RAM KUMAR MANJHI    M    30    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

7    RAMASHANKAR RAM    M    43    Rashtriya Jan-Jagram Morcha

8    SATYADEO RAM    M    39    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

9    ASHA DEVI    F    46    Independent

10    DINANATH MANJHI    M    31    Independent

11    DHARMENDRA KUMAR HAZRA    M    41    Independent

12    BANITHA BAITHA    F    25    Independent

13    RAJESH KUMAR RAM    M    28    Independent

14    RAM SURAT RAM    M    42    Independent

15    SHAMBHU DOM    M    41    Independent

16    SURENDRA PASWAN    M    28    Independent

S04    18    BR    SIWAN    16-Apr-09    1    PARASH NATH PATHAK    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BRISHIN PATEL    M    60    Janata Dal (United)

3    VIJAY SHANKER DUBEY    M    60    Indian National Congress

4    HENA SHAHAB    F    36    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    AMAR NATH YADAV    M    44    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    ASWANI KR. VERMA    M    28    Indian Justice Party

7    MADHURI PANDAY    F    35    Samajik Jantantrik Party

8    LAL BABU TIWARI    M    55    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

9    UMESH TIWARY    M    30    Independent

10    OM PRAKASH YADAV    M    43    Independent

11    NIDHI KIRTI    F    26    Independent

12    PRABHU NATH MALI    M    26    Independent

13    DR. MUNESHWAR PRASAD    M    68    Independent

14    RAJENDRA KUMAR    M    36    Independent

15    SHAMBHU NATH PRASAD    M    60    Independent

S04    19    BR    MAHARAJGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    UMA SHANAKER SINGH    M    61    Rashtriya Janata Dal

2    TARKESHWAR SINGH    M    51    Indian National Congress

3    PRABHU NATH SINGH    M    56    Janata Dal (United)

4    RAVINDRA NATH MISHRA    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    RAMESH SINGH KUSHWAHA    M    59    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    SATYENDRA KR. SAHANI    M    41    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    GAUTAM PRASAD    M    30    Independent

8    DHURENDRA RAM    M    47    Independent

9    NAYAN PRASAD    M    53    Independent

10    PRADEEP MANJHI    M    32    Independent

11    BANKE BIHARI SINGH    M    25    Independent

12    RAJESH KUMAR SINGH    M    26    Independent

13    BREENDA PATHAK    M    63    Independent

S04    20    BR    SARAN    16-Apr-09    1    RAJIV PRATAP RUDY    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    LALU PRASAD    M    60    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    SALIM PERWEZ    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SANTOSH PATEL    M    39    Loktantrik Samata Dal

5    SOHEL AKHATAR    M    33    Bharatiya Momin Front

6    KUMAR BALRAM SINGH    M    56    Independent

7    DHUPENDRA SINGH    M    33    Independent

8    RAJKUMAR RAI    M    33    Independent

9    RAJAN HRISHIKESH CHANDRA    M    25    Independent

10    RAJARAM SAHANI    M    49    Independent

11    LAL BABU RAY    M    46    Independent

12    SHEO DAS SINGH    M    74    Independent

S04    32    BR    ARRAH    16-Apr-09    1    MEENA SINGH    F    44    Janata Dal (United)

2    RAMA KISHORE SINGH    M    46    Lok Jan Shakti Party

3    REETA SINGH    F    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    HARIDWAR PRASAD SINGH    M    64    Indian National Congress

5    AJIT PRASAD MEHTA    M    43    Jawan Kisan Morcha

6    ARUN SINGH    M    48    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    BHARAT BHUSAN PANDEY    M    35    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

8    RAMADHAR SINGH    M    48    Shivsena

9    SAMBHU PRASAD SHARMA    M    57    All India Forward Bloc

10    SANTOSH KUMAR    M    32    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

11    SATYA NARAYAN YADAV    M    67    Rashtra Sewa Dal

12    SAIYAD GANIUDDIN HAIDER    M    42    Ambedkar National Congress

13    ASHOK KUMAR SINGH    M    38    Independent

14    BHARAT SINGH SAHYOGI    M    45    Independent

15    MAHESH RAM    M    45    Independent

16    SOBH NATH SINGH    M    39    Independent

S04    33    BR    BUXAR    16-Apr-09    1    KAMLA KANT TIWARY    M    67    Indian National Congress

2    JAGADA NAND SINGH    M    65    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    LAL MUNI CHOUBEY    M    71    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SHYAM LAL SINGH KUSHWAHA    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    MOKARRAM HUSSAIN    M    57    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

6    MOHAN SAH    M    33    Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

7    RAJENDRA SINGH MAURYA    M    32    Loktantrik Samata Dal

8    DR. VIJENDRA NATH UPADHYAY    M    37    Shivsena

9    SHYAM BIHARI BIND    M    46    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

10    SATYENDRA OJHA    M    27    Apna Dal

11    SUDAMA PRASAD    M    41    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

12    SURESH WADEKAR    M    38    Republican Party of India

13    KAMLESH CHOUDHARY    M    35    Independent

14    JAI SINGH YADAV    M    34    Independent

15    DADAN SINGH    M    45    Independent

16    PRATIBHA DEVI    F    40    Independent

17    PHULAN PANDIT    M    44    Independent

18    RAJENDRA PASWAN    M    33    Independent

19    LALLAN RUPNARAIN PATHAK    M    65    Independent

20    SHIV CHARAN YADAV    M    55    Independent

21    SUNIL KUMAR DUBEY    M    32    Independent

22    SURENDRA KUMAR BHARTI    M    38    Independent

S04    34    BR    SASARAM    16-Apr-09    1    GANDHI AZAD    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    MEIRA KUMAR    F    63    Indian National Congress

3    MUNI LAL    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    LALAN PASWAN    M    45    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    DUKHI RAM    M    39    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    BABBAN CHAUDHARY    M    39    Loktantrik Samata Dal

7    BALIRAM RAM    M    43    Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party

8    BHOLA PRASAD    M    38    Indian Justice Party

9    RADHA DEBI    F    28    Apna Dal

10    RAM NAGINA RAM    M    41    Rashtriya Krantikari Janata Party

11    RAM YADI RAM    M    72    Republican Party of India

12    PRAMOD KUMAR    M    26    Independent

13    BHARAT RAM    M    33    Independent

14    MUNIYA DEBI    F    41    Independent

15    RAM PRAVESH RAM    M    47    Independent

16    SURENDRA RAM    M    39    Independent

S04    35    BR    KARAKAT    16-Apr-09    1    AWADHESH KUMAR SINGH    M    53    Indian National Congress

2    UPENDRA KUMAR SHARMA    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    KANTI SINGH    F    54    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    MAHABALI SINGH    M    54    Janata Dal (United)

5    AJAY KUMAR    M    32    Republican Party of India (A)

6    JYOTI RASHMI    F    30    Rashtra Sewa Dal

7    MUDREEKA YADAV    M    59    Apna Dal

8    RAJ KISHOR MISRA    M    30    Alpjan Samaj Party

9    RAJA RAM SINGH    M    53    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

10    MD.SHAMIULLAH MANSOORI    M    62    Shoshit Samaj Dal

11    ER.ABDUL SATAR    M    62    Independent

12    AMAVAS RAM    M    50    Independent

13    PRO. KAMTA PRASAD YADAV    M    46    Independent

14    GIRISH NARAYAN SINGH    M    48    Independent

15    SATISH PANDEY    M    27    Independent

16    HARI PRASAD SINGH    M    63    Independent

S04    36    BR    JAHANABAD    16-Apr-09    1    DR. ARUN KUMAR    M    49    Indian National Congress

2    JAGDISH SHARMA    M    58    Janata Dal (United)

3    RAMADHAR SHARMA    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SURENDRA PRASAD YADAV    M    51    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    AYASHA KHATUN    F    28    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    PROF. JAI RAM PRASAD SINGH    M    70    Shoshit Samaj Dal

7    TARA GUPTA    F    62    Rashtriya Pragati Party

8    MAHANAND PRASAD    M    41    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

9    RAMASRAY PRASAD SINGH    M    83    Rashtriya Lok Dal

10    MD. SAHABUDDIN JAHAN    M    36    Bharatiya Sarvodaya Kranti Party

11    SHRAVAN KUMAR    M    32    Lal Morcha

12    SADHU SINHA    M    68    All India Forward Bloc

13    SYED AKBAR IMAM    M    49    Akhil Bharatiya Ashok Sena

14    AJAY KUMAR VERMA    M    41    Independent

15    ABHAY KUMAR ANIL    M    41    Independent

16    DR. ARBIND KUMAR    M    52    Independent

17    ARVIND PRASAD SINGH    M    43    Independent

18    UPENDRA PRASAD    M    31    Independent

19    JAGDISH YADAV    M    40    Independent

20    PRIKSHIT SINGH    M    36    Independent

21    PRABHAT KUMAR RANJAN    M    32    Independent

22    RANJIT SHARMA    M    28    Independent

23    RAKESHWAR KISHOR    M    35    Independent

24    SIYA RAM PRASAD    M    40    Independent

25    SUMIRAK SINGH    M    50    Independent

S04    37    BR    AURANGABAD    16-Apr-09    1    ARCHANA CHANDRA    F    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    NIKHIL KUMAR    M    67    Indian National Congress

3    SHAKIL AHMAD KHAN    M    61    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH    M    43    Janata Dal (United)

5    ANIL KUMAR SINGH    M    36    Rashtra Sewa Dal

6    AMERIKA MAHTO    M    48    Shoshit Samaj Dal

7    RAM KUMAR MEHTA    M    37    Loktantrik Samata Dal

8    VIJAY PASWAN    M    48    Bharatiya Sarvodaya Kranti Party

9    ASLAM ANSARI    M    38    Independent

10    INDRA DEO RAM    M    58    Independent

11    UDAY PASWAN    M    41    Independent

12    PUNA DAS    M    34    Independent

13    RANJEET KUMAR    M    48    Independent

14    RAJENDRA YADAV    M    42    Independent

15    RAMSWARUP PRASAD YADAV    M    72    Independent

16    SANTOSH KUMAR    M    40    Independent

S04    38    BR    GAYA    16-Apr-09    1    KALAWATI DEVI    F    27    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    RAMJI MANJHI    M    49    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    SANJIV PRASAD TONI    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    HARI MANJHI    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DILIP PASWAN    M    41    Navbharat Nirman Party

6    NIRANJAN KUMAR    M    35    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    RAJESH KUMAR    M    27    Loktantrik Samata Dal

8    RAMDEV ARYA PAAN    M    67    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

9    AMAR NATH PRASAD    M    35    Independent

10    KRISHNA CHOUDHARY    M    26    Independent

11    KAIL DAS    M    66    Independent

12    DIPAK PASWAN    M    27    Independent

13    RAM KISHORE PASWAN    M    36    Independent

14    RAMU PASWAN    M    29    Independent

15    SHIV SHANKAR KUMAR    M    33    Independent

16    SHYAM LAL MANJHI    M    50    Independent

S04    39    BR    NAWADA    16-Apr-09    1    GANESH SHANKAR VIDYARTHI    M    85    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    BHOLA SINGH    M    70    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MASIH UDDIN    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    VEENA DEVI    F    36    Lok Jan Shakti Party

5    SUNILA DEVI    F    38    Indian National Congress

6    UMAKANT RAHI    M    37    Shoshit Samaj Dal

7    KAILASH PAL    M    48    Bharatiya Sarvodaya Kranti Party

8    VIDHYAPATI SINGH    M    46    Loktantrik Samata Dal

9    SURENDRA KUMAR CHAUDHARY    M    45    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

10    AKHILESH SINGH    M    38    Independent

11    ANIL MEHTA    M    36    Independent

12    KAUSHAL YADAV    M    39    Independent

13    CHANCHALA DEVI    F    33    Independent

14    DURGA PRASAD DHAR    M    29    Independent

15    NAVIN KUMAR VERMA    M    38    Independent

16    RAJ KISHOR RAJ    M    43    Independent

17    RAJ BALLABH PRASAD    M    46    Independent

18    RAJENDRA VISHAL    M    44    Independent

19    RAJENDRA SINGH    M    60    Independent

20    SHAMBHU PRASAD    M    41    Independent

21    SUNIL KUMAR    M    28    Independent

S04    40    BR    JAMUI    16-Apr-09    1    ASHOK CHOUDHARY    M    42    Indian National Congress

2    GAJADHAR RAJAK    M    63    Communist Party of India

3    BHAGWAN DAS    M    61    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    BHUDEO CHOUDHARY    M    46    Janata Dal (United)

5    SHYAM RAJAK    M    56    Rashtriya Janata Dal

6    ARJUN MANJHI    M    45    Jago Party

7    UPENDRA RAVIDAS    M    30    Samata Party

8    OM PRAKASH PASWAN    M    62    Loktantrik Samata Dal

9    GULAB CHANDRA PASWAN    M    58    Rashtriya Krantikari Janata Party

10    NUNDEO MANJHI    M    54    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

11    PRASADI PASWAN    M    37    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

12    SUBHASH PASWAN    M    36    Samajtantric Party of India

13    KAPILDEO DAS    M    55    Independent

14    JAY SEKHAR MANJHI    M    48    Independent

15    PAPPU RAJAK    M    40    Independent

16    YOGENDRA PASWAN    M    37    Independent

17    VIJAY PASWAN    M    29    Independent

18    BILAKSHAN RAVIDAS    M    51    Independent

19    SARYUG PASWAN    M    65    Independent

S09    6    JK    JAMMU    16-Apr-09    1    S.TARLOK SINGH    M    59    Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party

2    HUSSAIN ALI    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    LILA KARAN SHARMA    M    68    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    MADAN LAL SHARMA    M    56    Indian National Congress

5    UDAY CHAND    M    55    Duggar Pradesh Party

6    SURJIT SINGH ‘G’ SITARA    M    58    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

7    SANT RAM    M    73    Bharatiya Bahujan Party

8    SANJEEV KUMAR MANMOTRA    M    42    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    QARI ZAHIR ABBAS BHATTI    M    39    All India Forward Bloc

10    ABDUL MAJEED MALIK    M    37    Backward Classes Democratic Party, J&K

11    ASHOK KUMAR    M    45    Independent

12    BALWAN SINGH    M    35    Independent

13    PARAS RAM POONCHI    M    56    Independent

14    RAMESH CHANDER SHARMA    M    36    Independent

15    SATISH POONCHI    M    60    Independent

16    SANJAY KUMAR    M    39    Independent

17    SHAKEELA BANO    F    32    Independent

18    LABHA RAM GANDHI    M    46    Independent

19    CH. MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN CHOUHAN    M    38    Independent

20    NARESH DOGRA    M    40    Independent

21    HILAL AHMED BAIG    M    29    Independent

S11    1    KL    KASARAGOD    16-Apr-09    1    P KARUNAKARAN    M    64    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    K.H.MADHAVI    F    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SHAHIDA KAMAL    F    40    Indian National Congress

4    K. SURENDRAN    M    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ABBAS MUTHALAPPARA    M    47    Independent

6    MOHAN NAYAK    M    73    Independent

7    P.K. RAMAN    M    48    Independent

S11    2    KL    KANNUR    16-Apr-09    1    P.P KARUNAKARAN MASTER    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    K.K BALAKRISHNAN NAMBIAR    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    K.K RAGESH    M    38    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    K. SUDHAKARAN    M    60    Indian National Congress

5    P.I. CHANDRASEKHARAN    M    53    The Humanist Party of India

6    JOHNSON ALIAS SUNNY AMBATT    M    48    Independent

7    K. RAGESH S/O. JANARDHANAN    M    33    Independent

8    PATTATHIL RAGHAVAN    M    82    Independent

9    K. SUDHAKARAN KAVINTE ARIKATH    M    39    Independent

S11    3    KL    VADAKARA    16-Apr-09    1    ADV.K. NOORUDHEEN MUSALIAR    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    MULLAPPALLY RAMACHANDRAN    M    64    Indian National Congress

3    K.P SREESAN    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ADV. P. SATHEEDEVI    F    52    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    T.P CHANDRASEKHARAN    M    47    Independent

6    NAROTH RAMACHANDRAN    M    58    Independent

7    P.SATHIDEVI PALLIKKAL    F    36    Independent

8    SATHEEDEVI    F    42    Independent

S11    4    KL    WAYANAD    16-Apr-09    1    K. MURALEEDHARAN    M    51    Nationalist Congress Party

2    RAJEEV JOSEPH    M    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    C. VASUDEVAN MASTER    M    65    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    M.I. SHANAVAS    M    57    Indian National Congress

5    ADVOCATE. M. RAHMATHULLA    M    48    Communist Party of India

6    KALLANGODAN ABDUL LATHEEF    M    46    Independent

7    CLETUS    M    52    Independent

8    DR. NALLA THAMPY THERA    M    75    Independent

9    ADVOCATE. SHANAVAS MALAPPURAM    M    36    Independent

10    SHANAVAS MANAKULANGARA PARAMBIL    M    29    Independent

11    SUNNY PONNAMATTOM    M    58    Independent

12    M.P. RAHMATH    M    30    Independent

13    RAHMATHULLA POOLADAN    M    36    Independent

S11    5    KL    KOZHIKODE    16-Apr-09    1    A.K. ABDUL NASAR    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ADV. P.A. MOHAMED RIYAS    M    33    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    V. MURALEEDHARAN    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    M.K. RAGHAVAN    M    57    Indian National Congress

5    ADV. P. KUMARANKUTTY    M    64    Independent

6    K. MUHAMMED RIYAS    M    27    Independent

7    P. MUHAMMED RIYAS    M    28    Independent

8    P.A. MOHAMMED RIYAS    M    37    Independent

9    MUDOOR MUHAMMED HAJI    M    44    Independent

10    K. RAGHAVAN    M    44    Independent

11    P. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR    M    63    Independent

12    M. RAGHAVAN    M    65    Independent

13    VINOD K.    M    33    Independent

14    ADV. SABI JOSEPH    M    60    Independent

15    DR. D.SURENDRANATH    M    60    Independent

16    RIYAS    M    31    Independent

S11    6    KL    MALAPPURAM    16-Apr-09    1    ADV.E.A. ABOOBACKER    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ADV. N. ARAVINDAN    M    43    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    E. AHAMED    M    70    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

4    T.K. HAMSA    M    71    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

S11    7    KL    PONNANI    16-Apr-09    1    K. JANACHANDRAN MASTER    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    P.K. MUHAMMED    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    E.T. MUHAMMED BASHEER    M    62    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

4    ABDUREHMAN    M    32    Independent

5    DR. AZAD    M    45    Independent

6    PULLANI GOVINDAN    M    64    Independent

7    DR. HUSSAIN RANTATHANI    M    51    Independent

8    HUSSAIN EDAYATH    M    29    Independent

9    HUSSAIN KADAIKKAL    M    37    Independent

10    HUSSAIN PERICHAYIL    M    42    Independent

11    HUSSAIN    M    29    Independent

12    DR. HUSSAIN    M    40    Independent

13    K. SADANANDAN    M    62    Independent

S11    8    KL    PALAKKAD    16-Apr-09    1    ABDUL RAZAK MOULAVI    M    47    Nationalist Congress Party

2    CHANDRAN. V    M    63    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    C.K. PADMANABHAN    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    M.B. RAJESH    M    34    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    SATHEESAN PACHENI    M    41    Indian National Congress

6    A. AROKIASAMY    M    61    Independent

7    M.R. MURALI    M    43    Independent

8    N.V. RAJESH    M    35    Independent

9    VIJAYAN AMBALAKKAD    M    42    Independent

10    SATHEESAN. E.V    M    37    Independent

S11    9    KL    ALATHUR    16-Apr-09    1    P.K BIJU    M    34    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    M. BINDU TEACHER    F    35    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    DR. G SUDEVAN    M    61    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    N.K SUDHEER    M    44    Indian National Congress

5    K. GOPALAKRISHNAN    M    39    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    BIJU K.K    M    38    Independent

7    P.C BIJU    M    36    Independent

8    C.K RAMAKRISHNAN    M    43    Independent

9    K.K SUDHIR    M    44    Independent

S11    10    KL    THRISSUR    16-Apr-09    1    P C CHACKO    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    C N JAYADEVAN    M    58    Communist Party of India

3    ADV. JOSHY THARAKAN    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    REMA REGUNANDAN    F    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    AJAYAN KUTTIKAT    M    36    Janata Dal (United)

6    K ARUN KUMAR    M    39    Independent

7    KUNJAN PULAYAN    M    52    Independent

8    E A JOSEPH    M    49    Independent

9    N K RAVI    M    46    Independent

10    P C SAJU    M    35    Independent

11    ADV. N HARIHARAN NAIR    M    63    Independent

S11    11    KL    CHALAKUDY    16-Apr-09    1    ADV. U.P JOSEPH    M    45    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    K.P. DHANAPALAN    M    59    Indian National Congress

3    MUTTAM ABDULLA    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ADV.K.V. SABU    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    HAMSA KALAPARAMBATH    M    47    Lok Jan Shakti Party

6    JOHNNY K CHEEKU    M    47    Independent

7    JOSE MAVELI    M    58    Independent

8    U.P JOSE    M    45    Independent

9    DR. P.S. BABU    M    42    Independent

10    T.S NARAYANAN MASTER    M    67    Independent

11    C.A. HASEENA    F    36    Independent

S11    12    KL    ERNAKULAM    16-Apr-09    1    PROF. K V THOMAS    M    61    Indian National Congress

2    A.N. RADHAKRISHNAN    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SHERIF MOHAMMED    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SINDHU JOY    F    32    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    SAJU THOMAS    M    43    Lok Jan Shakti Party

6    MARY FRANCIS MOOLAMPILLY    F    59    Independent

7    VISWAMBARAN    M    59    Independent

8    SAJI THURUTHIKUNNEL    M    37    Independent

9    SINDHU K.S    F    36    Independent

10    SINDHU JAYAN    F    38    Independent

S11    13    KL    IDUKKI    16-Apr-09    1    ADV. P.T THOMAS    M    59    Indian National Congress

2    ADV. K. FRANCIS GEORGE    M    54    Kerala Congress

3    ADV. BIJU M JOHN    M    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SREENAGARI RAJAN    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    VASUDEVAN    M    39    Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch

6    ADV. CHITTOOR RAJAMANNAR    M    50    Independent

7    JOSE KUTTIYANY    M    69    Independent

8    KANCHIYAR PEETHAMBARAN    M    45    Independent

9    BABY    M    51    Independent

10    M A SOOSAI    M    45    Independent

S11    14    KL    KOTTAYAM    16-Apr-09    1    JOSE K.MANI    M    44    Kerala Congress (M)

2    ADV. NARAYANAN NAMBOOTHIRI    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ADV. SURESH KURUP    M    52    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    SPENCER MARKS    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ADV. JAIMON THANKACHAN    M    39    Samajwadi Jan Parishad

6    ANTO P JOHN    M    41    Independent

7    JUNO JOHN BABY    M    34    Independent

8    JOSE    M    45    Independent

9    JOSE MATHEW    M    32    Independent

10    JOSE K. MANI    M    32    Independent

11    BABU    M    41    Independent

12    K.T MATHEW    M    50    Independent

13    MINI K PHILIP    F    41    Independent

14    M.S RAVEENDRAN    M    49    Independent

15    K. RAJAPPAN    M    57    Independent

16    SASIKUTTAN VAKATHANAM    M    53    Independent

17    SURESH N.B KURUP    M    26    Independent

18    SURESHKUMAR K    M    33    Independent

19    SURESHKUMAR T.R    M    36    Independent

20    SURESH KURUMBAN    M    36    Independent

S11    15    KL    ALAPPUZHA    16-Apr-09    1    DR. K.S MANOJ    M    43    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    K.C VENUGOPAL    M    46    Indian National Congress

3    K.S PRASAD    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    P.J KURIAN    M    63    Janata Dal (United)

5    S. SEETHILAL    M    45    Independent

6    SONY J. KALYANKUMAR    M    51    Independent

S11    16    KL    MAVELIKKARA    16-Apr-09    1    R.S ANIL    M    34    Communist Party of India

2    KODIKKUNNIL SURESH    M    46    Indian National Congress

3    DR. N.D MOHAN    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    P.M VELAYUDHAN    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ANIL KUMAR    M    26    Independent

6    K.S SASIKALA    F    40    Independent

7    SOORANAD SUKUMARAN    M    60    Independent

S11    17    KL    PATHANAMTHITTA    16-Apr-09    1    ANANTHA GOPAN    M    61    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    ANTO ANTONY    M    52    Indian National Congress

3    KARUNAKARAN NAIR    M    78    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    MANI C.KAPPEN    M    51    Nationalist Congress Party

5    RADHAKRISHNA MENON    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    KUNJU PILLAI    M    60    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    ANTO    M    33    Independent

8    JYOTHISH M.R    M    37    Independent

9    THAMBI    M    40    Independent

10    NIRANAM RAJAN    M    47    Independent

11    PUSHPANGADAN    M    40    Independent

12    MATHEW PAREY    M    26    Independent

S11    18    KL    KOLLAM    16-Apr-09    1    ADVT. K M JAYANANDAN    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    N.PEETHAMBARAKURUP    M    66    Indian National Congress

3    VAYAKKAL MADHU    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    P.RAJENDRAN    M    58    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    ADV.ANU SASI    M    28    Independent

6    KRISHNAMMAL    F    59    Independent

7    K A JOHN    M    55    Independent

8    N.PEETHAMBARAKURUP    M    61    Independent

9    S.PRADEEP KUMAR    M    30    Independent

10    S.RADHAKRISHNAN    M    47    Independent

11    R.ZAKIEER HUSSAIN    M    37    Independent

S11    19    KL    ATTINGAL    16-Apr-09    1    PROF.G BALACHANDRAN    M    63    Indian National Congress

2    THOTTAKKADU SASI    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ADV. A SAMPATH    M    46    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    J SUDHAKARAN    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SREENATH    M    53    Shivsena

6    JAYAKUMAR    M    56    Independent

7    BALACHANDRAN    M    51    Independent

8    BALACHNDRAN C P    M    59    Independent

9    MURALI KUMAR    M    43    Independent

10    J VIJAYAKUMAR    M    49    Independent

11    VIVEKANANDAN    M    59    Independent

12    SHAMSUDEEN    M    56    Independent

13    SAJIMON    M    25    Independent

14    SAIFUDEEN M    M    55    Independent

S11    20    KL    THIRUVANANTHAPURAM    16-Apr-09    1    P K KRISHNA DAS    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    M.P.GANGADHARAN    M    74    Nationalist Congress Party

3    DR.A NEELALOHITHADASAN NADAR    M    61    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ADV. P RAMACHANDRAN NAIR    M    57    Communist Party of India

5    SHASHI THAROOR    M    53    Indian National Congress

6    AJITHKUMAR.K    M    41    All India Trinamool Congress

7    JAIN WILSON    M    41    Bahujan Shakty

8    G ASHOKAN    M    47    Independent

9    T.GEORGE    M    40    Independent

10    DILEEP    M    28    Independent

11    U.NAHURMIRAN PEERU MOHAMMED    M    49    Independent

12    PRATHAPAN    M    54    Independent

13    MOHANAN JOSHWA    M    49    Independent

14    SASI – JANAKI SADAN    M    39    Independent

15    SASI – KALAPURAKKAL    M    51    Independent

16    SHAJAR KHAN    M    38    Independent

S13    5    MH    BULDHANA    16-Apr-09    1    JADHAV PRATAPRAO GANPATRAO    M    49    Shivsena

2    DANDGE VASANTRAO SUGDEO    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SHINGNE DR.RAJENDRA BHASKARRAO    M    48    Nationalist Congress Party

4    AMARDEEP BALASAHEB DESHMUKH    M    27    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    QURRASHI SK.SIKANDAR SK. SHAUKAT    M    33    Democratic Secular Party

6    GAJANAN RAJARAM SIRSAT    M    27    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    DHOKNE RAVINDRA TULSHRAMJI    M    44    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

8    FERAN CHADRAHAS JAGDEO    M    54    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

9    GANESH ARJUN ZORE    M    25    Independent

10    TAYDE VITTHAL PANDHARI    M    56    Independent

11    DEVIDAS PIRAJI SARKATE    M    35    Independent

12    SY. BILAL SY. USMAN    M    38    Independent

13    BHARAT PUNJAJI SHINGANE    M    40    Independent

14    RAJESH NIKANTHRAO TATHE    M    52    Independent

15    RATHOD CHHAGAN BABULAL    M    29    Independent

S13    6    MH    AKOLA    16-Apr-09    1    DHOTRE SANJAY SHAMRAO    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BABASAHEB DHABEKAR    M    78    Indian National Congress

3    ATIK AHAMAD GU. JILANI    M    34    Democratic Secular Party

4    AMBEDKAR PRAKASH YASHWANT    M    56    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    GANESH TULSHIRAM TATHE    M    49    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

6    DIPAK SHRIRAM TIRAKE    M    33    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    AJABRAO UTTAMRAO BHONGADE    M    36    Independent

8    THAKURDAS GOVIND CHOUDHARI    M    39    Independent

9    MUJAHID KHAN CHAND KHAN    M    42    Independent

10    RAUT DEVIDAS ANANDRAO    M    45    Independent

11    WASUDEORAO KHADE GURUJI    M    68    Independent

S13    7    MH    AMRAVATI    16-Apr-09    1    ADSUL ANANDRAO VITHOBA    M    61    Shivsena

2    GANGADHAR GADE    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    UGLE SUNIL NAMDEV    M    32    Peoples Republican Party

4    UBALE SHRIKRISHNA CHAMPATRAO    M    62    Ambedkarist Republican Party

5    KESHAV DASHARATH WANKHADE    M    38    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

6    GAWAI RAJENDRA RAMKRUSHNA    M    46    Republican Party of India

7    PRINCIPAL GOPICHAND SURYABHAN MESHRAM    M    52    Republican Paksha (Khoripa)

8    BARSE MANOHAR DAULATRAO    M    53    Indian Union Muslim League

9    SAU MAMATA VINAYAK KANDALKAR    F    31    Assam United Democratic Front

10    DR. HEMANTKUMAR RAMBHAU MAHURE    M    34    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

11    AMOL DEVIDASRAO JADHAV    M    25    Independent

12    UMAK SHRIKRUSHNA SHYAMRAO    M    57    Independent

13    BANDU SAMPATRAO SANE (BANDYA L.S.)    M    43    Independent

14    BHAURAO SHRIRAM CHHAPANE    M    38    Independent

15    MITHUN HIRAMAN GAIKWAD    M    51    Independent

16    PROF. MUKUND VITTHALRAO KHAIRE    M    51    Independent

17    DR. RAJIV GULABRAO JAMTHE    M    53    Independent

18    RAJU MAHADEVRAO SONONE    M    38    Independent

19    VISHWANATH GOTUJI JAMNEKAR    M    60    Independent

20    SUDHAKAR VYANKAT RAMTEKE (MAJI SAINIK)    M    25    Independent

21    ADV. SUDHIR HIRAMAN TAYADE    M    42    Independent

22    SUNIL PRABHU RAMTEKE    M    37    Independent

S13    8    MH    WARDHA    16-Apr-09    1    KANGALE BIPIN BABASAHEB    M    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DATTA MEGHE    M    72    Indian National Congress

3    SURESH GANPATRAO WAGHMARE    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DIWATE RAMESH MADHAORAO    M    46    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    NARAYANRAO RAMJI CHIDAM    M    68    Gondvana Gantantra Party

6    DR. NITIN KESHORAO CHAVAN    M    46    Peoples Republican Party

7    PYARE SAHAB SHEIKH KARIM    M    41    Democratic Secular Party

8    BHOSE KAILAS VISHWASRAO    M    36    Gondwana Mukti Sena

9    ADV. SURESH SHINDE    M    42    Indian Justice Party

10    SANGITA SUNIL ALIAS SONU KAMBLE    F    33    Ambedkarist Republican Party

11    ISHWARKUMAR SHANKARRAO GHARPURE    M    50    Independent

12    GUNWANT TUKARAMJI DAWANDE    M    70    Independent

13    JAGANNATH NILKANTHRAO RAUT    M    54    Independent

14    TAGADE VISHWESHWAR AWADHUTRAO    M    47    Independent

15    RAMTEKE PRAKASH BAKARAM    M    60    Independent

16    SARANG PRAKASHRAO YAWALKAR    M    31    Independent

S13    9    MH    RAMTEK    16-Apr-09    1    TUMANE KRUPAL BALAJI    M    43    Shivsena

2    PRAKASHBHAU KISHAN TEMBHURNE    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    WASNIK MUKUL BALKRISHNA    M    49    Indian National Congress

4    KUMBHARE SULEKHA NARAYAN    F    49    Bahujan Republican Ekta Manch

5    DESHPANDE SANJAY SAOJI    M    44    Hindustan Janta Party

6    NAGARKAR PRASHANT HANSRAJ    M    34    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

7    NANDKISHOR SADHUJI DONGRE    M    34    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    BAGDE SUJEET WASUDEORAO    M    43    Janata Dal (Secular)

9    PROF. BORKAR PRADIP DARYAV    M    48    Republican Paksha (Khoripa)

10    MAYATAI CHAWRE (UTWAL)    F    37    Samajwadi Party

11    VISKAS RAJARAM DAMLE    M    41    Republican Party of India (Khobragade)

12    SEEMA JEEVAN RAMTEKE    F    36    Democratic Secular Party

13    SANDIP SHESHRAO GAJBHIYE    M    36    Gondwana Mukti Sena

14    ASHISH ARUN NAGARARE    M    28    Independent

15    KHUSHAL UDARAMJI TUMANE    M    53    Independent

16    DHONE ANIL    M    43    Independent

17    ADV. DUPARE ULHAS SHALIKRAM    M    42    Independent

18    BARWE MADHUKAR DOMAJI    M    43    Independent

19    ADV. YUVRAJ ANANDRAOJI BAGDE    M    34    Independent

20    RURESH MANGALDAS BORKAR    M    33    Independent

S13    10    MH    NAGPUR    16-Apr-09    1    PUROHIT BANWARILAL BHAGWANDAS    M    69    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    ENGINEER MANIKRAO VAIDYA    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MUTTEMWAR VILASRAO BABURAOJI    M    60    Indian National Congress

4    ARUN SHAMRAO JOSHI    M    58    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

5    KUMBHARE SULEKHA NARAYAN    F    49    Bahujan Republican Ekta Manch

6    ADV. GAJANAN SADASHIV KAWALE    M    51    Republican Paksha (Khoripa)

7    DILIP MANGAL MADAVI    M    44    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    MEHMOOD KHAN RAHEEM KHAN    M    27    Democratic Secular Party

9    DR. YASHWANT MANOHAR    M    66    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

10    RAUT RAMESHCHANDRA    M    56    Prabuddha Republican Party

11    RAJESH SUKHDEV GAIKWAD    M    32    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

12    ADV. VASANTA UMRE    M    50    Democratic Party of India

13    SOMKUWAR VIJAY SITARAM    M    41    Ambedkarist Republican Party

14    AZIZUR REHMAN SHEIKH    M    46    Independent

15    ASHISH ARUN NAGRARE    M    28    Independent

16    ADV. UPASHA BANSI TAYWADE    M    67    Independent

17    JAGDISH RAGHUNATH AMBADE    M    44    Independent

18    PRATIBHA UDAY KHAPARDE    F    35    Independent

19    PREMDAS RAMCHANDRA RAMTEKE    M    48    Independent

20    BARPATRE CHANDRABHAN SOMAJI    M    48    Independent

21    BLASAHEB ALIAS PRAMOD RAMAJI SHAMBHARKAR    M    40    Independent

22    MOHAMAD HABIB REEZAVI    M    50    Independent

23    RAJESHKUMAR MOHANLAL PUGALIA    M    37    Independent

24    RAHUL MADHUKAR DESHMUKH    M    34    Independent

25    VIJAY DEVRAO DHAKATE    M    26    Independent

26    SUNIL GAYAPRASAD MISHRA    M    41    Independent

27    PROF. DNYANESH WAKUDKAR    M    52    Independent

S13    11    MH    BHANDARA – GONDIYA    16-Apr-09    1    GANVIR SHIVKUMAR NAGARCHI    M    56    Communist Party of India

2    JAISWAL VIRENDRAKUMAR KASTURCHAND    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PATLE SHISHUPAL NATTHUJI    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    PATEL PRAFUL MANOHARBHAI    M    52    Nationalist Congress Party

5    UNDIRWADE HEMANT JAGIVAN    M    45    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    JAMAIWAR SUNIL PARASRAM    M    38    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    PATHAN MUSHTAK LATIF    M    32    Democratic Secular Party

8    PRATIBHA VASANT PIMPALKAR    F    38    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

9    WASNIK SUNIL MANIRAM    M    38    Republican Paksha (Khoripa)

10    UKEY CHINDHUJI LAKHAJI    M    50    Independent

11    GAJBHIYE BRAMHASWARUP BABURAO    M    33    Independent

12    GAJBHIYE RAJENDRA MAHADEO    M    35    Independent

13    ADV. DHANANJAY SHAMLALJI RAJABHOJ    M    50    Independent

14    NANABHAU FALGUNRAO PATOLE    M    47    Independent

15    PATLE AKARSING SITARAM    M    36    Independent

16    PROF. DR. BHASKARRAO MAHADEORAO JIBHAKATE    M    63    Independent

17    MIRZA WAHIDBEG AHAMADBEG    M    33    Independent

18    YELE GANESHRAM SUKHRAM    M    54    Independent

19    RAHANGADALE MULCHAND OLGAN    M    56    Independent

20    DR. RAMSAJIVAN KAWDU LILHARE    M    60    Independent

21    SADANAND SHRAWANJI GANVIR    M    40    Independent

S13    12    MH    GADCHIROLI-CHIMUR    16-Apr-09    1    ASHOK MAHADEORAO NETE    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    ATRAM RAJE SATYAWANRAO    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    KOWASE MAROTRAO SAINUJI    M    59    Indian National Congress

4    NAMDEO ANANDRAO KANNAKE    M    50    Communist Party of India

5    PROFFESOR KHANDALE KAWDU TULSHIRAM    M    69    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

6    ADV. DADMAL PRABHAKAR MAHAGUJI    M    54    Peoples Republican Party

7    PENDAM DIWAKAR GULAB    M    38    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

8    PENDAM PURUSHOTTAM ZITUJI    M    35    Democratic Secular Party

9    VIJAY SURAJSING MADAVI    M    39    Gondvana Gantantra Party

10    JAMBHULE NARAYAN DINABAJI    M    54    Independent

11    DINESH TUKARAM MADAVI    M    28    Independent

S13    13    MH    CHANDRAPUR    16-Apr-09    1    AHIR HANSARAJ GANGARAM    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PUGALIA NARESH    M    60    Indian National Congress

3    ADV. HAZARE DATTABHAU KRUSHNARAO    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    KHARTAD LOMESH MAROTI    M    55    Rashtrawadi Sena

5    KHOBRAGADE DESHAK GIRISHBABU    M    38    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    CHATAP WAMAN SADASHIVRAO    M    58    Swatantra Bharat Paksha

7    JAWED ABDUL KURESHI ALIAS PROF. JAWED PASHA    M    47    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

8    JITENDRA ADAKU RAUT    M    32    Akhil Bhartiya Manavata Paksha

9    DANGE NATTHU BHAURAO    M    41    Ambedkarist Republican Party

10    PATHAN A. RAZZAK KHAN HAYAT KHAN    M    44    Samajwadi Party

11    MASRAM NIRANJAN SHIVRAM    M    42    Gondvana Gantantra Party

12    KALE DAMODHAR LAXMAN    M    85    Independent

13    QURESHI IKHALAQ MOHD. YUSUF    M    51    Independent

14    GODE NARAYAN SHAHUJI    M    42    Independent

15    DEKATE BHASKAR PARASHRAM    M    55    Independent

16    MADHUKAR VITTHALRAO NISTANE    M    43    Independent

17    MESHRAM CHARANDAS JANGLUJI    M    65    Independent

18    RAMESH RAGHOBAJI TAJNE    M    45    Independent

19    VINOD DINANATH MESHRAM    M    34    Independent

20    VIRENDRA TARACHANDJI PUGLIA    M    53    Independent

21    SHATRUGHN VYANKATRAO SONPIMPLE    M    37    Independent

22    SANJAY NILKANTH GAWANDE    M    45    Independent

23    HIWARKAR SUDHIR MOTIRAMJI    M    43    Independent

S13    14    MH    YAVATMAL-WASHIM    16-Apr-09    1    YEDATKAR DILIP LAXMANRAO    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BHAVANA GAWALI (PATIL)    F    36    Shivsena

3    HARISING RATHOD    M    54    Indian National Congress

4    UTTAM BHAGAJI KAMBLE    M    41    Prabuddha Republican Party

5    KURESHI SK. MEHBUB SK.FATTU    M    44    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    KWAJA NASIRODDINE KHAN    M    29    Democratic Secular Party

7    GAJANAN KASHIRAM PATIL (HEMBADE)    M    26    Krantisena Maharashtra

8    DHAGE VITTHAL MAHADEV    M    45    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

9    MANIYAR YUNUS MAHMOOD ZAHMI    M    50    Assam United Democratic Front

10    MOHMMAD KHAN AZIZ KHAN    M    43    Samajwadi Party

11    ATHAWALE SADANAND PRALHADRAO    M    39    Independent

12    GAJANAN BURMAL DODWADE    M    36    Independent

13    NETAJI SITARAMJI KINAKE    M    58    Independent

14    NANDKISHOR NARAYANRAO THAKARE    M    34    Independent

15    PAWAR RAMESH GORSING    M    53    Independent

16    PURUSHOTTAM DOMAJI BHAJGAWRE    M    48    Independent

17    MADHUKAR SHIVDASPPA GORATE    M    67    Independent

18    MANOJ JANARDAN PATIL    M    38    Independent

19    MUKHADE SAU. LALITARAI SUBHASHRAO    F    32    Independent

20    MESHRAM BANDU GANPAT    M    40    Independent

21    MOHD. INAMURRAHIM MOHD. MUSA    M    51    Independent

22    RAVINDRA ALIAS RAVIPAL MADHUKARRAO GANDHE    M    32    Independent

23    RAJKUMAR NARAYAN BHUJADALE    M    35    Independent

24    RATHOD DEVISING RAMA    M    56    Independent

25    SD. VHIDODDIN SD. KRIMODDIN    M    44    Independent

26    VISHNU KASINATH TAWKAR    M    47    Independent

27    SURESH BABAN PEDEKAR    M    33    Independent

28    SURESH BHIVA TARAL    M    29    Independent

S13    15    MH    HINGOLI    16-Apr-09    1    DR. B.D. CHAVHAN    M    45    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    SUBHASH BAPURAO WANDHEDE    M    46    Shivsena

3    SURYAKANTA JAIWANTRAO PATIL    F    63    Nationalist Congress Party

4    UTTAMRAO DAGADUJI BHAGAT    M    65    Prabuddha Republican Party

5    AJAS NOORMINYA    M    32    Democratic Secular Party

6    NAIK MADHAVRAO BAHENARAO    M    65    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

7    VINAYAK SHRIRAM BHISE    M    27    Krantisena Maharashtra

8    GUNDEKAR SANJAY ADELU    M    35    Independent

9    PATHAN SATTAR KASIMKHAN    M    38    Independent

10    PACHPUTE RAMPRASAD KISHANRAO    M    41    Independent

11    MD. A. MUJIM ANSARI A.    M    33    Independent

S13    16    MH    NANDED    16-Apr-09    1    KHATGAONK PATIL BHASKARRAO BAPURAO    M    65    Indian National Congress

2    MD. MAKBUL SALIM HAJI MD. KHAJA    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SAMBHAJI PAWAR    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ALTAF AHMAD EAKBAL AHMAD    M    43    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    KHADE SANJAY WAMANRAO    M    29    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    TIWARI RAMA BHAGIRAT    F    40    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    ADV. C.S. BAHETI    M    56    Janata Party

8    MORE RAJESH EKNATHRAO    M    34    Krantisena Maharashtra

9    A. RAEES A. JABBAR    M    36    Ambedkar National Congress

10    SHINDE PREETI MADHUKAR    F    27    Jan Surajya Shakti

11    SHUDHIR YASHWANT SURVE    M    40    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

12    COM. ASHOK NAGORAO GHAYALE    M    40    Independent

13    ANAND JADHAV HOTALKAR    M    42    Independent

14    KOREWAR BALAJI NARSING    M    38    Independent

15    JADHAV VISHNU MAROTI    M    35    Independent

16    NAVGHARE ANAND PANDURANG    M    48    Independent

17    NARAYAN SURYAVANSHI DOANGONKAR    M    63    Independent

18    PATHAN ZAFAR ALI KHAN MAHEMUD ALI KHAN    M    63    Independent

19    ‘AIDS MAN’ PRAKASH TATERAO LANDGE    M    40    Independent

20    BHARANDE RAMCHANDRA GANGARAM    M    31    Independent

21    ADV. RAMRAO PANDURANG WAGHMARE    M    52    Independent

22    HANMANTE VIJAY CHANDRAO    M    35    Independent

S13    17    MH    PARBHANI    16-Apr-09    1    ADV. DUDHGAONKAR GANESHRAO NAGORAO    M    64    Shivsena

2    RAJSHRI BABASAHEB JAMAGE    F    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    WARPUDKAR SURESH AMBADASRAO    M    60    Nationalist Congress Party

4    AJIM AHMED KHAN AJIJ KHAN    M    32    Democratic Secular Party

5    ASHOKRAO BABARAO AMBHORE    M    46    Ambedkar National Congress

6    KACHOLE MANAVENDRA SAWALARAM    M    65    Swatantra Bharat Paksha

7    KALE VYANKATRAO BHIMRAO    M    31    Krantisena Maharashtra

8    NAMDEV LIMBAJI KACHAVE    M    68    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

9    BHAND GANGADHAR SAKHARAM    M    70    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

10    MULE BABAN DATTARAO    M    41    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

11    RUMALE TUKARAM DHONDIBA    M    51    Prabuddha Republican Party

12    SAYYAD EKRAMODDIN SAYYAD MUNIRODDIN    M    58    Lok Vikas Party

13    ASAD BIN ABDULLAHA BIN    M    43    Independent

14    JAMEEL AHMED SK. AHMED    M    44    Independent

15    DR. DESHMUKH KISHANRAO JANARDHANRAO (EX-SERVICEMAN)    M    74    Independent

16    RATHOD RAMRAO DHANSING SIR    M    58    Independent

17    SHINDE LAXMAN EKANATH    M    36    Independent

18    SAMAR GORAKHNATH PAWAR    M    41    Independent

19    SALVE SUDHAKAR UMAJI    M    47    Independent

S14    2    MN    OUTER MANIPUR    16-Apr-09    1    THANGSO BAITE    M    56    Indian National Congress

2    D. LOLI ADANEE    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    L.B. SONA    M    58    Nationalist Congress Party

4    M. JAMKHONGAM @ M. YAMKHONGAM HAOKIP    M    49    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    THANGKHANGIN    M    53    Lok Jan Shakti Party

6    MANI CHARENAMEI    M    50    Peoples Democratic Alliance

7    VALLEY ROSE HUNGYO    F    53    Independent

8    MANGSHI (ROSE MANGSHI HAOKIP)    F    63    Independent

9    LAMLALMOI GANGTE    M    33    Independent

S15    1    ML    SHILLONG    16-Apr-09    1    DALINGTON DYMPEP    M    78    Communist Party of India

2    JOHN FILMORE KHARSHIING    M    46    United Democratic Party

3    VINCENT H PALA    M    41    Indian National Congress

4    P. B. M. BASAIAWMOIT    M    60    Hill State People’s Democratic Party

5    MARTLE N.MUKHIM    M    59    Meghalaya Democratic Party

6    DENIS SIANGSHAI    M    44    Independent

7    TIEROD PASSAH    M    45    Independent

S15    2    ML    TURA    16-Apr-09    1    AGATHA K. SANGMA    F    28    Nationalist Congress Party

2    DEBORA C. MARAK    F    43    Indian National Congress

3    BOSTON MARAK    M    28    A-Chik National Congress(Democratic)

4    ARLENE N. SANGMA    F    53    Independent

S16    1    MZ    MIZORAM    16-Apr-09    1    LALAWMPUIA CHHANGTE    M    42    Nationalist Congress Party

2    C.L.RUALA    M    72    Indian National Congress

3    DR. H. LALLUNGMUANA    M    65    Independent

4    RUALPAWLA    M    54    Independent

S17    1    NL    NAGALAND    16-Apr-09    1    K. ASUNGBA SANGTAM    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    C.M. CHANG    M    65    Nagaland Peoples Front

3    DR. RILANTHUNG ODYUO    M    39    All India Trinamool Congress

S18    1    OR    BARGARH    16-Apr-09    1    RADHARANI PANDA    F    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    SANJAY BHOI    M    35    Indian National Congress

3    SUNIL KUMAR AGRAWAL    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    DR. HAMID HUSSAIN    M    54    Biju Janata Dal

5    NILADRI BEHARI PANDA    M    29    Kosal Kranti Dal

6    SURENDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL    M    37    Independent

S18    2    OR    SUNDARGARH    16-Apr-09    1    JUAL ORAM    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    JEROM DUNGDUNG    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    LIVNUS KINDO    M    64    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

4    SALOMI MINZ    F    48    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    HEMANANDA BISWAL    M    67    Indian National Congress

6    RAMA CHANDRA EKKA    M    61    Jharkhand Disom Party

7    SAGAR SING MANKEE    M    60    Kosal Kranti Dal

8    DALESWAR MAJHI    M    58    Independent

9    MANSID EKKA    M    63    Independent

S18    3    OR    SAMBALPUR    16-Apr-09    1    AMARNATH PRADHAN    M    51    Indian National Congress

2    GOBINDA RAM AGARWAL    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    ROHIT PUJARI    M    35    Biju Janata Dal

4    SURENDRA LATH    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ASHOK KUMAR NAIK    M    53    Kosal Kranti Dal

6    BIJAYA KUMAR MAHANANDA    M    35    Republican Party of India

7    MD. ALI HUSSAIN    M    37    Independent

S18    10    OR    BOLANGIR    16-Apr-09    1    KALIKESH NARAYAN SINGH DEO    M    34    Biju Janata Dal

2    NARASINGHA MISHRA    M    68    Indian National Congress

3    BALHAN SAGAR    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SANGITA KUMARI SINGH DEO    F    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DINGAR KUMBHAR    M    41    Samruddha Odisha

S18    11    OR    KALAHANDI    16-Apr-09    1    NAKULA MAJHI    M    66    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BIKRAM KESHARI DEO    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    BHAKTA CHARAN DAS    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    SUBASH CHANDRA NAYAK    M    62    Biju Janata Dal

5    PARAMESWAR KAND    M    47    Samajwadi Party

6    BALARAM HOTA    M    33    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    DAMBARUDHARA SUNANI    M    34    Independent

8    MAHESWAR BHOI    M    36    Independent

S18    12    OR    NABARANGPUR    16-Apr-09    1    CHANDRADHWAJ MAJHI    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DOMBURU MAJHI    M    68    Biju Janata Dal

3    PARSURAM MAJHI    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    PRADEEP KUMAR MAJHI    M    33    Indian National Congress

S18    13    OR    KANDHAMAL    16-Apr-09    1    ASHOK SAHU    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PAULA BALIARSING    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    RUDRAMADHAB RAY    M    71    Biju Janata Dal

4    SUZIT KUMAR PADHI    M    49    Indian National Congress

5    NAKUL NAYAK    M    46    Samajwadi Party

6    AJIT KUMAR NAYAK    M    26    Independent

7    KAMALA KANTA PANDEY    M    64    Independent

8    GHORABANA BEHERA    M    42    Independent

9    DEENABANDHU NAIK    M    45    Independent

S18    19    OR    ASKA    16-Apr-09    1    NITYANANDA PRADHAN    M    65    Biju Janata Dal

2    RAMACHANDRA RATH    M    63    Indian National Congress

3    SHANTI DEVI    F    71    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    KRISHNA DALABEHERA    M    43    Kalinga Sena

5    BIJAYA KUMAR MAHAPATRO    M    56    Revolutionary Socialist Party

6    SURJYA NARAYAN SAHU    M    37    Samruddha Odisha

7    KALICHARAN NAYAK    M    53    Independent

8    DEBASIS MISRA    M    48    Independent

9    K. SHYAM BABU SUBUDHI    M    73    Independent

S18    20    OR    BERHAMPUR    16-Apr-09    1    CHANDRA SEKHAR SAHU    M    58    Indian National Congress

2    PABITRA GAMANGO    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BHARAT PAIK    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SIDHANT MAHAPATRA    M    42    Biju Janata Dal

5    NIRAKAR BEHERA    M    35    Kalinga Sena

6    ALI RAZA ZIADI    M    30    Independent

7    KISHORE CHANDRA MAHARANA    M    61    Independent

8    A. RAGHUNATH VARMA    M    71    Independent

9    K. SHYAM BABU SUBUDHI    M    73    Independent

S18    21    OR    KORAPUT    16-Apr-09    1    UPENDRA MAJHI    M    29    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    GIRIDHAR GAMANG    M    56    Indian National Congress

3    JAYARAM PANGI    M    53    Biju Janata Dal

4    PAPANNA MUTIKA    M    65    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KUMUDINI DISARI    F    34    Samruddha Odisha

6    MEGHANADA SABAR    M    40    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

S24    63    UP    MAHARAJGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    AJEET MANI    M    41    Samajwadi Party

2    GANESH SHANKER PANDEY    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PANKAJ CHAUDHARY    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    HARSH VARDHAN    M    61    Indian National Congress

5    ABDWURRUF ANSARI    M    45    National Lokhind Party

6    PAWAN KUMAR    M    39    Republican Party of India (A)

7    RAM KISHUN NISHAD    M    52    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

8    SATYA NARAYAN URF SATNARAYAN    M    58    Bharatiya Eklavya Party

9    OMPRAKASH CHATURVEDI    M    63    Independent

10    DILIP KUMAR    M    28    Independent

11    RAM NIVAS    M    37    Independent

12    LAL BIHARI    M    42    Independent

13    CHAUDHARY SANJAY SINGH PATEL    M    29    Independent

14    SHYAM SUNDER DAS CHAURASIA    M    28    Independent

15    HANUMAN    M    51    Independent

S24    64    UP    GORAKHPUR    16-Apr-09    1    ADITYANATH    M    36    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    MANOJ TIWARI MRIDUL    M    39    Samajwadi Party

3    LALCHAND NISHAD    M    67    Indian National Congress

4    VINAY SHANKAR TIWARI    M    41    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    AMAN    M    35    Ambedkar Samaj Party

6    JOKHAN PRASAD    M    46    Eklavya Samaj Party

7    DAYASHANKAR NISHAD    M    38    Apna Dal

8    RAJBAHADUR    M    28    Indian Justice Party

9    RAJMANI    M    46    Bharatiya Eklavya Party

10    RAJESH SAHANI    M    44    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

11    SRINATH    M    29    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

12    AJAY KUMAR    M    40    Independent

13    AWADHESH SINGH    M    32    Independent

14    OMPRAKASH SINGH    M    43    Independent

15    GOVIND    M    43    Independent

16    CHHEDILAL    M    59    Independent

17    NIRANJAN PRASAD    M    35    Independent

18    NEERAJ YADAV    M    31    Independent

19    DR. BRIJESH MANI TRIPATHI    M    44    Independent

20    MANOJ TIWARI    M    30    Independent

21    RAKESH KUMAR    M    38    Independent

22    RAJAN YADAV M.B.A.    M    31    Independent

23    RAMHIT NISHAD    M    53    Independent

24    LAL BAHADUR    M    68    Independent

25    VINOD SHUKLA    M    29    Independent

26    HARISHCHANDRA    M    42    Independent

S24    65    UP    KUSHI NAGAR    16-Apr-09    1    BRAMHA SHANKER    M    56    Samajwadi Party

2    KU. RATANJEET PRATAP NARAYAN SINGH    M    45    Indian National Congress

3    VIJAY DUBEY    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SWAMI PRASAD MAURYA    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ANIL    M    43    Republican Party of India (A)

6    KISHOR KUMAR    M    40    Indian Peace Party

7    K KUMAR    M    56    Purvanchal Rajya Banao Dal

8    JANGI    M    55    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

9    DHEERAJ SHEKHAR SHRIWASTAWA    M    49    Rashtriya Lokwadi Party

10    BABU LAL    M    40    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

11    MATIULLAH    M    43    National Lokhind Party

12    MADAN LAL    M    46    Maulik Adhikar Party

13    AMEERUDDIN    M    31    Independent

14    JAGDISH    M    57    Independent

15    JAI GOVIND    M    35    Independent

16    DAROGA    M    37    Independent

17    RAMESH    M    35    Independent

18    RAM BRIKSH    M    54    Independent

S24    66    UP    DEORIA    16-Apr-09    1    GORAKH PRASAD JAISWAL    M    72    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BALESHWAR YADAV    M    55    Indian National Congress

3    MOHAN SINGH    M    58    Samajwadi Party

4    SHRI PRAKASH MANI TRIPATHI    M    64    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    GANGA PRASAD KUSHWAHA    M    70    Purvanchal Rajya Banao Dal

6    JAGDISH KUMAR VERMA    M    36    Lokpriya Samaj Party

7    DHARMENDRA KUMAR    M    33    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

8    MOTI LAL KUSHWAHA SHASTRI    M    59    Rashtriya Samanta Dal

9    SAFAYAT ALI    M    51    Peace Party

10    SARITA    F    27    Ambedkar Samaj Party

11    RAM KISHOR YADAV ALIAS VIDHAYAK    M    51    Independent

12    VIJAY JUAATHA    M    42    Independent

S24    67    UP    BANSGAON    16-Apr-09    1    KAMLESH PASWAN    M    33    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    MAHA BEER PRASAD    M    66    Indian National Congress

3    SHARADA DEVI    F    59    Samajwadi Party

4    SHREE NATH JI    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    CHANDRIKA    M    29    Rashtriya Jan-vadi Party (Krantikari)

6    RAMA SHANKER    M    37    Peace Party

7    RAM PRAVESH PRASAD    M    37    Eklavya Samaj Party

8    HARILAL    M    32    Bahujan Uday Manch

9    KU. KUNJAWATI    F    36    Independent

10    MANOJ KUMAR    M    29    Independent

11    RADHEYSHYAM    M    35    Independent

12    RAMKAWAL    M    56    Independent

13    RAMSAKAL    M    32    Independent

14    RAMA PASWAN    M    33    Independent

15    VINAI KUMAR    M    33    Independent

S24    68    UP    LALGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    DAROGA PRASAD SAROJ    M    60    Samajwadi Party

2    NEELAM SONKAR    F    33    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    DR. BALIRAM    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    HAREE PRASAD SONKER    M    50    Communist Party of India

5    MANBHAWAN    M    32    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

6    RAM DAYAL ALIAS MOHAN    M    32    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

7    ACHCHHELAL    M    42    Independent

8    URMILA DEVI    F    27    Independent

9    CHANDRA RAM ALIAS CHANDU SAROJ    M    36    Independent

10    DHARMRAJ    M    55    Independent

11    SUKHNAYAN    M    29    Independent

S24    69    UP    AZAMGARH    16-Apr-09    1    AKBAR AHMAD DUMPY    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ARUN KUMAR SINGH    M    63    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    DURGA PRASAD YADAV    M    56    Samajwadi Party

4    RAMAKANT YADAV    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH    M    49    Indian National Congress

6    JAI JAI RAM PRAJAPATI    M    36    Lokpriya Samaj Party

7    RAM BHAROS    M    34    Bahujan Uday Manch

8    VINOD    M    33    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

9    USMANA FARUQEE    F    27    Independent

10    KEDAR NATH GIRI    M    49    Independent

11    KHAIRUL BASHAR    M    56    Independent

12    DR. JAVED AKHTAR    M    54    Independent

13    DAAN BAHADUR YADAV    M    54    Independent

14    YADUNATH    M    31    Independent

15    RAM UJAGIR    M    45    Independent

16    RAM SINGH    M    35    Independent

S24    70    UP    GHOSI    16-Apr-09    1    ATUL KUMAR SINGH ANJAN    M    55    Communist Party of India

2    ARSHAD JAMAL ANSARI    M    43    Samajwadi Party

3    DARA SINGH CHAUHAN    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RAM IQBAL    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    SUDHA RAI    F    54    Indian National Congress

6    AKHILESH    M    43    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

7    KAILASH YADAV    M    46    Peace Party

8    RAMESH ALIAS RAJU SINGH    M    41    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

9    RAM BADAN KAUL    M    60    Bahujan Shakty

10    LALJI RAJBHAR    M    44    Bharatiya Samaj Dal

11    HARISH CHANDRA    M    62    Rashtriya Jan-vadi Party (Krantikari)

12    ASHOK KUMAR    M    27    Independent

13    ZAKIR HUSSAIN    M    45    Independent

14    PALAKDHARI    M    41    Independent

15    RAKESH    M    34    Independent

16    SUJIT KUMAR    M    34    Independent

S24    71    UP    SALEMPUR    16-Apr-09    1    DR. BHOLA PANDEY    M    55    Indian National Congress

2    RAMASHANKAR RAJBHAR    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    HARIKEWAL    M    71    Samajwadi Party

4    IZHAR    M    48    Peace Party

5    ZUBAIR    M    39    Nelopa(United)

6    JANG BAHADUR    M    50    Bharatiya Samaj Dal

7    FATE BAHADUR    M    35    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

8    RAVISHANKAR SINGH “PAPPU”    M    38    Janata Dal (United)

9    RAMCHARAN    M    72    People’s Democratic Front

10    RAMDAYAL    M    57    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

11    RAMNAWAMI YADAV    M    37    Samajwadi Jan Parishad

12    RAMASHRAY CHAUHAN    M    55    Moderate Party

13    SRIRAM    M    50    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

14    HARISHCHAND    M    48    Eklavya Samaj Party

15    AMEER    M    53    Independent

16    PARASURAM    M    56    Independent

17    FULENDRA    M    40    Independent

18    MAN JI    M    50    Independent

19    MAHESH    M    70    Independent

20    RAJENDRA ALIAS RAJAN    M    33    Independent

21    VINDHACHAL    M    44    Independent

22    SHAILENDRA    M    36    Independent

23    SATISH    M    37    Independent

24    SARVDAMAN    M    26    Independent

25    SANJAY    M    36    Independent

S24    72    UP    BALLIA    16-Apr-09    1    NEERAJ SHEKHAR    M    40    Samajwadi Party

2    MANOJ SINHA    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SANGRAM SINGH YADAV    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ARVIND KUMAR GOND    M    30    Gondvana Gantantra Party

5    KANHAIYA PRAJAPATI    M    44    Rashtriya Samanta Dal

6    NARAYAN RAJBHAR    M    32    Bharatiya Samaj Dal

7    RAJESH    M    40    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

8    RAMSAKAL    M    48    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

9    ANANT    M    36    Independent

10    GANGADYAL    M    48    Independent

11    DIWAKAR    M    38    Independent

12    RAMJI    M    49    Independent

13    LALBABU    M    36    Independent

14    SHESHNATH    M    40    Independent

15    SHANKER RAM RAWAT    M    43    Independent

16    HARIHAR    M    73    Independent

S24    74    UP    MACHHLISHAHR    16-Apr-09    1    KAMLA KANT GAUTAM (K.K. GAUTAM)    M    66    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    TUFANI SAROJ    M    48    Samajwadi Party

3    RAJ BAHADUR    M    66    Indian National Congress

4    VIDYASAGAR SONKER    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KRISHNA SEWAK SONKER    M    48    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

6    RAM CHARITRA    M    41    Apna Dal

7    VIJAYEE RAM    M    38    Ambedkar Samaj Party

8    SHEOMURAT RAM    M    71    Gondvana Gantantra Party

9    SUKHRAJ DINKAR    M    51    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

10    SUSHMA    F    29    Rashtriya Agraniye Dal

11    DINESH KUMAR    M    31    Independent

12    BALJIT    M    59    Independent

13    RAM DAWAR GAUTAM    M    41    Independent

14    VINOD KUMAR    M    40    Independent

15    SHYAM BIHARI KANNAUJIYA    M    39    Independent

16    SOHAN    M    46    Independent

S24    75    UP    GHAZIPUR    16-Apr-09    1    AFZAL ANSARI    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PRABHUNATH    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RADHEY MOHAN SINGH    M    43    Samajwadi Party

4    SURAJ RAM BAGI    M    52    Communist Party of India

5    ISHWARI PRASAD KUSHAWAHA    M    48    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    DINESH    M    42    Rashtriya Samanta Dal

7    NANDLAL    M    67    Ambedkar Samaj Party

8    SHYAM NARAYAN    M    54    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

9    SATISH SHANKAR JAISAWAL    M    28    National Lokhind Party

10    SARAJU    M    67    Lok Dal

11    SURENDRA    M    43    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

12    ANIL    M    32    Independent

13    ASHOK (DR.ASHOK KUMAR SRIVASTAVA)    M    54    Independent

14    BRAJENDRA NATH URF BIJENDRA    M    66    Independent

15    RAJESH    M    37    Independent

S24    76    UP    CHANDAULI    16-Apr-09    1    KAILASH NATH SINGH YADAV    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    JAWAHAR LAL JAISAWAL    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAMKISHUN    M    49    Samajwadi Party

4    SHAILENDRA KUMAR    M    40    Indian National Congress

5    CHANDRASHEKHAR    M    34    Republican Party of India

6    JAWAHIR    M    48    Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party

7    JOKHU    M    45    Peoples Democratic Forum

8    TULASI    M    42    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

9    RAJNATH    M    35    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

10    RAJESH SINGH    M    27    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

11    RAMAWATAR SHARMA ADVOCATE    M    38    Maulik Adhikar Party

12    RAMSEWAK YADAV    M    46    Rashtriya Lokhit Party

13    LALLAN    M    49    Indian Justice Party

14    SURENDRA PRATAP    M    36    Jai Bharat Samanta Party

15    DEVAROO    M    40    Independent

16    MUNNI LAL    M    66    Independent

17    SURAFARAJ AHMAD    M    29    Independent

18    HARI LAL    M    52    Independent

S24    77    UP    VARANASI    16-Apr-09    1    AJAY RAI    M    36    Samajwadi Party

2    MUKHTAR ANSARI    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI    M    73    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DR. RAJESH KUMAR MISHRA    M    48    Indian National Congress

5    AWADHESH KUMAR KUSHWAHA    M    43    Rashtriya Samanta Dal

6    USHA SINGH    F    45    Rashtriya Agraniye Dal

7    KISHUN LAL    M    59    Indian Justice Party

8    VIJAY PRAKASH JAISWAL    M    43    Apna Dal

9    ER. SHYAM LAL VISHWAKARMA    M    61    Maulik Adhikar Party

10    ANAND KUMAR AMBASTHA    M    36    Independent

11    NARENDRA NATH DUBEY ADIG    M    36    Independent

12    PARVEZ QUADIR KHAN    M    38    Independent

13    PUSHP RAJ SAHU    M    47    Independent

14    RAJESH BHARTI    M    33    Independent

15    SATYA PRAKASH SRIVASTAVA    M    37    Independent

S24    79    UP    MIRZAPUR    16-Apr-09    1    ANIL KUMAR MAURYA    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ANURAG SINGH    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    BAL KUMAR PATEL    M    48    Samajwadi Party

4    RAMESH DUBEY    M    66    Indian National Congress

5    AJAY SHANKER    M    33    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    KAILASH    M    48    Bahujan Shakty

7    KHELADI    M    58    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    JAGDISH    M    49    Apna Dal

9    PREM CHAND    M    45    Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party

10    RADHE SHYAM    M    58    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

11    LALJI    M    48    Rashtriya Agraniye Dal

12    LALTI DEVI    F    54    Vikas Party

13    SHANKAR    M    38    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

14    SHYAM LAL    M    41    Eklavya Samaj Party

15    MOHD. SAGIR    M    41    National Loktantrik Party

16    TRILOK NATH VERMA    M    61    Indian Justice Party

17    ANOOP KUMAR    M    34    Independent

18    KRISHNA CHAND    M    40    Independent

19    KRISHNA CHAND SHUKLA    M    40    Independent

20    CHHABEELE    M    41    Independent

21    DANGAR    M    52    Independent

22    DULARI    F    61    Independent

23    MANIK CHAND    M    37    Independent

24    MUNNA LAL    M    34    Independent

25    RAM GOPAL    M    53    Independent

26    RAM RAJ    M    37    Independent

27    HANS KUMAR    M    37    Independent

S24    80    UP    ROBERTSGANJ    16-Apr-09    1    PAKAURI LAL    M    57    Samajwadi Party

2    RAM ADHAR JOSEPH    M    43    Indian National Congress

3    RAM CHANDRA TYAGI    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RAM SHAKAL    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    GULAB    M    31    Peoples Democratic Forum

6    CHANDRA SHEKHAR    M    34    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

7    MUNNI DEVI    F    42    Rashtriya Samanta Dal

8    RAMESH KUMAR    M    31    Apna Dal

9    SHRAWAN KUMAR    M    41    Rashtrawadi Sena

10    RAMBRIKSHA    M    39    Independent

S26    1    CG    SARGUJA    16-Apr-09    1    DHAN SINGH DHURVE    M    38    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BAL SINGH    M    38    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    BHANU PRATAP SINGH    M    42    Indian National Congress

4    MURARILAL SINGH    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ANOOP MINJ    M    28    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

6    KUMAIT B.D.O.    M    64    Janata Dal (United)

7    BHUPNATH SINGH MARAVI    M    43    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    RAMDEO LAKRA    M    32    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

9    RAMNATH CHERWA    M    36    Shoshit Samaj Dal

10    SOMNATH BHAGAT    M    46    Lok Jan Shakti Party

11    AMRIT SINGH MARAVI    M    35    Independent

12    JUGESHWAR    M    29    Independent

13    DHANESHWAR SINGH    M    39    Independent

14    SARJU XESS ORANW    M    43    Independent

15    SUNIL KUMAR SINGH KANHARE    M    27    Independent

16    SURAJ DEO SINGH KHAIRWAR    M    35    Independent

S26    2    CG    RAIGARH    16-Apr-09    1    BAHADUR SINGH RATHIA    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    VISHNU DEO SAI    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    HRIDAYARAM RATHIYA    M    43    Indian National Congress

4    DARSHAN SIDAR    M    32    Gondvana Gantantra Party

5    MEERA DEVI SINGH TIRKEY    F    39    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

6    SHIRACHAND EKKA    M    29    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

7    AMRIT TIRKEY    M    30    Independent

8    KAMRISH SINGH GOND    M    59    Independent

9    SANJAY TIRKEY    M    29    Independent

10    HALDHAR RAM SIDAR    M    42    Independent

S26    3    CG    JANJGIR-CHAMPA    16-Apr-09    1    SHRIMATI KAMLA DEVI PATLE    F    43    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DAURAM RATNAKAR    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR.SHIVKUMAR DAHARIYA    M    45    Indian National Congress

4    B.R. CHAUHAN    M    59    Republican Party of India (A)

5    NEELKANTH WARE    M    59    Chhattisgarhi Samaj Party

6    PREM SHANKAR MAHILANGE URF PREM INDIA    M    39    Lok Jan Shakti Party

7    SANJEEV KUMAR KHARE    M    26    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

8    ANANDRAM GILHARE    M    35    Independent

9    CHAITRAM SURYAVANSHI    M    62    Independent

10    DR.CHHAVILAL RATRE    M    55    Independent

11    MAYARAM NAT    M    50    Independent

12    RAMCHARAN PRADHAN ADHIWAKTA    M    51    Independent

S26    4    CG    KORBA    16-Apr-09    1    KARUNA SHUKLA    F    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    CHARANDAS MAHANT    M    54    Indian National Congress

3    VIJAY LAXMI SHARMA    F    41    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    KEDARNATH RAJWADE    M    28    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    CHAITI DEVI MAHANT    F    49    Chhattisgarhi Samaj Party

6    BUDHWAR SINGH UIKEY    M    34    Rashtriya Gondvana Party

7    DR. VIPIN SINHA    M    40    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

8    SANGEETA NIRMALKAR    F    32    Bharatiya Pichhra Dal

9    HIRASINGH MARKAAM    M    74    Gondvana Gantantra Party

10    GEND DAS MAHANT    M    35    Independent

11    CHARAN DAS    M    25    Independent

12    PAWAN KUMAR    M    38    Independent

13    FULESHWAR PRASAD SURJAIHA    M    75    Independent

14    RAMDAYAL ORAON    M    49    Independent

15    RAMLAKHAN KASHI    M    68    Independent

16    SHAMBHU PRASAD SHARMA ADHIWAKTA    M    62    Independent

17    SATRUPA    F    37    Independent

18    SANTOSH BANJARE    M    25    Independent

S26    5    CG    BILASPUR    16-Apr-09    1    DILIP SINGH JUDEV    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    ADVOCATE T.R.NIRALA    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR.RENU JOGI    F    56    Indian National Congress

4    UTTAM PRASAD DANSENA    M    27    Sunder Samaj Party

5    DR.GOJU PAUL    M    40    Republican Party of India (A)

6    DR.BALMUKUND SINGH MARAVI    M    41    Gondvana Gantantra Party

7    BALARAM SAHU    M    46    Bharatiya Pichhra Dal

8    MUKESH KUMAR SAHU    M    32    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

9    SAPNA CHAKRABORTY    F    37    Lok Jan Shakti Party

10    ARJUN SHRIVAS GANGUAA    M    63    Independent

11    ANUJ DHRITLAHRE    M    34    Independent

12    ABDUL HAMID SIDDIQUE    M    43    Independent

13    ASHOK SHRIVASTAVA    M    37    Independent

14    UMESH SINGH    M    31    Independent

15    TUKLAL GARG    M    40    Independent

16    DAYA DAS LAHRE    M    65    Independent

17    DR.DAYA RAM DAYAL    M    60    Independent

18    DILIP KUMAR    M    30    Independent

19    DILIP GUPTA    M    38    Independent

20    DILIP SINGH    M    41    Independent

21    MANOJ KUMAR BIRKO    M    34    Independent

22    RAMESH AHUJA    M    43    Independent

23    RAMESH KUMAR LAHARE    M    36    Independent

24    RAJENDRA SAHU    M    29    Independent

25    RAJESH PRATAP    M    32    Independent

26    RAMBILAS SHARMA    M    52    Independent

27    B.P.VISWAKARMA    M    57    Independent

28    SHYAM BIHARI TRIVEDI    M    56    Independent

S26    6    CG    RAJNANDGAON    16-Apr-09    1    DEVWRAT SINGH    M    39    Indian National Congress

2    PRADHUMAN NETAM    M    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MADHUSUDAN YADAV    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    GANGARAM NISHAD    M    48    Eklavya Samaj Party

5    NARAD KHOTHALIYA    M    48    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

6    AJAY JAISWAL    M    35    Independent

7    AJAY PALI    M    32    Independent

8    JALAL MOHAMMAD QURESHI    M    45    Independent

9    DERHARAM LODHI    M    37    Independent

10    DILIP RATHOR SAMPADAK    M    40    Independent

11    BHAG CHAND VAIDHYA    M    48    Independent

12    MADAN YADAV    M    34    Independent

13    MANGAL DAS BANGARE    M    52    Independent

14    D.R.YADAV PRACHARYA    M    66    Independent

S26    7    CG    DURG    16-Apr-09    1    PRADEEP CHOUBEY    M    55    Indian National Congress

2    RAGHUNANDAN SAHU    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SAROJ PANDEY    F    40    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DEVIDAS KURRE    M    43    Chandigarh Vikas Party

5    DR. PANKAJ GOSOMI (PANDIT)    M    37    Republican Party of India

6    ANAND GAUTAM    M    35    Independent

7    TARACHAND SAHU    M    30    Independent

8    TARACHAND SAHU    M    66    Independent

9    TARACHAND SAHU    M    62    Independent

10    MASOOD KHAN    M    43    Independent

11    RATAN KUMAR KSHETRAPAL    M    61    Independent

12    RAJENDRA KUMAR SAHU    M    38    Independent

13    LAXMAN PRASAD    M    31    Independent

14    GURU DADA LOKESH MAHARAJ    M    56    Independent

15    SHITKARAN MHILWAR    M    40    Independent

S26    8    CG    RAIPUR    16-Apr-09    1    BHUPESH BAGHEL    M    47    Indian National Congress

2    RAMESH BAIS    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    VIDHYADEVI SAHU    F    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ER. ASHOK TAMRAKAR    M    56    Jai Chhattisgarh Party

5    IMRRAN PASHA    M    33    Loktantrik Samajwadi Party

6    P.R. KHUNTE    M    54    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

7    MADHUSUDAN MISHRA    M    49    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

8    SHAILENDRA BANJARE (SHAKTIPUTRA)    M    34    Shakti Sena (Bharat Desh)

9    SHANKAR LAL VARANDANI    M    45    Pyramid Party of India

10    HARGUN MEGHWANI    M    56    Akhil Bhartiya Sindhu Samajwadi Party

11    ARUN HARPAL    M    35    Independent

12    JAFAR HUSSAIN, BABABHAI (PURVA MUTVALLI)    M    57    Independent

13    MOH. JILANI ALIAS TANI    M    30    Independent

14    NAND KISHOR DEEP    M    48    Independent

15    NARESH BHISHMDEV DHIDHI    M    31    Independent

16    NAVIN GUPTA    M    35    Independent

17    NARAD NISHAD    M    33    Independent

18    PRAVEEN JAIN    M    44    Independent

19    BHARAT BHUSHAN PANDEY    M    45    Independent

20    MATHURA PRASAD TANDON    M    42    Independent

21    YASHWANT SAHU    M    35    Independent

22    RAJENDRA KUMAR SAHU    M    38    Independent

23    RAJENDRA SINGH THAKUR (ADVOCATE)    M    34    Independent

24    RAMKRISHNA VERMA    M    49    Independent

25    RAMCHARAN YADAV    M    33    Independent

26    SHOBHARAM GILHARE    M    38    Independent

27    SIYARAM DHRITLAHARE    M    34    Independent

28    SMT. SUSIL BAI BANJARE    F    36    Independent

29    SYED RASHID ALI    M    62    Independent

30    SANJAY BAGHEL    M    29    Independent

31    HAIDAR BHATI    M    38    Independent

32    SHRIKANT KASER    M    41    Independent

S26    9    CG    MAHASAMUND    16-Apr-09    1    CHANDULAL SAHU (CHANDU BHAIYA)    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    MOTILAL    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MOTILAL SAHU    M    44    Indian National Congress

4    DR. ANAND MATAWALE (GURUJI)    M    38    Lok Bharati

5    KIRAN KUMAR DHRUW    M    44    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

6    BAUDDH KUMAR KAUSHIK    M    37    Chhattisgarh Vikas Party

7    DR. LATA MARKAM    F    26    Republican Party of India (A)

8    SHRIDHAR CHANDRAKAR (PATEL)    M    40    Apna Dal

9    KHEDUBHARTI “SATYESH”    M    33    Independent

10    CHAMPA LAL PATEL    M    43    Independent

11    NARENDRA BHISHMDEV DHIDHI    M    34    Independent

12    NARAYANDAS INQALAB GANDHI    M    63    Independent

13    BHARAT DIWAN    M    29    Independent

14    RAMPRASAD CHAUHAN    M    46    Independent

15    SULTANSINGH SATNAM    M    58    Independent

S26    10    CG    BASTAR    16-Apr-09    1    AYTU RAM MANDAVI    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BALIRAM KASHYAP    M    73    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MANISH KUNJAM    M    42    Communist Party of India

4    SHANKAR SODI    M    44    Indian National Congress

5    CHANDRA SHEKHAR DHRUV (SHEKHAR)    M    42    Independent

6    MAYARAM NETAM ALIAS (FULSING SILADAR)    M    60    Independent

7    SUBHASH CHANDRA MOURYA    M    35    Independent

S26    11    CG    KANKER    16-Apr-09    1    SMT. PHOOLO DEVI NETAM    F    35    Indian National Congress

2    MIRA SALAM    F    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SOHAN POTAI    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    JALSINGH SHORI    M    30    Chhattisgarhi Samaj Party

5    N. R. BHUARYA    M    50    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    BHOM LAL    M    59    Apna Dal

7    MAYARAM NAGWANSHI    M    48    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    G. R. RANA    M    62    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

9    DEVCHAND MATLAM    M    31    Independent

10    PRAFUL MANDAVI    M    35    Independent

11    MAYARAM NETAM (FULSINGH SILEDAR)    M    60    Independent

S27    4    JH    CHATRA    16-Apr-09    1    ARUN KUMAR YADAV    M    41    Janata Dal (United)

2    DHIRAJ PRASAD SAHU    M    50    Indian National Congress

3    NAGMANI    M    46    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    SUGAN MAHTO    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KESHWAR YADAV    M    47    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    PARAS NATH MANJHI    M    58    Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

7    K.P. SHARMA    M    62    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

8    SURENDRA YADAV    M    36    Jharkhand Party

9    INDER SINGH NAMDHARI    M    62    Independent

10    DHIRENDRA AGRAWAL    M    53    Independent

11    RATNESH KUMAR GUPTA    M    47    Independent

S27    5    JH    KODARMA    16-Apr-09    1    TILAKDHARI PD. SINGH    M    65    Indian National Congress

2    PRANAV KUMAR VERMA    M    29    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    LAXAMAN SAWARNKAR    M    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    BISHNU PRASAD BHAIYA    M    47    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    SABHAPATI KUSHWAHA    M    61    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    UMESH CHANDRA TRIVEDI    M    41    Jharkhand Party

7    PRAMESHWAR YADAV    M    49    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

8    BABULAL MARANDI    M    51    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

9    RAJKISHOR PRASAD MODI    M    54    Jharkhand Vikas Dal

10    RAJ KUMAR YADAV    M    37    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

11    HADTAL DAS    M    43    Bahujan Shakty

12    ASHOK KUMAR SHARMA    M    35    Independent

13    KAMAL DAS    M    35    Independent

14    CHANDRA DHARI MAHTO    M    28    Independent

15    MANJOOR ALAM ANSARI    M    45    Independent

16    LAXAMAN DAS    M    37    Independent

S27    11    JH    KHUNTI    16-Apr-09    1    KARIYA MUNDA    M    72    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    NEIL TIRKEY    M    55    Indian National Congress

3    MARSHAL BARLA    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    THEODORE KIRO    M    58    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

5    NITIMA BODRA BARI    F    41    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

6    NISHIKANT HORO    M    55    Jharkhand Party

7    ANAND KUJUR    M    27    Independent

8    UMBULAN TOPNO    M    49    Independent

9    KARLUS BHENGRA    M    41    Independent

S27    12    JH    LOHARDAGA    16-Apr-09    1    JOKHAN BHAGAT    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    RAMESHWAR ORAON    M    63    Indian National Congress

3    SUDARSHAN BHAGAT    M    40    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DEOSHARAN BHAGAT    M    45    All Jharkhand Students Union

5    BAHURA EKKA    M    61    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

6    BHUNESHWAR LOHRA    M    42    Lok Jan Vikas Morcha

7    RAMA KHALKHO    F    38    Jharkhand Janadikhar Manch

8    ARJUN BHAGAT    M    60    Independent

9    ETWA ORAON    M    45    Independent

10    GOPAL ORAON    M    56    Independent

11    CHAMRA LINDA    M    39    Independent

12    JAI PRAKASH BHAGAT    M    36    Independent

13    NAWAL KISHOR SINGH    M    51    Independent

14    PADMA BARAIK    F    25    Independent

15    SUKHDEO LOHRA    M    69    Independent

S27    13    JH    PALAMAU    16-Apr-09    1    KAMESHWAR BAITHA    M    56    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

2    GHURAN RAM    M    42    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    RADHA KRISHNA KISHORE    M    52    Janata Dal (United)

4    HIRA RAM TUPHANI    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    GANESH RAM    M    56    Jharkhand Party

6    JAWAHAR PASWAN    M    48    AJSU Party

7    NANDDEV RAM    M    70    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

8    PARVATI DEVI    F    34    Manav Mukti Morcha

9    PRABHAT KUMAR    M    31    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

10    RAJU GUIDE MAJHI    M    30    Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

11    RAM NARESH RAM    M    36    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

12    BIRBAL RAM    M    28    Rashtriya Lok Dal

13    SATYENDRA KUMAR PASWAN    M    30    Bharatiya Samta Samaj Party

14    SUSHMA MEHTA    F    31    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

15    JITENDRA RAM    M    31    Independent

16    NARESH KUMAR PASWAN    M    29    Independent

17    BRAJMOHAN RAM    M    48    Independent

18    BHOLA RAM    M    32    Independent

19    MUNESHWAR RAM    M    58    Independent

20    RAM PRASAD RAM    M    58    Independent

21    SUNESHWAR BAITHA    M    54    Independent

S27    14    JH    HAZARIBAGH    16-Apr-09    1    KISHOR KUMAR PANDEY    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD MEHTA    M    64    Communist Party of India

3    YASHWANT SINHA    M    71    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SHIVLAL MAHTO    M    34    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    SAURABH NARAIN SINGH    M    34    Indian National Congress

6    CHANDRA PRAKASH CHOUDHARY    M    40    All Jharkhand Students Union

7    DIGAMBER KU. MEHTA    M    42    Samajwadi Party

8    BRAJ KISHORE JAISWAL    M    67    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

9    DEONATH MAHTO    M    29    Independent

10    MAHENDRA KISHORE MEHTA    M    38    Independent

11    MD. MOINUDDIN AHMED    M    32    Independent

12    LALAN PRASAD    M    34    Independent

13    SNEHLATA DEVI    F    49    Independent

U01    1    AN    ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS    16-Apr-09    1    SMTI. R. S. UMA BHARATHY    F    44    Nationalist Congress Party

2    SHRI. KULDEEP RAI SHARMA    M    41    Indian National Congress

3    SHRI. P. R. GANESHAN    M    71    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    SHRI TAPAN KUMAR BEPARI    M    51    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    SHRI. BISHNU PADA RAY    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    SHRI. M. S. MOHAN    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

7    SHRI. N. K. P. NAIR    M    54    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

8    SHRI. PRADEEP KUMAR EKKA    M    37    Jharkhand Disom Party

9    SHRI. T. ALI    M    37    Independent

10    DR. THANKACHAN    M    50    Independent

11    SHRI. VAKIATH VALAPPIL KHALID    M    40    Independent

U06    1    LD    LAKSHADWEEP    16-Apr-09    1    MUHAMMED HAMDULLA SAYEED A.B    M    26    Indian National Congress

2    DR. P. POOKUNHIKOYA    M    60    Nationalist Congress Party

3    DR. K P MUTHUKOYA    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    LUKMANUL HAKEEM    M    32    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

S14    1    MN    INNER MANIPUR    22-Apr-09    1    DR. THOKCHOM MEINYA    M    58    Indian National Congress

2    THOUNAOJAM CHAOBA    M    70    Manipur People’s Party

3    MOIRANGTHEM NARA    M    58    Communist Party of India

4    WAHENGBAM NIPAMACHA SINGH    M    78    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    L. KSHETRANI DEVI    F    50    Rashtriya Bahujan Congress Party

6    ABDUL RAHMAN    M    58    Independent

7    NONGMAITHEM HOMENDRO SINGH    M    45    Independent

S01    23    AP    KAKINADA    23-Apr-09    1    DOMMETI SUDHAKAR    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    M.M.PALLAMRAJU    M    46    Indian National Congress

3    BIKKINA VISWESWARA RAO    M    34    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    VASAMSETTY SATYA    M    44    Telugu Desam

5    ALURI VIJAYA LAKSHMI    F    64    Lok Satta Party

6    UDAYA KUMAR KONDEPUDI    M    36    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

7    GALI SATYAVATHI    F    40    Republican Party of India

8    GIDLA SIMHACHALAM    M    50    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

9    CHALAMALASETTY SUNIL    M    39    Praja Rajyam Party

10    NAMALA SATYANARAYANA    M    45    Rajyadhikara Party

11    N.PALLAMRAJU    M    52    Ajeya Bharat Party

12    BUGATHA BANGARRAO    M    48    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

13    AKAY SURYANARAYANA    M    50    Independent

14    CHAGANTI SURYA NARAYANA MURTHY    M    44    Independent

15    DANAM LAZAR BABU    M    42    Independent

16    BADAMPUDI BABURAO    M    51    Independent

S01    24    AP    AMALAPURAM    23-Apr-09    1    KOMMABATTULA UMA MAHESWARA RAO    M    65    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    GEDDAM SAMPADA RAO    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DOCTOR GEDELA VARALAKSHMI    F    55    Telugu Desam

4    G.V.HARSHA KUMAR    M    50    Indian National Congress

5    AKUMARTHI SURYANARAYANA    M    50    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

6    KIRAN KUMAR BINEPE    M    43    Praja Bharath Party

7    P.V.CHAKRAVARTHI    M    54    Republican Party of India (Khobragade)

8    POTHULA PRAMEELA DEVI    F    55    Praja Rajyam Party

9    BHEEMARAO RAMJI MUTHABATHULA    M    39    Pyramid Party of India

10    MASA RAMADASU    M    46    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

11    YALANGI RAMESH    M    45    Independent

S01    25    AP    RAJAHMUNDRY    23-Apr-09    1    ARUNA KUMAR VUNDAVALLI    M    54    Indian National Congress

2    M. MURALI MOHAN    M    68    Telugu Desam

3    VAJRAPU KOTESWARA RAO    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SOMU VEERRAJU    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    UPPALAPATI VENKATA KRISHNAM RAJU    M    69    Praja Rajyam Party

6    DATLA RAYA JAGAPATHI RAJU    M    50    Pyramid Party of India

7    DR. PALADUGU CHANDRA MOULI    M    69    Lok Satta Party

8    MEDAPATI PAPIREDDY    M    30    Trilinga Praja Pragati Party

9    MEDA SRINIVAS    M    39    Rashtriya Praja Congress (Secular)

10    PARAMATA GANESWARA RAO    M    46    Independent

11    MUSHINI RAMAKRISHNA RAO    M    51    Independent

12    VASAMSETTY NAGESWARA RAO    M    46    Independent

13    SANABOINA SUBHALAKSHMI    F    44    Independent

S01    26    AP    NARSAPURAM    23-Apr-09    1    KALIDINDI VISWANADHA RAJU    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    THOTA SITA RAMA LAKSHMI    F    59    Telugu Desam

3    BAPIRAJU KANUMURU    M    61    Indian National Congress

4    BHUPATHIRAJU SRINIVASA VARMA    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ALLURI YUGANDHARA RAJU    M    44    Pyramid Party of India

6    GUBBALA TAMMAIAH    M    61    Praja Rajyam Party

7    NAVUNDRU RAJENDRA PRASAD    M    44    Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

8    MANORAMA SANKU    F    62    Lok Satta Party

9    M V R RAJU    M    35    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

10    KALIDINDI BHIMARAJU    M    73    Independent

S01    27    AP    ELURU    23-Apr-09    1    KAVURI SAMBASIVA RAO    M    65    Indian National Congress

2    KODURI VENKATA SUBBA RAJU    M    46    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    PILLELLLI SUNIL    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    MAGANTI VENKATESWARA RAO(BABU)    M    49    Telugu Desam

5    Y.V.S.V. PRASADA RAO (YERNENI PRASADA RAO)    M    61    Pyramid Party of India

6    KOLUSU PEDA REDDAIAH YADAV    M    67    Praja Rajyam Party

7    SAVANAPUDI NAGARAJU    M    48    Marxist Communist Party of India (S.S. Srivastava)

8    SIRIKI SRINIVAS    M    32    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

9    KASI NAIDU KAMMILI    M    39    Independent

10    TANUKU SEKHAR    M    45    Independent

11    DODDA KAMESWARA RAO    M    54    Independent

12    DOWLURI GOVARDHAN    M    32    Independent

S01    28    AP    MACHILIPATNAM    23-Apr-09    1    KONAKALLA NARAYANA RAO    M    59    Telugu Desam

2    CHIGURUPATI RAMALINGESWARA RAO    M    33    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BADIGA RAMAKRISHNA    M    66    Indian National Congress

4    BHOGADI RAMA DEVI    F    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KOPPULA VENKATESWARA RAO    M    45    Lok Satta Party

6    CHENNAMSETTI RAMACHANDRAIAH    M    60    Praja Rajyam Party

7    YARLAGADDA RAMAMOHANA RAO    M    44    Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

8    VARA LAKSHMI KONERU    F    59    Pyramid Party of India

9    G.V. NAGESWARA RAO    M    25    Independent

10    YENDURI SUBRAMANYESWA RAO ( MANI )    M    50    Independent

S01    29    AP    VIJAYAWADA    23-Apr-09    1    LAGADAPATI RAJA GOPAL    M    45    Indian National Congress

2    LAKA VENGALA RAO    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    VAMSI MOHAN VALLABHANENI    M    38    Telugu Desam

4    SISTLA NARASIMHA MURTHY    M    63    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    DEVINENI KISHORE KUMAR    M    59    Lok Satta Party

6    RAGHAVA RAO JAKKA    M    60    Pyramid Party of India

7    RAJIV CHANUMOLU    M    43    Praja Rajyam Party

8    APPIKATLA JAWAHAR    M    44    Independent

9    KRISHNA MURTHY SUNKARA    M    46    Independent

10    JAKKA TARAKA MALLIKHARJUNA RAO    M    42    Independent

11    DEVERASETTY RAVINDRA BABU    M    35    Independent

12    DEVIREDDY RAVINDRANATHA REDDY    M    36    Independent

13    PERUPOGU VENKATESWARA RAO    M    41    Independent

14    BAIPUDI NAGESWARA RAO    M    30    Independent

15    BOPPA VENKATESWARA RAO    M    42    Independent

16    BOLISETTY HARIBABU    M    46    Independent

17    VEERLA SANJEEVA RAO    M    44    Independent

18    VENKATA RAO P.    M    44    Independent

19    SENAPATHI CHIRANJEEVI    M    36    Independent

20    SHAIK MASTAN    M    28    Independent

S01    30    AP    GUNTUR    23-Apr-09    1    MALLELA BABU RAO    M    61    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    YADLAPATI SWARUPARANI    F    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    RAJENDRA MADALA    M    42    Telugu Desam

7    SAMBASIVA RAO RAYAPATI    M    65    Indian National Congress

8    AMANULLA KHAN    M    37    Lok Satta Party

9    KOMMANABOINA LAKSHMAIAH    M    39    Rajyadhikara Party

11    THOTA CHANDRA SEKHAR    M    47    Praja Rajyam Party

12    YARRAKULA TULASI RAM YADAV    M    29    Samajwadi Party

13    VELAGAPUDI LAKSHMANA RAO    M    59    Pyramid Party of India

14    SRINIVASA RAO THOTAKURA    M    34    Ajeya Bharat Party

S01    31    AP    NARASARAOPET    23-Apr-09    1    BALASHOWRY VALLABHANENI    M    43    Indian National Congress

2    BEJJAM RATNAKARA RAO    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    VALLEPU KRUPA RAO    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    VENUGOPALA REDDY MODUGULA    M    42    Telugu Desam

7    GANUGAPENTA UTTAMA REDDY    M    30    Lok Satta Party

8    S.G. MASTAN VALI    M    31    Pyramid Party of India

9    RAMADUGU VENKATA SUBBA RAO    M    45    Samajwadi Party

11    SHAIK SYED SAHEB    M    65    Praja Rajyam Party

13    SAI PRASAD EDARA    M    42    Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

14    ATCHALA NARASIMHA RAO    M    39    Independent

15    ANNAMRAJU VENUGOPALA MADHAVA RAO    M    37    Independent

17    KATAMARAJU NALAGORLA    M    61    Independent

19    YAMPATI VEERANJANEYA REDDY    M    38    Independent

21    SRINIVASA REDDY KESARI    M    40    Independent

S01    32    AP    BAPATLA    23-Apr-09    1    DARA SAMBAIAH    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PANABAKA LAKSHMI    F    50    Indian National Congress

3    BATTULA ROSAYYA    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    MALYADRI SRIRAM    M    55    Telugu Desam

5    GARIKAPATI SUDHAKAR    M    37    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

6    NUTHAKKI RAMA RAO    M    61    Praja Rajyam Party

7    GUDIPALLI SATHYA BABUJI    M    40    Independent

8    GORREMUCHU CHINNA RAO    M    42    Independent

9    GOLLA BABU RAO    M    34    Independent

10    DEVARAPALLI BUJJI BABU    M    34    Independent

S01    33    AP    ONGOLE    23-Apr-09    1    MANDAVA VASUDEVA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    MADDULURI MALAKONDAIAH YADAV    M    47    Telugu Desam

3    MAGUNTA SRINIVASULU REDDY    M    55    Indian National Congress

4    CHALUVADI SRINIVASARAO    M    38    Pyramid Party of India

5    DR,NARAYANAM RADHA DEVI    F    57    Lok Satta Party

6    PIDATHALA SAI KALPANA    F    50    Praja Rajyam Party

7    SHAIK SHAJAHAN    M    49    United Women Front

8    GARRE RAMAKRISHNA    M    34    Independent

9    DAMA MOHANA RAO    M    53    Independent

10    NALAMALAPU LAKSHMINARASAREDDY    M    40    Independent

11    YATHAPU KONDAREDDY    M    28    Independent

S01    34    AP    NANDYAL    23-Apr-09    1    NASYAM MOHAMMED FAROOK    M    57    Telugu Desam

2    S.MOHAMMED ISMAIL    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    S.P.Y.REDDY    M    59    Indian National Congress

4    ABDUL SATTAR . G    M    26    B. C. United Front

5    PICHHIKE NARENDRA DEV    M    39    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

6    BHUMA VENKATA NAGI REDDY    M    45    Praja Rajyam Party

7    RAMA JAGANNADHA REDDY TAMIDELA    M    34    Lok Satta Party

8    SADHU VEERA VENKATA RAMANAIAH    M    35    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

9    AMBATI RAMESWARA REDDY    M    35    Independent

10    K.ARTHER PANCHARATNAM    M    44    Independent

11    B.P.KAMBAGIRI SWAMY    M    36    Independent

12    GALI RAMA SUBBA REDDY    M    33    Independent

13    A.U.FAROOQ    M    25    Independent

14    G.BALASWAMY    M    37    Independent

15    T.MAHESH NAIDU    M    28    Independent

16    B.V.RAMI REDDY    M    47    Independent

17    B.R.L.REDDY    M    40    Independent

18    VENNUPUSA VENKATESHWARA REDDY    M    35    Independent

19    SINGAM VENKATESHWARA REDDY    M    35    Independent

20    T.SRINUVASULU    M    38    Independent

21    V.SESHI REDDY    M    33    Independent

S01    35    AP    KURNOOL    23-Apr-09    1    KOTLA JAYA SURYA PRAKASH REDDY    M    57    Indian National Congress

2    GADDAM RAMAKRISHNA    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    B.T.NAIDU    M    36    Telugu Desam

4    RAVI SUBRAMANYAM K.A.    M    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    JALLI VENKATESH    M    38    Lok Satta Party

6    DR.DANDIYA KHAJA PEERA    M    55    Praja Rajyam Party

7    B.NAGA JAYA CHANDRA REDDY    M    35    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

8    DR.P.R.PARAMESWAR REDDY    M    36    Pyramid Party of India

9    DEVI RAMALINGAPPA    M    44    Independent

10    V.V. RAMANA    M    38    Independent

11    RAJU    M    45    Independent

S01    36    AP    ANANTAPUR    23-Apr-09    1    ANANTHA VENKATA RAMI REDDY    M    52    Indian National Congress

2    AMBATI RAMA KRISHNA REDDY    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    KALAVA SRINIVASULU    M    44    Telugu Desam

4    GADDALA NAGABHUSHANAM    M    45    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    AMARNATH    M    32    Lok Satta Party

6    KRUSHNAPURAM GAYATHRI DEVI    F    36    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

7    MANSOOR    M    56    Praja Rajyam Party

8    G HARI    M    29    Pyramid Party of India

9    T CHANDRA SEKHAR    M    30    Independent

10    DEVELLA MURALI    M    44    Independent

11    K P NARAYANA SWAMY    M    41    Independent

12    J C RAMANUJULA REDDY    M    52    Independent

S01    37    AP    HINDUPUR    23-Apr-09    1    KRISTAPPA NIMMALA    M    52    Telugu Desam

2    P KHASIM KHAN    M    53    Indian National Congress

3    NARESH CINE ACTOR    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    B.S.P.SREERAMULU    M    30    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KADAPALA SREEKANTA REDDY    M    56    Praja Rajyam Party

6    NIRANJAN BABU. K    M    30    Lok Satta Party

7    S. MUSKIN VALI    M    26    Pyramid Party of India

8    K. JAKEER    M    40    Independent

9    B. NAGABHUSHANA RAO    M    76    Independent

10    P. PRASAD (PEETLA PRASAD)    M    32    Independent

S01    38    AP    KADAPA    23-Apr-09    1    JAMBAPURAM MUNI REDDY    M    31    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    Y.S. JAGAN MOHAN REDDY    M    36    Indian National Congress

3    PALEM SRIKANTH REDDY    M    45    Telugu Desam

4    VANGALA SHASHI BHUSHAN REDDY    M    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KASIBHATLA SAINATH SARMA    M    38    Rajyadhikara Party

6    N. KISHORE KUMAR REDDY    M    38    Janata Dal (Secular)

7    KUNCHAM VENKATA SUBBA REDDY    M    42    Rayalaseema Rashtra Samithi

8    DR. KHALEEL BASHA    M    60    Praja Rajyam Party

9    GAJJALA RAMA SUBBA REDDY    M    57    Pyramid Party of India

10    GUDIPATI. PRASANNA KUMAR    M    55    Lok Satta Party

11    C. GOPI NARASIMHA REDDY    M    31    Janata Dal (United)

12    CHINNAPA REDDY KOMMA    M    41    Bharatiya Jan Shakti

13    Y. SEKHARA REDDY    M    47    Republican Party of India (A)

14    S. ALI SHER    M    47    Independent

15    THIMMAPPAGARI VENKATA SIVA REDDY    M    47    Independent

16    V. NARENDRA    M    39    Independent

17    S. RAJA MADIGA    M    46    Independent

18    YELLIPALAM RAMESH REDDY    M    35    Independent

19    SIVANARAYANA REDDY CHADIPIRALLA    M    39    Independent

20    J. SUBBARAYUDU    M    51    Independent

S01    39    AP    NELLORE    23-Apr-09    1    S. PADMA NAGESWARA RAO    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BATHINA NARASIMHA RAO    M    65    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MEKAPATI RAJAMOHAN REDDY    M    64    Indian National Congress

4    VANTERU VENU GOPALA REDDY    M    59    Telugu Desam

5    JANA RAMACHANDRAIAH    M    56    Praja Rajyam Party

6    VEMURI BHASKARA RAO    M    36    Lok Satta Party

7    SIDDIRAJU SATYANARAYANA    M    43    Pyramid Party of India

8    KARIMULLA    M    42    Independent

9    MUCHAKALA CHANDRA SEKHAR YADAV    M    40    Independent

10    VENKATA BHASKAR REDDY DIRISALA    M    37    Independent

11    SYED HAMZA HUSSAINY    M    46    Independent

S01    40    AP    TIRUPATI    23-Apr-09    1    CHINTA MOHAN    M    54    Indian National Congress

2    VARLA RAMAIAH    M    57    Telugu Desam

3    N.VENKATASWAMY    M    77    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    JUVVIGUNTA VENKATESWARLU    M    37    Lok Satta Party

5    DEGALA SURYANARAYANA    M    34    Pyramid Party of India

6    DHANASEKHAR GUNDLURU    M    41    Republican Party of India (A)

7    VARAPRASADA RAO. V    M    55    Praja Rajyam Party

8    OREPALLI VENKATA KRISHNA PRASAD    M    43    Independent

9    KATTAMANCHI PRABAKHAR    M    40    Independent

10    YALAVADI MUNIKRISHNAIAH    M    64    Independent

S01    41    AP    RAJAMPET    23-Apr-09    1    ANNAYYAGARI SAI PRATHAP    M    64    Indian National Congress

2    ALLAPUREDDY. HARINATHA REDDY    M    69    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAMESH KUMAR REDDY REDDAPPAGARI    M    44    Telugu Desam

4    SUNKARA SREENIVAS    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    DR. ARAVA. VENKATA SUBBA REDDY    M    38    Pyramid Party of India

6    ADI NARAYANA REDDY .V    M    40    Bharatheeya Sadharma Samsthapana Party

7    NAGESWARA RAO EDAGOTTU    M    38    Lok Satta Party

8    D.A. SRINIVAS    M    36    Praja Rajyam Party

9    SHAIK AMEEN PEERAN    M    39    Ambedkar National Congress

10    ASADI VENKATADRI    M    41    Independent

11    INDRA PRAKASH    M    32    Independent

12    KASTHURI OBAIAH NAIDU    M    55    Independent

13    B. KRISHNAPPA    M    32    Independent

14    PULA RAGHU    M    44    Independent

15    HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM    M    82    Independent

S01    42    AP    CHITTOOR    23-Apr-09    1    JAYARAM DUGGANI    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    THIPPESWAMY M    M    55    Indian National Congress

3    NARAMALLI SIVAPRASAD    M    57    Telugu Desam

4    B.SIVAKUMAR    M    40    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    A. AMARNADH    M    37    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

6    TALARI MANOHAR    M    54    Praja Rajyam Party

7    G. VENKATACHALAM    M    29    Lok Satta Party

S03    4    AS    DHUBRI    23-Apr-09    1    ANWAR HUSSAIN    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    BADRUDDIN AJMAL    M    54    Assam United Democratic Front

3    ARUN DAS    M    39    Rashtrawadi Sena

4    ALOK SEN    M    37    Samajwadi Party

5    SOLEMAN ALI    M    45    Independent

6    SHAHJAHAN ALI    M    39    Independent

7    SOLEMAN KHANDAKER    M    53    Independent

8    TRIPTI KANA MAZUMDAR CHOUDHURY    F    45    Independent

9    NUR MAHAMMAD    M    61    Independent

10    MINHAR ALI MANDAL    M    61    Independent

S03    5    AS    KOKRAJHAR    23-Apr-09    1    SABDA RAM RABHA    M    39    Asom Gana Parishad

2    SANSUMA KHUNGGUR BWISWMUTHIARY    M    49    Bodaland Peoples Front

3    URKHAO GWRA BRAHMA    M    45    Independent

S03    6    AS    BARPETA    23-Apr-09    1    ABDUS SAMAD AHMED    M    41    Assam United Democratic Front

2    MD. AMIR ALI    M    42    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    ISMAIL HUSSAIN    M    55    Indian National Congress

4    DURGESWAR DEKA    M    54    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    BHUPEN RAY    M    49    Asom Gana Parishad

6    ABU CHAND MAHMMAD    M    63    Republican Party of India (A)

7    ABDUL KADDUS    M    35    Samajwadi Party

8    KANDARPA LAHKAR    M    53    Rashtravadi Janata Party

9    MD. DILIR KHAN    M    42    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

10    MUIJ UDDIN MAHMUD    M    51    Lok Jan Shakti Party

11    ABDUL KADER    M    41    Independent

12    GOLAP HUSSAIN MAZUMDER    M    35    Independent

13    DEWAN JOYNAL ABEDIN    M    65    Independent

14    BHADRESWAR DAS    M    40    Independent

S03    7    AS    GAUHATI    23-Apr-09    1    AKSHAY RAJKHOWA    M    49    Nationalist Congress Party

2    BIJOYA CHAKRAVARTY    F    70    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    CAPT. ROBIN BORDOLOI    M    67    Indian National Congress

4    SONABOR ALI    M    58    Assam United Democratic Front

5    AMBU BORA    M    78    Revolutionary Communist Party of India (Rasik Bhatt)

6    DEEPAK KALITA    M    34    Samajwadi Party

7    SHIMANTA BRAHMA    M    48    Rashtrawadi Sena

8    AMIT BARUA    M    42    Independent

9    KAZI NEKIB AHMED    M    51    Independent

10    DEVA KANTA RAMCHIARY    M    46    Independent

11    BRIJESH ROY    M    30    Independent

12    RINA GAYARY DAS    F    41    Independent

S03    8    AS    MANGALDOI    23-Apr-09    1    BADIUJ ZAMAL    M    33    Assam United Democratic Front

2    MADHAB RAJBANGSHI    M    53    Indian National Congress

3    RAMEN DEKA    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DINA NATH DAS    M    65    Bodaland Peoples Front

5    PARVEEN SULTANA    F    42    All India Minorities Front

6    RABINDRA NATH HAZARIKA    M    72    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

7    RATUL KUMAR CHOUDHURY    M    38    Samajwadi Party

8    LANKESWAR ACHARJYA    M    45    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

9    LUCYMAI BASUMATARI    F    58    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

10    AROON BAROOA    M    53    Independent

11    PRODEEP KUMAR DAIMARY    M    42    Independent

12    BHUPENDRA NATH KAKATI    M    62    Independent

13    MANOJ KUMAR DEKA    M    55    Independent

S03    9    AS    TEZPUR    23-Apr-09    1    JITEN SUNDI    M    64    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    DEBA ORANG    M    54    Assam United Democratic Front

3    MONI KUMAR SUBBA    M    51    Indian National Congress

4    JOSEPH TOPPO    M    60    Asom Gana Parishad

5    ARUN KUMAR MURMOO    M    33    Bharat Vikas Morcha

6    PARASHMONI SINHA    M    33    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

7    JUGANANDA HAZARIKA    M    42    Samajwadi Party

8    RUBUL SARMA    M    52    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

9    REGINOLD V. JOHNSON    M    45    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

10    KALYAN KUMAR DEORI BHARALI    M    69    Independent

11    DANIEL DAVID JESUDAS    M    66    Independent

12    MD. NAZIR AHMED    M    56    Independent

13    DR. PRANAB KR. DAS    M    41    Independent

14    PRASANTA BORO    M    32    Independent

15    RUDRA PARAJULI    M    52    Independent

S03    10    AS    NOWGONG    23-Apr-09    1    ANIL RAJA    M    51    Indian National Congress

2    RAJEN GOHAIN    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SIRAJ UDDIN AJMAL    M    52    Assam United Democratic Front

4    PHEIROIJAM IBOMCHA SINGH    M    60    All India Forward Bloc

5    BIPIN SAIKIA    M    55    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

6    BIREN DAS    M    48    Rashtrawadi Sena

7    BHUPEN CHANDRA MUDOI    M    55    Republican Party of India (A)

8    LIAQAT HUSSAIN    M    40    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    ASHIT DUTTA    M    47    Independent

10    NAZRUL HAQUE MAZARBHUIYAN    M    55    Independent

11    PUSPA KANTA BORA    M    49    Independent

12    BIMALA PRASAD TALUKDAR    M    46    Independent

13    HERAMBA MOHAN PANDIT    M    45    Independent

S03    11    AS    KALIABOR    23-Apr-09    1    GUNIN HAZARIKA    M    61    Asom Gana Parishad

2    DIP GOGOI    M    57    Indian National Congress

3    SIRAJ UDDIN AJMAL    M    52    Assam United Democratic Front

4    KAMAL HAZARIKA    M    48    Independent

5    PAUL NAYAK    M    40    Independent

6    PRADEEP DUTTA    M    42    Independent

7    BINOD GOGOI    M    38    Independent

8    MRIDUL BARUAH    M    37    Independent

S03    12    AS    JORHAT    23-Apr-09    1    KAMAKHYA TASA    M    34    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DRUPAD BORGOHAIN    M    68    Communist Party of India

3    BIJOY KRISHNA HANDIQUE    M    77    Indian National Congress

4    ABINASH KISHORE BORAH    M    30    Rashtrawadi Sena

5    BIREN NANDA    M    48    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

6    NAVAPROKASH SONOWAL    M    36    Independent

7    RAJ KUMAR DOWARAH    M    43    Independent

8    SUJIT SAHU    M    38    Independent

S03    13    AS    DIBRUGARH    23-Apr-09    1    SRI PABAN SINGH GHATOWAR    M    60    Indian National Congress

2    SRI ROMEN CH. BORTHAKUR    M    48    Nationalist Congress Party

3    SRI RATUL GOGOI    M    31    Communist Party of India

4    SRI SARBANANDA SONOWAL    M    47    Asom Gana Parishad

5    SRI GONGARAM KAUL    M    39    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    NIHARIKA BORPATRA GOHAIN GOGOI    F    30    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

7    IMTIAZ HUSSAIN    M    31    Independent

8    FRANCIS DHAN    M    40    Independent

9    LAKHI CHARAN SWANSI    M    34    Independent

10    SIMA GHOSH    F    40    Independent

S03    14    AS    LAKHIMPUR    23-Apr-09    1    DR. ARUN KR. SARMA    M    52    Asom Gana Parishad

2    BHOGESWAR DUTTA    M    63    Communist Party of India

3    RANEE NARAH    F    45    Indian National Congress

4    GANGADHAR DUTTA    M    39    Shivsena

5    DEBNATH MAJHI    M    30    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

6    PRAN JYOTI BORPATRA GOHAIN    M    26    Rashtrawadi Sena

7    MINU BURAGOHAIN    F    50    Samajwadi Party

8    RATNESWAR GOGOI    M    63    All India Forward Bloc

9    LALIT MILI    M    53    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

10    SONAMONI DAS    M    39    Lok Jan Shakti Party

11    ASAP SUNDIGURIA    M    62    Independent

12    PRASHANTA GOGOI    M    35    Independent

13    BHUMIDHAR HAZARIKA    M    38    Independent

14    RANOJ PEGU    M    45    Independent

15    RABIN DEKA    M    54    Independent

S04    1    BR    VALMIKI NAGAR    23-Apr-09    1    DILIP VERMA    M    52    Nationalist Congress Party

2    BAIDYANATH PRASAD MAHTO    M    51    Janata Dal (United)

3    MANAN MISHRA    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    MOHAMMAD SHAMIM AKHTAR    M    37    Indian National Congress

5    RAGHUNATH JHA    M    63    Rashtriya Janata Dal

6    BIRENDRA PRASAD GUPTA    M    40    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    SHAILENDRA KUMAR GARHWAL    M    38    Loktantrik Samata Dal

8    AMBIKA SINGH    M    53    Independent

9    UMESH    M    36    Independent

10    DEORAJ RAM    M    31    Independent

11    FAKHRUDDIN    M    37    Independent

12    MAGISTER YADAV    M    42    Independent

13    MANOHAR MANOJ    M    40    Independent

14    RAMASHANKAR PRASAD    M    35    Independent

15    RAKESH KUMAR PANDEY    M    51    Independent

16    SATYANARAIN YADAV    M    28    Independent

S04    2    BR    PASCHIM CHAMPARAN    23-Apr-09    1    ANIRUDH PRASAD ALIAS SADHU YADAV    M    46    Indian National Congress

2    PRAKASH JHA    M    55    Lok Jan Shakti Party

3    RAMASHRAY SINGH    M    65    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    SHAMBHU PRASAD GUPTA    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    DR. SANJAY JAISWAL    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    FAIYAZUL AZAM    M    71    Janata Dal (Secular)

7    MANOJ KUMAR    M    44    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

8    SYED SHAMIM AKHTAR    M    48    Loktantrik Samata Dal

9    NAFIS AHAMAD    M    35    Independent

10    SHRIMAN MISHRA    M    41    Independent

11    SYED IRSHAD AKHTER    M    32    Independent

S04    3    BR    PURVI CHAMPARAN    23-Apr-09    1    AKHILESH PD. SINGH    M    40    Rashtriya Janata Dal

2    ARVIND KR. GUPTA    M    29    Indian National Congress

3    GAGANDEO YADAV    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RADHA MOHAN SINGH    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    RAMCHANDRA PD.    M    51    Communist Party of India

6    UMESH KR. SINGH    M    43    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

7    NAGENDRA SAHANI    M    33    Loktantrik Samata Dal

8    SURESH KR. RAJAK    M    45    Indian Justice Party

9    SURESH KR. RAI    M    41    Bajjikanchal Vikas Party

10    JHAGARU MAHATO    M    48    Independent

11    PARASNATH PANDEY    M    48    Independent

12    MD. MURTAZA ANSARI(DR. LAL)    M    40    Independent

S04    4    BR    SHEOHAR    23-Apr-09    1    MD. ANWARUL HAQUE    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    MD. TANVEER ZAFER    M    33    Communist Party of India

3    RAMA DEVI    F    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    LOVELY ANAND    M    35    Indian National Congress

5    SITARAM SINGH    M    60    Rashtriya Janata Dal

6    ARUN SAH    M    30    Bharatiya Loktantrik Party(Gandhi-Lohiawadi)

7    BASDEO SAH    M    36    Indian Justice Party

8    SHATRUGHANA SAHU    M    38    Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

9    AJAY KUMAR PANDEY    M    36    Independent

10    CHANDRIKA PRASAD    M    34    Independent

11    MOHAMMAD FIROZ AHAMAD    M    28    Independent

12    MOHSIN    M    29    Independent

13    YOGENDRA RAM    M    38    Independent

14    RAM ASHISH, MAHTO    M    64    Independent

15    SUNIL SINGH    M    44    Independent

S04    5    BR    SITAMARHI    23-Apr-09    1    ARJUN ROY    M    37    Janata Dal (United)

2    MAYA SHANKAR SHARAN    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SAMIR KUMAR MAHASETH    M    49    Indian National Congress

4    SITARAM YADAV    M    61    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    S. ABU DAUJANA    M    41    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    CHITARANJAN GIRI    M    42    Rashtriya Pragati Party

7    MOHAMMAD AFZAL PAINTHER    M    44    Ambedkar National Congress

8    SHANKAR SINHA    M    51    Revolutionary Socialist Party

9    CHANDRIKA PRASAD    M    34    Independent

10    ZAHID    M    30    Independent

11    DINESH PRASAD    M    40    Independent

12    PAPPU KUMAR MISHRA    M    30    Independent

13    MUKESH KUMAR GUPTA    M    39    Independent

14    RAVINDRA KUMAR    M    36    Independent

15    RAM KISHORE PRASAD    M    71    Independent

16    SONE LAL SAH    M    61    Independent

S04    6    BR    MADHUBANI    23-Apr-09    1    ABDULBARI SIDDIKI    M    62    Rashtriya Janata Dal

2    LAXMANKANT MISHRA    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR SHAKEEL AHAMAD    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    HUKM DEO NARAYAN YADAV    M    72    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DR HEMCHANDRA JHA    M    48    Communist Party of India

6    MINTU KUMAR SINGH    M    30    Jago Party

7    MISHRI LAL YADAV    M    39    Rashtriya Krantikari Janata Party

8    RAMCHANDRA YADAV    M    65    Krantikari Samyavadi Party

9    RAM SAGAR SAHANI    M    51    Indian Justice Party

10    MD ZINNUR    M    47    Independent

11    RAVINDRA THAKUR    M    40    Independent

12    RAJESHWAR YADAV    M    37    Independent

13    SANJAY KUMAR MAHTO    M    36    Independent

14    HARIBHUSHAN THAKUR “BACHOL”    M    44    Independent

S04    7    BR    JHANJHARPUR    23-Apr-09    1    KRIPANATH PATHAK    M    65    Indian National Congress

2    GAURI SHANKAR YADAV    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DEVENDRA PRASAD YADAV    M    53    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    MANGANI LAL MANDAL    M    60    Janata Dal (United)

5    DR KIRTAN PRASAD SINGH    M    50    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    YOGNATH MANDAL    M    36    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    OM PRAKASH    M    27    Independent

8    NATHUNI YADAV    M    57    Independent

9    FIROZ ALAM    M    38    Independent

10    VIVEKA NAND JHA    M    33    Independent

11    SHANKAR PRASAD    M    26    Independent

S04    14    BR    DARBHANGA    23-Apr-09    1    AJAY KUMAR JALAN    M    49    Indian National Congress

2    MD. ALI ASHRAF FATMI    M    53    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    KIRTI AZAD    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    YUGESHWAR SAHNI    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    KUMARI SURESHWARI    F    60    Rashtriya Mazdoor Ekta Party

6    MD. KHURSHID ALAM    M    46    Apna Dal

7    DURGANAND MAHAVIR NAYAK    M    37    Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

8    MD. NIZAMUDDIN    M    36    Indian Justice Party

9    SATYANARAYAN MUKHIA    M    41    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

10    ABDUR RAHIM    M    49    Independent

11    GOVIND ACHARAY    M    27    Independent

12    BHARAT YADAV    M    54    Independent

13    LALBAHADUR YADAV    M    35    Independent

14    PROF. HARERAM ACHARAY    M    49    Independent

S04    15    BR    MUZAFFARPUR    23-Apr-09    1    CAPTAIN JAI NARAYAN PRASAD NISHAD    M    78    Janata Dal (United)

2    BHAGWANLAL SAHNI    M    57    Lok Jan Shakti Party

3    VINITA VIJAY    F    41    Indian National Congress

4    SAMEER KUMAR    M    41    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    JITENDRA YADAV    M    35    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    DINESH KUMAR KUSHWAHA    M    32    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

7    DEVENDRA RAKESH    M    49    Bajjikanchal Vikas Party

8    NEELU SINGH    F    36    Proutist Sarva Samaj

9    MAHENDRA PRASAD    M    63    Rashtriya Pragati Party

10    MITHILESH KUMAR    M    40    Rashtra Sewa Dal

11    MOHAMMAD SHAMIM    M    31    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

12    MD. RAHAMTULLAHA    M    37    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

13    RAM DAYAL RAM    M    48    All India Forward Bloc

14    REYAJ AHMAD ATISH    M    62    Jago Party

15    MD. SALEEM    M    36    Rashtravadi Janata Party

16    ASHOK KUMAR LALAN    M    37    Independent

17    AHMAD RAZA    M    31    Independent

18    GEORGE FERNANDES    M    78    Independent

19    TARKESHWAR PASWAN    M    38    Independent

20    VIJENDRA CHAUDHARY    M    42    Independent

21    VINOD PASWAN    M    35    Independent

22    SHAMBHU SAHNI    M    37    Independent

23    SADANAND KISHORE THAKUR    M    38    Independent

24    SYED ALAMDAR HUSSAIN    M    27    Independent

S04    16    BR    VAISHALI    23-Apr-09    1    RAGHUVANSH PRASAD SINGH    M    62    Rashtriya Janata Dal

2    VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA    M    38    Janata Dal (United)

3    SHANKAR MAHTO    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    HIND KESRI YADAV    M    58    Indian National Congress

5    PUNAMRI DEVI    F    37    United Women Front

6    PRAMOD KUMAR SHARMA    M    27    Bajjikanchal Vikas Party

7    BADRI PASWAN    M    39    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

8    BALAK NATH SAHANI    M    39    Indian Justice Party

9    LALJI KUMAR RAKESH    M    35    Rashtra Sewa Dal

10    BINOD PANDIT    M    29    Lokpriya Samaj Party

11    INDARDEO RAI    M    46    Independent

12    JITENDRA PRASAD    M    34    Independent

S04    21    BR    HAJIPUR    23-Apr-09    1    DASAI CHOWDHARY    M    52    Indian National Congress

2    MAHESHWAR DAS    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    RAM VILAS PASWAN    M    61    Lok Jan Shakti Party

4    RAM SUNDAR DAS    M    88    Janata Dal (United)

5    DINESH CHANDRA BHUSHAN    M    36    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    NAND LAL PASWAN    M    47    Independent

7    PRATIMA KUMARI    F    33    Independent

8    RAJENDRA KUMAR PASWAN    M    54    Independent

9    RAM TIRTH PASWAN    M    59    Independent

10    VISHWA VIJAY KUMAR VIDHYARTHI    M    30    Independent

11    SANJAY PASHWAN    M    30    Independent

S04    22    BR    UJIARPUR    23-Apr-09    1    ASWAMEDH DEVI    F    40    Janata Dal (United)

2    ALOK KUMAR MEHTA    M    40    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    RAMDEO VERMA    M    62    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

4    VIJAYWANT KUMAR CHOUDHARY    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SHEEL KUMAR ROY    M    40    Indian National Congress

6    CHANDRA DEO ROY    M    48    Socialist Party (Lohia)

7    JAI NARAYAN SAH    M    53    Bajjikanchal Vikas Party

8    JITENDRA KUMAR ROY    M    32    Shivsena

9    TOSHAN SAH    M    62    Rashtriya Pragati Party

10    MD. TAUKIR    M    40    Samata Party

11    MASSOD HASSAN    M    29    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

12    RAMNATH SINGH    M    36    Rashtra Sewa Dal

13    ARJUN SAHNI    M    28    Independent

14    PRADEEP KUMAR    M    41    Independent

15    BRAJESH KUMAR NIRALA    M    51    Independent

16    MANSOOR    M    42    Independent

17    MOHAN PAUL    M    47    Independent

18    MOHAMMAD KURBAN    M    43    Independent

19    RATAN SAHNI    M    46    Independent

20    RAM SAGAR MAHTO    M    45    Independent

21    SANJAY KUMAR JHA    M    36    Independent

22    SUJIT KUMAR BHAGAT    M    29    Independent

S04    23    BR    SAMASTIPUR    23-Apr-09    1    DR. ASHOK KUMAR    M    54    Indian National Congress

2    MAHESWER HAZARI    M    38    Janata Dal (United)

3    RAM CHANDRA PASWAN    M    47    Lok Jan Shakti Party

4    BINDESHWAR PASWAN    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    UPENDRA PASWAN    M    42    Loktantrik Samata Dal

6    JEEBACHH PASWAN    M    41    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    RANDHIR PASWAN    M    27    Independent

8    RAJA RAM DAS    M    56    Independent

9    REKHA KUMARI    F    29    Independent

10    SHIVCHANDRA PASWAN    M    31    Independent

11    SATISH MAHTO    M    33    Independent

S05    1    GA    NORTH GOA    23-Apr-09    1    CHRISTOPHER FONSECA    M    55    Communist Party of India

2    JITENDRA RAGHURAJ DESHPRABHU    M    53    Nationalist Congress Party

3    RAUT PANDURANG DATTARAM    M    62    Maharashtrawadi Gomantak

4    SHRIPAD YESSO NAIK    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    UPENDRA CHANDRU GAONKAR    M    48    Shivsena

6    NARACINVA SURYA SALGAONKAR    M    51    Independent

7    MARTHA D’ SOUZA    F    55    Independent

S05    2    GA    SOUTH GOA    23-Apr-09    1    COSME FRANCISCO CAITANO SARDINHA    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    ADV. NARENDRA KESHAV SAWAIKAR    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ADV. RAJU MANGESHKAR ALIAS RAJENDRA NAIK    M    52    Communist Party of India

4    ROHIDAS HARICHANDRA BORKAR    M    63    Save Goa Front

5    MATANHY SALDANHA    M    60    United Goans Democratic Party

6    DIAS JAWAHAR    M    53    Independent

7    DERICK DIAS    M    41    Independent

8    FRANCISCO ANTONIO JOAO DE PHILOMENO FERNANDES    M    66    Independent

9    MULLA SALIM    M    25    Independent

10    SALUNKE SMITA PRAVEEN    F    38    Independent

11    HAMZA KHAN    M    57    Independent

S09    5    JK    UDHAMPUR    23-Apr-09    1    ADREES AHMAD TABBASUM    M    45    Communist Party of India

2    BALBIR SINGH    M    53    Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party

3    PROF. BHIM SINGH    M    69    Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party

4    RAKESH WAZIR    M    29    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    CH. LAL SINGH    M    50    Indian National Congress

6    DR. NIRMAL SINGH    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

7    BODH RAJ    M    42    Backward Classes Democratic Party, J&K

8    RAJESH MANCHANDA    M    40    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

9    KANCHAN SHARMA    F    40    Bharatiya Bahujan Party

10    MASTER WILLIAM GILL    M    60    All India Forward Bloc

11    ATUL SHARMA    M    30    Independent

12    DEV RAJ    M    57    Independent

13    MOHD. YOUSUF    M    46    Independent

14    NARESH DOGRA    M    40    Independent

S10    1    KA    CHIKKODI    23-Apr-09    1    KATTI RAMESH VISHWANATH    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PRAKASH BABANNA HUKKERI    M    62    Indian National Congress

3    SHIVANAND WANTAMURI SIDDAMALLAPPA    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    BANASHANKARI BHIMAPPA ITTAPPA    M    32    Independent

5    MALLAPPA MARUTI KHATANVE    M    60    Independent

6    YASHWANT MANOHAR SUTAR    M    32    Independent

7    SHAILA SURESH KOLI    F    37    Independent

S10    2    KA    BELGAUM    23-Apr-09    1    AMARSINH VASANTRAO PATIL    M    49    Indian National Congress

2    ANGADI SURESH CHANNABASAPPA    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    A. B. PATIL    M    56    Janata Dal (Secular)

4    RAMANAGOUDA SIDDANGOUDA PATIL    M    66    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ALLAPPA RAMAPPA PATIL    M    31    Independent

6    KASTURI BASANAGOUDA BHAVI    F    40    Independent

7    MOHAN. H. GADIWADDAR    M    29    Independent

8    RAMCHANDRA MAREPPA TORGAL(CHALAWADI)    M    66    Independent

9    VIJAYKUMAR JEENDATTA UPADHYE    M    47    Independent

10    HANAJI ASHOK PANDU    M    28    Independent

S10    4    KA    BIJAPUR    23-Apr-09    1    ALMELKAR VILASABABU BASALINGAPPA    M    46    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    KANAMADI SUDHAKAR MALLESH    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PRAKASH KUBASING RATHOD    M    48    Indian National Congress

4    RAMESH CHANDAPPA JIGAJINAGI    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    NARASAPPA TIPPANNA BANDIWADDAR    M    48    Sarvodaya Karnataka Paksha

6    LAMANI CHANDRAKANT RUPASING    M    38    Lok Jan Shakti Party

7    ARAKERI NIRMALA SRINIVAS    F    35    Independent

8    CHALAWADI RAMANNA    M    54    Independent

9    SEVALAL SOMASHEKAR PURAPPA    M    46    Independent

10    HARIJAN AMBANNA TUKARAM    M    33    Independent

S10    5    KA    GULBARGA    23-Apr-09    1    BABU HONNA NAIK    M    55    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    MALLIKARJUN KHARGE    M    67    Indian National Congress

3    MAHADEV. B. DHANNI    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    REVUNAIK BELAMGI    M    70    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DR. K. T. PALUSKAR    M    53    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    RAVIKUMAR SHALIMANI SEDAM    M    34    Ambedkar National Congress

7    SHANKER KODLA    M    73    Janata Dal (United)

8    SHANKAR JADHAV    M    48    Bharatiya Peoples Party

9    H.V. DIWAKAR    M    46    Independent

10    SHIVAKUMAR . KOLLUR    M    44    Independent

S10    6    KA    RAICHUR    23-Apr-09    1    K.DEVANNA NAIK    M    56    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    PAKKIRAPPA.S.    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAJA VENKATAPPA NAIK    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    SHIVAKUMAR    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    COM II. V.H.MASTER    M    73    Independent

6    COMRADE V.MUDUKAPPA NAYAK    M    36    Independent

7    R.MUDUKAPPA NAYAK    M    44    Independent

8    K.SOMASHEKHAR    M    43    Independent

S10    7    KA    BIDAR    23-Apr-09    1    GURUPADAPPA NAGMARPALLI    M    25    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    JAGANNATH.R.JAMADAR    M    25    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    N.DHARAM SINGH    M    25    Indian National Congress

4    SUBHASH TIPPANNA NELGE    M    25    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    ADVOCATE MOULVI ZAMEERUDDIN    M    25    National Development Party

6    BHASKAR BABU PATERPALLI    M    25    Indian Christian Secular Party

7    SHRAVAN SANGONDA BHANDE    M    25    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

8    SUBHASH CHANDRA G.KHAPATE    M    25    Laghujan Samaj Vikas Party

9    AMRUTHAPPA.M.D    M    25    Independent

10    MD ARSHAD AHMED ANSARI    M    25    Independent

11    KHAJA SAMEEUDDIN KHAJA MOINUDDIN    M    25    Independent

12    JADHAV VENKAT RAO GYANOBA RAO    M    25    Independent

13    DONGAPURE SHANT KUMAR    M    25    Independent

14    DEVENDRAPPA SANGRAMAPPA PATIL    M    25    Independent

15    NARSAPPA MUTHANGI    M    25    Independent

16    PARMESHWAR RAMCHANDRA    M    25    Independent

17    PASHAMIYA ESMAIL SAB    M    25    Independent

18    BASWARAJ PAILWAN OKALLI    M    25    Independent

19    MANJILE MIYYA PEER SAB QURESH    M    25    Independent

20    MD OSMAN ALI LAKHPATI    M    25    Independent

21    MUFTI SHAIKH ABDUL GAFFAR QASMI    M    25    Independent

22    YEVATE PATIL SHRIMANT    M    25    Independent

23    YASHWANTH NARSING    M    25    Independent

24    SHIVARAJ TIMMANNA BOKKE    M    25    Independent

25    SAMEEUDDIN BANDELI    M    25    Independent

26    SURESH SWAMY TALGHATKER    M    25    Independent

27    SYED QUBUL ULLA HUSSIANI SAJID    M    25    Independent

S10    8    KA    KOPPAL    23-Apr-09    1    ANSARI IQBAL    M    50    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    BASAVARAJ RAYAREDDY    M    53    Indian National Congress

3    SHIVAPUTRAPPA GUMAGERA    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SHIVARAMAGOUDA SHIVANAGOUDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ZAKEER    M    30    Lok Jan Shakti Party

6    BASAVARAJ KARADI WADDARAHATTI    M    27    Janata Dal (United)

7    BHARADWAJ    M    63    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

8    ISHWARAPPA J    M    52    Independent

9    UPPARA HANUMANTAPPA    M    33    Independent

10    GOUSIA BEGUM    F    31    Independent

11    CHAKRAVARTI NAYAK T    M    70    Independent

12    CHANDRASHEKAR    M    37    Independent

13    NAJEER HUSAIN    M    41    Independent

14    PUJAR D.H    M    42    Independent

15    MAREMMA YANKAPPA    F    40    Independent

16    SHARABHAYYA HIREMATH    M    27    Independent

17    SHIVAKUMAR NAVALI SIDDAPPA TONTAPUR    M    44    Independent

18    HANDI RAFIQSAB    M    53    Independent

S10    9    KA    BELLARY    23-Apr-09    1    T. NAGENDRA    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    J. SHANTHA    F    35    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    N.Y. HANUMANTHAPPA    M    69    Indian National Congress

4    CHOWDAPPA    M    29    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

5    D. GANGANNA    M    59    Independent

6    B. RAMAIAH    M    60    Independent

7    A. RAMANJANAPPA    M    41    Independent

S10    12    KA    UTTARA KANNADA    23-Apr-09    1    ANANTKUMAR HEGDE    M    40    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    ALVA MARGARET    F    67    Indian National Congress

3    HADAPAD BASAVARAJ DUNDAPPA    M    28    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    V D HEGADE    M    68    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    ELISH KOTIYAL    M    44    Janata Dal (United)

6    D M GURAV    M    49    Shivsena

7    ABDUL RASHEED SHAIKH    M    44    Independent

8    UDAY BABU KHALVADEKAR    M    57    Independent

9    KHAZI RAHMATULLA ABDUL WAHAB    M    60    Independent

10    L P M NAIK    M    39    Independent

11    YASHWANT TIMMANNA NIPPANIKAR    M    58    Independent

S10    18    KA    CHITRADURGA    23-Apr-09    1    JANARDHANA SWAMY    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    M JAYANNA    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DR. B THIPPESWAMY    M    37    Indian National Congress

4    M RATHNAKAR    M    42    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    SHASHISHEKAR NAIK    M    46    Rashtriya Janata Dal

6    M KUMBAIAH    M    56    Independent

7    GANESHA    M    48    Independent

8    K H DURGASIMHA    M    61    Independent

9    RAMACHANDRA    M    49    Independent

10    B SUJATHA    F    33    Independent

11    HANUMANTHAPPA TEGNOOR    M    59    Independent

S10    19    KA    TUMKUR    23-Apr-09    1    ASHOK    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    P. KODANDARAMAIAH    M    69    Indian National Congress

3    G.S. BASAVARAJU    M    67    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    S.P. MUDDAHANUMEGOWDA    M    55    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    SREE GOWRISHANKARA SWAMIGALU    M    63    Samajwadi Party

6    D.R. NAGARAJA    M    53    Independent

7    G. NAGENDRA    M    34    Independent

8    NIRANJANA C.S    M    29    Independent

9    MOHAMED KHASIM    M    47    Independent

10    SHASIBHUSHANA    M    34    Independent

S10    23    KA    BANGALORE RURAL    23-Apr-09    1    H.D.KUMARASWAMY    M    49    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    TEJASVINI GOWDA    F    42    Indian National Congress

3    MOHAMED HAFEEZ ULLAH    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    C. P. YOGEESHWARA    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    C.THOPAIAH    M    56    Janata Dal (United)

6    I VENKATESWARA REDDY    M    55    Pyramid Party of India

7    AGNISHREENIVAS    M    30    Independent

8    D.KUMARASWAMY    M    43    Independent

9    KUMARASWAMY C    M    28    Independent

10    KRISHNAPPA    M    46    Independent

11    Y.CHINNAPPA    M    33    Independent

12    A CHOWRAPPA    M    44    Independent

13    DR. K PADMARAJAN    M    50    Independent

14    K.PUTTAMADEGOWDA    M    40    Independent

15    T.M.MANCHEGOWDA    M    62    Independent

S10    24    KA    BANGALORE NORTH    23-Apr-09    1    D. B. CHANDRE GOWDA    M    73    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    C. K. JAFFER SHARIEF    M    75    Indian National Congress

3    PADMAA K. BHAT    F    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    R. SURENDRA BABU    M    48    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    M. TIPPUVARDHAN    M    39    Bharatiya Praja Paksha

6    ANCHAN KHANNA    M    34    Independent

7    KANYA KUMAR    M    36    Independent

8    G S KUMAR    M    68    Independent

9    C. KRISHNAMURTHY    M    45    Independent

10    B K CHANDRA    M    38    Independent

11    T. R. CHANDRAHASA    M    45    Independent

12    ABDUL JALEEL    M    39    Independent

13    ZAFER MOHIUDDIN    M    48    Independent

14    JOSEPH SOLOMON    M    39    Independent

15    L. NAGARAJ    M    52    Independent

16    V. PRASANNA KUMAR    M    38    Independent

17    H. PILLAIAH    M    46    Independent

18    T. B. MADWARAJA    M    33    Independent

19    MEER LAYAQ HUSSAIN    M    42    Independent

20    K. A. MOHAN    M    51    Independent

21    S. M. RAJU    M    52    Independent

22    L. LAKSHMAIAH    M    64    Independent

23    MU. VENKATESHAIAH    M    50    Independent

24    VENKATESA SETTY    M    63    Independent

25    H. A. SHIVAKUMAR    M    30    Independent

26    K. SATHYANARAYANA    M    57    Independent

27    SYED AKBAR BASHA    M    50    Independent

28    N. HARISH GOWDA    M    33    Independent

S10    25    KA    BANGALORE CENTRAL    23-Apr-09    1    ZAMEER AHMED KHAN. B.Z    M    43    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    P. C. MOHAN    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    VIJAY RAJA SINGH    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    H.T.SANGLIANA    M    67    Indian National Congress

5    IFTHAQUAR ALI BHUTTO    M    37    Ambedkar National Congress

6    J.D.ELANGOVAN    M    64    Indian Justice Party

7    S M KRISHNA    M    44    Bharatiya Praja Paksha

8    B KRISHNA PRASAD    M    55    Proutist Sarva Samaj Party

9    A.S. PAUL    M    60    Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

10    D.C. PRAKASH    M    41    Karnataka Thamizhar Munnetra Kazhagam

11    K.PRABHAKARA REDDY    M    61    Kannada Chalavali Vatal Paksha

12    T.K.PREMKUMAR    M    45    Pyramid Party of India

13    ABHIMANI NARENDRA    M    50    Independent

14    M.A. ASHWATHA NARAYANA SETTY    M    64    Independent

15    K UMA    F    46    Independent

16    UMASHANKAR    M    42    Independent

17    K.S.S.IYENGAR    M    77    Independent

18    B.M.KRISHNAREDDY    M    64    Independent

19    S.KODANDARAM    M    50    Independent

20    C.V.GIDDAPPA    M    55    Independent

21    A.CHANDRASHEKAR    M    45    Independent

22    JAYARAMA    M    60    Independent

23    K.NARASIMHA    M    38    Independent

24    B.K NARAYANA SWAMY    M    52    Independent

25    P.PARTHIBAN    M    34    Independent

26    MEER LAYAQ HUSSAIN    M    42    Independent

27    B.MOHAN VELU    M    39    Independent

28    R. RAJ    M    49    Independent

29    E. RAMAKRISHNAIAH    M    50    Independent

30    K.H.RAMALINGAREDDY    M    41    Independent

31    VIJAYA BHASKAR N    M    61    Independent

32    DR.D. R.VENKATESH GOWDA    M    82    Independent

33    SHAFFI AHMED    M    50    Independent

34    S.N. SHARMA    M    67    Independent

35    SHASHIKUMAR A.R    M    43    Independent

36    K.SHIVARAMANNA    M    55    Independent

37    SHAIK BAHADUR    M    54    Independent

S10    26    KA    BANGALORE SOUTH    23-Apr-09    1    ANANTH KUMAR    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    KRISHNA BYRE GOWDA    M    36    Indian National Congress

3    NAHEEDA SALMA S    F    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    PROF.RADHAKRISHNA    M    63    Janata Dal (Secular)

5    B.M.GOVINDRAJ NAIK    M    38    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

6    P.JOHNBASCO    M    37    Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

7    VATAL NAGARAJ    M    60    Kannada Chalavali Vatal Paksha

8    B.SHIVARAMAPPA    M    62    Pyramid Party of India

9    ABHIMAANI NARENDRA    M    50    Independent

10    KHADER ALI KHAN    M    39    Independent

11    GANESH HANUMANTARAO MOKHASHI    M    58    Independent

12    CAPT. G.R. GOPINATH    M    57    Independent

13    K.C.JANARDHAN    M    46    Independent

14    DR.JAYALAKSHMI.H.G.    F    48    Independent

15    K.M.NARAYANA    M    54    Independent

16    MADESH.C    M    40    Independent

17    MURALIDHARA.D.J.    M    44    Independent

18    RAVI KUMARA.T.    M    26    Independent

19    SUGANDHARAJE URS    M    59    Independent

20    SANTHOSH MIN.B    M    33    Independent

S10    27    KA    CHIKKBALLAPUR    23-Apr-09    1    C.ASWATHANARAYANA    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    C.R.MANOHAR    M    29    Janata Dal (Secular)

3    M.VEERAPPA MOILY    M    69    Indian National Congress

4    HENNURU LAKSHMINARAYANA    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    M.RAMAKRISHNAIAH    M    40    Pyramid Party of India

6    M.VENKATESH    M    55    Bharatiya Praja Paksha

7    H.R.SHIVAKUMAR    M    39    Lok Jan Shakti Party

8    KRISHNAMURTHY .T    M    70    Independent

9    K.S.CHANDRASHEKARA RAO (AZAD)    M    54    Independent

10    L.NAGARAJ    M    52    Independent

11    G.NARAYANAPPA    M    62    Independent

12    A.N.BACHEGOWDA    M    50    Independent

13    G.B.MUTHUKUMAR    M    62    Independent

14    M.MUNIVENKATAIAH    M    64    Independent

15    M.RAMESH    M    30    Independent

16    RAVI GOKRE    M    32    Independent

17    G.N. RAVI    M    45    Independent

18    K.VENKATAREDDY    M    36    Independent

19    B.SHIVARAJA    M    40    Independent

20    Y.A.SIDDALINGEGOWDA    M    42    Independent

S10    28    KA    KOLAR    23-Apr-09    1    G.CHANDRANNA    M    56    Janata Dal (Secular)

2    K.H.MUNIYAPPA    M    61    Indian National Congress

3    N.MUNISWAMY    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    LAKSHMI SHANMUGAM    F    56    Nationalist Congress Party

5    D.S.VEERAIAH    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    K.R.DEVARAJA    M    51    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

7    B.M.KRISHNAPPA    M    59    Independent

8    M.R.GANTAPPA    M    46    Independent

9    P.V.CHANGALARAYAPPA    M    38    Independent

10    P.CHANDRAPPA    M    42    Independent

11    V.JAYARAMA    M    59    Independent

12    JAYARAMAPPA    M    45    Independent

13    NAGARATHNA M.    F    47    Independent

14    M.NAGARAJA    M    35    Independent

15    NARAYANASWAMY    M    49    Independent

16    K.NARAYANASWAMY    M    37    Independent

17    C.K.MUNIYAPPA    M    43    Independent

18    M.RAVI KUMAR    M    36    Independent

19    M.VENKATASWAMY    M    55    Independent

20    K.VENKATESH    M    40    Independent

21    SRINIVASA T.O.    M    37    Independent

22    SRINIVASA P.    M    42    Independent

S12    8    MP    KHAJURAHO    23-Apr-09    1    JAYAWANT SINGH    M    49    Samajwadi Party

2    JEETENDRA SINGH    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAJA PATERYA    M    49    Indian National Congress

4    SEWA LAL PATEL    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    M. SHAKIL    M    38    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    SAROJ BACHCHAN NAYAK    F    56    Janata Dal (United)

7    SURYA BHAN SINGH ‘YADAV GURUJI’    M    75    All India Forward Bloc

8    AKEEL KHAN    M    43    Independent

9    AKANCHHA JAIN    F    34    Independent

10    KRISHNA SHARAN SINGH (RAJA BHAIYA)    M    36    Independent

11    NARENDRA KUMAR    M    54    Independent

12    RAJENDRA AHIRWAR    M    43    Independent

13    RAM NATH LODHI    M    41    Independent

14    SHABNAM (MAUSI)    F    48    Independent

15    SHUKL SITARAM    M    48    Independent

S12    9    MP    SATNA    23-Apr-09    1    GANESH SINGH    M    46    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PT. RAJARAM TRIPATHI    M    56    Samajwadi Party

3    SUKHLAL KUSHWAHA    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SUDHIR SINGH TOMAR    M    41    Indian National Congress

5    ONKAR SINGH    M    56    Akhil Bharatiya Hind Kranti Party

6    GIRJA SINGH PATEL    M    49    Apna Dal

7    CHHOTELAL SINGH GOND    M    65    Gondwana Mukti Sena

8    PRAMILA    F    43    Republican Party of India (A)

9    B BALLABH CHARYA    M    38    Advait Ishwasyam Congress

10    RAJESH SINGH BAGHEL    M    41    Gondvana Gantantra Party

11    SHOBHNATH SEN    M    29    Lok Jan Shakti Party

12    SUNDERLAL CHAUDHARI    M    64    Indian Justice Party

13    ASHOK KUMAR KUSHWAHA    M    33    Independent

14    ASHOK KUSHWAHA    M    28    Independent

15    CHHOTELAL    M    59    Independent

16    BHAIYALAL URMALIYA    M    62    Independent

17    MANISH KUMAR JAIN    M    31    Independent

18    MUNNI KRANTI    F    44    Independent

19    RAMVISHWAS BASORE    M    38    Independent

20    RAM SAJIVAN    M    46    Independent

21    RAMAYAN CHAUDHARI    M    39    Independent

S12    10    MP    REWA    23-Apr-09    1    CHANDRA MANI TRIPATHI    M    62    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DEORAJ SINGH PATEL    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PUSHPRAJ SINGH    M    48    Samajwadi Party

4    SUNDER LAL TIWARI    M    51    Indian National Congress

5    BADRI PRASAD KUSHWAHA    M    47    Apna Dal

6    RAMKISHAN NIRAT (SAKET)    M    32    Republican Party of India (A)

7    RAMAYAN PRASAD PATEL    M    42    Yuva Vikas Party

8    VIMALA SONDHIA    F    53    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    SALMA    F    33    All India Forward Bloc

10    MD. AKEEL KHAN (BACHCHA BHAI)    M    34    Independent

11    JAIKARAN SAKET    M    48    Independent

12    BRAHMDUTTMISHRA ALIAS CHHOTE MURAITHA    M    46    Independent

13    SUKHENDRA PRATAP    M    44    Independent

14    SUNDAR LAL    M    37    Independent

15    HIRALAL VISHWAKARMA    M    56    Independent

S12    11    MP    SIDHI    23-Apr-09    1    ASHOK KUMAR SHAH    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    INDRAJEET KUMAR    M    61    Indian National Congress

3    GOVIND PRASAD MISHRA    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    MANIK SINGH    M    43    Samajwadi Party

5    LOLAR SINGH URETI    M    29    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    VEENA SINGH NETI    F    34    Gondvana Gantantra Party

7    BABOOLAL JAISWAL    M    39    Independent

8    MADAN MOHAN JAISWAL (ADVOCATE)    M    36    Independent

9    MAHENDRA BHAIYA (DIKSHIT)    M    42    Independent

10    RAMAKANT PANDEY MALAIHNA    M    63    Independent

11    VEENA SINGH (VEENA DIDI)    F    56    Independent

S12    12    MP    SHAHDOL    23-Apr-09    1    CHANDRA PRATAP SINGH (BABA SAHAB)    M    51    Samajwadi Party

2    NARENDRA SINGH MARAVI    M    29    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MANOHAR SINGH MARAVI    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RAJESH NANDINI SINGH    F    52    Indian National Congress

5    SADAN SINGH BHARIA    M    39    Communist Party of India

6    KRISHN PAL SINGH PAVEL    M    29    Lok Jan Shakti Party

7    GANPAT GOND    M    38    Gondwana Mukti Sena

8    RAM RATAN SINGH PAVLE    M    28    Gondvana Gantantra Party

S12    13    MP    JABALPUR    23-Apr-09    1    AZIZ QURESHI    M    64    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ASHOK KUMAR SHARMA    M    40    Samajwadi Party

3    RAKESH SINGH    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ADVOCATE RAMESHWAR NEEKHRA    M    61    Indian National Congress

5    MEERCHAND PATEL (KACHHVAHA)    M    63    Republican Party of India

6    RAVI MAHOBIA (KUNDAM)    M    29    Gondvana Gantantra Party

7    RAJKUMARI SINGH    F    40    Lok Jan Shakti Party

8    HARI SINGH MARAVI    M    36    Gondwana Mukti Sena

9    DR. MUKESH MEHROTRA    M    57    Independent

10    RAKESH SONKAR (PRAMUKH DHAI AKSHAR)    M    39    Independent

11    SUNIL PATEL    M    38    Independent

S12    14    MP    MANDLA    23-Apr-09    1    JALSO DHURWEY    F    25    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    FAGGAN SINGH KULASTE    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    BASORI SINGH MASRAM    M    59    Indian National Congress

4    UDAL SINGH DHURWEY    M    35    Loktanrik Sarkar Party

5    JHANK SINGH KUSHRE    M    37    Gondvana Gantantra Party

6    PREM SINGH MARAVI    M    35    Gondwana Mukti Sena

7    BHAGAT SINGH VARKEDE    M    45    Lok Jan Shakti Party

8    MANESHWARI NAIK    F    65    Republican Party of India (A)

9    SUNITA NETI    F    33    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

10    CHANDRA SHEKHAR DHURWEY    M    46    Independent

11    CHAMBAL SING MARAWEE    M    62    Independent

12    DEV SINGH BHALAVI    M    25    Independent

13    SHIVCHARAN UIKEY    M    26    Independent

14    SAHDEO PRASAD MARAVI    M    43    Independent

S12    15    MP    BALAGHAT    23-Apr-09    1    AJAB LAL    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    KISHOR SAMRITE    M    42    Samajwadi Party

3    KANKAR MUNJARE    M    52    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    K. D. DESHMUKH    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    VISHVESHWAR BHAGAT    M    57    Indian National Congress

6    KALPANA GOPAL WASNIK    F    38    Republican Party of India (A)

7    DARBU SINGH UIKEY    M    37    Gondwana Mukti Sena

8    BHAIYA BALKRISHNA    M    53    Gondvana Gantantra Party

9    ADVOCATE AZHAR UL ALIM    M    58    Independent

10    ANJU ASHOK UIKEY    F    34    Independent

11    GOVARDHAN PATLE URF HITLAR    M    75    Independent

12    JITENDRA MESHRAM    M    37    Independent

13    DHANESHWAR LILHARE    M    40    Independent

14    NYAZMIR KHAN    M    32    Independent

15    POORANLAL LODHI    M    37    Independent

16    MANSINGH BISEN    M    59    Independent

17    SANDEEP SANTRAM    M    31    Independent

18    SHRIRAM THAKUR    M    58    Independent

S12    16    MP    CHHINDWARA    23-Apr-09    1    KAMAL NATH    M    62    Indian National Congress

2    MAROT RAO KHAVASE    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAO SAHEB SHINDE    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    JOGILAL IRPACHI    M    48    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    PARDHESHI HARTAPSAH TIRKAM    M    40    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    BALVEER SINGH YADAV    M    30    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

7    RAMKISHAN PAL    M    62    Republican Party of India (A)

8    SATAP SHA UIKEY    M    35    Gondvana Gantantra Party

9    ABDUL SHAMAD KHAN    M    45    Independent

10    AMRITLAL PATHAK RAGHUVAR    M    70    Independent

11    ASHARAM DEHARIYA    M    33    Independent

12    KAMALNATH (MAYAWADI-PARASIA)    M    31    Independent

13    GANARAM UIKEY    M    53    Independent

14    AZAD CHANDRASHEKHER PANDOLE SAMAJ SEVAK    M    42    Independent

15    JAGDISH BAIS    M    35    Independent

16    TULSIRAM SURYAWANSHI    M    62    Independent

17    DUARAM UIKEY    M    40    Independent

18    DHANPAL BHALAVI    M    35    Independent

19    DHANRAJ JAMBHATKAR    M    37    Independent

20    NARESH KUMAR YUVNATI    M    33    Independent

21    NIKHILESH DHURVEY    M    30    Independent

22    PITRAM UIKEY    M    48    Independent

23    PRAVINDRA NAURATI    M    37    Independent

24    MANMOHAN SHAH BATTI    M    46    Independent

25    R.K. MARKAM    M    28    Independent

26    SHOAIB KHAN    M    44    Independent

27    SUKMAN INVATI    M    42    Independent

28    SUBHASH SHUKLA    M    40    Independent

S12    17    MP    HOSHANGABAD    23-Apr-09    1    UDAY PRATAP SINGH    M    44    Indian National Congress

2    ADV.B.M.KAUSHIK    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    HAJAEE SYID MUEEN UDDIN    M    47    Samajwadi Party

4    RAMPAL SINGH    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DINESH KUMAR AHIRWAR    M    42    Independent

6    BHARAT KUMAR CHOUREY    M    29    Independent

7    MOHAMMD ABDULLA    M    54    Independent

8    RAKHI GUPTA    F    31    Independent

9    RAMPAL    M    62    Independent

10    SUDAMA PRASAD    M    55    Independent

S12    18    MP    VIDISHA    23-Apr-09    1    DR.PREMSHANKAR SHARMA    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    CHOUDHARY MUNABBAR SALIM    M    50    Samajwadi Party

3    SUSHMA SWARAJ    F    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    BHAI MUNSHILAL SILAWAT    M    25    Republican Party of India (A)

5    RAMGOPAL MALVIYA    M    35    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

6    HARBHAJAN JANGRE    M    33    Lok Jan Shakti Party

7    GANESHRAM LODHI    M    44    Independent

8    RAJESHWAR SINGH YADAV (RAO)    M    39    Independent

S12    19    MP    BHOPAL    23-Apr-09    1    ER. ASHOK NARAYAN SINGH    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    KAILASH JOSHI    M    79    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MHOD. MUNAWAR KHAN KAUSAR    M    44    Samajwadi Party

4    SURENDRA SINGH THAKUR    M    55    Indian National Congress

5    ASHOK PAWAR    M    47    Prajatantrik Samadhan Party

6    AHIRWAR LAKHANLAL PURVI    M    42    Republican Party of India (A)

7    KARAN KUMAR KAROSIA URF KARAN JEEJA    M    41    Gondvana Gantantra Party

8    RADHESHYAM KULASTE    M    38    Gondwana Mukti Sena

9    RAMDAS GHOSLE    M    54    Republican Party of India (Democratic )

10    SANJEEV SINGHAL    M    42    Savarn Samaj Party

11    ANIL SINGH    M    30    Independent

12    AMAR SINGH    M    72    Independent

13    KAPIL DUBEY    M    37    Independent

14    D. C. GUJARKAR    M    52    Independent

15    DARSHAN SINGH RATHORE    M    53    Independent

16    BRAJENDRA CHATURVEDI URF GAPPU CHATURVEDI    M    35    Independent

17    DR. MAHESH YADAV ‘AMAN GANDHI’    M    40    Independent

18    MUKESH SEN    M    32    Independent

19    MEHDI SIR    M    30    Independent

20    RAJESH KUMAR YADAV    M    42    Independent

21    RAM SAHAY YATRI (SHRIVASTAVA) URF RASHTRAVADI YATRI    M    79    Independent

22    SHAHNAWAZ    M    59    Independent

23    SHIV NARAYAN SINGH BAGWARE    M    60    Independent

S12    29    MP    BETUL    23-Apr-09    1    OJHARAM EVANE    M    54    Indian National Congress

2    JYOTI DHURVE    F    43    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAMA KAKODIA    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    DR. SUKHDEV SINGH CHOUHAN    M    42    Samajwadi Party

5    KALLUSINGH UIKEY    M    59    Gondwana Mukti Sena

6    KADMU SINGH KUMARE (K.S.KUMARE)    M    59    Gondvana Gantantra Party

7    GULABRAV    M    53    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

8    MANGAL SINGH LOKHANDE    M    51    Samajwadi Jan Parishad

9    SUSHILKUMAR ALIS BALUBHAIYYA    M    39    Republican Party of India (A)

10    IMRATLAL MARKAM    M    58    Independent

11    KAMAL SING    M    45    Independent

12    KADAKSHING VADIVA    M    27    Independent

13    KRISHNA GOPAL PARTE    M    35    Independent

14    MOTIRAM MAVASE    M    48    Independent

15    ADHIVAKTA SHANKAR PENDAM    M    66    Independent

16    SUNIL KUMAR KAWADE    M    27    Independent

S13    1    MH    NANDURBAR    23-Apr-09    1    GAVIT MANIKRAO HODLYA    M    75    Indian National Congress

2    NATAWADKAR SUHAS JYANT    M    48    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    PADVI BABITA KARMSINGH    F    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    KOKANI MANJULABAI SAKHARAM    F    59    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    GAVIT SHARAD KRUSHNRAO    M    46    Samajwadi Party

6    ABHIJIT AATYA VASAVE    M    30    Independent

7    KOLI RAJU RAMDAS    M    34    Independent

S13    2    MH    DHULE    23-Apr-09    1    AMARISHBHAI RASIKLAL PATEL    M    56    Indian National Congress

2    RIZWAN MO.AKBAR    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SONAWANE PRATAP NARAYANRAO    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ANIL ANNA GOTE    M    61    Loksangram

5    ANSARI MOHD. ISMAIL MOHD. IBRAHIM    M    37    Bharatiya Minorities Suraksha Mahasangh

6    ARIF AHMED SHAIKH JAFHAR    M    99    Navbharat Nirman Party

7    KAVAYATRI-SONKANYA THAKUR RAJANI BAGWAN    F    49    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

8    NIHAL AHMED MOLVI. MOHAMMED USMAN    M    81    Janata Dal (Secular)

9    MD. ISMAIL JUMMAN    M    49    Independent

10    KISHOR PITAMBAR AHIRE    M    28    Independent

11    GAZI ATEZAD AHMED MUBEEN AHMED KHAN    M    57    Independent

12    GAIKWAD PATIL BHUSHAN BAJIRAO    M    28    Independent

13    DADASO. PANDITRAO PATIL KOKALEKAR    M    55    Independent

14    SHEVALE PATIL SANDEEP JIBHAU    M    31    Independent

15    SONAWANE PANDIT UTTAMRAO    M    42    Independent

S13    3    MH    JALGAON    23-Apr-09    1    A.T. NANA PATIL    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    ADV. MATIN AHMED    M    38    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    ADV. VASANTRAO JIVANRAO MORE    M    63    Nationalist Congress Party

4    ATMARAM SURSING JADHAV (ENGG.)    M    33    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

5    JADHAV NATTHU SHANKAR    M    56    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    JANGALU DEVRAM SHIRSATH    M    65    Hindustan Janta Party

7    NANNAWARE CHAITANYA PANDIT    M    33    Prabuddha Republican Party

8    LAXMAN SHIVAJI SHIRSATH (PATIL)    M    42    Krantisena Maharashtra

9    ANIL PITAMBAR WAGH (SIR)    M    38    Independent

10    KANTILAL CHHAGAN NAIK (BANJARA)    M    39    Independent

11    WAGH SUDHAKAR ATMARAM    M    26    Independent

12    SHALIGRAM SHIVRAM MAHAJAN (DEORE)    M    49    Independent

13    SALIMODDIN ISAMODDIN SHE.(MISTARI)    M    56    Independent

S13    4    MH    RAVER    23-Apr-09    1    PATIL SURESH CHINDHU    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ADV. RAVINDRA PRALHADRAO PATIL    M    54    Nationalist Congress Party

3    HARIBHAU MADHAV JAWALE    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    TELI SHAIKH ISMAIL HAJI HASAN    M    57    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    BAPU SAHEBRAO SONAWANE    M    45    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    MARATHE BHIMRAO PARBAT    M    51    Krantisena Maharashtra

7    SHIVAVEER DNYANESHWAR VITTHAL AMALE URPH AMALE SARKAR    M    26    Shivrajya Party

8    IQBAL ALAUDDIN TADVI    M    41    Independent

9    UTTAM KASHIRAM INGALE    M    36    Independent

10    KOLI SANTOSH GOKUL    M    25    Independent

11    FIRKE SURESH KACHARU EX ACP (CRPF)    M    58    Independent

12    MAKBUL FARID SK.    M    36    Independent

13    MOHD. MUNAWWAR MOHD. HANIF    M    45    Independent

14    MORE HIRAMAN BHONAJI    M    41    Independent

15    D.D. WANI (PHOTOGRAPHER) (DYNESHWAR DIWAKAR WANI)    M    43    Independent

16    VIVEK SHARAD PATIL    M    41    Independent

17    SHAIKH RAMJAN SHAIKH KARIM    M    40    Independent

18    SUJATA IBRAHIM TADAVI    F    45    Independent

19    SANJAY PRALADH KANDELKAR    M    34    Independent

S13    18    MH    JALNA    23-Apr-09    1    DR. KALE KALYAN VAIJINATHRAO    M    46    Indian National Congress

2    DANVE RAOSAHEB DADARAO    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RATHOD RAJPALSINH GABRUSINH    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    AAPPASAHEB RADHAKISAN KUDHEKAR    M    29    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    KISAN BALVANTA BORDE    M    61    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    KHARAT ASHOK RAMRAO    M    51    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

7    TAWAR KAILAS BHAUSAHEB    M    45    Swatantra Bharat Paksha

8    DR. DILAWAR MIRZA BAIG    M    29    Indian Union Muslim League

9    BHOJNE BABASAHEB SANGAM    M    37    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

10    MISAL TUKARAM BABURAOJI    M    48    Samajwadi Party

11    RATNAPARKHE ARCHANA SUDHAKAR    F    31    Republician Party of India Ektawadi

12    SUBHASH FAKIRA SALVE    M    43    Ambedkar National Congress

13    SAYYAD MAKSUD NOOR    M    42    Lok Jan Shakti Party

14    KOLTE MANOJ NEMINATH    M    26    Independent

15    KHANDU HARISHCHANDRA LAGHANE    M    30    Independent

16    NADE DNYANESHWAR DAGDU    M    41    Independent

17    BABASAHEB PATIL SHINDE    M    53    Independent

18    SONWANE ASHOK VITTHAL    M    45    Independent

19    S. HUSAIN AHEMAD    M    37    Independent

S13    19    MH    AURANGABAD    23-Apr-09    1    UTTAMSINGH RAJDHARSINGH PAWAR    M    58    Indian National Congress

2    CHANDRAKANT KHAIRE    M    57    Shivsena

3    SAYYED SALIM SAYYED YUSUF    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    JAHAGIRDAR MOHMAD AYUB GULAM    M    55    Samajwadi Party

5    JYOTI RAMCHANDRA UPADHAYAY    F    35    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    PANDURANG WAMANRAO NARWADE    M    39    Prabuddha Republican Party

7    BHIMSEN RAMBHAU KAMBLE    M    44    Republician Party of India Ektawadi

8    MANIK RAMU SHINDE    M    34    Krantisena Maharashtra

9    SHAIKH HARUN MALIK SAHEB    M    50    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

10    UTTAM MANIK KIRTIKAR    M    30    Independent

11    EJAZ KHAN BISMILLAH KHAN    M    33    Independent

12    KAZI MUSHIRODDIN TAJODDIN    M    63    Independent

13    KRISHNA DEVIDAS JADHAV    M    25    Independent

14    JADHAV TOTARAM GANPAT    M    51    Independent

15    JADHAV VISHNU SURYABHAN    M    50    Independent

16    JADHAV SUBHASH RUPCHAND    M    33    Independent

17    BANKAR MILIND RANUJI    M    38    Independent

18    SHANTIGIRIJI MOUNGIRIJI MAHARAJ    M    50    Independent

19    SHAIKH RAFIQ SHAIKH RAZZAK    M    30    Independent

20    SHAIKH SALIM PATEL WAHEGAONKAR    M    38    Independent

21    SAYYED RAUF SAYYED ZAMIR    M    54    Independent

22    SUBHASH KISANRAO PATIL (JADHAV)    M    47    Independent

S13    20    MH    DINDORI    23-Apr-09    1    GAVIT JEEVA PANDU    M    60    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    GANGURDE DIPAK SHANKAR    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    CHAVAN HARISHCHANDRA DEORAM    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ZIRWAL NARHARI SITARAM    M    50    Nationalist Congress Party

5    PAWAR SAMPAT WAMAN    M    30    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    GANGURDE BALU KISAN    M    37    Independent

7    BHIKA HARISING BARDE    M    75    Independent

8    VIJAY NAMDEO PAWAR    M    45    Independent

9    SHANKAR DEORAM GANGUDE    M    51    Independent

S13    21    MH    NASHIK    23-Apr-09    1    GAIKWAD DATTA NAMDEO    M    47    Shivsena

2    SAMEER BHUJBAL    M    35    Nationalist Congress Party

3    SHRIMAHANT SUDHIRDAS MAHARAJ    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    KAILAS MADHUKAR CHAVAN    M    28    Indian Justice Party

5    GODSE HEMANT TUKARAM    M    38    Maharashtra Navnirman sena

6    JADHAV NAMDEO BHIKAJI    M    57    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

7    RAYATE VIJAY SAKHARAM ( RAYATE SIR)    M    52    Hindustan Janta Party

8    AD. GULVE RAMNATH SANTUJI    M    42    Independent

9    DATTU GONYA GAIKWAD    M    50    Independent

10    PRAVINCHANDRA DATTARAM DETHE    M    42    Independent

11    BHARAT HIRMAN PARDESHI    M    37    Independent

12    RAJENDRA SAMPATRAO KADU    M    35    Independent

S13    32    MH    RAIGAD    23-Apr-09    1    ANANT GEETE    M    58    Shivsena

2    BARRISTER A.R. ANTULAY    M    80    Indian National Congress

3    MOHITE KIRAN BABURAO    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    EKANATH ARJUN PATIL    M    48    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

5    ADV. PRAVIN MADHUKAR THAKUR    M    39    Independent

6    DR. SIDDHARTH PATIL    M    54    Independent

7    SUNIL BHASKAR NAIK    M    51    Independent

S13    33    MH    MAVAL    23-Apr-09    1    PANSARE AZAM FAKEERBHAI    M    48    Nationalist Congress Party

2    BABAR GAJANAN DHARMSHI    M    66    Shivsena

3    MISHRA UMAKANT RAMESHWAR    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    AYU. DEEPALI NIVRUTTI CHAVAN    F    35    Prabuddha Republican Party

5    PRADIP PANDURANG KOCHAREKAR    M    49    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

6    ADV.SHIVSHANKAR DATTATRAY SHINDE    M    31    Krantisena Maharashtra

7    ISHWAR DATTATRAY JADHAV    M    46    Independent

8    JAGANNATH PANDURANG KHARGE    M    38    Independent

9    DOLE BHIMRAJ NIVRUTTI    M    38    Independent

10    ADVOCATE TUKARAM WAMANRAO BANSODE    M    64    Independent

11    TANTARPALE GOPAL YASHWANTRAO    M    43    Independent

12    ADVOCATE PRAMOD MAHADEV GORE    M    56    Independent

13    BHAPKAR MARUTI SAHEBRAO    M    38    Independent

14    MAHENDRA PRABHAKAR TIWARI    M    41    Independent

15    BRO. MANUAL DESOZA    M    45    Independent

16    YASHWANT NARAYAN DESAI    M    42    Independent

17    SHAKEEL RAJBHAI SHAIKH    M    38    Independent

18    HARIBHAU DADAJI SHINDE    M    70    Independent

S13    34    MH    PUNE    23-Apr-09    1    ANIL SHIROLE    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    KALMADI SURESH    M    64    Indian National Congress

3    D S K ALIAS D.S.KULKARNI    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ARUN BHATIA    M    66    Peoples Guardian

5    GULAB TATYA WAGHMODE    M    47    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    BAGBAN JAVED KASIM    M    26    Indian Union Muslim League

7    VIKRAMADITYA OMPRAKASH DHIMAN    M    40    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

8    VINOD ANAND SINH    M    55    Proutist Sarva Samaj Party

9    SHIROLE RANJEET SHRIKANT    M    32    Maharashtra Navnirman sena

10    SAVITA HAJARE    F    46    Pyramid Party of India

11    SANGHARSH ARUN APTE    M    28    Prabuddha Republican Party

12    AJAY VASANT PAITHANKAR    M    49    Independent

13    ADAGALE BHAUSAHEB RAMCHANDRA    M    48    Independent

14    ASHOK GANPAT PALKHE ALIAS SUTAR    M    45    Independent

15    KAMTAM ISWAR SAMBHAYYA    M    67    Independent

16    KULKARNI KAUSTUBH SHASHIKANT    M    26    Independent

17    KHAN AMANULLA MOHMOD AL    M    55    Independent

18    KHAN NISSAR TAJ AHMAD    M    44    Independent

19    P. K. CHAVAN    M    80    Independent

20    CHOUDHARI SUNIL GULABRAO    M    41    Independent

21    CHOURE VILAS CHINTAMAN    M    45    Independent

22    TATYA ALIAS NARAYAN SHANKAR WAMBHIRE    M    51    Independent

23    TAMBOLI SHABBIR SAJJANBHAI    M    52    Independent

24    DATTATRAYA GANESH TALGERI    M    61    Independent

25    BAGADE SACHIN MARUTI    M    29    Independent

26    BALU ALIAS ANIL SHIROLE    M    28    Independent

27    BHARAT MANOHAR GAVALI    M    65    Independent

28    BHAGWAT RAGHUNATH KAMBLE    M    35    Independent

29    RAJENDRA BHAGAT ALIAS JITU BHAI    M    29    Independent

30    VIKRAM NARENDRA BOKE    M    53    Independent

31    SHINDE RAJENDRA BABURAO    M    44    Independent

32    SHAIKH ALTAF KARIM    M    48    Independent

33    SHRIKANT MADHUSUDAN JAGTAP    M    33    Independent

34    SARDESAI KISHORKUMAR RAGHUNATH    M    42    Independent

35    ADV.SUBHASH NARHAR GODSE    M    59    Independent

36    SANTOSH ALIAS SOMNATH KALU PAWAR    M    38    Independent

S13    35    MH    BARAMATI    23-Apr-09    1    KUDALEPATIL VIVEK ANANT    M    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    KANTA JAYSING NALAWADE    F    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SUPRIYA SULE    F    39    Nationalist Congress Party

4    MAYAWATI AMAR CHITRE    F    31    Bharatiya Minorities Suraksha Mahasangh

5    SHELAR SANGEETA PANDURANG    F    33    Krantisena Maharashtra

6    SACHIN VITTHAL AHIRE    M    29    Prabuddha Republican Party

7    SAMPAT MARUTI TAKALE    M    54    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

8    GHORPADE SAVEETA ASHOK    F    29    Independent

9    TATYA ALIAS NARAYAN SHANKAR WAMBHIRE    M    51    Independent

10    TANTARPALE GOPAL YESHWANTRAO    M    43    Independent

11    DEEPAK SHANKAR BHAPKAR    M    26    Independent

12    BHIMA ANNA KADALE    M    31    Independent

13    MRUNALEENI JAYRAJ KAKADE    F    34    Independent

14    YOGESH SONABA RANDHEER    M    39    Independent

15    SHIVAJI JAYSING KOKARE    M    58    Independent

16    SURESH BABURAO VEER    M    62    Independent

17    SANGITA SHRIMAN BHUMKAR    F    30    Independent

S13    36    MH    SHIRUR    23-Apr-09    1    ADHALRAO SHIVAJI DATTATRAY    M    52    Shivsena

2    ZAGADE YASHWANT SITARAM    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    VILAS VITHOBA LANDE    M    47    Nationalist Congress Party

4    PALLAVI MOHAN HARSHE    F    27    Prabuddha Republican Party

5    SHELAR DNYANOBA SHRIPATI    M    57    Republican Presidium Party of India

6    SURESH MULCHAND KANKARIA (MAMA)    M    57    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    ABHANG KONDIBHAU BHIMAJI    M    48    Independent

8    KARANDE CHANGDEO NAMDEO    M    43    Independent

9    KALURAM RAGHUNATH TAPKIR    M    52    Independent

10    RAM DHARMA DAMBALE    M    37    Independent

11    LANDE VILAS MHATARBA    M    37    Independent

S13    37    MH    AHMADNAGAR    23-Apr-09    1    KARDILE SHIVAJI BHANUDAS    M    50    Nationalist Congress Party

2    KARBHARI WAMAN SHIRSAT ALIAS K.V. SHIRSAT    M    65    Communist Party of India

3    GADAKH TUKARAM GANGADHAR    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    GANDHI DILIPKUMAR MANSUKHLAL    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KAZI SAJID MUJIR    M    41    Republician Party of India Ektawadi

6    HAKE BHANUDAS KISAN    M    55    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    HOLE BHANUDAS NAMDEO    M    48    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

8    ARUN KAHAR    M    45    Independent

9    AVINASH MALHARRAO GHODAKE    M    40    Independent

10    KHAIRE ARJUN DEORAO    M    39    Independent

11    GAIKWAD BALASAHEB RAMCHANDRA    M    35    Independent

12    NAUSHAD ANSAR SHAIKH    F    39    Independent

13    PROF. MAHENDRA DADA SHINDE    M    29    Independent

14    RAUT EKNATH BABASAHEB    M    56    Independent

15    RAJIV APPASAHEB RAJALE    M    39    Independent

S13    38    MH    SHIRDI    23-Apr-09    1    KACHARU NAGU WAGHMARE    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    WAKCHOURE BHAUSAHEB RAJARAM    M    59    Shivsena

3    ATHAWALE RAMDAS BANDU    M    52    Republican Party of India

4    DHOTRE SUCHIT CHINTAMANI    M    25    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    SATISH BALASAHEB PALGHADMAL    M    26    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    ADHAGALE RAJENDRA NAMDEV    M    39    Independent

7    KAMBALE RAMESH ANKUSH    M    32    Independent

8    GAIKWAD APPASAHEB GANGADHAR    M    64    Independent

9    BAGUL BALU DASHARATH    M    34    Independent

10    MEDHE PRAFULLAKUMAR MURLIDHAR    M    46    Independent

11    RAKSHE ANNASAHEB EKNATH    M    43    Independent

12    RUPWATE PREMANAND DAMODHAR    M    65    Independent

13    LODHE SHARAD LAXAMAN    M    42    Independent

14    WAGH GANGADHAR RADHAJI    M    60    Independent

15    VAIRAGHAR SUDHIR NATHA    M    38    Independent

16    SABALE ANIL DAMODHAR    M    40    Independent

17    SANDIP BHASKAR GOLAP    M    29    Independent

S13    39    MH    BEED    23-Apr-09    1    KOKATE RAMESH BABURAO (ADASKAR)    M    42    Nationalist Congress Party

2    MASKE MACHHINDRA BABURAO    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MUNDE GOPINATHRAO PANDURANG    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    KHALGE KACHRU SANTRAMJI    M    48    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    GURAV KALYAN BHANUDAS    M    62    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

6    TATE ASHOK SANTRAM    M    50    Ambedkarist Republican Party

7    NIKALJE SHEELATAI MAHENDRA    F    34    Prabuddha Republican Party

8    PRAMOD ALIAS PARMESHWAR SAKHARAM MOTE    M    32    Krantisena Maharashtra

9    BABURAO NARAYANRAO KAGADE    M    63    Ambedkar National Congress

10    DR. SHIVAJIRAO KISANRAO SHENDGE    M    39    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

11    KAMAL KONDIRAM NIMBALKAR    F    39    Independent

12    KAMBLE DEEPAK DYANOBA    M    32    Independent

13    KHAN SIKANDAR KHAN HUSSAIN KHAN    M    58    Independent

14    GUJAR KHAN MIRZA KHAN    M    28    Independent

15    ADV.NATKAR RAMRAO SHESHRAO    M    61    Independent

16    PATHAN GAFARKHAN JABBARKHAN    M    42    Independent

17    MAHAMMAD AKARAM MAHAMMAD SALIMUDDIN BAGWAN    M    34    Independent

18    RAMESH VISHVANATH KOKATE    M    32    Independent

19    SAYYED MINHAJ ALI WAJED ALI (PENDKHJUR WALE)    M    34    Independent

20    SAYYED SALIM FATTU    M    47    Independent

21    SARDAR KHAN SULTANABABA    M    26    Independent

S13    40    MH    OSMANABAD    23-Apr-09    1    GAIKWAD RAVINDRA VISHWANATH    M    49    Shivsena

2    DIVAKAR YASHWANT NAKADE    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    PATIL PADAMSINHA BAJIRAO    M    68    Nationalist Congress Party

4    JAGTAP BHAGWAN DADARAO    M    70    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    TARKASE DHANANJAY MURLIDHAR    M    34    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

6    TAWADE PRAKASH TANAJIRAO    M    28    Krantisena Maharashtra

7    BANSODE GUNDERAO SHIVRAM    M    73    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

8    BABA FAIJODDIN SHAIKH    M    28    Nelopa(United)

9    BHOSLE REVAN VISHWANATH    M    45    Janata Dal (Secular)

10    MUJAWAR SHAHABUDDIN NABIRASUL    M    37    Prabuddha Republican Party

11    RAJENDRA RANDITRAO HIPPERGEKAR    M    38    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

12    ANGARSHA SALIM BABULAL    M    62    Independent

13    GAIKWAD UMAJI PANDURANG    M    39    Independent

14    CHAVAN BABU VITHOBA    M    40    Independent

15    CHANDANE PINTU PANDURANG    M    35    Independent

16    DADASAHEB SHANKARRAO JETITHOR    M    50    Independent

17    NITURE ARUN BHAURAO    M    38    Independent

18    PATEL HASHAM ISMAIL    M    55    Independent

19    PAWAR HARIDAS MANIKRAO    M    35    Independent

20    PATIL MAHADEO DNYANDEO    M    50    Independent

21    BALAJI BAPURAO TUPSUNDARE    M    37    Independent

22    ADV. BHAUSAHEB ANIL BELURE (BEMBLIKAR)    M    29    Independent

23    MUNDHE PATRIL PADAMSINHA VIJAYSINHA    M    29    Independent

24    YEVATE-PATIL SHRIMANT    M    55    Independent

25    SANDIPAN RAMA ZOMBADE    M    41    Independent

S13    41    MH    LATUR    23-Apr-09    1    AAWALE JAYWANT GANGARAM    M    99    Indian National Congress

2    GAIKWAD SUNIL BALIRAM    M    99    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ADV. BABASAHEB SADSHIVRAO GAIKWAD    M    99    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    ARAK ASHOK VIKRAM    M    99    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    V.K. ACHARYA    M    99    Prabuddha Republican Party

6    T.M. KAMBLE    M    99    Republican Party of India (Democratic )

7    GANNE TUKARAM RAMBHAU    M    99    Jan Surajya Shakti

8    BANSODE RAGHUNATH WAGHOJI    M    99    Peoples Republican Party

9    BABURAO SATYAWAN POTHHARE    M    99    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

10    RAMKUMAR RAIWADIKAR    M    99    Samajwadi Jan Parishad

11    SHRIKANT RAMRAO JEDHE    M    99    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

12    SUSANE ATUL GANGARAM    M    99    Ambedkarist Republican Party

13    SAHEBRAO HARIBHAU WAGHMARE    M    99    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

14    AAWCHARE VIJAYKUMAR BABRUWAN    M    99    Independent

15    KAMBLE BANSILAL RAMCHANDRA    M    99    Independent

16    NILANGAEKAR AVINASH MADHUKARRAO    M    99    Independent

17    MANE GAJANAN PANDURANG    M    99    Independent

18    SANJAY KABIRDAS GAIKWAD    M    99    Independent

S13    42    MH    SOLAPUR    23-Apr-09    1    GAIKWAD PRAMOD RAMCHANDRA    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ADV. BANSODE SHARAD MARUTI    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SHINDE SUSHILKUMAR SAMBHAJIRAO    M    67    Indian National Congress

4    ADV. KASABEKAR SHRIDHAR LIMBAJI    M    59    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

5    RAJGURU NARAYAN YEDU    M    60    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    LAXMIKANT CHANDRAKANT GAIKWAD    M    37    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

7    NARAYANKAR RAJENDRA BABURAO    M    44    Independent

8    NITINKUMAR RAMCHANDRA KAMBLE ALIAS NITIN BANPURKAR    M    37    Independent

9    BANSODE UTTAM BHIMSHA    M    50    Independent

10    BANSODE RAHUL DATTU    M    33    Independent

11    MILIND MAREPPA MULE    M    49    Independent

12    VIKRAM UTTAM KASABE    M    33    Independent

13    VIJAYKUMAR BHAGWANRAO UGHADE    M    38    Independent

S13    43    MH    MADHA    23-Apr-09    1    DESHMUKH SUBHASH SURESHCHANDRA    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    PAWAR SHARADCHANDRA GOVINDRAO    M    68    Nationalist Congress Party

3    RAHUL VITTHAL SARWADE    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    AYU GAIKWAD SATISH SUGRAV    M    28    Prabuddha Republican Party

5    CHAVAN SUBHASH VITTHAL    M    34    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

6    MAHADEO JAGANNATH JANKAR    M    40    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

7    RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN KACCHAVE    M    40    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

8    SASTE KAKASAHEB MAHADEO    M    48    Krantisena Maharashtra

9    SOU. NAGMANI KISAN JAKKAN    F    45    Independent

10    DR.M. D. PATIL    M    50    Independent

11    BANSODE BALVEER DAGADU    M    42    Independent

12    BHANUDAS BHAGAWAN DEVAKATE    M    70    Independent

13    DR. MAHADEO ABAJI POL    M    56    Independent

14    SURESH SHAMRAO GHADGE    M    36    Independent

15    DNYANESHWAR VITTHAL AMALE    M    26    Independent

S13    44    MH    SANGLI    23-Apr-09    1    PATEL M.JAVED M. YUSUF    M    38    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PRATIK PRAKASHBAPU PATIL    M    35    Indian National Congress

3    ASHOK DNYANU MANE(BHAU)    M    37    Swatantra Bharat Paksha

4    MANOHAR BALKRISHNA KHEDKAR    M    58    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    MAHADEV ANNA WAGHAMARE    M    65    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

6    AJITRAO SHANKARRAO GHORPADE    M    56    Independent

7    ANSARI SHABBIR AHEMED    M    61    Independent

8    GANPATI TUKARAM KAMBLE ALIAS G.T. KAMBLE    M    70    Independent

9    PANDHARE DATTATRAYA PANDURANG    M    51    Independent

10    KAVTHEKAR PRAVIN BHAGWAN KAVTHEKAR ALIAS JIVA MAHALE    M    47    Independent

11    MULANI BALEKHAN USMAN    M    46    Independent

12    VAGARE MARUTI MURA    M    34    Independent

13    SHAMRAO PIRAJI KADAM    M    64    Independent

14    SIDDESHWAR SHIVAPPA BHOSALE    M    36    Independent

S13    45    MH    SATARA    23-Apr-09    1    CHAVAN PRASHANT VASANT    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PURUSHOTTAM BAJIRAO JADHAV    M    45    Shivsena

3    BHONSLE SHRIMANT CHH. UDYANRAJE PRATAPSINH    M    43    Nationalist Congress Party

4    BHAUSAHEB GANGARAM WAGH    M    51    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

5    ALNKRITA ABHIJIT AWADE-BICHUKALE    F    29    Independent

S13    46    MH    RATNAGIRI – SINDHUDURG    23-Apr-09    1    DR.NILESH NARAYAN RANE    M    28    Indian National Congress

2    PARULEKAR JAYENDRA SHRIPAD    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SURESH PRABHAKAR PRABHU    M    55    Shivsena

4    AJAY ALIAS AABA DADA JADHAV    M    28    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

5    RAJESH PUSUSHOTTAM SURVE    M    41    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

6    VILASRAO KHANVILKAR    M    54    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

7    SIRAJ ABDULLA KAUCHALI    M    60    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

8    KHALAPE AKBAR MAHAMMAD    M    55    Independent

9    SURENDRA BORKAR    M    62    Independent

S13    47    MH    KOLHAPUR    23-Apr-09    1    KAMBLE SUHAS NIVRUTI    M    41    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    CHHATRPATI SAMBHAJIRAJE SHAHU    M    38    Nationalist Congress Party

3    DEVANE VIJAY SHAMRAO    M    50    Shivsena

4    KAMBLE MARUTI RAVELU    M    34    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

5    CHOUGULE BHAI P.T.    M    64    Independent

6    DR. NEELAMBARI RAMESH MANDAPE    F    49    Independent

7    S.R. TATYA PATIL    M    70    Independent

8    BAJRANG KRISHNA PATIL    M    39    Independent

9    MAHAMMADGOUS GULAB NADAF    M    57    Independent

10    SADASHIVRAO MANDLIK DADOBA    M    74    Independent

S13    48    MH    HATKANANGLE    23-Apr-09    1    KANADE ANILKUMAR MAHADEV    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    MANE NIVEDITA SAMBHAJIRAO    F    45    Nationalist Congress Party

3    RAGHUNATH RAMCHANDRA PATIL    M    58    Shivsena

4    PATIL UDAY PANDHARINATH    M    39    Krantisena Maharashtra

5    BABURAO OMANNA KAMBLE    M    61    Rashtriya Samaj Paksha

6    MANE ARVIND BHIVA    M    43    Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha

7    SHETTI RAJU ALIAS DEVAPPA ANNA    M    41    Swabhimani Paksha

8    ARUN ALIAS SHAM BAJARNAG BUCHADE    M    28    Independent

9    THORAT ANANDRAO TUKARAM    M    46    Independent

10    SURNIKE ANANDRAO VASANTRAO (FOUJI BAPU)    M    48    Independent

S18    4    OR    KEONJHAR    23-Apr-09    1    ANANTA NAYAK    M    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DHANURJAYA SIDU    M    43    Indian National Congress

3    YASHBANT NARAYAN SINGH LAGURI    M    38    Biju Janata Dal

4    LACHHAMAN MAJHI    M    42    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    DR SUDARSHAN LOHAR    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    CHITTA RANJAN MUNDA    M    37    Independent

7    DR. FAKIR MOHAN NAIK    M    34    Independent

S18    5    OR    MAYURBHANJ    23-Apr-09    1    GAMHA SINGH    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DROUPADI MURMU    F    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    LAXMAN TUDU    M    47    Biju Janata Dal

4    LAXMAN MAJHI    M    62    Indian National Congress

5    SUDAM MARNDI    M    43    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

6    LAXMISWAR TAMUDIA    M    68    Samajwadi Party

7    SUNDAR MOHAN MAJHI    M    65    Jharkhand Disom Party

8    DEVI PRASANNA BESRA    M    61    Independent

9    NARENDRA HANSDA    M    26    Independent

10    RAMESWAR MAJHI    M    29    Independent

S18    6    OR    BALASORE    23-Apr-09    1    ARUN JENA    M    47    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

2    ARUN DEY    M    63    Nationalist Congress Party

3    MAHAMEGHA BAHAN AIRA KHARABELA SWAIN    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SHRADHANJALI PRADHAN    F    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SRIKANTA KUMAR JENA    M    58    Indian National Congress

6    DEBASISH RANJAN DASH    M    37    Samruddha Odisha

7    RAKESH RANJAN PATRA    M    27    Jana Hitkari Party

8    GHASIRAM MOHANTA    M    66    Independent

9    LAXIMIKANTA BEHERA    M    51    Independent

S18    7    OR    BHADRAK    23-Apr-09    1    ANANTA PRASAD SETHI    M    58    Indian National Congress

2    ARJUN CHARAN SETHI    M    68    Biju Janata Dal

3    NITYANANDA JENA    M    29    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RATH DAS    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    GOLAK PRASAD MALLIK    M    60    Independent

6    SUSANTA KUMAR JENA    M    31    Independent

S18    8    OR    JAJPUR    23-Apr-09    1    AMIYA KANTA MALLIK    M    50    Indian National Congress

2    PARAMESWAR SETHI    M    40    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MOHAN JENA    M    52    Biju Janata Dal

4    AJIT KUMAR JENA    M    42    Samruddha Odisha

5    BABULI MALLIK    M    36    Orissa Mukti Morcha

6    BHIMSEN BEHERA    M    44    Jana Hitkari Party

7    UDAYA NATH JENA    M    29    Independent

8    KALANDI MALLIK    M    28    Independent

S18    9    OR    DHENKANAL    23-Apr-09    1    KRISHNA CHANDRA SAHOO    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    CHANDRA SEKHAR TRIPATHY    M    60    Indian National Congress

3    TATHAGATA SATPATHY    M    53    Biju Janata Dal

4    RUDRANARAYAN PANY    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    PRIYABRATA GARNAIK    M    28    Kalinga Sena

S18    14    OR    CUTTACK    23-Apr-09    1    ANADI SAHU    M    68    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    GOPAL CHANDRA KAR    M    63    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BIBHUTI BHUSAN MISHRA    M    57    Indian National Congress

4    BHARTRUHARI MAHTAB    M    51    Biju Janata Dal

5    KAPILA CHARAN MALL    M    72    Bira Oriya Party

6    PRADIP ROUTRAY    M    40    Kalinga Sena

7    DEBANANDA SINGH    M    33    Independent

S18    15    OR    KENDRAPARA    23-Apr-09    1    JNANDEV BEURA    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    RANJIB BISWAL    M    38    Indian National Congress

3    LENIN LENKA    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    BAIJAYANT PANDA    M    45    Biju Janata Dal

5    PRATAP CHANDRA JENA    M    60    Samruddha Odisha

6    PRAVAKAR NAYAK    M    48    Kalinga Sena

7    RAMA KRUSHNA DASH    M    44    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

8    SARAT CHANDRA SWAIN    M    49    Independent

S18    16    OR    JAGATSINGHPUR    23-Apr-09    1    BAIDHAR MALLICK    M    46    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BIBHU PRASAD TARAI    M    42    Communist Party of India

3    BIBHUTI BHUSAN MAJHI    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RABINDRA KUMAR SETHY    M    54    Indian National Congress

5    AKSHAYA KUMAR SETHI    M    25    Samruddha Odisha

S18    17    OR    PURI    23-Apr-09    1    JITENDRA KUMAR SAHOO    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DEBENDRA NATH MANSINGH    M    59    Indian National Congress

3    PINAKI MISRA    M    49    Biju Janata Dal

4    BRAJA KISHORE TRIPATHY    M    62    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    KSHITISH BISWAL    M    80    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

6    SABYASACHI MOHAPATRA    M    35    Kalinga Sena

7    PRABHAT KUMAR BADAPANDA    M    42    Independent

S18    18    OR    BHUBANESWAR    23-Apr-09    1    AKSHAYA KUMAR MOHANTY    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ARCHANA NAYAK    F    43    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    PRASANNA KUMAR PATASANI    M    66    Biju Janata Dal

4    SANTOSH MOHANTY    M    58    Indian National Congress

5    UMA CHARANA MISHRA    M    60    Jana Hitkari Party

6    NABAGHAN PARIDA    M    66    Bira Oriya Party

7    PRAFUL KUMAR SAHOO    M    38    Republican Party of India (A)

8    BASANTA KUMAR BEHERA    M    47    Kalinga Sena

9    BIJAYANANDA MISHRA    M    51    Lok Jan Shakti Party

10    JAGANNATH PRASAD LENKA    M    75    Independent

11    DHIRENDRA SATAPATHY    M    67    Independent

12    PRAMILA BEHERA    F    33    Independent

13    SASTHI PRASAD SETHI    M    47    Independent

S23    1    TR    TRIPURA WEST    23-Apr-09    1    NILMANI DEB    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    KHAGEN DAS    M    71    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    SUDIP ROY BARMAN    M    45    Indian National Congress

4    SANJIB DEY    M    32    Nationalist Congress Party

5    ARUN CHANDRA BHOWMIK    M    63    All India Trinamool Congress

6    RAKHAL RAJ DATTA    M    60    Amra Bangalee

7    PARTHA KARMAKAR    M    40    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

8    TITU SAHA    M    32    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

9    BINOY DEB BARMA    M    49    Independent

10    SUBRATA BHOWMIK    M    58    Independent

S23    2    TR    TRIPURA EAST    23-Apr-09    1    PULIN BEHARI DEWAN    M    69    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BAJU BAN RIYAN    M    67    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    DIBA CHANDRA HRANGKHWAL    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    RITA RANI DEBBARMA    F    51    All India Trinamool Congress

5    KARNA DHAN CHAKMA    M    37    Amra Bangalee

6    FALGUNI TRIPURA    M    42    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

7    RAJESH DEB BARMA    M    34    Independent

8    BINOY REANG    M    34    Independent

9    MEVAR KUMAR JAMATIA    M    40    Independent

S24    37    UP    AMETHI    23-Apr-09    1    ASHEESH SHUKLA    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH    M    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAHUL GANDHI    M    38    Indian National Congress

4    BHUWAL    M    56    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

5    MOHD.HASAN LAHARI    M    35    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

6    SUNITA    F    26    Mahila Adhikar Party

7    SURYABHAN MAURYA    M    45    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

8    AAVID HUSSAIN    M    31    Independent

9    OMKAR    M    46    Independent

10    KAPIL DEO    M    30    Independent

11    DILIP    M    36    Independent

12    MIHILAL    M    52    Independent

13    MEET SINGH    M    65    Independent

14    RAMESH CHANDRA    M    30    Independent

15    RAM SHANKER    M    43    Independent

16    SWAMI NATH    M    25    Independent

S24    38    UP    SULTANPUR    23-Apr-09    1    ASHOK PANDEY    M    58    Samajwadi Party

2    MOHD.TAHIR    M    33    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SURYA BHAN SINGH    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DR.SANJAY SINGH    M    55    Indian National Congress

5    ANIL    M    35    Republican Party of India (A)

6    CHOTELAL MAURYA    M    40    Apna Dal

7    MOHD.UMAR    M    42    Peace Party

8    RAKESH    M    25    National Youth Party

9    RAJKUMAR PANDEY    M    36    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

10    TRIVENI PRASAD BHEEM    M    52    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

11    ARVIND KUMAR    M    46    Independent

12    AWADHESH KUMAR    M    30    Independent

13    KRISHNA NARAYAN    M    33    Independent

14    JHINKURAM VISHWAKARMA    M    33    Independent

15    PRAKASH CHANDRA    M    35    Independent

16    HARI NARAYAN    M    70    Independent

S24    39    UP    PRATAPGARH    23-Apr-09    1    KUNWAR AKSHAYA PRATAP SINGH ‘GOPAL JI’    M    41    Samajwadi Party

2    RAJKUMARI RATNA SINGH    F    49    Indian National Congress

3    LAKSHMI NARAIN PANDEY ‘GURU JI’    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    PROF. SHIVAKANT OJHA    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ATIQ AHAMAD    M    46    Apna Dal

6    ARUN KUMAR    M    48    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

7    A. RASHID ANSARI    M    54    Momin Conference

8    RAJESH    M    36    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

9    ATUL DWIVEDI    M    29    Independent

10    UDHAV RAM    M    53    Independent

11    CHHANGALAL    M    56    Independent

12    JITENDRA PRATAP SINGH    M    40    Independent

13    DINESH PANDEY ALIAS D.K. PANDEY    M    34    Independent

14    BADRI PRASAD    M    48    Independent

15    MUNEESHWAR SINGH    M    65    Independent

16    RAMESH KUMAR    M    31    Independent

17    RAVINDRA SINGH    M    33    Independent

18    RANI PAL    F    58    Independent

19    RAMMURTI MISHRA    M    36    Independent

20    RAM SAMUJH    M    60    Independent

21    VINOD    M    29    Independent

22    SHIVRAM    M    51    Independent

23    SATRAM    M    42    Independent

S24    48    UP    BANDA    23-Apr-09    1    AMITA BAJPAI    F    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BHAGAWAN DEEN GARG    M    47    Indian National Congress

3    BHAIRON PRASAD MISHRA    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SANTOSH KUMAR    M    54    Communist Party of India

5    R. K. SINGH PATEL    M    49    Samajwadi Party

6    ASHOK KUMAR    M    40    Indian Justice Party

7    ANAND YADAV    M    45    United Communist Party of India

8    PARASHU RAM NISHAD    M    45    Apna Dal

9    LALIT KUMAR    M    37    Ambedkar Samaj Party

10    ANSH DHARI    M    29    Independent

11    JAGAN NATH SINGH    M    62    Independent

12    PRAKASH NARAYAN    M    32    Independent

13    BALENDRA NATH    M    38    Independent

14    MANOJ KUMAR    M    30    Independent

15    SHIV KUMAR    M    43    Independent

S24    50    UP    KAUSHAMBI    23-Apr-09    1    GIRISH CHANDRA PASI    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    GAUTAM CHAUDHARY    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAM NIHOR RAKESH    M    64    Indian National Congress

4    SHAILENDRA KUMAR    M    51    Samajwadi Party

5    UMESH CHANDRA PASI    M    40    Apna Dal

6    GULAB SONKAR    M    45    Indian Justice Party

7    GULAB CHANDRA    M    39    Independent

8    JAGDEO    M    53    Independent

9    MAN SINGH    M    28    Independent

10    RAM SARAN    M    56    Independent

S24    51    UP    PHULPUR    23-Apr-09    1    KAPIL MUNI KARWARIYA    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    KARAN SINGH PATEL    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    DHARMARAJ SINGH PATEL    M    50    Indian National Congress

4    SHYAMA CHARAN GUPTA    M    63    Samajwadi Party

5    CHANDRAJEET    M    28    Lok Dal

6    DEVENDRA PRATAP SINGH    M    38    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

7    PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA    M    49    Apna Dal

8    LALLAN SINGH    M    35    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

9    VIJAY KUMAR    M    56    Gondwana Mukti Sena

10    SATISH YADAV    M    34    Indian Justice Party

11    SANJEEV KUMAR MISHRA    M    30    Yuva Vikas Party

12    KRISHNA KUMAR    M    33    Independent

13    DR. NEERAJ    M    43    Independent

14    BHARAT LAL    M    52    Independent

15    DR. MILAN MUKHERJEE    M    67    Independent

16    MUNISHWAR SINGH MAURYA    M    65    Independent

17    RADHIKA PAL    F    34    Independent

18    RADHESHYAM SINGH YADAV    M    72    Independent

19    RAM JANM YADAV    M    31    Independent

20    RAMSHANKAR    M    47    Independent

21    VIRENDRA PAL SINGH    M    66    Independent

22    SHAILENDRA KUMAR PRAJAPATI    M    40    Independent

23    SAMAR BAHADUR SHARMA    M    40    Independent

24    DR. SONE LAL PATEL    M    59    Independent

S24    52    UP    ALLAHABAD    23-Apr-09    1    ASHOK KUMAR BAJPAI    M    58    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    YOGESH SHUKLA    M    39    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    KUNWAR REWATI RAMAN SINGH ALIAS MANI JI    M    65    Samajwadi Party

4    SHYAM KRISHNA PANDEY    M    65    Indian National Congress

5    OM PRAKASH    M    41    Rashtriya Machhua Samaj Party

6    GULAB GRAMEEN    M    47    Lok Dal

7    BIHARI LAL SHARMA    M    54    Apna Dal

8    BAIJAL KUMAR    M    48    Bahujan Sangharsh Party (Kanshiram)

9    RAMA KANT    M    47    Indian Justice Party

10    RAJESH PASI    M    32    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

11    RAM PARIKHAN SINGH    M    59    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

12    VIJAY SHANKAR    M    45    Bahujan Shakty

13    SARFUDDIN    M    32    Nelopa(United)

14    AKBAL MOHAMMD    M    34    Independent

15    AJUG NARAIN    M    33    Independent

16    ABHAY SRIVASTAVA    M    31    Independent

17    KM. KUSUM KUMARI AD    F    45    Independent

18    GOPAL SWROOP JOSHI    M    62    Independent

19    NARENDRA KUMAR TEWARI    M    47    Independent

20    BAJRANG DUTT    M    36    Independent

21    MUNNU PRASAD    M    44    Independent

22    RAVI PRAKASH    M    41    Independent

23    RAKESH KUMAR    M    47    Independent

24    RAJ BALI    M    51    Independent

25    RAM GOVIND    M    46    Independent

26    RAM JEET    M    38    Independent

27    RAM LAL    M    46    Independent

28    KM. SHASHI PANDEY    F    45    Independent

29    DR. MOHD. SALMAN RASHIDI    M    57    Independent

30    SADHNA AGARWAL    F    47    Independent

31    HIRA LAL    M    54    Independent

S24    54    UP    FAIZABAD    23-Apr-09    1    NIRMAL KHATRI    M    58    Indian National Congress

2    BIMLENDRA MOHAN PRATAP MISRA “PAPPU BHAIYA”    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MITRASEN    M    76    Samajwadi Party

4    LALLU SINGH    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    AJAY KUMAR    M    25    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

6    ATUL KUMAR PANDEY    M    39    The Humanist Party of India

7    AMAR NATH JAISWAL    M    44    Rashtriya Kranti Party

8    GIRISH CHANDRA VERMA    M    32    Apna Dal

9    GULAM SABIR    M    42    Navbharat Nirman Party

10    CHANDRASHEKHAR SINGH    M    36    Bharat Punarnirman Dal

11    NUSRAT QUDDUSI ALIAS BABLOO    M    41    Peace Party

12    MANISH KUMAR PANDEY    M    35    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

13    SAIYYAD MUSHEER AHMED    M    55    Awami Party

14    RAMESH KUMAR RAWAT    M    42    Maulik Adhikar Party

15    SUSHIL KUMAR    M    45    Bharatiya Lok Kalyan Dal

16    ATAURR RAHMAN ANSARI    M    52    Independent

17    AMARNATH VERMA    M    36    Independent

18    DINA NATH PANDEY    M    35    Independent

19    NASREEN BANO    F    38    Independent

20    BALAK RAM ALIAS SHIV BALAK PASI    M    34    Independent

21    RAM DHIRAJ    M    46    Independent

22    SWAMI NATH    M    29    Independent

23    SIYARAM KORI    M    50    Independent

S24    55    UP    AMBEDKAR NAGAR    23-Apr-09    1    RAKESH PANDEY    M    55    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    VINAY KATIYAR    M    49    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SHANKHLAL MAJHI    M    54    Samajwadi Party

4    DINESH KUMAR RAJBHAR    M    33    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

5    BASANT LAL    M    53    Peace Party

6    BAL MUKUND DHURIYA    M    31    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

7    BHARTHARI    M    44    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

8    MANSHARAM    M    40    Maulik Adhikar Party

9    LALMAN    M    34    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

10    VIJAY KUMAR MAURYA    M    38    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

11    SANTOSH KUMAR    M    50    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

12    IFTEKHAR AHMAD    M    37    Independent

13    KAILASH KUMAR SHUKLA    M    60    Independent

14    GAYADEEN    M    43    Independent

15    CHANDRA BHUSHAN    M    61    Independent

16    DEO PRASAD MISHRA    M    42    Independent

17    NABAB ALI    M    55    Independent

18    PARASHU RAM    M    49    Independent

19    PATANJALI JAITALI    M    58    Independent

20    RAM SUKH SAHOO    M    50    Independent

21    DR. LAL BAHADUR    M    42    Independent

22    SRIRAM AMBESH    M    61    Independent

S24    57    UP    KAISERGANJ    23-Apr-09    1    MOHD ALEEM    M    46    Indian National Congress

2    BRIJBHUSHAN SARAN SINGH    M    52    Samajwadi Party

3    DR LALTA PRASAD MISHRA ALIS DR L P MISHRA    M    59    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    SURENDRA NATH AWASTHI    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    ZAMEER AHAMAD    M    53    Ambedkar National Congress

6    DAYA RAM    M    41    Peoples Democratic Forum

7    MANOJ KUMAR    M    33    Lok Dal

8    RAM PRAKSH    M    39    Republican Party of India (A)

9    RAMENDER DEV PATHAK    M    60    Peace Party

10    HAFEEZ    M    47    Apna Dal

11    ANOKHI LAL    M    49    Independent

12    OM PRAKASH    M    35    Independent

13    UDAI RAJ    M    52    Independent

14    CHANDRA BHAN    M    42    Independent

15    JAGDISH    M    40    Independent

16    JAGDISH PRASAD    M    38    Independent

17    JITENDRA BAHADUR    M    57    Independent

18    PARAMHANS SINGH    M    33    Independent

19    RAJ KISHORE SINGH    M    38    Independent

20    RADHEYSHYAM BOAT    M    62    Independent

21    RAMFEER ALIS CHUNTI    M    59    Independent

22    VINESH KUMAR    M    32    Independent

23    VIMAL VERMA    M    30    Independent

S24    58    UP    SHRAWASTI    23-Apr-09    1    RIZVAN ZAHEER    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    RUBAB SAIDA    F    58    Samajwadi Party

3    VINAY KUMAR ALIAS VINNU    M    45    Indian National Congress

4    SATYA DEO SINGH    M    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    ARUN KUMAR    M    33    Ambedkar National Congress

6    KULDEEP    M    44    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

7    RAJESHWAR MISHRA    M    28    Peace Party

8    RAM ADHAR    M    62    Republican Party of India (A)

9    TEJ BAHADUR    M    32    Independent

10    RAM SUDHI    M    38    Independent

11    VINOD KUMAR PANDEY    M    27    Independent

S24    59    UP    GONDA    23-Apr-09    1    DR ACHUTANANDDUBE    M    64    Nationalist Congress Party

2    KIRTI VARDHAN SINGH RAJA BAIYA    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BENI PRASAD VERMA    M    68    Indian National Congress

4    RAM PRATAP SINGH    M    58    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    VINOD KUMAR SINGH ALIAS PANDIT SINGH    M    42    Samajwadi Party

6    ASHIQ ALI    M    46    Peace Party

7    OM PRAKASH SINGH    M    54    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

8    PREM KUMAR    M    26    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

9    RAJENDRA PRASAD1    M    55    Ambedkar National Congress

10    RAM KEWAL    M    41    Vanchit Jamat Party

11    RAM LOCHAN    M    46    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

12    VIDYA SAGAR    M    36    Apna Dal

13    HARSH VARDHAN PANDEY    M    33    Lok Dal

14    AKILENDRA KUMAR PATHAK    M    34    Independent

15    ANURADHA PATEL    F    42    Independent

16    OM PRAKASH    M    47    Independent

17    GAGNGA DHAR SHUKLA    M    38    Independent

18    DEEPAK    M    31    Independent

19    NARENDRA SINGH    M    34    Independent

20    BAIJNATH    M    30    Independent

21    RAJENDRA PRASAD    M    28    Independent

22    RADHEY SHYAM    M    59    Independent

23    RAM PRASAD    M    61    Independent

24    RAM LAKHAN    M    54    Independent

25    SATYA PRAKASH    M    39    Independent

S24    60    UP    DOMARIYAGANJ    23-Apr-09    1    JAGDAMBIKA PAL    M    59    Indian National Congress

2    JAI PRATAP SINGH    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MATA PRASAD PANDEY    M    72    Samajwadi Party

4    MOHD. MUQUEEM    M    59    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    INAMULLAH CHAUDHARY    M    66    Peace Party

6    JITENDRA PRATAP SINGH    M    46    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

7    PINGAL PRASAD    M    41    Republican Party of India

8    BALKRISHNA    M    39    Bahujan Sangharsh Party (Kanshiram)

9    MUKHDEV    M    41    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

10    RAJDEV    M    35    Bharatiya Eklavya Party

11    RAM SAMUJH    M    41    Bharatiya Jan Berojgar Chhatra Dal

12    RAHUL SANGH PRIYA BHARTI    M    36    Indian Justice Party

13    HARISHANKAR    M    45    Lok Jan Shakti Party

14    MOTILAL VIDHYARTHI    M    59    Independent

15    RAM KRIPAL    M    58    Independent

16    SIRAJ AHAMAD    M    26    Independent

S24    61    UP    BASTI    23-Apr-09    1    ARVIND KUMAR CHAUDHARY    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    BASANT CHAUDHARY    M    43    Indian National Congress

3    RAJ KISHOR SINGH    M    38    Samajwadi Party

4    DR. Y. D. SINGH    M    64    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    OM PRAKASH    M    40    Vanchit Jamat Party

6    DAYASHANKAR PATWA    M    57    Peace Party

7    DALBAG SINGH    M    50    Bahujan Sangharsh Party (Kanshiram)

8    RAM NAYAN PATEL    M    49    Apna Dal

9    VINOD KUMAR RAJBHAR    M    33    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

10    SHIVDAS    M    50    Shoshit Samaj Dal

11    SANJEEV KUMAR NISHAD    M    27    Bahujan Uday Manch

12    SITARAM NISHAD    M    63    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

13    RAM LALAN YADAV    M    36    Independent

14    SHIV POOJAN ARYA    M    52    Independent

15    SATYADEV OJHA    M    70    Independent

16    SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA    M    40    Independent

S24    62    UP    SANT KABIR NAGAR    23-Apr-09    1    KAMLA KANT CHAUDHARY    M    41    Communist Party of India

2    FAZLEY MAHAMOOD    M    41    Indian National Congress

3    BHAL CHANDRA YADAV    M    42    Samajwadi Party

4    BHISMA SHANKAR ALIAS KUSHAL TIWARI    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SHARAD TRIPATHI    M    35    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    INDRA KUMAR    M    37    Bahujan Uday Manch

7    KRISHNA NAND MISHRA    M    38    All India Minorities Front

8    KHELADI    M    35    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

9    JANTRI LAL    M    37    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

10    PANCHOO BELDAR    M    48    Ambedkar Samaj Party

11    RAJESH SINGH    M    37    Peace Party

12    RAM ACHAL    M    34    Maulik Adhikar Party

13    RAM AVADH NISHAD    M    62    Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party

14    LOTAN ALIAS LAUTAN PRASAD    M    47    Shoshit Samaj Dal

15    VINOD RAI    M    38    National Lokhind Party

16    ANJU    F    28    Independent

17    JOOGESH YADAV    M    35    Independent

18    NITYANAND MANI TRIPATHI    M    35    Independent

19    PHOOLDEO    M    49    Independent

20    RAMESH    M    26    Independent

21    VINAY PANDEY    M    31    Independent

22    SHRI BABA RAM CHANDRA    M    52    Independent

23    SUSHILA JIGYASU    F    29    Independent

24    HARISH CHANDRA    M    32    Independent

S24    73    UP    JAUNPUR    23-Apr-09    1    DHANANJAY SINGH    M    33    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PARAS NATH YADAVA    M    54    Samajwadi Party

3    SEEMA    F    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    ACHHEYLAL NISHAD    M    61    Nelopa(United)

5    GIRAJA SHANKAR YADAVA    M    49    Gondvana Gantantra Party

6    GEETA SINGH    F    46    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

7    BAHADUR SONKAR    M    48    Indian Justice Party

8    RAVI SHANKAR    M    38    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    RAJKISHUN    M    26    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

10    RAJESH S/O RAMESHCHANDRA    M    30    Apna Dal

11    RAJESH S/O RAMYAGYA    M    32    Eklavya Samaj Party

12    RAMCHANDAR    M    52    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

13    SHEETALA PRASAD    M    51    Revolutionary Socialist Party

14    AJAY KASYAP – GUDDU    M    26    Independent

15    JAGDISH CHANDRA ASTHANA    M    62    Independent

16    TASLEEM AHMED REHMANI    M    45    Independent

S24    78    UP    BHADOHI    23-Apr-09    1    DR. AKHILESH KUMAR DWIVEDI    M    41    Nationalist Congress Party

2    GORAKHNATH    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    CHHOTELAL BIND    M    53    Samajwadi Party

4    DR. MAHENDRA NATH PANDEY    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    SURYMANI TIWARI    M    60    Indian National Congress

6    JAJ LAL    M    47    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

7    NANDLAL    M    56    Vikas Party

8    RAMRATEE BIND    M    74    Apna Dal

9    THAKUR SANTOSH KUMAR    M    27    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

10    SHAHID    M    42    Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party

11    GAURISHANKAR    M    38    Independent

12    JEETENDRA    M    30    Independent

13    TEJ BAHADUR YADAV ADVOCATE    M    56    Independent

S27    1    JH    RAJMAHAL    23-Apr-09    1    CHANDRA SHEKHAR AZAD    M    38    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    JYOTIN SOREN    M    59    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    THOMAS HASDA    M    58    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    DEVIDHAN BESRA    M    69    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    HEMLAL MURMU    M    54    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

6    AAMELIYA HANSDA    F    29    Revolutionary Socialist Party

7    CHARAN MURMU    M    33    Shivsena

8    DAUD MARANDI    M    25    Samajwadi Party

9    SUKHWA URAON    M    33    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

10    SUNDAR TUDU    M    45    Bharatiya Jagaran Party

11    SOM MARANDI    M    44    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

12    STIPHEN MARANDI    M    55    Jharkhand Jan Morcha

S27    2    JH    DUMKA    23-Apr-09    1    CHURKA TUDU    M    44    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    PASHUPATI KOL    M    29    Communist Party of India

3    RAMESH TUDU    M    34    Rashtriya Janata Dal

4    SHIBU SOREN    M    64    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

5    SUNIL SOREN    M    30    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    ARJUN PUJHAR    M    33    Samajwadi Party

7    NIRMALA MURMU    F    33    Revolutionary Socialist Party

8    PHATIK CHANDRA HEMBRAM    M    64    All Jharkhand Students Union

9    BITIYA MANJHI    F    53    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

10    RAMESH HEMBROM    M    39    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

11    RAMJIVAN DEHRI    M    35    Samata Party

12    KALESHWAR SOREN    M    38    Independent

13    CHARLES MURMU    M    27    Independent

14    NANDLAL SOREN    M    55    Independent

15    PULICE HEMRAM    M    31    Independent

16    BIVISAN PUJHAR    M    50    Independent

17    CYRIL HANSDA    M    63    Independent

18    SONA MURMU    F    56    Independent

19    HOPNA BASKI    M    57    Independent

S27    3    JH    GODDA    23-Apr-09    1    IQBAL DURRANI    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    DURGA SOREN    M    39    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

3    NISHIKANT DUBEY    M    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    FURKAN ANSARI    M    61    Indian National Congress

5    ASHOK SHARMA    M    39    Jharkhand Party

6    GEETA MANDAL    F    39    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    GOVIND LAL MARANDI    M    39    Revolutionary Socialist Party

8    JAWAHAR LAL YADAV    M    31    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    NANDLAL YADAV    M    39    Samajwadi Party

10    NIRANJAN PRASAD YADAV    M    33    Rashtrawadi Sena

11    PRADEEP YADAV    M    42    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

12    PRADEEP YADAV    M    25    Samata Party

13    BINOD MEHARIA    M    56    Bahujan Shakty

14    RAJ NARAYAN KHAWADE    M    42    AJSU Party

15    SANTOSH KUMAR RAY    M    26    All India Trinamool Congress

16    SURAJ MANDAL    M    61    Jharkhand Vikas Dal

17    JAYSWAL MANJHI    M    38    Independent

18    JAHIR MUSTAKIM    M    35    Independent

19    MANOJ KUMAR MANDAL    M    35    Independent

20    MITHILESH PASWAN    M    38    Independent

21    MD. MOAJJAM ALI CHANCHAL    M    38    Independent

22    SHANKAR PRASAD KESHARI    M    39    Independent

23    SANJEEV KUMAR    M    27    Independent

S27    6    JH    GIRIDIH    23-Apr-09    1    AKLU RAM MAHTO    M    65    Communist Party of India

2    TEKLAL MAHTO    M    57    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

3    BIJAY SINGH    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RAVINDRA KUMAR PANDEY    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    MD. HIMAYUN ANSARI    M    72    Rashtriya Janata Dal

6    MRINAL KANTI DEV    M    61    Socialist Party (Lohia)

7    RAVINDER MAHTO    M    43    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

8    SHIVA MAHTO    M    75    Marxist Co-Ordination

9    SABA AHMAD    M    62    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

10    INDRA DEV MAHTO    M    45    Independent

11    UMESH RISHI    M    43    Independent

12    NAND KISHOR PRASAD    M    64    Independent

13    BUDDHI NATH TIWARY    M    41    Independent

14    MAHAVIR PRASAD    M    36    Independent

15    MASOOM RAJA ANSARI    M    27    Independent

16    LALOO KEWAT    M    46    Independent

17    SHANKAR RAJAK    M    38    Independent

S27    7    JH    DHANBAD    23-Apr-09    1    CHANDRASHEKHAR DUBEY    M    66    Indian National Congress

2    PASHUPATI NATH SINGH    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SAMARESH SINGH    M    68    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    INDU SINGH    F    32    Samata Party

5    JANARDAN PANDEY    M    56    All India Forward Bloc

6    DIN BANDHU SINGH    M    56    Socialist Party (Lohia)

7    PAWAN KUMAR JHA    M    28    Janata Dal (Secular)

8    PHUL CHAND MANDAL    M    66    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

9    M.K.MANDAL    M    62    Amra Bangalee

10    A.K. ROY    M    72    Marxist Co-Ordination

11    VIDESHI MAHATO    M    54    Jharkhand Vikas Dal

12    VIRENDRA PRADHAN    M    44    Lok Jan Shakti Party

13    SUNIL KUMAR    M    38    Indian Justice Party

14    MD. SULTAN    M    57    Jharkhand Party

15    HAFFIZUDDIN ANSARI    M    51    Samajwadi Party

16    ABDUL MUSTAFA    M    32    Independent

17    KARTIK MAHATO    M    44    Independent

18    JAI PRAKASH SINGH    M    39    Independent

19    JAIRAM SINGH    M    31    Independent

20    JITENDRA KUMAR SINGH    M    36    Independent

21    PHUL CHAND MAHATO    M    40    Independent

22    BAMA PADA BAURI    M    35    Independent

23    MADHUSUDAN RAJHANS    M    44    Independent

24    MANILAL MAHATO    M    27    Independent

25    MANOJ GANDHI    M    29    Independent

26    MANOJ PANDEY    M    29    Independent

27    MUNSI HEMBRAM    M    56    Independent

28    RAVI RANJAN SINHA    M    34    Independent

29    SHANKAR RAWANI    M    42    Independent

30    SALIM KHAN    M    42    Independent

31    SADHUSHARAN GOPE    M    46    Independent

32    SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH    M    57    Independent

S27    8    JH    RANCHI    23-Apr-09    1    RAJENDRA SINGH MUNDA    M    74    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    RAM TAHAL CHAUDHARY    M    66    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    MD. SARFUDDIN    M    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SUBODH KANT SAHAY    M    57    Indian National Congress

5    AKHTAR ANSARI    M    53    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

6    AFSAR EMAM    M    48    Jharkhand PeopleÂ’S Party

7    MD. AJAD ANSARI    M    47    National Lokhind Party

8    JIPALAL SINGH MUNDA    M    45    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

9    DAYANAND GUPTA    M    39    Jharkhand Vikas Dal

10    SURENDRA KUMAR SUMAN    M    36    Samata Party

11    ANJANI PANDEY    M    51    Independent

12    AGAM LAL MAHTO    M    34    Independent

13    AFTAB ALAM    M    42    Independent

14    ARTI BEHRA    F    32    Independent

15    UPENDRA PD. SRIVASTAVA    M    65    Independent

16    KESHAV NARAYAN BHAGAT    M    49    Independent

17    KAILASH PAHAN    M    40    Independent

18    JANARDAN TIWARI    M    42    Independent

19    JITENDRA MAHTO    M    27    Independent

20    DEVENDRA THAKUR    M    48    Independent

21    BIRSA HEMBRAM    M    31    Independent

22    RANJEET MAHTO    M    49    Independent

23    RAMPODO MAHTO    M    37    Independent

24    ROSHAN LAL MAHTO    M    28    Independent

25    ROSAN PRASAD    M    25    Independent

26    LAL BABA MASANI    M    65    Independent

S27    9    JH    JAMSHEDPUR    23-Apr-09    1    AJEET KUMAR    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    ARJUN MUNDA    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SUMAN MAHTO    F    44    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

4    ARVIND KUMAR SINGH    M    47    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

5    ASHOK TRIPATHI    M    44    Samajwadi Party

6    KINKAR GOUR    M    41    Rashtravadi Aarthik Swatantrata Dal

7    KRISHN MURARI MISHRA    M    47    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

8    PARIKSHIT MAHATO    M    43    Lok Jan Shakti Party

9    MUBIN KHAN    M    50    Bahujan Shakty

10    RAJ KAPOOR MAHATO    M    35    Jharkhand Vikas Dal

11    SHARAT MAHATO    M    36    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

12    SHAILENDRA MAHTO    M    55    All Jharkhand Students Union

13    SHYAM NARAYAN SINGH    M    50    All India Trinamool Congress

14    SANDIP PAUL    M    43    Jharkhand Party

15    DR. SUNARAM HANSDA    M    41    Jharkhand Disom Party

16    HEMANT SINGH    M    37    Amra Bangalee

17    KRISHNA PRASAD    M    40    Independent

18    JOSAI MARDI    M    31    Independent

19    DILIP KALINDI    M    44    Independent

20    DILIP TUDU    M    41    Independent

21    PARAS NATH PRASAD    M    56    Independent

22    RAKESH KUMAR    M    30    Independent

23    RAJIV CHANDRA MAHATO    M    27    Independent

24    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD GUPTA    M    49    Independent

25    VICTOR A. LAZARUS    M    60    Independent

26    SITARAM TUDU    M    61    Independent

S27    10    JH    SINGHBHUM    23-Apr-09    1    BARKUWAR GAGRAI    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BAGUN SUMBRUI    M    82    Indian National Congress

3    HIKIM CHANDRA TUDU    M    39    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    PREM SINGH MUNDRI    M    40    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

5    MANGAL SINGH BOBONGA    M    42    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

6    SUKH RAM JONKO    M    62    Jharkhand Disom Party

7    ASHOK KUMAR TIU    M    47    Independent

8    MADHU KORA    M    38    Independent

9    HIKIM SOREN    M    46    Independent

S04    11    BR    KATIHAR    30-Apr-09    1    NIKHIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY    M    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    MUNNI DEVI    F    35    Independent

3    SHAH TARIQ ANWAR    M    58    Nationalist Congress Party

4    MADAN MOHAN NISHAD    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    MANOJ PARASAR    M    44    Jan Samanta Party

6    PHOOLO DEVI    F    40    Independent

7    AHMAD ASHFAQUE KARIM    M    53    Lok Jan Shakti Party

8    SUNIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY    M    39    Independent

9    MOHAMMAD HAMID MUBARAK    M    33    Independent

10    SHOBHA DEVI    F    40    Independent

11    MAHBOOB ALAM    M    52    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

12    HIMRAJ SINGH    M    49    Independent

13    RAJESH GURNANI    M    38    Loktantrik Samata Dal

14    RAJGIRI SINGH    M    53    Independent

15    OM PRAKASH PODDAR    M    38    Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

16    MANENDRA KUMAR    M    38    Independent

17    BHOLA NATH KEWAT    M    60    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

18    CHANDU MURMU    M    43    Jharkhand Disom Party

19    SHIV PUJAN PASWAN    M    31    Buddhiviveki Vikas Party

20    SHAMBHU ROY    M    38    Independent

21    NITESH KUMAR CHOUDHARY    M    31    Independent

22    BABU LAL MARANDI    M    33    Independent

23    KISHAN LAL AGRAWAL    M    32    Independent

S04    13    BR    MADHEPURA    30-Apr-09    1    VINOD KUMAR JHA    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    OM PRAKASH NARAYAN    M    44    Communist Party of India

3    TARA NAND SADA    M    52    Indian National Congress

4    PROF RAVINDRA CHARAN YADAV    M    49    Rashtriya Janata Dal

5    SHARAD YADAV    M    61    Janata Dal (United)

6    RAJO SAH    M    30    Loktantrik Samata Dal

7    DHANOJ KUMAR    M    26    Rashtravadi Janata Party

8    RAVINDRA KUMAR    M    33    Rashtra Sewa Dal

9    NIRMAL KUMAR SINGH    M    66    Samata Party

10    SAKAR SURESH YADAV    M    32    Independent

11    KISHOR KUMAR    M    33    Independent

12    BALWANT GADHWAL    M    29    Independent

13    TIRO SHARMA    M    59    Independent

14    KARPOORI RISHIDEO    M    29    Independent

15    AMIT ACHARYA    M    26    Independent

16    PRASANNA KUMAR    M    54    Independent

17    DHRUWA KUMAR    M    43    Independent

18    MAHADEV YADAV    M    55    Independent

19    PARMESHWARI PRASAD NIRALA    M    68    Independent

S04    25    BR    KHAGARIA    30-Apr-09    1    SATYA NARAYAN SINGH    M    66    Communist Party of India

2    PRADUMAN KUMAR    M    31    Independent

3    DINESHCHANDRA YADAV    M    50    Janata Dal (United)

4    HARI NANDAN SINGH    M    61    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

5    GULABRAJ    M    31    Independent

6    ASARFI PRASAD MEHTA    M    63    Bahujan Samaj Party

7    SIKANDAR PRASAD SHARMA    M    56    Independent

8    SANGRAM KUMAR    M    27    Independent

9    SURESH PODDAR    M    47    Bharatiya Jantantrik Janta Dal

10    SANJAY YADAV    M    41    Independent

11    NEHA CHAUHAN    F    27    Independent

12    MANJU KUMARI    F    31    Rashtra Sewa Dal

13    CHAUDHRY MEHBOOB ALI KAISER    M    42    Indian National Congress

14    BHARAT KUMAR YADAV    M    52    Kosi Vikas Party

15    RAM NANDAN YADAV    M    45    Independent

16    NAYEEMUDDIN4    M    42    Independent

17    LAL BAHADUR HIMALAYA    M    38    Independent

18    BABULU PASWAN    M    35    Navbharat Nirman Party

19    PAWAN KUMAR “SUMAN”    M    33    Independent

20    RAVINDRA KU. RANA    M    62    Rashtriya Janata Dal

S04    27    BR    BANKA    30-Apr-09    1    GRIDHARI YADAV    M    44    Indian National Congress

2    JAI PRAKASH NARAYAN YADAV    M    55    Rashtriya Janata Dal

3    DAMODAR RAWAT    M    47    Janata Dal (United)

4    MUKESH KUMAR SINGH    M    45    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    SANJAY KUMAR    M    45    Communist Party of India

6    ANIL KUMAR ALIAS ANIL GUPTA    M    40    Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik)

7    AMRESHWAR KUMAR    M    29    Jago Party

8    ARBIND KUMAR SAH    M    42    Rashtriya Pragati Party

9    KEDAR PRASAD SINGH    M    61    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

10    MAHABUB ALAM ANSARI    M    50    Bharatiya Momin Front

11    RAJENDRA PANDIT NETAJI    M    57    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Ulgulan)

S06    1    GJ    KACHCHH    30-Apr-09    1    JAT POONAMBEN VELJIBHAI    F    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    DANICHA VALJIBHAI PUNAMCHANDRA    M    54    Indian National Congress

3    NAMORI MOHANBHAI LADHABHAI    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    CHAUHAN MOTILAL DEVJIBHA    M    49    Lokpriya Samaj Party

5    DR. TINA MAGANBHAI PARMAR    F    26    Bharatiya Natiional Janta Dal

6    DUNGARIYA BHARMALBHAI NARANBHAI    M    45    Samajwadi Party

7    PARMAR MUKESHBHAI MANDANBHAI    M    44    Indian Justice Party

8    BADIYA RAMESH GANGJI    M    44    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

9    KANJI ABHABHAI MAHESHWARI    M    55    Independent

10    GARVA ASMAL THAKARSHI    M    44    Independent

11    GOVIND JIVABHAI DAFADA    M    50    Independent

12    BADIA GANGJI FAKIRA    M    55    Independent

13    MAHESHWARI GANGJI DAYABHAI    M    55    Independent

14    MAHESHWARI DHANJIBHAI KARSHANBHAI    M    51    Independent

15    MUNSHI BHURALAL KHIMJIBHAI    M    40    Independent

16    MANGALIYA LILBAI JIVANBHAI    F    42    Independent

17    VANZARA HIRABEN DALPATBHAI    F    35    Independent

18    SARESA NANJI BHANJIBHAI    M    42    Independent

S06    2    GJ    BANASKANTHA    30-Apr-09    1    GADHVI MUKESHKUMAR BHERAVDANJI    M    47    Indian National Congress

2    CHETANBHAI KALABHAI SOLANKI    M    28    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    CHAUDHARI HARIBHAI PARTHIBHAI    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    AMRUTBHAI LAKHUBHAI PATEL(FOSI)    M    49    Mahagujarat Janta Party

5    KATARIYA HASMUKHBHAI RAVJIBHAI    M    34    Akhand Bharti

6    NAGORI JHUBERKHAN LIYAKATKHAN    M    33    Adarsh Lok Dal

7    LODHA ISHVARBHAI MAHADEVBHAI    M    57    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

8    SAVJIBHAI PATHUBHAI RAJGOR    M    34    Vishva Hindustani Sangathan

9    KARNAVAT YOGESHKUMAR BHIKHABHAI    M    31    Independent

10    PATEL NAGJIBHAI PRAGJIBHAI    M    43    Independent

11    PARSANI MAHMAD SIKANDAR JALALBHAI    M    30    Independent

12    PUROHIT ASHOKBHAI CHHAGANBHAI    M    32    Independent

13    PANSAL KALABHAI PUNMABHAI    M    49    Independent

14    MAJIRANA BHOPAJI AASHAJI    M    68    Independent

15    MALI JAGDISHKUMAR HASTAJI    M    30    Independent

16    ROOTHAR LEBUJI PARBATJI    M    32    Independent

17    SHARDABEN BHIKHABHAI PARMAR    F    45    Independent

18    SIPAI AAIYUBBHAI IBRAHIMBHAI    M    35    Independent

19    SHRIMALI ASHOKBHAI BALCHANDBHAI    M    40    Independent

S06    3    GJ    PATAN    30-Apr-09    1    KHOKHAR MAHEBOOBKHAN RAHEMATKHAN    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    JAGDISH THAKOR    M    51    Indian National Congress

3    BAROT SANJAYBHAI MAGANBHAI    M    50    Nationalist Congress Party

4    RATHOD BHAVSINHBHAI DAHYABHAI    M    68    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    PATAVAT MAHAMMADBHAI SHARIFBHAI    M    50    Independent

6    PATEL NARANBHAI PRAGDASBHAI    M    55    Mahagujarat Janta Party

7    KANUBHAI BHURABHAI MAHESHVARI    M    60    Independent

8    CHAUDHARY KIRTIKUMAR JESANGBHAI    M    30    Independent

9    CHAUDHARY MANSINHBHAI MANABHAI    M    32    Independent

10    JUDAL GANESHBHAI MEGHRAJBHAI    M    35    Independent

11    THAKOR NATUJI HALAJI    M    48    Independent

12    THAKOR BHUPATSINH KANTIJI    M    29    Independent

13    DIVAN YASIN AHMAD MAHAMADSHAH    M    47    Independent

14    PATEL KALPESHBHAI SHANKARLAL    M    27    Independent

15    PATEL KIRITKUMAR CHIMANLAL    M    38    Independent

16    PATEL DILIPKUMAR LILACHAND    M    31    Independent

17    PATEL MANORBHAI VIRAMDAS    M    68    Independent

18    PATEL RAMESHBHAI GOVINDBHAI    M    45    Independent

19    BRAHMKSHATRIYA NIRUPABEN NATVARLAL    F    35    Independent

20    BRAHMKSHATRIYA BHAGVATIBEN KHETSINH    F    55    Independent

21    RABARI BABUBHAI LALLUBHAI    M    56    Independent

22    RAJPUT JAGATSINH SAMANTSANG    M    29    Independent

23    RAVAL BHURABHAI MOTIBHAI    M    45    Independent

24    VAGHELA SHIVUBHA RAMSING    M    53    Independent

25    SUNSARA AAMINBHAI USMANBHAI    M    35    Independent

S06    9    GJ    SURENDRANAGAR    30-Apr-09    1    BHATIYA NARANBHAI KEHARBHAI    M    45    Independent

2    VAGHELA SATUBHA KANUBHA    M    75    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

3    BHARATBHAI RAMNIKLAL MAKWANA    M    43    Independent

4    KOLI PATEL SOMABHAI    M    68    Indian National Congress

5    DEVJIBHAI GOVINDBHAI FATEPARA    M    51    Indian National Congress

6    MER LALJIBHAI CHATURBHAI    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

7    SONI PRAKASHBHAI GOVINDBHAI    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

8    KORDIA ALTAFBHAI VALIBHAI    M    25    Independent

9    PATEL MOHANBHAI DAHYABHAI    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

10    TUNDIYA PREMJIBHAI VIRJIBHAI    M    53    Independent

11    NAYAKPRA HITSH BHAGVANGIBHAI    M    40    Independent

12    DABHI MOHANBHAI TULSHIBHAI    M    63    Independent

13    DERVALIA MEDHABHAI KALABHAI    M    51    Independent

14    PATEL KHEMABHAI ISHVARBHAI    M    43    Independent

15    RABA HARSURBHAI RAMBHAI    M    63    Independent

16    JADAV BHAGWANBHAI MATHURBHAI    M    56    Independent

17    UKABHAI AMARABHAI MAKWANA    M    40    Independent

18    JAGRUTIBEN BABULAL GADA (SHAH)    F    39    Mahagujarat Janta Party

19    PATADIYA KHIMJIBHAI HARAJIVANBHAI    M    52    Kranti Kari Jai Hind Sena

20    SOLANKI KARSHANBHAI JIVABHAI    M    38    Independent

21    PATEL ASHOKKUMAR CHIMANLAL    M    54    Independent

22    DHAVANIYA BACHUBHAI CHHAGANBHAI    M    58    Lokpriya Samaj Party

23    CHAVDA ASHOKBHAI KARSHANBHAI    M    33    Bahujan Samaj Party

24    SAVUKIYA LALJIBHAI MOHANLAL    M    50    Independent

25    MER MAVJIBHAI KUKABHAI    M    63    Independent

S06    10    GJ    RAJKOT    30-Apr-09    1    MULTANI SUBHANBHAI POPATBHAI    M    52    Independent

2    GOKALBHAI KHODABHAI PARMAR    M    53    Lokpriya Samaj Party

3    KIRANKUMAR VALJIBHAI BHALODIA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    DHANSUKHBHAI CHUNIBHAI BHANDERI    M    46    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    DR. ZAKIRHUSEN MATHAKIYA    M    38    Samajwadi Party

6    ARVINDBHAI JADAVJIBHAI RATHOD    M    42    Independent

7    KUBAVAT BABUDAS CHHAGANDAS    M    63    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

8    PRAVINBHAI MEGHJIBHAI DENGADA    M    46    Independent

9    KUVARJIBHAI MOHANBHAI BAVALIA    M    54    Indian National Congress

10    JOSHI SUDHIRBHAI REVASHANKAR    M    67    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

11    JADEJA SATUBHA AMARSANG    M    41    National Secular Party

12    JADEJA NATUBHA AMARSANG    M    39    National Secular Party

13    DHEDHI DALEECHANDBHAI LIRABHAI    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

14    KHIMSURIYA BHANUBHAI RAMJIBHAI    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

15    NARENDRASINH TAPUBHA JADEJA    M    35    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

16    HIRABHAI GORDHANBHAI CHANGELA    M    58    Independent

17    HARSODA MAHESH HIRABHAI    M    25    Independent

18    BHIKHABHAI KURJIBHAI SADADIYA    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

19    GAR PRAKASH KHIMJIBHAI    M    40    Independent

20    DUDHATRA MUKUNDBHAI GOVINDBHAI    M    41    Independent

21    SAROLA GEETABEN MANJIBHAI    F    32    Independent

22    RABARI MOMAIYABHAI ALABHAI    M    60    Independent

23    AJITSINH HARISINH JADEJA    M    55    Independent

24    DR.RAJESHKUMAR SHANTIBHIA MANKADIA    M    35    Independent

25    RAJGURU INDRANIL SANJAYBHAI    M    43    Indian National Congress

26    NAYANBHI HASHMUKHBHAI UPADHYAY    M    42    Independent

27    KESHUBHAI DHANJIBHAI VEKARIYA    M    30    Independent

28    MATHAKIA USMAN HASAN    M    56    Independent

29    BABUBHAI DEVJIBHAI GHAVA    M    42    Lok Jan Shakti Party

30    PATADIA VINODBHAI KHODABHAI    M    45    Independent

31    CHAVDA LAKHMANBHAI DEVJIBHAI    M    49    Republican Party of India

32    VEKARIYA PRAGJIBHAI NATHUBHAI    M    60    Independent

33    BHIKHABHAI KURJIBHAI SADADIA    M    57    Independent

34    VEKARIA ALPESHBHAI KESHUBHAI    M    32    Mahagujarat Janta Party

35    JASVANTBHAI RANCHHODBHAI SABHAYA    M    38    Samajwadi Party

36    PIPALIA BHARATBHAI SAVJIBHAI    M    52    Mahagujarat Janta Party

37    GORI BHARTIBEN MAHENDRABHAI    F    26    Independent

S06    13    GJ    JUNAGADH    30-Apr-09    1    BARAD JASHUBHAI DHANABHAI    M    54    Indian National Congress

2    BHUVA KAMLESHBHAI LALJIBHAI    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    SOLANKI DINUBHAI BOGHABHAI    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    AKHED MAHESHBHAI VALLABHBHAI    M    48    Indian Justice Party

5    KUNJADIYA VALLABHBHAI RAMBHAI    M    46    Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

6    CHANDULAL BHANUBHAI DHADUK    M    42    Mahagujarat Janta Party

7    DANGAR BRIJESH RAMBHAI    M    31    Rashtrawadi Sena

S06    15    GJ    BHAVNAGAR    30-Apr-09    1    GOHILMAHAVIRSINHBHAGIRATHSINH    M    52    Indian National Congress

2    VAGHANI PRAKSHBHAI ARJANBHAI    M    38    Indian National Congress

3    RANA RAJENDRASINH GHANSHYAMSINH    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    MANDAVIA MANSUKHBHAI LAXMANBHAI    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    BORICHA VALJIBHAI BAGHABHAI    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    REVAR MANSUKHBHAI KHODIDASBHAI    M    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

7    ZADAFIA GORDHANBHAI PRAGJIBHAI    M    54    Mahagujarat Janta Party

8    ZADAFIA GORDHANBHAI PRAGJIBHAI    M    54    Mahagujarat Janta Party

9    ZADAFIA GORDHANBHAI PRAGJIBHAI    M    54    Mahagujarat Janta Party

10    YADAV TULSHIBHAI RAMJIBHAI    M    67    Samajwadi Party

11    YADAV TULSHIBHAI RAMJIBHAI    M    67    Samajwadi Party

12    YADAV TULSHIBHAI RAMJIBHAI    M    67    Samajwadi Party

13    SAPARIA DINESHBHAI NANUBHAI    M    45    Lokpriya Samaj Party

14    SAPARIA DINESHBHAI NANUBHAI    M    45    Lokpriya Samaj Party

15    SAPARIA DINESHBHAI NANUBHAI    M    45    Lokpriya Samaj Party

16    PANDYA ATULBHAI HARSHADRAI    M    46    Bharatiya Natiional Janta Dal

17    PANDYA ATULBHAI HARSHADRAI    M    46    Bharatiya Natiional Janta Dal

18    PANDYA ATULBHAI HARSHADRAI    M    46    Bharatiya Natiional Janta Dal

19    GOHIL NANAJIBHAI MADHABHAI    M    38    Republican Party of India (A)

20    GOHIL NANAJIBHAI MADHABHAI    M    38    Republican Party of India (A)

21    CHAUHAN PREMJIBHAI SHAMJIBHAI    M    42    Akhil Bharatiya Congress Dal (Ambedkar)

22    MAKWANA HARINBHAI RAMNIKLAL    M    37    Independent

23    MAKWANA HARINBHAI RAMNIKLAL    M    37    Independent

24    MAKWANA HARINBHAI RAMNIKLAL    M    37    Independent

25    GOHIL KISHORSINH BALAVANTSINH    M    54    Independent

26    GOHIL KISHORSINH BALAVANTSINH    M    54    Independent

27    GOHIL KISHORSINH BALAVANTSINH    M    54    Independent

28    KATARIA ZINABHAI NAGAJIBHAI    M    49    Independent

29    KATARIA ZINABHAI NAGAJIBHAI    M    49    Independent

30    KATARIA ZINABHAI NAGAJIBHAI    M    49    Independent

31    PUNANI MUKESHBHI MAGANBHAI    M    43    Independent

32    PUNANI MUKESHBHI MAGANBHAI    M    43    Independent

33    PUNANI MUKESHBHI MAGANBHAI    M    43    Independent

34    CHAUHAN DHIRUBHAI KARSHANBHAI    M    39    Independent

35    CHAUHAN DHIRUBHAI KARSHANBHAI    M    39    Independent

36    CHAUHAN DHIRUBHAI KARSHANBHAI    M    39    Independent

37    SONANI NARESHBHAI NANAJIBHAI    M    36    Independent

38    SONANI NARESHBHAI NANAJIBHAI    M    36    Independent

39    SONANI NARESHBHAI NANAJIBHAI    M    36    Independent

40    CHUDASAMA MEPABHAI MAVJIBHAI    M    42    Independent

41    CHUDASAMA MEPABHAI MAVJIBHAI    M    42    Independent

42    CHUDASAMA MEPABHAI MAVJIBHAI    M    42    Independent

43    SOLANKI MAHAMADRAFIKBHAI IBRAHIMBHAI    M    50    Independent

44    SOLANKI MAHAMADRAFIKBHAI IBRAHIMBHAI    M    50    Independent

45    SOLANKI MAHAMADRAFIKBHAI IBRAHIMBHAI    M    50    Independent

46    DABHI DEVJIBHAI MEGHABHAI    M    29    Independent

47    DABHI DEVJIBHAI MEGHABHAI    M    29    Independent

48    DABHI DEVJIBHAI MEGHABHAI    M    29    Independent

49    PATEL KALPESHBHAI ASHOKBHAI    M    30    Independent

50    PATEL KALPESHBHAI ASHOKBHAI    M    30    Independent

51    PATEL KALPESHBHAI ASHOKBHAI    M    30    Independent

S06    18    GJ    PANCHMAHAL    30-Apr-09    1    MANSURI MUKHTYAR MOHAMAD    M    49    Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

2    VAGHELA SHANKERSINH LAXMANSINH    M    68    Indian National Congress

3    PATEL PROSOTTAMBHAI MANGALBHAI    M    53    Indian National Congress

4    BAROT PRAKASHKUMAR MANEKLAL    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    CHAUHAN PRABHATSINH PRATAPSINH    M    67    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    MALIVAD KALUBHAI HIRABHAI    M    58    Bharatiya Janata Party

7    SHAIKH KALIM A.LATIF    M    42    Lok Jan Shakti Party

8    SHUKLA ARVINDKUMAR JYANTILAL    M    66    Bahujan Samaj Party

9    BHABHOR RASILABEN SAMSUBHAI    F    26    Indian Justice Party

S06    19    GJ    DAHOD    30-Apr-09    1    KATARA SINGJIBHAI JALJIBHAI    M    62    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    KALARA RAMSINGBHAI NANJIBHAI    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    DAMOR SOMJIBHAI PUNJABHAI    M    70    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    TAVIYAD DR. PRABHABEN KISHORSINH    F    54    Indian National Congress

5    MEDA KALSINGBHAI TAJSINHBHAI    M    57    Nationalist Congress Party

6    PARMAR DINESHBHAI NAGJIBHAI    M    28    Indian Justice Party

7    BARIYA NAVALSINGBHAI MADIABHAI    M    39    Mahagujarat Janta Party

8    MUNIA KAMALSINH CHHAGANBHAI    M    61    Samajwadi Party

S06    20    GJ    VADODARA    30-Apr-09    1    GAEKWAD SATYAJITSINH DULIPSINH    M    46    Indian National Congress

2    PUROHIT VINAYKUMAR RAMANBHAI    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BALKRISHNA KHANDERAO SHUKLA    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    GIRISHBHAI MADHAVLAL BHAVSAR    M    42    Independent

5    THAVARDAS AMULRAI CHOITHANI    M    63    Independent

6    DASGUPTA TAPANBHAI SHANTIMAY    M    45    Independent

7    PARMAR BHARTIBEN KISHORCHANDRA    F    36    Independent

8    MALEK MAHEBUBBHAI RAHIMBHAI    M    42    Independent

9    VASAVA HARILAL SHANABHAI    M    46    Independent

S06    21    GJ    CHHOTA UDAIPUR    30-Apr-09    1    RATHWA RAMSINGBHAI PATALBHAI    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    RATHWA NARANBHAI JEMLABHAI    M    55    Indian National Congress

3    BHIL PRAKASHBHAI SOMABHAI    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    RATHWA SATISHBHAI RAMANBHAI    M    32    Janata Dal (United)

5    VASAVA(BHIL) VITTHALBHAI VENIBHAI    M    63    Independent

S06    22    GJ    BHARUCH    30-Apr-09    1    PATEL MEHRUNNISHA VALLIBHAI    F    40    Lok Jan Shakti Party

2    PATHAN JAHANGIRKHA AHEMADKHA    M    69    Indian National Congress

3    PATHAN JAHANGIRKHA AHEMADKHA    M    69    Indian National Congress

4    MANSUKHBHAI DHANJIBHAI VASAVA    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    UGHARATDAR UMARJI AHMED    M    64    Indian National Congress

6    UGHARATDAR UMARJI AHMED    M    64    Indian National Congress

7    UGHARATDAR UMARJI AHMED    M    64    Indian National Congress

8    UGHARATDAR UMARJI AHMED    M    64    Indian National Congress

9    MANSUKHBHAI DHANJIBHAI VASAVA    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

10    MANSUKHBHAI DHANJIBHAI VASAVA    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

11    MORI CHHATRASINH PUJABHAI    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

12    MORI CHHATRASINH PUJABHAI    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

13    MORI CHHATRASINH PUJABHAI    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

14    VASAVA SURESHBHAI GORDHANBHAI    M    40    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

15    VASAVA DILIPKUMAR GULSINGBHAI    M    32    Independent

16    PANDEY SANATKUMAR RAJARAMBHAI    M    32    Bahujan Samaj Party

17    BASHIRBHAI MAHAMEDBHAI FOJDAR    M    44    Independent

18    VASAVA CHHOTUBHAI AMARSINHBHAI    M    62    Janata Dal (United)

19    BHAGAT ANILKUMAR CHHITUBHAI    M    44    Janata Dal (United)

20    LAD MAHIPATBHAI MAGANBHAI    M    52    Independent

21    PATEL THAKORBHAI CHANDULAL    M    58    Independent

22    HEMANTKUMAR JERAMBHAI GOHIL    M    31    Independent

23    MANGROLA KANAKSINH MOHANSINH    M    58    Samajwadi Party

24    MANGROLA VIKRAMSINH KANAKSINH    M    28    Samajwadi Party

25    PATEL NARESHKUMAR BHAGVANBHAI    M    48    Mahagujarat Janta Party

26    PATEL NARESHKUMAR BHAGVANBHAI    M    48    Mahagujarat Janta Party

27    NARENDRASINH RANDHIRSINH VASHI    M    37    Loktantrik Samajwadi Party

28    PARMAR BALVANTSINH VIJAYSINH    M    53    Nationalist Congress Party

29    PATHAN NISHARKHAN ZAHIRKHAN    M    38    Independent

30    LAKDAWALA SHAKIL AHMED    M    43    Independent

31    PATEL USMANBHAI GULAMBHAI    M    26    Independent

S06    25    GJ    NAVSARI    30-Apr-09    1    NAIK YOGESHKUMAR THAKORBHAI    M    54    Nationalist Congress Party

2    C. R. PATIL    M    54    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RAJPUT DHANSUKHABHAI BHAGVATIPRASAD    M    51    Indian National Congress

4    SHAILESHBHAI BISHESWAR SHRIVASTAV    M    37    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    AMULKUMAR DHIRUBHAI DESAI    M    46    Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh

6    AAZADKUMAR CHATURBHAI PATEL    M    33    Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Party

7    YADAV GANGAPRASAD LALANBHAI    M    55    Mahagujarat Janta Party

8    KANUBHAI DEVJIBHAI SUKHADIA    M    47    Independent

9    JASHAVANTBHAI DALPATBHAI PANCHAL    M    48    Independent

10    TARUNBHAI CHAMPAKBHAI PATEL    M    39    Independent

11    PATEL PRAVINCHANDRA MANILAL    M    52    Independent

12    PRAKASH MANHAR SHAH    M    45    Independent

13    PRAVINBHAI RANGILDAS KAPASIYAWALA    M    71    Independent

14    YADAV RAJENDRAKUMAR RAMRAJ    M    35    Independent

15    RATHOD GOVINDBHAI LAXMANBHAI    M    52    Independent

16    VARANKAR KAMALBEN KASHIRAM    F    50    Independent

17    SHATRUDHANDAS OMKARDAS SUGAT (BAIRAGI)    M    78    Independent

18    SATYAJIT JAYANTILAL SHETH    M    41    Independent

S06    26    GJ    VALSAD    30-Apr-09    1    DHIRUBHAI CHHAGANBHAI PATEL    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    NARESHBHAI MAGANBHAI PATEL    M    41    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    LAXMANBHAI CHHAGANBHAI VARLI    M    51    Independent

4    BHOYE NAYNESHBHAI MADHUBHAI    M    31    Samajwadi Party

5    GAVLI CHHAGANBHAI PILUBHAI    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    PATEL PANKAJKUMAR PRABHUBHAI    M    40    Aadivasi Sena Party

7    KISHANBHAI VESTABHAI PATEL    M    46    Indian National Congress

8    JEETUBHAI HARJIBHAI CHAUDHARI    M    45    Indian National Congress

9    RAMBHAI KOYABHAI PATEL    M    59    Independent

S10    3    KA    BAGALKOT    30-Apr-09    1    SHANKAR TELI    M    33    Independent

2    MANOHAR H.AYYANNAVAR    M    51    Independent

3    MALAKAJAPPANAVAR BASAYYA    M    49    Janata Dal (Secular)

4    KALLAPPA REVANASIDDAPPA KADECHUR    M    43    Independent

5    JAGADISH TIMMANAGOUDA PATIL    M    59    Indian National Congress

6    BASAVARAJ KALAKAPPA PUJAR    M    42    Nationalist Congress Party

7    HULLANAGOUDA CHANDANAGOUDA PATIL    M    70    Independent

8    GADDIGOUDAR PARVATGOUDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

9    PATIL JAGADISH    M    59    Indian National Congress

10    DANAPPA MALLAPPA ASANGI    M    38    Independent

11    CHINCHOLI SANTOSHKUMAR SAHEBGOUDA    M    25    Independent

12    GADADANNAVAR RAMANNA BHIMAPPA    M    47    Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha

13    CHANDRASHEKHAR HANAMANT BANDIWADDAR    M    29    Akhil Bharatiya Manav Seva Dal

14    PARASHURAM JALAGAR    M    48    Pyramid Party of India

15    PARASHURAM JALAGAR    M    48    Janata Dal (Secular)

16    KRISHNAGOUDA RANGANAGOUDA PATIL    M    56    Independent

17    R. RAMESH BABU    M    38    Janata Dal (Secular)

18    R.RAMESH BABU    M    38    Janata Dal (Secular)

19    BADASHA RAJESAB MUJAWAR    M    40    Independent

20    KRISHNAGOUDA RANGANAGOUDA PATIL    M    56    Independent

21    PATIL VIJAYKUMAR    M    46    Janata Dal (Secular)

22    PANDIT BODALI    M    33    Independent

23    GADADANNAVAR RAMANNA BHIMAPPA    M    47    Independent

24    GADADANNAVAR RAMANNA BHIMAPPA    M    47    Independent

25    R.RAMESH BABU    M    38    Independent

26    R.RAMESH BABU    M    38    Independent

27    RENUKARADHYA HIREMATH    M    29    Independent

28    SANNAGOUDAR GURURAJ SATYAPPAGOUDA    M    27    Independent

29    PAKALI FAROOQ    M    33    Bahujan Samaj Party

30    SINDHUR GURUBASAVARYA    M    48    Janata Dal (Secular)

31    NAZIR DUNDASI    M    31    Independent

32    SANGMESH .G. BHAVIKATTI    M    29    Independent

S10    10    KA    HAVERI    30-Apr-09    1    RAMACHANDRAPPA GUDDAPPA BILLAL    M    59    Independent

2    CHANDRAGOUDA HANUMANTA GOUDA PATIL    M    29    Independent

3    FAKKIRESH SHAMBHU BIJAPUR    M    39    Independent

4    SHIVAKUMAR CHANNABASAPPA UDASI    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    BASAVARAJ SHANKRAPPA DESAI    M    38    Independent

6    JAGADEESH YANKAPPA DODDAMANI    M    35    Independent

7    RAJESAB RAHAMANSAB SIDNEKOPPA    M    65    Independent

8    PRABHU K PATIL    M    31    Janata Dal (United)

9    JAVALI ASHOKAPPA MALLAPPA    M    43    Nationalist Congress Party

10    RAMACHANDRASA SAHASRARJUNSA HABIB    M    26    Independent

11    IGAL DILLPPA KARIYAPPA    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

12    KRISHNAJI RAGHAVENDRARAO OMKAR    M    32    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

13    MULLANAVAR ABDULRAJAK MODINSAB    M    49    Bahujan Samaj Party

14    MEHABUB KUTUBSAB NADAF    M    47    Independent

15    SALEEM AHAMAD    M    45    Indian National Congress

16    PATIL SHIVAKUMARGOUDA    M    42    Janata Dal (Secular)

17    MANJUNATH KALAVEERAPPA PANCHANAN    M    38    Independent

18    DESAI MALLIKARJUN BASAPPA    M    61    Independent

19    SALEEM AKBAR NAIK    M    30    Independent

20    DAYANAND RAMACHANDRA RATHOD    M    35    Independent

21    ALLABAX TIMMAPUR    M    34    Independent

22    BADIGER KOTESHWAR    M    28    Independent

23    VASTRAD VEERBHADRAYYA KALAKAYYA    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

S10    11    KA    DHARWAD    30-Apr-09    1    PRALHAD JOSHI    M    46    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    CHANNABASAPPA.S.KUSUGAL    M    48    Independent

3    RAJANNA.P.KADDLYANAVARAMATH    M    36    Independent

4    KUNNUR MANJUNATH CHANNAPPA    M    55    Indian National Congress

5    BAGWAN NASIR PAPULSAB    M    51    Janata Dal (Secular)

6    RAMACHANDRA KALINGAPPA MAHAR    M    59    Independent

7    TALAKALLAMATH MAHESH GURUPADAYYA    M    52    Nationalist Congress Party

8    ASHOK BADDI    M    38    Independent

9    KURUBAR BEERAPPA    M    38    Independent

10    BABUSAB KASHEEMNAVAR    M    61    Janata Dal (Secular)

11    PATIL GURUPADAGOUDA    M    62    Independent

12    JANUMALA BASKAR    M    39    Independent

13    BASANGOUDA HANSI    M    63    Independent

14    PANCH MAHALDAR    M    38    Independent

15    NIRJAN HANMANTSA    M    40    Janata Dal (United)

16    SHANKRAPPA YADAVANNAVAR    M    50    Independent

17    SONDUR RAGHAVENDRA SRINIVAS    M    46    Janata Dal (Secular)

18    ALLISAB SANDIMANI    M    30    Independent

19    KILLADAR ALLABAKSH    M    52    Nationalist Congress Party

20    TAKAPPA KALAL    M    59    Independent

21    MULLA KASHIMASAB    M    57    Bahujan Samaj Party

22    PREMANATH KASHAPPA CHIKKTUMBAL    M    31    Bahujan Samaj Party

23    MARUTI RAMAPPA HANASI    M    40    Independent

24    DADAPEER KOPPAL    M    50    Ambedkar National Congress

25    KALLIMANI IBRAHIM    M    32    Independent

26    IMAMHUSEN KUNDAGOL    M    46    Independent

27    GADAGKAR MOHAMMAD YOOSUF    M    56    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

28    SHANKRAPPA JINNAKAR    M    63    Independent

29    HULLI MOHAMMEDALI    M    67    Independent

30    JAMIRAHMEDKHAN    M    27    Independent

31    MOHAMMED ISMAIL BHADRAPUR    M    28    Independent

32    BIJAPUR JALALSAHEB    M    78    Independent

33    BALANNAVAR BASAVARAJ    M    30    Independent

34    KASHEEMNAVAR BABUSAB    M    61    Independent

35    PATIL GURUPADAGOUDA    M    62    Janata Dal (Secular)

S10    13    KA    DAVANAGERE    30-Apr-09    1    RAMESH HULI    M    35    Independent

2    MUJEEB PATEL M.H.K.    M    25    Independent

3    DR. SRIDHARA UDUPA    M    56    Independent

4    SUBHAN KHAN    M    45    Independent

5    SIDDESWARA G.M.    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    DR.RAJU C.    M    44    Independent

7    MALLIKARJUN S.S.    M    42    Indian National Congress

8    IDLI RAMAPPA    M    46    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

9    NAGARAJA    M    30    Independent

10    H K KENCHVEERAPPA    M    65    Independent

11    L.H. PATIL    M    41    Independent

12    RAJASHEKHARAYYA B.    M    62    Independent

13    DR. HIDAYATHUR RAHMAN KHAN    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

14    NINGAPPA A.    M    77    Independent

15    MALLIKARJUN L.S.    M    39    Independent

16    AMANULLA KHAN J.    M    35    Independent

17    JAYANNA ITAGI    M    38    Independent

18    ALUR M.G. SWAMY    M    62    Independent

19    SATHISH B.M    M    45    Independent

20    INAYAT ALI KHAN    M    31    Independent

21    YOGESHWARA RAO SINDHE    M    42    Independent

22    RAJASHEKAR    M    44    Independent

23    HANUMANTHAPPA    M    32    Independent

24    MANJUNATH K.    M    43    Independent

25    MAHESH Y.    M    40    Independent

26    EHSANULLA PATEL H.M.    M    53    Independent

27    SUDESH G.M.    M    31    Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

28    CHANDRASHEKARAPPA S.    M    59    Independent

29    VEERESH T.    M    35    Independent

30    SIDDESHI G.    M    42    Independent

31    MARUTHI H.    M    51    Independent

32    GNANA PRAKASH B.    M    30    Independent

33    ESWARAPPA H.    M    30    Independent

34    NAGARAJAPPA    M    46    Independent

35    KALLERUDRESHAPPA K.B.    M    49    Janata Dal (Secular)

S10    14    KA    SHIMOGA    30-Apr-09    1    UMESHKUMAR S    M    38    Janata Dal (United)

2    N DINESH KUMAR    M    40    Independent

3    M.P. SRIDHAR. BYNDOOR    M    44    Independent

4    AKHIL AHMED    M    45    Independent

5    H.S. SHEKARAPPA    M    47    Independent

6    J. JAYAPPA    M    40    Bahujan Samaj Party

7    S. BANGARAPPA    M    76    Indian National Congress

8    D.S. ESHWARAPPA    M    41    Independent

9    T. CHAKRAVARTI NAYAKA    M    70    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

10    MAINUDDIN.M.S    M    35    Independent

11    C. MURUGAN    M    29    Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

12    B,Y. RAGHAVENDRA    M    36    Bharatiya Janata Party

13    Y.H. NAGARAJA    M    51    Independent

14    MANJAPPA. S.    M    58    Independent

15    RANGANATHA T.L.    M    50    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

16    H.G. LOKESHA    M    47    Independent

17    V. SHAIK MEHABOOB    M    43    Independent

S10    15    KA    UDUPI CHIKMAGALUR    30-Apr-09    1    GANAPATHI SHETTIGARA    M    58    Independent

2    SRINIVASA    M    51    Independent

3    DENIAL FEDRIK RANGER    M    35    Independent

4    JAYAPRAKASH HEGDE    M    57    Indian National Congress

5    JAYAPRAKASH HEGDE    M    57    Indian National Congress

6    JAYAPRAKASH HEGDE    M    57    Indian National Congress

7    JAYAPRAKASH HEGDE    M    57    Indian National Congress

8    SMT. RADHA    F    49    Communist Party of India

9    SMT. RADHA    F    49    Communist Party of India

10    SMT. RADHA    F    49    Communist Party of India

11    DR. SRIDHAR UDUPA    M    56    Independent

12    UMESH KUMARA    M    38    Independent

13    B.VINAYAK MALLYA    M    26    Independent

14    STEVEN JOHN MENEZES    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

15    STEVEN JOHN MENEZES    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

16    ABDUL RASHEED    M    40    Independent

17    ABDUL RASHEED    M    40    Independent

18    VENKATRAMANA HEGADE.B    M    39    Jai Vijaya Bharathi Party

19    D.V.SADANANDA GOWDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

20    D.V.SADANANDA GOWDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

21    D.V.SADANANDA GOWDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

22    D.V.SADANANDA GOWDA    M    56    Bharatiya Janata Party

S10    16    KA    HASSAN    30-Apr-09    1    KOVI BABANNA    M    47    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

2    B. C. VIJAYAKUMAR    M    43    Independent

3    A. P. AHAMED    M    66    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    B. SHIVRAMU    M    58    Indian National Congress

5    K. H. HANUME GOWDA    M    78    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    S. HARISH(S. C. S)    M    37    Independent

7    AIJAZ AHAMED FAROOQI    M    52    Republican Party of India (A)

8    H. D. DEVEGOWDA    M    76    Janata Dal (Secular)

9    KODIHALLI CHANDRASHEKAR    M    51    Sarvodaya Karnataka Paksha

10    M. MAHESH URF HARSHA    M    38    Independent

11    K. SHANMUKHA    M    42    Independent

12    RAJANI NARAYANAGOWDA    M    34    Independent

13    K. REVANNA    M    34    Independent

14    G. P. SANTHOSH GUPTHA    M    28    Independent

15    B. LOHITHGOWDA KUNDURU    M    30    Bharatiya Janata Party

16    BOMMEGOWDA    M    62    Independent

17    T. R. VIJAYA KUMAR    M    33    Independent

18    DEVARAJ. P. B    M    26    Independent

19    DYAVEGOWDA    M    53    Independent

S10    17    KA    DAKSHINA KANNADA    30-Apr-09    1    SUPREETHA KUMAR POOJARY    M    31    Independent

2    JANARDHANA POOJARY    M    71    Indian National Congress

3    VASUDEVA M P    M    49    Independent

4    DR.THIRUMALA RAYA HALEMANE    M    55    Independent

5    G.MOHAMMED    M    48    Independent

6    K RAMA BHAT URIMAJALU    M    78    Independent

7    ABDUL RAZAK    M    50    Independent

8    MADHAVA B    M    71    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

9    MOHAMMED SALI    M    40    Independent

10    GIRISH A RAI    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

11    NALIN KUMAR KATEEL    M    42    Bharatiya Janata Party

12    K MONAPPA BHANDARY    M    57    Bharatiya Janata Party

13    C AHAMMAD JAMAL    M    54    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

14    ANANDA GATTY    M    59    Independent

15    SUBRAHMANYA KUMAR KUNTIKANA MATA    M    36    Independent

16    DR.U.P.SHIVANANDA    M    59    Independent

S10    20    KA    MANDYA    30-Apr-09    1    SHAMBHULINGEGOWDA    M    48    Independent

2    KOWDLEY CHANNAPPA    M    60    Janata Dal (United)

3    K S NANJAPPA    M    56    Independent

4    K S PUTTANNAIAH    M    60    Sarvodaya Party

5    N NANJUNDAIAH    M    57    Independent

6    S B SHIVALINGEGOWDA    M    62    Indian National Congress

7    SUMANTH    M    60    Independent

8    M KRISHNAMURTHY    M    35    Bahujan Samaj Party

9    VENKTESH R    M    37    Independent

10    T S ASHRAF    M    33    Independent

11    SHIVARAMU    M    41    Independent

12    L R SHIVARAMEGOWDA    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

13    SHAKUNTHALA    F    29    Independent

14    H S RAMANNA    M    45    Independent

15    H R CHANDRASHEKHARAIAH    M    43    Independent

16    BALASUBRAMANIAN    M    38    Independent

17    CHELUVARAYA SWAMY    M    49    Janata Dal (Secular)

18    M H AMARANATH @ AMBAREESH    M    57    Indian National Congress

19    CHANDRASHEKHARAIAH    M    46    Independent

20    N J RAJESH    M    35    Independent

21    KEMPEGOWDA    M    36    Independent

22    BOREGOWDA    M    57    Independent

23    M P MUNAVAR SHARIF    M    50    Independent

24    H V MADEGOWDA    M    47    Independent

25    K SHIVANAND    M    45    Independent

26    K KEMPEGOWDA    M    47    Independent

27    JHONSON CHINNAPPAN    M    32    Independent

S10    21    KA    MYSORE    30-Apr-09    1    C.H.VIJAYASHANKAR    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    SRINATH-PATHRIKE    M    39    Independent

3    M.BASAVANNA    M    30    Independent

4    S.P.MAHADEVAPPA    M    59    Independent

5    SYED NIZAM ALI    M    51    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    P.KARIGOWDA    M    63    Independent

7    P.PARASHIVAMURTHY    M    41    Rashtriya Krantikari Samajwadi Party

8    ADAGURU H VISHWANATH    M    59    Indian National Congress

9    M.ANWARJI    M    62    Independent

10    ARHSADULLA SHARIFF    M    40    Bharatiya Praja Paksha

11    M.V.SANTHOSHKUMAR    M    27    Independent

12    M.S.BALAJI    M    51    Ambedkar National Congress

13    SANTHOSH KUMAR.P    M    35    Akhila India Jananayaka Makkal Katchi (Dr. Issac)

14    S.P.GEETHA    F    36    United Women Front

15    RAJU    M    54    Independent

16    B.A.JIVIJAYA    F    71    Janata Dal (Secular)

17    M.LEELAVATHI    F    51    Independent

18    RAFEEQ    M    27    Independent

19    E.RAJU    M    42    Independent

20    M.NAGENDRA    M    42    Independent

21    DR.E.KESHAMMA    F    32    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

22    K.P.CHIDANANDA    M    48    Janata Dal (United)

23    B.D.LINGAPPARAI    M    52    Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha

S24    33    UP    UNNAO    30-Apr-09    1    SHIVSHANKERKUSHWAHA    M    46    Akhil Bharatiya Ashok Sena

2    RAMESHKUMARSINGH    M    60    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ANNUTANDON    F    51    Indian National Congress

4    DEEPAKKUMAR    M    40    Samajwadi Party

5    SUNILKUMAR    M    35    Independent

6    RASHIDQAMAR    M    28    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

7    BASUDEVVISHARAD    M    65    Vikas Party

8    ABHICHHEDILALYADAV    M    47    Rashtriya Samajwadi Party (United)

9    RAMASHREY    M    36    Independent

10    RAJKISHORESINGH    M    36    Rashtravadi Communist Party

11    LALA    M    40    Independent

12    UMESHCHANDRA    M    25    Apna Dal

13    RAJUKASHYAP    M    40    Vanchit Jamat Party

14    RAMAOTAR    M    63    Buddhiviveki Vikas Party

15    KRISHNAPALSINGHVAIS    M    62    Independent

16    CHANDRASHEKHARTIWARI    M    43    Independent

17    ARUNSHANKARSHUKLA    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

18    ASHOKKUMAR    M    39    Independent

19    CHHEDILAL    M    42    Republican Party of India (A)

20    RAMSEVAK    M    44    Ambedkar Samaj Party

21    UDAISHANKERTIWARI    M    64    Independent

22    JAVEDRAZA    M    39    Janata Dal (United)

23    KAILASHNATHMISHRA    M    66    Independent

24    DRCOLPRATAPSHANKARTIWARI    M    65    Rashtriya Raksha Dal

S24    34    UP    MOHANLALGANJ    30-Apr-09    1    R.K.CHAUDHARY    M    50    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

2    ASHA DEVI    F    38    Bharatiya Grameen Dal

3    JAI PRAKASH    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    SUSHILA SAROJ    F    58    Samajwadi Party

5    JAIPAL PATHIK    M    50    Rashtravadi Communist Party

6    NARENDRA KUMAR    M    38    Indian National Congress

7    DINESH KUMAR    M    38    Independent

8    SATTIDEEN    M    53    Uttar Pradesh Republican Party

9    RANJAN    M    38    Bharatiya Janata Party

10    RAM DHAN    M    42    Independent

11    RAJU SONKAR    M    46    Independent

12    AMRESH KUMAR    M    27    Rashtravadi Communist Party

13    SATISH SONKAR    M    40    Dharam Nirpeksh Dal

14    BINDU DEVI    F    33    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

15    SARJU    M    52    Independent

S24    35    UP    LUCKNOW    30-Apr-09    1    RAVI SHANKAR    M    28    Bharat Punarnirman Dal

2    SUKHVEER SINGH    M    41    Independent

3    DR. AKHILESHWAR SAHAI    M    39    Independent

4    RAVI    M    32    Vikas Party

5    AMIT PANDEY    M    33    Independent

6    RAJESH KUMAR    M    25    Independent

7    PADAM CHANDRA GUPTA    M    35    Independent

8    DR. AKHILESH DAS GUPTA    M    48    Bahujan Samaj Party

9    SEHNAAZ SIDRAT    F    48    Independent

10    NAND KUMAR    M    44    Bharatiya Grameen Dal

11    DASHARATH    M    36    Rashtriya Mazdoor Ekta Party

12    MOHD. IRSHAD    M    40    Navbharat Nirman Party

13    A. HAROON ALI    M    48    Independent

14    LAL JI TANDON    M    73    Bharatiya Janata Party

15    ANUPAM MISHRA    M    37    Swarajya Party Of India

16    ZUBAIR AHMAD    M    32    Independent

17    PRAVEEN KUMAR MISHRA    M    32    Eklavya Samaj Party

18    RISAV KUMAR SHARMA    M    28    Maulik Adhikar Party

19    BAL MUKUND TIWARI    M    26    Independent

20    S.MD.AHAMAD    M    59    Independent

21    HARJEET SINGH    M    48    Independent

22    CHANDRA BHUSHAN PANDEY    M    60    Independent

23    S.R.DARAPURI    M    65    Independent

24    RADHEYSHYAM    M    37    Independent

25    NAFISA ALI SODHI    F    52    Samajwadi Party

26    DR.KHAN MOHMAD ATIF    M    64    Muslim Majlis Uttar Pradesh

27    AMBIKA PRASAD    M    49    Independent

28    MANOJ SINGH    M    37    Independent

29    VINAY PRAKASH    M    36    Independent

30    RAJESH KUMAR PANDEY    M    40    All India Trinamool Congress

31    RAJESH KUMAR NAITHANI    M    35    Independent

32    CHATURI PRASAD    M    56    Independent

33    MURLI PRASAD    M    56    Rashtriya Kranti Party

34    ASHOK KUMAR PAL    M    31    Rashtriya Swabhimaan Party

35    SITARAM    M    38    Uttar Pradesh Republican Party

36    NITIN DWIWEDI    M    25    Independent

37    MUSTAQ KHAN    M    38    Indian Justice Party

38    RAM KUMAR SHUKLA    M    62    Independent

39    SMT. JUGUNU RANJAN    F    47    Jaganmay Nari Sangathan

40    LT.COL.(RETD.) KUSH PRASAD MATHUR    M    55    Rashtriya Raksha Dal

41    RITA BAHUGUNA JOSHI    F    59    Indian National Congress

42    RAJIV RANJAN TIWARI    M    29    Independent

43    SUMAN LATA DIXIT    F    53    Independent

44    DHEERAJ    M    37    Independent

45    AMRESH MISHRA    M    43    Independent

46    DEVENDRA    M    25    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

47    KEDAR MAL AGRAWAL    M    55    Independent

48    AMAR SINGH YADAV    M    53    Independent

49    SAYED MOH. LADEL    M    45    Independent

50    KAMAL CHANDRA    M    39    Gondvana Gantantra Party

51    SHARAD KUMAR CHAUDHARY    M    35    Bharatiya Rashtriya Bahujan Samaj Vikas Party

52    GIRISH CHANDRA    M    62    Independent

53    C.A. RAJESH RASTOGI    M    52    Independent

54    K.C. KARDAM    M    65    Independent

55    CHAMAN BIHARI TANDON    M    66    Independent

56    LADDAN    M    49    Independent

S24    53    UP    BARABANKI    30-Apr-09    1    KAMALA PRASAD RAWAT    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    P.L.PUNIA    M    64    Indian National Congress

3    RAM NARESH RAWAT    M    44    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    RAM SAGAR    M    62    Samajwadi Party

5    VED PRAKASH RAWAT    M    29    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    JEEVAN    M    26    Janvadi Party(Socialist)

7    DESHRAJ    M    49    Bharatiya Subhash Sena

8    BABADEEN    M    49    Bharatiya Republican Paksha

9    BHAGAUTI    M    54    Apna Dal

10    SANTRAM    M    40    Navbharat Nirman Party

11    KAMLESH KUMAR    M    38    Independent

12    GAYA PRASAD    M    50    Independent

13    DEPENDRA KUMAR RAWAT    M    25    Independent

14    PREM CHANDRA ARYA    M    33    Independent

15    RAM AUTAR    M    39    Independent

16    LAJJAWATI KANCHAN    F    43    Independent

17    VISHRAM DAS    M    67    Independent

S25    1    WB    COOCH BEHAR    30-Apr-09    1    ARGHYA ROY PRODHAN    M    37    All India Trinamool Congress

2    KRISHNA KANTA BARMAN    M    29    Party for Democratic Socialism

3    NIRANJAN BARMAN    M    42    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    NRIPENDRA NATH ROY    M    49    All India Forward Bloc

5    HITENDRA DAS    M    54    Independent

6    HAREKRISHNA SARKAR    M    37    Republican Party of India

7    BANGSHI BADAN BARMAN    M    41    Independent

8    BHABENDRA NATH BARMAN    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

9    DALENDRA ROY    M    50    Amra Bangalee

10    NUBASH BARMAN    M    46    Independent

S25    2    WB    ALIPURDUARS    30-Apr-09    1    MANOHAR TIRKEY    M    54    Revolutionary Socialist Party

2    ELIAS NARJINARY    M    56    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    BILKAN BARA    M    62    Samajwadi Jan Parishad

4    JOUCHIM BAXLA    M    55    Independent

5    DWIPEN ORAON    M    30    Kamtapur Progressive Party

6    KAMAL LAMA    M    49    Independent

7    THADDEVS LAKRA    M    60    Independent

8    PABAN KUMAR LAKRA    M    56    All India Trinamool Congress

9    MANOJ TIGGA    M    36    Bharatiya Janata Party

10    PAUL DEXION KHARIYA    M    55    Independent

S25    3    WB    JALPAIGURI    30-Apr-09    1    MAHENDRA KUMAR ROY    M    54    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    PRITHWIRAJ ROY    M    36    Independent

3    SHANTI KUMAR SARKAR    M    50    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    HARIBHAKTA SARDAR    M    54    Independent

5    SATYEN PRASAD ROY    M    46    Independent

6    SUKHBILAS BARMA    M    64    Indian National Congress

7    PABITRA MOITRA    M    58    Amra Bangalee

8    DR. DHIRENDRA NATH DAS    M    47    Nationalist Congress Party

9    SRI CHINMAY SARKAR    M    30    Independent

10    SRI MUNDRIKA RAM    M    51    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

11    SRI DWIPENDRA NATH PRAMANIK    M    37    Bharatiya Janata Party

S25    4    WB    DARJEELING    30-Apr-09    1    JASWANT SINGH    M    70    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    JIBESH SARKAR    M    55    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

3    DAWA NARBULA    M    73    Indian National Congress

4    SHANTA KUMAR SINGHA    M    40    Nationalist Congress Party

5    HARIDAS THAKUR    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    ABHIJIT MAJUMDAR    M    48    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

7    TRILOK KUMAR DEWAN    M    63    Independent

8    NIRANJAN SAHA    M    50    Amra Bangalee

9    BAIDYANATH ROY    M    55    Indian Peoples Forward Block

10    ARUN KUMAR AGARWAL    M    48    Independent

11    NITU JAI    M    35    Independent

12    RAM GANESH BARAIK    M    44    Independent

13    HELARIUS EKKA    M    50    Independent

S25    5    WB    RAIGANJ    30-Apr-09    1    ANIL BISWAS    M    49    Independent

2    GOPESH CH. SARKAR    M    66    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    SULEMAN HAFIJI    M    51    Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist)(Liberation)

4    MANAS JANA    M    36    Independent

5    UPENDRA NATH DAS    M    47    Independent

6    AKHIL RANJAN MONDAL    M    62    Bahujan Samaj Party

7    BIRESWAR LAHIRI    M    61    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

8    NACHHIR ALI PRAMANIK    M    64    Independent

9    ABDUL KARIM CHOUDHURY    M    62    Independent

10    DEEPA DASMUNSHI    F    48    Indian National Congress

11    MATIUR RAHMAN    M    49    Janata Dal (United)

12    FAIZ RAHAMAN    M    45    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

S25    6    WB    BALURGHAT    30-Apr-09    1    BIPLAB MITRA    M    57    All India Trinamool Congress

2    SAMU SOREN    M    48    Independent

3    PRASANTA KUMAR MAJUMDAR    M    68    Revolutionary Socialist Party

4    GOBINDA HANSDA    M    47    Bahujan Samaj Party

5    PRAHALLAD BARMAN    M    32    Independent

6    MRIDUL GHOSH.    M    30    Assam United Democratic Front

7    SUBHASH CH. BARMAN    M    50    Bharatiya Janata Party

8    CHAMRU ORAM    M    52    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

S25    7    WB    MALDAHA UTTAR    30-Apr-09    1    AMLAN BHADURI    M    35    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    BIKASH BISWAS    M    54    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    MAUSAM NOOR    M    27    Indian National Congress

4    SAILEN SARKAR    M    68    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    ATUL CHANDRA MANDAL    M    39    Independent

6    MALLIKA SARKAR (NANDY)    F    50    Independent

7    MONOWARA BEGAM    F    39    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

8    ASIM KUMAR CHOWDHURY    M    47    Independent

9    AMINA KHATUN    F    29    Independent

S25    8    WB    MALDAHA DAKSHIN    30-Apr-09    1    ABDUR RAZZAQUE    M    60    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    ABU HASEM KHAN CHOUDHURY    M    65    Indian National Congress

3    BHARAT CHANDRA MANDAL    M    52    Bahujan Samaj Party

4    DIPAK KUMAR CHOWDHURY    M    47    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    MOHAMMAD EJARUDDIN    M    74    Muslim League Kerala State Committee

6    MD. KAMAL BASIRUJJAMAN    M    32    Independent

7    RUSTAM ALI    M    39    Independent

8    MANIRUDDIN SAIKH    M    64    Paschim Banga Rajya Muslim League

9    MANJUR ALAHI MUNSHI    M    42    Independent

10    SHYAMAL DAS    M    38    Independent

S25    32    WB    GHATAL    30-Apr-09    1    MATILAL KHATUA    M    55    Bharatiya Janata Party

2    NARAYAN CHANDRA SAMAT    M    60    Bahujan Samaj Party

3    GURUDAS DASGUPTA    M    73    Communist Party of India

4    NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY    M    66    All India Trinamool Congress

5    LIYAKAT KHAN    M    31    Indian Justice Party

6    ARUN KUMAR DAS    M    40    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

7    AHITOSH MAITY    M    53    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

S25    33    WB    JHARGRAM    30-Apr-09    1    AMRIT HASNDA    M    63    Indian National Congress

2    NABENDU MAHALI    M    34    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    ADITYA KISKU    M    46    Independent

4    PULIN BIHARI BASKE    M    40    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

5    SUSIL MANDI    M    28    Independent

6    CHUNIBALA HANSDA    M    44    Jharkhand Party

7    PANCHANAN HANSDA    M    70    Bahujan Samaj Party

8    SUNIL MURMU    M    30    Independent

9    DARKU MURMU    M    56    Independent

S25    34    WB    MEDINIPUR    30-Apr-09    1    DIPAK KUMAR GHOSH    M    72    All India Trinamool Congress

2    SANJAY MISHRA    M    49    Independent

3    PRADIP PATNAIK    M    51    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    PARTHA ADDHYA    M    32    Independent

5    SRI AMIT MAITRA    M    63    Independent

6    PRABODH PANDA    M    63    Communist Party of India

7    ASOK KUMAR GOLDER    M    64    Bahujan Samaj Party

9    SUKUMAR DE    M    54    Independent

10    JOYNAL ABEDIN SEKH    M    52    Independent

11    MUKUL KUMAR MAITY    M    33    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

12    NEPAL CHANDRA DAS    M    60    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

S25    35    WB    PURULIA    30-Apr-09    1    ASIT BARAN MAHATO    M    38    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    NILKAMAL MAHATO    M    69    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    RENUKA SINGH DEV    F    60    Indian National Congress

4    SHANTIRAM MAHATO    M    56    Indian National Congress

5    SAYANTAN BASU    M    32    Bharatiya Janata Party

6    NARAHARI MAHATO    M    54    All India Forward Bloc

7    AJIT PRASAD MAHATO    M    56    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

8    ABINASH SAREN    M    39    Independent

9    ABHIRAM BESRA    M    41    Jharkhand Disom Party

10    AMULYA RATAN MAHATO    M    68    Independent

11    UMACHARAN MAHATO    M    69    Independent

12    DHIREN CHANDRA MAHATO    M    48    Independent

13    DHIREN RAJAK    M    44    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

14    BISAMBAR MURA    M    42    Independent

15    MUKHES SAHU    M    36    All Jharkhand Students Union

16    MRITYUNJAY MAHATO    M    46    Independent

S25    36    WB    BANKURA    30-Apr-09    1    BASUDEB ACHARIA    M    67    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    LAKSHMI SARKAR    F    54    Independent

3    SUBRATA MUKHERJEE    M    63    Indian National Congress

4    BYASDEB CHAKRABORTTY    M    37    Janata Dal (United)

5    PARESH MARANDI    M    54    Independent

6    PRABIR BANERJEE    M    36    Independent

7    SUDHIR KUMAR MURMU    M    40    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

8    GANESH ROY    M    34    Bahujan Samaj Party

9    RAHUL (BISWAJIT) SINHA    M    45    Bharatiya Janata Party

10    ASWINI DULEY    M    51    Jharkhand Party (Naren)

11    TAPAN KUMAR PATHAK    M    27    Rashtriya Dehat Morcha Party

S25    37    WB    BISHNUPUR    30-Apr-09    1    SUSMITA BAURI    F    34    Communist Party of India (Marxist)

2    UMA KANTA BHAKAT    M    62    Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)

3    TAPAS DAS    M    31    Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

4    UTTAM BOURI    M    30    Independent

5    SEULI SAHA    F    39    All India Trinamool Congress

6    JAYANTA MONDAL    M    53    Bharatiya Janata Party

7    MANIK BAURI    M    43    Bahujan Samaj Party

U03    1    DN    DADAR & NAGAR HAVELI    30-Apr-09    1    DELKAR MOHANBHAI SANJIBHAI    M    46    Indian National Congress

2    PATEL SUMANBHAI THAKORBHAI    M    37    Indian National Congress

3    PATEL NATUBHAI GOMANBHAI    M    36    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    MADHA JATARIYABHAI BUDHIYABHAI    M    33    Bharatiya Janata Party

5    BIJ YOHANBHAI BHADIYABHAI    M    36    Bahujan Samaj Party

6    RAJESH PRABHUBHAI PATEL    M    38    Independent

7    MISHAL LAXMANBHAI NAVSUBHAI    M    39    Independent

8    GAVIT BARAKBHAI JAURBHAI    M    38    Independent

9    KHULAT BHIKALYABHAI VANSYABHAI    M    40    Independent

S07    2    HR    KURUKSHETRA    7-May-09    1    VISHNU BHAGWAN    M    61    Independent

S07    6    HR    SONIPAT    7-May-09    1    SHIV NARAYAN    M    45    Independent

2    JITENDER SINGH    M    40    Indian National Congress

3    JITENDER SINGH    M    40    Indian National Congress

S19    10    PB    FEROZPUR    7-May-09    1    MATHRA DASS    M    73    Proutist Sarva Samaj

S19    11    PB    BATHINDA    7-May-09    1    HARDEV SINGH ARSHI    M    59    Communist Party of India

2    HARDEV SINGH ARSHI    M    59    Communist Party of India

S19    12    PB    SANGRUR    7-May-09    1    TARSEM JODHAN    M    59    Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation)

S20    3    RJ    CHURU    7-May-09    1    SALIM GUJAR    M    39    Independent

2    RAM SINGH KASWAN    M    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

3    KAMALA KASWAN    F    63    Bharatiya Janata Party

4    YUSUF KHAN    M    46    Independent

S20    15    RJ    PALI    7-May-09    1    PUSP JAIN    M    52    Bharatiya Janata Party

S20    18    RJ    JALORE    7-May-09    1    SUKHRAJ    M    66    Independent

2    SHANTI PARMAR    F    48    Independent

S20    23    RJ    BHILWARA    7-May-09    1    VIJAYENDRA PAL SINGH    M    61    Bharatiya Janata Party

S24    15    UP    ALIGARH    7-May-09    1    RAJ KUMARI CHAUHAN    F    46    Bahujan Samaj Party

S24    17    UP    MATHURA    7-May-09    1    UDYAN SHARMA    M    42    Samajwadi Party

2    PHAKKAD BABA    M    64    Independent

S24    40    UP    FARRUKHABAD    7-May-09    1    SWAMI SACHIDANAND HARI SAKSHI    M    53    Rashtriya Kranti Party

S24    42    UP    KANNAUJ    7-May-09    1    MAHESH CHANDRA    M    53    Bahujan Samaj Party

2    AKHILESH YADAV    M    35    Samajwadi Party

S25    27    WB    SRERAMPUR    7-May-09    1    KALYAN BANERJEE    M    52    All India Trinamool Congress

A toast to each and all of you in your endeavours in these hot summer months and Jai Hind.

Subroto Roy, Kolkata

Postscript:  I shall be grateful if any inadvertent errors or ommissions are kindly brought to notice by sending in a  comment on the post.  Thanks in advance.

Alfred Lyall on Christians, Muslims, India, China, Etc, 1908

“THE STATE IN ITS RELATION TO EASTERN AND WESTERN RELIGIONS”

By Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall (1835-1911)

Delivered as President of the Congress for the History of Religions, September 1908.—Fortnightly Review, November 1908.

“In considering the subject of my address, I have been confronted by this difficulty—that in the sections which regulate the order of our proceedings, we have a list of papers that range over all the principal religions, ancient and modern, that have existed and still exist in the world. They are to be treated and discussed by experts whose scholarship, particular studies, and close research entitle them all to address you authoritatively. I have no such special qualifications; and in any case it would be most presumptuous in me to trespass upon their ground. All that I can venture to do, therefore, in the remarks which I propose to address to you to-day, is to attempt a brief general survey of the history of religions from a standpoint which may possibly not fall within the scope of these separate papers.

The four great religions now prevailing in the world, which are historical in the sense that they have been long known to history, I take to be—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Having regard to their origin and derivation, to their history and character, I may be permitted, for my present purpose only, to class the two former as the Religions of the West, and the two latter as the Religions of the East. These are the faiths which still maintain a mighty influence over the minds of mankind. And my object is to compare the political relations, the attitude, maintained toward them, from time to time, by the States and rulers of the people over which these religions have established their spiritual dominion.

The religion of the Jews is not included, though its influence has been incalculable, because it has been caught up, so to speak, into Christianity and Islam, and cannot therefore be counted among those which have made a partition of the religious world. For this reason, perhaps, it has retained to this day its ancient denomination, derived from the tribe or country of its origin; whereas the others are named from a Faith or a Founder. The word Nazarene, denoting the birthplace of Christianity, which is said to be still used in that region, was, as we know, very speedily superseded by its wider title, as the Creed broke out of local limits and was proclaimed universal. There has evidently been a foretime, though it is prehistorical, when, so far as we know, mankind was universally polytheistic; when innumerable rites and worships prevailed without restraint, springing up and contending with each other like the trees in a primeval forest, reflecting a primitive and precarious condition of human society.

I take polytheism to have been, in this earliest stage, the wild growth of superstitious imagination, varied indefinitely by the pressure of circumstance, by accident, by popular caprice, or by the good or evil fortunes of the community. In this stage it can now be seen among barbarous tribes—as, for instance, in Central Africa. And some traces of it still survive, under different pretexts and disguises, in the lowest strata of civilised nations, where it may be said to represent the natural reluctance of the vagrant human fancy to be satisfied with higher forms and purer conceptions that are always imperfectly assimilated by the multitude. Among primitive societies the spheres of human and divine affairs were intermixed and identical; they could not be disentangled. But with the growth of political institutions came gradual separation, or at any rate the subordination of religion to the practical necessities of orderly government and public morals.

That polytheism can exist and flourish in the midst of a highly intellectual and civilised society, we know from the history of Greece and Rome. But in ancient Greece its direct influence upon political affairs seems to have been slight; though it touched at some points upon morality. The function of the State, according to Greek ideas, was to legislate for all the departments of human life and to uphold the moral standard. The law prohibited sacrilege and profanity; it punished open impiety that might bring down divine wrath upon the people at large. The philosophers taught rational ethics; they regarded the popular superstitions with indulgent contempt; but they inculcated the duty of honouring the gods, and the observance of public ceremonial. Beyond these limits the practice of local and customary worship was, I think, free and unrestrained; though I need hardly add that toleration, as understood by the States of antiquity, was a very different thing from the modern principle of religious neutrality. Under the Roman government the connection between the State and religion was much closer, as the dominion of Rome expanded and its power became centralised. The Roman State maintained a strict control and superintendence over the official rituals and worships, which were regulated as a department of the administration, to bind the people together by established rites and worships, in order to cement political and social unity. It is true that the usages of the tribes and principalities that were conquered and annexed were left undisturbed; for the Roman policy, like that of the English in India, was to avoid giving offence to religion; and undoubtedly this policy, in both instances, materially facilitated the rapid building up of a wide dominion. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to draw in the worship toward a common centre. The deities of the conquered provinces were respected and conciliated; the Roman generals even appealed to them for protection and favour, yet they became absorbed and assimilated under Roman names; they were often identified with the gods of the Roman pantheon, and were frequently superseded by the victorious divinities of the new rulers—the strange deities, in fact, were Romanised as well as the foreign tribes and cities. After this manner the Roman empire combined the tolerance of great religious diversity with the supremacy of a centralised government. Political amalgamation brought about a fusion of divine attributes; and latterly the emperor was adored as the symbol of manifest power, ruler and pontiff; he was the visible image of supreme authority. This régime was easily accepted by the simple unsophisticated paganism of Europe. The Romans, with all their statecraft, had as yet no experience of a high religious temperature, of enthusiastic devotion and divine mysteries. But as their conquest and commerce spread eastward, the invasion of Asia let in upon Europe a flood of Oriental divinities, and thus Rome came into contact with much stronger and deeper spiritual forces. The European polytheism might be utilised and administered, the Asiatic deities could not be domesticated and subjected to regulation; the Oriental orgies and strange rites broke in upon the organised State worship; the new ideas and practices came backed by a profound and fervid spiritualism. Nevertheless the Roman policy of bringing religion under authoritative control was more or less successful even in the Asiatic provinces of the empire; the privileges of the temples were restricted; the priesthoods were placed under the general superintendence of the proconsular officials; and Roman divinities gradually found their way into the Asiatic pantheon. But we all know that the religion of the Roman empire was falling into multitudinous confusion when Christianity arose—an austere exclusive faith, with its army of saints, ascetics, and unflinching martyrs, proclaiming worship to be due to one God only, and sternly refusing to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor. Against such a faith an incoherent disorderly polytheism could make no better stand than tribal levies against a disciplined army. The new religion struck directly at the sacrifices that symbolised imperial unity; the passive resistance of Christians was necessarily treated as rebellion, the State made implacable war upon them. Yet the spiritual and moral forces won the victory, and Christianity established itself throughout the empire. Universal religion, following upon universal civil dominion, completed the levelling of local and national distinctions. The Churches rapidly grew into authority superior to the State within their own jurisdiction; they called in the temporal government to enforce theological decisions and to put down heresies; they founded a powerful hierarchy. The earlier Roman constitution had made religion an instrument of administration. When one religion became universal, the churches enlisted the civil ruler into the service of orthodoxy; they converted the State into an instrument for enforcing religion. The pagan empire had issued edicts against Christianity and had suppressed Christian assemblies as tainted with disaffection; the Christian emperors enacted laws against the rites and worships of paganism, and closed temples. It was by the supreme authority of Constantine that, for the first time in the religious history of the world, uniformity of belief was defined by a creed, and sanctioned by the ruler’s assent.

Then came, in Western Europe, the time when the empire at Rome was rent asunder by the inrush of barbarians; but upon its ruins was erected the great Catholic Church of the Papacy, which preserved in the ecclesiastical domain the autocratic imperial tradition. The primacy of the Roman Church, according to Harnack, is essentially the transference to her of Rome’s central position in the religions of the heathen world; the Church united the western races, disunited politically, under the common denomination of Christianity. Yet Christianity had not long established itself throughout all the lands, in Europe and Asia, which had once been under the Roman sovereignty, when the violent irruptions of Islam upset not only the temporal but also the spiritual dominion throughout Western Asia, and along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Eastern empire at Constantinople had been weakened by bitter theological dissensions and heresies among the Christians; the votaries of the new, simple, unswerving faith of Mohammed were ardent and unanimous.

In Egypt and Syria the Mohammedans were speedily victorious; the Latin Church and even the Latin language were swept out of North Africa. In Persia the Sassanian dynasty was overthrown, and although there was no immediate and total conversion of the people, Mohammedanism gradually superseded the ancient Zoroastrian cultus as the religion of the Persian State. It was not long before the armies of Islam had triumphed from the Atlantic coast to the Jaxartes river in Central Asia; and conversion followed, speedily or slowly, as the direct result of conquest. Moreover, the Mohammedans invaded Europe. In the south-west they subdued almost all Spain; and in the south-east they destroyed, some centuries later, the Greek empire, though not the Greek Church, and consolidated a mighty rulership at Constantinople. With this prolonged conflict between Islam and Christianity along the borderlands of Europe and Asia began the era of those religious wars that have darkened the history of the Western nations, and have perpetuated the inveterate antipathy between Asiatic and European races, which the spread of Christianity into both continents had softened and might have healed. In the end Christianity has fixed itself permanently in Europe, while Islam is strongly established throughout half Asia. But the sharp collision between the two faiths, the clash of armies bearing the cross and the crescent, generated fierce fanaticism on both sides. The Crusades kindled a fiery militant and missionary spirit previously unknown to religions, whereby religious propagation became the mainspring and declared object of conquest and colonisation.

Finally, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the great secession from the Roman Church divided the nations of Western Europe into hostile camps, and throughout the long wars of that period political jealousies and ambitions were inflamed by religious animosities. In Eastern Europe the Greek Church fell under almost complete subordination to the State. The history of Europe and Western Asia records, therefore, a close connection and community of interests between the States and the orthodox faiths; a combination which has had a very potent influence, during many centuries, upon the course of civil affairs, upon the fortunes, or misfortunes, of nations.

Up to the sixteenth century, at least, it was universally held, by Christianity and by Islam, that the State was bound to enforce orthodoxy; conversion and the suppression or expulsion of heretics were public duties. Unity of creed was thought necessary for national unity—a government could not undertake to maintain authority, or preserve the allegiance of its subjects, in a realm divided and distracted by sectarian controversies. On these principles Christianity and Islam were consolidated, in union with the States or in close alliance with them; and the geographical boundaries of these two faiths, and of their internal divisions respectively, have not materially changed up to the present day.

Let me now turn to the history of religion in those countries of further Asia, which were never reached by Greek or Roman conquest or civilisation, where the ancient forms of worship and conceptions of divinity, which existed before Christianity and Islam, still flourish. And here I shall only deal with the relations of the State to religion in India and China and their dependencies, because these vast and populous empires contain the two great religions, Hinduism and Buddhism, of purely Asiatic origin and character, which have assimilated to a large extent, and in a certain degree elevated, the indigenous polytheism, and which still exercise a mighty influence over the spiritual and moral condition of many millions. We know what a tremendous power religion has been in the wars and politics of the West. I submit that in Eastern Asia, beyond the pale of Islam, the history of religion has been very different. Religious wars—I mean wars caused by the conflict of militant faiths contending for superiority—were, I believe, unknown on any great scale to the ancient civilisations. It seems to me that until Islam invaded India the great religious movements and changes in that region had seldom or never been the consequence of, nor had been materially affected by, wars, conquests, or political revolutions. Throughout Europe and Mohammedan Asia the indigenous deities and their temples have disappeared centuries ago; they have been swept away by the forces of Church and State combined to exterminate them; they have all yielded to the lofty overruling ideal of monotheism.

But the tide of Mohammedanism reached its limit in India; the people, though conquered, were but partly converted, and eastward of India there have been no important Mohammedan rulerships. On this side of Asia, therefore, two great religions, Buddhism and Brahmanism, have held their ground from times far anterior to Christianity; they have retained the elastic comprehensive character of polytheism, purified and elevated by higher conceptions, developed by the persistent competition of diverse ideas and forms among the people, unrestrained by attempts of superior organised faiths to obliterate the lower and weaker species. In that region political despotism has prevailed immemorially; religious despotism, in the sense of the legal establishment of one faith or worship to the exclusion of all others, of uniformity imposed by coercion, of proselytism by persecution, is unknown to history: the governments have been absolute and personal; the religions have been popular and democratic. They have never been identified so closely with the ruling power as to share its fortunes, or to be used for the consolidation of successful conquest. Nor, on the other hand, has a ruler ever found it necessary, for the security of his throne, to conform to the religion of his subjects, and to abjure all others. The political maxim, that the sovereign and his subjects should be of one and the same religion, ‘Cujus regio ejus religio’, has never prevailed in this part of the world.

And although in India, the land of their common origin, Buddhism widely displaced and overlaid Brahmanism, while it was in its turn, after several centuries, overcome and ejected by a Brahmanic revival, yet I believe that history records no violent contests or collisions between them; nor do we know that the armed force of the State played any decisive part in these spiritual revolutions. I do not maintain that Buddhism has owed nothing to State influence. It represents certain doctrines of the ancient Indian theosophy, incarnate, as one might say, in the figure of a spiritual Master, the Indian prince, Sakya Gautama, who was the type and example of ascetic quietism; it embodies the idea of salvation, or emancipation attainable by man’s own efforts, without aid from priests or divinities. Buddhism is the earliest, by many centuries, of the faiths that claim descent from a personal founder. It emerges into authentic history with the empire of Asoka, who ruled over the greater part of India some 250 years before Christ, and its propagation over his realm and the countries adjacent is undoubtedly due to the influence, example, and authority of that devout monarch.

According to Mr. Vincent Smith, from whose valuable work on the Early History of India I take the description of Asoka’s religious policy, the king, renouncing after one necessary war all further military conquest, made it the business of his life to employ his autocratic power in directing the preaching and teaching of the Law of Piety, which he had learnt from his Buddhist priesthood. All his high officers were commanded to instruct the people in the way of salvation; he sent missions to foreign countries; he issued edicts promulgating ethical doctrines, and the rules of a devout life; he made pilgrimages to the sacred places; and finally he assumed the yellow robe of a Buddhist monk.

Asoka elevated, so Mr. Smith has said, a sect of Hinduism to the rank of a world-religion. Nevertheless, I think it may be affirmed that the emperor consistently refrained from the forcible conversion of his subjects, and indeed the use of compulsion would have apparently been a breach of his own edicts, which insist on the principle of toleration, and declare the propagation of the Law of Piety to be his sole object. Asoka made no attempt to persecute Brahmanism; and it seems clear that the extraordinary success of Buddhism in India cannot be attributed to war or to conquest. To imperial influence and example much must be ascribed, yet I think Buddhism owed much more to its spiritual potency, to its superior faculty of transmuting and assimilating, instead of abolishing, the elementary instincts and worships, endowing them with a higher significance, attracting and stimulating devotion by impressive rites and ceremonies, impressing upon the people the dogma of the soul’s transmigration and its escape from the miseries of sentient existence by the operation of merits. And of all great religions it is the least political, for the practice of asceticism and quietism, of monastic seclusion from the working world, is necessarily adverse to any active connection with mundane affairs.

I do not know that the mysterious disappearance of Buddhism from India can be accounted for by any great political revolution, like that which brought Islam into India. It seems to have vanished before the Mohammedans had gained any footing in the country.

Meanwhile Buddhism is said to have penetrated into the Chinese empire by the first century of the Christian era. Before that time the doctrines of Confucius and Laotze were the dominant philosophies; rather moral than religious, though ancestral worship and the propitiation of spirits were not disallowed, and were to a certain extent enjoined. Laotze, the apostle of Taoism, appears to have preached a kind of Stoicism—the observance of the order of Nature in searching for the right way of salvation, the abhorrence of vicious sensuality—and the cultivation of humility, self-sacrifice, and simplicity of life. He condemned altogether the use of force in the sphere of religion or morality; though he admitted that it might be necessary for the purposes of civil government. The system of Confucius inculcated justice, benevolence, self-control, obedience and loyalty to the sovereign—all the civic virtues; it was a moral code without a metaphysical background; the popular worships were tolerated, reverence for ancestors conduced to edification; the gods were to be honoured, though it was well to keep aloof from them; he disliked religious fervour, and of things beyond experience he had nothing to say.

Buddhism, with its contempt for temporal affairs, treating life as a mere burden, and the soul’s liberation from existence as the end and object of meditative devotion, must have imported a new and disturbing element into the utilitarian philosophies of ancient China. For many centuries Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are said to have contended for the patronage and recognition of the Chinese emperors. Buddhism was alternately persecuted and protected, expelled and restored by imperial decree. Priesthoods and monastic orders are institutions of which governments are naturally jealous; the monasteries were destroyed or rebuilt, sacerdotal orders and celibacy suppressed or encouraged by imperial decrees, according to the views and prepossessions of successive dynasties or emperors. Nevertheless the general policy of Chinese rulers and ministers seems not to have varied essentially. Their administrative principle was that religion must be prevented from interfering with affairs of State, that abuses and superstitious extravagances are not so much offences against orthodoxy as matters for the police, and as such must be put down by the secular arm. Upon this policy successive dynasties appear to have acted continuously up to the present day in China, where the relations of the State to religions are, I think, without parallel elsewhere in the modern world. One may find some resemblance to the attitude of the Roman emperors towards rites and worships among the population, in the Chinese emperor’s reverent observance and regulation of the rites and ceremonies performed by him as the religious chief and representative before Heaven of the great national interests. The deification of deceased emperors is a solemn rite ordained by proclamation. As the Ius sacrum, the body of rights and duties in the matter of religion, was regarded in Rome as a department of the Ius publicum, belonging to the fundamental constitution of the State, so in China the ritual code was incorporated into the statute books, and promulgated with imperial sanction. Now we know that in Rome the established ritual was legally prescribed, though otherwise strange deities and their worships were admitted indiscriminately. But the Chinese Government goes much further. It appears to regard all novel superstitions, and especially foreign worships, as the hotbed of sedition and disloyalty. Unlicensed deities and sects are put down by the police; magicians and sorcerers are arrested; and the peculiar Chinese practice of canonising deceased officials and paying sacrificial honours to local celebrities after death is strictly reserved by the Board of Ceremonies for imperial consideration and approval. The Censor, to whom any proposal of this kind must be entrusted, is admonished that he must satisfy himself by inquiry of its validity. An official who performs sacred rites in honour of a spirit or holy personage not recognised by the Ritual Code, was liable, under laws that may be still in force, to corporal punishment; and the adoration by private families of spirits whose worship is reserved for public ceremonial was a heinous offence. No such rigorous control over the multiplication of rites and deities has been instituted elsewhere. On the other hand, while in other countries the State has recognised no more than one established religion, the Chinese Government formally recognises three denominations. Buddhism has been sanctioned by various edicts and endowments, yet the State divinities belong to the Taoist pantheon, and their worship is regulated by public ordinances; while Confucianism represents official orthodoxy, and its precepts embody the latitudinarian spirit of the intellectual classes. We know that the Chinese people make use, so to speak, of all three religions indiscriminately, according to their individual whims, needs, or experience of results. So also a politic administration countenances these divisions and probably finds some interest in maintaining them. The morality of the people requires some religious sanction; and it is this element with which the State professes its chief concern. We are told on good authority that one of the functions of high officials is to deliver public lectures freely criticising and discouraging indolent monasticism and idolatry from the standpoint of rational ethics, as follies that are reluctantly tolerated. Yet the Government has never been able to keep down the fanatics, mystics, and heretical sects that are incessantly springing up in China, as elsewhere in Asia; though they are treated as pestilent rebels and law-breakers, to be exterminated by massacre and cruel punishments; and bloody repression of this kind has been the cause of serious insurrections. It is to be observed that all religious persecution is by the direct action of the State, not instigated or insisted upon by a powerful orthodox priesthood. But a despotic administration which undertakes to control and circumscribe all forms and manifestations of superstition in a vast polytheistic multitude of its subjects, is inevitably driven to repressive measures of the utmost severity. Neither Christianity nor Islam attempted to regulate polytheism, their mission was to exterminate it, and they succeeded mainly because in those countries the State was acting with the support and under the uncompromising pressure of a dominant church or faith. Some writers have noticed a certain degree of resemblance between the policy of the Roman empire and that of the Chinese empire toward religion. We may read in Gibbon that the Roman magistrates regarded the various modes of worship as equally useful, that sages and heroes were exalted to immortality and entitled to reverence and adoration, and that philosophic officials, viewing with indulgence the superstitions of the multitude, diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers. So far, indeed, his description of the attitude of the State toward polytheism may be applicable to China; but although the Roman and Chinese emperors both assumed the rank of divinity, and were supreme in the department of worships, the Roman administration never attempted to regulate and restrain polytheism at large on the Chinese system. The religion of the Gentiles, said Hobbes, is a part of their policy; and it may be said that this is still the policy of Oriental monarchies, who admit no separation between the secular and the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. They would agree with Hobbes that temporal and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. But while in Mohammedan Asia the State upholds orthodox uniformity, in China and Japan the mainspring of all such administrative action is political expediency. It may be suggested that in the mind of these far-Eastern people religion has never been conceived as something quite apart from human experience and the affairs of the visible world; for Buddhism, with its metaphysical doctrines, is a foreign importation, corrupted and materialised in China and Japan. And we may observe that from among the Mongolian races, which have produced mighty conquerors and founded famous dynasties from Constantinople to Pekin, no mighty prophet, no profound spiritual teacher, has arisen. Yet in China, as throughout all the countries of the Asiatic mainland, an enthusiast may still gather together ardent proselytes, and fresh revelations may create among the people unrest that may ferment and become heated up to the degree of fanaticism, and explode against attempts made to suppress it. The Taeping insurrection, which devastated cities and provinces in China, and nearly overthrew the Manchu dynasty, is a striking example of the volcanic fires that underlie the surface of Asiatic societies. It was quenched in torrents of blood after lasting some ten years. And very recently there has been a determined revolt of the Lamas in Eastern Tibet, where the provincial administration is, as we know, sacerdotal.

The imperial troops are said to be crushing it with unrelenting severity. These are the perilous experiences of a philosophic Government that assumes charge and control over the religions of some three hundred millions of Asiatics.

I can only make a hasty reference to Japan. In that country the relations of the State to religions appear to have followed the Chinese model. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, are impartially recognised. The emperor presides over official worship as high priest of his people; the liturgical ordinances are issued by imperial rescripts not differing in form from other public edicts. The dominant article of faith is the divinity of Japan and its emperor; and Shinto, the worship of the gods of nature, is understood to be patronised chiefly with the motive of preserving the national traditions. But in Japan the advance of modern science and enlightened scepticism may have diminished the importance of the religious department. Shinto, says a recent writer, still embodies the religion of the people; yet in 1877 a decree was issued declaring it to be no more than a convenient system of State ceremonial.[ The Development of Religion in Japan, G. W. Knox, 1907] And in 1889 an article of the constitution granted freedom of belief and worship to all Japanese subjects, without prejudice to peace, order, and loyalty.

In India the religious situation is quite different. I think it is without parallel elsewhere in the world. Here we are at the fountainhead of metaphysical theology, of ideas that have flowed eastward and westward across Asia. And here, also, we find every species of primitive polytheism, unlimited and multitudinous; we can survey a confused medley of divinities, of rites and worships incessantly varied by popular whim and fancy, by accidents, and by the pressure of changing circumstances. Hinduism permits any doctrine to be taught, any sort of theory to be held regarding the divine attributes and manifestations, the forces of nature, or the mysterious functions of mind or body. Its tenets have never been circumscribed by a creed; its free play has never been checked or regulated by State authority. Now, at first sight, this is not unlike the popular polytheism of the ancient world, before the triumph of Christianity. There are passages in St. Augustine’s Civitas Dei, describing the worship of the unconverted pagans among whom he lived, that might have been written yesterday by a Christian bishop in India. And we might ask why all this polytheism was not swept out from among such a highly intellectual people as the Indians, with their restless pursuit of divine knowledge, by some superior faith, by some central idea. Undoubtedly the material and moral conditions, and the course of events which combine to stamp a particular form of religion upon any great people, are complex and manifold; but into this inquiry I cannot go. I can only point out that the institution of caste has riveted down Hindu society into innumerable divisions upon a general religious basis, and that the sacred books separated the Hindu theologians into different schools, preventing uniformity of worship or of creed. And it is to be observed that these books are not historical; they give no account of the rise and spread of a faith. The Hindu theologian would say, in the words of an early Christian father, that the objects of divine knowledge are not historical, that they can only be apprehended intellectually, that within experience there is no reality. And the fact that Brahmanism has no authentic inspired narrative, that it is the only great religion not concentrated round the life and teachings of a person, may be one reason why it has remained diffuse and incoherent. All ways of salvation are still open to the Hindus; the canon of their scripture has never been authoritatively closed. New doctrines, new sects, fresh theological controversies, are incessantly modifying and superseding the old scholastic interpretations of the mysteries, for Hindus, like Asiatics everywhere, are still in that condition of mind when a fresh spiritual message is eagerly received. Vishnu and Siva are the realistic abstractions of the understanding from objects of sense, from observation of the destructive and reproductive operations of nature; they represent among educated men separate systems of worship which, again, are parted into different schools or theories regarding the proper ways and methods of attaining to spiritual emancipation. Yet the higher philosophy and the lower polytheism are not mutually antagonistic; on the contrary, they support each other; for Brahmanism accepts and allies itself with the popular forms of idolatry, treating them as outward visible signs of an inner truth, as indications of all-pervading pantheism. The peasant and the philosopher reverence the same deity, perform the same rite; they do not mean the same thing, but they do not quarrel on this account. Nevertheless, it is certainly remarkable that this inorganic medley of ideas and worships should have resisted for so many ages the invasion and influence of the coherent faiths that have won ascendancy, complete or dominant, on either side of India, the west and the east; it has thrown off Buddhism, it has withstood the triumphant advance of Islam, it has as yet been little affected by Christianity. Probably the political history of India may account in some degree for its religious disorganisation. I may propound the theory that no religion has obtained supremacy, or at any rate definite establishment, in any great country except with the active co-operation, by force or favour, of the rulers, whether by conquest, as in Western Asia, or by patronage and protection, as in China. The direct influence and recognition of the State has been an indispensable instrument of religious consolidation. But until the nineteenth century the whole of India, from the mountains to the sea, had never been united under one stable government; the country was for ages parcelled out into separate principalities, incessantly contending for territory. And even the Moghul empire, which was always at war upon its frontiers, never acquired universal dominion. The Moghul emperors, except Aurungzeb, were by no means bigoted Mohammedans; and their obvious interest was to abstain from meddling with Hinduism. Yet the irruption of Islam into India seems rather to have stimulated religious activity among the Hindus, for during the Mohammedan period various spiritual teachers arose, new sects were formed, and theological controversies divided the intellectual classes. To these movements the Mohammedan governments must have been for a long time indifferent; and among the new sects the principle of mutual toleration was universal. Towards the close of the Moghul empire, however, Hinduism, provoked by the bigotry of the Emperor Aurungzeb, became a serious element of political disturbance. Attempts to suppress forcibly the followers of Nanak Guru, and the execution of one spiritual leader of the Sikhs, turned the Sikhs from inoffensive quietists into fanatical warriors; and by the eighteenth century they were in open revolt against the empire. They were, I think, the most formidable embodiment of militant Hinduism known to Indian history. By that time, also, the Marathas in South-West India were declaring themselves the champions of the Hindu religion against the Mohammedan oppression; and to the Sikhs and Marathas the dislocation of the Moghul empire may be very largely attributed. We have here a notable example of the dynamic power upon politics of revolts that are generated by religious fermentation, and a proof of the strength that can be exerted by a pacific inorganic polytheism in self-defence, when ambitious rebels proclaim themselves defenders of a faith. The Marathas and the Sikhs founded the only rulerships whose armies could give the English serious trouble in the field during the nineteenth century. On the whole, however, when we survey the history of India, and compare it with that of Western Asia, we may say that although the Hindus are perhaps the most intensely religious people in the world, Hinduism has never been, like Christianity, Islam, and to some extent Buddhism, a religion established by the State. Nor has it suffered much from the State’s power. It seems strange, indeed, that Mohammedanism, a compact proselytising faith, closely united with the civil rulership, should have so slightly modified, during seven centuries of dominion, this infinitely divided polytheism. Of course, Mohammedanism made many converts, and annexed a considerable number of the population—yet the effect was rather to stiffen than to loosen the bonds that held the mass of the people to their traditional divinities, and to the institution of castes. Moreover the antagonism of the two religions, the popular and the dynastic, was a perpetual element of weakness in a Mohammedan empire. In India polytheism could not be crushed, as in Western Asia, by Islam; neither could it be controlled and administered, as in Eastern Asia; yet the Moghul emperors managed to keep on good terms with it, so long as they adhered to a policy of toleration. To the Mohammedan empire has succeeded another foreign dominion, which practises not merely tolerance but complete religious neutrality.

Looking back over the period of a hundred years, from 1757 to 1857, during which the British dominion was gradually extended over India, we find that the British empire, like the Roman, met with little or no opposition from religion. Hindus and Mohammedans, divided against each other, were equally willing to form alliances with, and to fight on the side of, the foreigner who kept religion entirely outside politics. And the British Government, when established, has so carefully avoided offence to caste or creed that on one great occasion only, the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, have the smouldering fires of credulous fanaticism broken out against our rule. I believe the British-Indian position of complete religious neutrality to be unique among Asiatic governments, and almost unknown in Europe. The Anglo-Indian sovereignty does not identify itself with the interests of a single faith, as in Mohammedan kingdoms, nor does it recognise a definite ecclesiastical jurisdiction in things spiritual, as in Catholic Europe. Still less has our Government adopted the Chinese system of placing the State at the head of different rituals for the purpose of controlling them all, and proclaiming an ethical code to be binding on all denominations. The British ruler, while avowedly Christian, ignores all religions administratively, interfering only to suppress barbarous or indecent practices when the advance of civilisation has rendered them obsolete. Public instruction, so far as the State is concerned, is entirely secular; the universal law is the only authorised guardian of morals; to expound moral duties officially, as things apart from religion, has been found possible in China, but not in India. But the Chinese Government can issue edicts enjoining public morality and rationalism because the State takes part in the authorised worship of the people, and the emperor assumes pontifical office. The British Government in India, on the other hand, disowns official connection with any religion. It places all its measures on the sole ground of reasonable expediency, of efficient administration; it seeks to promote industry and commerce, and material civilisation generally; it carefully avoids giving any religious colour whatever to its public acts; and the result is that our Government, notwithstanding its sincere professions of absolute neutrality, is sometimes suspected of regarding all religion with cynical indifference, possibly even with hostility. Moreover, religious neutrality, though it is right, just, and the only policy which the English in India could possibly adopt, has certain political disadvantages. The two most potent influences which still unite and divide the Asiatic peoples, are race and religion; a Government which represents both these forces, as, for instance, in Afghanistan, has deep roots in a country. A dynasty that can rely on the support of an organised religion, and stands forth as the champion of a dominant faith, has a powerful political power at its command. The Turkish empire, weak, ill-governed, repeatedly threatened with dismemberment, embarrassed internally by the conflict of races, has been preserved for the last hundred years by its incorporation with the faith of Islam, by the Sultan’s claim to the Caliphate. To attack it is to assault a religious citadel; it is the bulwark on the west of Mohammedan Asia, as Afghanistan is the frontier fortress of Islam on the east. A leading Turkish politician has very recently said: ‘It is in Islam pure and simple that lies the strength of Turkey as an independent State; and if the Sultan’s position as religious chief were encroached upon by constitutional reforms, the whole Ottoman empire would be in danger.’ We have to remember that for ages religious enthusiasm has been, and still is in some parts of Asia, one of the strongest incentives to military ardour and fidelity to a standard on the battlefield. Identity of creed has often proved more effective, in war, than territorial patriotism; it has surmounted racial and tribal antipathies; while religious antagonism is still in many countries a standing impediment to political consolidation. When, therefore, we survey the history of religions, though this sketch is necessarily very imperfect and inadequate, we find Mohammedanism still identified with the fortunes of Mohammedan rulers; and we know that for many centuries the relations of Christianity to European States have been very close. In Europe the ardent perseverance and intellectual superiority of great theologians, of ecclesiastical statesmen supported by autocratic rulers, have hardened and beat out into form doctrines and liturgies that it was at one time criminal to disregard or deny, dogmatic articles of faith that were enforced by law. By these processes orthodoxy emerged compact, sharply defined, irresistible, out of the strife and confusion of heresies; the early record of the churches has pages spotted with tears and stained with blood. But at the present time European States seem inclined to dissolve their alliance with the churches, and to arrange a kind of judicial separation between the altar and the throne, though in very few cases has a divorce been made absolute. No State, in civilised countries, now assists in the propagation of doctrine; and ecclesiastical influence is of very little service to a Government. The civil law, indeed, makes continual encroachments on the ecclesiastical domain, questions its authority, and usurps its jurisdiction. Modern erudition criticises the historical authenticity of the scriptures, philosophy tries to undermine the foundations of belief; the governments find small interest in propping up edifices that are shaken by internal controversies. In Mohammedan Asia, on the other hand, the connection between the orthodox faith and the States is firmly maintained, for the solidarity is so close that disruptions would be dangerous, and a Mohammedan rulership over a majority of unbelievers would still be perilously unstable. I have thus endeavoured to show that the historical relations of Buddhism and Hinduism to the State have been in the past, and are still in the present time, very different from the situation in the West. There has always existed, I submit, one essential distinction of principle. Religious propagation, forcible conversion, aided and abetted by the executive power of the State, and by laws against heresy or dissent, have been defended in the West by the doctors of Islam, and formerly by Christian theologians, by the axiom that all means are justifiable for extirpating false teachers who draw souls to perdition. The right and duty of the civil magistrate to maintain truth, in regard to which Bossuet declared all Christians to be unanimous, and which is still affirmed in the Litany of our Church, is a principle from which no Government, three centuries ago, dissented in theory, though in practice it needed cautious handling. I do not think that this principle ever found its way into Hinduism or Buddhism; I doubt, that is to say, whether the civil government was at any time called in to undertake or assist propagation of those religions as part of its duty. Nor do I know that the States of Eastern Asia, beyond the pale of Islam, claim or exercise the right of insisting on conformance to particular doctrines, because they are true. The erratic manifestations of the religious spirit throughout Asia, constantly breaking out in various forms and figures, in thaumaturgy, mystical inspiration, in orgies and secret societies, have always disquieted these Asiatic States, yet, so far as I can ascertain, the employment of force to repress them has always been justified on administrative or political grounds, as distinguishable from theological motives pure and simple. Sceptics and agnostics have been often marked out for persecution in the West, but I do not think that they have been molested in India, China, or Japan, where they abound, because they seldom meddle with politics.[ ‘Atheism did never disturb States’ (Bacon)]. It may perhaps be admitted, however, that a Government which undertakes to regulate impartially all rites and worship among its subjects is at a disadvantage by comparison with a Government that acts as the representative of a great church or an exclusive faith. It bears the sole undivided responsibility for measures of repression; it cannot allege divine command or even the obligation of punishing impiety for the public good. To conclude. In Asiatic States the superintendence of religious affairs is an integral attribute of the sovereignty, which no Government, except the English in India, has yet ventured to relinquish; and even in India this is not done without some risk, for religion and politics are still intermingled throughout the world; they act and react upon each other everywhere. They are still far from being disentangled in our own country, where the theory that a Government in its collective character must profess and even propagate some religion has not been very long obsolete. It was maintained seventy years ago by a great statesman who was already rising into prominence, by Mr. Gladstone. The text of Mr. Gladstone’s argument, in his book on the relations of the State with the Church, was Hooker’s saying, that the religious duty of kings is the weightiest part of their sovereignty; while Macaulay, in criticising this position, insisted that the main, if not the only, duty of a Government, to which all other objects must be subordinate, was the protection of persons and property. These two eminent politicians were, in fact, the champions of the ancient and the modern ideas of sovereignty; for the theory that a State is bound to propagate the religion that it professes was for many centuries the accepted theory of all Christian rulerships, though I think it now survives only in Mohammedan kingdoms. As the influence of religion in the sphere of politics declines, the State becomes naturally less concerned with the superintendence of religion; and the tendency of constitutional Governments seems to be towards abandoning it. The States that have completely dissolved connection with ecclesiastical institutions are the two great republics, the United States of America and France. We can discern at this moment a movement towards constitutional reforms in Mohammedan Asia, in Turkey, and Persia, and if they succeed it will be most interesting to observe the effect which liberal reforms will produce upon the relation of Mohammedan Governments with the dominant faith, and on which side the religious teachers will be arrayed. It is certain, at any rate, that for a long time to come religion will continue to be a potent factor in Asiatic politics; and I may add that the reconciliation of civil with religious liberty is one of the most arduous of the many problems to be solved by the promoters of national unity.”

An Academic Database of Doctoral & Other Postgraduate Research Done at UK Universities on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Other Asian Countries Over 100 Years

British universities have in the last one hundred years produced a vast and unsurpassable body of doctoral and other postgraduate research relating to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Afghanistan, Malaysia and  other Asian countries.

The first table below contains almost 3,300 entries,  each beginning with the date of award and the degree, followed by the University (and College), followed by the title of the thesis, followed by the AUTHOR in capital letters, followed by the name of the thesis supervisor where provided.

NB: There is a second table  that follows containing a further 78 77 entries — these latter are, however, incomplete in that either the year or the degree appears not to be available.

If you are an author or thesis-supervisor or other academic representative and you are able to correct any inadvertent error or omission, please feel free to write to me promptly by email and I shall seek to account for it.  For omissions, please also identify yourself clearly and send a comment  to the post along with the necessary data that you believe should be accounted for.  Numerous typos existed in the original transcription, several of which have been corrected though many might remain.  In several cases,  it is not impossible the original transcription has mis-spelt a name but authentication could require  the original thesis to be checked.

This  database has been created from public data and is published below with the aim of encouraging further research and reflection.  It may be of special interest to notice the choice and quality of subjects in the context of particular times.

Subroto Roy

Postscript:   More than one grateful reader has called this document someone’s  “labour of love”.   I agree though I have to say it was not mine — my contribution has been merely to  transform a confused spreadsheet into HTML, editing it very slightly, removing some but not all typos yet, and publishing it.  The spreadsheet was one of a million files on my computer, which must mean I downloaded it from some public source at some time though I am afraid I have no record where, most probably in British academia.

Degree    University & College    Title    AUTHOR    Supervisor

1909    MA    Liverpool    The interaction of England and India during the early years of George III    Dorothy DUDLEY
1917    BLitt    Oxford    The history of the occupation and rural administration of Bengal by the English Company from the time of Clive to the permanent settlement under Cornwallis    W K FIRMINGER
1917    MA    Liverpool    The constitutional relations of the Marquess Wellesley with the home authorities    Beatrice L FRAZER
1917    BLitt    Oxford    Agricultural cooperation in British India    J MATTHAI
1921    BA    Cambridge    Relations between the Bombay government and the Marathi powers up to the year 1774    W S DESI
1921    MA    Manchester    The movement of opinion in England as regards Indian affairs, 1757-1773    E EMMETT    Prof Muir
1921    MA    Manchester    The relations of the Mahrattas with the British power    I Kathleen WALKER    Prof Muir
1922    BLitt    Oxford    The history of Burma to 1824    G E HARVEY
1922    PhD    London    Commercial relations between India and England, 1600-1757    B KRISHNA
1922    MSc    London    Agricultural problems and conditions in the Bombay Presidency, 1870-1914    M A TATA
1922    BLitt    Oxford    The Indian calico trade and its influence on English history    P J THOMAS
1922    MSc    London    The cotton industry in India to 1757    J N VARMA    Prof Sargeant
1922    PhD    Manchester    The administration of Bengal under Warren Hastings    Sophia WEITZMAN    Prof Muir
1923    MA    Manchester    The administrative and judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal (excluding the permanent settlement)    A ASPINALL    Mr Higham
1923    MA    Manchester    The Residency of Oudh during the administration of Warren Hastings    C C BRACEWELL    Prof Davis
1923    MLitt    Cambridge    Industrial evolution of India in recent times    D R GADGIL
1923    PhD    London    The Punjab as a sovereign state, 1799-1839    GULSHAM LALL    Prof Dodwell
1924    BLitt    Oxford    Development of the cotton industry in Indian from the early 19th century    S DESOUANDE
1925    MA    Liverpool    Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1784-1800    Dorothy THORNTON    Prof Veitch
1926    PhD    Cambridge    The North West Frontier of India, 1890-1909, with a survey of policy since 1849    C C DAVIES
1927    PhD    Leeds    A study of the development of agriculture in the Punjab and its economic effects    K S BAJWA
1927    BLitt    Oxford    The military system of the Mahrattas: its origin and development from the time of the Shivaji to the fall of the Mahratta empire    S SEN
1928    MA    Birmingham    The East India Company crisis, 1770-1773    R BEARD
1928    PhD    Edinburgh    A comparative study of the woollen industry in Scotland and the Punjab    J W SIRAJUDDIN    Dr Rankin
1929    PhD    London    The relations of the Governor-General and council with the Governor and council of Madras under the Regulating Act of 1773    A Das GUPTA    Prof Dodwell
1929    PhD    London, LSE    The evolution of Indian income tax, 1860-1922: a historical, critical and comparative study    J P NIYOGI
1929    PhD    London    Development of Indian ralways, 1842-1928    N SANYAL    Prof Foxwell; Dr Slater
1930    PhD    London    Financial history of Mysore, 1799-1831    M H GOPAL    Dr Slater; Prof Dodwell
1930    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s Soc    The development of political institutions in the state of Travancore, 1885-1924    V M ITTYERAH
1930    BLitt    Oxford    Sir Charles Crosthwaite and the consolidation of Burma    Mys J MAY-OUNG
1930    PhD    London, SOAS    Revenue administration of the Sirkars under the East India Company down to 1802    Lanka SUNDERAM
1930    PhD    London, LSE    Hastings’ experiments in the judicial administration    N J M YUSUF
1931    PhD    London    State policy and economic development in Mysore State since 1881    UDAYAM ABHAYAMBAL    Miss Anstey
1931    PhD    London    The origin and early history of public debt in India    P DATTA    Prof Coatman
1931    MA    London    Lord Macaulay and the Indian Legislative Council    C D DHARKAR    Prof Dodwell
1931    MA    London    The bilingual problem in Ceylon    T D JAYASURIYA
1931    PhD    London; LSE    Study of agricultural cooperation in India based upon foreign experience    H L PASRICHA    Prof Gregory
1931    PhD    London, UC    The administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon. 1834-1861    K N V SASTRI    Prof Dodwell

1931    PhD    London, SOAS    Administrative beginnings in British Burma, 1826-1843    Barbara J STEWART

1931/32    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    English social life in India in the 18th century    T G P SPEAR
1932    PhD    London    The growth and development of the Indian tea industry and trade    S M AKHTAR    Dr Anstey
1932    PhD    London    Anglo-Sikh relations, 1839-1849    K C KHANNA    Prof Dodwell
1932    PhD    London, LSE    Indian commodity market speculation    L N MISRA    Prof Coatman
1932    PhD    London, LSE    Indian foreign trade, 1870-1930    Parimal RAY    Prof Sargent
1932    PhD    London, King’s    Ceylon under the British occupation: its political and economic development, 1795-1833    C R de SILVA    Prof Newton
1932    PhD    London    Post-war labour legislation in India – a comparison with Japan    Sasadhar SINHA    Dr Anstey
1932    PhD    London    Local finance in India    G C VARMA    Prof Coatman
1933    PhD    Leeds    Historical survey of the financial policy of the government of India from 1857 to 1900 and of its economic and other consequences    H S BHAI
1933    PhD    London    The relations between the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India and the Court of Directors, 1784-1816    P CHANDRA    Prof Coatman
1934    PhD    London    The influence of the home government on land revenue and judicial administration in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal from 1807-1822    B S BALIGA    Prof Dodwell
1934    MSc    Leeds    A survey of the resources of tanning materials and the leather industry of Bhopal State, India    G W DOUGLAS
1934    PhD    Edinburgh    Human geography of Bengal    Arthur GEDDES
1934    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    A study of the legal and administrative records of Dacca as illustrating the policy of Warren Hastings in East Bengal    F M SACHSE
1934    BLitt    Oxford    Biography of Maharaja DalipSingh    K S THAPER
1935    DPhil    Oxford    The development of the Indian administrative and financial system, 1858-1905, with special reference to the relations    F J THOMAS
1936    MSc    London    British Indian administration: a historical study    K R Ramaswami AIYANGAR
1936    MA    London    Lord Ellenborough’s ideas on Indian policy    Kathleen I GARRETT    Dr Morrell
1936    MA    London    British public opinion regarding Indian policy at the time of the mutiny    Jessie HOLMES    Dr Morrell
1936    PhD    London, SOAS    The rise and fall of the Rohilla power in Hindustan, 1707-1774 AD    A F M K RAHMAN
1936/37    PhD    Edinburgh    Indian foreign trade, 1900-1931, and its economic background: a study    W B RAGHAVIAH
1937    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville    The national income of British India, 1931-1932    V K R V RAO
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Culture change in South-Western India    A AIYAPPAN
1937    PhD    London, UC    Banks and industrial finance in India    R BAGCHI
1937    PhD    London    Development of social and political ideas in Bengal, 1858-1884    B C BHATTACHARYA    Prof Dodwell
1937    MSc    Leeds    An interpretation of the distribution of the population within the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh    Nora Y BOYDELL
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Rise and growth of Indian liberalism    M A BUCH
1937    PhD    London, LSE    Industrial finance and management in India    N DAS
1937    MSc    London, LSE    The effect of the breakdown of the international gold standard on India    R DORAISWAMY
1937    PhD    London, LSE    The problem of rural indebtedness in Indian economic life    B G GHATE
1937    MSc    London, LSE    Indian coal trade    J GUHATHAKURTA
1937    PhD    London SOAS    Reorganisation of the Punjab government (1847-1857)    R C LAI

1937    PhD    London, External    An economic and regional geography of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh    S M T RIZVI
1937    PhD    Wales    Purposes and methods of recording and accounting as applied to agriculture, with special reference to provision and use of economic data relating to agriculture in India    Arjan SINGH
1938    PhD    London, SOAS    The relations between Oudh and the East India Company from 1785-1801    P BASU
1938    PhD    London,  SOAS    East India Company’s relations with Assam, 1771-1826    S K BHUYAN
1938    PhD    London, LSE    Discretionary powers in the Indian Government with special reference to district administration    B CHAND
1938    MA    London, SOAS    The British conquest of Sind    K A CHISHTI
1938    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    The working of the Bengal legislative council under the Government of India Act, 1919    J G DRUMMOND
1938    MA    London    British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840    E R KAPADIA
1938    PhD    London, SOAS    The East India interest and the British government, 1784-1833    C H PHILIPS
1938    PhD    London, LSE    The position of the Viceroy and Governor General of India    A RUDRA
1938    MA    London    British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840    Charles WADE
1938/39    PhD    Edinburgh    Agricultural geography of the United Provinces    B N MUKERJI
1939    PhD    London, LSE    Industrial development of Mysore    R BALAKRISHNA
1939    MA    London, LSE    A general geographical account of the North West Frontier Province of India    M A K DURRANI
1939    PhD    Wales    The international production and exchange of rice with special reference to the production, market demand and consumption of rice in India and Burma    Ahmas KHAN
1939    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s Soc    The Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, 1793-1798    A W MAHMOOD
1939    PhD    London, LSE    Indian provincial finance (1919-1937) with special reference to the United Provinces    B R MISRA
1940    PhD    London, LSE    Recent economic depression in India with reference to agriculture and rural life    R K BHAN
1940    PhD    Wales    The future of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces (with an examination of the cooperative experience)with special reference to the problems of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces, India    H R CHATURVEDI
1940    PhD    London, LSE    An administrative study of the development of the civil service in India during the Company’s regime    A K GHOSAL
1940    PhD    Wales    The production, marketing and consumption of the chief oilseeds in India and the supply and use of oilseeds in the United Kingdom    A S KHAN
1940    PhD    Wales    Principles of agricultural planning with reference to relationships of natural resources, populations and dietaries in India and with further reference to rural development in certain provinces of India    Jaswant SINGH
1941    PhD    London, LSE    Financing of local authorities in British India    A N BANERJI
1941    PhD    London    The political and cultural history of the Punjab including the North West Frontier Province in its earliest period    L CHANDRA    Prof Barnett
1941    PhD    London, LSE    Capital development of India, 1860-1913    A KRISHNASAWMI
1941    PhD    London, LSE    Influence of European political doctrines upon the evolution of the Indian governmental institutions and practice, 1858-1938    G PRASAD
1942    MLitt    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Economic and political relations of India with Iran and Afghanistan since 1900    T BASU
1942    PhD    Edinburgh    A study of missionary policy and methods in Bengal from 1793 to 1905    W B S DAVIS    Prof Watt; Prof Buleigh
1943    PhD    London, LSE    Development of large scale industries in India and their localisation    N S SASTRI
1944    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    Communal representation and Indian self-government    I J BAHADOORSINGH
1944    MA    London, External    The physiographic evolution of Ceylon    K KULARATNAM
1946    MA    London, SOAS    The origins and development to 1892 of the Indian National Congress    Iris M JONES
1947    PhD    London, LSE    The agricultural geography of Bihar    P DAYAL
1947    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Consumer expenditure in India, 1931/32 to 1940/41    R L DESAI
1947    MA    London, LSE    Power resources and utilisation in the United Provinces    P K DUTT
1947    PhD    London, LSE    Cultural change with special reference to the hill tribes of Burma and Assam    Edmund Ronald LEACH
1947    PhD    London, SOAS    The judicial administration of the East India Company in Bengal, 1765-1982    B B MISRA
1947    PhD    London, LSE    The monetary policy of the Reserve Bank of India with special reference to the structural and institutional factors in the economy    K N RAJ
1948    PhD    Wales    The principles and practice of health insurance as applied to India    J AGRAWALA
1948    MSc    London, LSE    International monetary policy since 1919 with special reference to India    D C GHOSE
1948    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    British policy on the North East Frontier of India, 1826-1886    S GUPTA
1948    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Local self-government in the Madras Presidency, 1850-1919    K K PILLAY
1948    PhD    London, LSE    The problem of the standards of the Indian currency    A SADEQUE
1948    DPhil    Oxford, Exeter    The social function of religion in a south India community    Mysore Narasimhashar SRINIVAS
1948    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s Society    Some aspects of agricultural marketing in India with reference to developments in western marketing systems    R S SRIVASTAVA
1948    PhD    London,. SOAS    Muslims in India: a political analysis (from 1885-906)    Rafiq ZAKARIA
1949    PhD    London, LSE    Settlements in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh    E AHMAD
1949    PhD    London, SOAS    The growth of self-government in Assam, 1984-1919    A K BARKAKOTY
1949    PhD    London, SOAS    British administration in Assam (1825-1845)with special reference to the hill tribes on the frontier    H BARPUJARI
1949    MA    London    An enquiry into the development of training of teachers in the Punjab during the British period    Aquila B BERLAS
1949    PhD    London, LSE    The problem of federation in India with special reference to economic relations    J N BHAN
1949    PhD    London, LSE    A study of methods of national income measurements with special reference to the problems of India    V K CHOPRA
1949    PhD    London, LSE    An analysis of the Indian price structure from 1861    A K GHOSH
1949    DPhil    Oxford, Keble    The achievement of Christian missionaries in India, 1794-1833    Kenneth INGHAM
1949    PhD    Wales    The organization and methods of agricultural cooperation in the British Isles and the possibility of their application in the Central Province of India    N Y KHER
1949    PhD    London, LSE    Industrial geography of Bihar    S A MAJID
1949    PhD    London, LSE    Development of Indian public finance during the war, April 1939-March 1946    S MISRA
1949    PhD    London, LSE    A study of the methods of state regulation of wages with special reference to their possible applications in India    S B L NIGAM
1949    PhD    London, SOAS    The development of marriage in ancient India    B C PAUL
1949    PhD    St Andrews    The social and administrative reforms of Lord William Bentinck    G SEED
1950    PhD    London, LSE    Jails and borstals with special reference to West Bengal    B BHATTACHARYYA    Dr Mannheim
1950    PhD    London    The growth of local self-government in Assam, 1874-1919    A K BORKAKOTY    Prof C R Philips; Prof Hall
1950    DPhil    Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall    The problem of the Indian immigrant in British colonial policy after 1834    I Mary CUMPSTON
1950    PhD    London, LSE    Underemployment and industrialisation: a study of the basic problems with special reference to India    B DATTA
1950    PhD    London, UC    The agriculture of Mysore    G K GHORI
1950    PhD    London, SOAS    The influence of western, particularly English, political ideas on Indian political thought, with special reference to the political ideas of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919    Sailesh C GHOSH
1950    PhD    London, LSE    Principles of unemployment insurance and assistance with special reference to their application to India    D GUPTA
1950    PhD    Newcastle    Anglo-Afghan relations, 1798-1878, with particular reference to British policy in Central Asia and on the North West Frontier of India    M KHAN
1950    PhD    London, LSE    The social consequences of imperialism with special reference to Ceylon    P R PIERIS
1950    PhD    London, LSE    An experiment in the estimation of national income and the in the construction of social accounts of India, 1945-1946    D N SAXENA    Mr Booker
1950    PhD    London, SOAS    The relations between the home and Indian governments, 1858-1870    Zahinuddin  Husain ZOBERI
1951    PhD    London, External    Memoir of the geology and mineral resources of the neighbourhood of Bentong, Pahang and adjoining portions of Selangor and Negri Sembilan, incorporating an account of the prospecting and mining activities of the Bentong District    J B ALEXANDER
1951    BLitt    Oxford, Exeter    The political organization of the plains Indians    Frederick George BAILEY
1951    BLitt    Oxford, Corpus    Southern India under Wellesley, 1798-1805    A S BENNELL    Mr C C Davies
1951    PhD    London, LSE    Problems of the Indian foreign exchanges since 1927    D GHOSH
1951    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884    S GOPAL    Mr R C Davies
1951    MA    Wales    The problem of the Straits, 1896-1936    E W GRIFFITHS
1951    PhD    London, LSE    Sources of Indian official statistics relating to production    O P GUPTA    Dr Rhodes
1951    MA    Manchester    The administration and financial control of municipalities and district boards in the UP    N K KATHIA
1951    PhD    Glasgow    The legal and constitutional implications of the evolution of Indian independence    R KEMAL
1951    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    An analysis of the Hindu caste system in its interactions with the total social structure in certain parts of the Malabar coast    E J MILLER    Prof Hutton
1951    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    Changes in matrilineal kinship on th Malabar coast    E K MILLER    Prof Hutton
1951    PhD    Bristol    Agriculture and horticulture in India – sundry papers    K C NAIK
1951    MA    Manchester    An economic survey of West Pakistan    A SHARIF
1951    PhD    Cambridge    The interpretation of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935    S D SHARMA
1951    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s Society    Religion and society among some of the tribes of Chota Nagpur    H N C STEVENSON
1951        London, SOAS    The political development of Burma during the period 1918-1935    OHN TIN
1951    PhD    London, LSE    The working of the Donoughmore constitution of Ceylon, 1931-1947: a study of a colonial central government by executive committees    Irripitwebadalge don Samaradasa WEERAWARDANA    Mr W H Morris-Jones
1952    PhD    London SOAS    The career of Mir Jafar Khan, 1757-1765 AD    Raya ATULA-CHANDRA    Prof C H Philips
1952    PhD    London, LSE    The development of Calcutta: a study in urban geography    M GUHA    Prof L D Stamp; Prof O H K Spate
1952    PhD    London, LSE    The East India Company’s land policy and management in Bengal from 1698 to 1784    Mazharul HUQ    Dr Anstey
1952    MA    Leeds    The social accounts relating to Ceylon    E L P JAYTILAKA
1952    MSc    London, LSE    Rural industries in India: a study in rural economic development with special reference to Madras    C K KAUSUKUTTY    Dr Anstey
1952    MSc    London, LSE    India’s balance of international payments with special reference to her food and agricultural conditions    G B KULKARNI    Dr Anstey; Dr Raeburn
1952    PhD    Cambridge    Utilitarian influence and the formation of Indian policy, 1820-1840    E T STOKES
1952    PhD    London, SOAS    Local government in India and Burma, 1908-1937: a comparative study of the evolution and working of local authorities in Bombay, the United Provinces and Burma    Hugh R TINKER    Prof Hall
1953    PhD    London, LSE    Economic geography of East Pakistan    N AHMAD    Prof Stamp
1953    MSc    London, UC    the changing pattern of India’s foreign trade, with special reference to the impact of large scale industrial development since 1919    A ALAGAPPAN
1953    PhD    London, SOAS    The East India Company and the economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740    Sukumar BHATTACHARYYA    Prof C H Philips
1953    MA    Wales    National income of Pakistan for the year 1948-49    Z ul H CHAUDRI
1953    MLitt    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The influence of Western thought on social, educational, political and cultural development of India, 1818-1840    V DATTA    Dr T G P Spear
1953    MSc    Belfast    The growth of trade unions in India    S DAYAL
1953    PhD    London    The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1658     K W GOONEWARDENA    Prof Hall
1953    PhD    London, LSE    The submontane region of North West Pakistan: a geographical study of its economic development    Maryam KARAM-ELAHI    Prof Buchanan; Prof Stamp
1953    PhD    London, LSE    A study of rhe measurement of national product and its distribution, with special reference to Pakistan    A H KHANDKER
1953    PhD    Edinburgh    A regional study of survival, mortality and disease in British India in relation to the geographic factors, 1921-1940    A T A LEARMONTH
1953    PhD    London, SOAS    Development of the Muslims of Bengal and Bihar, 1819-1856, with special reference to their education    A R MAALICK    Prof Philips
1953    DPhil    Oxford, Jesus    The study of the economy of self-subsisting rural communities: the methods of investigation, economic conditions and economic relations, with specific reference to India    P K MUKHOPADHYAY
1953    PhD    London, LSE    The relationship of land tenure to the economic modernization of Uttar Pradesh    W C NEALE
1953    PhD    London, Bedford    Social status of women during the past fifty years (1900=1950)    T N PATEL    Mrs B Wootton
1953    PhD    London, LSE    The state in relation to trade unions and trade disputes in India    Anand PRAKASH    Mr W H Morris-Jones; Mr Roberts
1953    MA    London, SOAS    The tribal village in Bihar    SACHCHIDANANDA    Prof C Haimendorf
1953    PhD    London, UC    Delegated legislation in India    V N SHULKA    Prof Keeton
1953    PhD    London, SOAS    The internal policy of the Indian government, 1885-1898    H L SINGH    Prof C H Philips
1953    PhD    London, SOAS    The internal policy of Lord Auckland in British India, 1836-1842, with special reference to education    D P SINHA    Prof C H Philips
1953/54    MA    Leeds    Demand for certain exports of Ceylon    K THARMARATNAM
1954    MA    London    The administration of Sir Henry Ward,Governor of Ceylon, 1855-1860    S V BALASINGHAM    Prof Graham
1954    PhD    London, SOAS    Social policy and social change in Western India, 1817-1830    Kenneth A BALLHATCHET    Prof C H Philips
1954    Dphil    Oxford, St Hilda’s    Lord William Bentinck in Bengal, 1828-1835    C E BARRETT    Dr C C Davies
1954    MA    London    A historical survey of the training of teachers in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries    S BHATTACHARYA
1954    MA    London, SOAS    Evolution of representative government in India, 1884-1909    Sasadhar CHAKRAVARTY    Prof C H Philips

1954    PhD    London, LSE    Consumption levels in India    T P CHAUDHURI
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The forests of Assam: a study in economic geography    H DAS
1954    MSc    Leeds    A study of price fixing for agricultural products with special reference to milk in Great Britain and Bombay    N K DESAI
1954    BLitt    St Andrews    Eldred Pottinger and the North West Frontier, 1838-1842    D W F GOURLAY    Sir C Ogilvie
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The Korean crisis and the Indian Union    K GUPTA
1954    MA    Manchester    Some aspects of the development of Pakistan’s financial structure    M HOSSAIN
1954    MSc    London, LSE    Financing economic development in Ceylon    A T JAYAKODDY    Prof Paish; Dr Anstey
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Measurement of profits: a study of methods with special reference to India    R K NIGAM
1954    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    A study of communal representation in constitutional systems of the British Commonwealth with specific reference to Ceylon, Kenya and Fiji    Carl Gustav ROSBERG    Mr K E Robinson
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Land utilization in Eastern Uttar Pradesh (comprising the districts of Jaunpur, Banares, Guezipur, Azamgarh and Baldea)    M SHAFI    Prof Stamp; Mr R R Rawson
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Representation and representative government in the Indian Republic    Irene C TINKER    Mr W H Morris-Jones
1954    PhD    London, SOAS    Trade and finance in the Bengal Presidency, 1793-1833    Amales TRIPATHY    Prof C H Phillips
1954    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of the history of the coffee industry in Ceylon with specific reference to 1823-1885    I H VAN DEN DRIESEN    Mr Fisher
1954    PhD    London, LSE    The Manning constitution of Ceylon, 1924-1931    Alfred Jeyaretnam WILSON    Mr R Bassett; Mr W H Morris-Jones
1955    MSC    London, LSE    Some aspects of the history of British investments in the private sector of the Indian economy, 1876-1914    N Z AHMED    Dr Ashworth; F J Fisher
1955    PhD    Manchester    The social organisation of a village on the Hindu frontier of Orissa    Frederick George BAILEY
1955    LLM    London, LSE    Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in India: a comparative study    B N BANERJEE
1955    PhD    London    The administration of criminal justice in Bengal from 1773 to 1861    T K BANERJEE    S A de Smith; Prof A Gledhill
1955    MA    London    The East India Company in Madras, 1707-1744    R N BANERJI
1955    PhD    London    The factory of the English East India Company at bantam, 1602-1682    D K BASSETT    Prof D G E Hall
1955    PhD    London, LSSE    Pressure of population on land in India: a regional approach    B S BHIR
1955    MA    London, SOAS    The economic policy of the Government of India, 1898-1905    Edna BONNER    Prof C R Philips
1955    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The educational policy of the East India Company, 1781-1854    J G BOWEN    Mr C C Davies
1955    BLitt    Oxford, Magdalen    Indian labour migration to Malaya, 1867-1910    D A CALMAN    Dr A F Madden
1955    PhD    London, LSE    Consumption levels in India    T P CHOUDHURY
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The Malay family in Singapore    J DJAMOUR
1955    PhD    Edinburgh    The abolition of the East India Company’s monopoly, 1833    D EYLES    Prof Pares
1955    MLitt    Cambridge. Fitzwilliam House    The mongoloids and their contributions to the growth of Assamese culture    M C GOSWAMI    Dr J E Lindgren
1955    PhD    London, SOAS    The administration of the Delhi Territory, 1803-1832    Jessie HOLMES    Prof C H Philips
1955    MSc (Econ)    London, LSE    Taxation and saving in India    D JHA
1955    MSc    London, LSE    A comparison of the federal aspects of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the constitution of 1950    S KHAN
1955    MA    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the social history of Bengal with special reference to the Muslims, 1854-1884    L KHATOON    Prof Philips
1955    PhD    Aberdeen    Ports of the Indian ocean: an historical geography    W KIRK    A C O’Dell
1955    PhD    Cambridge, Peterhouse    British investment in Indian guaranteed railways, 1845-1875    W J MACPHERSON    Mr K E Berrill
1955    PhD    London, UC    Fundamental freedoms, with particular reference to the Indian constitution    J C MEHDI    Prof G W Keeton
1955    PhD    Birmingham    The educational ideas of Mahatma Gandhi    N P PILLAI
1955    MA    Manchester    Cottage industries in Bihar    S B SAXENA
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The Indian jute industry: a study of agricultural geography    P SENGUPTA
1955    PhD    London,  LSE    The political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi in relation to the English liberal tradition    Bishan Sarup SHARMA
1955    LLM    London, SOAS    Distribution of legislative power under the India constitution    R P SHARMA
1955    PhD    London , SOAS    The Council of India, 1858-1919    S SINGH    Prof C H Philips
1955    PhD    London LSE    The origin and development of left wing movements and ideas in India, 1919-1947    Lalan Prasad SINHA    R Mikband; W H Morris-Jones
1955    PhD    London; SOAS    British interest in trans-Burma trade routes to China, 1826-1876    Ma THAUNG
1955    MA    London    The training of teachers in the Bombay Presidency during the British period: a historical survey    N L VAIDYA
1955    PhD    Edinburgh    Save there, eat here: a cultural study of labour migration from a Pakhtun village    Francis Philip WATKINS
1955    PhD    London, LSE    The southeast quadrant of Ceylon: a study of the geographical aspects of land use    W A R WIKKRAMATILEKE
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    The Dutch power in Ceylon, 1658-1687    S ARASARATNAM    Prof D Hall
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Land use and soil erosion problems of Bist Jullundur Doab, Punjab, India    O P BHARDWAJA
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    British rule in Assam, 1845-1858    B CHAUDHURI    Prof C R Philips
1956    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Josiah Child and the East India Company at the end of the 17th century    A L CROWE    Prof C Philips
1956    MSc    London, LSE    Scope and method of agricultural economic surveys in India    N Y Z FARUQI    Dr Raeburn
1956    PhD    London, LSE    A study of capital taxation and its scope in India    I S GULATI
1956    PhD    London, LSE    An analysis of the monetary experience of Ceylon    H A de S GUNASEKERA    Prof Sayers; Mr Wilson
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Federal finance and economic development with special reference to Pakistan    M HOSSAIN
1956    PhD    London, LSE    The demand for Indian exports and imports: an econometric study of selected commodities    A K MUKERJI    Prof Allen; Dr Norton
1956    PhD    London, LSE    Capital development in India with special reference to recent trends in investments    Dinanath Kashinath RANGNEKAR    Prof Paish; Dr Anstey
1956    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    A study of India’s balance of payments, 1901-1913 and 1924-1936    B S RAO    Prof E A G Robinson
1956    MA    London, SOAS    The relations between the Indian central and provincial governments with special reference to the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, 1858-1882    D N SINGH    Prof C H Philips
1957    MA    Birmingham    An examination in disposal and treatment of juvenile delinquents in Bombay State in relation to practice in England    A D ATTAR
1957    MA    London    The development and reconstruction of university education in Pakistan since 1854    S M A AZIZ
1957    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Social organisation of the Jaffna Tamils of North Ceylon with special reference to kinship, marriage and inheritance    M Y BANKS    Mr E R Leach
1957    PhD    London, LSE    West Midnapore: a study of land use    S C CHAKRABORTI
1957    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    The place of agricultural development in India’s first two Five-Year Plans    A CORREIA-AFONSO
1957    PhD    London, SOAS    Studies in the economic and social development of Inida, 1848-1856    M N DAS    Prof C Philips
1957    MA    London, LSE    The population of Chota Nagpur    H P DEVI    Prof L D Stamp
1957    MSc    London, LSE    Small scale and cottage industries as a means of providing better opportunities for labour in India    Q H FAROOQUEE    Prof A Plant; Mr Foldes
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Fiscal policy and inflation in post-war India, 1945-1954    K V G GOWDA
1957    DPhil    Oxford    Anglo Sikh relations, 1799-1849    B J HASRAT    C C Davies
1957    MLitt    Cambridge, Girton    Indian constitutional development, 1927-1935    M B HASSEN    Dr T G P Spear
1957    PhD    London, LSE    The commitee system in British and Indian local authorities    C JHA    Prof W A Robbins
1957    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    The development of money and banking in Ceylon    J B KELEGAMA
1957    PhD    London, LSE    The civil service in independent India: the All India and Union Civil Services    B S KHANNA    Prof W A Robson
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Urbanization in West Pakistan    K KURESHY
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Hinduism and economic growth: a study of the nature of the impact of Hinduism on India’s economic growth with special emphasis on theperiod since the mid 18th century    B B MISHRA    Dr Anstey
1957    PhD    London, External    Large scale sampling surveys in agriculture in the Punjab (Pakistan)    D M QURESHI
1957    PhD    London, SOAS    British land policy in Oudh    j RAJ    Prof C H Philips
1957    DPhil    Oxford    The Dutch in Coromandel, 1605-1690    Tapan RAYCHAUDHURI
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Geomorphological evolution of the highaland of Chota Nagpur and the adjoining districts of Bihar    R P SINGH
1957    PhD    London, LSE    Credit problems of small farmers in Ceylon    Wijetunga Mudianselagadera TILAKARATNA    Mr A D Knox
1957    PhD    London    The urban geography of Agra    A R TIWARI    Prof A E Smailes
1957/58    PhD    London, SOAS    The life and career of Jonathan Duncan, 1756-1795    V NARAIN
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    A comparative study of informal relationships in a Chinese village in Malaya and north India    W H NEWELL
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    The history of the Arghuns and Tarkhans of Sind    M H SIDDIQI
1957/58    PhD    Manchester    An analysis of the demand for, and the supply of, food in India    R P SINHA
1958    MA    London, Inst Ed    The missionary activities of the CMS and CZEMS in Kashmir during the second half of the 19th century    S Z AHMED SAH    Prof J A Lauwerys
1958    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The political organisation of the Swat Pathans    T F W BARTH    Mr E R Leach
1958    MA    London, Inst Ed    A historical survey of the languages problem in Bengal from the Muslim period to the end of the British period    K BHATTACHARYYA
1958    MSc    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The financing of planned economic development in India    S R DATTA GUPTA    Dr A R Prest
1958    MA    London, LSE    Sociology of marriage rituals in India: a study of Sanskritisation and de-Sanskritisation    B DATTAGUPTA
1958    MSc    Londond, LSE    Some aspects of Indo-British trade during the 20th century with special reference to capital goods    V P DHITAL
1958    MA    London, SOAS    The political system of the Rajputs    Sylvia J DUTRA    Dr Bauley; Prof C von Furer-Haimendorf
1958    MSc    London, LSE    The economics of the tea industry in Ceylon    J M F G FERNANDO    Dr V Anstey
1958    PhD    London    The development of the Indian National Congress, 1892-1909    Pansy C GHOSH    Dr K Balhatchet
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Inflation in India, 1939-1952: a study of inflation in an underdeveloped economy    S K GHOSH    Dr Anstey; Mr Day
1958    PhD    London,SOAS    The internal administration of Lord Lytton, with special reference to social and economic policy, 1876-1880    L M GUJRAL
1958    MLitt    Cambridge, King’s    Sir Richard Jenkins and the Residency at Nagpur, 1807-1818    F A HAGAR    Dr T G P Spear
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Agrarian problems in Bihar based, primarily, on surveys in five villages    F Tomasson JANNUZI    Dr V Anstey
1958    BLitt    Oxford, Campion Hall    An economic and historical study of food grain controls in India during the second world war and after    S C JOSEPH
1958    MSc    London, LSE    Union-state administrative cooperation in India (1937-1952)    M KAMAL    Prof W A Robson
1958    MSc    London, LSE    Problems of the agricultural labourers in India    R P KAMAT
1958    MSc    Cambridge, Newnham    The employment problem in Ceylon    I KANNANGARA    Mrs J V Robinson
1958    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The commercial and diplomatic relations between India and Tibet in the nineteenth century    H A LAMB    Dr V W W S Purcell
1958    PhD    Cambridge, St Catharine’s    The Dutch East India Company and Mysore, 1762-1790    J van LOHUIZEN    Dr T G P Spear
1958    MA    London, LSE    Social and economic geography of the Mathura District (western Uttar Pradash)    S D MISRA    Mr R R Rawson
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Economics of nutritional problems in India    R N MITRA    Dr Raeburn
1958    PhD    Cambridge, Peterhouse    The analysis of Kandyan marriage: landlords, labourers and aristocrats    OSMAN YALMAN NUR
1958    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Elijah Impey in India, 1774-1783    Bishwa Nath PANDEY    Prof C H Philips
1958    MA    London, LSE    A geography of the Peshawar region    M Z SAHIBZADA
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Indian monetary policy and debt management since 1939    J C D SETHI    Dr V Anstey; Mr R Turvey
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Strategic aspects of India’s foreign policy    V B L SHARMA
1958    BLitt    Oxford, St Antony’s    The rise and growth of the Praja Socialist Party of India (1934-1935)    H K SINGH    Mr F G Carnell
1958    PhD    London, LSE    Allahabad: a study in urban geography    Ujaqir SINGH    Prof D L Stamp

1958 PhD London, SOAS  Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas  Romila THAPAR Prof A.L.Basham [viz., note from Prof Thapar dated 4 March 2016]

1958    MA    London, SOAS    History of the development of Rangoon    TUN THET    Prof Hall
1958    PhD    London, LSE    India’s membership of the sterling area    Jai Dev VARMA
1958    PhD    Cambridge    The present situation and the probably future of cotton in West Pakistan’s economy    S B WHITEHILL
1958    PhD    Edinburgh    The economic geography of Madhya Pradesh (formerly Central Provinces and Behar)    R H ZAIDI
1959    MSc(Econ)    London, LSE    The industrial worker in East Pakistan: a study in the adaptation of an industrial labour force    A K AHMADULLAH    Prof Phelps
1959    MA    Manchester    The recruitment of Indians into the covenanted civil service, 1853-1892    M R ANWAR
1959    PhD    Manchester    Britain and Muslim India: a study of British public opinion vis-a-vis the development of Muslim nationalism in India, 1905-1947    K K AZIZ
1959    MSc    London, LSE    Problems in corporation taxation with special reference to India    M P BHATT    Mr Turvey
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Applications of linear programming to the development plans of India    B BHATTACHARYYA
1959    MA    London    Trincocmalee and the East Indies Squadron, 1746-1844    H A COLGATE    Prof Graham
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Economic development of Assam with special reference to the 20th century    P GOSWAMI    Dr Anstey
1959    PhD    London    The nationalist movement in Ceylon betweem 1910 and 1931, with special reference to communal and elective problems    D K GREENSTREET    Dr Miliband
1959    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    Land tenure in the Kandyan provinces of Ceylon    U A GUNASEKERA    Dr D F Pocock
1959    BLitt    Oxford, St Anne’s    The analysis of external trade and economic structure of Ceylon, 1900-1955    O E B GUNEWARDENA    Miss P H Ady
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Some problems of the organisation and administration of public enterprise with special reference to India    L N GUPTA    Prof Robson; Dr Anstey
1959    PhD    Edinburgh    The collection of agricultural statistics and the use of data in the United Kingdom and Pakistan: an objective study to explore possibilities of improvement in Pakistan    Muhammed Altaf HUSSAIN
1959    MA    London, SOAS    Social and administrative policy of the Government of Bengal, 1877-1890    Rokeya KABEER    Prof Basham
1959    PhD    London, External    Industrial relations in India    C B KUMAR
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of the problem of implementing agricultural planning in India    Gouri NAG    Mr Knox; Mr Lancaster
1959    PhD    Edinburgh    Early English travellers in India. A study in the travel literature of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods with particular reference to India    R C PRASAD    Prof W L Renwick; Mr G A Shepperson
1959    PhD    London, LSE    Judicial review in India: a study in constitutional theory and judicial practice    V R RAVIKANTI    Mr S de Smith
1959    MA    London, LSE    The position of women in Hinayana Buddhist countries (Burma, Ceylon, Thailand)    S SEIN    Mr F Freedman
1959    PhD    London , LSE    British opinion and Indian neutralism: an analysis of India’s foreign policy in the  light of British public reactions, 1947-1957    Shri Ram SHARMA    Prof Manning
1959/60    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The cottage industries of India: an enquiry into their economics with special reference to developmental planning    Kedarnath PRASAD
1959/60    PhD    Cambridge, Queen’s    The role of transport and foreign trade in the economic development of Burma under British rule, 1885-1914    Maung SHEIN
1959/60    PhD    London, External    North east Baluchistan, Quetta Division: a critical evaluation of the land and its resources    A H SIDDIQI
1959/60    MA    Manchester    An analysis of the principal factors affecting India’s policy toward her Himalayan border    J TOOMRE
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the history of the Muslim community in Bengal, 1884-1912    Sufia AHMED    Prof C H Philips
1960    MA    London    Aspects of the economic development of the Assam valley, 1858-1884    A C BARUA    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    Cambridge    Thomas Munro and the development of administrative policy in Madras, 1791-1818: the origins of “the Munro system”    T H BEAGLEHOLE    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    London, LSE    Measurements of production and productivity in Indian industry with special reference to methodological aspects    G C BERI
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    The state and the cooperative movement in the Bombay Presidency, 1880-1930    I J CATANACH    Dr K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    London, LSE    The centrally recruited services in Pakistan    M A CHAUDHURI    Prof P Robson
1960    DPhil    Oxford, Lincoln    Portuguese society in India in the sixteenth and seveteenth centuries    K J CROWTHER
1960    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Cottage industries of Ceylon    H D DIAS    Mr B H Farmer
1960    MSc (Econ)    London    Someproblems of agriculture in the Vale of Peshawar (West Pakistan)    Lloyd Suttor EDMONDS
1960    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Malabar in Asian trade, 1740-1800    Asin Ranjan Das GUPTA

1960    MA    Wales, Swansea    Indian international transactions 1948 to 1958    C GURUPRASAD
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy on the North West Frontier Province of India, 1889-1901    L HARRIS    Prof K Ballhatchet
1960    PhD    London, External    Agricultural geography of East Pakistan    B L C JOHNSON
1960    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The Indian National Congress, 1918-1923    G KKRISHNA    Dr G F Hudson
1960    PhD    London    The growth of the idea of Commonwealth in India. 1900-1929    S R MEHROTRA    Prof Philips
1960    PhD    London    The Burma-China boundary since 1886    Khin Maung NYUNT
1960    PhD    London, Birkbeck    Colombo: a study in urban geography    D B L PANDITARATNA    Prof A L Basham
1960    PhD    London, LSE    The law and the banker in Ceylon    M J L RAJANAYAGAM    Prof Gower
1960    PhD    London, LSE    Land reforms and some allied agrarian problems in Madras State since independence    Arungiri RAMASWAMI
1960    PhD    London LSE    Economic aspects of the sugar industry in India    Saraswathi RAU    Dr Raeburn
1960    PhD    London, LSE    Industrial injuries schemes in India and Britain: a comparative study    B RAYCHAUDHURI
1960    MSc    London, LSE    Wage boards in British and the application of their proceedings in India    C J N SAXENA    Prof Phelps Brown
1960    PhD    London, LSE    Recent changes in land use in the Upper Damodar Basin, India    A SHARAN    Mr Rawson
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    English relations with Haidar Ali, 1760-1782    B SHEIK ALI
1960    MA    London, Inst Ed    A comparative study of the language problem at the university level in India    R K YADAVA
1960    PhD    London, SOAS    Anglo-Chinese diplomacy regarding Burma, 1885-1897    Nancy Iu YAN-KIT
1960/61    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Surplus manpower in agriculture and economic development with special reference to India    P S SANGHVI    Dr M R Fisher
1960/61    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    A critique of surplus labour doctrine as applied to the Pakistan in 1947-1957    Rehana TANWIR
1961    PhD    London    Constitutional and political aspects of the public corporation in Britain and India    R S ARORA
1961    BLitt    Oxford, Exeter    Some aspects of change in the structure of the Muslim family in the Punjab under British rule    T ASAD    Dr D F Pocock
1961    PhD    London, SOAS    The structure and organisatioin of the Bengal Native Infantry with special reference to the problems of discipline (1796-1852)    Amiya BARAT    Dr K Ballhatchet
1961    PhD    London, LSE    Howrah: an urban study    A CHATTOPADHYAY    Dr E Jones
1961    PhD    Leeds    India, Britain and Russia: a study of British opinion    V K CHAVDA    Prof Briggs
1961    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    Muslim politics in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, 1858-1916    M CHUGHTAI    Dr C C Davies
1961    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1773-1801    B DE    Mr Davies
1961    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the development of social policy in Ceylon, 1840-1955 with special reference to the influence of missionary organisations    K M DE SILVA    Dr K Ballhatchet
1961    MSc    London    The economics, organisation and administration of the Indian paper industry    B N DHAR
1961    PhD    London    The administration of Guntur District with special reference to local influences on revenue policy, 1837-1848    Robert Eric FRYKENBERG    Dr K Ballhatchet
1961    PhD    Cambridge    Sir Richard Temple and the government of India 1868-1880: some trends in Indian administrative policy    G R G HAMBLY
1961    PhD    London, SOAS    Tribal unrest on the south-west frontier of the Bengal Presidency, 1831-1833    J C JHA
1961    MA    London, SOAS    Changing values in the Naga Hills and Manipur State    M KALABOVA    Prof C Von Furer Haimerdorf
1961    PhD    London, External    Financial administration in Ceylon since independence    V KANESALINGHAM
1961    MSc    London, LSE    Government of India policy towards Portuguese possessions in India from 1947 to 1957    R A KHAN
1961    PhD    London, SOAS    The development of nationalist ideas and tactics and the policies of the government of India    J R McLANE
1961    PhD    London, SOAS    The Kurumas of Malabar    Richard Lionel ROOKSBY
1961    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    The Ceylon economy, 1920-1938: a national accounts study    M R P SALGADO    Dr B B Das Gupta
1961    MA    London, SOAS    The social and political organisation of the Kandyan Kingdom (Ceylon)    S B W WICKREMASEKERA
1961/62    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    The growth of agricultural labour in the Madras Presidency in the nineteenth century    Dharma KUMAR    Mr J Gallagher
1962    MA    London, LSE    Population changes in West Bengal, 1872-1951    A BHATTACHARYYA    Prof Jones
1962    MA    London, Inst Ed    Policies regarding higher education in Ceylon during the 19th and 20th centuries with special reference to the establishment of the University of Ceylon    P CHANDRASEGARAM    Mr B Holmes
1962    PhD    London    The development of the English East India Company with special reference to its trade and organization, 1600-1640    K N CHAUDHURI
1962    PhD    Edinburgh    The control of public expenditure in less-developed countries with special reference to India    usha DAR
1962    PhD    London, LSE    Investment and economic growth in Ceylon    S B D DE SILVA    Prof Paish
1962    PhD    Londond, Birkbeck    The North West frontier of West Pakistan: a study in regional geography    D DICHTER    Prof East
1962    PhD    London    Social institutions in Ceylon 5th century BC to 4th century AD    H ELLAWALLA    Prof Basham; Dr de Casparia
1962    MLitt    Durham    The political ideas of Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall    P HASSAN    Prof W H Morris Jones
1962    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Some aspects of the social and political thought of Mahatma Gandhi    Raghavan Narasimhan IYER    Mr J P Plamenatz
1962    PhD    London, SOAS    Murshid Quli Khan and his times    Abdul KARIM    Mr Harrison
1962    PhD    London    Indo-Ceylon relations since independence    Shelton Upatissa KODIKARA
1962    PhD    London    The fiscal policy of the central government of India since independence and its economic effects    J MADHAB
1962    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    The impeachment of Warren Hastings    Peter James MARSHALL    Principal of Lady Margeret Hall
1962    PhD    London, External    Social geography of Himachal Pradesh    S D MISRA
1962    PhD    London, LSE    Public administration aspects of community development in India (with special reference to Rajasthan)    D C POTTER
1962    PhD    London, LSE    The development of the Indian capital market with special reference to the managing agent system    B PRASAD    Dr Paish; Dr Anstey
1962    PhD    London,  LSE    A study of productivity problems in the cotton textile industries of the UK (Lancashire) and India (Bombay and Ahmedabad) since the Second World War    S P S PRUTHI    Mr Roberts
1962    PhD    London    The political and constitutional evolution of Burma from 1923-1936    Asha RAM
1962    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Education in colonial Ceylon, being a research study on the history of education in Ceylon for the period 1796 to 1834    T R A RUBERU
1962    PhD    Edinburgh    Scottish experience in the impact of farm mechanisation on the employment and use of man labour with observatioins on possible Indian problems in this field    Kalyan Kumar SARKAR
1962    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    The emergence of Indian nationalism, 1885-1915    A SEAL    Mr J Gallagher
1962    PhD    Manchester    A comparative study of the central administrative organisation in India and in some other Commonwealth countries    S C SETH
1962    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    India’s export performance, 1951-1960, export prospects and policy implications    M V SINGH    Dr I M D Little
1962    PhD    Manchester    Some aspects of the administration of community projects in India    T N SRIVASTAVA
1962    PhD    London, QMC    Aspects of the urban geography of new Delhi    M P THAKORE    Prof Smailes
1962    PhD    London    Family planning in India: a field study of attitudes and behaviour in a population of Delhi compared with results of existing research in India and elsewhere    S THAPER
1962   PhD    London, SOAS    Lord Minto and the Indian nationalist movement with special reference to the political activities of the Indian Muslims, 1905-1910    S R WASTI
1962    DPhil    Oxford, New    The formation of policy in the India Office, 1858-1866, with special reference to the Political, Judicial, Revenue and Public Works Departments    D WILLIAMS    Mr C C Davies
1962/63    MA    London, Inst Ed    Education in the Roman Catholic missions in Ceylon in the second half of the 19th century (1842-1905)    C N V FERNANDO    Dr Weitzman
1962/63    PhD    London, External    Sterling tea and rubber companies in Ceylon, 1889-1958    N RAMACHANDRAN
1963    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Land systems in the Punjab (including North West Frontier Province)as affected by British rule between 1849 and 1901    R AHMAD    Mrs U K Hicks
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    The Bengali reaction to Christian missionary activities, 1833-1957    M M ALI
1963    PhD    Manchester    Economic ideas and Indian economic policies in the nineteenth century    S AMBIRAJAN
1963    PhD    London, UC    The development of the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir    A S ANAND    Mr Holland
1963    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Private investment and partial planning in India    Amiya Kumar BAGCHI
1963    PhD    London    The law of parliamentary elections in India and the United Kingdom    R K BAHL
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy towards the Panjab, 1844-1849    S S BAL    Dr K Ballhatchet
1963    PhD    London    Estimates of the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments of India, 1921/22 to 1938/39, incorporating also the estimates of the government of India    A K BANERJI
1963    MS    London    The governorship of Sir William Gregory in Ceylon    B E St J BASTIAMPILLAI    Prof G S Graham
1963    PhD    Manchester    The industrial growth and technological pluralism in India with special reference to the cotton textile industry    AS BHALLA
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Financial administration of nationalised industries in UK and India    G S BHALLA
1963    MA    London, Inst Ed    A cross-cultural study of interests and attitudes of British and Indian university students    J K BHATNAGAR
1963    MSc    London, LSE    American attitudes towards foreign aid with special reference to the Indian sub continent    E I BRODKIN    Mr Chambers
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Lord Curzon and the Indian states. 1899-1905    I A BUTT    Dr K A Ballhatchet

1963    MsC    London, UC    A comparative study of the nature and effectiveness of selective credit controls in the UK, India and Australia since 1951    J G CHAPATWALA    Dr Cramp
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Slavery in the Bengal Presidency under East India Company rule, 1772-1843    A K CHATTOPADHYAY    Major Harrison
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    The rice industry of Burma, 1852-1940    Siok-hwa CHENG    Prof C D Cowan
1963    MA    London, Inst Ed    The effects of diarchy upon educational developments in Bengal, 1919-1953    S K DUTTA GUPTA
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Colonisation of the dry zone of Ceylon    H N C FONSECA
1963    PhD    London    British relations with Kashmir, 1885-1893    D K GHOSE    Dr K Ballhatchet
1963    PhD    Sheffield    The Marquis of Dalhousie and education in India, 1848-1956    Kamala GHOSH
1963    PhD    Manchester    The British Conservative Party and Indian problems. 1927-1935    S C GHOSH
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    British historical writing from Alexander Dow to Mountstuart Elphinstone on Muslim India    J S GREWAL    Dr Hardy
1963    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian politics and the British right, 1914-1922    M R HASSAN    Dr K Ballhatchet
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Ritual pollution and social structure in Hindu Assam    T T S HAYLEY
1963    MSc    London, LSE    English, German, Spanish relations in the Sulu question, 1987-1877    S C HUNTER
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Rainfall, rice fields and irrigation needs in West Bengal    P HUR    Mr Rawson
1963    MSc    London, LSE    Ideological influences in the foreign policy of Pakistan    A HUSSAIN    Dr Manning
1963    MA    Sheffield    The industrial geography of Madras State    Iyer Balasubramanyan HYMA
1963    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The supply of Sinhalese labour to Ceylon plantations, 1830-1930: a study of imperial policy in a peasant society    L R U JAYAWARDENA    Mr K E Berrill
1963    PhD    London, External    Caste and class in pre-Muslim Bengal: studies in social history of Bengal    N KUNDU
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Jesus    The role and limits of state authority in northern India in the early historical period: an empirical examination of the administration of government    Ian W MABBETT    Prof T Borrow
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Lady Margaret    Lord Minto’s administration in India (1807-1813)with special reference to his foreign policy    Amita MAJUMDAR    Mr C C Davies
1963    DPhil    Oxford, St Hugh’s    Imperial policy in India, 1905-1910    V MAZUMDAR    Dr C C Davies
1963    PhD    London, LSE    The origin, development and problems of village (“community”) projects in India    Vindhyeshwari Prasad PANDE
1963    PhD    London, LSE    Constitutional protection of property in India: a critical and comparative study    P P PANDIT
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Regent’s Park    British Baptist missions and missionaries in India, 1793-1837    E D POTTS    Mr C C Davis
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Land revenue administration in the ceded and conquered provinces and its economic background, 1819-1833    Asiya SIDDIQI    Mr C C Davis
1963    MA    London, SOAS    British administration in Upper Burma, 1885-1897    Jagjit Singh SIDHU
1963    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    The Jats: an ethnographic survey    Gunter TIEMANN    Dr D F Pocock
1963    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The development and significance of transport in India (1834-1882)    K E VERGHESE    Mr C C Davies
1963    PhD    London,  SOAS    Some aspects of Indian society as depicted in the Pali Canon    N K WAGLE
1963    MA    London, LSE    Magic in Malaya    W D WILDER
1963    PhD    London, UC    Basic democracies in Pakistan    M S K YOUSUFZAI    Prof Holland
1964    LlM    London, UC    The origin and nature of presidential powers in Pakistan    M ARIF    Mr Holland
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The ideological differences between moderates and extremists in the Indian national movement with special reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, 1882-1919    D ATGOV    Prof H Tinker
1964    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The Indian Constituent Assembly and the framing of the Indian constitution    G S AUSTIN    Mr F G Carnell
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The role of Shaikh Ahmad of Sarhind in Islam in India    M Q BAIG    Prof Basham
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    David Scott on the North East Frontier of India and in Assam    N K BAROOAH    Mr Harrison
1964    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    An examination of marriage ritual among selected groups in South India    B E F BECK
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The mobilisation of savings and the role of financial institutions with special reference to India    M Q M S DALVI    Dr Anstey
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Producers’ rationality and technical changes in agriculture with special reference to India    S DASGUPTA    Dr Anstey; Mr Joy
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy towards the Pathans and Pindaris in central India, 1805-1818    B GHOSH    Dr K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    Cambridge. Newnham    Service centres in Southern Ceylon    K A GUNAWARDENA    Mr B H Farmer

1964 PhD London, UCL, A Comparative Study of Pakistani Bilingual and Monoglot School Children’s Performance in Verbal and Non Verbal Tests   Rafia HASAN Dr Charlotte Banks (added thanks to information of Naveed Hasan Henderson, PhD London 1995, in a comment below, and confirmed by the University of London Library)

1964    PhD    London, External    An appraisal of public investment policy in India, 1951-1961    J M HEALEY
1964    PhD    London    The formation of British land revenue policy in the ceded and conquered provinces of northern India. 1801-1833    M I HUSAIN    Dr K A Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Soviet Russia’s policy towards India and its effect on Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917-1928    Z IMAM    Mr Schapiro
1964    PhD    London, Wye    Efficiency in agricultural production; its meaning, measurement and improvement in peasant agriculture with special reference to Pakistan    M S ISLAM
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The urban labour movement in Ceylon with reference to political factors, 1893-1947    V K JAYAWARDENA    Prof Roberts
1964    PhD    London, External    A study of the current trends in the industrial development of Ceylon    V KANAPATHY
1964    PhD    London, LSE    The modern Muslim political elite in Bengal    Abdul Khair Nazmul KARIM
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Iron and steel prices in India since independence    S S MENSINKAI
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Charles Wood’s Indian policy, 1953-1866    R J MOORE    Prof Basham
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    Lord Northwood’s Indian administration, 1872-1876    E C MOULTON    Dr K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of agrarian reorganizationin India with special reference to size of holding    B MUKHERJEE    D Anstey
1964    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    British commercial interests and the expansion of the Bombay Presidency, 1784-1806    P NIGHTINGALE    Dr T G P Spear
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The rise of the Muslim middle class as a political factor in India and Pakistan    A H M NOORUZZAMAN    Prof H Tinker
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    The rev. James Long and Protestant missionary policy in Bengal, 1840-1872    G A ODDIE    Prof K Ballhatchet
1964    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Some issues between the church and state in Ceylon in the education of the people from 1870 to 1901    A RAJAINDRAN    Dr Holmes
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Rural development in India with special reference to agriculture, education and administration    K RAJARATNAM    Dr Anstey
1964    PhD    Durham    The central legislature in British India, 1921-1947    Md RASHIDUZZAMAN    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1964    PhD    London, LSE    Land tenure as related to agricultural efficiency and rural welfare in India    Paramahansa RAY    Dr Anstey; Mr Joy
1964    PhD    London    The revenue administration of Chittagong from 1761 to1784    Alamgir Muhammad SERAJUDDIN    Mr Harrison
1964    BLitt    Oxford, St Hilda’s    A study of representation in multi-lateral communities with special reference to Ceylon and Trinidad from 1946-1961    A SPACKMAN    Dr A F Madden
1964    MSc    London, LSE    Trends in the pattern of distribution of consumer goods in India    B K VADEHRA
1964    PhD    London, SOAS    British administration in the maritime provinces of Ceylon, 1796-1802    U C WICKREMERATNE    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1964    MA    Nottingham    British policy and the defence of Asia, 1903-1905: with special reference to China and India    B WILLCOCK    Dr J A S Grenville
1964/65    PhD    Manchester    Revolution and counter-revolution: a study of British colonial policy as a factor in the growth and disintegration of national liberation movements in Burma and Malaya    F NEMENZO
1964/65    PhD    Nottingham    Impact of the size of the organization on the personnel management function: a comparative study of personnel departments in some British and Indian industrial firms    B P SINGH
1965    DPhil    Oxford, New College    Life and conditions of the people of Bengal (1765-1785)    Z AHMA    Mr C C Davies
1965    PhD    London, External    The commercial progress and administrative development of the East India company on the Coromandel coast during the first half of the 18th century    R N BANERJI
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The minorities of Southern Asia and public policy with special reference to India (mainly since 1919)    J H BEAGLEHOLE    Prof H Tinker
1965    PhD    Manchester    Urban unemployment in India    RC BHARDWAJ
1965    DPhl    Oxford, Balliol    The governor-generalship of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823, with special reference to the Supreme Council and Secretariat…Palmer Company    Richard J BINGLE    Mr C C Davies
1965    MSc    London, SOAS    Ministerial government under the dyarchical reforms with special reference to Bengal and Madras    K A CHOWDHURY
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The idea of freedom in the political thought of Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Gandhi and Tagore    D G DALTON
1965    MA    London, LSE    Irrigation and winter crops in East Pakistan    O HUQ    Mr Rawson
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Conditions of employment and industrial disputes in Pakistan    A HUSAIN    Prof A Gledhill
1965    PhD    London, LSE    Democratic decentralization and planning in rural India    A C S ILCHMAN    Dr Anstey; Prof Self
1965    MSc    London, King’s    A social geography of Chitral State    ISRAR-UD-DIN    Prof Jones
1965    MSc (Econ)    London, LSE    Economic problems and organisation of public enterprise in Ceylon, 1931-1963    A S JAYAWARDENE    Mr Foldes
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The rights and liabilities of the Bengal raiyats under tenancy legislation from 1885 to 1947    L KABIR
1965    MA    Manchester    The failure of parliamentary system of government in Pakistan    M A KHAN
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Curzon, Kitchener and the problem of India army administration, 1899-1909    J E LYDGATE    Prof Robinson
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of urban centres and industries in the central provinces of the Mughal Empire between 1556 and 1803    H K NAQVI    Mr Harrison
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Sir Charles Metcalfe’s administration and administrative ideas in India, 1806-1835    D N PANIGRAHI    Prof C H Philips
1965    PhD    Birmingham    Peasant farming past and present in the wet zone of Ceylon    P D A PERERA    Prof H Thorpe; Dr W B Morgan
1965    DPhil    Oxford, Merton    Some aspects of British economic and social policy in Ceylon, 1840-1871    M W ROBERTS    Prof J A Gallagher
1965    PhD    London    The rise of business corporations in India and their development during 1851-1900    R S RUNGTA    Prof Paish; Dr V Ansty
1965    PhF    London, SOAS    The Sultanate of Jaunpur    Mian Muhhammad SAEED    Prof Basham
1965    BLitt    Oxford, Lady Margaret    Agricultural policy and economic development in India    K N V SASTRI    Mr G R Allen
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    A comparative study of the traditional political organisation of Kerala and Punjab    S J SHAHANI    Dr Mayer
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The joint Hindiu family: its evolution as a legal institution    Gunther-Dietz SONTHEIMER    Dr Derrett
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    Nullity of marriage in modern Hindu law    S K TEWARI    Dr J D M Derrett
1965    MA    London, Inst Ed    The social and political significance of Anglo-Indian schools in India    Rosalind TIWARI    Dr King
1965    MA    Manchester    Federalism in south-East Asia with special reference to Burma    Margaret YIYI
1965    PhD    London, SOAS    The partition of Bengal and its annulment: a survey of the schemes of territorial redistribution of Bengal, 1902-1911    S Z H ZAIDI    Prof Basham
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Economic geography of rubber production in Ceylon    G H PEIRIS    Mr B H Farmer
1965/66    PhD    Leeds    Impact of money supply on the Indian economy, 1950/51 – 1963/64    K PRASAD
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    The structure and working of the commercial banking system in Ceylon, 1945-1963    A J A N SILVA    Miss P M Deane
1965/66    PhD    Durham    Aspects of hte administration of the Punjab, judicial, revenue and political, 1849-1858    S K SONI
1965/66    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity House    The public finances of Ceylon, 1948-1961    G USWATTE-ARATCHI    Dr A R Prest

1966  PhD Manchester University Ramgopal AGARWALA  An econometric model of India, 1948-49 to 1960-61 Mr R.J. Ball

1966    PhD    London, LSE    Expenditure classification and investment planning with special reference to Pakistan    K U AHMAD    Dr Anstey
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The methodology of studying fertility differentials with reference to East Pakistan    M AHMAD    Prof Glass; Mr Carrier
1966    PhD    Bristol    The role of a higher civil service in Pakistan    A AHMED
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Conditions of employment and industrial disputed in Pakistan    H AHMED
1966    MScEcon    London, SOAS    Political parties and the Labour Movement in India in the 1920s    N BEGAM
1966    MLitt    Edinburgh    Patronage and education in the East India Company civil service, 1800-1857    J T BEYER
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Regional cooperation for development in South Asia with special reference to India and Pakistan    S R BOSE    Mr W B Reddaway
1966    PhD    London    The constitutional history of Malaya with special reference toe Malay states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahong, 1874-1914    P L BURNS    Prof C D Cowan
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The impact of planning upon federalism in India, 1951-1964    A CHATTERJI    Prof Sir Ivor Jennings
1966    PhD    London, UC    Industrial conciliation and arbitration in India    R L CHAUDHARY
1966    PhD    London, UC    Lahore: a geographical study    M M CHAUDHURY
1966    PhD    Manchester    The approach to planning in Pakistan    M K CHOWDHURY
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Jamshedpur – the growth of the city and its region    M DUTT    Prof Jones
1966    DPhil    Oxford, Campion Hall    The Tana Bhagats:a study in social change    P EKKA    Mr K O L Burridge
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The scope for wage policy as an instrument of planning in early stages of national economic development: a comparative study of the USSR, India and the UAR    M A ELLEISI    Prof Phelps Brown; Dr Ozga
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The social condition of the British community in Bengal, 1757-1800    S C GHOSH    Prof A L Basham
1966    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The transfer of power to Pakistan and its consequences (1946-1951)    M HASAN    Prof N Mansergh
1966    PhD    London, UC    The Indian Supreme Court and the constitution    M IMAM    Dr D C Holland
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Cotton futures markets in India: some economic studies    T ISLAM    Prof Yamey
1966    PhD    London, LSE    The extensions of the franchise in Ceylon with some consideration of the their political and social consequences    K H JAYASINGHE    Mr Pickles
1966    MA    London, External    The control of education in Ceylon: the last fifty years of British rule and after (1900-1962)    C S V JAYAWAWEERA
1966    PhD    London, External    A comparative study of British and American colonial educational policy in Ceylon and the Philippines from 1900 to 1948]    S JAYAWEERA
1966    PhD    Manchester    Import substitution in relations to industrial growth and balance of payments iof Pakistan, 1965-1970    A H KADRI
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Origins of Indian foreign policy: a study of Indian nationalist attitudes to foreign affairs, 1927-1939    T A KEENLEYSIDE    Prof H Tinker
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The transition in Bengal, 1756-1775: a study of Muhammad Reza Khan    Abdul Majed KHAN    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The British administration of Sind between 1843 and 1865: a study in social and economic development    Hamida KHUHRO    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The internal administration of Lord Elgin in India, 1984-1898    P L MALHOTRA    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of Murshidabad Distrrict, 1765-1793    K M MOHSIN    Mr Harrison
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905-1911    M K U MOLLA    Dr Hardy; Dr Pandey
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    The early history of the East Indian Railways, 1845-1879    Hena MUKHERJEE    Dr Chaudhuri
1966    PhD    London, King’s    British military policy and the defence of India: a study of British military policy, plans and preparations during the Russian crisis, 1876-1880    A W PRESTON    Prof M E Howard
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Changes in caste in rural Kumaon    R D SANWAL    Dr Freedman
1966    PhD    London,  SOAS    The Christian missionaries in Bengal. 1793-1833    K SENGUPTA    Prof Basham
1966    PhD    London, LSE    Central control and supervision of capital expenditure in the public sector in the UK and India    Ram Parkash SETH    Prof Greaves; Prof Self
1966    PhD    London, King’s    Surveying and charting the Indian Ocean    W A SPRAY    Prof G S Graham
1966    PhD    London, SOAS    Politics and change in the Madras Presidency, 1884-1894: a regional study of Indian nationalism    R SUNTHARALINGAM    Prof H R Tinker
1966    PhD    London, External    The law relating to directors and managing agents of companies limited by shares in Pakistan    Muhammad ZAHIR    Prof Gledhill
1966/67    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Planning and regional development: the application of a multi-sectoral programming model to inter-regional planning in Pakistan    A R KHAN    Dr J A Mirrlees
1966/67    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    The impact of the creation of Pakistan on Muslim education in Pakistan    G NABI
1966/67    PhD    Manchester    A study of fiscal policy in Pakistan, 1950-51, with special reference to its contribution to economic development    M NAYIMUDDIN
1966/67    PhD    Edinburgh    The fisheries of Pakistan: their present position and potentialities    R NIAZI
1966/67    PhD    Leeds    An evaluation of the human impact on the nature and distribution of wild plant communities in the Ceylon Highlands    N P PERERA
1966/67    PhD    Reading    Intra-party relationships and federalism: a comparative study of the Indian Congress Party and the Australian political parties    Y A RAFEEK
1966/67    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    The share of labour in value added during the inflation in the modern sector in under-developed economies: a comparative study of the experience of India, Peru and Turkey between 1939 and 1958    W M WARREN    Mr J A C Bowen
1967    LLM    Queen’s, Belfast    A comparative study of the provisions for emergency powers in the constitutions of the Indian, Australian, Nigerian and Malaysian federations with special emphasis on the Malaysian constitution    A ABIDIN
1967    PhD    Edinburgh    The peasant family and social status in East Pakistan    Nizam Uddin AHMED
1967    BLitt    Glasgow    Foreign trade policy of India    N M AMIN
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    English educated Ceylonese in the official life of Ceylon from 1865 to 1883    W M D D ANDRADI    Mr J B Harrison
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the relationship of political and constitutional theories to the constitutional evolution of India and Pakistan with special reference to the period 1919-1956    B P BARUA    Prof H Tinker
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Indian education and politics,1898-1920    A BASU    Prof J A Gallagher

1967    MA    Sussex    Choice of technique: an activity analysis approach with special reference to the Indian cotton textiles industry    C L BELL
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Anglo-Afghan relations, 1870-1880    S CHAKRAVARTY    Dr T G Spear
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    The relations of the Court of Directors, the India Board, the India Office and the Government of India, 1853-1865    P K CHATTARJI    Dr T G Spear
1967    MA    Sussex    The regulation of communal disturbances in West Bengal and East Pakistan in 1950    M CHAUDHURY
1967    MSc    London, SOAS    Political parties in the Bombay Presidency, 1920-1929    D S CHAVDA    Prof H Tinker
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Oil prices and the Indian market, 1886-1964    Biplab Kumar DASGUPTA    Prof Penrose
1967    MPhil    London, LSE    Some aspects of stratificatioin in Indian rural communities    K S DASGUPTA    Prof Glass
1967    DPhil    Oxford, Lady Margaret    The growth of urban leadership n Western India with special reference to Bombay City, 1845-1885    C E DOBBIN    Prof J A Gallagher
1967    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Judicial control of administrative action in India and Pakistan    A FAZAL    Prof H W R Wade
1967    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre House    Patterns of investment, political stability and rates of growth: an analysis of central government expenditure of Ceylon, 1930-1963    S T G FERNANDO    Lady Hicks
1967    MA    Sussex    Development administration and Calcutta metropolitan government    R FOGEL
1967    PhD    London, QMC    Peasant production of tea in Sri Lanka    R S GUNAWARDENA    Dr Hodder; Prof Smailes
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    The policy of Sir James Fergusson as Governor of Bombay Presidency, 1880-1885    A GUPTA    Prof K Ballhatchet
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney    The effect of a change in the terms of trade on the economic growth of Pakistan: a study of the third five year plan    I U HAQUE    Mr W B Reddaway
1967    PhD    London, LSE    Agricultural taxation in a newly developing country: the case of Pakistan    A HASHEM    Prof Peston
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    A price stabilisation model for Pakistan: jute    A K M S HUQ    Prof Penrose
1967    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The failure of parliamenary politics in Pakistan, 1953-1958    I HUSAIN    Prof M Beloff
1967    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The development of Indian politics, 1888-1909    G JOHNSON    Dr A Seal
1967    MA    Sussex    Language as an issue in Indian politics    J KABANGO
1967    MA    London, LSE    The changing distribution of cash crops in East Pakistan, 1945-1962    A K M KALIMULLAH    Dr Board
1967    PhD    Aberdeen    The development of transport in East Pakistan    Abul Fazal Muhammed KAMALUDDIN
1967    MPhil    London, SOAS    The advent of the British in Ceylon, 1762-1803    V L B MENDIS    Dr Bastin
1967    MPhil    Leeds    The linguistic world of Anglo-India    K MUSA
1967    MPhil    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the Hindu-Muslim relationship in India, 1876-1892    Shamsun NAHAR    Dr B N Pandey
1967    PhD    Edinburgh    The contribution of Scottish missions to the rise and growth of responsible churches in India    James McMichael ORR    Dr H Watt; Prof A C Cheyne
1967    PhD    London, LSE    The impact of industrialisation on urban growth: a case study of Chotanagpur    P PANDEYA    Prof Jones
1967    DPhil    Oxford, Jesus    British relations with Pakistan, 1947-1962: a study of British policy towards Pakistan    M A QURESHI    Mr G Wint
1967    PhD    London    The evolution for civil procedure in Bengal from 1772 to 1806    Z RAHMAN
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Local government services in India: a case study of Punjab, 1860-1960    D R SACHDEVA    Prof H Tinker
1967    PhD    London, UC    Judicial interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935    H SAHARAY
1967    MA    London, SOAS    Political conflict in selected villages of India, Pakistan and Ceylon    M J SHEPPERSDSON    Prof Mayer
1967    PhD    Leicester    Some early tertiary ostracods from West Pakistan    Qadeer Ahmad SIDDIQUI
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Evolution of the structure of civil judiciary in Bengal, 1800-1831    C SINHA    Dr Pandey
1967    PhD    London, External    The social structure of an Indian-Jewish community    S STRIZOWER
1967    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    Education and international understanding between the East and the West with special reference to the UK and Pakistan    Q J SURI    Prof Lauwery; Mr Goodings
1967    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    Education in Kerala and the missionary contribtion to it during the first half of the nineteenth century    Joseph THAIKOODAN
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Customs and institutions connected with the domestic life of the Sinhalese in the Kandyan period:    Miniwan P TILLAKARATNE
1967    PhD    London, SOAS    Trends in and prospectsof Pakistan’s exports to the UK and the European Economic Community, 1951-1970    Z A VAINCE    Prof Penrose
1967    DPhil    Oxford, Merton    The policies of the government of Ceylon concerning education and religion, 1865-1885    L A WICKREMERATNE    Mr K A Ballhatchet
1967    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    The sociological implications of educational policies in Ceylon since 1947    C K WICKREMESINGHE    Dr D F Pocock
1967    BLitt    Oxford, St Hilda’s    Henry Russell’s activities in Hyderabad, 1811-1820    Z YAZDANI    Mr K A Ballhatchet
1967/68    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    The causes and consequence of trade fluctuations in Ceylon, 1948-1960    M A FERNANDO    Mr H H Leisner
1967/68    PhD    London, External    British relations with Tanjore (1748-1799)    C S RAMANUJAM
1967/68    PhD    Edinburgh    The agricultural geography of Hissar District    Jasbur SINGH
1967-68    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    Anglo-Mughal relations in western India and the development of Bombay, 1662-1690    G Z REFAI
1968    MA    Durham    The influence of religion on politics in Pakistan, 1947-1956    S R AHMAD
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    The administration of the North West Frontier,1901-1919    L BAHA    Dr Hardy
1968    MSc    Cambridge, Christ’s    Industrial expansion and regional cooperation in South Asia: a study of selected industries    Peter Douglas BALACS
1968    MLitt    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    The working of the supreme government of India and its constitutional relations with the home authorities, 1833-1853    A G BANERJEE    Dr T G P Spear
1968    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    On price relationships in Indian agriculture    K BARDHAN    P M Deane
1968    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Social and conceptual order in Kongu: a region of South India    B E F BECK    Dr R K Jain
1968    PhD    London    The urban geography of Lyallpur    M H BOKHARI    Prof A E Smailes
1968    PhD    Cambridge    Rohilkhand from conquest to revolt, 1774-1858: a study in the origins of the Indian Mutiny uprising    E I BRODKIN    Dr E T Stokes
1968    PhD    Cam,bridge, Girton    Gandhi in India, 1915-1920: his emergence as a leader and the transformation of politics    J M BROWN    Dr A Seal
1968    MPhil    London    The development of education in India under Lord Curzon, 1899-1905    Hamida I BUTT
1968    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Bengali political unrest (1905-1918)with special reference to terrorism    H CHAKRABARTI    Prof K Ballhatchet
1968    MPhil    London, King’s    The development of mountain warfare in India in the 19th century    S CHANDRA    Prof M E Howard
1968    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    American policy towards India, 1941-1947, with emphasis on the Phillips mission to India, 1943    F L CHASE    Prof J A Gallagher
1968    DPHil    Oxford, Linacre    The agrarian economy and agrarian relations in Bengal, 1859-1885    B B CHAUDHURI    Dr K A Ballhatchet
1968    BLitt    Oxford, Linacre    Some aspects of English Protestant missionary activities in Bengal, 1857-1885    T CHAUDHURI    Dr S Gopal
1968    DPhil    Oxford, University    British government and society in the residency of Bengal, 1858-1880: an examination of certain aspects of British policy in relation to the changing nature of society    J M COMPTON    Mr K A Ballhatchet
1968    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    British reform policy and Indian politics on the eve of the rise of Gandhi    R J DANZIG    Dr S Gopal
1968    PhD    Cambridge, Magdalen    Optimum investment decisions with special reference to the Indian fertilizer industry    A K DAS GUPTA    Dr J A Mirrlees
1968    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Public opinion and Indian policy, 1872-1880    U DAS GUPTA    Dr S Gopal
1968    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    The contribution of the Wesleyan missionaries to southern India    P W DE SILVA
1968    PhD    York    The verbal piece in spoken Hindi: a morpho-syntactic study    Hans DUA
1968    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    An enquiry into the purpose and development of Catholic education in Madras. 1850-1950    M A DUNNE    Prof Lauwerys
1968    PhD    London, LSE    Some political aspects of foreign aid in India, 1947-1966    P J ELDRIDGE    Prof Goodwin
1968    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre House    The development of a new elite in Ceylon with special reference to educational and occupational background, 1910-1931    P T M FERNANDO    Dr A H Halsey
1968    BLitt    Oxford, Exeter    An historical survey and assessment of the ecclesiastical and missionary policy of the East India Company    I J GASH    Mr C C Davies
1968    MLitt    Bristol    The civil servant and contemporary government in India    B GIRI
1968    PhD    Birmingham    Consumption patterns in India: a regional analysis    D B GUPTA
1968    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    The debts of the Nawab of Arcot, 1763-1776    J D GURNEY    Dame L Sutherland
1968    PhD    London, LSE    Econometrics of import planning in India (1947-1965): a case study of selected commodities    M L HANDA    Prof Sargan; De Desai
1968    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Moral and religious changes in an urban village of Bangalore, South India    M N HOLSTROM    Dr D P Pocock
1968    MPhil    London SOAS    Lord Mayo’s Viceroyalty (1869-1872) with special reference to problems of external security and internal stability    M A HOSSAIN    Dr Zaidi
1968    PhD    London, LSE    British policy towards Persia and the defence of British India, 1798-1807    R INGRAM ELLIS    Miss H Lee
1968    PhD    London, LSE    Karachi: a pre-industrial city in transition    M Z KHAN    Prof Jones
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    The Dutch in Ceylon, 1743-1766    D A KOTELAWEL    Dr Bastin
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    The contribution of Christian missionaries to education in Bengal, 1793-1837    M A LAIRD    Prof K Ballhatchet

1968    PhD    London, LSE    Socio-economic determinants of infant and child mortality in Sri Lanka: an analysis of post-war experience     S A MEEGAMA    Prof Glass
1968    MPhil    London, UC    Higher judiciary in Pakistan    M Y MIRZA    Mr Holland
1968    BLitt    Oxford, St Cath’s    Funeral ritual in South India    M M MOFFATT    Dr R K Jain
1968    MPhil    London, LSE    Land use and nutrition in Lucknow District    I MOHIUDDIN    Mr R Rawson
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    Political relations between India and Nepal, 1877-1923    K MOJUMDAR    Prof K Ballhatchet
1968    MPhil    London, Bedford    The cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad with special reference to their industrial development    K B MUSTAFA    Mr Mountjoy
1968    MPhil    London, LSE    Concepts of purity and pollution in Indian religion    Judith Ann OSTROW
1968    PhD    Lancaster    The evolution and history of the Buddhist monastic order with special reference to the Sangha in Ceylon    Gunaratne PANABOKKE
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    The invasion of Nepal: John Company at war, 1814-1816    J C PEMBLE    Dr Moore
1968    PhD    London, SOAS    The All-India Muslim League in Indian politics, 1906-1912    M RAHMAN    Dr Moore
1968    MPhil    London, SOAS    The reform of local self-government in India under Lord Ripon, 1880-1884: a study in the formation of policy    Q RAHMAN
1968    PhD    Wales, Bangor    An economic appraisal of agricultural marketing in Pakistan    Abdur RASHID
1968    PhD    Edinburgh    A geographical analysis of the historical development of towns in Ceylon    L K RATNAYAKE    Prof J W Watson; Dr R Jones
1968    MA    Sussex    Constitutional change and the depressed classes: the representations from the depressed classes in the United Provinces to the Indian Statutory Commission, 1928, and their outcome    L SEN-GUPTA
1968    PhD    London, External    The role of railway transport in Ceylon: present problems and future prospects    K SUNDERALINGAM
1968    PhD    London, Inst Ed    A critical study of the history and development of university education in modern India, with special reference to problems and patterns of growth since 1847    C TICKOO
1968    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Kinship and marriage among the Jat of Haryana in northern India    Gunter TIEMANN    Dr R K Jain
1968    PhD    Edinburgh    The strategy of Christian missions to the Muslims: Anglican and reformed contributions in India and the Near East from Henry Martyn to Samuel Zwemmer, 1800-1938    Lyle L VANDER WERFF    Prof M Watt; Prof AC Cheyne
1968    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Indian historical writing in English, 1870-1920, with special reference to the influence of nationalism    Johannes H VOIGT    Mr K A Ballhatchet
1968    MPhil    London, LSE    The hierarchy of towns in Vidarbha, India, and its significance for regional planning    Sudhir Vyankatesh WANMALI.  Prof MJ Wise
1968    MA    Manchester    The relevance of land reform to economic progress in Pakistan    M A ZAMAN
1968/69    PhD    Glasgow    Planning for economic development: a comparative case study of Indian and Egyptian experience, 1946-1966, with special reference to planning strategy and effectiveness    A El- H H EL-GHAZALI
1968/69    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    Muslim politics and government policy: studies in  the development of Muslim organisation and its social background in North India and Bengal, 1885-1917    Janetr Mary RIZVI
1969    PhD    Durham    The working of district administration in Pakistan, 1947-1964    N ABEDIN    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1969    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The formation of the Government of India Act, 1935    W AHMAD    Dr T G P Sper
1969    MPhil    London, SOAS    Ideological factors in selected fields of policy making in India    Zoe F ALLEN
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    British famine and agricultural policies in India with special reference to the administration of Lord George Hamilton    S K BANDYOPADHYAY    Dr R J Moore
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    The political and economic conditions of Indians in Burma, 1900-1941    N R CHAKRAVARTI
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    The amending process in the Indian constitution    H CHAND
1969    PhD    London    Trade and commercial organisation in Bengal with special reference to the English East India Company, 1650-1720    S CHAUDHURY    Dr K N Chaudhuri
1969    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The Bombay political service, 1863-1924    I F S COPLAND    Prof J A Gallagher
1969    PhD    London, Birkbeck    The Colonial Office and political problems in Ceylon and Mauritius, 1907-1921    L B L CROOK    Dr I M Cumpston
1969    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    British defence policy in the Indian Ocean region between the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the British defence review, 1966    P G C DARBY    Prof N H Gibbs
1969    DPhil    Oxford    An evaluation of the Eastern bloc assistance to India (1956-57 to 1965-66)    DATARHA
1969    PhD    London, LSE    The effect of international labour migration on trade and real income: a case study of Ceylon, 1920 to 1938    A DUTTA    Prof Johnson
1969    PhD    London, Bedford    The development of the sugar industry in Nizamabad, Andhra Pradesh    A H FAROOQI
1969    PhD    London    Lord William Bentinck in Madras, 1803-1807    M GUPTA    Dr B M Pandey
1969    PhD    London, External    A study of the planning techniques in India: India’s five year plans    S GUPTA
1969    PhD    Manchester    A typical support structure of leadership in Punjab – the faction    J J M HAUDHRI
1969    PhD    Manchester    A structural study of Pakistan’s monetary sector    K A IMAN
1969    PhD    London, LSE    Regional development in Pakistan with special reference to the effects of import licensing and exchange control    A I A ISLAM
1969    PhD    London    Social aspects of the historical geography of East Pakistan, 1608-1857    Bilquis JAHAN    Miss E M J Campbell
1969    PhD    London, External    The sources and development of the customary laws of the Sinhalese up to 1835    M L S JAYASEKERA
1969    MSocSc    Birmingham    Industrial development and organization in Ceylon – a case study of the Ceylon cement industry    G W JAYSURIYA
1969    PhD    London    Dutch rule in maritime Ceylon, 1766-1796    V KAMAPATHYPILLAI    Dr J S Bastin
1969    PhD    London, LSE    Domestic instability as a factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy, 1952-1958    M KAMLIN    Dr Lyon
1969    PhD    London, LSE    A study of import control, with special reference to India    H KUSARI
1969    PhD    London, LSE    Britain and the termination of the India-China opium trade, 1905-1913    Margaret J B-C LIM    Prof Medlicott; Mr Dilks
1969    BLitt    Oxford, Linacre    Financing agricultural development with special reference to the place of agricultural credit in West Pakistan after 1947    A M MALIK    Mr R G Opie
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    Election laws in Pakistan    M D MALIK
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    The development of the jurisdiction and powers of the superior courts in Pakistan    M A MANNAN    Prof Gledhill
1969    MA    Sussex    Th Krishak Praja Party and the Bengal provincial elections, 1937    H MOMEN
1969    BPhil    St Andrews    Muslim politics in India, 1858-1918    S NAZ    D G Seed
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    Jury and police reform during the Indian Vice-Royalty of Lord Lansdowne, 1888-1894    R RAHMAN    Dr P Hardy
1969    PhD    London, LSE    Frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy    S M M RAZVI    Dr P H Lyon
1969    DPhil    Oxford, Merton    The Commission of Eastern Inquiry in Ceylon, 1829-1837: a study of a Royal Commission of Colonial Inquiry    V K SAMARAWEERA    Dr A F Madden
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    Hinduism in a Kangra village    U M SHARMA    Pror Mayer
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    The reorganization of the Indian armies, 1858-1879    A H SHIBLEY    Dr Moore
1969    PhD    London, SOAS    Land resumption in Bengal, 1819-1846    A M WAHEEDUZZAMA    Dr Zaidi
1969    PhD    London, External    Methodism in north Ceylon: its history and influences, 1814-1890    D K WILSON
1969/70    PhD    Bristol    On the construction and implementation of a planning model for Ceylon    S NARAPALASINGAM
1969/70    PhD    Durham    Some aspects of central banking in Pakistan, 1948-1966    A K NIAZI
1969/70    PhD    Edinburgh    Settlement geography of the Indian desert (Rajasthan area)    Ram C SHARMA
1969/70    PhD    Bristol    The relations between central and provincial governments in Pakistan    M A TAYYEB    Prof Bromhead
1969/70    PhD    London, SOAS    Some legal aspects of agrarian reform in India    Namgi Lal UPADHYAYA
1970    MPhil    London, LSE    Production and trade in the raw cotton and cotton textile industries of Pakistan,1948-1966    Q K AHMAD    Prof H Myint
1970    PhD    Edinburgh    Regionalism and political integration in Pakistan: a case study in political geography    Masood ALI
1970    MPhil    London, SOAS    The urban geography of Kanpur    S A ALI
1970    MPhil    London, LSE    Peasant agriculture in Ceylon, 1933-1893    A C L AMEER ALI    Prof F J Fisher
1970    PhD    Edinburgh    Possible developments in building technology in relations to low cost housing in Pakistan    Mohammed M BAJWA
1970    DPhil    Oxford, St Anthony’s    The growth of political organization inthe Allahabad locality, 1880-1925    C A BAYLY    Prof J A Gallgher
1970    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville       Spatial organizationof some villages in Northern India    P M BLAIKIE    Mr B H Farmer
1970    PhD    Cambridge    British impact on the Indian cotton textile industry, 1757-1865    J G BORPUJARI    Dr W J Macpherson
1970    MPhil    London, UC    Some problems of physical planning in Ceylon    S W P BULANKULAME
1970    PhD    London, LSE    The behaviour of prices in India, 1952-1966: an empirical study    S K CHAKRABARTI    Prof Walters
1970    MSc    Bristol    The long-term outlook for the consumption of tea in India – a quantitative analysis    B M CHAMBERS
1970    MA    Manchester    Social change in Indian towns    M K CHATERJEE
1970    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall: a study of the Anglo-Indian official mind    E C T CHEW    Dr E T Stokes
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy on the North East frontier of India, 1865-1914    D P CHOUDHURY    Prof K Ballhatchet
1970    MA    Kent    Recent trends in Indian federalism    S DAS
1970    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    Development of adult education in India since independence with special reference to rural reconstruction    B DUTTA
1970    BLitt    Oxford, Keble    Identity amongst Muslims in West Bengal, India, and its relationship with political, social and economic change    P J K EADE    Dr R K Jain
1970    BLitt    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    Aspects of history of the Indian National Congress with special reference to the Swarajya Party, 1919-1927    R A GORDON    Prof J A Gallagher
1970    PhD    Wales, Swansea    A study of the social and economic geography of the coastal fishing industry of Ceylon    Suniti Danissari GUNASEKERA
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy and Baluchistan, 1854-1876    T A HEATHCOTE    Dr M E Yapp
1970    MPhil    London, King’s    Selected aspects of agricultural development in West Pakistan    J HUSSAIN
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    Social and political change in Ceylon, 1900-1919 with special reference to the disturbances of 1915     p v i JAYASEKERA    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1970    MSc    Edinburgh    Language and politics in modern India    P KARAT
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    Protection of minority interests under the Indian constitution    G T LUIS    Prof Derrett
1970    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    Sociological aspects of revival and change in Buddhism in nineteenth century Ceylon    Kitsiri MALALGODA    Mr B R Wilson
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    The administration of British Burma, 1852-1885    J A MILLS    Prof C D Cowan
1970    DPhil    Oxford, St John’s    Renewable natural resources planning for regional development with special reference to Kashmir    Maharaj K MUTHOO    Mr J J Macgregor
1970    DPhil    Sussex    Labour organisation in the Bombay textile industry, 1918-1929    R NEWMAN    Dr Reeves
1970    PhD    London, QMC    Land development in the Sinharaja foothill of Ceylon    M P PERERA    Mr B W Hodder
1970    PhD    London, SOAS    Shareholders’ control of public companies in Pakistan    A K RANJHA
1970    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The politics of U.P. Muslims    Francis Christopher Rowland ROBINSON    Dr Seal
1970    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    Urbanisation – its educational implications in India    P SAJNANI
1970    PhD    York    Predicate complement constructions in Hindi and English    Anil SINHA
1970    PhD    London, LSE    Water supply and irrigation in the dry zone of Ceylon    K U SIRINANDA    Mr P Rawson; Dr Chandler
1970    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    Ceylon’s export trends and prospects    M P S SURIAARACHCHI    Mr H Leisner
1970    MA    London, Inst Ed    The t rainingof teachers in Bombay Province (including Gujerat) since 1947    M N UPADHYAYA
1970    MSc    Wales    Britain’s forgotten war: the British role in the confrontation of Malaysia by Indonesia    Michael R WAGSTAFF
1970    MPhil    London, SOAS    A structural analysis of myths from the North east frontier of India    James Mackie WILSON
1970    PhD    Leeds    The role of the Ceylon civil service before and after independence    Watareke Aratchchige WISWA WARNAPALA
1970/71    PhD    St Andrews    The theory, practice and administration of Waqf with special reference to the Malayan state of Kadah    M Z B H OTHMAN    Dr J Burton
1970/71    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The politics of U P muslims    M A ROWLANDS
1970/71    PhD    London, LSHTM    Dynamics of malaria in Ceylon    C SIVAGNANASUNDRAM
1971    MPhil    London, SOAS    A comparative study of social heirarchies in selected areas of India and Pakistan    Makhdum Tasadduq AHMAD    Dr Mayer
1971    PhD    Lancaster    Technical change and economic development of agriculture: the case of Bangladesh    M ALAMGIR
1971    MPhil    London, UC    A select bibliography of periodical literature published in English, German, French, Sanskrit, Hindi, Pali and Bengali during 1951-1966 on some aspects of Indian culture (philosophy, religion, linguistics, literature)from the post-Vedic to the pre-Kalidasa era    P BISWAS
1971    MPhil    London, SOAS    Symbolic and material aspects of institutions in political process: analysis of two North Indian villages    Bengt-Erik Per Gustaf BORGSTROM
1971    MLitt    Cambridge, Firtzwilliam    Metropolitan dominance in South India    R W BRADNOCK    Mr B H Farmer
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    Social change of marriage patterns in the North Western Himalayas (Churah, Pangi and Ladakh)    Bharpur Singh BRAR
1971    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Political alliances in rural Western Maharashtra    Anthony Thomas CARTER
1971    PhD    London, External    Culture conflicts and education in Ceylon after independence    Ida W DESILVA
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    The internal politics of the Kandyan kingdom, 1707-1760    Lorna S DEWARAJA
1971    PhD    Durham    Patterns of population structure and growth in East Pakistan    K Maudood ELAHI
1971    PhD    London, LSE    An econometric growth model for Pakistan    A FAROOQUI    Mr J M Desai
1971    DPhil    Sussex    Municipal politics in Calcutta: elite groups and the Calcutta corporation, 1875-1900     C P M FUREDY    Prof A Low
1971    BLitt    Oxford, St John’s    Statutory provisions for the settlement of collective industrial disputes in England and Australia and India    S T GOH
1971    MA    Exeter    A study of the authority structure of an industrial organisation in a transitional setting: case study of a Ceylon industrial plant    S GOONATILAKE
1971    MSc    Hull    The impact of foreign aid on India’s international trade, 1951-1965    C P HALLWOOD
1971    PhD    Nottingham    Pakistan’s external relations    A K M A HAQUE    Prof Pear
1971    PhD    Durham    The working of parliamentary government in Pakistan, 1947-1958    S C HARUN
1971    MLitt    Glasgow    Government expenditure: a study with reference to economic development in Pakistan    M HUQ
1971    PhD    London, King’s    Freedom of interstate trade in India    C K M JARIWALA
1971    DPhil    Oxford, St Hilda’s    Government policy and economic and social change in western India,1850-1875    J F M JHIRAD    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971    MSc    Strathclyde    Administrative aspects of social security programmes for factory labourers in East Pakistan    M KABIR
1971    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Nationalism n Bengal, 1903-1911: a study of Bengali reactions to the partition of the province with special reference to the social groups involved    A P KANNANGARA    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of society and politics in Bengal, 1927 to 1936    B R KHAN    Mr J B Harrison
1971    MPhil    London, SOAS    The tripartite countries [Iran, Pakistan and Turkey]of the regional cooperation for development: a geographical study of a regional grouping    Durray S KURESHI
1971    DPhil    Sussex    Administrative structures, economic change and problems of rural development in Aligarh District, Uttar Pradesh, India    Bismarck U MWANSASU
1971    PhD    London, King’s    A comparative study of the executive in Australia and India    J D OJO
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of the Indian Viceroyalty of Lord Elgin, 1862-1863    J A RAHMAN    Dr Harrison
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    Legal aspects of the “doctrine of pleasure” in relation to public servants in India    U R RAI
1971    MPhil    London, LSE    A comparative study of manpower in selected industries with similar technologies in India and the UK    S F RICHARDS    Prof Wise
1971    MPhil    Leeds    The military in politics in India and Pakistan since 1947    A H RIZVI    Prof Hanson; Dr O A Hartley
1971    PhD    London, SOAS    The government of India under Lord Chelmsford, 1916-1921, with special reference to the policies adopted towards constitutional change and political agitation in British India    P G ROBB    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1971    PhD    York    A generative semantic treatment of some aspects of English and Hindigrammar    Prajapati SAH
1971    PhD    London, LSE    The problem of economic holdings in the peasant agriculture of the dry zone of Ceylon    Somasundaram SELVANAYAGAM
1971    PhD    London,  SOAS    Status, power and resources: the study of a Sinhalese village    S P F SENATATNE
1971    MPhil    London. LSE    British opinion and Indian independence: a study of some British pressure groups which advanced the cause of Indian independence    Kumar Indra VIJAY
1971    MLitt    Edinburgh    David Livingstone and India    rOSINA g VISRAM    Prof G A Shepperson
1971    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Employment incomes in Ceylon: an inquiry into the structure and determination of wage and salary earnings in Ceylon, 1949-1969    Pabawathie C WICKREMASINGHE
1971    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    A critical analysis of the problems of higher education in Pakistan since independence (1947) with special reference to student unrest    U S ZAMAN
1971/72    PhD    Liverpool    British opinion and Indian reform, 1858-1876    Nilima SAHA    Mr P J N Tuck
1972    DPhil    Oxford, Christ Church    Economic aspects of some peasant colonizations in Ceylon    G M ABAYARATNA    Miss M R Haswell
1972    PhD    Leeds    Economic, political and administrative aspects of planning for development in a divided country: a study of relationships between East Bengal and West Pakistan, 1947-1971    Shaikh Magsood ALI
1972    MSc    Bristol    Capital finance in a developing economy – Ceylon    Bernard V ANTHONISZ
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Communal conflict in Ceylon politics and the advance towards self-government    Rupasinghe A ARIYARATNE
1972    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    A comparative study of language policies and problems in Ceylon and India since independence    V ARUMUGAM
1972    MPhil    London, SOAS    Judicial control of the machinery of government in Pakistan    Chaudhary M Y ASIM
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Queens    Politics in South India. 1917-1947    Christopher J BAKER
1972    PhD    Durham    The hierarchy of central places in Northern Ceylon    P BALASUNDARAMPILLAI
1972    PhD    London, LSE    Some aspects of the strains and stresses in Indo-British relations, 1947-1965: an analysis of the causes and course of gradual decline in Britain’s importance to India    A R BANERJI    Mr J B L Mayall
1972    PhD    London, QMC    Fiscal policy in India (with reference to taxation)over three five year plans    S BHADURI    Prof M H Peston
1972    DPhil    Sussex    Political change in Rohilkhand, 1932-1952: a study of the rleationships between provincial and district level politicans    L BRENNAN
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    An examination of the development and structure of the legal profession at Allahabad, 1866-1935    Gilliam F BUCKEE
1972    MPhil    Sussex    Educational administration in Bombay Presidency, 1913-1937    J L BUTLER
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Extra-constitutional actions in Pakistan    Z I CHOUDHURY
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    The politics and functioning of the East Bengal legislature, 1947-1958    Najma CHOWDHURY
1972    MEd    Manchester    The social and educational changes brought about in some South Indian villages by the Saruodaya movement    A G CLARK
1972    DPhil    Oxford    Decentralisation and political change in the United Provinces, 1880-1921    W F CRAWLEY
1972    PhD    Aberdeen    The development and influence of British missionary movements toward India, 1786-1830    Allan K DAVIDSON    Mr A F Walls
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Emmanuel    The official mind and the problem of agrarian indebtedness in India, 1870-1910    Clive J DEWEY
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Juristic techniques in the Supreme Court of India (195-1971)in some selected areas of public and personal law    Rajeev DHAVAN

1972    MA    Hull    Resource allocation in the public sector in Malaysia with special reference to the Muda River irrigation scheme    CHEW CHAI DOAN
1972    PhD    Hull    Some aspects of private foreign enterprise in Ceylon    L E N FERNANDO
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Rural money markets in India    Subrata GHATAK
1972    MA    Manchester    Traditional India and the meaning of caste    Beth GOLDBLATT
1972    DPhil    Sussex    Optimum location of paddy improvement schemes in Ceylon    J M GUNADESA
1972    MA     Exeter    Industrialization and protective tariffs in Pakistan    A M A HAKIM
1972    PhD    Cambridge,St John’s    The place of India in the strategic and political consideration of the Axis powers, 1939-1942    Milan HAUNER    Prof F H Hinsley
1972    MA    Exeter    Foreign capital and economic development: the case of Pakistan    M E HOSSAIN
1972    PhD    London, LSE    Rural society and leadership in Malaya with special reference to three selected communities    Syed HUSIN ALI
1972    BLitt    Oxford, Lady Margaret    Some aspects of religion and culture in Bengal    H K ION
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Agricultural development of Bengal: a quantitative study, 1920-1946    M M ISLAM    Dr Chaudhuri
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Bengali Moslem public opinion as reflected in the vernacular press between 1901 and 1930    Mustafa N ISLAM
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    The permanent settlement and the landed interests in Bengal from 1793 to 1819    M S ISLAM    Mr G B Harrison
1972    BLitt    Oxford, Somerville    A social anthropological study of Jainism in Northern India    S JAIN    Dr R G Leinhardt
1972    DPhil    Sussex    Techno-economic survey of industrial potential in Sri Lanka    N D KARUNARATNE
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Constitutional protection of the freedom of association in Pakistan    Hamiduddin KHAN
1972    PhD    London, UC    Kowloon: a factorial study of urban land use and retail structure    Chi-sen LIANG    Prof P Wood
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    The rajas and nawabs of Bengal, 1911-1919    Pronoy Chand MEHTAB
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Income distribution and savings in Pakistan: an appraisal of development strategy    T E NULTY    Prof W B Reddaway
1972    DPhil    Oxford    The organisational basis of Indian agriculture with special reference to the development of capitalistic farming (ie based on wage-labour and following economic criteria for investment) in selected regions in recent years    U PATNAIK
1972    PhD    York    A systematic treatment of certain aspects of Telugu phonology    Vennelakanti PRAKASAM
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Regional disparities in the growth of incomes and population in India, 1951-1965    Siripurapu Kesava RAO    Dr A K Bagchi
1972    PhD    Exeter    The impact of devaluation on prices and production in Pakistan    M M SHAIKH
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    The study of inflation in Pakistan, 1955-1968    Qamarul H SIDDIQI    Prof E Penrose
1972    PhD    London, UC    Functions of international conflict: a case study of Pakistan    K SIDDIQUI    Dr J W Burton
1972    PhD    London    The home government of India, 1834-1853    Robert F S TATE    Mr Harrison
1972    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian politics and the elections of 1937    D D TAYLOR    Prof H Tinker
1972    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Economic integration and development with special reference to four Asian countries [India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaysia]    Ransit Corneille WANIGATUNGA    Prof G L Rees
1972    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    The development and function of the transport system in Ceylon: a network analysis    Poonanulkarange C H WEERASURIYA    Dr B T Robson
1972    MPhil    London, SOAS    Tribal identity among the Santals, 1770-1857    Michael Piers YORKE
1972/73    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Social conflict and political unrest in Bengal, 1875-1908    Rajat K RAY
1972/73    PhD    Reading    The applicability of linear programming to resource allocation in an irrigated agriculture with special reference to the Punjab of Pakistan    T U REHMAN
1973    BLitt    Oxford, Balliol    A study of Bengal peasants, 1765-1812    S U AHMED    Dr C C Davies
1973    PhD    London    The role of the Zamindars in Bengal, 1707-1772    Shirin AKHTAR    J B Harrison
1973    DPhil    Sussex    Political structure and economic development in rural West Pakistan    H ALAVI
1973    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    The impact of British educational thought onthe concept of university education in Sri Lanka    Chandra Lilian AMARASEKERA
1973    PhD    London, Wye    A study of economic resource use and production possibilities on settlement schemes in Sri Lanka (with special reference to the Minipe Colonisation Scheme)    Nihal St Michael Aloysius AMERASINGHE
1973    DPhil    Sussex    Nationalism and the regional politics: Tamiland, India, 1920-1937    D J ARNOLD    Prof D A Low
1973    PhD    London, QMC    Functions and status of urban settlement in West Bengal    Mira DAS
1973    DPhil    Sussex    Peasant movements in India,c.1920-1950    D N DHANAGARE
1973    PhD    London, LSE    The development of the port of Colombo, 1860-1939    K DHARMASENA    Prof F J Fisher
1973    MPhil    York    Male nurses in Ceylon: a study of the career problems of male nurses in the Ceylon health service, 1972    Malsiri K DIAS
1973    BLitt    Oxford, Campion Hall    Some aspects of agricultural policy in Ceylon since independence with special reference to youth resettlement schemes    B W DISSANAYAKE    Miss M R Haswell
1973    PhD    Exeter    Orgnisational forms in post traditional society with special reference to South Asia    P D S  GOONATILAKE
1973    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of the revenue administration of Sylhet District in Bengal, 1765-1792    Kusha HARAKSINGH    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1973    DPhil    Sussex    Revolutionary networks in Northern Indian politics, 1907-1935: a case study of the terrorist movement in Delhi, the Punjab, the United Provinces and adjacent princely states    M HARCOURT
1973    PhD    London, LSE    Indian population policy and the family planning programme    Edward C HARRIMAN
1973    BLitt    Oxford, Jesus    The role of law in the politics of Pakistan from 1947 to 1956    S F A HASSAN    Prof H W R Wade
1973    DPhil    Oxford, St Catharine’s    Foreign aid in the economic development of Ceylon    W HETTIARACHI    Miss P H Ady
1973    MSc    Lancaster    Monetary management, commercial bank credit expansion and economic development in Pakistan    Rafiqul ISLAM
1973    PhD    London, External    Economic development in Ceylon    Halwalage N S KARUNATILAKE
1973    MSocSc    Birmingham    Distribution of rate of suicide according to age and sex on the basis on caste in Gujerat State    H KAZI
1973    PhD    Hull    Some economic aspects of the oil palm industry of West Malaysia    Hacharan Singh KHERA
1973    DPhil    Oxford    Terms of trade, public policy and economic development of Ceylon, 1948-1958    W D LAKSHMAN
1973    PhD    Wales    An economic analysis of recent developments in the production and marketing of jute with particular reference to their implications for the economy of Pakistan    Saidur R LASKER
1973    PhD    London, LSE    Local government and administration in Ceylon    Genevieve R LEITAN
1973    PhD    York    Some aspects of Bhartrhari’s linguistic theory as represented in the Vakyapadiya    Kaluwachchimule MAHANAMA
1973    PhD    London, SOAS    The changing position and functions of the Rajahs and Nawabs of Bengal, 1911-1919    P C MAHTAB    Prof K Ballhatchet
1973    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Private corporate industrial investment in India, 1947/1967: factors affecting its size, fluctuations and sectoral distribution    P PATNAIK    Mr P P Streeten
1973    PhD    London, King’s    The legal framework for the settlement of industrial disputes in Ceylon    Stanislaus Edward PULLE    Mr A Hughes
1973        London, SOAS    The minorities of Ceylon,, 1926-1931 with special reference to the Donoughmore Commission    G QUINTUS
1973    PhD    London, SOAS    The covenanted civil servant and the government of India, 1858-1883: a study of his part in the decision-making and decision implementing process in India    Muhammad A RAHIM    Mr J B Harrison
1973    MPhil    London, QMC    The markets of Calcutta: an analysis of the evolution of indigenous marketing systems and shopping facilities    Mondira Sinha RAY
1973    DPhil    Sussex    Poverty and policy: the impact of rural public works in the Kosi area of Bihar, India    Gerry RODGERS    L Joy
1973    PhD    Cambridge, Lucy     Polarization on Colombo in the economic geography of Ceylon    Liyanage Kundali Vidyamali SAMARASINGHE    Mr B H Farmer
1973    PhD    Birmingham    A quantitative analysis of the patterns of export: a case study of India    M L SETH
1973    MA    Sussex    A multisectoral model of production for Sri Lanka    Paran SIRISENA
1973    MSc    Cambridge, Girton    Underutilized industrial capacity in India    Nancy SLOCUM
1973    MPhil    London, QMC    External aspects of Pakistan’s political geography    A H SYED
1973    PhD    London, SOAS    Extradition in the light of the Indian constitution    Madan M TEWARI
1973    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The Vice-royalty of Lord Irwin in 1926/31 with special reference to political and constitutional developments    James Frederick Caleb WATTS    Dr A F Madden
1973    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Some aspects of prodcution and market surplus in the rice sector of Ceylon    Piyasiri WICKRAMASEKARA
1973    PhD    Exeter    A theory of multiple exchange rates and exchange rate management in Ceylon    G W P WICKRAMASINGHE
1973/74    PhD    London, Wye    The marketing of tea with special reference to India’s share of thew world market    N C NANDA
1973/74    PhD    East Anglia    Constraints on optimum resource use in an irrigated land settlement scheme in Ceylon    D H R J PERERA
1973/74    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Locational analysis and government sponsored large-scale industries in Ceylon    Y RASANAYAGAM

1973/74    DPhil    Sussex    A multisectoral model of production for Sri Lanka    N L SIRISENA
1973/74    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The kinship and social organization of a Roman Catholic fishing village in Ceylon    Roderick Lennox STIRRAT
1974    PhD    Brunel    Defence expenditure and economic growth with reference to India    V AGARWAL
1974    MSc    London, LSHTM    Current patterns of food administration in the West and their application to Pakistan    A AHMED
1974    DTPH    London, LSHTM    Some problems in family planning in rural Sri Lanka    E R AMARASEKERA
1974    PhD    London, Inst Comm    Trotskyism in Ceylon: a study of the development, ideology and political role of Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935-1964    Y R AMARASINGHE    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1974    PhD    London, SOAS    Changes in patterns and practices of wheat farming since the introduction of the new high yielding varieties. A study of six villages in the Bulandshahr District, Uttar Pradesh, Northern India    Kathleen May BAKER
1974    PhD    London    Urban society in Bengal, 1850-1872,with special reference to Calcutta    Ranu BASU    Prof K Ballhatchet
1974    MPhil    London, Wye    Some economic aspects of rubber production in Sri Lanka    Gamlath Rallage CHADRASIRI
1974    PhD    Cambridge, Pembroke    Agrarian society and British administration in Western India, 1847-1920    Neil Rex Foster CHARLESWORTH
1974    DPhil    Sussex    Innovation, inequality and rural planning: the economics of Tubewell irrigation in the Kosi region, Bihar, India    Edward J CLAY
1974    PhD    Kent    Money and monetary policy in a lerss developed economy: the case of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)1950-1970    E CONTOGIANNIS
1974    DPhil    Sussex    A study of wages of the coal miners in India (with special reference ot the Raniganj and Jharia coalfields)    A DASGUPTA
1974    MSc    Wales, Aberystwyth    The factor shares of Indian international trade, 1947-1948 to 1967-1968    Mazumdar D DATT
1974    MPhil    Nottingham    A Marxist analysis of the economic development of India    Brian DAVEY    Prof Parkinson
1974    PhD    London    The intrigues of the German government and the Ghadr Party against British rule in India, 1914-1918    T G FRASER    Mr D N Dilks
1974    DTPH    London, LSHTM    Some public health problems of the labour force in Sri Lanka    A N HANIFFA
1974    MPhil    London, SOAS    The role of “reasonable restrictions” under the Indian constitution    Tirukattupali Kalyana Krishnamurthy IYER
1974    PhD    London    Buddhist-Christian relationships in British Ceylon, 1797-1948    C W KARUNARATNA    E G S Parrinder
1974    MSc    London, LSHTM    Growth study of the preschool children of Pakistan    M M R KHAN
1974    MPhil    Edinburgh    Implementation of development plans in Pakistan    S J KHAWAJA
1974    DPhil    Oxford, St Hugh’s    The movement towards constitutional reform in Ceylon, 1880-1910    N N LABROOY
1974    DPhil    Oxford    Social and political attitudes of British expatriates in India, 1880-1920    Margaret O MACMILLAN    Prof Gallagher
1974    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    Allahabad: a study in social structure and urban morphology    L MALVIYA
1974    DPhil    Oxford    The Donoughmore Commission in Ceylon, 1927-1931    Tilaka Piyaseeli METHTHANANDA
1974    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    India’s exports and export policies in the sixties    D NAYYAR    Mr P P Streeten
1974    DPhil    Oxford    Prelude to partition: all-India moslem politics, 1920-1932    D J H PAGE
1974    PhD    London, King’s    The social background, motivation and training of missionaries to India, 1789-1858    Frederic S PIGGIN
1974    PhD    York    Some aspects of the Vanni dialect of Sinhalese as contrasted with the dialect of the western region of Sri Lanka    Pushpakumara PREMARATNE
1974    PhD    Manchester    The commercial pressure on the British government policy towards Indian nationalist movement, 1919-1935    M R PREST
1974    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Change in Bengal agrarian society c.1760-1850: a study of selected districts    Ratnalekha RAY    Prof E G Stokes
1974    PhD    London, SOAS    Education and society in the Bombay Presidency, 1840-1858    A J ROBERTS    Prof K S Ballhatchet
1974    PhD    Bradford    Pakistani villages in a British city: the world of the Mirpuri villager in Bradford and in his village of origin    Verity J SAIFULLAH-KHAN
1974    DPhil    Oxford    Labour and industrial organization in the Indian coal-mining industry, 1900-1939    Colin P SIMMONS    Prof P Mathias
1974    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Nationalism and Indian politics: the Indian National Congress, 1934-1942    B R TOMLINSON    Dr A Seal
1974    PhD    Hull    The European plantation rubber industry in South East Asia, 1876-1921    Phin Keong VOON
1974    PhD    London, SOAS    British scholarship and Muslim rule in India: the work of William Erskine, Sir Henry Elliot, John Dowson, Edwards Thomas, J Talboys Wheeler and Henry J Keene    Tripta WAHI    Dr P Hardy
1974    PhD    Cambridge, Tinity    The society and politics of the Madras Presidency, 1880-1920    D A WASHBROOK    Dr A Seal
1974    PhD    Hull    The Saribas Malays of Sarawak: their social and economic organisation and system of values    BIN kLING ZAINAL
1974/75    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Landlords, planters and colonial rule: a study of tensions in Bengal rural society, c. 1830-1860    Chittabrata PALIT    Prof E T Stokes
1974/75    PhD    London, SOAS    The Khilafat movement in India, 1919-1924    M Naeem QURESHI    SDr Moore
1974/75    PhD    Birmingham    A multisectoral model for manpower and educational planning in Sri Lanka    T W Y RANAWEERA
1974/75    MSc    Cambridge Trinity    The extraction and use of surplus in India and China, 1950-1960    Chiranjivi Shumshere THAPA
1975    MSc    Strathclyde    Foreign indebtedness and debt servicing capacity of Pakistan, 1955-1970    M K ACHIGZAI
1975    MSc    London, LSHTM    Mortality and fertility trends in Orissa, 1951-1972    V AHMAD
1975    PhD    Edinburgh    Industrialisation and the problems of access to finance of small and medium sized forms in Ceylon    C A BALASURIYA
1975    MA    Ulster    Bangladesh: a divided Pakistan    N J BEST
1975    PhD    Manchester    Science and politics in India: accountability of scientific research policy structures, 1952-1970    B BHANEJA
1975    MSc    Salford    Factionalism and party building in India with special reference to the State of Rajasthan    R BHARGAVA
1975    MSc    Wales, Swansea    Population planning in Bangladesh    A R BHUIYAN    Mr J Whetton
1975    PhD    Lancaster    As assessment of the economic effects of a customs union among the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka    M A R BHUYAN
1975    PhD    London    The East India Company and its army, 1600-1778    G J BRYANT    Dr P J Marshall
1975    DPhil    sussex    The effects of external assistance on economic development: the case of Sri Lanka    A CHANDRA-RANDENI
1975    PhD    Leeds    The marketing of cotton in Pakistan    I U CHAUDHRY
1975    MSc    Wales, Swansea    Social welfare services in Pakistan: the integration of state and welfare activity    A CHOUDRY    Jim Whetton
1975    PhD    Londond, Wye    Factors influencing India’s exports since 1950    Kashmir Singh DHINDSA
1975    DPhil    Oxford    The journals and memoirs of British travellers and residents in India in the late 18th century and the 19th century prior to the Mutiny    Ketaki K DYSON    Dr C M Ing
1975    PhD    London, SOAS    The structure of politics in South India, 1918-1939: conflict and adjustment in Madras City    J A ELLIS
1975    MA    Sussex    The Vidhan Sabha election, Uttar Pradash, India, of February 1974    J GOODMAN
1975    MPhil    London, UC    Problems of port development in Sri Lanka, with special reference to Colombo    Daya Somalatha GUNATILLAKE
1975    DPhil    Sussex    Peasant agitations in Kheder District, Gujerat, 1917-1934    D R HARDIMAN    Mr P K Chaudhuri
1975    MSc    Wales, Swansea    Organisation and staffing needs in four state social services departments in Malaysia    Kamariah Mohd ISMAIL    Mr C Gore
1975    MScEcon    Wales    Economic development and the problem of unemployment with special reference to Bangladesh    Halim JAHANGIR
1975    PhD    Edinburgh    Public sector investment in the direct development of urban housing in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)    M E JOACHIM
1975    DPhil    Sussex    The relation between land settlement and party politics in Uttar Pradesh, India, 1950-69, with special reference to the formulation of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal    M H JOHNSON
1975    PhD    London, SOAS    Business, labour and opposition movements in the politics of Ahmedabad City, 1960-1972    Bharti KANSARA    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1975    MLitt    Aberdeen    South Asian international relations since rthe emergence of Bangladesh    A KHAN
1975    MA    Sussex    The Congress split of 1969: a study in factional and ideological conflicts    H KINASE-LEGGETT
1975    PhD    London    Legal aspects of stage carriage licensing in India    P LEELAKRISHNAN
1975    PhD    London, SOAS    Economics of higher yielding varieties of rice with special reference to a south Indian district…West Godavari (Andhra Pradesh)    S MADHAVAN    Mr T J Byres
1975    DPhil    Sussex    Political change in an Indian state: Mysore, 1910-1952    James G MANOR    Prof A Low; Dr Reeves
1975    PhD    Leeds    Financial institutions and private investment in Pakistan, 1955/56 to 1969/70    A M M MASIH    Finance
1975    MPhil    London, UC    Self-help in Hyderabad’s urban development    Catherine Anne MEDE
1975    PhD    London, LSE    An analysis of the economy and social organisation of the the Malapantara – a south Indian hunting and gathering people    Brian MORRIS
1975    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The Indian National Congress and political mobilization in the United Provinces, 1926-1934    G PANDEY

Mr D K Fieldhouse
1975    PhD    Edinburgh    A prototype system for the control of land use and settlements in the planned development of Bangladesh    A M A QUAZI
1975    PhD    London, Inst Comm    The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state    Mizanur RAHMAN
1975    DPhil    Oxfird, Linacre House    Some aspects of the Indian government’s policy of state railways, 1869-1884    V SHANMUGASUNDARAM    Prof K Ballhatchet
1975    PhD    Edinburgh    Changing patterns of cropland use in Bist Doab, Punjab, 1951-1968    Gurjeet SINGH
1975    PhD    London, LSE    A demographic analysis of the sterilization programme in the Indian states, 1957-1973    Veena SONI    Prof D Glass
1975    MLitt    St Andrews    Tax revenue forecasting in a developing economy with special reference to India    D K SRIVASTAVA
1975    DPhil    Sussex    The British in Malabar, 1792-1806    B S W SWAI    Prof D A Low; Dr P Reeves
1975    PhD    London, SOAS    The cotton trade and the commercial development of Bombay, 1855-1875    Antonia M VICZIANY    Dr K N Chaudhuri
1975    PhD    London, SOAS    The Moplah rebellion of 1921-1922 and its genesis    Conrad WOOD
1975/76    PhD    Birmingham    Significance of size in Indian public limited companies    N P NAYAR
1975/76    DPhil    Oxford, Trinity    British policy and the political impasse in India during the viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow    Gowher RIZVI
1976    MPhil    London, UC    Development of printing in Urdu, 1743-1857    Nazir AHMAD    Mr R Staveley
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    The beginnings of British rule in Upper Burma: the study of British policy and Burmese reaction, 1885-1890    Muhammad S ALI    Prof C D Cowan
1976    MLitt    Glasgow    Jute in the agrarian history of Bengal, 1870-1914: a study in primary production    M W ALI    Prof S Checkland; Mr J F Munro
1976    PhD    Cambridge, Queen’s    Private industrial investment in Pakistan    Rashid AMJAD    Mr M A King
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    The Tamil renaissance and Dravidian nationalism, 1905-1944, with special reference to the works of Maraimalai Atikal    K Nambi AROORAN    Prof K Ballhatchet
1976    PhD    Lancaster    Regional dualism: a case study of Pakistan, 1947/48 to 1969/70    M AZHAR-UD-DIN
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Patterns of rural development in Tamil Nadu    Robert Wilfred BRADNOCK
1976    DPhil    Sussex    Patterns of tractorization in the major rice growing areas of Sri Lanka    M N CARR
1976    DPhil    Oxford, St John’s    Aspects of the registration and legal control of trade unions in India with some comparative observations    B K CHANDRASHEKAR
1976    MSc    Heriot-Watt    The development of tourism in Sri Lanka(Ceylon)with special reference to Nuwara Elyia    E G DHARMASIRIWARANDE
1976    MPhil    Edinburgh    Some guidelines for a spatial framework for regional planning in Sri Lnaka    N D DICKSON
1976    PhD    London, UC    Some problems relating to constitutional amendments in India    Bhubaneswar DUTTA
1976    MA    Sheffield    An examination of the letters and papers of a Wesleyan missionary (the Rev. James John Ellis of India, 1883-1962    J ELLIS    Prof J Atkinson; Dr J C G Binfield
1976    DPhil    Sussex    Caste and Christianity: a study of the development and influence of attitudes and policies concerning caste held by Protetsant Anglo-Saxon missions in India    D B FORRESTER
1976    DPhil    Sussex    Sri Lanka and the powers: an investigation into Sri Lanka’s relations with Britain, India, US, Soviet Union and China, 1948-1974    Birty GAJAMERAGEDARA    Coral Bell
1976    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Bombay city businessmen and politics, 1918-1933: the politics of indigenous colonial businessmen in relation to rising nationalism and a modernising economy    A D D GORDON    Prof J A Gallagher
1976    MSc    Wales, UWIST    The impact of the Central Freight Bureau of Sri Lanka on liner conferences and trade patterns    M H GUNARATNE
1976    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Programming for a balanced development of modern industries in Bangladesh    A K Md HABIBULLAH    Prof P N Mathur
1976    MPhil    East Anglia    Techniques and management of annual planning with reference to Bangladesh    Shamsul HAQUE
1976    MSc    Wales, Swansea    Employment planning in Sri Lanka    Nimal HETTIARATCHY
1976    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    Agrarian structure and land productivity in Bangladesh: an analysis of farm level data    Mahabub HOSSAIN    Mrs S Paine
1976    PhD    Glasgow    Factor price distortions in Bangladesh    M M HUQ
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    A quantitative study of price movements in Bengal during the 18th and 19th centuries    A S M A HUSSAIN    Dr K N Chaudhuri
1976    MPhil    London    A study of 19th century historical work on Muslim rule in Bengal: Charles Stewart to Henry Beveridge    Muhammad D HUSSAIN    Dr P Hardy
1976    MSc    Wales    Construction and use of new system of national accounts for Sri Lanka    Siripala IPALAWATTE    Prof P N Mathur
1976    PhD    London, LSE    Factor intensity and labour absorption in manufacturing industries: the case of Bangladesh    R ISLAM    Prof A Sen; Dr Dasgupta
1976    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    An investigation into the effect of farm structure on resource productivitiy in selected areas of Bangladesh    Md Abdul JABBAR
1976    PhD    London, Inst Comm    India in the British Commonwealth: the problem of diplomatic representation 1917-1947    James L KEMBER    Dr T Reese
1976    PhD    Aberdeen    International relations in the South Asian sub-continent since the emergence of Bangladesh: conflict or co-operation ?    Ataur Rahman KHAN
1976    MSc    Strathclyde    Indian decision making and the Sino-Indian boundary conflict    R LOUDIS
1976    PhD    Glasgow    Regional disparities and structural change in an underdeveloped economy: a case study of India    M MAJMUDAR
1976    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Radical nationalism in India, 1930-1942: the role of the All India Congress Socialist Party    Z M MASANI
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Political leadership among the Hindu community in Calcutta, 1857-1885    John G McGUIRE    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1976    MPhil    Leeds    Public enterprise and the economic development of Pakistan: a study of the relationship between industrial finance corporations and the development of the private sector    I MEHDI
1976    PhD    Manchester    Marketing of social products: family planning in Bangladesh    M A MIYAN
1976    PhD    London, UC    History of printing in Bengali characters up to 1866    Hussain Khan MOFAKHKHAR
1976    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    An Indian rural society: aspects of the structure of rural society in the United Provinces, 1860-1920    P J MUSGRAVE    Prof E T Stokes
1976    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    The British in India, 1740-1763: a study in imperial expansion into Bengal    J B NICHOL    Prof E T Stokes
1976    PhD    London, LSE    Education and educated manpower in Bangladesh: a study of development after the 1947 partition    M NURUZZAMAN    Dr C M Phillips
1976    PhD    Manchester    The sensitivity of the demand for Indian exports to world prices: a study of particular commodities    N G PEERA
1976    PhD    Glasgow    Some methodological aspects of the cost benefit analysis of irrigation projcts: a case study of the Telegana region of India    Gautam PINGLE    Mr E RAdo; Dr R P Sinha
1976    DPhil    Oxford, St John’s    The role of India in imperial defence beyond its frontiers and home waters, 1919-1939    J O RAWSON    Prof N H Gibbs
1976    PhD    London, LSE    Towards a spatial strategy for Indian development    L R SATIN
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Municipal markets of Calcutta: three case studies    Mondira SINHA RAY
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Munda religion and social structure    Hilary STANDING
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Pakistan: a geopolitical analysis, 1947-1974    Arif Hassan SYED
1976    MSc    Wales, Swansea    Child welfare planning in India    Kalyani Sarojini THADI
1976    PhD    Aston    Techno-economic aspects of the competitive position of natural rubber with special reference to the natural rubber industry in Sri Lanka    G VARATHUNGARAJAN
1976    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney    The impact of tariff protection on Indian industrial growth, 1918-1939, with special reference to the steel, cotton mill and sugar industries    D M WAGLE    Dr W J Macpherson
1976    DPhil    Sussex    The use of project appraisal techniques in the Indian public sector: a case study of the fertiliser industry    John WEISS
1976    PhD    London, SOAS    Decisions and analogy: political structure and discourse among the Ho tribes of India    Michael Piers YORKE
1976/77    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Living saints and their devotees: a study of guru cults in urban Orissa    Deborah Anne SWALLOW    Prof E R Leach
1977    PhD    London, LSE    The jute manufacturing industry of Bangladesh, 1947-1974    Q K AHMAD
1977    DPhil    Oxford    The Bengal Muslims, circa 1871-1906: the re-definition of identity    R AHMED
1977    PhD    Hull    The Boria: a study of a Malay theatre in its socio-cultural context    RAHMAN AZMAN
1977    PhD    London,SOAS    Guardianship in South Asia with special reference to alienation and limitation    M BADARUDDIN
1977    PhD    Lancaster    The image of Gandhi in the Indo-Anglican nove    D CHATTERJEE
1977    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Lancashire cotton trade and British policy in India, 1919-1939    Basudev CHATTERJI
1977    PhD    Aberdeen    Doctrinal and exegetical issues in the Hindu-Christian debate during the nineteenth century Bengal renaissance with special reference to St Paul’s teaching on the religions of the nations    Chee Pang CHOONG
1977    PhD    Glasgow    Technological change in agriculture: the development experience of Tamil Nadu    M D’SA
1977    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Indigo plantations and agrarian society in North Bihar in the 19th and early 20th centuries    C M FISHER    Prof E Stokes
1977    PhD    Edinburgh    Some aspects of the colonial administration in Ceylon, 1855-1865    Alison C FORBES    Dr T J Barron
1977    PhD    Manchester    A model of manpower planning for India    R D GAIHA
1977    PhD    East Anglia    Paddy and rice marketing in Northern Tamil Nadu, India    Barbara HARRISS
1977    PhD    East Anglia    Technological change in agriculture and agrarian social structure in Northern Tamil Nadu    John Charles HARRISS
1977    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Indian National congress and the Indian Muslims (1916-1928)    M HASAN    Dr A Seal
1977    MEd    Wales, Aberystwyth    Television strategies for health education in Pakistan    Muhammad Anwar HASSAN
1977    PhD    London, UC    The tax burden on Bangladeshi agriculture – a welfare economics approach    M HUQ
1977    PhD    Durham    Differentiation, polarisation and confrontation in rural Bangladesh    B K JAHANGIR
1977    DPhil    Oxford, St Hugh’s    Gangaguru: the public and private life of a Brahmin community of North India    A S JAMESON
1977    PhD    Edinburgh    A Bangladeshi town’s elite: a sociological study    F KHAN
1977    MPhil    London, King’s    South Asia Muslims and the ocncept of equality with reference to the 20th century    M LAHLOU    Dr P Hardy
1977    PhD    London, SOAS    Evaluation of integrated rural development project in Pakistan    W E LOVETT
1977    PhD    London    Depression kills more than a self: concepts of mental distress among Pakistanis    R MALIK
1977    PhD    London, SOAS    The origins and early years of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1907    Margot I MORROW    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1977    MPhil    London, SOAS    Caste, rituals and strategies    Rina NAYAR
1977    PhD    Edinburgh    The directors of the East India Company, 1754-1790    J G PARKER    Dr J N M Maclean; Prof V G Kiernan
1977    PhD    Hull    Anglo-Burmese relations, 1795-1826    Gandadharan Padmanabhan RAMACHANDRA
1977    PhD    Leicester    The development of local transport in Bangladesh    Abu REZA
1977    DPhil    Sussex    An analysis of the export performance and policies of Bangladesh since 1950 with special reference to the income and employment implications of trade in manufactures    S A L REZA
1977    DPhil    Sussex    A study of political elites in Bangladesh, 1947-1970    Rangalal SEN    Prof T B Bottomore
1977    PhD    Leeds    Organisation and leadership of industrial labour in Karachi, Pakistan    Z A SHAHEED
1977    PhD    Kent    A monetary macro-economic model for India, 1951/52-1965/66    M A SHAHI
1977    MLitt    Cambridge, Girton    The Congress ministry in Bombay, 1937-1939    Rani SHANKAREDASS    Prof J Gallagher
1977    mpHIL    Edinburgh    A comparative study of development policies in Pakistan, 1955-1970    S H SYED
1977    MPhil    London, Birkbeck    Differences between the UK and Indian management attitudes to organization development (OD) and manpower planning: a comparative study    M N THAKUR
1977    PhD    London, LSE    Anglo-Indian  economic relations, 1913-1928: with special reference to the cotton trade    James David TOMLINSON    Mr M E Falkus; Mr D E Baines
1977/78    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Thje unemployment problem and development planning in Pakistan    Ghazy bin Subh-o MUHJAHID    Mr D A S Jackson
1977/78    PhD    London, LSE    Economic inequality and group welfare: theory and application in Bangladesh    S R OSMANI    Prof A Sen
1977/78    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The interrelation of agriculture and industry in a developing country: the case of Bangladesh    A H WAHIDUDDIN MAHMUD    Dr R M Goodwin
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    The economic and social organization of selected Mohmand Pukhtun settlements    Akbar S AHMED
1978    MPhil    Leeds    Disguised unemployment in the rural sector in Bangladesh    A H W M ALAM
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    British policy towards the Indian states, 1905-1939    S R ASHTON    Dr B N Pandey
1978    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Lord Willington and India, 19192-1936    George W BERGSTROM    Dr A F Madden
1978    DPhl    Sussex    Inequality, demand, structures and employment: the case of India    R BERRY
1978    PhD    Edinburgh    The Kui people: changes in belief and practice    Barbara Mather BOAL
1978    MPhil    Sussex    Islam in India since the partition of the sub-continent: issues in self-definition    J A BOND
1978    PhD    Leicester    The civil and military patronage of the East India Company, 1784-1840    John Michael BOURNE
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    The history of Janakpurdham: a study of asceticism and the Hindu polity    Richard BURGHART
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    The Hindu family firm and its future in the light of Indian tax law    S C CHAKRABORTY
1978    PhD    Exeter    The production and trade of rice and cotton in Pakistan with special reference to exports to the European Community    M A CHOUDHRY
1978    DPhil    Oxford    The colonial police and anti-terrorism: Bengal 1930-1936, Palestine 1837-1947 and Cyprus 1955-1959    D J CLARK    Prof M E Howard
1978    DPhil    Oxford, Hertford    International trade and payments and economic policy in Ceylon during 1938/1953: a case study in the economics of independence    D C DOLAWATTA    Mr R W Bacon
1978    MPhil    Leicester    An econometric model of consumer behaviour in India, 1950/51-1972/73    A GHATAK
1978    PhD    Durham    Kinship and ritual in a South Indian micro-region    Anthony GOOD
1978    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Pineapples from Sri Lanka: the export potential of fresh fruit in relation to some aspects of post-harvest deterioration    S J GOONERATNE    Dr P H Lowings
1978    PhD    London    The law of homicide in Pakistan    M HANIF

1978    PhD    Cranfield    Inter-urban bus operation in Bangladesh: a comparative study of the efficiency of the public and private bus sectors    M ISLAM
1978    PhD    Lancaster    Religion and moderenisation: a case study of interactions between Christianity, Hinduism and modernisation in Northern Orissa, 1947-197    A KANJAMALA
1978    PhD    Manchester    Analysis of industrial efficiency in Pakistan, 1959/60 to 1969/70    A R KEMAL
1978    PhD    Cambridge    Indian business and nationalist politics, 1931-1939: the political attitude of the indigenous capitalist class in relation to the crisis of the colonial economy    Claude MARKOVITS    Dr A Seal
1978    PhD    Lancaster    Herman Merivale and the British Empire. 1806-1874, with special reference to British North America, Southern Africa and India    D T McNAB    Dr J M MacKenzie
1978    DPhil    Oxford.     The era of civillisation: British policy for the Indians of the Canadas, 1830-1860    John Sheridan MILLOY    Dr F Madden
1978    PhD    Exeter    An analysis of the world jute economy and its implications for Bangladesh    M G MOSTAFA
1978    PhD    Surrey    Causes of educated unemployment in less developed countries: the case of Sri  Lanka    T PERERA
1978    PhD    Leeds    Public expenditure growth and its role in developing countries: the case of Bangladesh    A H PRAMANIK
1978    DPhil    Sussex    Capacity utilisation and labour employment in large scale manufacturing plant in Bangladesh    Alimur RAHMAN    B Dasgupta
1978    MPhil    Liverpool    A study in some aspects of demand and supply of food in a rapidly expanding population: the case of Bangladesh    F RAHMAN
1978    PhD    Essex    Tenancy and production behaviour in agriculture: a study of Bangladesh agriculture    K M RAHMAN
1978    MPhil    Leeds    The political economy of inflation: a case study of Bangladesh, 1959-1975    Syed Z SADEQUE
1978    PhD    Wales, InstSciTech    Spatial impact of growth poles in the context of regional development planning: a case study in the Ranchi Region (Bihar), India    Suranjit Kumar SAHA
1978    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Agrarian structure, technology and marketed surplus in the Indian economy    A SAITH
1978    MPhil    London, LSE    The Cominterm and the Communist Party of India, 1920-1929    Dushka Hyder SAIYID    Prof J Joll
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Relations between Roman Catholics and Hindus in Jaffna, Ceylon, 1900-1926: a study of religious encounter    N M SAVERIMUTTU    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Legal aspects of public enterprise in India and Tanzania: a comparative study    A SEN
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    The life and writings of Sir John William Kaye, 1814-1876    Nihar Nandan Prasad SING
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Some aspects of education and educational administration in the Madras Presidency between 1870 and 1898: a study of British educational policy in India    S SRIVASTAVA    Mr J Harrison
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Public expenditure and state accumulation in India, 1960-1970    John F J TOTE    Mr T J Byres
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Law and order in Oudh, 1856-1877    D B TRIVEDI    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1978    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Periodic markets in south Bihar, India    Sudhir Vyankatesh WANMALI    Dr GP Chapman Mr BH Farmer
1978    PhD    Brunel    Job satisfaction and labour turnover among women workers in Sri Lanka    W T WEERAKOON
1978    PhD    London, SOAS    Gandhists and socialists: the struggle for control of the Indian National Congress, 1931-1939    James Carroll WILSON
1978    MPhil    London, Insti Comm    Political conflict and regionalism: Orissa, 1938-1948    T W WOLF    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1979    MPhil    Edinburgh    National parks planning in Malaysia    A K bin ABANG MORSHIDI
1979    PhD    Cambridge    Labour market and labour utilisation in Bangladesh agriculture: an analysis of farm level data    Iqbal AHMED
1979    PhD    London, SOAS    The history of the city of Dacca, 1840-1884    S U AHMED    Mr Harrison
1979    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Sugar cane cultivation in Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh c.1890-1940: a study in the interrelations between capitalistic enterprise and a dependent peasantry    S AMIN    Dr Raychaudhuri
1979    PhD    London, UC    Occupational and spatial mobility among shanty dwellers in Poona: a study of selected settlements and implications for housing policy    M M BAPAT
1979    MLitt    Oxford, St Antony’s    The Punjab and recruitment to the Indian Army (1846-1918)    D BRIEF
1979    PhD    Keele    UN India Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), 1965-1966    S CHAUHDRY
1979    PhD    Wales    Local government finance in Bangladesh    Amirul Islam CHOWDHURY    Mr J Eaton
1979    PhD    Warwick    Interrelationships between income redistribution and economic growth with special reference to Sri Lanka    H M A CODIPPILY
1979    MPhil    London, SOAS    The constitutional history of Sri Lanka with special reference to the judiciary    M J A COORAY
1979    PhD    London, SOAS    Local politics in Bengal, Midnapur District    Swapan DAS GUPTA
1979    PhD    Edinburgh    Government and princes: India 1918-1939    G J DOUDS
1979    PhD    Manchester    The establishment of nuclear industry in less developed countries: the cases of Argentine, Brazil and India    M DUAYER DE SOUZA
1979    DPhil    Sussex    Levels, the communication of programmes and sectional strategies in Indian politics with reference to the Bharatiya Kranti Dal and the Republican Party of India in Uttar Pradesh State and Aligarh District (UP)    R I DUNCAN
1979    DPhil    Oxford, Keble    An anthropological analysis of the identity of the educated Bengali Muslim middle class of Calcutta, India    P J K EADE    Prof M Freeman
1979    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Bombay peasants and Indian nationalism: a study of economic change and political activity in the Bombay countryside, 1919-1939    Simon J M EPSTEIN
1979    DPhil    Sussex    Bilateral trade and payments agreements as an instrument of trade policy in Ceylon, 1952-1971    L S FERNANDO    D Wall
1979    DPhil    Oxford    Military aid as a factor in Indo-Soviet relations, 1961-1971    P C GERHARDT
1979    PhD    Manchester    Image makers of Kumartuli: the transformation of a caste-based industry in a slum quarter of Calcutta    Beth GOLDBLATT
1979    PhD    Lancaster    Achieving national development in the Third World: a systems study [Sri Lanka and Venezuela]    P W GUNAWARDENA
1979    PhD    London, SOAS    Industrial development of Bengal, 1902-1939    A Z M IFTIKHAR-UL-AWWAL
1979    PhD    Cambridge    Afghanistan in British imperial strategy and diplomacy, 1919-1941    Lesley Margaret JACKMAN
1979    DPhil    Sussex    Changing production relations and population in Uttar Pradesh    Vinod K JAIRATH    S Epstein
1979    DPhil    Oxford, Merton    Religion and politics among the Sikhs in the Punjab, 1873-1925    R A KAPUR    Prof R E Robinson
1979    PhD    Aberdeen    Nationalism in Bangladesh    Ataur R KHAN
1979    MLitt    Oxford, Wolfson    Communities in Ceylon: an ethnic perspective on Sinhalese-Tamil relations    P LANGTON    Dr Schuyler-Jones
1979    PhD    London, Wye    An economic analyses of resource use with respect of farm size and tenure in an area of Bangladesh    Md Abdur Sattar MANDAL
1979    DPhil    Oxford    Hindu pilgrimage with particular reference to West Bengal, India    E Alan MORINIS
1979    MPhil    York    Sociolinguistics of language planning: a historical study of language planning in Sri Lanka    Abul Monsur Md Abu MUSA    Dr M W S De Silva
1979    PhD    London, SOAS    Chittagong Port: a study of its fortunes, 1892-1912    S H OSMANY    Mr J B Harrison
1979    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Punjab peasants and politics: a study of the Lower Chenab Canal, 1890-1020    B J POFF    Prof E Stokes
1979    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    Agrarian structure and capital formation: a study of Bangladesh agriculture with farm level data    Atiqur RAHMAN
1979    PhD    London, SOAS    The non-official British in India, 1883-1920    R K RENFORD
1979    PhD    Aberdeen    The soils of the central Sarawak lowlands, Malaysia    I M SCOTT
1979    PhD    Durham    The socio-cultural determinants of fertility and the population policy in India    M SEKHRI
1979    PhD    St Andrews    Macroeconmic forecasting in developing countries with special reference to fiscal policy: a case study of India    Dinesh K SRIVASTAVA    Dr GK Shaw
1979    PhD    London,  SOAS    Emergency powers in the Indian constitution    Jahnavi K P SRIVASTAVA
1979    PhD    London, LSE    Democratic considerations and population policies in development planning: a survey of third world countries with case studies of Bangladesh and Pakistan    B F M STAMFORD    Prof D V Glass
1979    PhD    Edinburgh    The development of British Indology    K B SWANSON
1979    PhD    London, Royal Holloway    Anglo-French diplomacy overseas, 1935-1845, with special reference to West Africa and the Indian Ocean    Rosalind M WALLER    Prof G N Sanderson
1979/80    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Some aspects of the monetary and financial experience of a mixed economy: the case of Ceylon, 1950-1970    S W R D SARMARASINGHE    Mr M G Kuczynski
1980    MPhil/PhD    London, LSHTM    Sex differential mortality: a study of the status of women in Pakistan    A AHMAD
1980    DPhil    Sussex    Overseas aid and the transfer of technology – agricultural mechanisation in Sri Lanka    D F BURCH    E Brett
1980    PhD    Aberdeen    Aspects of population changes in British colonial Malacca: a study in social geography    Kok Eng CHAN
1980    PhD    London, SOAS    Rural power and debt in Sind in late 19th century, 1865-1901    David CHEESMAN    Dr Zaidi
1980    PhD    London, UC    Optimal development and various public policies: a case study of Bangladesh    Omar H CHOWDHURY    Mr Lal
1980    PhD    Cambridge    The agrarian economy of northern India, 1800-1880: aspects of growth and stagnation in the Doab    S J COMMANDER    Prof Stokes
1980    PhD    Leeds    Methodism and Sinhalese Buddhism: the Wesleyan-Methodist missionary encounter with Buddhism in Ceylon, 1814-1868, with special reference to the work of Robert Spencer Hardy    Barbara A R COPLANS    Dr E M Pye; Dr R C Towler
1980    PhD    London, King’s    British and Indian strategy and policy in Mesopotamia, November 1914-May 1916    P K DAVIS    Dr M L Dockrill
1980    MPhil    Edinburgh    Use of technology: rural industrialization in Sri Lanka    A DE WILDE
1980    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    The Indian Civil Service. 1919-1947    H A EWING    Dr A Seal
1980    PhD    Edinburgh    Devotional music in Mysore    Gordon GEEKIE
1980    MPhil    CNAA    An approach to the assessment and control by developing countries of the economic costs and benefits of their national fleets, with particular reference to Sri Lanka    M D H GUNATILLAKE
1980    DPhil    Sussex    Development of capitalism in agriculture in Pakistan with special reference to the Punjab Province    S A HUSSAIN
1980    PhD    Cambridge    Popular Christianity, caste and Hindu society in south India, 1800-1915: a study of Travancore and Tirunelveli    Susan Banks KAUFMANN
1980    PhD    Edinburgh    The cost and effictiveness of export incentive schemes in Pakistan, 1950-1970    Mohammad KHAYRAT
1980    PhD    London, SOAS    The city of Lucknow before 1856 and its buildings    Rosaleen M LLEWELLYN-JONES    Dr Chaudhuri
1980    PhD    Manchester    Domestic worship and the festival cycle in the south Indian city of Madurai    Penelope LOGAN
1980    PhD    Leeds    The policy of the government of India towards Afghanistan, 1919-1947    C MAPRAYIL    Prof D Dilks
1980    PhD    Strathclyde    Appropriate products, employment and income distribution in Bangladesh and Ghana: a case study of the soap industry    A K A MUBIN
1980    PhD    Manchester    Choice and transfer of technology: the case of modernization of dairying in India    S K MUKERJI
1980    DPhil    Oxford    The rebellion in Awadh, 1857-1858: a study in popular resistance    R MUKHERJEE
1980    DPhil    Sussex    The Muriya and Tallot Mutte: a study of the concept of the earth among the Muriya Gonds of Bastar District, India    Terrell POPOFF
1980    DPhil    Oxford    Saving in Pakistan, 1950-1977: estimation and analysis    M Z M QURESHI
1980    PhD    Durham    A study of the status of women in Islamic law and society with special reference to Pakistan    S F SAIFI
1980    PhD    London, SOAS    The political economy of rural poverty in Bangladesh    K U SIDDIQUI    Mr T J Byres
1980    DPhil    Sussex    Export led industrial development: the case of Sri Lanka    Upanda VIDANAPATHIRANA    Mr Godfrey
1980    PhD    London    Foreign investment law and policy of India: the control of private direct foreign investment    S L WATKINS
1980    PhD    Kent    The little businessman of Bukit Timah: a study of the economic, social and political organisation of traders in a market complex in Singapore    C W WONG
1981    PhD    London, External    An analysis of academic libraries in the Punjab (Pakistan)and proposals for their future development    Nazir AHMAD
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Institutional structure, income distribution and economic development: a case study of Pakistan    S E AHMAD    R Jolly; P Chaudhuri
1981    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Productivity, prices and distribution in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector, 1955-1970    Meekal A AHMED    Mr Z A Silberston
1981    PhD    Birmingham    Pakistani entrepreneurs, their development, characteristics and attitudes    Zafar ALTAF
1981    MPhil    Reading    Approaches to the optimisation of calving interval in large dairy herds in Sri Lanka    V ARIYAKUMAR
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Adoption of high-yielding varieties of paddy: a case study of Bangladesh agriculture    M ASADUZZAMAN
1981    MPhil    Oxford    Alternative approaches to the analysis of Indian agriculture: an evaluation    P BALAKRISHNAN
1981    MLitt    Oxford, Balliol    The Indian state and the state of emergency    Ashis BANERJEE    Mr N Maxwell
1981    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Migration theory with special reference to Delhi    B BANERJEE    Prof I M D Little
1981    PhD    London, SOAS    Evaluation of changes brought about by resettlement scheme in Sri Lanka    G S BETTS
1981    PhD    Newcastle    Genetic variation and structure in selected populations of India    S M S CHAHAL
1981    PhD    London, LSE    Commercial policy and industrialization with special reference to India since independence    S CHATTERJEE    Prof T Scitovsky
1981    PhD    Edinburgh    The politics and technology ofsharing  the Ganges    B CROW
1981    PhD    Hull    Karst water studies and environment in West Malaysia    J CROWTHER
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Land and politics in West Bengal: a sociological study of a multicaste village    A S DASGUPTA
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Population trends and changes in village organisation – Rampur revisited    M DASGUPTA    S Epstein; R Cassen
1981    MPhil    London, King’s    A study of female offenders in Sri Lanka and England    S S H DE SILVA
1981    MPhil    Oxford    Educated unemployment in India    D J DONALDSON
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Rules and transactions: some aspects of marriage among the Dhund Abbasi of North East Pakistan    H DONNAN
1981    PhD    London    India’s relations with developing countries: a study of the political economy of Indian investment, aid, overseas banking and insurance    S K DUTT
1981    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Geomorphology and environmental change in South India and Sri Lanka    Rita A M GARDNER    Dr A S Goudie
1981    PhD    Aberdeen    A study of Bangladesh tea soils with particular reference to the efficiency of phosphatic fertilizers    A K M GOLAM KIBRIA
1981    MPhil    Oxford    Some early British socialists in India    N GOPAL
1981    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The agrarian economy of the Bombay Deccan, 1818-1941    Sumit GUHA
1981    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Planning for growth and structural change in an under-nourished economy: the case of India    U R GUNJAL    Dr D M Nuti
1981    PhD    Manchester    Buddism, magic and society in a southern Sri Lankan town    M C HODGE
1981    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    An investigation of the impact of British rule in India, c 1820-1860 in the context of political, social and economic continuity and change    D J HOWLETT    Dr G Johnson
1981    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The origins of the partition of India, 1936-1947    Anita INDER SINGH
1981    PhD    Cambridge    Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan    A JALAL
1981    PhD    London, Imperial    Supervisory style and work group satisfaction: an empirical study in the textile industry in Sri Lanka    N W N JAYASIRI
1981    MPhil    Sussex    The effect of proximity to urban influence on rural leadership in Sri Lanka    s JAYATILAKE    R Dore
1981    MPhil    London, LSHTM    Relations between estimation biases and response errors in the analysis of a retrospective demographic survey of Bangladesh    Mokbul Ahmed KHAN    Prof W Brass
1981    MTh    Aberdeen    Salvation in a Malaysian context    Boo Wah KHOO
1981    MPhil    Edinburgh    British and Indian post-war new towns: a comparative analysis    D KUMER
1981    PhD    London, LSE    Bhutto, the People’s Pakistan Party and political development in Pakistan,1867-1977    M LODHI
1981    PhD    Bradford    The economics of railway traction with particular reference to India    J MAJUMDAR
1981    PhD    London, SOAS    Law and development in Sri Lanka: an historical perspective, 1796-1989     M L MARASINGHE
1981    PhD    Glasgow    The techno-economic development of the Indian machine tool industry, with special emphasis on aspects affecting efficiency    Ronald G MATTHEWS
1981    PhD    Durham    Spatial patterns of population growth and agricultural change in the Punjab, Pakistan, 1901-1972    M A MIAN
1981    PhD    Cambridge    Patterns of long-run agrarian change in Bombay and Punjab, 1881-1972    S C MISHRA
1981    PhD    Edinburgh    An empirical analysis of export promotion in Pakistan, 1959-1977    K MOHAMMAD
1981    DPhil    Sussex    The state and peasantry in Sri Lanka    M P MOORE
1981    PhD    Warwick    Rural factor markets in Pakistan    I NABI    Prof Stern
1981    PhD    Wales, UCNW    Basic needs fulfillment and the evaluation of land use alternatives with special reference to forestry in Kerala State, India    C T S NAIR
1981    MPhil    Oxford    The structure of Indian society: a study of some aspects of the work of Louis Dumont    S S RANDERIA
1981    DPhil    Sussex    The historical problems of agricultural productivity with special reference to the use of modern technology inputs: a case study of Meerut district in western Uttar Pradesh    Sumit ROY    B Dasgupta
1981    PhD    London, SOAS    The thakur and the goldsmith: aspects of legitimation in an Indian village    Christopher Thomas SELWYN
1981    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    The agrarian constraint to economic development: the case of India    Abhijit SEN    Mr J A Rowthorn
1981    MPhil    London, LSE    Control and regulation of cotton marketing in India, 1950-1975    J SENGUPTA    Prof B S Yamey
1981    MPhil    Kent    Patani nationalism    O bin SHEIKH AHMAD
1981    PhD    Cambridge, St Edmund’s    Canal irrigation and agrarian change under colonial rule: a study of the UP Doab, India, 1830-1930    Ian Edward STONE
1981    PhD    London    The growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937-1946    I A TALBOT
1981    MPhil    Brunel    A study of financing of small industries in UK and India    J P TEWARI
1981    DPhil    Sussex    Population, growth and labour utilisation in a rural/urban context: a Sri Lanka case study    W TILAKARATNE
1981    PhD    London, SOAS    Determinants of change in population resource relationships at village level: a study of two south Indian villages    Christopher Louis WILDE
1981    PhD    Bath    Class formation, state intervention and rural development in South Asia    G D WOOD
1981    PhD    London, LSE    The identification of developing Soviet strategy interests in the Indian Ocean, 1968-1974    Rashna Minoo WRITER    Mr P Windsor
1981    PhD    London, SOAS    The impact of canal irrigation on the rural structuresof the Punjab: the canal colony districts, 1880 to 1940    Fareeha ZAFAR
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Capital accumulation, land productivity and agrarian structure in Bangladesh agriculture    M ALAM
1982    PhD    Warwick    Effects of taxation on business in less developed countries with special reference to Sri Lanka    P BENNETT
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Agrarian structure, economic change and poverty: the experience of central Gujerat    BHANWARSINGH
1982    PhD    London, Imperial    Development of the labour process in the Indian electrical industry    B BHUSHAN
1982    PhD    Edinburgh    Energy flows in subsistence agriculture: a study of a dry zone village in Sri Lanka    Jan Roderic BIALY
1982    PhD    Cambridge    Conjugal units and single persons: an analysis of the social system of the Naiken of the Nilgirirs (South India)    Nirut BIRD
1982    PhD    Aberdeen    A sociological study of the development of social classes and social structure of Bangladesh    B M CHODWHURY
1982    PhD    Salford    Foreign aid and economic development: a case study of Pakistan with special reference to poverty and income distribution    M K CHOUDHARY
1982    PhD    Cabridge    A study of cotton-weaving in Bangladesh: the relative advantages and disadvantages of handloom weaving and factory production    Nuimuddin CHOWDHURY
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Technological innovation in agriculture in India: an analysis of economic policy and political pressures    F C CLIFT
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Open unemployment and poverty in the rural sector in Sri Lanka    I COOMARASWAMY
1982    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    The jute economy of Bengal, 1900-1947: unequal interaction between the industrial, trading and agricultural sectors    O GOSWAMI    Dr Raychaudhuri
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Changing socio-economic relations in a Kandyan countryside    P N GUNASINGHE    S Epstein
1982    MPhil    Leeds    Recovery of gemstones from river gravels in Sri Lanka    S M HERATH BANDA
1982    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The changing structure of cotton textile production in Bengal under the impact of the East India Company, 1750-1813, and the textile producers of Bengal    Hameeda HOSSAIN    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1982    MPhil    Sussex    The difference between ideological planning and service performance and the problems of differential access to agricultural credit in Bangladesh: the case of the integrated rural development programme    Sajjad HUSSAIN
1982    PhD    London, LSE    Boundary problems in South Asia    K H KAIKOBAD    Prof I Brownlie
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Spring Valley: a social, anthropological and historical enquiry into the impact of the tea estates upon a Sinhalese village in the Uva Highlands of Sri Lanka    C P KEMP
1982    DPhil    Oxford, Trinity    Pakistan’s relations with the USA, the USSR, China and India from the Sino-Indian war of 1962 to the Simla Pact    Mohamed Jameelur Rehman KHAN    Dr S Rose
1982    PhD    London    Aspects of the urban history, social, administrative and insttitutional of Dacca City, 1921-1947    Nazia KHANUM    Mr J B Harrison
1982    MPhil    Cambridge, Magdalene    The British policy of withdrawal from India: in particular with reference to its impact on the subsequent political development of India    S W KIM    Mr C Barnett
1982    DPhil    Oxford, New    The Indian coal industry after nationalisation    Rajiv KUMAR    Mr S Lall
1982    PhD    Lonon, SOAS    Industrial location and regional policy in south India    James William MACKIE    Dr Bradnock
1982    PhD    Cambridge    Women’s work and economic power in the family: a study of two villages in West Bengal    Linda Catherine MAYOUX
1982    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Construction of capital and labour coefficient matrices for the India economy and their use in framing a development plan    Deba Kumar Datt MAZUMDAR    Prof F N Mathur
1982    PhD    Edinburgh    Relativization in Bengali    A K M MORSHED
1982    PhD    London, LSE    India and the EEC, 1962-1973    Bishakha MUKHERJEE
1982    PhD    Keele    Social aspects of production and reproduction in Bonda society    Bikram N NANDA
1982    MPhil    Reading    The evaluation and control of constraints on the development of dairying in the Jaffna District of Sri Lanka    A NAVARATNARAJAH
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Social change and class relations in rural Sri Lanka    U L PERERA    R Dore
1982    PhD    Manchester    An evaluationof the problems of measuring the profit performance of multinational enterprise in less developed countries: a case study of Bangladesh    M Z RAHMAN
1982    DPhil    Sussex    Villagers education aspirations and their relationship to rural development: a south Indian case study    Sudha V RAO    S Epstein
1982    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    On liberty and economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India    Subroto ROY    Prof F Hahn
1982    PhD    London, LSHTM    Education and fertility in Pakistan    Zeba A SATHAR
1982    PhD    London, LSE    Maintaining non-alignment: India’s political relations with the superpowers in the 1970s    Muhammad Azher Zafar SHAH    Mr C J Hill
1982    DPhil    Sussex    The process of rural change and its impact on income distribution in Gujerat    Bhanwar SINGH    R Cassen
1982    PhD    Leeds    Analytical techniques in agricultural development planning: a critical appraisal of a project for the modernization of an irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka    Nelson VITHANAGE    Mr I G Simpson
1982    PhD    Reading    A biological study of the benefits of intercropping in England and India    N VORASOOT
1982/83    PhD    Birmingham    Pakistan: the energy sector: a study in sector planning    Tariq RIAZ
1982/83    PhD    Cambridge    A study of the development of the sugar industry in Ahmednagar Diustrict, Maharashtra, (with particular reference to the harvesting and carting labourers employed in the industry    Joy RICHARDSON
1982/83    PhD    London, SOAS    Politics and the state in Pakistan, 1947-1975    Mohammad WASEEM
1983    PhD    London, LSHTM    Dimensions of intra-household food and nutrient allocation: a study of a Bangaldeshi village    M ABDULLAH    Ms Wheeler
1983    PhD    Aberdeen    Inter-religious controversy in India: the interpretation of Jesus in the works of Rammohun Roy and Sayyid Ahmad Khan    Muda Ismail bin AB-RAHMAN
1983    DPhil    Oxford    Emerson and India    S ACHARYA
1983    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The contribution of Elphinstone College to higher education and political leadership in the Bombay Presidency. 1840-1940    Naheed AHMAD    Prof R E Robinson
1983    PhD    London, Inst Comm    The Mujib regime in Bangladesh, 1972-75: an analysis of its problems and performance    A U AHMED
1983    PhD    London, King’s    Chromite deposits of the Sakhakot-Qila ultramafic complex, Pakistan    Zulfiqar AHMED
1983    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Rural society and politics in Bengal, 1900-1950    Sugata BOSE    Prof T E Stokes
1983    PhD    City    Conflict and communication in the Third World: a study of class and ethnic bases of conflict and relationships between these and the mass media in Pakistan and Nigeria    C M BRYNIN
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Contemporary problems in Hindu religious endowments    Nihar Ranjan CHAKRABARTI
1983    PhD    Cambridge    Labour and society in Bombay, 1918-1940: workplace, neighbourhood and social organization    R S CHANDAVARKAR    Dr A Seal
1983    MLitt    Oxford, Trinity    The Congress ministers and the Raj, 1937-1939: a style of British policy and Indian politics    Sunil CHANDER    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1983    PhD    London, King’s    Transforming a traditional agriculture: the change from subsistence to commercial cropping in a part of Hazara District, Pakistan    K L COOK
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Family and business in a small town of Rajasthan    C COTTAM    Dr L Caplan
1983    MPhil    Edinburgh    Towards a national human settlements strategy for Pakistan    M CRAGLIA
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    The urban demography of industrialization and its economic implications, with particular reference to a region of India from 1951 to 1971    Nigel Royden CROOK
1983    PhD    Newcastle    Agricultural export diversification and earnings instability of Sri Lanka    Maxwell Peter DE SILVA
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    British firms and the economy of Burma, with special reference to the rice and teak industries    Maria Serena Icaziano DIOKNO
1983    MPhil    London, UC    Jammu and Kashmir: a selected and annotated bibliography of manuscripts, books and articles together with a survey of its history, languages and literature from Rajatarangini, 1977/8    Ramesh Chander DOGRA
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Trade unionism in Bengal before 1922: historical origins, development and characteristics    Stephen N GOURLAY    Dr K chaudhuri
1983    PhD    Exeter    Forms of Chhou: an investigation of an Indian theatre tradition    S J HAWKES
1983    PhD    London, Wye    Food production and food entitlement in rural Bangladesh: five year outlook for a small community in an irrigated area    Walza Md Hossaine JAIM    Mr G Allanson
1983    PhD    Cambridge    The economic and social bases of political allegiance in Sri Lanka, 1947-1982    D J JAYANNATHA    Mr G P Hawthonr
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Domestic terms of trade and agricultural taxation policy in Pakistan, 1970-1977    Shahnaz KAZI    Mr T Byres
1983    PhD    Wales    Production technology and industrial development: India’s planning period    Edward Lawrence LYNK
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Transport systems and urban growth in Punjab, Pakistan    M K MALIK    Dr R W Bradnock
1983    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Peasant society and agricultural development: a case study from coastal Orissa    S MITRA    Prof J A Barnes
1983    PhD    London    A general information programme for Pakistan: some problems and prospects with special reference to the promotion of cultures in the libraries and other information centres    Rafia MOHADADALLY
1983    PhD    London, UC    A general information programme for Pakistan: some problems and prospects with special reference to the promotion of culture in the libraries and other information centres    Rafia MOHAMMADALLY
1983    PhD    Cranfield    Smallholder mechanization in Pakistan    A Q A MUGHAL
1983    DPhil    Oxford    Madrasahs, scholars and saints: Muslim response to the British presence in Delhi and the Upper Doab, 1803-1857    Farhan Ahmed NIZAMI    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1983    MPhil    Edinburgh    Social consequences of rural economic change in South Asia    O NOTE
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of low caste consciousness and social protest in Western India in the later 19th century    Rosalind O’HANLON    Prof K Ballhatchet
1983    PhD    Bradford    Gandhi as a political organiser; an analysis of local and national campaigns in Inda    B OVERY
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Contact and controversy between Islam and Christianity in northern India, 1833-1857: the relations between Muslim and Protestant missionaries in the north-western provinces and Oudh    Avril Ann POWELL    Prof K Ballhatchet
1983    DPhil    Sussex    Technological capacity and production performance in the fertilizer and the paper industries in Bangladesh    H A QUAZI
1983    PhD    London, SOAS    Differrentiation of the peasantry in Bangladesh: an empirical study with micro-level data    A RAHMAN    Mr T J Byres
1983    MPhil    Edinburgh    Planning for rural development with particular reference to Bangladesh    A H S RAHMAN    Mr J B Leonard; Prof P Johnson-Marshall
1983    PhD    Birmingham    A study of small indigenous church movements in Andra Pradesh    S RAJ
1983    PhD    London, InstiComm    Problems of organisation, policies and mobilisation in the development of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1936-1947    Mohammed Harun-Or RASHID    Prof W H Morris-Jones
1983    PhD    London, UC    Commodity taxes and employment policy in developing countries (with special reference to India)    B RAYCHAUDHURI
1983    PhD    Edinburgh    Responsiveness and rules: parent-child interaction in Scotland and India    V REDDY
1983    MPhil    Sueery    Alignment in Pakistan’s foreign policy, 1954-1977    Arif H SYED    Prof C Pick
1983    MLitt    Aberdeen    The 1853 Government of India Act    Jane THOMAS    Miss R M RTyzack; Dr E C Bridges
1983    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    Labour migration and economic development in an Indian hillarea    W WHITTAKER    Mr B H Farmer
1983    PhD    Warwick    Some experiments with a multisectoral intertemporal optimization model for Sri Lanka    D E WIJESINGHE
1984    PhD    Bristol    The socio-economic aspects of the population age structure of Uttar Pradesh, India    Mhammed ABUZAR    Dr Morgan
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Peasant production and capitalist development: a model with reference to Bangladesh    Abu M S ADNAN
1984    PhD    London, LSE    Squatter settlements of Karachi: a comparative perspective of the culture of activism    M O L AZAM
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney    Regional dependence and rural development in Central India, 1820-1930    C N BATES    Dr D A Washbrook
1984    DPhil    Oxford    Agricultural growth in Bangladesh and West Bengal    J K BOYCE
1984    PhD    Edinburgh    The Vellore Mutiny, 1806    Alan D CAMERON    Prof G Shepperson
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    Opening up the interior: the impact of railways on the north Indian economy and society, 1860-1914    Ian David DERBYSHIRE
1984    PhD    Reading    Technology, growth and distribution in Sri Lanka’s paddy sub-sector    J FARRINGTON
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Non capitalist land rent: theories and the case of North India    J GHOSH    Mr T Byres
1984    PhD    Ulster    The 1st Marquess of Dufferin and Ava: Whig Ulster landlord and imperial statesman     A T HARRISON    Dr T G Fraser
1984    PhD    Edinburgh    The cultural determinants of fertility in a region of South India    Heather M  JACKSON
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    Human rights – the Sri Lanka experience    N JAYAWICKRAMA
1984    PhD    London, Bedford    Urban transport problems: the case of Bombay    P JOSHI    Dr D Hilling
1984    PhD    London, LSE    Caste and temple service in a Sinhalese highland village    Andrew John KENDRICK    Dr J P Perry
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    Tribal settlement and socio-economic integration: a case study of the Bannu lowlands, Pakistan    Gul Mohammad KHAN    Dr R Bradnock
1984    MPhil    Sussex    The effects of the changing patterns of leadership on succession problems and the use of ideology: a comparative study of India (1962-1969)and Japan (1929-1936)    H KINASE-LEGGETT    B D Graham
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    The British administaration of the Kandyan provinces of Sri Lanka, 1815-1833    K M P KULASEKERA    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    Studies in the development of India’s non-traditional manufactured exports, 1957-1980    A KUMAR    Prof W B Reddaway
1984    DPhil    Sussex    Implications of international mobility of labour for trade and development with particular reference to Bangladesh    Raisul MAHMOOD    Mr Godfrey
1984    MLitt    Oxford, St Antony’s    The Communist Movement in West Bengal. 1962-1980    Ross MALLICK    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    Role and ritual in Hindu marriage    Werner F MENSKI    Prof J D M Derrott
1984    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    Political mobilisation and the nationalism movement in India – a study of eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 1936-1942    Chandan S MITRA    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    Instability in food grain production: causes, adjustments, policies: a case study of Bangladesh    K A S MURSHID    Prof A Robinson
1984    DPhil    Sussex    Poverty and inequality in rural India: a state-wide analysis of trends since 1950    R NAYYAR    P Chaudhuri
1984    PhD    Edinburgh    Productivity and innovation in traditional agriculture: a comparative study of agricultural development in the Forth Valley, 1760-1841 and the Bengal Presidency, 1870-1914    Alastair William ORR
1984    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Alliance and elopement: economy, social order and sexual antagonism the Kalasha (Kalash Kafirs) of Chitral    Peter S C PARKES    Dr Schuyler-Jones
1984    PhD    Leicester    The structure, petrology and geochemistry of the Kohistan batholith, Gilgit, Kashmir, North Pakistan    Michael George PETTERSON
1984    PhD    Cambridgew    Respecting power: temples, resources and authority in southern Tamilnadu, India    Gordon Darge PRAIN
1984    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The evolution of the agrarian economy of western India, 1860-1940: a case study of selected Gujerat and Deccan districts    S PRAKASH    Dr G Johnson
1984    PhD    London, LSE    Rural protest and politics: a study of peasant movements in Western Maharashtra, 1875-1947    Livi Nancy Mary RODRIGUES
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    Crime and society in the Sinhala speaking areas of Sri Lanka, 1865-1905    John D ROGERS    Prof K Ballhatchet
1984    MPhil    Nottingham    The right to property under the Indian independence constitution    J S SANGHIA    Prof Pear
1984    PhD    Cambridge    Rural organizations in Sri Lanka: official policy and institutional reform in the peasant agricultural sub-sector, 1948-1977    S SATHANANDAN
1984    PhD    London, SOAS    Muslim society and politics in the Punjab    P SCRAGG    Dr Zaidi
1984    MPhil    London, LSE    Bengal economic development, 1790-1830    P SEN    Mr M E Falkus
1984    PhD    Reading    Tropical forest monitoring using digital Landsat data in northeastern India    Ashbindu SINGH
1984    PhD    Cambridge    Temple “prostitution” and community reform: an examination of the ethnographic, historical and textual context of the devadasi of Tamil Nadu, south India    A SRINAVASAN

1984    PhD    Edinburgh    Technology transfer in the Indian and Indonesian pharmaceutical industries    A J STOKER

1984 PhD London, SOAS, British Attitudes to Indian Nationalism, 1922-1935. Pillarisetti SUDHIR. Professor Kenneth A. Ballhatchet.

1984    PhD    London,  SOAS    Ritual status in the life cycles of women in a village of central India    catherine S THOMPSON    Prof A Mayer
1984    DPhil    Sussex    Gender as a variable in the political process: a case study of women’s participation in state-level electoral politics, Andhra Pradesh, India    C WOLKOWITZ
1985    PhD    Strathclyde    The development of small-scale enterprises: a study of the agriculture-related engineering industry in Pakistan Punjab    K AFTAB
1985    PhD    London, Royal Holloway    The emergence of Muslim socialists in North India, 1917-1947    Khizar H ANSARI    Dr F C R Robinson
1985    PhD    Salford    The impact of farm mechanization on productivity and employment: a case study of Punjab, Pakistan    M ASHRAF
1985    PhD    Durham    Blue-green algal nitrogen fixation associated with deepwater rice in Bangladesh    A AZIZ
1985    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian opium and Sino-Indian trade relations    F BAKHALA    Prof K N Chaudhuri
1985    PhD    Cambridge    On the Srawacs or Jains: processes of division and cohesion among two Jain communities in India and England    M J BANKS
1985    PhD    London, SOAS    Martial law in Bangladesh, 1975-`979: a legal analysis    M E BARI
1985    PhD    London, SOAS    Thomas Munro: the decision making process in Madras, 1795-1830    H BREITMEYER    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1985    PhD    London, LSE    Political radicalism and middle class ideology in Bengal: a study of the politics of Subhas Chandra Bose, 1928-1940    B CHAKRABARTY
1985    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The behaviour of industrial prices in India, 1947-1977    Ruchira CHATTERJI    Dr G Meeks
1985    PhD    Edinburgh    Lateritic soils and their managment in parts of West Bengal    Sandip K CHAUDHURI
1985    PhD    London, SOAS    Social change and the development of “modern” politics in Travancore from the late 19th century to 1938    James L CHIRIYANKANDATH    Dr P G Robb
1985    PhD    Manchester    The role of exchange rate policies in the balance of payments and adjustment process in a small open developing economy: a case study of Sri Lanka    S S COLOMBAGE
1985    DPhil    Sussex    Sharecropping and sharecroppers’ struggles in Bengal, 1930-1950    Adrienne J COOPER    Mr R Guha
1985    MSc    Stirling    The mechanism of distribution of marketed surplus in the models of dual economies through the Soviet, Chinese and Indian practice towards economic development    Z COTTI
1985    PhD    Sheffield    Vegetation and land use studies in the Udawalawe Basin, Sri Lanka    D S EPITAWATTA
1985    PhD    Newcastle    Analysis of the lactation curve of Pakistani dairy buffaloes    K Z GONDAL
1985    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    The relations between Britian, India and Burma in the formulaton of imperial policy, 1890-1905    G P GUYER
1985    PhD    Lancaster    The continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism    I C HARRIS
1985    PhD    London, LSE    Women in the urban labour force in Pakistan: the case of Lahore    Emma HOOPER
1985    PhD    Strathclyde    The choice of technique in cotton textiles and its impact on employment in Bangladesh    M R ISLAM
1985    DPhil    Sussex    The impact of male outmigration on intra-village social relationships: a case study of Meharabad, a Punjabi village in Pakistan    Naveed-I-Rahat JAAFRI
1985    PhD    Edinburgh    Health and the state in India    Roger JEFFERY
1985    PhD    Oxford    Limites and renewals: transformations of belief in Kipling’s fiction    S KEMP
1985    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    The traditional tabla drumming of Lucknow in its social and cultural context    J R KIPPEN
1985    MPhil    CNAA, Kingston Poly    The rubber industry in India: a vital industry in the planned economy    P A MARS
1985    PhD    Cambridge    Economic relations between a centrally planned and a developing market economy: Indo-Soviet trade (1970-1982)and technology transfer (post 1955)    Santosh Kumar MEHROTRA    Dr P Nolan
1985    DPhil    Oxford    The Bengal Muslim intelligentsia, 1937-1977: the tension between the religious and the seccular    Tazeen Mahnaz MURSHID
1985    PhD    Kent    The impact of colonial rule in Johore: a case of social and political adjustment    M S H MUSTAJAB
1985    PhD    London, LSE    The sacred city of Anuradhapura: aspect of Sinhalese Buddhism and nationhood    Elizabeth NISSAN    Dr C J Fuller; Dr J P Parry
1985    MPhil    Manchester    Land ownership and irrigation development in the Sind region of Pakistan: institutional constraints on technical change    Meherunissa M K PANWHAR
1985    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Social and political implications of changing land and labour relations in rural Bangladesh: a village level study    Tanyal RAHMAN VIROOMAL
1985    DPhil    Oxford, Lincoln    The Naxalites and their ideology: a study in the sociology of knowledge    Rabindra RAY    Dr F Parkin
1985    PhD    Cambridge    Honour, nurture and festivity: aspects of female religiosity amongst Jain women in Jaipur    J REYNELL
1985    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    An analysis of the structure, conduct and performance of the date marketing system in Sind-Pakistan    Muneer Ali Shah RIZVI
1985    PhD    Brunel    The influence of the state in the industrial relations systems of third world countries with special reference to Bangladesh    S A SIDDIQ
1985    MPhil    London, LSHTM    Refugees, health and development: a case study of Tibetan refugees in India    Staphanie Pietre Pardoe SIMMONDS
1985    PhD    Durham    Ritual tradition of Berava caste of southern Sri Lanka    Robert SIMPSON    Mr D Brooks
1985    DPhil    Oxford, Christ Church    Some aspects of implementing appropriate technology with special reference to cotton textiles in India    Harsha Vardhana SINGH    Mrs F J Stewart
1985    PhD    Aston    Nations and organisations: a comparative study of English and Indian work-related values and attitudes in matched manufacturing firms    M H TAYEB
1985    PhD    London, SOAS    Planned language and Penang Hokkien: the socioeconomic effects of language planning on an urban Chinese community in West Malaysia    Diane Arnauld de TERRA
1985    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Education and rural development in India since independence in 1947: with special reference to Kerala    Joseph THAIKOODAN    Prof B holmes
1985    PhD    London, Queen Elizabeth    Class, nutrition education and growth: a class analysis of the impact on infant nutritional status of maternal education concerning early supplementation in Bangladesh    Katharine J WILSON    Dr C Greissler
1985    PhD    Edinburgh    Upholding the veil: Hindu women’s perceptions of gender and caste identity in rural Pakistan    Caroline Sara Lindsay YOUNG

1986    PhD    Bradford    Higher education in developing countries    M A ADEEB
1986    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Information, uncertainty and rural credit markets in Pakistan    Irfan ALEEM    Prof J A Mirrlees
1986    MPhil    Edinburgh    Housing and the state in Lahore, Pakistan    I U BAJWA
1986    MPhil    Edinburgh    Visual patterns and the landscape of wet zone Sri Lanka    S I BALASURIYA
1986    MPhil    Ulster    Russio-Afghan boundary demarcation. 1884-1895    Anila BALI    Dr T G Fraser
1986    PhD    London, SOAS    The devolution of government in Sri Lanka: legal aspects of the relationship between central and local government: an historical and comparative study    S A BANDARANAYAKE
1986    PhD    Keele    Migrant employment in the urban formal sector: the jute industry in Dacca, Bangladesh    Salma BANU    Prof D Dwyer
1986    PhD    Sheffield    The economic impact of a regional economy: the case of Bhilai Steel Plant (India)    S BHATARA    Mr W D Watts
1986    PhD    Open    Implementation across national boundaries: implementing the Government of India Act, 1935    V BOROOAH
1986    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    British politics and the East India Company, 1767-1773    H V BOWEN    Prof P D H Thomas
1986    PhD    London, LSHTM    Evaluation of a community based oral rehydration programme in rural Bangladesh    Ahmed M R CHOWDHURY
1986    PhD    Exeter    Household, kin and community in a Bangladesh village    M A M CHOWDHURY
1986    PhD    Cranfield    Rice by-product production, disposal and utilisation in Sri Lanka    S ELIAS
1986    PhD    London    Trade, kinship and Islamisation: a comparative study of the social and economic organisation of Muslim and Hindu traders in Tirunelveli District, South India    Frank Sylvester FANSELOW
1986    PhD    Aberdeen    Inter-religious conflict in India – the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim relations in North Malabar, 1498-1947    Theodore Paul Christian GABRIEL    Prof A Walls
1986    DPhil    Sussex    Rice in Bangladesh: post harvest losses, technology and employment    M T GREELEY
1986    MSc    Cambridge    The impact of Sri Lankan land reform measures, 1972-1975, on the tea sub-sector    S A P JAYATILAKA
1986    MLitt    Oxford, Trinity    The nature of Indian state: an investigation into the interrelationship between economic and political crisis (1965-75)    A K JHA
1986    PhD    London, LSE    The functions of children in the household economy and levels of fertility: a case study of a village in Bangladesh    N KABEER    Mr C M Langford
1986    MPhil    Edinburgh    The role of incentives for paddy cultivation in developing countries with reference to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka    G A M KARUNARATNE
1986    PhD    Reading    Obstacles to the adoption of modern rice cultivation practices by small farmers in Bangaldesh    Md Abul KASHEM
1986    PhD    Glasgow    Handling of industrial disputes in the public sector industries in Bangladesh    M A A KHAN
1986    DPhil    York    The state, village society and political economy of agricultural development in Bangladesh. 1960-1985    S A KHAN
1986    DPhil    Oxford, Corpus    Instability of jute prices and supplies: the impact on and implications for jute fibre production in Bangladesh    Reza KIBRIA    Mr M F G Scott
1986    MPhil    Essex    Selected aspects of India’s foreign trade in the 1970s    S LAKRA
1986    MTh    Wales, Aberystwyth    The life of the people of north Mizoram prior to and subsequent to the advent of Christianity, up the the year of the Mizo Church’s jubilee in 1944    J M LLOYD
1986    PhD    Bradford    The modelling and analysis of national development strategies for India    P MANDAL
1986    PhD    Cambridge, Emmanuel    Financial and manpower aspects of the Dominions and India’s contribution to Britain’s war effort, 1914-1919    G W MARTIN    Dr Z S Steiner
1986    PhD    Leicester    Fulfilment theology: the Aryan race theory and the work of British Protestant missionariesin Victorian India    Martin MAW
1986    PhD    London, LSHTM    Patterns of adult energy nutrition in a south Indian village    G McNEILL
1986    PhD    Dundee    Estimates of gross domestic product by provinces in Pakistan    A M MIRZA
1986    DPhil    Oxford, New    Caste, Christianity and Hinduism: a study of social organisation and religion in rural Ramnad    C MOSSE    Dr N J Allen
1986    MPhil    East Anglia    Go plough and eat: the impact of Gandhian intervention in a Bihar village between 1954 and 1974    Ivan Charles NUTBROWN
1986    PhD    Londonb, SOAS    A history of the London Missionary Scoiety in the Straits Settlements, 1815-1847    Ronnie Leona O’SULLIVAN    Prof K Ballhatchet
1986    PhD    Aston    Investigation of relationship betrween product design and production departments in manufacturing companies (India)    K PAWAR
1986    PhD    Manchester    Landed property and dynamic of instability: Bengal: the property-power nexus: state formation under colonialism and its contemporary siginificance    H Z RAHMAN
1986    PhD    Cranfield    Appropriateness of incentives for small scale enterprise location in less developed areas: the experience of the UK, Japan and India    K RAMACHANDRAN
1986    DPhil    London, St Antony’s    Exchange rate and commercial policy in a controlled trade regime: a case study of India    Narhari RAO
1986    PhD    City    The social and economic conditions of export orientated industrialisation as a strategy of development [Sri Lanka]    K RUPESINGHE
1986    PhD    City    British press coverage and the role of the Pakistan press from independence to the emergence of Bangladesh    M SHAMSUDDIN
1986    PhD    London SOAS    Vallabhbhal Patel: his role and style in Indian politics, 1928-1947    R D SHANKARDASS
1986    PhD    Sheffield    Transport and regional development in Bangladesh: a geographical study    A H M Raihan SHARIF
1986    PhD    London, SOAS    Sri Lanka: an examination of economic and social development associated with recolonisation on an irrigation scheme    Richard Paul SLATER    Dr A Turton
1986    PhD    Leeds    Pakistan’s relations with Britain, 1947-1951: with particular reference to some problems of partition    M SOHAIL
1986    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    Tenna: peasant, state and nation in the making of a Sinhalese rural community    Jonathan R SPENCER
1986    PhD    Salford    Rural-urban population mobility in Bangladesh: its implications for rural areas with particular reference to two villages    R M TALUKDAR
1986    PhD    London, LSE    Sacrifice and divine power: Hindu temple rituals and village festivals in a fishing village, Sri Lanka    Masakazu TANAKA
1986    DPhil    Oxford, St Peter’s    India: colonialism, nationalism and perception sof develeopment    Kevin WATKINS
1986    PhD    Manchester    Agrarian change in India: a case study of Bundwan District, West Bengal    Neil Anthony WEBSTER
1986    MLitt    Oxford, Wolfson    A critical examination of Aurobindo’s contribution to the tradition of Vedanta    Yvonne WILLIAMS    Prof B K Matilal
1986    PhD    East Anglia    Cyclone vulnerability and housing policy in the Krishna Delta, South India, 1977-83    Peter WINCHESTER    Dr P M Blaikie
1986    MPhil    East Anglia    Urban unemployment in peninsular Malaysia    S R YAHYA    Dr J T Thoburn
1986    PhD    Edinburgh    The realities of life from a Hindu Sindi perspective    John Nicol YOUNG
1986    PhD    London, LSE    Sacrifice and the sacred in a Hindu “t-irtha”: the case of Pushkar, India    Sushila Jane ZEITLYN    Dr J R Parry
1986/87    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Surplus appropriation and accumulation by rural households in India: a case study based on fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh    Ravi Shankar SRIVASTAVA
1987    PhD    London Royal Holloway    All India Muslim League, 1906-1919    M S AHMAD
1987    PhD    Sheffield    Formulation of design criteria for industrial architecture in Bangladesh in light of the developments made in the United Kingdom and other developed countries    N AHMED
1987    MPhil    CNAA Sheffield Poly    The effects of climate on the design and location of windows for buildings in Bangladesh    Z N AHMED
1987    PhD    Nwecastle    Housing for the lower income people of Dhaka,Bangladesh: a peri-urban development approach    S AMEEN
1987    MPhil    City    Personality, leadership and subordinate satisfaction: an empirical study in the civil service of Singapore    C T ANG
1987    PhD    London, RHBNC    The Pirs of Sind and their relationship with the British, 1843-1947    Sarah Frances Deborah ANSARI    Dr F R C Robinson
1987    MPhil    Strathclyde    The development of sugar manufacturing in Pakistan    M AURANGZEB
1987    PhD    Keele    The growth and development of trade unionism in Bangladesh, 1947-1986    M Z BADIUZZAMAN
1987    PhD    Loughborough    A strategy for the integrated development of squatter settlements: a Karachi case study    Q A BAKHTEARI
1987    PhD    Edinburgh    State and indigenous medicine in nineteenth and twentieth-century Bengal, 1800-1947    Poonam BALA
1987    PhD    Cambridge    Sectoral price determination and the inflationary process in the Indian economy, 1950-1980    P BALAKRISHNAN
1987    PhD    East Anglia    Draught animal power in Bangladesh    D BARTON    Dr D P Gibbon
1987    MPhil    Manchester    The role and contribution of the Alilgarh Muslim University in modern Indian Islam, 1877-1947    G N BUDDHANI
1987    PhD    Cambridge, Magdalene    From a pre-colonial order to a princely state: Hyderabad in tranition, c.1748-1865    S CHANDER
1987    PhD    Dundee    Financial development and agricultural development in Pakistan, 1952-1982    Mohammad Jamil CHAUDHARY
1987    PhD    Leicester    Conflict and change among the Khyber Afridis: a study of British policy and tribal society on the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947    R O CHRISTENSEN
1987    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney     State, tribe and region: policy and politics in Indiaa’s Jharkhand, 1900-1980    S E CORBRIDGE    Mr B H Farmer
1987    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Communal riots in Bengal, 1905-1947    Suranjan DAS    Dr T Raychoudhuri
1987    PhD    Cambridge    Money and finance in an underdeveloped economy: some themes from Indian economic history, 1914-1917    T DATTA    Mr M G Kuczynki
1987    PhD    London, SOAS    Images and metaphor: an analysis of Iban collective representations    J DAVISON
1987    PhD    Keele    The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 1948-1965, with postscript on the impact of UNMOGIP on the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971    Pauline DAWSON    Prof A M James
1987    PhD    London, SOAS    The changing role of women in Bengal, c.1890-c.1930, with special reference to British and Bengali discourse on gender    Dagmar ENGELS    Prof K Ballhatchet
1987    PhD    London, SOAS    Psychiatry and colonialism: the treatment of European lunatics in British India, 1800-1858    Waltraud ERNST    Prof K A Ballhatchet
1987    PhD    Manchester    The origins of inflation in Pakistan, 1959-1982: an evaluation of alternative hypotheses    Faiz B FIROZE
1987    PhD    Cambridge    The brick trade in India: energy use, tradition and development    S GANDHI
1987    DPhil    Oxford    Money and the real economy: a study of India, 1960-1984    S E GHANI
1987    PhD    Cranfield    Computer simulation of runoff and soil erosion from small agricultural catchments in Sri Lanka    E GUNAWARDENA
1987    PhD    Exeter    Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah movement and its contribution to creating a separatist political consciousness among the Muslims of India, 1818-1872    Ghulam Muhammad JAFFAR
1987    PhD    Salford    Agricultural marketing and agrarian relations in Pakistan: a case study of the Nawahshak districrt, Sind    M A KAMDAR    Dr C P Simmons
1987    MLitt    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    Communal politics in the United Provinces, 1935-1947    Mukul KESAVAN    Dr C A Bayley
1987    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Poverty and public policy: government intervention and levels of living in Kerala, India    Bhaskar Gopalakrishna KUMAR    Prof A K Sen
1987    DPhil    Oxford, Hertford    The rise and fall of the Indian cotton mill industry, 1900-1985: the Swadeshi movement and its political legacy    Simon Robert Bough LEADBEATER    Mr G P Williams
1987    DPhil    Oxford, Oriel    British architecture in Victorian Bombay    Christopher W LONDON    Dr R A Beddard
1987    PhD    Cambridge    West Bengal government policy, 1977–1985    Ross MALLICK
1987    PhD    London, LSE    Muslims, work and status in Aligargh    Elizabeth Ashley MANN
1987    PhD    London, SOAS    Migration and the international Goan community    Stella V MASCARENHAS-KEYES
1987    MPhil    Edinburgh    Women and the housing process: observations in a Katchi Abadi in Pakistan    F McCLUNEY
1987    PhD    Leicester    The mineralogy and geochemistry of the carbonatites, syenites and fenites of North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    Ihsanullah MIAN
1987    MPhil    Sussex    Linguistic nationalism in Pakistan (with special reference to the role and history of Urdu in the Punjab)    Yameema MITHA    Dr R I Duncan
1987    PhD    Stirling    Food retailing in Malaysia: a study of supermarket use in peninsular Malaysia    K B OTHMAN
1987    DPhil    Oxford    British rule and the Konds of Orissa: a study of tribal administration and its legitimating discourse    Felix J PADEL
1987    PhD    Reading    Extension needs of a plantation industry with special reference to the tea industry in Sri Lnaka    W A PADMASIRI WANIGASUNDARA
1987    PhD    Wales, UWIST    The role of government in the administration and management of major ports in developing countries with special reference to India    Jose PAUL
1987    PhD    London, LSE    Time, work and the gods: temporal strategies and industrislisation in central India    Christopher PINNEY
1987    DPhil    York    The political dynamics of Indo-Soviet relations, 1930-1977    S S RAI
1987    PhD    London, SOAS    Islamization of laws in Pakistan with particular reference to the status of women    Abdur RASHID
1987    PhD    Aberdeen    Availability and retention of zinc, especially in relation to the soils of Bangladesh    H M RASHID
1987    DPhil    York    Indo-Soviet relations during the period 1955-1974    S S ROY
1987    PhD    Liverpool    The role of small towns in rural development: a case study of Bangaldesh    Toufiq Mohammad SERAJ
1987    PhD    Liverpool    An analysis of squatter settlements in Dhaka, Bangladesh    M T SHAKUR
1987    PhD    London, LSE    Communism in Punjab up to 1867    Gurharpal SINGH
1987    PhD    Edinburgh    The implementation of systematic nursing in selected hospsitals in India: a chronicle of the change process    Esther SIRRA
1987    DPhil    Sussex    Sri Lankan traders: a case study of credit relations and coconut marketing in a rural economy    sARAH lLEWELLYN SOUTHWOLD
1987    PhD    Leeds    The life and influence of Shapurji Saklatvala    Michael John SQUIRES
1987    PhD    Leicester    Evolution of the southern part of the Aravalli-Delhi orogen western India    Tim J SUGDEN
1987    MSc    Aberdeen    Supply response analysis of palm oil in Malaysia, 1961-1985    B A TALIB
1987    PhD    Leicester    Communication and development in South India    Pradip Ninan THOMAS
1987    PhD    Southampton    Developing a critical success factor approach to a holistic institutional evaluation for polytechnics in the states of Gujerat and Madhya Pradesh, 1977-1984    V N TRAFFORD
1987    PhD    Cranfield    The social relevance of postgraduate management education: a case study of India    S VYAKARNAM
1988    PhD    London    Breast feeding, weaning and infant growth in rural Chandpur, Bangladesh    S AHMED
1988    PhD    London, External    Islam in contemporary Bangladesh     Umne Asman Begum Razia AKEER BANU    Dr D Taylor
1988    PhD    Bradford    The impact of public policy on the poor in Sri Lnaka, 1970-1982    Pat ALAILIMA    C Dennis; S Curry
1988    PhD    Manchester    Makran and Baluchistan from the early Islamic times to the Mongol invasion    S S M AL-HUMAIDI    Prof Bosworth
1988    PhD    Birmingham    The British iron and steel industry and India, 1919-1939    H J ANDERSEN
1988    PhD    Edinburgh    Some aspects of the political and commercial history of the Muslims of Sri Lanka with special referenmce to the British period    Mahmudu Naina Marikar Kamil ASAD
1988    MPhil    Kent    The image of women in selected Malaysian novels    Rosnah BAHARUDIN
1988    PhD    Wales, UCNW    Ecology, management and conservation of Pinus roxburghii forests in Kumaun Himalaya, India    Bhagat Singh BURFAL
1988    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    The nineteenth-century book trade in Sind    Allah Rakhio BUTT
1988    PhD    London, King’s    Soldiers of Christ: evangelicals and India, 1784-1833    Penelope S E CARSON
1988    DPhil    Oxford, Exeter    Punjab politics, 1909-1923    Amrita CHEEMA    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1988    MSc    Wales    Economic appraisal of irrigated plantations of the Punjab, Pakistan: Changa Manga case study    Faqir Ahmad CHOUDHRY
1988    PhD    Reading    State sponsrship of investment credit to promote rural development in India    J G COPESTAKE
1988    PhD    Leicester    Leucogranites of the North West Himalaya: crust-mantle interaction beneath the Karakoram and the magmatic evolution of collisional belts    Mark B CRAWFORD
1988    MPhil    Brunel    Aspects of the development of manufacturing industries of India    Parviz DABIR-ALAI
1988    MLitt    Oxford, Keble    An ecumneical episcopate: Edwin James Palmer, seventh Bishop of Bombay and the reunion of the churches, with special reference to the church of South India    R W DAVIS
1988    PhD    Cambridge    The irrigation and water supply systems of the city of Vijayanagara    D J DAVISON-JENKINS
1988    PhD    Kent    Law, nation and cosmology in Sri Lanka: deconstructioni and the failure of closure    Rochan DE SILVA    Prof F Fitzpatrick
1988    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Application of social accounting matrix framework to agricultural policy analysis in Pakistan    Shafique DHANANI    Mr G H Peters
1988    DPhil    Sussex    Rural commerce in Sri Lanka: commercialisation and farm credit in the Uva highlands    E DUE
1988    PhD    Nottingham    Environmental upgrading and intra-urban migration in Calcutta    Margaret Sylvia FOSTER    Prof J C Moughton; Dr T Oc
1988    PhD    Southampton    Catholic education in Sri Lanka during its first century as a British colony, 1796-1901    J B GNANAPRAGASAM
1988    PhD    East Anglia    Inter- and intra-household analysis in North Bihar village: implications for agricultural research    Ruth GROSVENOR-ALSOP    Dr S D Biggs
1988    PhD    Cambridge    Conservation and colonial expansion: a study of the evolution of environmental attitudes and conservation policies on St Helena, Mauritius and in India, 1660-1860    R H GROVE
1988    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Art, artists and aesthetics in Bengal, c.1850-1920: westernising trends and nationalist concerns in the making of new “Indian” art    Tapati GUHA-THAKURTA    Dr T. Raychaudhuri
1988    MSc    Manchester    Science and technology policy in developing countries of South Asia and South East Asia    K R GUPTA
1988    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    The sitar music of Calcutta: a study of two gharanas    J S HAMILTON
1988    PhD    London, UC    Inbreeding and fertility in a South Indian village population    Katherine Louise  HANN    Dr J Landers
1988    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Education and political instability in Pakistan, 1937-1971    M HAQUE
1988    PhD    Strathclyde    Tubewell irrigation and green revolution: impact on productivity and income distribution    A IKRAMULLAH
1988    MPhil    Edinburgh    Marketing problems of farmers in Punjab, Pakistan: a case study    Qamar-ul ISLAM
1988    PhD    Edinburgh    The reawakening of Islamic consciousness in Malaysia, 1970-1987    Fadzillah bin Mohd JAMIL
1988    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Clientelism, corruption and capitalist development: an analysis of state intervention with special reference to Bangladesh    Mushtaq Husain KHAN
1988    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    External developments and policy choices facing the non-oil developing countries in the post 1973 period    Faizullah KHILJI    Mrs F J Stewart
1988    DPhil    Sussex    Political and economic organisation in a Sri Lanka market town    Colin KIRK
1988    PhD    Leicester    Media education, communications and public policy: an Indian perspective    K J KUMAR
1988    PhD    Leeds    R K Narayan and V S Naipaul: a comparative study of some Hindu aspects of their work    P LANGRAN
1988    DPhil    Oxford    Orientalism, utilitarianism and British India: James Mill’s “The history of British India” and the romantic orient    Javed MAJEED    Dr N G Shrimpton
1988    MPhil    Edinburgh    Policy issues for conservation: the case of Lahore walled city    M I MIAN
1988    PhD    Sheffield    Development of small and medium sized towns in Bangladesh: a regional planning approach    Mohammed A MOHIT
1988    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The question of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Indian sub-continent    Ziba MOSHAVER    Mr E A Roberts
1988    PhD    London, UC    The theoretical modelling and empirical measurement of the shadow economy with application to India    U MUKHERJEE
1988    MPhil    Reading    Farming systems and information needs of tea smallholders in Sri Lanka    D K NAWARATNA
1988    PhD    London, SOAS    A social history of a colonial steroetype: the “criminal tribes and castes” of Uttar Pradesh    S B L NIGAM
1988    PhD    London, LSE    Policy making in the Indian offshore oil industry with reference to the period 1974-1986    M L NORONHA    Prof D C Watt
1988    PhD    London, LSE    The Asiatic mode of production, historical materialism and Indian historiography    Denis Brendan O’LEARY
1988    PhD    Leicester    Terraces, uplift and climate, Karakoram Mountains, Northern Pakistan    Lewis Andrew OWEN
1988    MPhil    London, LSE    The tea plantation labour movement in the “Dooars” region of north Bengal, 1900-1951    Nayantara PALCHOUDHURI
1988    PhD    Oxford, St Antony’s    Decline of the Bengal zamindars: Mindapore, 1870-1920    C PANDA    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1988    PhD    London, King’s    Between Mars and Mammon: the military and the political economy of British India at the time of the first Burma war, 1824-1826    Douglas M PEERS
1988    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    British intelligence and Indian subversion: the surveillance of Indian revolutionaries in India and abroad    R J POPPLEWELL
1988    PhD    London, SOAS    Socio-economic change in Bihar (India) in the later 19th and early 20th century    Bihdeshwar RAM    Dr P Robb
1988    PhD    Kent    Figuring Naipaul: the subject of the post-colonial world    Dulluri Venkat RAO
1988    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Aspects of the ethnoarchaeology of Adilabad (Andhra-Pradesh), India    Nandini Rameshwar RAO

1988    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The determinants of India’s manufactured export performance: industry-level and firm-level evidence    Amit Shovon RAY
1988    DPhil    Sussex    Religion, class and function: the politics of communalism in twentieth century Punjab    Mark ROBINSON    Dr R I Duncan
1988    PhD    London, SOAS    The evolution of the printed Bengali character from 1778 -1978    Fiona Georgina Elizabeth ROSS
1988    PhD    Keele    Marginality, identity and the politicisation of the Bhangi community, Delhi    Rama SHARMA
1988    PhD    Kent    Class, kinship and ritual: Islam and the politics of change in Pakistan    S R SHERANI
1988    PhD    De Montfort    Temple architecture of the Marathas in Maharashtra    A SOHONI
1988    PhD    London, SOAS    Nalanda Mahayihara, 1812-1939: some aspects of the study of its art and archaeology    M L STEWART
1988    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    White-collar crime: a study of the nature, extent and control of income tax evasion in Pakistan    Muhammad Shoaib SUDDLE
1988    PhD    CNAA, Westminster     A critical and comparative study of the practice and theology of Christian social witness in Indonesia and India between 1974 and 1983 with special reference to the work of Wayan Mastra in the Protestant Christian Church of Bali and of Vinay Samual in the Church of South India    C M N SUGDEN
1988    PhD    Leeds    Some aspects of Muslim politics in the Pubab, 1921-1947    Qalb-i-Abid SYED    Prof D N Dilks
1988    PhD    Wales, UCNW    Utility-based social shadow pricing and its comparison with other evaluation techniques: a cost-benefit study of fuelwood plantations in Bihar, India    Satyendra Nath TRIVEDI
1988    PhD    Glasgow    Characteristics of public enterprise management in Bangladesh    Syed J UDDIN    Dr D Buchanan
1988    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    The economic and political context of Indian independence    R P WANCHOO    Dr C A Dayly
1988    PhD    Bath    In the teeth of the crocodile: class and gender in rural Bangladesh    Sarah C WHITE
1988    PhD    Nottingham    Presenting the Raj: the politics of representation in recent fiction on the British empire    R J F WILLIAMS
1988    PhD    East Anglia    Sources of growth and its beneficiaries in Pakistan’s large-scale manufacturing sector, 1955-1981    S WIZARAT
1988/89    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Household energy in rural Pakistan: a technical, environmental and socio-economic assessment    A N QAZI
1988/89    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Administration, classification and knowledge:land revenue settlements in the Panjab at the start of British rule    R W SAUMAREZ-SMITH
1989    PhD    Cambridge    Sedimentology and structure of the Southern Kohat, Trans Indus Ranged, Pakistan    Iftikhar AHMED
1989    PhD    York    Pakistan since independence: the political role of the Ulama    Safir AKHTAR    Dr T V Sathyamurthy
1989    PhD    Strathclyde    Growth of tubewell irrigation and agricultural development in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan    M AKRAM
1989    PhD    London, Wye    A quantitative analysis of marketable surplus of paddy and food policy in Bangladesh    S AKTER
1989    MA    Leeds    Communication influences on the political socialisation of Bangladeshi adolescents    A M ALI    Prof J G Blumer; Dr T J Nossiter
1989    MPhil    London, LSE    The India League and the Indian reconciliation group as factors in Indo-British relations, 1930-1949    Keshava Chand ARORA    Prof I H Nish
1989    PhD    London, King’s    Pakistan crisis 1971: its political and strategic causes    F J AZIZ
1989    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian monetary policy and the international liquidity crisis during rthe inter-war years (1919-1939)    Gopalan BALACHANDRAN
1989    PhD    London, LSE    Communism in Tripura up to 1965    Harihar BHATTACHARYYA    Dr T J Nossiter
1989    DPhil    Oxford    The evolution of classical Indian dance literature: a study of the Sanskritic tradition    M BOSE
1989    PhD    Kent    An ethnographic account of the religious practice in a Tibetan Buddhist refugee monastery in Northern India    Catherine Mary CANTWELL    Dr J Endes
1989    MPhil    Reading    Cropping systems research in North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    E W CHARLES
1989    PhD    Glasgow    The inter-war depression in British India: aspects of its economic and social impact, 1929-36    P S COLLINS
1989    DPhil    Sussex    Paliamentary representation in Sri Lanka, 1931-1986    R COOMARASWAMY    Prof Lloyd
1989    PhD    London, LSE    Ideology and urban planning: the case of Hong Kong    A R CUTHBERT    Dr D R Diamond
1989    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney     Unfulfilled promises, popular protest, the Congress and the national movement in Bihar    V DAMODARAN
1989    PhD    London, LSE    Embodying spirits: village oracles and possession rituals in Ladakh, North India    Sophia Elizabeth DAY    Dr J P Parry
1989    PhD    London, SOAS    Discourses of ethnicity: the adivasis of Jharkhand    S B C DEVALLE
1989    MPhil    Wales, Cardiff    Rice leaffolders: natural enemies and management ractices in Sri Lanka    Malgaha Gamage DHANAPALA
1989    PhD    London, SOAS    The growth of Buddhist monastic institutions in Sri Lanka as depicted in the Brahmi inscriptions    K D M DIAS
1989    PhD    Cambridge    The socio-economic impact of a minor flood control project in rural Bangladesh    B J DODSON
1989    PhD    Bath    Water to the swamp ? Irrigation and patterns of accumulation and agrarian change in Bangladesh    M GLASER
1989    MPhil    Cranfield    Vocational training and self employment in developing countries: aspects of the design and approach of sucessful programmes    John Patrick GRIERSON    Prof M H Harper
1989    MPhil    CNAA, Poly NLondon    British women and the British empire in India, 1915-1947    Florence HAMILTON    Mr E Wilson; Dr D Judd
1989    MPhil    London, LSE    The problem of federalism and regional autonomy in Pakistan    Fayyaz Ahmad HUSSAIN    P Dawson
1989    PhD    Bradford    The monetary transmission mechanism in Sri Lanka, 1977-1985    Ranee JAYAMAHA    P Wilson; J Weiss
1989    DPhil    Sussex    The impact of international labour migration on the rural “Barani” areas of Northern Pakistan    A F KHAN
1989    PhD    Sheffield    The implementation of rural poor programmes in Bangladesh    T A KHAN
1989    PhD    Manchester    Perception and response to floods in Bangladesh    M S KHONDAKER
1989    PhD    Wales, Bangor,    Cost benefit analysis and sustained yield forestry in India    Periyapattanam Jayapal Dilip KUMAR
1989    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Medical knowledge in rural Rajasthan: popular constructions of illness and therapeutic practice    Helen Susanna LAMBERT    Dr N J Allen
1989    MPhil    London    The expansion of the Indian Army during the Great War    I D LEASK    Prof M E Yapp
1989        Bath    Technologies and transactions: a study of the interaction between new technology and agrarian structure in Bangladesh    D J LEWIS
1989    PhD    Edinburgh    One or two sons: class, gender and fertility in north India    Andrew LYON
1989    DPhil    Sussex    Capital accumulation in agriculture in the Punjab (Pakistan)    Moazam MAHMOOD    Prof M Lipton
1989    DPhil    Oxford    The performance of selected public sector industries in Bangladesh, 1972-1985    Syed A MAHMOOD
1989    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    Missionary of the Indian Road: a study of the thought and work of E Stanley Jones between 1915 and 1948 in the light of certain issues raised by M K Gandhi for Anglo-Saxon Protestant missionaries during the period    P A J MARTIN    Dr J J Lipner
1989    PhD    Glasgow    Exchange rate regimes of less developed countries: the cxase of India    M J MELAZHAKAM
1989    PhD    London, UC    Appropriate evaluation techniques for urban planning in Sri Lanka    N S P MNEDIS
1989    PhD    Cambridge, Magdalene    The Harappan civilisation: a study in variation and regionalisssssssation in Haryana, India    V MOHAN    Dr F R Allchin
1989    PhD    Lancaster    Three Hindu philosophers: comparative philosophy and philosophy in modern India    Paul Martin MORRIS    Prof N Smart; Dr D Smith
1989    PhD    Manchester    The role of financial information in collective bargaining in a developing country: the case of Bangladesh    A J M H MURSHED
1989    PhD    East Anglia    Agrarian structure and rural poverty in Western India    Thomas PALAKUDIYIL    Dr J C Harriss
1989    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    The role of accounting in the economic development of Bangladesh    Michael John PARRY
1989    PhD    London, LSE    Household organisation and marriage in Ladakh Indian Himalaya    Maria Christina PHYLACTOU    Dr C J Fuller
1989    PhD    London, LSE    Social representations of birth control and family welfare: an Indian study    Ragini PRAKASH    Prof R Farr
1989    PhD    London, LSHTM    Household food insecurity and its implications on health, nutrition and work – a study of a dry land farming community in Sri Lanka    M K RATNAYAKE
1989    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Colonial policy, ethnic politics and the minorities in Ceylon    Nira Konjit SAMARASINGHE    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1989    PhD    Cambridge    Administration, classification and knowledge: land revenue settlements in the Panjab at the start of British rule    R S SMITH
1989    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Inequality and economic mobility: an analysis of panel data from a south Indian village    Madhura SWAMINATHAN    Dr S Anand
1989    DPhil    Oxford    Art, artists and aesthetics in Bengal, c. 1850-1920: westernising trends and nationalist concerns in the making of a new “Indian” art    Tapati G THAKURTA
1989    PhD    Middlesex Polytechnic    The impact of flood control on agricultural development in India: a case study in north Bihar    P M THOMPSON    Prof E Penning-Rowsell
1989    MPhil    East Anglia    The state and the determinants of the fiscal process in India: an application of James O’Connor’s Theory of the Fiscal Crisis of the State    Sarah VARKKI
1989    PhD    Aberdeen    Some aspects of the chemistry and mineralogy of soil potassium in Sri Lanka acid tea soils and Scottish soils under a range of crops    G WIMALADASA
1989    PhD    Strathclyde    Marketing implications of intermediate technology in the textile industry in Pakistan    M ZAFARULLAH
1989    PhD    Edinburgh    Strategic planning: an exploratory study of its practice by agro-based public enterprises in Malaysia    M ZAINAL ABIDIN
1990    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    The politics of pollution control: the Ganges at Varanasi    Sara AHMED    Prof T O’Riordan
1990    PhD    London, LSE    The budgetary process in uncertain contexts: a study of public sector corporations in Bangladesh    Mansurai ALAM
1990    PhD    Aberdeen    Petroleum geochemistry of the tertiary sediments and oil samples from the Bengal Basin, Bangladesh    M ALAM
1990    PhD    Glasgow    Size and management characteristics in the public sector: a case of Pakistan International Airlines    A H M H H AL-ESHAIKER
1990    PhD    CNAA Birmingham Poly    The low-income housing production process in Lakore, Pakistan    M I A ALVI
1990    PhD    Aberdeen    Theological education in relation to the identificaton of the task of mission and the development of ministries in India: 1947 to 1987 with special reference to the Church of South India    Siga ARLES
1990    MPhil    London, QMW    A study of some influences on the development of Ruth Jhabvala’s Indian fiction    Jayanti BAILUR
1990    PhD    London, LSE    Pakistan and the birth of the regional pacts in Asia, 1947-1955    Farooq Naseem BAJWA    Prof I H Nish
1990    PhD    Cam,bridge, King’s    Procedural rationality in public expenditure decision making with specific reference to India    A BASU
1990    PhD    Cambridge    Inter-urban and rural-urban linkages in terms of migration and remittances    J R CHAUDHURI
1990    MPhil    Bradford    Kashmir and the partition of India: the politicians and the personalities involved in the partition of India, particularly in relation to the position of Kashmir at the moment of independence on 15th August, 1947    S CHOUDHRY    Dr M J LeLohe
1990    PhD    Aberdeen    An Indian perspective on the church in the context of poverty and religious pluralism, with special reference to the works of M M Thomas    Ashish J CHRISPAL    Prof. Terrance
1990    PhD    London, LSE    Petty-trading in Calcutta: a socio-political analysis of a third world city    Nandini DASGUPTA
1990    PhD    London, King’s    Rural Bengal: social structure and agrarian economy in the late eighteenth century    Rajat DATTA    Prof P Marshall
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    Development of Sinhala drama: a socio-cultural analysis (from Nadagama to modern theatre, up to 1922)    T R G DELA BANDARA
1990    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Indian death rituals: the enactment of ambivalence    Gillian A  EVISON    Prof R F Gombrich
1990    PhD    Bradford    Financial reforms in Sri Lanka, 1977-1987    D J G FERNANDO
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    Discussions of polygamy and divorce by Muslim modernists in South Asia, with special reference to their treatment in Qur’an and Sunna    Rehana FIRDOUS
1990    PhD    Kent    The six-nation initiative    C FRANGONIKOLOPOULOS    Prof A J R Groom
1990    PhD    Sheffield    Man mosquito interaction: the social context of Malaria transmisson in Sri Lanka    Jayaratne Pinnikamaha GAMAGE    Ms J M M Hoogvelt; Dr R A Dixon
1990    PhD    London, LSE    Paddy fields and jumbo jets: overseas migration and village life in Sylhet district, |Bangladesh    Katherine Jane GARDNER
1990    PhD    York    The politics of British aid policy formation: the case of Bangladesh, 1972-1986    M GUHATHAKURTA
1990    DPhil    Oxford    Exports and exchange rate policy: the case of India    B D GUPTA
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    The short story in Pakistan Panjab, 1947-1980    Salim Ullah HAIDRANI
1990    PhD    London, External    The phenomenonology of religious change in Bangladesh in relation to the theology and practice of conversion    Ian McLaurin HAWLEY
1990    PhD    London, UC    The single dominant party system and political development: case studies of India and Japan    Takako HIROSE
1990    MPhil    London, External    The economy and development of education in Bangladesh with particular reference to cost and some aspects of efficiency and effectiveness of higher education for the period 1972-1985    Mohammad Tazammul HUSSAIN
1990    PhD    London    Variations in mountain front geometry across the Potwar Plateau and Hazara/Kalachitta Hill ranges, North Pakistan    C N IZATT
1990    PhD    Open    Charnockite formation in Southern India    D H JACKSON
1990    PhD    Leeds    The effects of agrarian development on class formation and production relations in Pakistan    Muhammad Siddique JAVED    Mr J V Hillard
1990    MPhil    Manchester Poly    Ethnic identity and contemporary female costumes of Sri Lanka    V R JAYASURIYA
1990    PhD    London, UC    Transfer of private external capital to LDCs with special reference to India in comparison to Brazil    Veena JHA
1990    PhD    Salford    The impact of decentralisation on development, with special reference to the experience of Bangladesh since 1982    A K M A KALAM    Prof M B Gleave; Dr B Ingham
1990    PhD    Exeter    Some statistical aspects of child health and growth modelling in Pakistan    S KAMAL
1990    MSc    Wales, Cardiff    Analysis of the provision of sites and services schemes as a solution to low income housing in Colombo, Sri Lanka    Somas Kandarajah KANDIAH
1990    PhD    London, LSE    Gender, caste and class in rural South India    Karin KAPADIA
1990    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    The consequence of economic liberalisation in Sri Lanka    Saman B KELEGAMA    Dr S Anand
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    Revenue, agriculture and warfare in North India: technical knowledge and the post-Mughal elites from the mid-18th century to the early 19th century    Iqbal Ghani KHAN
1990    PhD    Kent    Bengali elites’ perceptions of Pakistan – the road to disillusionment: uneven development or ethnicity    Alqama KHAWAJA    Prof A J R Groom
1990    PhD    Bath    Impact of irrigation upon the rural political economy in Bangladesh    David LEWIS    Dr G D Wood
1990    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    United States-Indian relations, 1961-1989: the pursuit and limits of accommodation    Satu P LIMAYE    Dr G Rizvi
1990    PhD    London, UC    Hydrogeology of part of South-Eastern Bangladesh    S M MAHABUB-UL-ALAM
1990    PhD    Lancaster    The atavara myth in the in the Harivamsa, the Visnupurana and the Bhagavatapurana    Freda MATCHETT    Prof N Smart; Dr D Smith
1990    PhD    Open    East India patronage and the political management of Scotland, 1720-1774    G K McGILVARY    Dr A L R Calder; Mr J Riddy
1990    PhD    London, UC    Epidemiology of coronary heart disease in Asians in Britain    Paul Matthew McKEIGUE
1990    PhD    Hull    The fiction of Ruth Prawer Jhabvala: irony within a dual philosophical framework    F F MERICAN
1990    PhD    Leicester    A thermotectonic evolution for the main central thrust and higher Himalaya, Western Garhwal, India    Richard Paul METCALFE
1990    PhD    Leeds    A history of Nandyal Diocese in Andhra Pradesh, 1947-1990    Constance Mary MILLINGTON    Prof A Hastings
1990    PhD    Newcastle    Becoming bilingual: a sociolinguistic study of the communication of young mother tongue Panjabi-speaking children    S MOFFAT
1990    PhD    Wales, BBangor    Ecology and silviculture of Malamus manan in peninsular Malaysia    A B MOHAMAD
1990    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The politics of Oriya nationalism, 1903-1936    Bishnu Narayan MOHAPATRA    Dr G Rizvi
1990    PhD    London, UC    Rural development and the problem of access: the case of the integrated rural development programme in Bangladesh    Salim MOMTAZ    Prof R J C Munton
1990    PhD    CNAA, Oxford Poly    Geology and geochemistry of the Closepet granite, Karnataka, South India    K A OAK
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian Muslims and the Ottomans (1877-1914): a study of Indo Muslim attitudes to Pan-Islamism and Turkey    Azmi OZCAN
1990    PhD    London, Inst Ed    The cooperative movement in the Jaffa district of Sri Lanka from 1911 to 1970    Kanthappoo PARAMOTHAYAN
1990    PhD    Sheffield    Man-mosquito interaction: the social context of malaria transmission in Sri Lanka    J PINIKAHANAN GAMAGE
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    The mercantile community of Penang and the changing pattern of trade, 1890-1941    Chuleeporn PONGONGSUPATH    Dr I Brown
1990    PhD    Salford    Gandhi and deep ecology: experiencing the nonhuman environment    S A POWER
1990    PhD    London, External    Socio-economic and environmental aspects of under nutrition and ill health in an urban slum in Bangladesh    Jane Allison PRYER
1990    PhD    London, External    Impact of zinc supplementation on Bangladeshi children suffering from acute and persistent diarrhoea    Swapan Kumar ROY
1990    PhD    London, Wye    Persistent poverty among rice farmers in the major irrigated colonization scheme of Sri Lanka    Madar SAMAD    I Carruthers
1990    PhD    London, Wye    Persistent poverty among rice farmers in the major irrigated colonization schemes of Sri Lanka    Madar SAMAD
1990    PhD    St Andrews    Political violence in the Third World: a case study of Sri Lanka, 1971-1987    Gemini SAMARANAYAKE    Prof P Wilkinson
1990    PhD    London, QMW    The use of Hindu mythology in some novels of R K Narayan and Raja Rao    Chitra SANKARAN
1990    PhD    Liverpool    State intervention in rural development: a case study of Bangladesh    A E SARKER
1990    PhD    London, SOAS    The emergence of a Muslim “middle class” in Bengal: attitudes and rhetoric of communalism, 1880-194    Mohammad SHAH    Dr P G Robb
1990    PhD    Edinburgh    Socioeconomic planning in social forestry with particular reference to Orissa State, India    Ran Avtar SHARMA
1990    PhD    Cambridge    A “despotism of law”: a British criminal justice and public authority in north India, 1772-1837    Radhika SINGHA    Dr C A Bayley
1990    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Indian merchant communities in 19th century western India    Sheila M SMITH    Dr R K Newman
1990    PhD    London, LSHTM    The estimation of fertility from incomplete birth registration records, with application to India    Govind Singh SOMAWAT    B Brass
1990    PhD    Cranfield    The role of industrial extension for  the local production of agricultural machinery in developing countries with particular reference to Sri Lanka    K-H STEINMANN    I Crawford; F Inns
1990    PhD     North London Poly    The Viceroyalty of Lord Reading, 1921-1926, with particular reference to Indian political constitutional problems and progress    Christine TURNBULL    Dr D Judd
1990    PhD    Cambridge    Constructing difference: social categories and Girahya women: social kinship and resources in south Rajasthan    Maya UNNITHAN    Dr C Humphrey
1990    MPhil    Essex    An analysis of the effects of salinity on the growth of Sri Lankan rice cultivars    S C WANIGASURIYA
1990    PhD    London, Imperial    The structure and metamorphism of the northern margin of Indian Plate, North Pakistan    Mathew Philipps WILLIAMS
1991    MPhil    Trinity College, Bristol    Identity, Islam and Christianity in rural Bangladesh    D W ABECASSSIS
1991    MPhil    London, LSHTM    Fertility trends in Pakistan: a birth order analysis    Mohamed AFZAL    J Blacker
1991    PhD    Sheffield    Intraurban residential mobility in the city of Karachi    N AHMAD
1991    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Decentralisation and the local state under peripheral capitalism: a study in the political economy of local government in Pakistan    Tofail AHMAD
1991    PhD    Newcastle upon Tyne    The effects of price and non-price factors on the production of major crops in Bangladesh    S ALAM
1991    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    North Indian military culture in transition, 1770-1830    S ALAVE    Dr C A Bayly
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Inheriting then earth: Pakistan People’s Party: popular mobilisation and political conflict in Pakistan, 1967-1971    R F ALI    Mr P G Hawthorn
1991    PhD    London, LSHTM    Anti-microbial chemotherapy of leprosy: a quantitiave theoretical basis for trial regimens with particular reference to India    J E ALMEIDA
1991    PhD    London, King’s    The international arms trade: case studies of India and Pakistan, 1947-86    I ANTHONY
1991    PhD    Manchester    The role of the housing market in the development of Jaffna City and its fringe    Krishnapillai ARUMUHAM    Prof B Robson
1991    PhD    London, SOAS    Agricultural production in six selected Qasbas in eastern Rajasthan (c. 1700-1780)    Madhavi BAJAKAL
1991    PhD    LondonSOAS    Agricultural production in six selected qasbas of eastern Rajastan (c.1700-1780)    Madhavi BAJEKAL    Prof K N Chaudhuri
1991    PhD    Salford    Some environmental implications of agricultural and agro-industrial developments in rural India    S K BARAT
1991    PhD    Newcastle upon Tyne    Swami Vivekananda’s practical vedanta    Vivienne BAUMFIELD    Dr D H Killingley
1991    PhD    Wales, Swansea    The significqance of “Ostindien” in the evolution of German colonial thought, 1840-1885    Theodore Robert Maria BOSKE    Prof M E Chamberlain
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Communal politics and the partition of Bengal, 1932-1947    Joya CHATTERJI    Dr A Seal
1991    PhD    Cambridge    A study of subsistance and settlement patterns during the late prehistory of northcentral India    U C CHATTOPADHYAYA
1991    PhD    London, King’s    Indian nuclear strategy    Mohammad Zafar Iqbal CHEEMA    Prof L D Freedman
1991    MPhil    Bradford    Kashmir and the partition of India    S CHOUDRY
1991    PhD    London, UC    The social implications of thalassaemia major among Muslims of Pakistani origin: family experience and service delivery    Aamra Rashid DARR
1991    MPhil    CNAA, Architectural Assoc    The roots of power and root power: an enquiry into negotiations for the consolidation of illegal settlements in New Delhi, India    S DASAPPA
1991    PhD    London, SOAS    Strategy and structure: a case study in imperial policy and tribal society in British Baluchistan    Simanti DUTTA
1991    PhD    Loughborough    The Revd A G Fraser: his ecclesiastical, educational and political activity in Ceylon, 1904-1924    Brian EATHARD    Dr Avril Powell
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The political culture of the urban poor: the United Provinces between the two World Wars    N GOOPTU    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1991    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Azariah and Indian Christianity in the late years of the Raj    S Bharper HARPER, s b
1991    DPhil    Oxford, Green College    Public health and medical research in India, c. 1860-1914    Mark HARRISON    Miss M H Pelling; Dr P J Weindling
1991    PhD    London, King’s College    Rhizolith occurrence and formation within the quartnary coastal deposits of Tamil Nadu State, South East India    Derek Albert HENDRY    Dr R Garner
1991    PhD    London, Wye    Economic analysis of production opportunities, constraints and improvement policies in coconut-based farming systems in Sri Lanka    Mudiyanselage Anura Lokubandara HERATH
1991    MPhil    Wales    Performance, problems and potential of irrigated land settlements in Sri Lanka: an analysis of past policies    Thosapala HEWAGE
1991    PhD    Cambridge    Tax reform, public pricing and trade protection in Bangladesh    S M HOSSAIN
1991    PhD    London, SOAS    The production and use of ritual terracottas in India    Stephen Porter HUYLER
1991    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Defence production in a third world country: the case of the Indian aircraft industry 1940-1980    Shireen Karim Alimohamed JANMOHAMED    Prof E A Roberts
1991    PhD    London, LSE    Rice, work and community among the Kelabit of Sarawak, East Malaysia    Monica Rachel Hughes JANOWSKI
1991    PhD    Stirling    Fishery, population dynamics and breeding biology of Panulirus homarus (L.)on the south coast of Sri Lanka    D S JAYAKODY
1991    PhD    Stirling    The utilisation of acid sulphate on soils for shrimp (Oenaeus monodon)culture on the west coast of Sri Lanka    J JAYASINGHE
1991    PhD    Durham    Perception of, and adjustment to. drought hazard by farmers in southern Sri Lanka    N L A KARUNARATNE
1991    DPhil    Oxford, Trinity    Competing through technology and manufacturing: a study of the Indian commerical vehicles industry    Sanjay KATHURIA    Dr J L Enos
1991    PhD    Leicester    Primary geochemistry and secondary dispersion from gold prospects in the Karkoram and Hindu Kush, northern Pakistan    Abdul KHALIQ
1991    PhD    London, RHBNC    The contribution of the All India Muslim Educational Conference to the educational and cultural development of Indian Muslims, 1886-1947    Abdul Rashid KHAN    Dr F C Robinson
1991    PhD    Sheffield    Low income settlement in city fringes: a case study of eastern fringe Dhaka    R A KHAN    Dr C Choguill
1991    PhD    Edinburgh    Women’s work and rural transformation in India: a study from Gujerat    Uma KOTHARI
1991    DPhil    Sussex    The role of women in household survival strategies: a case study from an urban low-income settlement in Colombo, Sri Lanka    Chandrika KOTTEGODA    Dr K Young
1991    PhD    Warwick    Critical reflections on law and public enterprises in Bangladesh    A K MASUDAL HAQUE
1991    PhD    Sheffield    Urban services in the national cities of India: organisation, financing, planning and delivery    B MATHUR
1991    DPhil    Oxford    The ecological interaction between habitat composition, habitat quality and abundance of some wild ungulates in India    V B MATHUR
1991    PhD    Bath    Poverty and patronage: a study of credit, development and change in rural Bangladesh    James Allister McGREGOR    Dr D G Wood
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Caste, nationalism and communism in Malabar, 1900-1948    D M MENON    Dr R S Chandravarkar
1991    PhD    Southampton    Municipal finance and local self government: the Indian experience    Rajalakshmi MISHRA    Dr D M Hill
1991    PhD    Durham    Industrial water pollution in a surface water system in Colombo, Sri Lanka    S K MOHAMMED-ALI    Prof I G Simmons
1991    PhD    Warwick    The migration and racialisation of doctors fromthe Indian subcontinent    P J MOSS
1991    PhD    London, LSE    India and the Middle East: constancy of policy in the context of changing perspectives, 1947-1986    Prithvi Ram MUDIAM    Dr G Sen
1991    PhD    Surrey    The impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on Patidar women in the Khada District of Gujerat    P R NATTRESS
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    People and trees: gender relations and participation in social forestry in West Bengal, India    C A NESMITH    Dr T P Bayliss-Smith
1991    PhD    Nottingham    Urban lower-middle class and middle income housing: an investigation into affordability and options, Dhaka, Bangladesh    Mohammed Mahbubur RAHMAN    Prof J C Moughton; Mr S Jalloh
1991    PhD    Exeter    Location-allocation modelling for primary health provision in Bangladesh    S-U RAHMAN
1991    MSc    Kent    On the systematics and ecology of some freshwater turtles of Bangladesh    S M A RASHID
1991    PhD    London, SOAS    Structure and performance: a case study of Pakistan’s large scale manufacturing sector (1950-1987)    Shahnaz RAUF
1991    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Inter-urban and rural-urban linkages in terms of migration and remittances: case study – Durgapur (West Bengal)    J RAY CHAUDHURI    Prof G P Chapman
1991    PhD    London, King’s    A comparison of the diet and health of pre-menopausal Indian and Caucasian vegetarian women    Sheela REDDY
1991        Cranfield, Silsoe    A case study on training and development of cooperative managers in implementing “Irrigation management programme” of Bangladesh Rural Development Board in Hossainpur Upazila, Bangladesh    M A SADEQUE
1991    PhD    Warwick    Towards a definition of Indian literary feminism: an analysis of the novels of K Markandaya, N Sahgal and A Desai    Minola K SALGADO    Ms P Dunbar
1991    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    South Asian Muslim politics, 1937-1958    Ahmad Y SAMAD    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1991    PhD    London, SOAS    Poverty, growth and stagnation in north Indian agriculture: a comparative study in the political economy of poverty generation in western and eastern Uttar Pradash in the early 1970s    Jean Diana SARGENT
1991    PhD    CNAA, Leicester Poly    Speech in Sri Lankan cleft palate subjects with delayed palatoplasty    D A SELL
1991    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    The biology of vitex (verbenaceae)in Sri Lanka    Balangeda M P SINGHAKUMARA    Dr C Huxley-Lambrick
1991    PhD    London, King’s    Nabob, historian and orientalist: the life and writing of Robert Orme (1728-1801)    Asora SW TAMMITA-DELGODA    Prof P J Marshall
1991    PhD    London, LSE    Donors, development and dependence: some lessons from Bangladesh, 1971-1986    Peter Graeme Rugge THOMSON    Prof M Desai
1991    PhD    East Anglia    Errant males and the divided woman: melodrana and sexual difference in the Hindi social film of the 1950s    Ravi VASUDEVAN
1991    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The uplift history of the Western Ghats in India    Mike WIDDOWSON    Dr K G Cox; Prof A S Goudie
1991    PhD    Salford    The causes and processes of rural-urban migration in 19th and early 20th century India: the case of Ratnagiri district    G M YAMIN
1992    PhD    East Anglia    Models of household behaviour in subsistence agriculture: a case study of NWFP in Pakistan    Farman ALI    Prof A Parikh
1992    PhD    London, King’s    Nation-building and the nature of conflict in South Asia: a search for patterns in the use of force as a political instrument within and between the states of the region    Syed Mahmud ALI
1992    PhD    Aberdeen    Aspects of Islamic revival and consciousness in Bangladesh, 1905 AC and 1975 AC    A N M AMIN
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Colonialism and the transformation of matriliny in Malabar, 1850-1940    G ARUNIMA    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1992    LLD    Edinburgh    Dravidian studies    Ronald ASHER
1992    PhD    Kent    The political implications of migration: a study of the British Sikh community    S BALI    Mr K Webb
1992    PhD    Manchester    A study of aspects of Indian theatre and its role: consideration and strategies for developing theatre in education in India    S N BARHANPURKAR    Dr Jackson
1992    PhD    London^hUC    The temples of the interface: a study of the relation between Buddhism and Hinduism at the Munnervaram temples, Sri Lanka    Rohan Neil BASTIN
1992    PhD    London, SOAS    Poverty and power: survival strategies of the poorest in three villages of West Bengal, India    Anthony BECK    Dr R W Bradnock
1992    DPhil    Oxford, St Anne’s    The English East India Company and Hindu laws of property in Bengal, 1765-1801: appropriation and invention of tradition    Nandini BHATTACHARYYA-PANDA    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1992    MLitt    Oxford, Magdalen     South Asian women, midwives and the maternity system: the role of cultural differences in the creation of inequality    Isobel M W BOWLER    Dr R W Dingwall
1992    PhD    London, LSE    Agricultural pricing in developing countries: Pakistan 1960-1988    David Patrick COADY    Prof N H Stern
1992    PhD    St Andrews    Alexander Dalrymple (1737-1808), hydrographer to the East India Company and to the Admiralty, as publisher: a catalogue of books and charts.    Andrew COOK    Dr B P Lenman
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Cross cultural conflict analysis: the “reality” of British victory in the second Anglo-Maratha War, 1803-1805    Randolf G S COOPER    Dr G Johnson
1992    DPhil    Sussex    The determinants of private consumption and the impact of fiscal policy: a study of Sri Lanka    Ginige A C DE SILVA    Prof M T Sumner
1992    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Aspects of community participation among the slum dwellers in achieving housing in Bombay    Vandana DESAI    Dr M J Banks; Dr G C K Peach
1992    DPhil    Sussex    Biomass entitlements and rural poverty in India: a village study of crop residues in south Gujerat    Priyamwada DESHINGKAR    Dr M Greeley
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    Indian thought, myth and folklore in the fiction of Rudyard Kipling and E M Forster    C R DEVADAWSON    Prof J B Beer
1992    PhD    London, UC    Residential location of low-income households in Hyderabad, India    Pothuia Jonathan DHARMARAJ
1992    PhD    London, UC    Residential location of low-income households in Hyderabad, India    J P DHARMARAT
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Religion, identity and authority among the Satnamis in colonial central India    S DUBE    Dr R O’Hanlon
1992    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson College    Continuity and recreation in the performing arts of India: a study of two artistic traditions    Anne-Marie GASTON    Mr B R Wilson
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    The institutional politics of gender in development policy for rural development in Bangladesh    A M M GOETZ    Mr G P Hawthorn
1992    PhD    CNAA, Central England    The “Karnata Dravida” tradition: development of Indian temple architecture in Karnataka 7th to 13th centuries    C A HARDY
1992    PhD    Open    State policy, liberalisation and the development of the Indian software industry    Richard Brendan HEEKS
1992    DPhil    Oxford    Entreprenurial decline and the end of Empire: British business in India, 1919-1949    A-M HISRA
1992    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Music of Northern Pakistan    C E HUEHNS    Dr R F Davis
1992    PhD    London, SOAS    Female migrants’ adaptation in Dhaka: a case study of the processes of urban socio-economic change    Shahnaz HUQ-HUSSAIN    Dr R W Bradnock
1992    PhD    Bristol    Hindu Muslim inter group relations in Bangladesh: a cognitive inter group analysis    Mir R ISLAM    Prof M R C Hewstone
1992    MLitt    Cambridge, Christ’s    Medical choice in an urban village: a study of Zamrudpur, Delhi    R JALOTA
1992    MPhil    London, Wye    The economics of tea investments: an assessment of factors influencing the profitability of management and rehabilitation of tea establishments in Sri Lanka    Jayakodi Arachchige Maikanthi JAYAKODY
1992    MPhil    Liverpool    The response of democratic governments to armed resistance: India, Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Northern Ireland    J KARUMBIAH
1992    PhD    Leicester    Plume-lithosphere interaction: petrology of Rajmahal continental flood basalts and associated lamproites, Northeast India    Raymond William KENT
1992    PhD    Nottingham    Housing and landslides: a case study in Murree, Pakistan    Amir Nawaz KHAN    Prof J C Moughtin; Mr S Jalloh
1992    MPhil    Bradford    Investment in human capital in Pakistan    M N KHAN
1992    PhD    Strathclyde    Foreign aid, domestic saving and economic growth in retrospect: the case of Pakistan (1960-1988)    Naheed Zia KHAN    Dr E Rahim
1992    PhD    Strathclyde    Settlement processes and strategy in metropolitan areas: policy options for improvements of slums in Pakistan    Dost-Ali KHOWAJA    A Ramsey
1992    PhD    London, Wye    Irrigation systems management under diversified cropping in Sri Lanka: a multiple objective economic assessment on performance of main-water management    Hemesiri Bandara KOTAGAMA
1992    DPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    A description of the trade in readers for children by Longmans to British India and by Thomas Nelson to the British West Indies (1900-1939)and an examination of the structure of motifs in the readers’ texts    Wayne Barry KUBLALSINGH    Dr T F Eagleton
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill College    State power and the erosion of colonial authority in Uttar Pradesh, India, 1930-42    G KUDAISYA    Prof D A Low
1992    PhD    Cambridge    The public career of G D Birla, 1911-1947    M Mlf G S KUDAISYA    Prof D A Low
1992    PhD    London, LSE    An anthropological account of Islamic holy men in Bangladesh    Samual Peter LANDELL-MILLS    Dr A A F Gell
1992    PhD    London, LSE    Inequality, poverty and mobility: the experience of a north Indian village    Peter Frederik LANJOUW    Prof N Stern
1992    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Planning education in small dispersed island states with particular reference to the Maldives    Mohamed  LATHEEF
1992    PhD    London, LSE    The demography of Indian famines: a historical perspective    A MAHARATNA
1992    MPhil    London, King’s    The British in Bihar, 1757-81    Paramita MAHARATNA    Prof P J Marshall
1992    MPhil    London, King’s    The establishment of British rule in Bihar, 1757-1981    Paraamita MAHARATNA    Prof P J Marshall
1992    MPhil    East Anglia    Rural development in Pakistan: role and some effects of public sector    Abrar Ahmad MALIK
1992    DPhil    Sussex    A study of rural poverty in Pakistan with special reference to agricultural price policy    Shahnawaz MALIK    Mr P Chaudhuri
1992    PhD    Liverpool    Prevalence and genetics of resistance of antimicrobial agents in faecal enterobacteriaceae from children in Bangladesh    K Z MAMUM
1992    PhD    Bradford    Foreign joint ventures in Bangladesh: an empirical investigation of joint ventures in a less developed country between foreign multinational countries and local enterpirses: the case of Bangladesh    G S MAOLA    Prof P J Buckley
1992    DPhil    Oxford, St Hilda’s     Entreprenurial decline and the end of the Empire: British business in India, 1919-1949    Anna-Maria MISRA    Dr T Raychaudhuri; Dr D R Tomlinson
1992    PhD    London, Birkbeck    Languages as identity symbols: an investigation into language attitudes and behaviour amongst second-generation South Asian schoolchildren in Britain including the special case of Hindi and Urdu    M C MOBBS
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville       From cattle to cane: the economic and social transformation of a Tarai village, North India    R H MONTGOMERY    Dr C Humphrey
1992    MPhil    Leicester    British newspaper coverage of Pakistan    Ahmad MUKHTAR    P Golding
1992    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Food Engel curves and equivalence scales in Sri Lanka    M MURTHI
1992    PhD    Glasgow    The institution of cooperation, credit and the process of of development in the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs    K MUSTAFA
1992    PhD    CNAA, Huddersfield    Hindu students in a further education college: an ethnographic enquiry    P OLIVER
1992    DPhil    Oxford , Hertford College    Distress sales and exchange relations in a rural area of Rayalaseema Andhra Pradesh    Wendy K OLSEN    Mrs J U Heyer
1992    PhD    Newcastle    Vulnerability, seasonality and the public distribution system in western India: a micro-level study    E A OUGHTON
1992    PhD    Warwick    Education and community in colonial Jallandhar, 1880-1935    Rajvinder S PAL    Dr D A Washbrook
1992    PhD    London, LSE    Electricity demand and pricing in India, 1947-1986    Kirtida Vimai PARIKH    Dr M S Morgan
1992    PhD    London, Wye    Micropropogation of the Sri Lankan anthurium cultivar “Crinkled Red” (Anthurium andreanum Lind)    Sriyani Edussuriya PEIRIS
1992    MPhil    CNAA, St John’s College, Nottingham    The extended family in spouse selection: a critical study and theological evaluation of the patterns of Christian family life in India (especially in the churches of South India)    P S C POTHAN
1992    PhD    Sheffield    A study of rainfall fluctuations in the homogeneous rainfall regimes in Sri Lanka    M PUVANESWARAN
1992    PhD    Stirling    Studies of filter feeding carps of commerical importance in Bangladesh with particular emphasis on the use of automated counting methods    S RAHMATULLAH
1992    PhD    Strathclyde    Solar radiation assessment in Pakistan    I A RAJA
1992    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Forest policy in the Central Provinces, 1860-1914    Mahesh RANGARAJAN    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1992    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre College    Ecophysiology of natural regeneration of “Abies pindrow” in the moist temperate forest of Pakistan    RAZA-UL-HAQ    Mr F B Thompson; Dr P S Savill
1992    PhD    London, External    Recent Christian-Hindu dialogue with reference to Christology    Robert Arthur ROBINSON
1992    MPhil    Newcastle upon Tyne    Changing the attitudes of staff in a residential setting in India – a case study    N ROTTON
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The effect of regular deworming on the growth, health and nutritional status of pre-school children in Bangladesh    Emily Kate ROUSHAM    Dr C G Mascie-Taylor
1992    PhD    South Bank    Effects of psycho-cultural factors on the socialization of British born Indian and indigenous British children living in England    D SACHDEV
1992    PhD    Birmingham    An ecumenical ecclesiology: an historical and systemaic theological enquiry into the Church of North India    D K SAHU
1992    PhD    Reading    A systems approach to the study of potential production of boro rice in the Haor region of Bangladesh    M U SALAM
1992    PhD    Aberdeen    Farm level approaches to tree growing in agroforestry in Haryana, India    P K SARDANA
1992    DPhil    Oxford, Green    Adoption and rejection of eucalyptus on farms in North-West India    Naresh C SAXENA    Dr B Harriss; Mr J E M Arnold
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Women workers in the Bengal jute industry, 1890-1940: migration, motherhood and militancy    S SEN    Dr R S Chandabarkar
1992    PhD    Cambridge^hTrinity    Literary representation of national identity and the rhetoric of nationalism in Raja Rao’s Kanthapura    R SETHI    Mr T J L Cribb
1992    DPhil    Sussex    The determinants of private consumption and the impact of fiscal policy: a study of Sri Lanka    G A C de SILVIA
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville    A forest policy for Western India: the Dangs, 1800s-1920s    A SKARIA    Prof C A Bayly
1992    MPhil    Birmingham    The encounter between Christianity and Buddhism in Sri Lanka from the perspective of the Lausanne Movement    S F SKUCE
1992    MPhil    Birmingham    The development of Gandhi’s moral and religious philosophy from 1888-1921    G E SMITH
1992    PhD    Leicester    The geology of the roof-zone of the Kohistan Batholith, Northwestern Pakistan    Michael A SULLIVAN
1992    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The military and the state in colonial Punjab, 1900–1939    T Yong TAN    Prof D A Low
1992    PhD    London, SOAS    Competing identities: the problem of what to wear in late colonial and contemporary India    Emma Josephine TARLO
1992    DPhil    Oxford, St John’s College    Studies in English and European writing on India, 1600-1800    Kate ( Katherine S) TELTSCHER    Prof J Carey; Mr J B Katz
1992    PhD    London, LSE    Health attitudes and personal health care decisions in Bombay, India    Bayjool THAKKER    Dr J E Stockdale
1992    PhD    London, LSE    Personal health care decisions in Bombay, India    B THAKKER
1992    PhD    East Anglia    NGOs and rural development process in India: case studies from Rayalaseema    V UMA
1992    PhD    London, SOAS    The personal pronouns and their related clitics in six Khasi dialects: a grammatical and sociolinguistic study    B WAR
1992    PhD    CNAA, North London    Sir Walter Lawrence and India, 1879-1918    Catherine Mary WILSON    Prof D Judd; Dr P Mercer
1993    PhD    Open    Women’s home-based income generation as a strategy towards poverty survival: dynamics of the “Khannawalli” (mealmaking)activity of Bombay    D ABBOTT    Mr A Thoms
1993    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    The role of communication in the rise of the Islamic movements in the Muslim world with special reference to Egypt, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey    K ABU-ALKHAIR
1993    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    The People’s Party, the National Awami League and the political dynamics of federalism in Pakistan    S J AHMED    Mr G P Hawthorn
1993    PhD    Dundee    E M Forster at home and abroad: British and non-British elements in his fiction    A AL-HOUT
1993    PhD    Reading    Farmer-extension worker interaction and upstream information transfer in the T   V extension system in Bangladesh    Md. Mozahar ALI    Prof M J Rolls
1993    PhD    London, Ext (LSHTM)    Cultural influences on contraceptive behaviour in rural Bangaldesh    A AL-SABIR    J Simons
1993    PhD    Bradford    Agricultural credit for small farmers in Northern Pakistan: an analysis of access and productivity impact    Shehla Nasreen AMJAD    Dr Allan Low; Dr Behrooz Morvaridi
1993    PhD    East Anglia    Women’s experiences of a survival strategy: commoditisation of folk embroidery in Gujarat, India    J B ANDHARIA
1993    PhD    Liverpool    Seaweed resources in Sri Lanka: culture of Gracilaria and intertidal surveys    P ANNESTY JAYASURIYA
1993    PhD    Sheffield    A study of significant historic buildings in Lahore, leading towards the formulation of a national conservation policy for Pakistan    M Y AWAN    A Craven
1993    DPhil    York    The management of ethnic secessionist conflict with special reference to devolution of government: the external dimension and the big neighbour syndrome    Abersinghe BANDARA    Prof A Dunsire; Dr A Leftwich
1993    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    A study of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement 1930-1947, North West Frontier Province, British India    Mukulika BANERJEE    Prof J Davis
1993    MPhil    Eales, Cardiff    A survey of the Pakistani Muslim community in Cardiff    P G BATEMAN
1993    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Agrarian reforms and the politics of the Left in West Bengal    D BHATTACHARYYA    Mr G P Hawthorn
1993    PhD    Leeds    Salisbury at the India Office, 1866-67 and 1874-78    Paul R BRUMPTON    Dr E D Steele
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Contesting the resource: the politics of forest management in colonial Burma    Raymond Leslie BRYANT
1993    PhD    London, UC    The incompatability between the the needs of low-income households and the perceptions and attitudes of architects and planners: a case study of Lahore, Pakistan    Arif Qayyum BUTT
1993    PhD    Kent    Confidence building measures in South Asia    Navnita CHADHA    Prof A J R Groom
1993    DPhil    Oxford    The changing nature of the Indian hill station    A CHATERJI
1993    MLitt    Oxford, St Hilda’s    The changing nature of the Indian Hill Station    Aditi CHATTERJI    Dr D I Scargill
1993    PhD    Keele    Paul Scott’s “Raj Quartet”: historical approaches and Bakhtinian readings    P CHILDS
1993    MPhil    Sheffield    Applicability of the CDS-ISIS package in the automation of University libraries with partciular reference to India    S CHOWDHURY
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Colonialism and cultural identity: the making of a Hindu discourse, Bengal, 1867-1905    Indira CHOWDHURY-SENGUPTA    Prof D J Arnold
1993    MPhil    London, SOAS    The rhythmic organisation of North Indian classical music: tal, lay and laykari    Martin Richard Lawson CLAYTON
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    From Bhakti to Buddhism: early Dalit literature and ideology    Philip John CONSTABLE    Prof D J Arnold
1993    PhD    London    The relevance and feasibility of community-based production of leaf concentrate as a supplement for pre-school children in Sri Lanka    David Nicholas COX
1993    PhD    Edinburgh    Size isn’t everything: an anthropologist’s view of the cook, the potter, her engineer and his donor in appropriate technology development in Sri Lanka, Kenya and UK    Emma CREWE    Dr A Good; Dr M Noble
1993    PhD    Essex    An empirical study of technical and allocative efficiency of wheat farmers in the Indian village of Palanpur    A CROPPENSTEDT
1993    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Privilege and policy: the indigenous elite and the colonial education system in Ceylon, 1869-1948    Lakshmi K DANIEL    Dr T Raychaudhuri
1993    PhD    REading    Weed ecology studies in Sri Lanka: competition studies with maize, barley and oilseed rape    N P DISSANAYAKER
1993    M.Phil    Edinburgh    A study of the indigenous contribution to Tamil Saiva bhakti    C J EDEN
1993    PhD    Lancaster    Epic naratives inthe Hoysala temples: the Ramayana, Mahabharata and Bhagavata Purana in Halebid, Belur and Amrtapura    Kirsti Kaarina EVANS    Dr David Smith
1993    PhD    CNAA, Brighton Poly    Sport and South Asian male youth    S FLEMING
1993    PhD    Manchester    Intermarriage of Zoroastrian women in bombay    H K FRASER
1993    PhD    Brunel    TV talk in a London Punjabi peer culture    M GILLESPIE
1993    PhD    Keele    Occasions of grace: interpretations of truth in Paul Scott’s “The Raj Quartet”    P A GLOVER
1993    PhD    London, LSE    The multiplicity of agencies promoting the health of refugees, with a case study of the Afghans in Pakistan, 1978-1989    Nancy GODFREY    Prof B Abel-Smith
1993    PhD    Open    The Gujeratis of Bolton: the leaders and the led    K G HAHLO
1993    PhD    Loughborough    Acquiring foreign language materials for Pakistani libraries: a study    Syed Jalaluddin HAIDER    Prof J P Feather
1993    Phil    East Anglia    The implications of tourism for the environment: a Maldives case study    H HAMEED
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Eurasians in British India, 1773-1833: the making of a reluctant community    Christopher John HAWES    Prof D J Arnold
1993    PhD    Aberdeen    Some aspects of the chemistry and mineralogy of soil magnesium in relation to Camellia growth on Sri Lankan acid tea soils    L HETTIARACHCHI
1993    PhD    Manchester    Management control in public sector enterprises: a case study of budgeting in the jute industry of Bangladesh    A K M Z HOQUE    Prof T Hopper
1993    PhD    Salford    Rural accessibility and agricultural development in Bangladesh    N A HUQ    Dr R D Knowles
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Decentralized resource allocation in primary health care: formal methods and their application in Britain and Pakistan    M ISHFAQ
1993    PhD    Manchester    Transnational corporations and economic development: a study of the Malaysian electronics industry    M N ISMAIL
1993    PhD    Edinburgh    Rice marketing in Pakistan: the case for liberalisation ?    Amanat Ali JALBANI
1993    DPhil    York    Language maintenance and bilingualism in Darbhanga    Shailjanand JHA    Dr C Verma
1993    PhD    Cambridge    Industrial concentration and performance: an empirical study of the structure, conduct and performance of Indian industry (1970-1985)    U S KAMBHAMPATI
1993    PhD    London    A genetic analysis of diabetes mellitus in subjects of Indian origin    Parminder Kaur KAMBO
1993    MPhil    Strathclyde    Famine and poliocy in the Central Provinces of India: the crises of 1896/97 and 1899/1900    Nicalas W KEYS    Dr P S Collins
1993    PhD    Kent    Regional conflict in South Asia: the route to intractability in the Kashmir conflict, 1947-1990    A Robert KHAN    Prof A J R Groom
1993    MPhil    Wales, Bangor    Wood production through agroforestry in Charsadda district, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    F S KHAN
1993    DPhil    Oxford, St Hilda’s     Indian Muslim perceptions of the West during the 18th century    Gulfishan KHAN    Dr I Malik
1993    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Ex-post cost benefit analysis of village woodlots of Gujarat, India    J A KHAN
1993    PhD    London, External    The history of printing and publishing in Ceylon, with special reference to Sinhalese books, 1737-1912    Egodahettiarachchige Don Tilakapala KULARATNE
1993    MLitt    Cambridge    The security of new states, Pakistan and Singapore: a study in contrast and compulsion    A UL I LATIF
1993    MLitt    Glasgow    The imperial eye: perceptions in British photography (1850-1870)of India and the Near East    Alison J LINDSAY    Dr C A Wilson
1993    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    The role of culture in India’s international relations    V MANI
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Caring women: power and ritual in Gujerati households in East London    Merryle Ann McDONALD    Dr N Lindisfarne
1993    PhD    Cambridge    Governance and resistance in north Indian towns, c.1860-1900    Patrick M McGINN    Prof C A Bayly
1993    PhD    City    Gamaka and Alamkara: concepts of vocal ornamentation with reference to Bara Khayal    S M McINTOCH
1993    PhD    Aston    Management role in employee participation: a comparative study of multination enterprisei n India and the UK    Santrupt MISRA    Dr R Lumley
1993    PhD    Aston    Management role in employee participation: a comparative study of multinational enterprises in India and the UK    Santrupt MISRA    Dr R Lumley
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Inside and outside: conceptual continuities from household to region in Kumaon, North India    Joanne MOLLER    Dr C Fuller
1993    MPhil    Loughborough    Performance of concrete buried pipe distribution systems of surface irrigation under farm manager’s management in Tangail, Bangladesh    Mohammed Abdul Karim MRIDHA    Mr I K Smout
1993    PhD    London, Wye    The economic evaluation of agricultural research in Sri Lanka    Jeyaluxmy NADARAJAH
1993    PhD    Cambridge, St Edmund’s    Co-option and control: the role of the colonial army in India, 1918-47    Namrata NARAIN    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Kinship, marriage and womanhood among the Nakarattars of South India    Yuko NISHIMURA    Dr C Fuller
1993    PhD    Guildhall    The determinants of direct overseas investment from Singapore    Samual Bassey OKPOSEN    M Cowen
1993    PhD    Hull    British policy and Chinese policy in Malaya, 1942-1955    HAK CHING OONG    C J Christie
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Making hierarchy natural: the cultural construction of gender and maturity in Kerala, India    Caroline OSELLA    Dr C Fuller; Dr J P Parry
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Caste, class, power and social mobility in Kerala, India    Filippo OSELLA    Dr C Fuller; Dr J P Parry
1993    DPhil    Oxford, Christ Church    The confusions of an imperialist inheritance: the Labour Party and the Indian problem, 1940-1947    Nicholas J OWEN    Dr J G Darwin
1993    DPhil    York    Imperialism, insularity and identity: the novels of Paul Scott    G Martin PATERSON    Mr Landig White
1993    PhD    London, UC    Effects of land use policies on land prices in middle income housing, Hyderabad, India    Padmavathi PERVAR
1993    PhD    London, UC    Sir Leonard Rogers F.R.S. (1868-1962): tropical medicine in the Indian Medical Service    Helen Joy POWER    Prof WF Bynum
1993    DPhil    Oxford, Campion Hall    Satnamis: the changing status of a scheduled caste in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradash    Gnana PRAKASAM    Dr N J Allen
1993    MPhil    Wales, Aberystwyth    The career of Robert, first  baron Clive (1725-1764) with special reference to his administrative and political career    David Livett PRIOR    Prof P D G Thomas
1993    PhD    London, QMW    Belonging and not belonging: understanding India in novels by Paul Scott, Ruth Prawer Jhabvala and V S Naipaul    Janet Mariana PUGH
1993    PhD    Newcastle upon Tyne    Coping strategies of domestic workers: a study of three settlements in Delhi metropolitan region, India    P RAGHURAM    Dr J D Jones
1993    MPhil    Leicester    Conceptions of health and health care among two generations of Gujerati-speaking Hindu women in Leicester    V RAJA
1993    PhD    London, LSE    The political economy of agrarian policies in Kerala: a study of state intervention in agricultural commodity markets with particular reference to dairy pmarkets    Velayudhan RAJAGOPALAN    Prof T J Nossiter
1993    PhD    Hull    Religion, politics and the secular state in India after independence    C S RANGANATHAN
1993    PhD    London, LSE    Construction of female gender in rural north India    Deborah Edith RUTTER    Dr J P Parry
1993    MPhil    Newcastle-upon-Tyne    Modelling growth of rainfed and irrigated sugarcane in the dryzone of Sri Lanka    K SANMUGANATHAN
1993    PhD    Hull    Tribes, politics and social change in India: a case study iof the Mullukurumbas of the Nilgiri Hills    S SATHIANATHAN
1993    PhD    Keele    The sources and supply of basic foods in Dhaka City    Sayeed SAYEED
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Pollution theory and Harijan strategies among south Indian Tamils    Yasumasa SEKINE
1993    PhD    London, Inst Comm    The linkages between Pakistan’s domestic policies and its foreign policy, 1971-1991    Mehtab-Ali SHAH    Dr P H Lyon
1993    PhD    UEA    Various approaches to the measurement of inefficiency in Pakistani agriculture: an empirical investigation    M K SHAR
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    Consumer protection law in India: a socio-legal study    Gurjeet SINGH
1993    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Quarternary alluvial sedimentology in Bihar, India    Rajeev SINHA    Dr P F Friend
1993    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    On religion and renunciation: the case of the Raikas of western Rajahastan    Vinay Kumar SRIVASTAVA    Dr C Humphrey
1993    PhD    Leicester    The empire aggrandized, a study in commemorative portrait statuary exported from Britain to her colonies in South Asia, 1800-1939    M A STEGGIES
1993    MPhil    Warwick    South Asians and employment in Great Britain with particular reference to agriculture    R H G SUGGETT
1993    OhD    London, SOAS    Peasant agriculture and tenancy in Orissa (India): a study of three villages at different levels of development, with special reference to share tenancy    M SWAIN
1993    PhD    Warwick    The politics of homeland: a study of ethnic linkages and political mobilisation amongst Sikhs in Britain and North America    D S TALLA
1993    PhD    Edinburgh    Lakshmi in the market place: traders and farmers in a north Indian market    M S TOMAR    Dr P M Jeffrey; Dr R Jeffrey
1993    PhD    Hull    Nagas in the museum: an anthropological study of the material cculture of the Hill People of the Assam-Burnma border    Andrew OChristopher WEST    Mr L G Hill
1993    PhD    London, SOAS    The politics of moderation: Britain and the Indian Liberal Party, 1917-1923    Philip Graham WOODS    Prof D J Arnold
1993    PhD    Leeds    Afghanistan in the defence of India, 1903-1915    Christopher Mark WYATT    Dr K M Wilson
1993    PhD    Exeter    The correlates of contraceptive and fertility behaviour withon the framework of sociocultural ideology: a case study of two urban centres of Pakistan    M I ZAFAR
1994    PhD    Glasgow    The non-compliant behaviour of the small states of South Asia: Nepal and Bangladesh in relation to India    S AFROZE
1994    MPhil    Lancaster    The status of women and fertility: a case study of Pakistani women in Rochdale     Salma AHMAD    Dr Suzette Heald; Dr Sarah Franklin
1994    PhD    London, UC    The hydrogeology of the Dupi Tila sands acquifer of the Barind tract, NA Bangladesh    Kazi Matin Uddin AHMED    Dr W G Burgess
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Behavioural ecology of the Hoolock gibbon (Hylobates Hoolock)in Bangladesh    M F AHSAN    Dr D J Chivers
1994    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Violence and the state in the partition of Punjab, 1947-48    Swarna AIYAR    Prof D A Low
1994    PhD    Manchester    Taxation and economic development in Bangladesh with special reference to indirect taxation    Sofia H J ALI    Ms W Olsen
1994    PhD    Salford    Environmental assessment for wetlands management in Sri Lanka    M D AMARASINGHE
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Residential land price changes in selected peripheral colonies of Lucknow City, India, 1970-1990    F AMITABH    Dr S E Corbridge
1994    PhD    Cranfield, Silsoe    Mechanisation of grain harvesting in Pakistan    Nadeem AMJAD
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Women’s consciousness and assertion in colonial India: gender, social reform and politics in Maharashtra, c.1870-c.1920    P ANAGOL-McGINN
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Women’s consciousness and assertion in colonial India: gender, social reform and politics in Maharashtra, c.1870-1920    Padma ANAGOL-McGINNnagol    Prof D J Arnold
1994    PhD    Strathclyde    Tourism in developing countries: a case study of Pakistan    M I ANWAR
1994    PhD    Bradford    The understanding of truth and the human person in Gandhi’s thought    C ARBER
1994    PhD    Leicester    Mineralogy, geochemistry and stable isotope studies of the ultramafic rocks from the Swat Valley ophiolite, North Western Pakistan: implications for the genesis of emerald and nickeliferous opaque phases    Mohammad ARIF
1994    PhD    Edinburgh    The understanding of pastoral care and counselling in the Church of South India, with special reference to the work of the Christian Counselling Centre, Velore    Nalini ARLES    Prof A F Walls; Dr D Lyall
1994    PhD    Birmingham    Bangladeshi community organisations in East London: a case study analysis    M A ASGHAR
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Naqshbandi Sufis in a western setting    A T ATAY
1994    PhD    London, LSHTM    Cost effectiveness of anti-malaria activities in Sri Lanka    A M G G N K ATTANAYAKE
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Is education beneficial ? A microeconomic analysis of the impact of education on the economic welfare of a developing country, Sri Lanka    D H C ATURUPANE    Dr P B Seabright
1994    PhD    Leicester    The Koga feldspathoidal syenite, North Western Pakistan: mineralogy and industrial applications    Iftikar Hussain BALOCH
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Workers’ politics in Bengal, 1890-1929: mill-towns, strikes and nationalist agitations    Subho BASU    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1994    BLitt    Oxford, Lady Margaret    The famine of 1899-1900 and the government of India    M BHABA
1994    PhD    Essex    A comparative sociolinguistic study of urban and rural Sindhi    M Q BUGHIO
1994    PhD    Southampton    India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1976-1990    A J BULLION
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Fluvial landforms and sediments in the North-Central Gangetic plain, India    S CHANDRA    Dr K S Richards
1994    PhD    London, LSE    Legislators in India: a comparison of MLAs in five states    Virender Kumar CHOPRA    Prof T J Nossiter
1994    PhD    London, King’s    The development of Singapore land law as influenced by English and Australian law    Panicker Alice CHRISTUDASON
1994    PhD    Cambridge, King’s     Urban texts: an interpretation of the architectural, textual and artefactual records of a Sri Lankan early historic city    R A E CONINGHAM    Dr F R Allchin
1994    PhD    Kent    Indias of the mind: the construction of post-colonial identity in Salman Rushdie’s fiction    C P CUNDY
1994    MLitt    Bristol    British Baptist missionary activity in Orissa, 1822-1914    P K DAS
1994    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s     The making of a Jat identity in the Southeast Punjab circa 1880-1936    Monica DATTA    Prof C A Bayly
1994    MPhil    Wales, Cardiff    An evaluation of the attractiveness to Apia cerana F. of the honeybee flora growing in the Dhaka region of Bangladesh and the socio-economic value of these plants to the local community    R J DAY
1994    DPhil    Oxford, New    Indian industry 1950-1990: growth, demand and productivity    Ranu DAYAL
1994    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Technical change and efficiency in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sector    Sonali D P DERANIYAGALA    Mrs F J Stewart
1994    PhD    Edinburgh    Energy resources and the role of mini and micro hydro power in Northern India    Alison DOIG
1994    PhD    London, Wye    Reaching the poor ? The identification and assessment of rural poverty by a non-governmental organisation (NGO)in Gujerat, India    Talib Baahadurail Karmali ESMAIL
1994    PhD    London, LSE    Defence industrialization in the NICs: case studies from Brazil and India    Carol Vervain EVANS
1994    PhD    London    Dying: death and bereavement in a British Hindu community    Shirley Jean FIRTH
1994    MPhil    Bristol    Pakistan: a power in central Asia     N GHUFRAN    Dr V Hewitt
1994    PhD    Hull    Construction of the European Union: implications for the developing countries: case study of India    D K GIRI
1994    PhD    London    Sufism and its development inthe Panjab    Shuja Ul HAQ
1994    PhD    Aberdeen    Export performance and marketing strategy for Malaysian palm oil    A HASHIM
1994    PhD    Bradford    Microenterprises in Pakistan: an efficiency and performance analysis of manufacturing microenterprises in North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    Syed Amjad Farid HASNU    Mr Michael Yaffey
1994    PhD    Birmingham    The quest of Ajneya: a theological appraisal of the search for meaning in his three Hindi novels    R H HOOKER
1994    PhD    Newcastle    Mechanisation of wheat production in Bangladesh based on a growth modelling approach    A H M S HOSSAIN
1994    PhD    Newcastle    Some factors affecting the performance of draught buffaloes in wetland rice cultivation in Sri Lanka    S M HULANGAMUWA
1994    PhD    Edinburgh    The scented garden in Deccani Muslim literature    S A A HUSAIN
1994    PhD    Durham    Rural-urban integration in Bangladesh: a study of linkages between villages and small urban centres    M N ISLAM    Dr P J Atkins
1994    PhD    Nottingham    Standards of safety in the underground coal mining industry of Pakistan    K G JADOON
1994    PhD    Bradford    Trade liberalization and performance: the impact of trade reform on manufacturing sector performance: Sri Lanka, 1977-89    Kangesu JAYANTHAKUMARAN    Prof C Kirkpatrick; Mr Michael Yaffey
1994    PhD    Reading    Changing patterns ofinformal and formal finance in a Rajasthan village    J Howard M JONES    Mr A Harrison
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Polygamy and purdah in the royal households of Rajastan – 13th-19th centuries    Varsha JOSHI    Prof D J Arnold
1994    MPhil    Oxford, St Cath’s    Sustainability of public debt: an application to India    Alka KACKER    Dr E V K Fitzgerald
1994    PhD    Reading    Comparison of extension provision for the smallholder and estate tea sectors in Sri Lanka    H R K K KARUNADASA    Dr C J Garforth
1994    PhD    Glasgow    Factor price distortions, underutilisation of capacity and employment in the large-scale manufacturing sector of Pakistan    R KAUSER
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Missionaries: the Hindu state and British paramountcy in Travancore and Cochin, 1858-1936    Koji KAWASHIMA    Prof D J Arnold
1994    MPhil    Strathclyde    Famine and famine policy in the central provinces of India: the crises of 1896-7 and 1899-1900    N W KEYS
1994    PhD    Wales, Lampeter    Indian Muslims in the political process    O KHALIDI
1994    PhD    Strathclyde    Poverty, uneven development, urbanisation and economic planning policies in Pakistan: a case study of Peshawar, North West Frontier Province    Assmatullah KHAN    Prof U Wannop
1994    PhD    Strathclyde    Interlinkages between land-lease and credit markets: impact on the introduction of modern technology in the North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)    H KHAN
1994    PhD    Lancaster    Saiva priests of Tamil Nadu    G LAZAR
1994    PhD    London    Fertility transition in Malaysia: an analysis by state and ethnic group    R LEETE
1994    PhD    London, Inst Ed    A comparative study of educational disadvantage in India within the Anglo-Indian community: a historical and contemporary analysis    Antoinette Iris Grace LOBO    Mr C Jones
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    The transformation of colonial perceptions into legal norms: legislating for crime and punishment in Bengal, 1790s to 1820s    Shahdeen MALIK
1994    PhD    Central England    Housing finance in developing countries: a case study of Lahore, Pakistan    T H MALIK
1994    PhD    Open    Thermal comfort for urban housing in Bangladesh    F H MALLICK
1994    PhD    London, Bedford    Consciousness and the actors: a re-assessment of Western and Indian approaches to the actor’s emotional involvement from the perspective of Vedic psychology    Daniel MEYER-DINKGRAFE
1994    DPhil    Sussex    The comprehensive crop insurance scheme in India, 1985-1991: a study of its working with special reference to Gujerat    Pramod K MISHRA    Prof M Lipton
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    From patriarchy to gender equity: family law and its impact on women in Bangladesh    Taslima MONSOOR
1994    DPhil    Sussex    Re-reading the Raj: narrative and power in British fictions of India    P G MOREY
1994    PhD    Reading    An effective communication model for the acceptance of new agricultural technology by farmers in the Punjab, Pakistan    Sher MUHAMMAD    Dr C J Garforth
1994    DPhil    Sussex    Brother, there are only two Jatis – men and women: the construction of gender identity, women, the state and personal laws in India    M MUKHOPADHYAY
1994    PhD    London, LSHTM    Visceral leishmaniasis vectors in Pakistan    Mohammad Arif MUNIR
1994    PhD    Leeds    Ramayana and Mahabharata: contemporary theatrical experiments in English with Indic oral traditions of storytelling    V NAIDU
1994    PhD    Durham    Rural-urban interaction in Bangladesh: a study of linkages between villagers and small urban centres    M N I NAZERN
1994    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    Rukmini Devi and the Bharata Natyam – the revival of classical dance in India    K OHTANI
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Bauls of West Bengal: with special reference to Raj Khyapa and his followers    Jeanne OPENSHAW    Dr A Cantlie
1994    DPhil     Sussex    Agrarian structure, new technology and labour absorption in Indian agriculture: an empirical investigation of Gujerat    Kirankumar Manubhai PANDYA
1994    PhD    London    Gender, discipleship and charismatic authority in the Rajneesh movement    Marie Elizabeth PUTTICK
1994    PhD    Durham    Social change and fertility transition in Sri Lanka    P PUVANARAJAN    Prof J I Clarke; Mr A R Townsend
1994    PhD    London, LSHTM    Epidemiology of visceral leishmaniasis in northern areas of Pakistan with particular reference to the reservoir(s)    Mohammed Abdur RAB
1994    PhD    Brunel    Management education and development strategies in Bangladesh    A S M M RAHMAN
1994    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Decentralisation and rural society in Bangladesh: a study of bureaucratic restraints on access in the UPAZILA structure     Mohammed Halibur RAHMAN    Dr C Gerry
1994    DPhil    Oxford, Worcester    India and the north-south politics of global environmental issues: the case of ozone depletion, climate change and loss of biodiversity    Mukund G RAJAN    Dr A J Hurrell
1994    PhD    Kent    Causal factors and transmission mechanisms of inflationary impulses in Sri Lanka, 1970-1989    Purnima RAJAPAKSE    Prof Thirlwall
1994    MPhil    London, SOAS    Remembering Burma: Tamil migrants and memories    Audrey Beatrice Stephanie RAMAMURTHY    Dr N Lindisfarne
1994    PhD    Reading    The analysis of farmer information systems for feeding dairy cattle in two villages of Kerala State, India    S N RAMKUMAR
1994    PhD    City    Perception-production in relation to fronting of velars in Hindi and Marati speaking children    M E RAO
1994    PhD    London, UC    Socio-economic status, channels of recruitment and the rural to urban migration of labour: a case study of the squatter settlements of Delhi, India    Himmat Singh RATNOO
1994    PhD    London, UC    Haemoglobin disorders among the tribal population of Madhya Pradesh, India    P H REDDY
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney    Mohajir subnationalism and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement in Sindh Province, Pakistan    J J RICHARDS    Dr S Corbridge
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Conversion and catholicism in Southern Goa, India    R T ROBINSON    Dr C Humphrey
1994    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Rural labour arrangements in West Bengal, India    Benjamin N ROGALY    Dr B Harriss
1994    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    The politics of fiscal policy: some reflections on fiscal policy and state intervention in developing economies with special reference to India    R ROY
1994    PhD    Reading    The taxonomy and ecology of the genus Licuala (Palmae)in Malaya    L G SAW
1994    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Politics in Orissa, 1900-1956: regional identity and popular movements    Jayanta SENGUPTA    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1994    MPhil    Newcastle    Public participation in the Malaysian structure plan system practice, response and impact studies    K SHAMSUDIN
1994    PhD    Aberdeen    Attitudes of tribal people towards social forestry with reference to Madhya Pradesh, India    A SHUKLA
1994    PhD    Manchester    Decentralisation, participation and rural development in Bangladesh: an analysis pf the Upazila system    N A SIDDIQUEE    Dr D Hulme
1994    PhD    Bradford    The political economy of agricultural change in India    Kalim U SIDDIQUI    Dr Carolyn Dennis; Dr Behrooz Morvaridi
1994    PhD    Leicester    Electoral campaigns and the media: the coverage of India’s 1991 general election in the Indian and the British press    Balwinder SINGH    Ms O Linne
1994    DPhil    York    Case and agreement in Hindi: a GB approach    Joga SINGH    Mr M K Verma
1994    PhD    Manchester    Historical relations: representing collective identities. Small group portraiture in eighteenth-century England, British India and America    K S STANWORTH
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    The symbolic construction of the Sri Lankan Hindu Tamil community in Britain    D A TAYLOR
1994    PhD    Leeds    The development of the Bangladesh jute industry since 1971    F TERKELSEN
1994    PhD    Reading    Exploring media non-professionals’ participation in access television: towards a participatory production model for development broadcasting in India    Korula VARGHESE    Dr P Norrish
1994    PhD    London, Goldsmiths’    What the neighbours say: gender and power in two low-income settlemets in Madras    Penny VERA-SANSO    Prof P Caplan
1994    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    Creation in Santal tribal religion and Christian faith: a study in comparative religion    W WALKER
1994    PhD    Manchester    Growth and adjustment after trade liberalisation: Sri Lanka, 1977-1992    D N WEERAKOON
1994    PhD    London, UC    The management of official records in Sri Lanka and its impact on public administration    Sarath Sisira Kumara WICKRAMANAYAKA
1994    PhD    REading    The solubility of rice straw silica and its use as a silicon source in paddy cultivation    D E WICKRAMASINGHE
1994    PhD    London    Effect of climatic factors on the growth of tea (“Camellia sinensis”)in the low country wet zone of Sri Lanka    Madawala Arachchillage WIJERATNE
1994    PhD    Leeds    Young British Hindu women’s interpretation of the images of womenhood in Hinduism    S M WILKINSON
1994    PhD    Bradford    Interlocking directorates in Hong Kong business organizations: a longitudinal study of their changing patterns    G Y-Y WONG
1994    PhD    London, SOAS    Mission-conversion-dialogue: the process of Christianization of the Richi in south-West Bangladesh    Cosimo ZENE    Dr A Cantlie
1995    PhD    London, King’s    The implications of the Falklands War for the defence of India’s island territories    Biju ABRAHAM    Prof G Till
1995    PhD    Exeter    An investigation into programme factors and providers and providers’ perceptions of family welfare centres in Faisalabad district of Pakistan    A AHMAD
1995    PhD    Exeter    An initiative into programme factors and providers’ perceptions at family welfare centres in Faisalbad district of Pakistan    Ashfaq AHMED
1995    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Aspects of influence over accounting and accounting for currency devaluation in Bangladesh    J AHMED
1995    PhD    Birmingham    Social relations and migration: a study of post-war migration with particular reference to migration from Bangladesh to Britain    F ALAM
1995    PhD    Hull    Keralites in Abu Dhabi: a study of skilled and unskilled Keralite migrant workers in the city of Abu Dhabi    S A S ALKOBAISI
1995    PhD    Reading    The effect of a prolonged release formulation of bovine somatotropin (sometribove)on milk production of Bos Taurus and dairy crossbred cows in Malaysia    A AZIZAN
1995    PhD    Stirling    Scholarly publishing in Malaysia: a study of marketing environment and influences on readership behaviour    Firdaus Ahmad AZZAM
1995    PhD    Strathclyde    The role of the private sector in the provision of sites and services schemes for low income groups: a case study of Lahore, Pakistan    Ihsan-Ullah BAJWA    P Green
1995    PhD    Open    Crustal evolution and metamorphism in the high-grade terrain of South India    J M BARTLETT
1995    PhD    Lancaster    A study of continuity within the Ramakrishna Math and Mission with reference to the practice of seva, service to humanity    G T BECKERLEGGE
1995    MPhil    Wales    Population planning and its effect upon the development of agricultural policies in India since 1947    Austin BICKERS
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    An Indian cloth painting and its art worlds: perceptions of Orissan “patta” paintings    Helle BUNDGAARD    Dr C Pinney
1995    PhD    London, LSE    Gender, exchange and person in a fishing community in Kerala, South India    Cecilia Jane BUSBY    Dr Henrietta Moore
1995    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Britain, India and the genesis of the Colombo Plan, 1945-51    Philip J CHARRIER    Prof D A Low
1995    MPhil    Warwick    Such a long journey: the Anglo-Indian literary tradition: a study in duality    Mithu CHATTOPADHYAY
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    Orientalist themes and English verse in nineteenth century India    Rosinka CHAUDHURI    Dr R Young
1995    MPhil    London, King’s College    So peculiarly formed a corps: the beginnings of Gorkha service with the British     A P (Jim) COLEMAN    Prof B J Bond
1995    PhD    London    The elites of the Maldives: sociopolitical organisation and change    Elizabeth Overton COLTON
1995    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville      Origins, development and organisation of national Antarctic programmes with special reference to the United Kingdom and India    A DEY-NUTTALL
1995    PhD    London    The control of Callosobruchus maculatus (Fab.)in cowpeas in Sri Lanka: effect of varietal resistance, conventional insecticides and locally available bontanicals    C M D DHARMASENA
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    The Gujerati lyrics of Kavi Dayarambhai    R M J DWYER
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Community health care the NGO way: an anthropological study of a maternal-child health and family planning programme in rural Bangladesh    R V EBDON    Dr A Good; Dr M C Jedrej
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Co-option and exclusion: a study of Indian MPs    Paul C R FLATHER    Dr A F Heath
1995    PhD    Strathclyde    Solar based technology for crop drying in rural Pakistan    Mohammad GHAFFAR    Dr G Zawdie
1995    PhD    Cambridge, St Edmund’s    The enforcement of the zini ordinance by the Federal Shariat Court in the period 1980-1990 and its impact on women    E GIUNCHI    Dr B F Musallam
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    Popular resistance to Zamindari oppression in the Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Northern India, 1920-1960    Kusum GOPAL    Prof D J Arnold
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    Geology in India, 1770-1851: a study in the methods and motivations of a colonial science    Andrew GROUT    Dr P G Robb
1995    PhD    London    Carbon dioxide abatement in an empirical model of the Indian economy: an integration of micro and macro analysis    S GUPTA
1995    DPhil    Oxford    The Kishangarh school of painting, c 1680-1850    N N HAIDAR
1995    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The implications of resettlement on Vasava identity: a study of a community displaced by the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)Dam project    R P HAKIM    Mr G P Hawthorn
1995    PhD    Keele    Dimensions and types of Malay family interaction in Malaysia: a humanistic approach    L M H HARUN
1995    PhD    London, LSE    Management practices and business development in Pakistan, 1950-1988    Naveed HASAN    Dr G M Austin
1995    PhD    London, Wye    Factors influencing post-harvest longevity of embul bananas    K S HEWAGE
1995    PhD    Durham    Singapore’s experience in ASEAN: the nature of trade and inward investment    M A HILEY    Dr R J A Wilson
1995    PhD    East London    Women’s right to divorce in rural Bangladesh    Naima HUQ    Mr J Roche; Dr J Cooper; Dr J Eade
1995    MPhil    Wales, Lampeter    Resistance, reformation and rejection: modernity and tradition in ninteenth century Hinduism    S B JACOBS
1995    PhD    London, LSHTM    Gynaecological and mental health of low-income urban women in India    Surinda Kaur Parmar JASWAL
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Estate Tamil: a morphosyntactic study    Nagita KADRURGAMUWE
1995    PhD    Leeds    Provision of corporate financial information in Bangladesh    A K M Waresul KARIM    Prof P Moizer; Ms H Short
1995    PhD    East London    Changing responses to child labour: the case of female children in the Bangladesh garment industry    Sumaiya KHAIR    Dr H Lim; Prof M Freeman
1995    PhD    London, Imperial    Inclincations towards enterprise – a typology of poor, enterprising and non-enterprising women in India    U E KRAUS-HARPER
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    Metropolitan encounters: a study of Indian students in Britain, 1880-1930    Shompa LAHIRI    Dr P G Robb
1995    PhD    Exeter    How to measure default risk: an empirical study on India’s operations in the loan and bond markets    Geeta LAKSHMI    Mr J Matatko; B Pearson
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Financial development, economic growth and the effect of financial innovation on the demand for money in an open economy: an econometric analysis for Singapore    Lamin LEIGH    Dr J Muellbauer; Prof D F Hendry
1995    PhD    Kent    Structured dependency: lone mothers and social security in Hong Kong    L C LEUNG
1995    PhD    London, RHBNC    Sufism, sufi leadership and modernisation in South Asia since c.1800    Claudia LIEBESKIND    Prof F R C Robinson
1995    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Planning for the participation of vulnerable groups in communal management of forest resources: the case of the Western Ghats forestry projects    Catherine LOCKE    Prof Alan Rew
1995    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Aspects of urban design with special reference to image and identity in built form – case study of Kuala Lumpur    B S MAHBOB
1995    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Pakistan’s foreign policy, 1971-1981: the search for security    Niloufer Q MAHDI    Dr G Rizvi
1995    DPhil    Oxford, St Peter’s     Impact of highland-lowland interaction on agriculture in the Hunza Valley: the socio-economic transformation of mountain societies    Arif MAHMUD    Prof G C K Peach
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Oriel    Contractual arrangements in Pakistani agriculture : a study of share tenancy in Sindh    Nomaan MAJID    Dr B Harriss
1995    MD    Manchester    Maternal and environmental factors and the development of Pakistani children (6-18 months)    S MAQBOOL
1995    PhD    Nottingham    Resource partitioning and productivity of perennial pigeonpea/groundnut agroforestry systems in India    F M MARSHALL
1995    PhD    Essex    Social factors shaping fertility behaviour in Pakistan    Rukhsana MASOOD    Dr Joan Busfield; Mr? Sullivan
1995    PhD    Kent    Toward an integral ecotheology relevant for India    MATHEW
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Alexander Duff and the theological and philosophical background to the General Assembly’s mission in Calcutta to 1840    Ian Douglas MAXWELL    Prof A F Walls; Dr A C Ross
1995    PhD    London, SOAS    Tibet and the British Raj, 1904-47: the influence of the Indian political department officers    Alexander Colin McKAY    Dr P G Robb
1995    PhD    Cambridge, New Hall    The politics of nationalism: the cast of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh    A A MOHSIN    Mr G P Hawthorn
1995    PhD    Leicester    Media, state and political violence: the press construction of terrorism in the Indian Pubjab    Vipul MUDGAL    Anders Hansen
1995    PhD    Leicester    Media, state and political violence: the press construction of terrorism in the Indian Punjab    Vipul MUDGAL
1995    PhD    Manchester    An analysis of factors affecting farmers’ participation in two rice irrigation schemes in Sri Lanka    S H MUDIYANSELAGE
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Evolution of the early Himalayan Foreland Basin in North West India and its relationship to orogenesis    Y M R NAJMAN
1995    PhD    Lancaster    The Mills and Boon memsahibs: women’s romantic Indian fiction, 1877-1947    Dominic OMISSI    Prof J M MacKenzie
1995    PhD    Surrey    Consumption, fiscal policy and endogenous growth: the case of India    I PATNAIK
1995    PhD    Durham    A theological reappraisal of the mission of the Christian church in Tamilnadu in the light of the challenge presented by the Dravida Kazhagam Movement (a secular humanistic)movement    R PAULRAJ
1995    PhD    Bradford    A cointegration analysis of money demand in a developing country: a case study of Pakistan    A QAYYUM
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    A comparative study of native and Pakistani geology research articles    Mujib RAHMAN
1995    PhD    Newcastle    Eco-engineering prtactices in Malaysia    N RAHMAN
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Activating vs. resetting functional categories in second language acquisition: the acquisition of AGR and TNS in English by Sinhalese first language speakers    Hemamala Vajira RATWATTE
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    George Orwell, the BBC and India: a critical study    Abha S RODRIGUES    Mr G D Carnell; Dr R C Craig
1995    PhD    London, LSE    Socio-cultural changes in an Indian peasant society    Arild Engelsen RUUD    Dr J Harries
1995    PhD    London, UC    Public transport in Kuala Lumpur: a model based approach    A F SADULLAH
1995    MPhil    Loughborough    The macroeconomic impact of foreign capital inflows: a case study of Pakistan    T SAEED
1995    PhD    Strathclyde    The lessons from privatization experience for privatization in Pakistan: from public sector enterprises to monopolistic utilities    Mushtaq A SAJID
1995    PhD    Leicester    Mineralogy, geochemistry and possible industrial applications of illite-smectite rich clays from Karak, Northwestern Pakistan    Akhtar Ali SALEEMI
1995    PhD    Stirling    Small enterprise development in Bangladesh: a study of the nature and effectiveness of support services    J H SARDER
1995    PhD    Cambridge    Histological techniques for estimating age at death from human bone:an Indian case study    A SAXENA
1995    MPhil    Newcastle    An analysis of prices and marketing margins for potatoes and onions in Pakistan    S SHAH
1995    MPhil    Leeds    The development of an environmentally sensitive information system in the water industry in Bangladesh    Mohammad Taslim Uddin SHARIF    Prof T Moizer
1995    PhD    Open    A comparative study of Milton Keynes (UK)and Islamabad (Pakistan)    M I H SIDDIQI    Mr R Thomas; Mr J B Harison
1995    PhD    Newcastle    The reproductive biology and histology of three species of sceractinian corals from the Republic of Maldives, India Ocean    C J SIER
1995    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Economic evaluation of agroforestry, forestry and agriculture projects in Orissa, India: with particular reference to financial profitability and basic needs fulfilment    Jitendra Prasad SINGH    Mr T H Thomas
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    The impact of migration, environment and economic conditions on the biological growth and physique of Sikhs    Lakhwinder P SINGH    Prof G A Harrison
1995    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Design and standardisation of a developmental test for Indian children: the Indian picture puzzle test    R SINGHANIA
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The stylistic development of the sculpture of Kashmir    John E C SIUDMAK    Mr G J S Sanderson
1995    MPhil    London, LSE    Auctioning the dreams: economy, community and philanthropy in a North Indian city    Roger Graham SMEDLEY    Dr C Fuller; Dr J P Parry
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The stylistic development of the sculpture of Kashmir    J E C SUIDMAK
1995    PhD    Lancaster    I see all the gods in your body: a study of religious doctrine in the Mahabharata    N SUTTON
1995    PhD    Sussex    Utilisation of industrial R & D findings in Malaysia: a case study of selected public research institutions, universities and industry    K THIRUCHELVAM
1995    PhD    Middlesex     A regional power : United States policy in the Indian Ocean and the definition of national security, 1978-1980    Paul TODD    T Putnam; Prof F Halliday
1995    PhD    London, LSE    Sacred grove (kaavu): ancestral land of “landless agricultural labourers” in Kerala, India    Yasushi UCHIYAMADA    Dr C Fuller
1995    PhD    East Anglia    Employment and the small enterprise economy in India: an inquiry into its growth and significance for development    Nalini VITTAL
1995    PhD    Edinburgh    Social control and deviance in Edinburgh’s Pakistani community    Abdul Ali WARDAK
1995    MLitt    Aberdeen    From Banff to Bengal and beyond: the list, travel and writings of a remarkable north-east loon: Robert Wilson, M D. (1787-1871)    Thelma G WATT    Prof R Bridges
1995    phD    Edinburgh    Environmental effects on the growth of broad-leaved trees introduced under pine stands in Sri Lanka    N D R WEERAWARDANE
1995    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    Manufactured exports, outward-orientation, and the acquisition of technological capabilities in Sri Lanka, 1997-1989    Ganeshan WIGNARAJA    Dr S Lall
1995    PhD    Birmingham    A study of recent conversion to and from Christianity in the Tamil area of South India    A D C WINGATE
1995    PhD    Bradford    The economic impact of temporary migrant workers remittances on the Pakistan economy: estimates from a macro economic model    K U ZAMAN
1996    MLitt    Oxford, Exeter    The women’s movement in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s    Nilofer AFRIDI-QAZI    Dr M W Lau
1996    PhD    Leicester    Paleoenvironments, diagenesis and geochemical studies of the Dungan formation (Palaocene)eastern Sulaiman Range, Pakistan    Nazir AHMAD
1996    PhD    Sheffield    A study of changes occurring in valuable aspects ofthe built environment of the core areas of historic settlements in Pakistan    T AHMAD    A Craven
1996    PhD    Open    Approaches to bioclimatic urban design for the tropics with special reference to Dhaka, Bangladesh    K S AHMED
1996    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    Oral traditions in Ladakh    Monisha AHMED    Dr R Barnes Dr N J Allen
1996    PhD    London, RHBNC    The emergence of Muslim feminism in South Asia, 1920-1960    Azra Asghar ALI    Prof F R C Robinson
1996    MPhil    Liverpool    Molecular epidemiology of human and environmental enterobacteriaceae in rural Bangladesh    K S ANWAR
1996    DPhil    Sussex    The spread of technology and the level of development: a comparative study of steel mills using electric arc furnace technology in India and Britain    S S ATHREYE
1996    PhD    Londond, SOAS    A garland of razors: the life of a traditional musician in contemporary Pakistan    Khalid Manzoor BASRA
1996    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Bharat versus India: peasant politics and rural-urban relations in North West India    M J R BENTALL    Dr S E Corbridge
1996    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    Four essays on the labour market in India    Sonia R BHALOTRA    Prof S J Nickell
1996    MPhil    York    Women writing India: a study of prose fiction by Ruth Prawer Jhabvala, Nayantara Sahgal and Sashi Deshpanda    Shivani BHARGAVA    Dr Joe Bristow
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    A necessary weapon of war: state policies towards propaganda and information in Eastern India, 1939-1945    Sanjoy BHATTACHARYA    Dr P G Robb
1996    PhD    Birmingham    Rich pickings ? the political economy of solid waste management in Calcutta, India    A BOSE    I C Blore
1996    PhD    Glasgow    Cultural strategies of young women of south Asian origin in Glasgow, with special reference to health    H BRADBY
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    European authority and caste disputes in South India, 1650-1850    N BRIMNES    Prof C A Bayly
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Contemporary uses of Vastu Vidya, the traditional Indian knowledge of architecture    Vibhuti CHAKRABARTI    Dr Giles Tillotson
1996    PhD    Strathclyde    Waterlogging and salinity in the Sukkur region of Sindh: causes and remedies    Mohammed Nawaz CHAND    Prof A I Clunies Ross
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Slavery and the household in Bengal, 1770-1880    Indrani CHATTERJEE    Prof D J Arnold

1996    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    A comparative analysis of centre-local relations in government with special reference to Pakistan and Britain    Ishtiaq Ahmed CHOUDHRY
1996    PhD    Dundee    Audit expectations gap in the public sector of Bangladesh    R R CHOWDHURY
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Gujjars in Garhwal – parallel lives: situational identity and exchange    B DALAL    Dr C Humphrey
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The Europeans of Calcutta, 1858-1883    Damayanti DATTA    Prof C A Bayley
1996    MPhil    Reading    The effectiveness of different radio programme formats for the dissemination of information on safe use of insecticides in paddy cultivation in Mahaweli system C in Sri Lanka    N DE SILVA
1996    PhD    Cranfield    Estimating groundwater recharge with limited resources with special emphasis on spatial variability: a study in the dry zone of Sri Lanka    Roshan Priyantha DE SILVA    R C Carter
1996    PhD    London, LSE    Religion and nationalism in India: the case of Punjab, 1960-1990    Harnick DEOL    Prof A Smith
1996    MPhil    London, SOAS    Love and mysticism in the Punjabi Qissas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries    Jeevan Singh DEOL    Prof C Shackle
1996    PhD    Lancaster    The development of Bhuddist monastic education in Sri Lanka with special reference to the modern period    Naimbala DHAMMADASSI    Prof G Samuel; Dr H Kawanami
1996    PhD    Strathclyde    Solar-based technology for crop drying in Pakistan    M G DOUGGAR
1996    PhD    Lancaster    Touring the Taj: tourist practices and narratives at the Taj Mahal and in Agra    T EDENSOR
1996    PhD    London    Indian music and the west: a critical history    GJ FARRELL
1996    PhD    Hull    Standarisation versus adaptation of marketing strategies: British multinationals in Pakistan    G GHOUS
1996    PhD    Hull    The religious and political thought of Swami Vivekananda    A HARILELA
1996    PhD    Leicester    Cross cultural interpretatioins of television: a phenomenonological hermeneutic enquiry [India]    Ramaswami HARINDRANATH    Mr R Dickinson
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    Pre-cursors to post-colonialism : Leonard Woolf, E. J. Thompson, and E. M. Forster and the rhetoric of English India    R B P HARRISON    Prof J B Beer
1996    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Farmers’ knowledge and the development of complex agroforestry practices in Sri Lanka    H HITINAYAKE
1996    PhD    Aberdeen    Effects of periodic drought on Acacia magum Willd. and Acacia auriculiformis A.Cunn.ex Benth growing on sand tailings in Malaysia    A L HOE
1996    DPhil    Sussex    Replacing market with government: the Indian experience in credit control    R KOHLI
1996    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    Indian civil servants, 1892-1937: an age of transition    Takehiko HONDA    Prof J M Brown; Dr M C Curthoys
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, 1880-1932: the status of Muslim women in Bengal    H Y HOSSAIN
1996    PhD    East London    Born to be wed: Bangladeshi women and the Muslim marriage contract    Shahnaz HUDA    Dr K Green; Ms A Stewart
1996    PhD    Manchester    Social, psychological and economic factors in the growth of a small firm: a study of the small scale furniture and footwear firms in Pakistan    S A HUSSAIN
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    Fluvial sedimentology of the Kamial Formation (Miocene)Himalayan Foreland, Pakistan    J A HUTT    Dr P F Friend
1996    DPhil    York    Development through conservation: a sustainable development strategy with special reference to a heritage zone in Madras    R V ISIAH
1996    PhD    Reading    Improvement of Erythrina variegata L.: a multipurpose fast growing tree species in Bangladesh    S ISLAM
1996    PhD    East Anglia    Constraints to the adoption of modern rice varieties during the Aman season in Bangladesh    Md Abdul JABBER    Dr Richard Palmer-Jones
1996    PhD    London, UC    Modern agricultural production and the environment: the case of wheat production in the Indian Punjab, 1971-1988    Amballur Jospeh JAMES
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Agro-ecological knowledges and forest managment in the Jharkhand, India: tribal development or populist impasse ?    S L JEWITT    Dr T P Bayliss-Smit
1996    PhD    Glasgow    A study of human rights organizations and issues in India    M JHA
1996    PhD    London, UC    Early iron and steel in Sri Lanka: a study of the Samanalawewa area    G JULEFF
1996    PhD    London, LSHTM    Areal variations in use of modern contraceptives in rural Bangladesh    Nashid KAMAL    A Sloggett
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    A longitudinal anthropometric study of mother-infants pairs in Dhaka, Bangladesh    E KARIM
1996    PhD    Southampton    Development of dietary assessment methods for use in the South Asian community    N A KARIM
1996    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    Capital market liberalization in Pakistan: 1980-1992    Bashir A KHAN    Mr C J Cowton
1996    PhD    Bradford    Public sector accounting and financial reporting oractices in Bangladesh    M A S KHAN
1996    PhD    Leicester    Genesis of stratabound scheelite and stratiform Pb-Zn mineralisation, Chitral, Northern Pakistan, and its comparison with South West England tin-tungsten deposits    Mohammad Zahid KHAN
1996    PhD    Wales, Swansea    A political economy of forest resource use: case studies of social forestry in Bangladesh    Niaz Ahmed KHAN    Prof A Rew
1996    PhD    Loughborough    An analysis of risk sharing in Islamic finance with reference to Pakistan    T KHAN
1996    PhD    Leeds    Central-local government relations in Pakistan since 1979    T KHAN    Dr Owen Hartley
1996    PhD    London, UC    Economic values of resource depreciation and environmental degradation in Bangladesh    Fahmida Akter KHATUN
1996    PhD    Warwick    Analysis of tariff and tax policies in Bangladesh: a computable general equilibrium approach    B H KHONDKER
1996    PhD    London, UC    Subsistence and petty-capitalist landlords: an enquiry into the petty commodity production of rental housing in low-income settlements in Madras, India    S KUMAR
1996    PhD    London, LSE    Civil-military relationships in British and independent India, 1918-1962, and coup prediction theory    Apurba KUNDU    Prof T J Nossiter
1996    PhD    London, King’s    Marketing and economic development: a case study of maize marketing in Mardan District, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    Teshome LEMMA    R Black; M Byron; M E Frost
1996    PhD    London, Imperial    The effects of ozone and nitrogen dioxide on Pakistan wheat (“Triticum aestivum”l.)and rice (“Oryza sativa”L) cultivars    R MAGGS
1996    PhD    Keele    The European Community and South Asia: development, economic cooperation and trade policies with India, Bangladesh and Bhutan, 1973-1993    M MARWAHA    Christopher Brewin
1996    PhD    Hull    Corporate management styles of Malaysian parent companies in managing their local subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector    N A MAZELAN
1996    PhD    Cambridge    Fertility and frailty: demographic change and the health and status of Indian women    K McNAY
1996    MPhil    Leicester    Constraints to professionalism in Sri Lankan newspaper journalism    Mahim MENDIS    Anders Hansen
1996    PhD    Wales, Bangor    The ecology and management of traditional home gardens in Bangladesh    M MILLAT-E-MUSTAFA
1996    PhD    East London    Land reform and landlessness in Bangaldesh    M A MOMEN
1996    PhD    London, King’s    Passing it on: the army in India and the development of frontier warfare, 1849-1947    Timothy Robert MOREMAN    Prof B J Bond
1996    MPhil    London, SOAS    Legal and penal institutions within a middle class perspective in colonial Bengal, 1854-1910    Anindita MUKHOPADHYAY    Prof D J Arnold
1996    DPhil    Oxford    Space, class and rhetoric in Lahore    R McG MURPHY
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity     The crisis of the Burmese State and the foundations of British colonial rule in Upper Burma (1853-1900)    T MYINT-U    Prof C A Bayly
1996    PhD    Nottingham    Open distance learning aspects of adult basic educastion in the UK and their implications for Kerala (India)    Chandrasekharan NAIR-MADHAVEN    W J Morgan
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Chidambaram – city and people in the Tamil tradition    V NANDA    Dr F R Allchin
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Chidambaram: temple and city in the Tamil tradition    Vivek NANDA    Dr F R Allchin
1996    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Manpower planning in Pakistan: a study of its assumptions concerning the education-occupation relationship    H K NIAZI
1996    PhD    Southampton    Exploring a bottom up approach to networking for open learning in India    Asad Mohd NIZAM    Dr A P Hart
1996    MPhil    East Anglia    Contradictions of organisation: a case study of a rural development NGO in Rajasthan, India    Jane Elizabeth OLIVER
1996    PhD    Reading    Studies of black pepper (Piper nigrum L)virus disease in Sri Lanka    D PADMINI DE SILVA
1996    PhD    Sheffield    The role of small towns and intermediate cities in regional development in India    A PANNEERSELVAM    C L Chogull
1996    PhD    Birmingham    The word of God is not bound: the necounter of Sikhs and Christians in India and the United Kingdom    J M PARRY
1996    DPhil    Oxford, Green College    Regeneration and sucession following shifting cultivation of dry tropical deciduous forests of Sri Lanka    Gamaralalage A D PERERA    Dr N D Brown; Dr P S Savill
1996    PhD    London    Bureaucrats, development and decentralisation in India: the bureau-shaping model applied to Panchayati in Karnataka, 1987-1991    H J PERRY
1996    PhD    London, LSHTM    Linear growth retardation (stunting)in Sri Lankan children and the role of dietary calcium    Ambegoda Geekiyanage Damayanthi PIYADASA
1996    DPhil    Sussex    English studies and the articulation of the nation in India    P K PODDAR
1996    MPhil    REading    Village organisations and extension: a case study of Balochistan rural support programme    A R QAZI
1996    PhD    Cambridge    Lactational amenorrhoea, infant feeding patterns and behaviours in Bangladeshi women    M RAHMAN
1996    PhD    Cambridge    Relation between energetics, body composition and length of post-partum amenorrhoea in Bangladeshi women    M RASHID
1996    MPhil    Leicester    Thermobarometry of the garnet bearing rocks of the Jijal complex (western Himalayas, northern Pakistan)    Lucie RINGUETTE
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    The devotional poetry of Svami Haridasa    Ludmila Lupu ROSENSTEIN    Dr R Snell
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Local perceptions of environmental change in a tropical coastal wetland: the case of Koggala Lagoon, Galle, Sri Lnaka    V N SAMARASEKARA
1996    PhD    Newcastle    The production of seed potato (Solanum tuberosum L)tubers from stem cuttings in Sri Lanka    P W S M SAMARASINGHE
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Mangrove ecology in Sri Lanka    V SAMARESKARA    Prof P Stott
1996    PhD    London, King’s    Agrarian impacts on manufacturing expansion in the Indian Punjab    Jagpal Kaur SANGHA    Dr L Hoggart
1996    DPhil    York    A sociolinguistic study of Panjabi Hindus in Southall: language maintenance and shift    Mukul SAXENA    C Wallace
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Political alignments, the state and industrial policy in Pakistan: a comparison of performance in the 1960s and 1980s    A U SAYEED    Dr M H Khan
1996    PhD    Manchester    The role of agriculture in the Indian economy: an analysis using a general equilibrium model based on a social accounting matrix    Sabyasachi SEN    Prof D Colman; Dr A Ozanne
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Famine, state and society in North India, c.1800-1840    Sanjay Kumar SHARMA    Dr P G Robb
1996    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Project appraisal under risk, threat and uncertainty: a case study of the afforestation project of Bihar, India    Devendra Kumar SHUKLA    Dr C Price
1996    PhD    London    Pakistan’s arms procurement decision-making    A SIDDIQA
1996    PhD    London, SOAS    Political prisoners in India, 1920-1977    Ujjwal Kumar SINGH    Dr Taylor
1996    PhD    Liverpool    Molecular and seroepidemiological studies of rotavirus from children in Bangladesh    S TABASSUM
1996    PhD    Beradford    Environmental education and distance teaching: a case study from Pakistan    F TAHIR
1996    MPhil    Liverpool John Moores    The demand for money in Pakistan: simple-sum versis Divisia    S M TARIQ
1996    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    Property rights and the issue of power: the case of inland fisheries in Bangladesh    Kazi Ali TOUFIQUE    Dr M H Khan
1996    MPhil    Open    Gender issues and social change: evaluating programme impact in rural Bangladesh    A M VAN SWINDEREN    Mr A Thomas
1996    PhD    Cranfield    The performance in public enterprises in a developing country: Sri Lanka’s experience in perspective    Tillaka S WEERAKOON    Prof Chris Brewster
1996    PhD    Reading    Evaluation of the effectiveness of radio and television in changing the knowledge and attitudes of cinnamon growers in Sri Lanka    J WEERASINGHE
1996    PhD    Manchester    Rationales of accounting controls in a developing context: a mode of production theory anaysis of two Sri Lankan case studies    D P WICKRAMASINGHE    Prof T Hopper
1996    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Socialist development ? Economic and political change in rural West Bengal under the Left Front    G O WILLIAMS    Dr S Corbridge
1996    PhD    Bristol    The politics of caste in India with special reference to the Dalit Christian campaign for scheduled caste reservations    Andrew K J WYATT    Dr D Turner; Dr V Hewitt
1997    PhD    Stirling    Strategic planning and strategic awareness in small enterprise: a study of small engineering firms in Bangladesh    A F M ABDUL MOYEEN
1997    PhD    Loughborough    A strategy for managing brickwork in Sri Lanka    W V K M ABEYSEKERA    Dr A Thorpe
1997    PhD    East Anglia    Sex ratio imbalances in India: a disaggregated analysis    S B AGNIHOTRI
1997    PhD    Lancaster    Gender roles and fertility: a comparative analysis of women from Britain and Pakistan    S AHMAD
1997    PhD    Nottingham    Modelling the impact of agricultural policy at the farm level in the Punjab, Pakistan    Z AHMAD
1997    PhD    London, Imperial    Particulate air pollution and respiratory morbidity in New Delhi, India    S AKBAR
1997    PhD    East London    Keeping a wife at the end of a stick: law and wife abuse in Bangladesh    Nusrat AMEEN    Dr Kate Green; Ms N Lacey
1997    PhD    Birmingham    The generation of a tool for screening the early grammatical development of Bangla-speaking children and the potential useof this instrument in classes of hearing-impaired children    N ANAM
1997    PhD    Durham    A mission for India: Dr Ellen Farrer and India, 1891-1933    Imogen S ANDERSON    A J Heesom
1997    DPhil    Sussex    Changes in poverty and inequality in Pakistan during the period of structural adjustment (1987-88 to 1990-91)    T ANWAR
1997    PhD    Cranfield    Sustainable farming systems and the role of change agents: Moneragala District, Sri Lanka    J P ATAPATTU
1997    PhD    Edinburgh    Common property resource management in Haryana State, India: analysis of the impact of participation in the management of common property resources and the relative effectiveness of common property regimes    Pasumarthy Venkata Subhash Chandra BABU
1997    MPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Recognising minorities: a study of some aspects of the Indian Constituent Assembly debates, 1946-1949    Rochana BAJPAI    Dr N Gooptu; Prof M S Freeden
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The transformation of domesticity as an ideology: Calcutta, 1880-1947    Sudeshna BANERJEE    Prof D J Arnold
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Decentralising forest management in India: the case of Van Panchayats in Kumaun    P C BAUMANN    Mr G P Hawthorn
1997    PhD    London, LSE    Households, livelihoods and the urban environmental social development perspectives on solid waste management in Faisalabad, Pakistan    J D BEALL
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    Tribe and state in Waziristan, 1849-83    Hugh BEATTIE    Prof M E Yapp
1997    DPhil    Sussex    A study of small-scale community tank irrigation systems in the dry zone of Sri Lanka    Saleha BEGUM    Dr M Moore
1997    PhD    Aberdeen    The “empire of the raj:” conflict and cooperation with Britain over the shape and function of the Indian sphere in Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1850s-1930s    Robert J BLYTH    Prof R C Bridges; Ms Rosemary M Tyzack
1997    PhD    Manchester    Comparative human resource managment: a cross national study of India and Britain    P S BUDHWAR
1997    PhD    Wales, Lampeter    Decision making and idjtihad in Islamic environments: a comparative study of Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom    G L R BUNT
1997    DPhil    Oxford, St Hilda’s    A history of the trade to South Asia of Macmillan   Co and Oxford University Press, 1875-1900    Rimi B CHATTERJEE    Mr M Turner; Mr L W St Clair
1997    PhD    East Anglia    Innovation paths in developing country agriculture: true potato seed in India, Egypt and Indonesia    a CHILVER
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    From nabob to sahib: the construction of the British body in India, c.1800-1914    Elizabeth M COLLINGHAM    Prof C A Bayley
1997    PhD    London, UC    Of moths and candle flames: the aesthetics of fertility and childbearing in the Northern areas of Pakistan    Teresa Mary Helen COLLINS    Dr N Redclift; Dr Murray Last
1997    PhD    London, UC    Environmental aspects of industrial location policy in India    Mala DAMODARAN
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Pembroke    A comparative analysis of sharecropping and mudaraba business in Pakistan: a study of PLS in the context of the new theory of the firm    M H A DAR    Dr A M M McFarquhar
1997    PhD    Open    Multiple realities, multiple meanings: a reception analysis of television and nationhood in India    S DAS
1997    PhD    Portsmouth    Control of mycotoxins in major food commodities in Bangladesh    M DAWLATANA
1997    PhD    Liverpool    Evidence based decision making and managerial chaos in population displacement emergencies: a case study of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, 1992-93    P M DISKETT
1997    PhD    Hull    An investigation into effective management structure for tuna resources in the West Indian Ocean    EDALY
1997    PhD    London, External    Parasitical clinical and sero-epidemiological studies of visceral leishmaniasis in Bangladesh    Md A EL-MASUM
1997    PhD    Manchester    Production, consumption and labour supply linkages of farm households in the rice-wheat zone of Punjab, Pakistan    U FAROOQ
1997    PhD    Aberdeen    An economic analysis of factors affecting the adoption of coconut-based intercropping systems in Sri Lanka    M T N FERNANDO
1997    PhD    Edinburgh    Varieties of pilgrimage experience: religious journeying in central Kerala    Alexander David Hanson GATH
1997    PhD    Warwick    Against purity, identity, Western feminism and Indian complications    I GEDALOF
1997    PhD    Oxford Brookes    Spatial setting for household income generation: The case of intermediate sized cities, Bangladesh    Shayer GHAFUR
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    Literature, language and print in Bengal, c.1780-1900    Anindita GHOSH    Dr R O’Hanlon
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Conservation ecology of primates and human impact in North East India    A K GUPTA    Dr D J Chivers
1997    DPhil    Oxford, New College    The monetary system of Mughal India    Syed N HAIDER    Dr D A Washbrook
1997    PhD    London    Diet, exercise and CHD risk: a comparison of children in the UK and Pakistan    Rubina HAKEEM
1997    PhD    London, LSE    India’s information technology industry: adapting to globalisation and policy change in the 1990s    Gopalakrishnan HARINDRANATH
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    State and local power relations in the towns of Gujerat, Surat and Cambray, c.1572-1740    F HASAN    Dr G Johnson
1997    PhD    Exeter    The organisation, development and management of the population training programmes: a case study in Bangladesh    Md Akhter HOSSAIN    Dr A Ankomah;  C Allison
1997    PhD    Reading    Involving women in the process of rural development: a project case study from Balochistan, Pakistan    U HUBNERR
1997    MPhil    London, Goldsmith’s    Significant other: Anglo Indian female authors, 1880-1914    Karyn Marie HUENEMANN    Dr B Moore-Gilbert
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    Public housing in Hong Kong    E C M HUI    Dr B J Pearce
1997    PhD    East London    Law as a site of resistance: recourse to the law by “garments women” in Bangladesh    Farmin ISLAM    Dr Hilary Lim; Prof J Cooper
1997    PhD    Middlesex    The impact of flooding and methods of assessment in urban areas of Bangladesh    K N ISLAM
1997    DPhil    Sussex    Democratic adjustment: explaining the political sustainability of economic reform in India     Robert S JENKINS    Prof J Manor
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Labour and nationalism in Sholapur: conflict, confrontation and control in a Deccan city, Western India, 1918-39    M N KAMAT    Dr R S Chandavakar
1997    PhD    London, LSE    Political communication in India    Kavita KARAN    Prof T J Nossiter
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    The social history of the Rajput clans in colonial North India circa 1800-1900    Malavika KASTURI    Prof C A Bayley
1997    PhD    Aberdeen    Sustainability of small-holder sugar cane based production systems in Sri Lanka    Adhikari P KEERTHIPALA
1997    PhD    Manchester    The market for local capital for small firms in Bangladesh: loan evaluation, monitoring and contracting practices    Mohammed Hassanul Abedin KHAN    P Taylor
1997    PhD    Reading    Improving precision of agricultural field experiments in Pakistan    M I KHAN
1997    PhD    London, Wye    The mango production and marketing system in Sindh Pakistan: constraints and opprtunities    A M KHUSHK
1997    PhD    Aberdeen    Factors influencing adoption of farm level tree planting in social forestry in Orissa, India    A K MAHAPATRA
1997    PhD    Bradford    The quality of higher education in Pakistan: an exploration into the quality of curriculum taught in the universities    M J MALIK
1997    PhD    Surrey    Management consultancies in developing countries: strategies for a competetive era – the case of Pakistan    S H MALLICK
1997    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Non-seccessionist regionalism in India: the demand for a separate state of Uttarakhand    E E MAWDSLEY    Dr S E Corbridge
1997    PhD    Cambridge    Sadhana and salvation: soteriology in Ramanuja and John Wesley    P R MEADOWS
1997    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    The unit head nurse in Pakistani hospitals: current and desired levels of practice    G P MILLER
1997    PhD    Edinburgh    The lunatic asylum in British India, 1857-1880: colonialism, medicine and power    James Henry MILLS    Dr C N Bates; Dr P J Bailey
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The making of a cultural identity: language, literature and gender in Orissa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries    Pragati MOHAPATRA    Dr P G Robb
1997    PhD    Leicester    Conceptualising post-colonial policing: an analysis and application of policing public order    S C MUKHOPADHYAY
1997    DPhil    Sussex    Small firm industrial districts in Pakistan    Khalid M NADVI    Dr H Schmitz
1997    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    British and American Army counterinsurgency learning during the Malaysian emergency and the Vietnam War    J A M NAGL
1997    PhD    London, External    Constitutional breakdown and the judiciary in Pakistan    M F NASEEM
1997    PhD    Sheffield    The external environment of housing in the third world: sustainability and user satisfaction in planned and unplanned low-income housing in Lahore, Pakistan    N NAZ
1997    PhD    London, UC    Dynamics of urban spatial and formal changes of old Dhaka: a developmental influence on a historical city of the Third World    Farida NILUFAR    Alan Penn
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The Hindi public sphere, 1920-1940    Francesca ORSINI    Dr A S Kalsi
1997    PhD    London, InstChild Health    Iodine deficiency in the Northern Pujab of Pakistan    M POULTON
1997    PhD    REading    Studies on weed management during early establishment of tea in low-country of Sri Lanka    K G PREMATILAKA
1997    PhD    Reading    The effect of defoliation of vetch, barley and their mixtures on forage yield, quality and residual effects on succeeding crops in the rainfed areas of Pakistan    I A QAMAR
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Lucy     Shifting culture in the global terrain: cultural identity constructions amongst British Hindu Punjabis    D S RAJ    Dr S N Bensen
1997    PhD    Manchester    The rural poor and technological change: an enquiry into agricultural extention in Sri Lanka    T T RANASINGHE    Dr J Mullen
1997    PhD    Bradford    Environmental education and agricultural education in Pakistan    G RASUL
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    Social history of North Bengal, c.1870-1949    Rubhajyoti RAY    Dr P G Robb
1997    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    Indian elites, urban space and the restructuring of Ahmedabad city, 1890-1947    Siddhartha RAYCHAUDHURI    Prof C A Bayly
1997    PhD    City    Military rule and the media: a study of Bangladesh     REZWAN-UL-ALAM
1997    PhD    London, LSE    The Kalbelias of Rajasthan: Jogi Nath snake charmers, an ethnography    Miriam ROBERTSON    Dr J Parry; Dr J Woodburn
1997    MPhil    Open    The role of caste in prostitution: culture and violence in the life histories of prostitutes in India    M R ROZARIO
1997    PhD    Hull    A socio-economic assessment of collective choices in the coastal trawl fishery of Malaysia    K H SALIM
1997    PhD    London, LSHTM    Contraception following birth in Bangladesh    S M SALWAY    Prof J Cleland
1997    PhD    Nottingham    People’s participation in community development and community work activities: a case study in a planned village settlement in Malaysia    Asnarulkhadi Abu SAMAH
1997    PhD    Bristol    A basket of resources: women’s resistence to domestic violence in Calcutta    P SEN
1997    MPhil    Reading    Evaluation of adoption levels of innovations in coffee in relation to technology transfer process in the Central Province of Sri Lanka    M A P K SENEVIRATNE
1997    PhD    Kent    Choice and collection of agricultural survey data in Punjab and its use in planning improved food supply    Javid SHABBIR    Mr G M Clarke
1997    DPhil    Sussex    Participatory village resource management: case study of Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), India    Parmesh SHAH    Dr M T Howes
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The formation of the Indo-European telegraph line: Britain, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, 1855-1865    Sulieman SHAHVAR    R M Burrell
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Emmanuel    The development of an Indian nuclear doctrine since 1980    W P S SIDHU    Dr I Clark
1997    PhD    Leeds    Gender and nation in selected contemporary writing from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan    N M S SILVA
1997    PhD    York    Changing attitudes to design with nature: the urban Indian context    P SINGH
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Emmanuel    Pollution and environmental policy in the Ganga Basin: a case study of heavy metal pollution by tanneries near Kanpur, India    S SINHA    Dr K S Richards
1997    PhD    East Anglia    Framing the nation: languages of “modernity” in India    Ajanta SIRCAR
1997    PhD    London, UC    Islamic anthropology and religious practice among Muslims in a southern Sri Lankan town    Llyn Frances SMITH    Prof B Kapferer
1997    PhD    Sussex    The formal and informal sector of solid waste management in Hyderabad, India    Marielle SNEL    Dr T Binns
1997    PhD    London, UC    Urban development and the information technology industry: a study of Bangalore, India    Sampath SRINIVAS    Ms Julie Davila
1997    PhD    London    Land policies in Delhi: their contribution to unauthorised land development    K SRIRANGAN
1997    PhD    Southampton    Coronary heart disease, diabetes, serum lipid concentrations and lung function in relation to fetal growth in South India    C E STEIN
1997    PhD    Open    The involvement of the Church of Pakistan in development    P SULTAN
1997    PhD    Salford    Off-farm activities in India: a case stury of rural househlds in Rurka Kalan Development Block, Punjab, c. 1961-1993    S S SUPRI
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Robinson    Gandhara art in the Swat Valley, Pakistan: a study based on the Peshawar University collection    M F SWATI    Dr J R Knox
1997    PhD    Reading    The compound verb in Assamese    J TAMULI
1997    MPhil    Newcastle    Socio-economic problems of second genertion settelrs in Mahaweli irigation settlement in Sri Lanka    T M P B TENNAKOON
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The political economy of Burma    TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN    Prof R Taylor
1997    PhD    Warwick    Reconstructing the history of women’s participation in the nationalist movement in India, 1905-1945: a study of women activitists inUttar Prqdesh    Suruchi THAPAR-BJORKERT    Dr C Wolkowitz; Ms Joanna Liddle
1997    PhD    London, LSE    Spiritual communities in India    Dimitrios THEODOSSOPOULOS    Dr P Loizos
1997    DPhil    Oxford, New    Rajput painting in Mewar    A S TOPSFIELD
1997    PhD    Manchester    The role of management control systems in privatisation: a labour process analysis of a Bangladeshi case study    S N UDDIN
1997    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Distribution improving development policies for Bangladesh: applying the equilibrium framework    W J A VAN DER GEEST    Prof D M G Newbery
1997    MPhil    City    Women, gender and news values: a case study of Bangladesh    F R VEENA
1997    PhD    Kingston    Miocene-aged extension within the main mantle thrust zone, Pakistan Himalaya    K J VINCE    Dr P Treloar; Dr J Grocott
1997    PhD    London, SOAS    The development of Siraiki language in Pakistan    M A WAGHA
1997    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    Worth its weight: gold, women and value in North West India    H WARD    Dr C Humphrey
1997    PhD    London, Birkbeck    Colonialism and culture in nineteenth century British India    Caroline L WEAVER
1997    PhD    Cambridge    Hedgerow intercropping for soil improvement in Sri Lanka    S M WEERASINGHE
1997    PhD    London, LSHTM    Control of anopheline vectors in a gem mining area in Sri Lanka    A M G M YAPABANDARA
1998    PhD    Liverpool    Malaria and malarial control in Jeli Peninsular Malaysia    M R ABDULLAH
1998    PhD    Reading    The management practices and organisational culture of large Malaysian construction contractors    R ABU BAKER
1998    MPhil    Aberdeen    The determination of sheep and goat prices in the markets of Balochistan – Pakistan    M AFZAL
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Litigating in the name of the people: stresses and strains of the development of public interest litigation in Bangladesh    Naim AHMED
1998    PhD    London, UC    An approach for the prevention of thalassaemia in Pakistan    S AHMED
1998    PhD    Leeds    Foreign direct investment in Pakistan    M AKHTAR    Hugo Radice
1998    PhD    Durham    Water rationality: mediating the Indus Waters Treaty    U Z ALAM    Dr J D Rigg
1998    PhD    Bath    Fish consumption behaviour in Bangladesh    Zulfiqar ALI    Prof Chris Heady; Dr J A McGregor
1998    DPhil    Oxford    Operationalizing Amartya Sen’s capability approach to human development: a framework for identifying valuable capabilities    Sabina ALKIRE
1998    PhD    Reading    The impact of Anand Pattern Cooperative Societies on the status of women in dairying households in Kerala, India    S S ANIL
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    The politics of time: “primitives” and the writing of history in colonial Bengal    Prathama BANERJEE    Prof D J Arnold
1998    PhD    Bristol    Scripture as empowerment for liberation and justice: the experience of Christian and Muslim women in Bangaldesh    Mukti BARTON    Prof U King
1998    PhD    Nottingham    The protection of human rights in Islamic Republic of Pakistan with special reference to Islamic Shari’ah under 1973 Constitution    A H BOKHARI
1998    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    A comparison of vocational schools and industrial training institutes in Malaysia    A BRAHIM
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    The Nayak temple complex: architecture and ritual in southern Tamilnadu, 1550-1700    Crispin Peter C BRANFOOT    Dr G Tillotson
1998    PhD    Bristol    Studies in early Indian Madhyamaka epistemology    David F BURTON    Dr P Williams; Dr R Gethin
1998    PhD    Cambridge    Agency, animacy and personification in “A passage to India”    R BUZZA
1998    MPhil    Birmingham    Identifying the requirements of a parent education programme for the primary prevention of child physical abuse in the Indian State of Maharashtra    M CAESAR
1998    PhD    Birmingham    Recent structural reforms in India: the role of the government    S CHATTERJEE
1998    PhD    Manchester    Gender implications of industrial reforms and adjustment in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh    Salma  CHAUDHURI ZOHIR    Ms D Elson
1998    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Order and diversity: representing and assisting organisational learning in non government aid organisations [Bangladesh]    Richard J DAVIES    Prof A Rew
1998    PhD    Kent    Law, nation and cosmology in Sri Lanka: deconstruction and the failure of closure    B R DE SILVE WIJEYERATNE
1998    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Muslim women in colonial North India, c.1920-1947: politics, law and community identity    Karin A DEUTSCH    Dr R O’Hanlon
1998    PhD    Bath    Factors influencing the growth of sustainable people’s organisations at grassroots level: the case of Caritas DEEDS and Sangathan in Bangladesh    Benedict D’ROZARIO
1998    PhD    Aberdeen    South Asia: a case study of a subordinate internaltional system approach with a speicla reference fo India’s security policy during the Cold War    B DUSADEEISARIYAWONG
1998    PhD    London    Childhood cataract in South India: aetiology, management and outcome    M B ECKSTEIN
1998    PhD    Leeds    Neighbourhood perceptiopns of health and the value placed on health care deliverers in the slums of Mumbai    Nick EMMEL    Dr Ray Bush; J Soussan
1998    PhD    Strathclyde    Patrick Geddes, education and society in colonial India    Michael EYRE    Prof B R Tomlinson
1998    PhD    London, LSE    Migrants to citizens: changing orientations among Bangladeshis of Tower Hamlets, London    K S GAVRON
1998    PhD    Bradford    Evaluating the performance of public infrastructure: the case of electric power and telecommications in Pakistan    A G GHAFOOR
1998    PhD    Bradford    Budget deficits and the economy: the macro-economic effects of budget deficits in Sri Lanka, 1978-1996    Nandana Wijesiri GOONEWARDENA    Prof C Kirkpatrick; Mr Roland Clarke
1998    MPhil    Bradford    An assessment of the survival of dairy residues associated with archaeological and ethnographic ceramics: GC and GC/MS analysis of lipid residues extracted from archaeological (Bronze Age Harappa)and ethnographic (modern Pakistan and India)ceramic vessels    S M GRAYSON
1998    PhD    Southampton    Household structure, health and mortality in three Indian states    Paula L GRIFFITHS    Dr P Hinde
1998    PhD    London, Goldsmiths    Local politics in the Suru Valley of northern India    Nicola GRIST    Dr Sophie Day
1998    PhD    London, LSHTM    The impact of peer counsellers on breast feeding practices in Dhaka, Bangladesh    Rukhsana HAIDER

1998    PhD    Oxford Brookes    Spatial setting of manufacturing activities in the metropolitan cities of developing countries: the example of Dhaka, Bangladesh    Mahmudul HASAN
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Jesus    The Hindu Kush of Pakistan: mountain range evolution from an active margin to continent-continent collision    P R HILDEBRAND    Prof J F Dewe; Dr M P Searle
1998    PhD    London, Institute of Child Health    Iodine nutrition, cognition and school achievement of Bangladeshi schoolchildren    S N HUDA
1998    PhD    Open    Education as a missionary tool: a study in Christian missionary education by English Protestant missionaries in India with special reference to cultural change    J C INGLEBY
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Urban planning in new Bombay: physical and socio-economic growth and development of a counter-magnet in India    Alain JAQUEMIN
1998    PhD    Open    A critical and comparative study of the relationship between missionary strategy, Dalit consciousness and socio-economic transformation in the missionary work by SPG among the Nadar and Paraiya communities of Tirunelveli District between 1830 and 1930    S JAYAKUMAR
1998    PhD    Birmingham    Portfolio behaviour ofIslamic banks: case studies for Pakistan, 1974-1994, and Iran, 1984-1994    K A A KAGIGI
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Performative politics: artworks, festival praxis and nationalism with reference to Ganipatil Utsav in western India    Raminder Kaur KAHLON    Dr C Pinney
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    The Vishnu Hindu Parishad in the rise of Hindu militancy in India    Manjari KATJA    Dr Taylor
1998    PhD    Bradford    Foreign aid as a determinant of health expenditure, life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate in Pakistan, 1971-1990    S G H KAZMI
1998    PhD    Reading    Farmers’ objectives and the choice of new crops in the irrigated farming systems of Pakistan’s Punjab    M A KHAN
1998    PhD    Reading    Improving the potential for adoption of agricultural technology through enhanced use of the mass media and the religious community in disadvantaged environments in Pakistan    N KHAN
1998    MPhil    Salford    Pakistan’s and international textile and clothing trade regime    S M KHAN
1998    MPhil    Manchester    Women’s access to credit and gender relations in Bangladesh    Mubina KHONDKAR    Dr D Hulme; Dr U Kothari
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Politics of mass literacy in India; a case study of two North Indian villaages under the “Total Literacy” campaign (198-1995)    Ajay KUMAR    Dr S Kaviraj
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Contesting seclusion: the political emergence of Muslim women in Bhopal, 1901-1930    Siobhan LAMBERT-HURLEY    Dr A A Powell
1998    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    Prosodic prominence in Singapore English    E L LOW    Dr F J D Nolan
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Pativratas and Kupattis: gender, caste and identity in Punjab, 1870-1920    Anshu MALHOTRA    Dr A A Powell
1998    PhD    Warwick    Modelling macroeconomic adjustment with growth in developing economies: the case of India    Sushanta Kumar MALLICK
1998    PhD    London, UC    Religion, ritual and the pantheon amongst the Sinhalese Buddhist traders of Kandy City, Sri Lanka    Desmond MALLIKARACHCHI    Prof Bruce Kapferer; Dr Danny Miller
1998    DPhil    Sussex    Rapid credit deepening and the joint liability of credit contract: a study of Grameen Bank borrowers in Madhupur    Imran MATIN
1998    PhD    Leeds    Spatial and temporal change in the caste system: the Punjab to Bradford    D J MEDWAY
1998    DPhil    Sussex    Contexts of scarcity: the political economy of water in Kutch, India    Lyla MEHTA    Dr M Greeley
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Popular princes: kingship and social change in Travancore and Cochin, 1870-1930    Vikram MENON    Prof J M Brown; Dr D A Washbrook
1998    PhD    Manchester    Perception of adolescent problems by form four malay students in Sarawak, Malaysia    Z MERAWI
1998    DPhil    Sussex    The peculiar mission of Christian womanhood: the selection and preparation of women missionaries of the Church of England Zenana Missionary Society, 1880-1920    Jennifer MORAWIECKI    C A Dyhouse; Prof P M Thane
1998    PhD    Dundee    Approaches to the integrated management of potato cyst nematode in Pakistan    A MUNIR
1998    PhD    Wales    A study of the relation between Christianity and Khasi-Jaintia culture, 1899-1969, with particular reference to the theology and practice of the Khasi-Jaintia Presbyterian Church    L MYLLIEMNGAP
1998    PhD    London, Wye    The pineapple industry in Sri Lanka: constraints and opportunities for its future development    Arumugam NAGENDRAM
1998    PhD    Southampton    Study of rice blast fungus Magnaporthe grisea (Herbert)of Bangladesh    N S NAHAR
1998    PhD    London, LSHTM    A study of policy process and implementation of the national tuberculosis programme India    Thelma NARAYAN
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    English in the colonial university and the politics of language: the emergence of a public sphere in western India, 1830-1880    Veena NAREGAL    Dr S Kaviraj
1998    PhD    Southampton    Women in Bangladesh: a study of the effects of garment factory work on control over income and autonomy    M H NEWBY
1998    MPhil    Oxford, Hertford    Homeward bound ? the influence of the national norm on voluntary repatriation on the construction of Indian refugee policy with reference to the Bangladeshi Jumma refugees and the Sri Lanka Tamil refugees    Pia A OBEROI
1998    PhD    Southampton    Theorising nuclear weapons proliferation: understanding the nuclear policies of India, South Africa, North Korea and Ukraine    T OGILVIE-WHITE
1998    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    Credit and women’s relative well-being: a case study of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh    L N K OSMANI
1998    PhD    Warwick    Pakistani children in Oslo: Islamic nurture in a secular context    Sissel OSTBERG

1998    PhD    London, UC    Control of childhood epilepsy in rural India    D K PAL
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    The politics of development and identity in the Jharkhand Region of Bihar (India), 1951-1991    Amit PRAKASH
1998    PhD    Bristol    The Assam Movement and the construction of Assamese identity    G PRICE
1998    PhD    Lancaster    Social access to housing: a study of low-income settlements around the walled city of Amritsar, Punjab, India    N K PUREWAL
1998    PhD    Aberdeen    An analysis of beef and bovine marketing systems in Pothwar Plateau of Punjab, Pakistan    A H QURESHI
1998    PhD    Aberdeen    An analysis of beef and bovine marketing systems in Pothwar Plateau of Punjab, Pakistan    A H QURISHI
1998    PhD    Reading    The role of the migrant moneylenders in North East India: the Kabuliwallahs of Assam    S RAFIQUE
1998    MPhil    Newcastle    Integrated crop growth modelling system for Barind in Bangladesh    M S RAHMAN
1998    PhD    Kent    Socio legal status of Bengali women in Bangladesh: implications for development    S RAHMAN
1998    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Risk, store of wealth and land use choice: a socio-economic analysis of farmer adoption of woodlots in Karnataka, India    D RAVINDRAN
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    Idealizing motherhood: the brahmanical discourse on women in ancient India (c500 BCE-300CE)    Ujjayini RAY    Dr I J Leslie
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    British women writers on India between the mid-eighteenth century and 1857    Rosemary A RAZA    Prof J M Brown; Mr J M Prest
1998    PhD    London, LSE    Organisational identification of managers in multinational corporations: a quantitative case study in India and Pakistan    C E W READE
1998    PhD    London, RHBNC    Intense weathering regimes of Deccan basalts    Jennifer Lesley REEVES    Dr J N Walsh
1998    PhD    Leeds    Sedimentology and dynamics of mega-dunes, Jamuna River, Bangladesh    Julie Elizabeth RODEN    Prof P Ashworth
1998    PhD    Newcastle    Owner-occupiers’ transformation of public low-cost housing in Peninsular Malaysia    Azizah SALIM    Dr A G Tipple
1998    PhD    Strathclyde    A study in inter-sectoral relations of linkages, trade and technology: the case of Bangladesh (an application of input-output analysis)    Mohammed SALIMULLAH    Prof I McNicoll
1998    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Contraband trade between Sri Lanka and India    M SARVATHAN    Mr J Whetton
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    The transitional state: Congress and government in Uttar Pradesh, India, 1947-1955    Suhit Kumar SEN    Dr P G Robb
1998    PhD    Manchester    Gender implications of economic reforms in the education sector in India-care of Haryana abd Madhya Pradesh    Manju SENAPATY    Ms D Elson
1998    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    The creation of religious identities in the Punjab, c,1850-1920    Anil SETHI    Prof C A Bayly
1998    PhD    Reading    Relative efficiency of crop production n the cotton-wheat cropping system of Pakistan’s Punjab    M SHAFIQ
1998    PhD    Nottingham    Educational management: an exploratory study of management roles and possibilities of management development at college level in AJK, Pakistan    Saeeda Jahan Ara SHAH    Dr M Parker-Jenkins; Dr M Griffiths
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Worcester    Muslim politics in the North West Frontier Province, 1937-1947    Sayed W A SHAH    Prof J M Brown
1998    PhD    Reading    Economic and non-economic factors that influence the adoption of no-tillage technologies at farm level in rice-wheat and cotton-wheat areas of Pakistana’s Punjab    A D SHEIKH
1998    PhD    Bradford    Project performance and the impact of official development assistance: aid to agricultural development in Pakistan    M K SHEIKH
1998    MLitt    Aberdeen    Selective evaluation of the cycle of women’s status through religious and social practices with special reference to Bengal    S K SIRKAR
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Transplanting liberal education: higher education in 19th century Bombay Presidency, India    Anne H E SLIWKA    Prof J M Brown
1998    MPhil    Newcastle    The  Permatent emergency shelter cum roofing unit for Bangladesh    David SORRILL    Dr A G Tipple
1998    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    Colonialism and linguistic knowledge: John Gilchrist and the representation of Urdu in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries    R D STEADMAN-JONES    Dr V A Law
1998    PhD    London, LSHTM    Child work and school attendance in urban India    H TAYLOR    Prof I Timaeus; N Crook (SOAS)
1998    PhD    Edinburgh    Building Christianity on Indian foundations: the theological legacy of Brahmabandav Upadhyay (1861-1907)    Timothy Craig TENNENT
1998    PhD    Leeds    Homelands and the representation of cultural and political identity in selected South Asian texts, 1857 to the present    g f h TICKELL
1998    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Between two civilisations: history and self representation of Bangladeshi Buddhism    Paola G TINTI    Prof R F Gombrich
1998    PhD    Kent    Readings in the works of Michael Ondaatje (1963-1982)    Monica TURCI    Prof C L Innes
1998    PhD    Queens, Belfast    Formal and de facto states of emergency: the Indian experience, 1947-1997    K S VENKATESWARAN
1998    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Studies on the biology and control of Tropilaelaps clareae: Asian parasitic brood mite in Apis mellifera colonies in Islamabad, Pakistan    Camphour E S WAGHCHOURE
1998    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Studies on the biology and control or Tropilaelaps clareae: Asian parasitic brood mites in Apis mellifera colonies in Islamabad, Pakistan    Elizabeth S WAGHCHOURE-CAMPHOR
1998    PhD    London, SOAS    India’s small scale industry policy: an evaluation and a case study    Trevor L WILLIAMS
1998    PhD    Aberdeen    Studies on weed populations in sugar cane in Sri Lanka    W R G WITHARAMA
1998    PhD    Strathclyde    Industrialization and economic growth: a case study of Bangladesh    A K M ZASHEEM UDDIN AHMED    Dr M M Huq
1998    PhD    Bristol    Sangathan: the pursuit of a Hindu ideal in colonial India: the idea of organisation in the emergence of Hindu nationalism, 1870-1930    John ZAVOS    Prof U King
1998    PhD    Ulster    Groundwater pollution and its environmental impact in Karachi Region (Pakistan)    A ZUBAIR
1999    PhD    London. LSE    Banking and debt recovery: a comparative study of the law and practice in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia    Sonil G ABEYRATNE
1999    PhD    Oxford Brookes    A micro-level view of low-income rural housing in Bangaldesh    K I AHMED
1999    PhD    Cambridge    A political economy of industrial policy and development: a comparative study of Pakistan and Malaysia    A AKHLAQUE    Industrial productivity
1999    MPhil    Newcastle    An appraisal of processes of soil degradation in the Barind Tract, Bangladesh    S M M ALAM
1999    PhD    Leeds    Urban women in households and in the labour market under structural adjustment policy and programmes: a case study of Pakistani working women    K ALI
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Magdalen    Operationalising Amartya Sen’s capability approach: a framework for identifying valuable capabilities    S M ALKIRE    Prof F J Stewart; Prof J M Finnis
1999    PhD    Manchester    Economic reform in India since 1991 with particular reference to direct foreign investment and privatisation    Thanhkom ARUN    Prof F Nixson
1999    PhD    Hull    Opium and heroin production in Pakistan    A Z ASAD
1999    DPhil    York    Biodiversity and community ecology of mangrove plants, molluscs and crustaceans in two mangrove forests in Peninsular Malaysia in relation to local management practices    E C ASHTON
1999    PhD    Southampton    A multilevel model of the impact of health services on child mortality in Bangladesh    Michael Dennis ASHTON    Dr J McDdonald
1999    PhD    Southampton    Genetic diversity of jackfruit in Bangladesh and development of propagation methods    A K AZAD
1999    PhD    London, King’s    Nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pakistan conflict    Sanjay BADRI-MAHARAJ
1999    PhD    Leicester    The growth of farm firms through production,investment and capital formation in the rice-wheat zone of the Punjab Province of Pakistan    K A BAJWA
1999    PhD    Aberdeen    An economic analysis of farm household pluriactivity in Sri Lanka    G BALASURIYA
1999    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    This work on Oriya literature and the Jagannath cult, 1866-1936: quest for identity    Subhakanta BEHERA    Dr F A Nizami
1999    PhD    London, UC    Structure of the DP in Bangla    Tanmoy BHATTACHARYA
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The politics of religious identity in South Asia in the late nineteenth century     Torkel BREKKE    Prof R F Gombrich
1999    MSc    Stirling    Investigations to the biology and ecology of an unidentified isopod affecting the CARE CAGES aquaculture programme, Bangladesh    P BULCOCK
1999    DPhil    Sussex    The global and the local in the post-colonial: popular music in Calcutta (1992-1997)    R CHAKRAVARTY
1999    PhD    London, SOAS    Change and continuity in Naqshbandi Sufism: Mujaddidi branch and its Hindu environment    T W P DAHNHARDT    Prof C Shackle
1999    PhD    Ulster    Traveller acts: a critical ethngraphy of backpacker India    K J DAVIDSON
1999    PhD    London , LSE    Tamil warps and wefts: an anthropological study of urban weavers in South India    Geert Raymond DE NEVE    Prof C Fuller; Prof J Parry
1999    PhD    London, Wye    Amelioration of the physical conditions of sandy soils with organic amendments under tropical conditions    S H S A DE SILVA
1999    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    Youth, gender and community change: a case study of Bangladeshi students in an inner city    Eva DEBNATH    Dr M M Arnot
1999    PhD    Bath    One foot in each boat: the macro politics and micro sociology of NGOs in Bangladesh    Joseph DEVINE    Dr G D Wood; Dr A McGregor
1999    PhD    London, RHUL    The image of the prophet in Bengali Muslim piety, 1850-1950    Amit DEY    Prof F C R Robinson
1999    PhD    London, RHBNC    Images of the Prophet in Bengali Muslim piety, 1850-1950    Amit DEY    Prof F R C Robinson
1999    PhD    London, LSE    Women and gold: gender and urbanisation in comtemporary Bengal    Fentje Henrike DONNER    Dr J F Parry; Dr C Fuller
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    A study of the origin, evolution and role in society of a group of chiselled steel Hindu arms and armour from Southern India, c.1400-1800 A D    Robert F W ELGOOD    Dr Schuyler Jones

1999    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Caste, ethnicity and nation in the politics of the Muslims of Tamil Nadu, 1930-1967    S M A K FAKHRI    Dr R S Chandravarkar
1999    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    The ecology and behaviour of the pig-tailed macaque (Macaca Nemestrina Leonina)in Bangladesh    M M FEEROZ
1999    PhD    Wales    At the feet of the goddess: a comparative study of local goddess worship in Khurdapur, a village settlement in Orisssa and Cholavandan, a small town in Tamil Nadu    L F FOULSTON
1999    PhD    Leeds    Socio-economic changes in the peri-urban villages in Penang, Malaysia    Suriati GHAZALI    Dr D Preston
1999    PhD    London, SOAS    The dynamics of scientific culture under a colonial state: Western India, 1823-1880    Vaswati Bidhan Chandra GHOSH    Prof P G Robb
1999    PhD    Southampton    A passage from India: British women travelling home, 1915-1947    Georgina GOWANS
1999    PhD    London, External    Solid waste management: a case study of Delhi    V I GROVER
1999    PhD    Aberdeen    A study of factors influencing participation in joint forest management in the northwest Himalayas, India    H K GUPTA
1999    PhD     Southampton    British relations with the Marathas under the Wellesley regime     William A C HALLIWELL    Dr C M Woolgar
1999    PhD    Leeds    A corpus-based study of apposition in written Malay    H A HAROON
1999    PhD    London, UC    The vulnerability of the Dupi Tila Aquifer, Daka, Bangladesh    Muhammed Kamrul HASAN    Dr W G Burgess; Dr J Dottridge
1999    PhD    London, LSHTM    The prevalence of reproductive tract infections in rural Bangladesh    Sarah Jane HAWKES
1999    PhD    Warwick    The colonial city and the challenge of modernity: urban hegemonies and civic contestations in Bombay City, 1905-1925    H HAZAREESINGH
1999    PhD    Warwick    Gandhi and the Muslim question    Sandip HAZARIESINGH    Dr D A Washbrook
1999    PhD    London    Malaria in Afghan refugee communities in North-Western Pakistan: appropriate strategies for vector control and personal protection    S E HEWITT
1999    PhD    London, SOAS    Kings, things and courtly ideal in pre-colonial south India, 1500-1800    Jennifer Anne HOWES    Dr Giles Tillitson
1999    PhD    Cambridge, Clare    The Gujerati literati and the construction of a regional identity in the late 19th century    Riho ISAKA    Dr R S Chandavarkar
1999    DPhil    Sussex    The Grameen Bank: rhetoric and reality    Sanae ITO    Dr M T Greeley
1999    PhD    Stirling    Gender and management: factors affecting career advancement of women in the federal civil service of Pakistan    N JABEEN
1999    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Hindu identity, nationalism and globalization    S R JACOBS
1999    PhD    Reading    Residual effect of phosphate fertiliser measured using the Olsen method in Pakistani soils    Shahid JAVID
1999    PhD    Edinburgh    When horizons darken: the process and experience of religious conversion among Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in London    A W JEBANESAN
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Press and Empire: the London press, government news management and India, c.1900-1922    Chandrika KAUL    Dr J G Darwin
1999    PhD    Edinburgh    Informal Islamic leadership in a Bangladeshi village    Jeffrey William John KEMP
1999    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    The economics of milk production and marketing in the development of Pakistan with special reference to Peshawar District    M KHAN
1999    PhD    Essex    Narratives of rise and fall: family, memory and mobility in Jaipur City    Ajay K KHANDELWAL    Prof P Thompson
1999    PhD    Durham    The provision of infrastructure services in Rohtak and Bhiwani Districts, Haryana, India, 1981-1998: a geographical analysis    N KUMAR
1999    PhD    Edinburgh    From people’s theatre to people’s Eucharist: resources from popular theatre for Eucharist reform in the Church of South India, Kerala State.    George KURUVILLA
1999    PhD    Nottingham    Spectrohistory: new historicism and beyond in Salman Rushdie’s novels    C-H LAI
1999    PhD    London, SOAS    Institutional and social change among the Muslims of Malabar, with special refernce to Calicut, 1870-1947    Lakshminarayayanapuram R S LAKSHMI    Dr Avril A Powell
1999    PhD    London, LSE    India’s relationship with the non-resident Indians, 1947-1996: a missed opportunity ?    Marie-Carine LALL
1999    PhD    London, SOAS    The Islamic marble carving and architecture of Cambay in Gujerat between 1200 and 1350: a collection of merits from difference sources    E A LAMBOURN
1999    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Science and related consciousness: a study of the response to modern science in colonial Bengal. c 1870-1930    John Bosco LOURDUSAMY    Dr D A Washbrook
1999    PhD    Manchester    Runoff modelling from large glacierised basins in the Karakoram Himalayas using remote sensing of the transient snowline    A LOWE
1999    MPhil    Edinburgh    The influence of light availability on attack by the mahogany shoot-borer (Hypsipyla rubusta Moore)in Sri Lanka    M R MAHROOF
1999    PhD    Kent    The interpretation of Islam and nationalism by the elite through the English language media in Pakistan    A L MAJOR
1999    PhD    Hull    Ethnicity and politics in the Kashmir Valley    I S MALIK
1999    PhD    London, LSHTM    Undernutrition and impaired functional ability amongst elderly slum dwellers in Mumbai, India    Mary C MANANDHAR
1999    PhD    East Anglia    Cotton leaf curl disease in Pakistan: molecular characterisation, diagnostics and genetically engineered virus resistance    S MANSOOR
1999    PhD    Birmingham    Some historical responses to disability in South Asia and reflections on service provision, with focus on mental retardation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and some consideration of blindness    M MILES
1999    PhD    Kent    Sacred anthropology: a study of nondual conceptions of man in Hinduism and Christianity    J R MILNE
1999    PhD    Hull    Perception of Islam in Indian nationalist thought    A MISRA
1999    PhD    London, Inst Comm    The politics of privatisation in Bangladesh    Mobasser MONEM    Prof J Manor
1999    PhD    Cambridge, King’s    The Kisan world abd human rights: a displaced people of eastern India    Ranjit NAYAK    Dr K J Hart
1999    PhD    Salford    An analysius of information systems development across time and space: the case of outsourcing to Infia    Brian NICHOLSON
1999    MLitt    Oxford, St Anne’s    Shaikh Mohammad Abdulllah and the movement for Muslim female education in North India (1890-1945)    Farah NIZAMI    Prof J M Brown; Prof F Robinson
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Lincoln    India, parliament and the press under George III: a study of British attitudes towards the East India Company amd empire in the later 18th and early 19th centuries    Jeremy R OSBORN    Dr D A Washbrook
1999    DPhil    Oxford, Brasenose    Identity and institutions in ethnic conflict:the Muslims of Sri Lanka    Meghan L O’SULLIVAN    Dr N Gooptu
1999    PhD    Warwick    Labour and land rights of women in rural India with particular reference to Western Orissa    Reena PATEL
1999    PhD    Edinburgh    Legislating forests in colonial India, 1800-1880    Akhileshwar PATHAK
1999    DPhil    York    An environmental Leibenstein framework: population pressure, agricultural land use and and environmental change in Orissa (India)    Lopamudra PATNAIK    Prof C Perrings
1999    PhD    Edinburgh    Social and cultural processes of healing and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka    Abigail PENNY    Dr J Spencer
1999    PhD    City    Development and international business: an application to India    M RAMAN
1999    PhD    Liverpool    Fertility in Kerala: the impacts of social development policies and gender relations    Linda REICHENFELD    Prof R I Woods; Mr W T S Gould
1999    PhD    London     Paleoclimate of South Asia over the last 80 ka: luminescent ages of sediments from former glaciations in Nepal and Pakistan    B W M RICHARDS
1999    PhD    Nottingham    Fiscal response to foreign aid: applications to Pakistan and Costa Rica    S E RODRIGUEZ

2000    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    Religion and the economics of fertility in South India    S IYER
2000    MPhil    London, Inst Ed    Privatisation and equity: the case of Pakistan urban secondary schools    B R JAMIL
2000    PhD     Exeter    The Penjdeh crisis and its impact on the Great Game and the defence of India, 1885-1897     Robert A JOHNSON    Prof J Black
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    The state and the political economy of industrial development in India: the automobile industry circa 1980-1996    Indraneel KARLEKAR    Dr S E Corbridge
2000    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Gender, identity and development among the Wakhi of northern Pakistan    Sabrina KASSAM-JAN    Dr D Parkes; Dr N J Allen
2000    PhD    Exeter    Drug addiction syndrome among university students in Pakistan    W KAUSAR
2000    PhD    Bath    Struggle for survival: networks and relationships in a Bangladesh slum    M Iqbal Alam KHAN    Prof G Wood; Dr J A McGregor
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    An empirical study of human resource management in a developing country – the case of the banking industry of Pakistan    Shaista Ensan KHILJI    Mr C G Gill
2000    PhD    Cambridge. Queens    Human resource management in a developing country: the case of banking industry in Pakistan    S E KHILJI    Mr C G Gill
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    A study of debates on Christian conversion in India, 1947-1999 from the perspective of Christian mission    Sebastian Chang-Hwan KIM    Dr B Stanley
2000    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    The “domestic” world of the Mughals in the reigns of Babar, Humayan and Akbar (1500-1605)    Ruby LAL    Dr D A Washbrook;  Dr J D Gurney
2000    PhD    East Anglia    Perceiving disability and practising community-based rehabilitiation: a critical examination with case studies from south India    R P LANG
2000    PhD    Keele    The internationalisation of Malaysian business and its relevance to Malay entrepreneurs    A J MAHAJAR
2000    PhD    Birmingham    The administration of waqf, pious endowment in Islam: a critical study of the State Islamic Religious Councils as the sole trustees of awqaf assets and the implementation of istibdal in Malaysia with special reference to the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur    S M MAHAMOOD
2000    PhD    Strathclyde    Price competetitiveness and performance of manufactured exports: the case of Pakistan    Seema K MAKHDOOMI    Dr M Huq; Prof J Love
2000    MPhil    Nottingham    Levels of flat ownership by middle-income households in Dhaka, Bangladesh    Nasima MATIN    Mr S Jalloh; Prof J C Moughtin
2000    MPhil    London, LSE    European images of India before the rise of orientalism in the late eighteenth century    Kyoko MATSUKAWA    Dr G Wilson
2000    PhD    East London    Thermal comfort in havelis of Jaisalmer    Jane MATTHEWS
2000    DPhil    Sussex    Distress diversification or growth linkages ? Explaining rural non-farm employment variations in Andhra Pradesh, India    Prasado R MECHARIA    D M Hunt
2000    PhD    Bradford    Social policy in Malaysia: a study of social support for the elderly in a rural area    N MOHAMED
2000    PhD    Oxford Brookes    Seismic interpretation and sequence stratigraphy of the offshore Indus basin of Pakistan    S MOHAMMAD
2000    PhD    London    Nationalism, literature and ideology in colonial India and occupied Egypt    A A  MONDAL
2000    MPhil    Manchester    Burma and British Cold War policy, 1946-1951    Benjamin John MORRIS    Dr P C Lowe
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Gender, work and familial ideology: women workers in the unorganised garment export industry, New Delhi, India    T MUKHOPADHYAY    Prof G P Hawthorn
2000    PhD    Newcastle    Supply reponse of major agricultural commodities in Pakistan    K MUSHTAQ
2000    MPhil    London, SOAS    Political economic dimensions of East Asian development: South Korea, India    Rajiv Chitazhi NARAYAN    Dr R H Taylor
2000    DPhil    Oxford, Christ Church    Conservation management of the tiger, Panthera Tigris Tigris, in Bandhavgarh National Park, India    Latika NATH    Dr D W MacDonald
2000    PhD    LSHTM    Epidemiological immunochemistry of Helicobacter pylori in Jessore, BBHangladesh    J NESSA
2000    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    An operational evaluation test of MEDLINE on CD-ROM  in Malaysia with special reference to investigating practicable relevance-based perfoormance measures    Roslina OTHMAN
2000    PhD    Hull    Changing dimensions of single European Market: implications for the non-member countries – a case study on India’s textile and clothing exports    S Gnanasekara PANDIAN
2000    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Technology and environmental leapfrogging: three case studies from India    R M PERKINS    Dr B Vira
2000    PhD    London, LSE    Legal systems as a determinant of foreign direct investment: the case of Sri Lanka    Amanda Joan PERRY    Mr P Muchlinski
2000    PhD    Lancaster    A critical ethnography on the production of the Indian MBA discourse    E PRIYADHARSHINI
2000    PhD    Nottingham Trent    Douglarisation and the politics of Indian/African relations in Trinidad writing    Sheila RAMPERSAD
2000    PhD    Edinburgh    Another member of our family: aspects of television culture and social change in Varanasi, North India    Simon William ROBERTS    Dr A Good; Dr J Spencer
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Communal conflict in Bengal, 1930-1947: political parties, the Muslim intelligentsia and the Pakistan Movement    Sulagna ROY    Dr R S Chandavarkar
2000    PhD    Cambridge    Matrilineal comunities, patriarchial realities: female headship in eastern Sri Lanka – a feminist economic reading    K N RUWANPURA    Mrs S Fennell
2000    MPhil    Newcastle    Modelling privatised minor irrigation systems in Bangladesh: an economic analysis    F I M G W SARKER
2000    PhD    Durham    The influence of British political thought in China and India: the cases of Sun Yat-Sen, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru    N A SCOTT
2000    PhD    Wales, Bangor    The influence of farmer knowledge, shade and planting density on smallholder rubber/banana intercropping in Sri Lanka    A M W K SENEVIRATHNA
2000    DPhil    Sussex    Mother/child health and health care in Pakistan    Shafqat SHEHZAD    Mr P Chaudhuri; Dr A Wagstaff
2000    PhD    Southampton    Constitutional rights relating to criminal justice in South Asia: a comparison with the European Convention on Human Rights    Kabiniyage Buddhappriya Asola SILVA
2000    PhD    Warwick    Gendered labour process and flexibility: a study of jewellery production in India    U SONI-SINHA
2000    PhD    London, SOAS    The impact of Islamization on the Christian community of Pakistan    P SOOKHDEO
2000    PhD    Southampton    The impact of rural-urban migration on child survival in India    Robert STEPHENSON    Dr J McDdonald
2000    PhD    Open    Coproducing universal primary education in a context of social exclusion: households, community organisations and state administration in a district of Karnataka, India    R SUBRAHMANIAN
2000    PhD    Edinburgh    Development of a range management decision support system (RAMDSS)for forest planning in the Banavasi Range of the Western Ghats, India    Ramanathan SUGUMARAN
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Women’s political strategies to combat poverty: a study of a squatter settlement in Dhaka    S M SULTAN    Dr R S Chandavarkar
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Mapping hinduism: “Hinduism” and the study of Indian religions, 1630-1776    Barry W H  SWEETMAN    Dr J Lipner
2000    PhD    Essex    The perception of social support and the experience of depression in Pakistani women    E TAREEN
2000    PhD    Southampton    Rural poverty and the role of the non-farm sector in economic development: the Indian experience    M TIWARI
2000    PhD    Portsmouth    Illiteracy in India: a multi-level analysis    S VENKATASUBRAMANIAN
2000    PhD    Warwick    The influence of culture and politics on accounting change in India from 1947 to 1998    Shradda VERMA
2000    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    Cranial diversity and the evolutionary history of South Asians    Samanti Dineshkumari WARUSAWITHANA KULATILAKE
2000    MPhil    Wales, Aberystwyth    Britain and the Muslims: imperial perceptions of Indian Muslims, 1914-1922    R A J WHITE
2000    MPhil    Oxford, St Cross    Released on both sides ? The origin and position of formless meditation in early Indian Buddhism    Alexander WYNNE    Prof R F Gombrich
2000    PhD    Edinburgh    The forest cooks and the people eat: nature and society in Mayurbhanj, Orissa    Hannele Kirsi Aija YLO’NEN
2000    PhD    Bradford    Agriculture and pastorarlism in the late Bronze Age, North West Frontier, Pakistan    R L YOUNG
2001    MPhil    Glasgow    Colonisation and Hijab: a case study of Egypt and India    N AHMAD
2001    PhD    Stirling    Socio-economic aspects of freshwater prawn culture development in Bangladesh    N AHMED
2001    PhD    Leeds    Thalassaemia carrier testing in pregnant Pakistani women: perceptions of “information ” and “consent”    Shenaz AHMED
2001    PhD    London, SOAS    Early Indian moulded terracotta: the emergence of an iconography and variations in style, circa second century BC to first century AD    Naman Parmeshwar AHUJA
2001    PhD    Essex    Pakistan’s export performance, 1972-1998    M AKBAR
2001    PhD    Durham    Slaves of water: indigenous knowledge of fisheries on the floodplain of Bangladesh    M ALAM
2001    PhD    Aberdeen    Evaluation of environmental sustainability of forest land use policies of Bangladesh    Mohammad ALI
2001    PhD    Aberdeen    The effects of low temperature and seed quality on the germination of fifteen rice (Oryza sative L)cultivars from Bangladesh    M G  ALI
2001    PhD    Portsmouth    The rise of a service class culture in India: the software industry in Bangalore    Elaine ASSAR
2001    PhD    Portsmouth    The emergence of a new culture class: the software industry in Bangalore, India    Elain Risa ASSER    Dr P Churmer-Smit
2001    PhD    Brunel    The development of India’s crafts and their implication upon Indo-European furniture    N W BAMFORTH
2001    PhD    Strathclyde    A critique of tourism development planning: a case of Sri Lanka    H M BANDARA
2001    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Developing fodder resources on the forest grassland of tribal areas in western India    Peter George BEZKOROWAJNYI
2001    PhD    Bristol    Conceptions: an exploration of infertility and assisted conception in India    A BHARADWAJ
2001    PhD    Oxford, St Antony’s    The emergence of the Bombay film industry, 1913-1937    Kaushik BHAUMIK    Dr D A Washbrook
2001    PhD    Strathclyde    Consumer preferences and public policy: a case study of water supply and waste management in Madras (Chennai), India    A P BHAYAN KARAM
2001    PhD    Strathclyde    Contingent variation in a developing metropolis: an exploration of water and waste management in Madres    Anand Prathivadi BHAYANKARAM    Mr R Perman
2001    PhD    Kingston    The initiation and magmatic evolution of a juvenile island arc: the Kohistan arc, Pakistan Himalaya    S M BIGNOLD
2001    PhD    London, LSHTM    The rational use of blood in India: intervention to promote good transfusion practice    Timothy John BRAY
2001    PhD    Aberdeen    Chipko and crofter: land movements in northern India and the Highlands of Scotland    Nandini B CHADHA    Mr W T C Brotherstone; Dr J Forster
2001    PhD    Strathclyde    The impact of trade policy on growth in India    Ramesh CHANDRA    Prof J Love
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    Colonial power and agrarian politics in Kheda District (Gujarat), c.1890-1930    Vinayak CHATURVEDI    Prof C A Bayly
2001    PhD    Leeds    Appropriate disposal of sewage in urban and suburban Sri Lanka    E J H COREA
2001    PhD    London, RHUL    Faith, unity, discipline: the making of a socio-political formation in urban India, Lahore,1935-1953    Markus DAECHSEL    Prof F C R Robinson
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney     Whither urban governance ? Self-help civil society, political conflicts and environmental services in Chennai, India    S L DAHIYA    Dr B J Devereux
2001    PhD    Glasgow    The Bengal Army and the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, 1856-1857    Julian Saul Markham DAVID    Prof H F A Strachen
2001    PhD    London    Air pollution and agricultural insect pests in urban and peri-urban areas of India    C DAVIES
2001    PhD    Essex    No time to play: social, economic and legal dimensions of child labour practices in India    Rie DEBABRATA
2001    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Sikh discourses of community and sovereignty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries     Jeevan S DEOL    Prof C A Bayley
2001    PhD    Exeter    The effects of marital dissolution, fertility and contraceptive behaviour among men and woimen in Addu Atoll, Maldives    Aminath Mohamed DIDI    Dr N Ford; Dr A Ankomah
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    The scars of piety: Islam and the dynamics of religious dispute on Androth Island, South India    Brian John DIDIER    Dr J A Laidlaw
2001    PhD    London, RHUL    Traditional rule and western conventions: the Maharajas of Bikaner and their partnership with the Raj, 1887-1947    Paolo DURISOTTO    Prof F C R Robinson
2001    PhD    Loughborough    Venture capital financing in India: a study of venture capitalist’s valuation, structuring and monitoring practices     Mansoor DURRANI
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Commerce and diaspora: locating the business practices of Hindu Sindhis     Mark Anthony FALZON    Dr J A Laidlaw
2001    PhD    London, SOAS    Buddhist narratives in Burmese murals    Alexandra Raissa GREEN    Dr E H Moore; Dr G H R Tillitson
2001    PhD    Lancaster    A critical review of ecological impact assessment in Sri Lanka: with particular reference to the shrimp aquaculture industry    Miriya Prasanni GUNAWARDENA
2001    DrPH    London, LSHTM    Regulation of the private health care sector in Pakistan    Ajmal HAMID
2001    PhD    South Bank    Social exclusion and women’s health in Lahore, Pakistan    N A HAMID
2001    PhD    Liverpool    Identity, conflict and nationalism: the Naga and Kuki peoples of northeast India and northwest Burma    Seilen HAOKIP
2001    MPhil    London, LSE    Humanitarian assistance: the relationship between NGOs and the government of Sri Lanka    Marit HAUG    Prof C Fuller; Prof M Light
2001    PhD    Durham    The engineering behaviour of the tropical clay soils of Dhaka, Bangladesh    A S HOSSAIN
2001    PhD    London, Imperial    The nitrogen economy of rice-based cropping systems in Bangladesh    F HOSSAIN
2001    PhD    Southampton    Assessment of family planning outreach workers’ contact and contraceptive use dynamics in rural Bangladesh using multilevel modelling    M B HOSSAIN
2001    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Essays on consumption and asset mobility in rural Pakistan: a microeconomic approach    Taimur HYAT    Prof B Harriss-White
2001    PhD    Leeds    Internet implementation and strategic subsidiary context of Malaysias subsidiaries located in the UK    Azizi Ali IBRAHIM
2001    PhD    Edinburgh    The scent of jasmine: experiencing knowledge and emotion in cross cultural contextrs of South Indian classical dance    Joanna Rose JACOBSON
2001    PhD    Stirling    Fishery biology and population dynamics of shrimps (Penaeua indicus)and Metapenaeus dobsoni)in the lagoon and coastal area of Negombo, Sri Lanka    P A A T JAYAWARDANE
2001    PhD    Birmingham    A cluster randomised controlled trial of reorganising maternal health services in Sindh, Pakistan    A H JOKHIO
2001    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    Christian and non-Christian Angami Nagas with special reference to traditional healing practices    Vibha JOSHI    Dr N J Allen
2001    PhD    London, SOAS    The making of colonial psychiatry, Bombay Presidentcy, 1849-1940    Shruti KAPILA    Prof D J Arnold
2001    PhD    London, Inst Comm.    Security, development and political accommodation in Bangladesh    Shahnaz KARIM    Prof J Manor; Prof R F Holland
2001    PhD    Southampton    Maternal health care utilisation among the urban poor of Maharashtra, India    F KAUSAR
2001    DPhil    Oxford    Echo words in Tamil    Elinor KEANE
2001    PhD    Newcastle    Enhancement of nutritional quality of straw-based diets in Pakistan by urea treatment or suppementation with protein or energy    Muhammad Aslam KHAN
2001    PhD    Nottingham    Environmental hazards, risk perception and general environmental beliefs: a cross cultural study between UK and Pakistan    N R KHAN
2001    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    Poverty in Pakistan: a study on health, nutrition, income and consumption    Salman H KHAN    Dr C Muller
2001    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    State, society and labour in colonial Bombay, 1893-1918    Prashant K KIDAMBI    Dr D A Washbrook
2001    PhD    Birminghm    Mission pneumatology with special reference to the Indian theologies of the holy spirit of Stanley Samartha, Vandana and Samuel Rayan    K KIM
2001    PhD    Reading    Sociolinguistic variation in urban India: a study of Marathi-speaking adolescents in Pune    Sonal KULKARNI
2001    PhD    Birmingham    British South Asian identities and the popular cultures of British Bhangra music, Bollywod films and Zee TV in Birmringham    r KUMAR DUDRAH
2001    PhD    London, External    Sarangi style in North Indian art music    Nicolas Fairchild MAGRIEL    Dr R Widdess
2001    PhD    Lancaster    Economic reforms in India: impact on savings and productivity of the manufacturing sector    Vidya MAHAMBARE    Prof V N Balasubramanyam
2001    PhD    Stirling    Small scale multispecies demersal fishery off Negombo, Sri Lanka    R R P MALDENIYA
2001    PhD    Oxford, St Antony’s    A reluctant warrior: Hong Kong in Anglo-American interactions, 1949-1957    Chi Kwan MARK    Dr R J Foot
2001    PhD    Brunel    Rushdie’s legacy: the emergence of a radical British Muslim identity    G A McROY
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    African NGOs: turning knowledge and experience into power    Sarah G MICHAEL    Dr C Elliott
2001    PhD    London, SOAS    Painting awareness: a study in the use of exotic cultural traditions by the artists of the Emperor Akbar’s Khamsa of Nizami    Gregory B MINISSALE
2001    PhD    Leeds    Weak market efficiency and the determinants of share returns: a study of the listed companies on the Dhaka Stock Exchange    Asma MOBAREK    Prof K Keasey; Dr H Short
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Love and marriage in Delhi    Perveez MODY SPENCER    Dr J A Laidlaw
2001    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Dispute settlement mechanism in the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA}    Rahmat MOHAMAD
2001    PhD    Leeds    Dividend policy and behaviour and security price reaction to the announcement of dividends in an emergency market: a study of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange    A Sabur MOLLAH    Prof K Keasey
2001    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Writing crime, writing empire: representing the colony in nineteenth century fiction fo crime    Upamanyu Pablo MUKHERJEE    Prof C I Donaldson
2001    PhD    Kent    On the strength of a likeness: Kipling and the analogical connections between India and Ireland    Kaori NAGAI
2001    PhD    Leeds    Perceptions of empowerment and reproductive health decisions amongst rural India women    Ann Marie NICHOLS    Dr Ray Bush; Dr Z Aydin
2001    PhD    London, LSE    The Singapore entrepreneurial state in China: a sociological study of the Suzhou industrial park, 1992-1999    Alexius A PEREIRA    Dr A Power
2001    PhD    Hull    Population biology and management of hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha)in Bangladesh    Md Jalilur RAHMAN
2001    PhD    London, LSHTM    Utilisation of primary health care services in rural Bangladesh: the population and provider perspectives    S A RAHMAN
2001    PhD    Manchester    Modelling demand and supply in Bangladesh agriculture: a computable general equilibrium approach to public policy and economic welfare    S M Osman RAHMAN    Dr N Russell
2001    PhD    City    The evolving devi: education, employment and British Hindu Gujerati women’s identity    Hasmita RAMJI
2001    DPhil    Oxford, Christ Church    Constrictions of identity and cultural translation in relation to origin and destination: a generational comparison of South Asian expatriate and immigrant writers in Britain (1937-present)    Ruvani RANASINHA    Dr J A Mee
2001    PhD    London, QMW    Public interest environmental legislation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh    J RAZZAQUE
2001    PhD    Manchester    Participation and protected area conservation in India: ecodevelopment theory and practice    Trevor Pritchard REES    Prof D Hulme
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    The making of ethnoHinduism: communalism, reservations and the Ahmedabad riot of 1985    Ornit SHANI    Dr R S Chandravarkar
2001    PhD    London, LSE    Merchants, “saints” and sailors: the social production of islamic reform in a port town of western India    Edward Lawrence SIMPSON
2001    PhD    Wales, Swansea    Gender participation and community forestry: the case of joint forest management in Madhya Pradesh, India    R SINGH
2001    PhD    Reading    International experience of plant variety protection: lessons for India    Chittur SSRINIVASAN    Prof C G Thirtle
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney Sussex    Ecological institutions: joint forest management in Bihar (Jharkhand)and West Bengal, India    M TIWARY    Dr S E Corbridge
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville    Contested notions of sovereignty in Bengal under British rule, 1765-1785    Thomas R TRAVERS    Prof C A Bayly
2001    MPhil    Open    The legacy of the controversies: the continuing impact on interfaith encounters in Sri Lanka of nineteenth century controversies between Buddhists and Christians     M S VASANTHAKUMAR
2001    PhD    Cambridge, Newnham    The appeal of a modern god-person in contemporary India: the case of Mata Amritanandamayi and her mission    M WARRIER    Dr S B Bayley
2001    PhD    Hertfordshire    Identifying potential barriers to business process and information systems reengineering in Sri Lanka    V WEERAKKODY
2001    PhD    Southampton    Short birth intervals and infant health in India    Alison K WHITWORTH
2001    DPhil    Oxford, St Hughes    Governing property, making law: British conceptions of agrarian society and the administration of rural Bengal, c.1785-1835    Jon E WILSON    Dr D A Washbrook
2001    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    Process analysis of a total literacy campaign in India: a case study of Udaiput District    Rie YAGI    Dr C Brock
2001    PhD    Loughborough    The globalisation of Western advertising: a case study of the impact of imported advertising on cultural values    Azizul Halim YAHYA
2001    PhD    London, SOAS    The intertextuality of women in Urdu litterature: a study of Fahmida Riaz and Kishwar Naheed    Amina YAQIN
2002    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Basic needs analysis of social forestry participants in northwest Bangladesh    S AKHTER    Prof C Price
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Child labour in the Bombay Presidency, 1850-1920    Emma Catherine ALEXANDER    Dr R S Chandavarkar
2002    PhD    London, Imperial    Biological variation and chemical control of Rhizoctonia solani causing rice sheath blight disease in Bangladesh    Md Ansar ALI
2002    PhD    LSHTM    An analysis of private hospital markets in Bangladesh    M A AMIN
2002    PhD    Stirling    A question of “Chineseness”: the Chinese diaspora in Singapore, 1819-1950s    Lynn Ling-Yin ANG    Dr S Mishra
2002    MPhil    Newcastle    Trophy hunting and conservation: Himalayan Ibrex Capra Ibex sibirica in northern Pakistan    Masood ARSHAD
2002    PhD    London    The political economy of policy reform: labour market regulation in India    Roli ASTHANA
2002    PhD    Sheffield    Children’s drawings as research tool: establishing children’s environmental concepts and preferences with reference to urban openspace planning design in Johore Bahru, Malaysia    M S A BAKAR
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Buddhism and shamanism in village Sikkim    A BALIKCI
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Somerville    The other side of the Raj: representation of colonial India in the writings of Edward John Thompson    Nilanjana BANERJI    Prof R J C Young
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    An investigation into the 56 Vinayakas in Banares and their origins    Isabelle O T BERMIJN
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    Biodiversity and conservation of a cultural landscape in the Western ghats of India    Shonil A BHAGWAT    Dr N D Brown; Dr P S Savill
2002    DPhil    Oxford, St Anne’s    Stylistic features of Sanskrit in the Upanisads and Pali in early Buddhist texts with special reference to prose word order    Pathompong BODHIPRASIDDHINAND    Prof R F Gombrich
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Archaeological science as anthropology: time, space and matreriality in rural India and the ancient past    Nicole Lise BOIVIN    Dr C A French
2002    MPhil    London, Birkbeck    Religion and the experiences of Indo-Pakistani women in the fiction of Bharati Mukherjee, Bapsi Sidhwa, Hanif Kureishi and Salmon Rushdie    N H BOWEN
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Baloch nationalism: its origin and development up to 1980    Taj Mohammad BRESEEG
2002    PhD    London    Asakta Karman in the Bhagavadgita    Simon Pearse BRODBECK
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Indian religions    Simon Pearse BRODBECK
2002    PhD    Newcastle    The integration of poverty-focused aquaculture in large-scale irrigation systems in South Asia    Cecile D BRUGERE
2002    PhD    London    Local governance in Calcutta: bureaucratic performance and health care delivery    Indranil CHAKRABARTI
2002    MLitt    Oxford, St Antony’s    Ashraf identity in early Urdu fiction    Shardul Kumar CHATURVEDI    Dr D A Washbrook; Dr N Gooptu
2002    PhD    Bristol    Towards the socialisation of children’s learning: pupils, parents and primary education in an Indian district – an ethnographic survey    Rita CHAWLA-DUGGAN
2002    PhD    London, UC    The influence of ethnicity and beliefs on the course and outcome of schizophrenia in Singapore    J L CHUA
2002    PhD    London, LSE    Social mobility in a Chamar community in eastern Uttar Pradesh, northern Indian    Manuela CIOTTI
2002    DPhil    Sussex    Rural poverty in Bangaldesh: a comparative study of determinants of economic well-being and inequality    Maria Jose A  CORTIJO
2002    PhD    Open    Environmental impact of Deccan Trap flood basalt volcanism: assessment of regional floral responses to late Cretaceous-early Tertiary activity    Jennifer Ann CRIPPS
2002    PhD    De Montfort    Maharashtra and the cross-fertilisation of style of Brahmanical caves in India    Deepanjana DANDA
2002    PhD    London, LSHTM    The long term effect of child bearing on adult mortality in Matlab, Bangladesh    Lisa Sioned DAVIES
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    British policy in Bengal: 1939-1954    Bikramjit DE    Prof J M Brown; Prof T Raychaudhuri
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Institutionalizing education: colonial government, missionary and household education in British colonial Punjab    Jeffrey Mark DIAMOND    Dr A A Powell
2002    PhD    Oxford Brookes    The molecular basis of thalassaemia in Sri Lanka    Christopher A FISHER
2002    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Globalization and religious revival in the imperial cities of the Indian Ocean rim, 1870-1820    Mark Ravinder FROST    Dr T N Harper
2002    PhD    Durham    Indigenous knowledge, livelihood and decision -making strategies on floodplain farmers in Bangladesh    G P GHOSH
2002    PhD    Bath    Competing interests and institutional ambiguities: problems of sustainable forest management in the northern areas of Pakistan    A GOHAR
2002    PhD    Edinburgh    Untouchable citizens: an analysis of the Liberation Panthers and democratistion in Tamil Nadu    Hugh GORRINGE
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    The Sufi saints of Awrangabad: narratives, contexts and identities    Nile S GREEN
2002    PhD    Cambridge. St John’s    Mantle plumes and depositional sequences: onshore/offshore India    A R W HALKETT    Dr N J White
2002    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Famine process and famine policy: a case study of Ahmednagar District, Bombay Presidency, 1870-84    David N J HALL-MATTHEWS    Dr D A Washbrook; Dr B Harriss
2002    PhD    Leeds    Computer misuse within the organisation: an evaluation of computer misuse legislation in Britain and Malaysia    Zaiton HAMIN
2002    PhD    London, Imperial    Characterisation of Bacillus cereus strains in Bangladeshi rice    Md Anwarul HAQUE
2002    PhD    Edinburgh    Growing gods: bidayuh processes of religious change in Sarawak, Malaysia    F M A HARRIS
2002    DPhil    Sussex    British collecting of Indian art and artifacts in the 18th and 19th centuies    Lucian G HARRIS
2002    PhD    Reading    Understanding farmers’ attitudes and behaviours towards the use of pesticides on cotton crop in Pakisdtan’s Punjab    Tariq HASSAN
2002    PhD    London    The curriculum for health education in schools: issues of definition, choice and implementation: an illuminative study based on Uganda, Zambia and India    Hubert William Richmond HAWES
2002    PhD    Strathclyde    The significance of ethnic ties and entreprenurial networks in the internationalisation of the firm: case study: the internationalisation of UK Indian enterprises    Jaswinder Singh HAYER
2002    PhD    Leeds    The expression of syntax in Sri Lankan English: speech and writing    S M F HERAT
2002    PhD    Hull    US – Pakistan partnership in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979-1988: causes, dynamics and consequences    A Z A HILALI
2002    PhD    Strathclyde    An integrated performance measurement system of health care services: an empirical study of public and private hospitals in Malaysia    Abdul Razak IBRAHIM
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Alternative methods and sources for measuring vaccination coverage in rural Bangladesh    MdD Shafiqul ISLAM    Dr C G N Mascie-Taylor
2002    DPhil    Sussex    Voice, responsiveness and collaboration: democratic decentralization and service delivery in two Indian cities    Jennifer JALAL    J P Gaventa
2002    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Drivers of land use change and policy analysis: the case of Bangladesh    Mohammed JASHIMUDDIN    Prof G Edwards-Jones
2002    PhD    Open    An investigation of teaching and learning biology at a distance: with special reference to Sri Lanka    B G JAYATILLEKE
2002    DPhil    York    Cultural construction of the “Sinhala woman” and women’s lives in post-independence Sri Lanka    J D JAYAWARDENA    Dr J de Groot
2002    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Greeks, Saracens and Indians: imperial builders in south India, 1800-1880    Ioma Shanti JAYEWARDENE-PILLAI    Dr D A Washbrook
2002    PhD    London, RHUL    Being Sri Lankan: three cultural geographies    Tariq JAZEEL    Dr C Nash; Prof D Gower
2002    PhD    Southampton    The rhetoric and reality of gender issues in the domestic water sector: a case study from India    Deepa JOSHI
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Behavioural ecology of sympatric langures in Bangladesh    Md Mofizul KABIR    Dr D J Chivers
2002    MD    Leeds    Genetic and environmental determinants of cardiovascular risk factors in South Asian patients with cerebrovascular disease and their first degree relatives    K KAIN
2002    PhD    Nottingham    The categories of Hindu nationalism: a neo-structuralist analysis of the discourse of Hindutva    Christian KARNER
2002    PhD    Manchester Metropolitan    Public participation in environmental impact assessment in the developing and developed worlds: Pakistan and UK perspectives    Amjad Ali KHAN
2002    PhD    Kent    Memory, dis-location, violence and women in the partition literature of Pakistan and India     Furrukh Abbas KHAN    Dr A S Gurnah
2002    MPhil    London, UC    Vitamin A deficiency in children in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)of Pakistan    M A KHAN
2002    PhD    Manchester    An evaluation of the performance of small and medium enterprises in Bangladesh with special reference to finance    Md Saiful Amin KHAN    Prof F Nixson
2002    PhD    Durham    Women’s voices: the presentation of women in the fiction of South Asian women    Lisa Ee Jia LAU    Dr M A Crang; Dr E E Mawdsley
2002    PhD    London    The role of Islam in the legal system of Pakistan    Martin Wilhelm LAU
2002    PhD    Kent    Power and patronage in Pakistan    Stephen M LYON    Mr R S Edmond
2002    PhD    Reading    The role of English in higher education in Pakistan    S MANSOOR
2002    PhD    Bristol    The global regulation of marine fisheries and its impact on two developing states: Namaibia and Kerala    Leonarda Enrica Camilla MARAZZI
2002    DClinPsy    Leicester    Illness representations, coping and locus of control in breast cancer: a comparative study amongst South Asian Indian women and white indigenous women    R MARTYN
2002    PhD    Durham    Sowing new ideas; an investigation of anthropology’s contribution to rural development in south east Sri Lanka    M MARZANO
2002    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The sepoy army and colonial Madras, c1806-57    Carina Anne MONTGOMERY    Dr D A Washbrook
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    A lot of history: sexual violence, public memory and the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971    Nayanika MOOKHERJEE    Dr C Pinney; Dr C Osella
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Hindi film songs: and the cinema    Anna Frances MORCOM    Dr R Widdess
2002    PhD    Bristol    A study of the late Madhyamaka doxography    Jundo NAGASHIMA
2002    PhD    East Anglia    Between work and school: children in rural Andhra Pradesh    Masako OTA    Prof J D Seddon; Dr R Palmer-Jones

2002    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    The fragile web of order: conflict avoidance and dispute resolution in Ladakh    Fernanda PIRIE    Dr M J Banks; Prof D Parkin
2002    PhD    Glasgow    Morphological and molecular systematic studies of Asian caecilians (Amphibia: Gymnophiona)    Bronwen PRESSWELL
2002    PhD    London, LSE    US foreign  policy to Pakistan, 1947-1960: reconstructing strategy    Saqib Iqbal QUERESHI    Dr C Coker
2002    PhD    Essex    India in the making of liberal identities: the case of Mary Carpenter and Harrier Martineau    Brenda A QUINN    Prof C M Hall
2002    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Muslims and crime: a comparative criminological study of South Asian Muslims in Britain and Pakistan    Muzammil QURAISHI    Dr J Wardhaugh
2002    PhD    London, LSE    US foreign policy to Pakistan, 1947-1960: re-constructing strategy    Saqib Iqbal QURESHI    Dr C Coker
2002    PhD    Aberdeen    Seasonal availability and utilisation of feed resources and their impact on the nutrition of livestock in an agro pastoral system of the Hindu Kush Karakoram Himalayan region of Pakistan    Abdur RAHMAN
2002    PhD    East Anglia    Standing one’s ground: gender, land and livelihoods in the Santal Parganas, Jharkhans, India    Nitya RAO    Prof C Jackson; Dr B Rogaly
2002    PhD    Bradford    Opening up spaces: engendering protracted social conflict and conflict transformation: an analysis with special reference to Sri Lanka    C REIMANN
2002    PhD    London, LSHTM    Sustaining menstrual regulation policy: a case study of the policy process in Bangladesh    Gabrielle Catherine ROSS
2002    PhD    Aberdeen    The economic viability of shrimp farming in the coastal areas of Pakistan    Nizam SABIR
2002    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Raj Bhakta Marg: the path of devotion to Srimad Rajcandra: a Jain community in the twenty first century    E K SALTER    Dr Johnson
2002    PhD    Edinburgh    Negotiations and contradictions: local perceptions of tourism on Langkawi Island, Malaysia    Nor Hafizah SELAMAT
2002    PhD    London, UC    A study to determine the effects of the status of women on child growth undertaken in the Mysore region of Karnataka, India    K SETHURAMAN
2002    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    The resolution of environmental disputes in India    D SHANNUGANATHAN
2002    PhD    Newcastle    Application of information technology to improve the design process in the construction sector in Pakistan: a case of the specification management process    B K SHAR
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    Communism in India    Shalini SHARMA    Dr S Kaviraj
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    The sacred geography of Sanchi Hill: the archaeological setting of Buddhist monasteries in central India    J SHAW    Dr D K Chakrabarti
2002    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Metaphysical psychology: an analysis of Sri Aurobindo Ghose’s theory of psychological consciousness development with special reference to his concepts of integral Brahman and the psychic entity     Girija SHETTAR    Dr Johnson
2002    MPhil/PhD    Reading    Credit constraints on the growth of rural non-farm sector in India    Anchita SHUKLA (TRIPATHI)    Dr S L Wiggins
2002    PhD    Bath    Escape and “struggle”: routes to women’s liberation in Bihar    Indu B SINHA    Dr G Wood; Dr J A McGregor
2002    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Representative agent modes and macroeconomic poliocy: an application to the UK    Naveen SRINIVASAN
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Trinity    Bhuvanekabahu VII and the Portuguese: temporal and spiritual encounters in Sri Lanka, 1521-1551    Alan Leiper STRATHERN    Dr P B R Carey; Prof T F Earle
2002    PhD    Cranfield, Silsoe    An evaluation of public and private groundwater irrigation systems in Bangladesh and Pakistan    David SUTHERLAND    Dr R Carter
2002    DPhil    Oxford    Clothing culture: sex, gender and transvestism with reference to UK transvestites and the hijras of India    Charlotte SUTHRELL    Prof M Banks
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    A study of consecration ritual in Indian Buddhist tantrism: a critical and annotated transslation of selected sections of the Kriyasagrahapanjika of Kuladatta    Ryugen TANEMURA    Prof A G J Sanderson
2002    PhD    Wales, Bangor    Influence of crop profitability, market, labour and land on smallholder cropping systems in rubber-growing areas of Sri Lanka    Sunethra Pushpa Kumri Thennakoon  THENNAKOON-MUDIYANSELAGE    Dr F Sinclair
2002    DPhil    Oxford, Hertford    Negotiating the boundaries of gender and empire: Lady Mary Curzon, Vicereine of India    Nicola J THOMAS    Dr P Coones; Dr J R Ryan
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    The institutional responses to the water needs of peri-urban communities in Delhi, India    Kathryn Signe TOVEY    Dr B Vira
2002    PhD    Cambridge, Christ’s    Crafting discourse: mat weaving in Pattamadai, South India    S VENKATESAN    Dr D A Swallow
2002    PhD    East Anglia    Foreign aid, power and elementary education reform in Pakistan from 1992 to 1999    Michael WARD    Dr R McBride
2002    PhD    Nottingham    Salman Rushdie: imagining the other name foe Islam    Y YACOUBI
2002    PhD    London, SOAS    The Vinaya in India and China: spirit and transformation    Jing YIN    Dr T Skorupski
2002    PhD    Reading    An application of theory of planned behaviour and logistic regression models to understand farm level tree planting and its determinants in the district of Dera Ismail of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province    Muhammad ZUBAIR
2003    PhD    Birmingham    Women empowerment and intrahousehold resource allocation through micro-finance: a comparative study of two micro-finance institutions in Bangladesh    Shahnaz Tarannum ABDULLAH
2003    PhD    Glasgow    An ethnographic study of violence experienced by Dalit Christian women in Kerala State, India, and the implications of this for feminist theology    S ABRAHAM
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Federal formation and consociational stabilisation: the politics of national identity, articulation and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan    Katharine ADENEY    Prof B O’Leary
2003    PhD    Stirling    An empirical study of employee share ownership in Malaysia    Mohmad ADNAN B ALIAS
2003    PhD    Exeter    Linking India with Britain: the Persian Gulf cable, 1864-1906    Farajollah AHMADI    Prof J Black; Dr L P Morris
2003    PhD    London, UC    Ethnicity and environment in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh    Farid AHMED    Dr M Banerjee
2003    DPhil    Sussex    The construction of childhood in Monipur: negotiating boundaries through activities    Iftikhar AHMED
2003    PhD    Manchester    Sri Lankan export-orientated clothing manufacturing industry: a comparison of management development practices across foreign, joint venture and local companies    Vathsala AKURATIYAGAMAGE    B Cooke; A Mamman
2003    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    We are fighting for the women’s liberation also: a comparative study of female combatants in the national conflicts in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland    M ALISON
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Dominant texts, subaltern performances: two tellings of the Ramayan in central India    S ANITHA
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    A political biography of Don Stephen Senanyake, (1931-1952): the former prime minister of Sri Lanka    Drene Terana APONSO    Dr G Johnson
2003    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    Education reform in developing countries:decentralisation with reference to India and Pakistan    Linda F C ARTHUR    Dr C Brock
2003    PhD    London, UC    Childhood epilepsy in Bangladesh: clinical profile, predictors of outcome and randomised controlled trial of efficacy and side effects of treatment    S H BANU
2003    MPhil    Birmingham    A comparative examination of critical, religious and interreligious ingredients contributing to intercommunal harmony and disharmony in Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu dynamism, British Christian evangelism and the rise of 20th century Sinhalese Buddhist militancy    A R BECKETT
2003    PhD    Manchester    Perceptions of user education in the university libraries of Pakistan    Rubina BHATTI    T Christie; G Price
2003    PhD    Oxford Brookes    Revolution, military personnel and the war of liberation in  Banglaldesh    O A BIR BIKRAM
2003    MPhil    London, SOAS    Hindustani music in the reign of Aurangzeb    Katherine Ruth BROWN    Dr R Widdess
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    We Nelpalis: language, lliterature and the formation of a Nepali public sphere in India, 1914-1940    Rhoderick Alasdair MacDonald CHALMERS    Dr M Hutt
2003    PhD    Leeds    The relationship between knowledge and power in the work of Amitav Ghosh    C G CHAMBERS
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity Hall    Mysore: the making and unmaking of a model state, c. 1799-1834    Nigel Hugh Mosman CHANCELLOR    Prof C A Bayly
2003    PhD    Edinburgh    Rishtas: transational Pakistani marriages    Katharine CHARSLEY
2003    PhD    Sheffield    Birth for some women in Pakistan: defining and defiling    M CHESNEY
2003    PhD    Edinburgh    Admitted truths in Muslim-Christian dialogue: a study of William Muir, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and William Goldsack in 19th century India    David Otis COFFEY
2003    DPhil    Oxford, Queen’s    Marxism and middle class intelligentsia: political ideology and culture in Bengal, 1920-1950    Rajarshi DASGUPTA    Dr N Gooptu
2003    DPhil    Oxford, St Hugh’s    Bridging educational and social divides ? private school outreach for out-of-school children in India    Laura L DAY    Dr C Brock
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Local brokers: knowledge and trust and organisation in the practice of agricultural extension for small and marginal farmers in Rajasthan, India    Bina DESAI    Dr D Mosse
2003    PhD    Newcastle    The regulation of private schools for low-income families in Andrha Pradesh,India: an Austrian economic approach    P DIXON
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Girton    Orientalism, Sanskrit scholarship and education in colonial north India, ca 1775-1875    Michael Sinclair DODSON    Prof C A Bayley
2003    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and the Ramakrishna movement: the question of continuity    Paul W EATON    Dr Johnson
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Jews and Judaism in modern Indian discourse    Yulia EGOROVA    Prof C Shackle
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Clare Hall    Behind the scenes at the magic house: an ethnoggraphy of the Indian Museum, Calcutta    M J ELLIOTT    Dr D A Swallow
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    A study of agricultural production at the level of household, community and region: long term trends in India and China    Shailaja FENNELL    Dr P H Nolan
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Sinhala Buddhist nationalism from revivalism to militant political ideology: the struggle to shape public culture in Sri Lanka    Yolanda FOSTER    Dr DTaylor
2003    PhD    Gloucestershire    Exiled from glory: Anglo-Indian settlement in nineteenth century Britain with special reference to Cheltenham    S FRASER    Dr C R V More; Dr J M Bourne
2003    PhD    Gloucestershire    Exiled from glory: Anglo-Indian settlement in nineteenth century Britain with special reference to Cheltenham    Stuart J FRASER    Dr C R V More; Dr J M Bourne
2003    PhD    London, LSE    From local tensions to ethnic conflict: the emergence of Hindu nationalism in a Christian/Hindu “tribal” community in Chhattisgargh, northern India    Peggy FROERER    Dr L Sklar
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    An economic perspective on resettlement of populations displaced by large dams: the case of the Sardar Sarovar Project displaced, India    Supriya GARIKIPATI
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    The origins and early development of anthropomorphic Indian iconography    Madhuvanti GHOSE    Dr G H R Tillotson
2003    DPhil    Oxford, St Edmund Hall    Subduction-related metamorphism, structure and tectonic evolution of the Kohistan arc and main mantle thrust zone, Pakistanm Himalayas    Simon J GOUGH    Dr D J Waters; Dr M P Searle
2003    PhD    Birmingham    Islamic activism in South Asia: the reasons for the electoral under-achievement of the Jama’at Islami Party of Pakistan, 1947-1977    F HAMEED
2003    PhD    Derby    A critical analysis of policy initiatives involving small and medium enterprises in  Malaysia    A B A HAMID
2003    PhD    Sunderland    Identity and the Bengal Muslims: mapping changing perspectives (1905-1971)    F HASHEM
2003    PhD    London, External    Patterns and dynamics of loan use: a study of BRAC borrowers in Bangladesh    F HASIN
2003    PhD    Durham    Arsenic toxicity in Bangladesh: health and social hazards    Md Manzarul HASSAN
2003    DPhil    Sussex    Elite public discourses of poverty and the poor in Bangladesh    Naomi T HOSSAIN    M P Moore
2003    PhD    Southampton    Quality of care in maternity services: childbirth among the urban poor of Mumbai, India    Louise A HULTON
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Effect of weekly iron supplementation and antihelminthic treatment on the physical growth and development of Bangladeshi children    Mohammad Mushtuq HUSAIN
2003    PhD    Essex    Factors limiting productivity and adoption of rubber tea intercropping in the low country wet zone of Sri Lanka    S M M IQBAL
2003    MPhil    Birmingham    A call to Christian discipleship in a situation of conflict: a study of Christian mission in the socio-ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka, with special reference to the life witness and theoleogy of Dietrich Bonhoefer    M B JEYAKUMAR
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    Novels of the South Asian diaspora in East Africa    Stephanie Jillian JONES    Mr T L J Cribb
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Governing morals: state, marriage and householfd among the Gaddis of north India    Kriti KAPILA
2003    MPhil    London, SOAS    The power behind the throne: relations between the British and Indian states, 1870-1909    Caroline J KEEN    Dr A A Powell
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Corpus    Representing children: power, policy and the discourse on child labour in the football manufacturing industry of Sialkot    Ali KHAN    Dr D Sneath
2003    PhD    Manchester    The impact of privatisation in Pakistan    Iram Anjum KHAN    Dr P Cook
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Hughes Hall    A social and political history of the telegraph in the Indian empire, circa 1850-1920    Deep Kanta LAHIRI CHOUDHURY    Prof C A Bayley
2003    PhD    Cambridge,Fitzwillliam    Colonial governmentality: spaces of inperialism and nationalism in India’s new capital, New Delh    S I LEGG    Dr J S Duncan
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Women, equality, autonomy: study of women’s rights in India    Sumi MADHOK    Dr S Kaviraj
2003    PhD    Aberdeen    The performance of agricultural institutions in disseminating new technologies: a case study of  modern rice variety BR 32 in Bangladesh’    B MAJUMDER
2003    PhD    Reading    Vegetation mapping in the north west of Pakistan    R N MALIK
2003    DPhil    Sussex    Gendered places, transnational lives: Sikh women in Tanzania, Britain and Indian Pubjab    K P K MAND
2003    PhD    Stirling    Policy transfer and policy translation: day care for people with dementia in Kerala, India    L F M McCABE
2003    PhD    Southampton    Barriers and opportunities in effective contraceptive management in Bangladesh    Juliet McEACHRAN
2003    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Federalism in Malaysia: a constitutional study of the federal institutions established by the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and their relationships with the traditional institutions in the constitution (with special reference to the Islamic religious power and bureaucracy in the states)    K A MOKHTAR
2003    PhD    Leeds    The levels of integration of people with spinal cord lesion in Bangladesh    Abdul Khair Mohammed MOMIN
2003    PhD    Loughborough    Modelling a flow of funds and policy simulation experiments in the financial sector in India    Tomoe MOORE
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Tradition and modernity: a sociological comparison between Sri Lankan women in Colombo and in London in the late 1990s    Fathima Fatheena MUBARAK
2003    PhD    London, Goldsmiths    Doing development: voluntary agencies in the Sundarbans of West Bengal    Amites MUKHOPADHYAY    Prof P Caplan
2003    PhD    London, LSHTM    Gender and reproductive health in Pakistan: a need for reconceptualisation    Z MUMTAZ
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Romance and pleasure in a restrictive society: understanding the sexual conduct of unmarried middle class young people in Bangladesh    Lazeena MUNA    Prof J Cleland (LSHTM)
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Marxism and beyond in Indian politicval thought: J P Narayan and M N Roy’s theory of radical democrary    Eva-Maria NAG    Dr Chun Lin
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    The museum in colonial India (1770-1936): a history of collecting, exhibiting and disciplining of knowledge    Savithri Preetha NAIR    De G H R Tillotson
2003    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Second World War Japanese atrocities and British minor war crimes trials: the issue of fair trial in four selected British war crimes trials in Malaysia and Singapore in 1946-1947    Arujanan NARAYANAN
2003    PhD    London, UC    The life cycle of clothing: recycling and the efficacy of materiality in contemporary urban India    Katherine Lucy NORRIS    Dr S Kuechler-Fogden
2003    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Refugees on the Indian sub-continent, 1947-1998: state policy and practice    Pia A OBEROI    Dr G S Goodwin-Gill
2003    PhD    Aberdeen    The classification and efficiency of use of forage resources under semi-arid conditions in the Hindukush, Karakoram and Himalayan region of Pakistan    R M OMER
2003    PhD    Birmingham    The echoes of a faded memory: a contribution to a history of the Tamil Coolie Mission    P J T PEIRIS
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    The formation of a divided public: print, language and literatuire in colonial Goa    R PINTO
2003    PhD    Greenwich    A tapestry of resistance: Afghan educated refugee women in Pakistan: “Agency” identity and resistance in war and displacement    N POURZAND
2003    PhD    Dundee    Quality assurance in undergraduate medical education: a multiple case study in Bangladesh, Thailand and Indonesia    Titi Savitri PRIHATININGSIH
2003    PhD    Reading    International joint ventures in developing economies: an analysis of Indo-British ventures in India    Raji RAJAN    Prof M Utton; Dr U Kambhampati
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Law and social change in India    Gopalan RAMAN
2003    PhD    London, LSHTM    The consequences of health insurance for the informal sector: two non-governmental, non-profit schemes in Gujerat    Michael Kent RANSON
2003    PhD    Durham    A study of land transformation in Savar Upazila, Bangladesh, 1915-2001: an integrated approach using remore sensing    Md Shahedur RASHID    Dr P J Atkins
2003    PhD    Cambridge, Sidney Sussex    Auditing “development”: an anthropological study of “audit culture” within a “participatory rural development” project in eastern India    M J REW
2003    MPhil    Newcastle    Development and land relations in tribal India: a study of Chotanagpur    Richard ROBERTS    P W Kellett
2003    PhD    Edinburgh    William Roxburgh (1751-1815)the founding father of Indian botany    Timothy Francis ROBINSON
2003    DPhil    Sussex    Representing rebellion: visual aspects of counter-insurgency in colonial India    Daniel J RYCROFT
2003    PhD    Wawick    Malaysian pre-school children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in inclusive settings    S SAAD
2003    PhD    Bristol    Voices from an island: a reading of four Sri Lankan novelists in English    D SAIKIA
2003    PhD    Bradford    A social constructionist account of children’s rights under the conditions of globalisation: the issue of child labour in India    G SANGHERA
2003    PhD    Warwick    The knowledge and perspectives about Educational Management Information System (EIS/SMPP) of decision makers in the Malaysian Ministry of Education (MMOE): an enquiry into the implementation of an EMIS    M W SARWANI
2003    PhD    Manchester    Institutions and poverty reduction: a case study of rural Bangladesh    Md Golam SARWAR    Dr J Mullen
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Woman and communal violence in India    Atreyee SEN    Dr D Mosse
2003    PhD    Manchester    Information technology and the construction industry in Pakistan    Ali SHAR    Prof S Guy
2003    PhD    Cambridge, St Cath’s    The making of modern Assam, 1826-1935    Jayeeta SHARMA    Prof C A Bayley
2003    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    Arsenic mobility in sediments and contamination of he Bengal Basin    Darren SHAW
2003    PhD    Bradford    Microfinance and social change: a case study of household finance, development and change in gender relations in rural Bangladesh    M N I SHEKH
2003    DPhil    Sussex    Resisting stigma and interventions: situating trafficked Nepali women’s struggles for self-respect, safety and security in Mumbai and Nepal    M M SHIVADAS
2003    PhD    Leicester    Violence as non communication: the news differential of Kashmir and north east conflicts in the Indian national press    Prasun SONWALKAR    Prof A Sreberny
2003    PhD    Aberdeen    Factors affecting tree growing in traditional agriforestry systems in Werstern Himalaya, India    K K SOOD
2003    PhD    Brunel    Moral continuity: Gujerati kinship, women, children and rituals    Alison SPIRO, Mary
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Social exclusion and cohesion: the case of leprosy in South India    James STAPLES    Dr D Mosse
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Bringing the Empire back in: patterns of growth in the British imperial state, 1890-1960 (with special reference to Indian and Africa)    Gita SUBRAHMANYAM
2003    PhD    Birmingham    Imagining Hinduism: a post colonial perspective    S SUGIRTHARAJAH
2003    PhD    Manchester    A feminist analysis of “white-ness” in an Indian research context    Maria SUMMERSON    Prof L Stanley
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Prostitution and the law in Pakistan: a case study of Lahore’s Hira Mandi    R TAK
2003    PhD    Open    South Asian women and the construction of political identity    S TAKHAR
2003    PhD    Warwick    Foreign music: linguistic estrangement and its textual effects in Joyce, Beckett, Nabokov and Rushdie    J TAYLOR
2003    DPhil    Oxford, Wadham    Monetary remedy for breach of constitutional rights in the United States, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom    Lisa Anne TORTELL    Prof P P Craig
2003    PhD    London, SOAS    Literature and the politics of identity in Orissa    Lopamudra TRIPATHY    Dr S Kaviraj
2003    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Growth empirics within a low income country: evidence from states in India,1960-1992    Kamakshya D TRIVEDI    Dr G M F Cameron
2003    PhD    London, LSE    Rebels and devotees of Jharkhand: social, religious and political transformation among the Adivasis of northern India    Barbara VERARDO
2003    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Institutional change and natural resource management: the case of forest policy reform in India    Bhaskar VIRA    Prof P H Nolan
2003    PhD    East Anglia    Embodied working lives: manual labouring in Maharashtra, India    Louise WAITE    Dr C Jackson; Dr R Palmer-Jones
2003    PhD    Warwick    Pakistan’s teaching hospitals: present measures quality and proposed quality improvement programmes    G WAJID
2003    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    Bangladeshi pupils: experiences, identity and achievement    Sue WALTERS    Dr C W R Davies; Prof S Tomlinson
2003    PhD    East Anglia    The growth of the Indian software industry: a social history    Meera WARRIER    Dr K Sen
2003    PhD    Edinburgh    Stereotyped Scots: representations and realities of Scottish missionary and military experience in colonial and post-independence Pakistan    Jeremy WESTON
2003    PhD    Wales    Pandita Ramabai (1858-1922): a re-evaluation of her life and work    Keith J WHITE
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Lucy     The world is established through the work of existence: the performance of Gham-Khadi among Pukhtun Bibiane in northern Pakistan:    Amineh A AHMED    Dr S B Bayly
2004    PhD    Hull    Political regime change and local government in Bangladesh    Tariq AHMED    L Summers
2004    MPhil    Bradford    Community level conflict transformation for sustainable peace: a Barefoot University for peace education in Sri Lanka    Monica ALFRED
2004    MPhil    De Montfort    Arsenic speciation in foodstuffs from Bangladesh and a method for arsenic removal from water    Shaban W AL-RMAILLY
2004    PhD    Wales, Cardiff    The portfolio behaviour of the GCC islamic and conventional banks    Abdulaziz Mohammad N AL-SAEED
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    Just a pile of stones ! The politicization of identity , indigenous knowledge and sacred landscapes among the Lepcha and the Bhutia tribes in contemporary Sikkim, India    Vibha ARORA    Prof D Parkin; Prof M J Banks
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Campion Hall    From outcaste to caste: the use of symbols and myths in the construction of identity: a study of conflict between the Paraiyars and the Vanniyars in Tamil Nadu, South India    Chockalingam Joe ARUN    Dr M J Banks
2004    PhD    Durham    Economic and structural reforms and bank efficiency: a comparative analysis of India and Pakistan, 1990-1998    A ATAULLAH
2004    PhD    Bradford    Quality assurance in the basic nurse education programme in Pakistan: a case study aimed at improving the quality assurance practices in the basic nurse education in Pakistan    A AZIZ
2004    PhD    Greenwich    A sustainable competitiveness model for strategic alliances: a study of rural entrepreneurs and commercial organisations in Malaysia with special emphasis on Malaysian farmer’s organisations    S A BAHARUM
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    The legisimating vocabulary of group rights in contemporary India    Rochana BAJPAI    Prof M S Freedom; Dr N Gooptu
2004    PhD    Reading    Farmers’ risk and uncertainty perceptions and their influence on farm level decision-making in the cotton-wheat zone of Pakistan’s Punjab    K A BAJWA    Dr T Rehman
2004    PhD    London, InstEd    An evaluation of the impact of school-based resource management and formula funding of schools and on the efficiency and equity of resource allocation in Sri Lanka    Balasooriya Mudiyanselage Jayantha BALASOORIYA    Prof A Little; Prof R Levacic
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Downing    Skill upgrading within informal training: lessons from the Indian auto mechanic    J C BARBER    Dr L Caley
2004    DBA    Strathclyde    The competitive advantage of Pakistan: empirical analysis of the textile/apparel industry    K M BARI
2004    PhD    London, Goldsmiths    In service in India: the ethics of rule and conduct of British administrators and army officers in late nineteenth and early twentieth century India    Jatinder BARN    N Rose
2004    MPhil    SOAS    The dispensary movement in Bombay Presidency: ideology and practice, 1800-1876    Jennifer BLAKE    Prof D Arnold
2004    PhD    Middlesex    The “divine heirarchy”: the social and institutional elements of vulnerability in South India    B BOSHER
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Challenging development: western discourses and Rajasthan women    Tamsin Jane BRADLEY
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Queens    Tectono-metamorphic evolution of the central and western Himalayas    M CADDICK    Dr T J B Holland
2004    PhD    Coventry    Empire and authority:  Curzon, collisions, character and the Raj, 1899-1906    M CARRINGTON
2004    DPhil    Sussex    Bringing citizens back in: public sector reform, service delivery performance and and accountability in an Indian state    Jonathan CASELEY    Dr A Joshi
2004    PhD    Sheffield    Site-formation studies and paleolithic investigations in the Siwalik Hill of northern India: reconsidering the  Soanian history    P R CHAUHAN
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Buddhist nuns in Sri Lanka and Taiwan    W-Y CHENG
2004    PhD    Warwick    Uncovering injustice: towards a Dalit feminist politics in Bangladesh    Shraddha CHIGATERI    C Wright
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    The Da’sanami-Samnyasis: the integration of ascetic lineages into an order    Matthew James CLARK
2004    PhD    Manchester    We are the kings: the children of Dhaka’s streets    Alessandro CONTICINI    D Hulme
2004    PhD    Anglia    Adaptation and change in a traditional society: sustainable development in the context of a Ladakhi village    Robert COOK
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    The Irish expatriate community in British India, c1750-1900    Barry James Conleth CROSBIE    Prof C A Bayley
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Balliol    Much ado about religion: a critical and annotated translation of the Agamadambara, a satirical play by the 9th century Kashmirian philosopher Bhatta Jayanta    Csaba DEZSO    Prof J A Sanderson
2004    PhD    Manchester    Marginal Indian Punjabi Sikh men; a psychotherapeutic perspective    Kamaldeep Singh DHILLON    Dr C Bates
2004    PhD    Nottingham    Inherited factors in pre-eclampsia: molecular genetic and epidemiological studies in a Sri Lankan population    V H W DISSANAYAKE
2004    PhD    Bristol    Gender and human rights: a discursive study of “violence against women” in Mexico and Pakistan    Silvie DRESSELHAUS    Dr J Weldes; Dr V Hewitt
2004    PhD    Portsmouth    The growth and applicationof Shari’ah in India: a legislative and judicial interpretation since 1947    E EHSANULLAH
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Portugal and Portuguese India, 1870-1961    Bernard Dale ETHELL    Prof P G Robb
2004    PhD    Bradford    Ceramic specialisation and standardisation in early historic South Asia: an interdisciplinary investigation of rouletted ware, grey ware and Arikamedu Type 10    L A FORD
2004    PhD    Hull    Identity, war and the state in India:  the case of the Nagas    Mr T FRANKS
2004    PhD    London, King’s    Improving the quality management systems for pharmaceutical services in developing countries: a case study in Sri Lanka    Piyadasa Galalla GAMAGE
2004    PhD    Oxford, Blackfriars    The Vedantic cosmology of Ramanuja and its western parallels    Robindra GANERI    Prof J S K Ward
2004    PhD    Nottingham    Slavery in ancient Greek poleis and ancient Sri Lanka: a comparison    W M W GEDARA
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    Of poverty and markets: the political economy of informal waste recovery and plastic recycling in Delhi    K GILL    Dr B Vira
2004    PhD    St Hugh’s    Caitanya Vaisnava Vedanta: acintyabhedabheda of Jiva Gosvani’s Catusutri Tika    Ravi Mohar GUPTA    Dr S Gupta-Gombrich; Prof J S K Ward
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Samaj and unity: the in Bengali literati’s discourse on nationhood,  1867-1905    Swarupa GUPTA    Prof P G Robb
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    The politics of language and nation-building: the Nehruvian legacy and representations of cultural diversity in Sahgal, Rushdie and Seth    A M GUTTMAN
2004    PhD    East Anglia    Understanding gender and intra-household relations: a case study of Shaviyani Atoll, Maldives    Hala HAMEED    Prof C Jackson
2004    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The dynamics of low-caste conversion movements: rural Punjab c 1880-1935    Christopher Gerard Michael HARDING    Prof J M Brown
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Religious mobilisation and the construction of political space in the Indian North West Frontier tribal areas in the early twentieth century    Sana HAROON
2004    MPhil    Leicester    Lord Lake of Laswaree and Delhi, 1744-1808    Roger HARRIS    Dr H V Bowen
2004    PhD    Durham    Detection, monitoring and management of small water bodies: a case study of Shahjadpur Thana, Bangladesh    Khondaker Mohammod Shariful HUDA    Dr P J Atkins; Dr D Donaghue
2004    PhD    Warwick    Problem of national identity of the middle class in Bangladesh and state-satellite television    Zeenat HUDA    Dr P Mukta
2004    PhD    Essex    Initial public offerings in Pakistan    T IMTIAZ
2004    PhD    South Bank    Parental involvement, attitudes and responsibilities in educaton: a case study of parents in Britain and Pakistan    N INAYAT
2004    PhD    Cranfield    Technology catch-up actions for manufacturing companies in Pakistan    N IQBAL

2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Protestant translations of the Bible (1714-1995) and defining a Protestant Tamil identity    Hephziba ISRAEL
2004    PhD    London, LSE    People and tigers: an anthropological study of the Sundarbans of West Belgal, India    A JALAIS
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Queens’    The agency of normal food: performing normality in contemporary urban Bengal    Manpreet Kaur JANEJA    Prof C Humphrey
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Nuffield    Bridging the digital divide: regulating universal access in India    Akash K KAPUR    Ms B Morgan
2004    PhD    Reading    Constraints and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and forest management in the mountains of North West Frontier Province, Pakistan    Jahangir KHAN    Dr H M Jones
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Selwyn    Ecology and conservation of the Bengal tiger in the Sundarbans mangrove forest of Bangadesh    M M H KHAN    Dr D J Chivers
2004    PhD    De Montfort    Temple architecture of Bengal 9th to 16th centuries    A KHARE
2004    PhD    Keele    Reconstructing rights: an analysis of the role of rights in reconstructing gender relations in the earthquake affected area, Maharashtra, India    Jane KRISHNADAS
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Resolution and rupture: the paradox of violence in witch accusations in Chhatisgarh, India    Helen M MACDONALD    Dr D Mosse
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Resolution and rupture: the paradox of violence in witch accusations in Chhattisgarh, India    Helen M MacDONALD
2004    PhD    Edinburgh    Pious flames: changing Western interpretations of widow burning in India to 1860    Andrea MAJOR    Dr C Bates; Dr I Duffield
2004    PhD    Oxford, St John’s    Cricket in colonial India, 1850-1947    Boria MAJUMDAR    Dr D A Washbrook
2004    PhD    Nottingham    Land tax administration and compliance attitudes in Malaysia    N A A MANAF
2004    PhD    London, King’s    Countering hegemony: the geopolitics of agrobiotechnology and the regulatory role of the Indian state    Martin MANSKI    M Mulligan
2004    PhD    Birmingham    The interdependency and the relationship between the government and private sector and their changing role in the development of micro island tourism in the Maldives    Abdulla MAUSOOM
2004    PhD    Durham    Travelling knowledges: urban poverty and slum/shack dwellers international    Colin McFARLANE    Dr G Macleod
2004    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    The establishment and growth of selected pioneer tree species from disturbed tropical rainforest sites in Malaysia    H MD NOOR
2004    PhD    London, King’s    Reterritorialising transnational corporate hegemony: the geopolitics of agribiotechnology and the regulatory role of the state in India    Martin MENSKI
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Zorastrian music    Raiomond MIRZA    Prof O Wright; Dr R Widdess
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Space, borders and histories: identity in colonial Goalpura (India)    Sanghamitra MISRA    Prof P G Robb
2004    PhD    Cambridge, St John’s    Crystal structure of north east India and southern Tibet and a comparison with thelithosphere of the stable Indian shield    S MITRA    Dr K F Priestley
2004    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    The British in India and their domiciled brethern: race and class in the colonial context, 1858-1930    Satoshi MIZUTANI    Dr D A Washbrook
2004    MPhil    Leeds    Enabling and disabling factors of community cohesion among Pakistani Muslims in Bradford    Dominic J MOGHAL    Dr K Knott
2004    PhD    London , UC    Reworking modernity: the impact of resettlement in the Narmada valley, India    Kuheli MOOKERJEE    Dr C Dwyer; Dr A Varley
2004    PhD    London, InstArch    An examination of the spatial and temporal variation of lithic technology throughout the early Bronze Age of Pakistan    Justin Collard MORRIS    K Thomas
2004    PhD    London, UC    Lithic technology and cultural change during the late prehistoric period of northwest South Asia    J C MORRIS
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Lucy     Markets, transport and the state of Bengal economy, c.1750-1800    T MUKHERJEE    Prof C A Bayley
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    The perception of the “medieval” in Indian popular films, 1920s -1960s    Urvi MUKHOPADHYAY    Dr D Ali; Dr R Dwyer
2004    PhD    Cambridge    Impact of food supplementation on pregnancy weight gain and birth weight in rural Bangladesh    Shamsun NAHAR
2004    PhD    Cambridge. Sidney    Caught in the digital divide: transforming meanings of space, gender and identity for high tech professionals in Bangalore city, India    Roopa NAIR    Prof S E Corbridge
2004    PhD    Reading    The motivation of masons in the Sri Lankan construction industry    Leyon NANAYAKKARA
2004    PhD    Wales, Aberystwyth    Second World War Japanese atrocities and British minor war crimes trials: the issue of fair trial in the four selected British minor war crimes trials in Malaya and Singapore    A NARAYAN
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    The Gandavyuha-sutra: a study of wealth, gender and power in an Indian Buddhist narrative    Douglas Edward OSTO
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Archaic knowledge, tradition and authenticity in colonial north India    Rakesh PANDEY    Dr D Ali
2004    PhD    West of England    Performance measurement and evaluation of supply chain: the Indian automobile industry    B PATEL
2004    PhD    Aberdeen    Emergency obstetric care: needs of poor women in Bangladesh    E PITCHFORTH
2004    PhD    London, LSE    Multinationals, local firms and economic reforms in Indian industry    Tushar PODDAR
2004    PhD    Birmingham    Mineral chemistry and metal extraction of Sri Lanka beach sands    W A P PREMARATNE
2004    PhD    London, LSE    A micro-econometric analysis of alcohol prohibition in India    L RAHMAN
2004    PhD    London, Wye    Measurement of productivity and efficiency of rice farmers in Bangladesh: an empirical study    Mohamed Mizanur RAHMAN
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Wolfson    Seismic characteristics of the southern Indian and the adjacent pan-African high grade terranes of Gondwanaland    Abhishek Kumar RAI    Dr K F Priestley
2004    PhD    Leeds    Nation, celebration and selected works of Michel Ondaatje and Carol Shields    Gillian Marie ROBERTS
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville    HLA-DBQ1 – reproduction and health in consanguinous and non consanguinous families in Bangladesh    S ROY CHOUDHURY    Dr L A Knapp
2004    PhD    Leeds    The Sixteenth Landers, 1822-1846: the experience of regimental soldiering in India    J H RUMSBY
2004    PhD    Newcastle    Trade reforms: total factor productivity and profitability of manufacturing sectors in Pakistan    Naveeda SALAM
2004    PhD    Open    Psychedelic whiteness: rave tourism and the materiality of race in Goa    Joseph Johannes Arun SALDANHA    Dr J D Robinson; Prof D B Massey
2004    PhD    Manchester    The effect of globalisation on the grassroots women in Bangladesh    Nasreen SATTAR    Ms S Rowbotham
2004    PhD    London, LSE    Understanding the state: an anthropological study of rural Jharkhand, India    A SHAH
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    The Balochi verb: an etymological study    Azim SHAHBAKHSH
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Wolfson    State and society in: Gujerat, c.1200-1500: the making of a region    Samira SHEIKH    Dr D A Washbrook
2004    PhD    Edinburgh    Living with HIV/AIDS: turning points, transitions and transformations in the lives of women in Bombay and Edinburgh    Dina Pervez SIDHVA
2004    PhD    Cambridge    Exploring inclusive education in an Indian context    N SINGAL
2004    PhD    Birmingham    The question of method in Dalit theology: in search of a systematic approach of an Indian liberation theology    Charles SINGARAM
2004    MPhil    Wales, Swansea    Policy and practice of forest management through local institutions in Himachal Pradesh, India    M P SOOD
2004    PhD    South Bank    Health beliefs and health practices of South Asian and British white adults with and without myocardial infarction    Dooroowadave SOOKHOO
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Linacre    Secularism in Salman Rushdie’s “Midnight’s children” and Vikram Seth’s “A suitable boy”: history, nation, language    Neelam F R SRIVASTAVA    Dr J A Mee
2004    PhD    Cardiff    Crossing boundaries: an ethnography of occupational socialization of post-diploma baccalaureate nursing students in Pakistan    Grace D STANLEY
2004    PhD    Cardiff    Crossing boundaries: an ethnography of occupational socialization of post-diploma baccalaureate student nurses in Pakistan    Grace Dianne STANLEY    M Neary; G A Donald
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Downing    From “Palestine” [poem] to India: Bishop Heber’s poetic pilgrimage    I TAKAHASHI    Dr N J Leask
2004    PhD    London, SOAS    Towards a definitive grammar of Bengali: a study and critique of research on selected grammatical structures    Hanne-Ruth THOMPSON    Dr W Radice
2004    PhD    Birmingham    Support and supervision of secondary school teachers in Bangladesh    H THORNTON
2004    DPhil    Oxford, Worcester    Tectonic, metamorphic and magmatic evolution of the central Karakoram crust, northern Pakistan    aNDREW THOW    Dr D J Waters; Prof R R Parrish; Dr M P Searle
2004    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    The grammar and poetics of Murti-Seva: Caitanya Vaisnava image worship as discourse, ritual and narrative    Kenneth R VALPEY    Dr S Gupta-Gombrich; Prof J S K Ward
2004    PhD    Birmingham    Differences in school performance between Tamil Brahmin and Malabar Muslim children in Kerala, India: a socio-cutural approach    V P VAZHALANICKAL
2004    PhD    Open    Science, technology and agency in the development of drought prone areas: a cognitive history of drought and scarcity    Linden Faith VINCENT    Prof D V Wield
2004    PhD    Coventry    Partition and locality: case studies of the impact of partition and its aftermath in the Punjab region, 1947-1961    Pritpal VIRDEE    Prof I A Talbot
2004    PhD    Cambridge, St Edmund’s    Eating and identity in the novels of V S Naipaul, Anita Desai, Timothy Mo and Salman Rushdie    Paul Matthew John VLITOS    Dr A D B Poole
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Churchill    Thuggee and the “construction” of crime in early nineteenth century India    Kim Ati WAGNER    Prof C A Bayley
2004    PhD    Cambridge, Emmanuel    Between bureaucrats and beneficiaries: the implementation of eco-development:in Pench tiger reserves, India    Jo L WOODMAN    Dr B Vira
2004    PhD    Glasgow    The analysis of human mitochondrial DNA in peninsular Malaysia    Z ZAINUDDIN
2004    PhD    London, King’s    Remote sensing and GIS based assessment of El-Nino related fire activity on Borneo, 1982-1998    Athanossios ZOUMAS
2005    PhD    Loughborough    Alternative arrangements for water supply in urban areas: case studies in Karachi, Pakistan    Noman AHMED
2005    PhD    London, UC    Through “spirits”: cosmology and landscape ecology among the Nyishi tribe of upland Arunachal Pradesh, northeast India    Alexander AISHER    Dr C Pinney; Dr M Banerjee
2005    PhD    Keele    The cultural politics of production: ethnicity, gender and the labour process in Sri Lanka tea plantations    Chandana G ALAWATTAGE
2005    PhD    London, King’s    Studies on slected Malaysian plants as antidiabetic agent    H M ALI
2005    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Equality of educational opportunity and public policy in Bangladesh    Mohammad Niaz ASADULLAH    Dr R Kingdon; Dr S Dercon
2005    PhD    London, LSE    Structural changes in East Asia: factor accumulation, technological progress and economic geography    Shuvojit BANERJEE
2005    PhD    Manchester    The politics of market space in Calcutta, India: past and present    Martin BEATTIE    Prof S Guy
2005    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    Missionary education knowledge and and north Indian society, c 1880- 1915    Hayden John-Andrew BELLENOIT    Dr D A Washbrook
2005    PhD    London, King’s    The changing goddess: the religious lives of Hindu women in West Bengal    Cynthia BRADLEY    Prof F Hardy
2005    PhD    London, UC    Mental illness, medical pluralism and Islamism in Sylhet, Bangladesh    Alyson Fleur CALLAN    Prof R Littlewood
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Muzaffar Ahmad, Calcutta and socialist politics, 1913-1929    Suchetana CHATTOPADYHYAY    Prof P G Robb
2005    PhD    East Anglia    Surface tension: water and agrarian change in a rainfed village, West Bengal, India    Daniel COPPARD    Dr B Lankford
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Sri Pada: diversity and exclusion in a sacred site in Sri Lanka    Delkandura Arachchige Premakumara DE SILVA
2005    PhD    London, LSHTM    Social capital and maternal mental health: a cross cultural comparison of four developing countries [Peru, India, Ethiopia, Vietnam]    Mary Joan DE SILVA    Ms S Huttly; Prof T Harpham
2005    PhD    Cambridge. Trinity Hall    Second language acquisition of articles and plural markings by Bengali learners of Engish    Hildegunn DIRDAL    Dr T Parodi
2005    MPhil    London, UC    The servant/employer relationship in19th century England and India    Fae Ceridwen DUSSART    Prof C M Hall
2005    PhD    London, Royal Holloway    Analysing the impact of labour and education laws on child labour in Pakistan during the 1990s    T FASIH
2005    PhD    London, Inst Ed    Ways forward to achieve school effectiveness and school improvement: a case study of school leadership and teacher professional development in Sri Lanka    B N A B FERNANDO
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Surrendering to the earth: a feminine interpretation of Dharma worship in Bengal with special reference to ‘Sunya Purana    Fabrizio FERRARI
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Twentieth century South Asian Christian theological engagement with religious pluralism: its challenges for pentecostalism in India    Geomon Kizhakkemalayil GEORGE
2005    MPhil    Birmingham    Sikhism and violence    P GILL
2005    PhD    Cambridge, Gonville     Inverted metamorphism in the Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalay: structural, metamorphic and numerical studies    S GOSWAMI    Prof M J Bickle
2005    MPhil    West of  England    A study of “enabling conditions” in primary schools in Negombo Education Zone in Sri Lanka with special reference to effective leadership and physical and material resources    Egodawatte Arachchige Don GUNAWARDENA
2005    DPhil    Oxford, St Cross    Discourses of religion and development: agency, empowerment and choices or Muslim women in Gujerat, India    Laila N HALANI    Dr M J Banks
2005    PhD    Reading    Farmers’ decision-making in rice pest management: implications for farmer field school approaches in Bangladesh    Mohammad Abdul HAMID    Dr D D Shepherd
2005    PhD    Manchester    A fire of tongues: narrative patterning in the Sanskrit Mahabharata    James Marcel HEGARTY
2005    PhD    London, Queen Mary    Intellectual property law and e-commerce in Sri Lanka: towards a jurisprudence based on consitution, Roman-Dutch law and Buddhist principles    T S K HEMARATNE
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Rights based development: formal and process approaches in Pakistan    Shiona Mary HOOD
2005    PhD    Cambridge, Fitzwilliam    Ecology, economy and society in the eastern Bengal delta, c.1840-1943    Khondker Iftekhar IQBAL    Prof C A Bayley
2005    PhD    Plymouth    International freight transport multimodal development in developing countries: the case of Bangladesh    Dewan Mohammad Zahurul ISLAM    Dr R Gray
2005    DPhil    Sussex    Women, employment and the family: poor informal sector women workers in Dhaka city    Farzana ISLAM    Dr H Standing
2005    PhD    London, LSE    Assessing the impact of Gujerat’s resettlement and rehabilitation policy on the livelihoods of women and their empowerment post-displacement    Anupma JAIN
2005    PhD    Open    Volcanic architecture of the Deccan Traps, western Maharashtra, India: an integrated chemostratigraphic and paleomagnetic study    Anne E JAY
2005    PhD    Cambridge, Darwin    Cross cultural perspectives in contemporary Sri Lankan writing in English    Sharanya JAYAWICKRAMA    Dr P Gopal
2005    DPhil    Oxford, St Antony’s    India divided: state and society in the aftermath of partitition: the case of Uttar Pradesh, 1946-1952    Yasmin KHAN    Prof J M Brown; Prof I A Talbot
2005    PhD    London, LSE    Soldiers’ experience of war, Burma 1942-1945    Tatjana Genoveva Ursula KRALJIC    Prof M Knox
2005    MPhil    West of England    An investigation of primary teachers’ professional attitudes in Sri Lanka with special reference to Negombo Educational Zone    Nihil Tissa Kumara LOKULIYANA
2005    DPhil    Oxford    Implications of displacement and resettlement for the Gonds of central India    Preeti MANN    Dr D Chatty; Dr M J Banks
2005    PhD    Queen’s, Belfast    Women’s human rights in Islam and international human rights regime: the case of Pakistan    N MIAN
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Merchants, markets and the monopoly of the East India Company: the salt trade in Bengal under colonial control c. 1790-1836    Sayako MIKI    Prof P G Robb
2005    PhD    London,  SOAS    The transmission and performance for khyai composition in the Gwalior gharana of India vocal music    A D MORRIS
2005    PhD    Essex    A case of interest maximisation? Military-civil bureaucratic behaviour and political outcomes in Bangladesh (1975-1990)    Khairuzzaman MOZUMDER
2005    EdD    Birmingham    Exploring the potential for educational change through participatory and democratic approaches in Pakistan    N MUHAMMAD
2005    PhD    Nottingham    United Nations charter and treaty-based international human rights monitoring in relation to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: a study of two states, the United Kingdom and the Republic of India    A MUKHERJEE
2005    DPhil    Sussex    Knowledge, identity, place and (cyber)space: growing up male and middle class in Bangalore    N C NISBETT
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Case study of a health-oriented NGO in Pakistan    Madeline PATTERSON
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    From medical relief to community health care: a case study of non-governmental organisation (Frontier Primary Health Care) in North Western Province, Pakistan    Margaret Madeline PATTERSON
2005    dpHIL    Oxford, Balliol    Through district eyes: local raj and the myth of the Punjab tradition in British India, 1858-1907    Dara Milnes PRICE    Dr D A Washbrook
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    The sant traditioin and community formation in the works of Guru Nanak and Dadu Dayal    Susan Elizabeth PRILL    Dr C Shackle
2005    PhD    King’s, London    Gender disadvantage as a risk factor for common mental disorder in women residing in Rawalpindi/Islamabad    F QADIR
2005    EdD    Durham    Nurse education, foreign aid and development: a case study from Bangladesh    Patricia ROBSON
2005    DPhil    Sussex    Tamil youth: the performance of hierarchical masculinities: an anthropological study of youth groups in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India    M C ROGERS
2005    PhD    London, Insti Comm    Socio-economic rights as constitutional human rights: Canada, South Africa and India compared    Desa ROSEN    Dr M Craven (SOAS); Dr P Gready
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Early photography in India, 1850s-1870s    Stephanie S ROY
2005    PhD    Cambridge, Trinity    Sentimental imperialism: British literature and India, 1770-1830    Andrew John RUDD    Dr N J Leask
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Conversion and communication: Christian communication and indigenous agency in conversion among the Kui people of Orissa, India, 1835-1970    Jagat Ranjan SANTRA
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    The formation of Islamic community identity in medieval north India    Nilanjan SARKAR    Dr D Ali
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    The political identity of the Delhi Sultanate, 1200-1400: a study of Zia ud-din Barani’s Fatawa-i-Jahandari    Nilanjan SARKAR    Dr D Ali
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Globalization and identity: Sikh nationalism, diaspora and international relations    Giorgiandrea SHANI
2005    PhD    Sheffield    Structure and composition of India’s exports with speial reference to India’s post- liberalisation period    Abhijit SHARMA
2005    PhD    De Montfort    Colonial intervention and urban transformation: a case studyof Shahjahanabad, Old Delhi    J P SHARMA
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    A study of the Amaravati stupa: the chronology and social contexts of an early historic Buddhist site in the Lower Krishna Valley    Akira SHIMADA    Dr D Ali
2005    DPhil    Oxford, Green    The business of schooling:the school choice processes, markets and institutions governing low-fee provate schooling for disadvantaged groups in India    Prachi SRIVASTAVA    Dr M Birbili; Prof G Walford
2005    DPhil    Oxford    The experience of four famines in NWP & O (1837-1838, 1860- 1861; 1868-1869; 1896-1897): the gainers and the losers    Seema SRIVASTAVA
2005    MPhil    Nottingham    The effects of Asean on trade flows and assessing trade flows of the candidate country (case study: India)    Puttachat SUWANKIRI
2005    PhD    Edinburgh    Prime time and prayer time: television, religion and the practices of everyday life of Marthoma Christians in Kerala, India    Sham Padinjattethil THOMAS
2005    PhD    Strathclyde    Car dependency and traffic congestion: a case of a Malaysian city in Borneo    L TSESED KONG
2005    MPhil    Dundee    Motivation and incentives in government organisations: a study of the Income Tax Department in India    Mohanish VERMA
2005    PhD    Cambridge, Jesus    Seeking cultural safety: NGO responses to HIV/AIDS among South Asians in Delhi and London    Hannah Jill WESTON    Dr G Kearns
2005    MPhil    London, King’s    Sri Lankan perceptions of health and illness: quantitative and qualitative approaches    Yapa Mudiyanselage Charitha Gothami WIJERATNE
2005    PhD    Sunderland    Women’s ordination in Theravada Buddhism:ancient evidence and modern debates    L WILLIAMS
2005    PhD    London, SOAS    Literate networks and the production of Sgaw and Pwo Karen writing in Burma, c.1830-1930    William Burgess WOMACK    Dr M Charney Professor Ian Brown
2005    PhD    Nottingham    Predictors of language learning success in Bangladeshi secondary education institutions    Feroza YASMIN    Prof Z Dornyel
2006    PhD    London, LSHTM    Quality of care for reproductive tract morbidities by rural private practitioners in north India    Meenakshi GAUTHAM
2006    DPhil    Sussex    Poor women’s experiences of marriage and love in the city of New Delhi: every day stories of Sukh and Dukh    Shalini GROVER
2006    PhD    Newcastle    Valuation techniques of protected areas: a case study of Gir, Gujarat, India    Mohan Lal SHARMA
2006    PhD    London, Imperial    Contaminated irrigaton water and food safety in India    Kerry Vivienne SWANTON

Table 2: List of theses with incomplete data, listed alphabetically by the University and College followed by the AUTHOR (in capital letters) followed by the Supervisor(s) where available and the thesis Title. The Year and/or  Degree were not available in the public database.  If you are an author or supervisor or other academic representative, please write in with these details if possible.

Aberdeen    Sultan Ali ADIL        An economic analysis of energy use in irrigated agriculture of Punjab        PhD
Birmingham 0.365217391    S A KARUNANAYAKE        An evaluation of the present system of local government in Ceylon in the light of national needs for unity and economic and social development and proposals for appropriate changes        PhD
Birmingham 0.369264706    M G KANBUR        Spatial equilibrium analysis of trhe rice economy of South India    2000
BradfordCambridge, Trinity    Z KHAN        The development of overt nuclear weapon states in South Asia        PhD
Cambridge    Katherine Helen PRIOR        The British administration of Hinduism in India, 1780-1900        PhD
Cambridge    G CHAKRAVARTY        Imagining resistance: British historiography and popular fiction on the Indian Rebellion of 1857-1859        PhD
Cambridge 0.327375    Ajit Kumar GHOSE        Production organisation, markets and resource use in Indian agriculture        PhD
Cambridge 0.361285714    M J EGAN        A structural analysis of a Sinhalese healing ritual        PhD
Cambridge, King’s 0.301    J A LAIDLAW        The religion of Svetambar Jain merchants in Jaipur        PhD
Cambridge, Pembroke    H T  FRY    Prof E E Rich    Alexander Dalrymple, cosmographer and servant of the East India Company        PhD
Cambridge, Trinity    Magnus Murray MARSDEN    Dr S B Bayly    Islamization and globalization in Chitral, Northern Pakistan
Cambridge, Trinity Hall    C J JEFFREY    Dr S E Corbridge    Reproducing difference: the accumulation strategies of richer Jat farmers in Western Uttar Pradesh, India    2002
Cambridge, Wolfson    Gethin REES    DrD K Chakrabarti    Buddhism and trade: rock cut caves of the Western Ghats        PhD
Cranfield, Silsoe    Ariyaratne DISSANAYAKE    J Morris    Research and development and extension for agricultural mechanisation in Sri Lanka
De Montfort    S JAIN        The havelis of Rajasthan: form and identity        PhD
Durham 0.401311475    M F A KHAN        The arid zone of West Pakistan        PhD
East Anglia    John HARISS        Technological change in agricultural and agrarian social structure in Northen Tamil Nadu, India        PhD
Edinburgh    N THIN        High spirits and heteroglossia: forest festivals of the Nilgiri Irulas        PhD
Edinburgh    AKSHAY KHANNA        Sexuality as a political object in civil society: active formations in India    2003
Edinburgh    Rebecca WALKER        Concepts of peace in conflict situations in Sri Lanka        PhD
Glasgow    Sana KHOKHAR    Dr F Noorbakhsh; Dr A Paloni    An evaluation of the structural adjustment and economic reform programme: a case study of Pakistan        MPhil
Lancaster    J A BURR        Cultural stereotypes and the diagnosis of depression: women from South Asian communities and their experience of mental distress    1980
Leeds    E K TARIN        Health sector reforms: factors influencing the policy process for government initiatives in the Punjab (Pakistan) health sector, 1993-2000        PhD
Leeds 0.35375    A P A FERNANDO        Agricultural development of Ceylon since independence (1948-1968)- an investigation into some aspects of agricultural development in Ceylon and an evaluation of major agricultural policies adopted in the peasant sector        PhD
Leeds 0.35375    M S KHAN        Policies and planning for agricultural development with a high population density: a case study of East Pakistan        PhD
London    F R M HASAN        Ecology and rural class relations in Bangladesh: a study with special reference to three villages        PhD
London    B GHOSH    Dr Anstey    The Indian salt industry, trade and taxation        PhD
London    R L HATFIELD        Management reform in a centralised environment: primary education administration in Balochistan, Pakistan, 1992-1997        MSc
London    GAYAS-UD-DIN        Medical library and information system for India        PhD
London    Sarmistha PAL        Choice of casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture: a theoretical and empirical analysis    2000
London,  SOAS    Pillarisetti SUDHIR    Mr Chaudhuri    British attitudes to Indian nationalism, 1922-1935    2001 (Apropos the author’s correction in the Comments section, this entry has been moved to the main list.)
London, External 0.357464789    A A KHATRI        Marriage and family relationships in Gujerati fiction        PhD
London, Imperial    Sinniah JEYALINGAWATHANI        Thr utilisation of indigenous and imported Bos indicus breeds in the dry zone of Sri Lanka    2002
London, LSE    A KUNDU    Prof Allen; Mr Booker    Statistical measures of five year plans in India    2003
London, LSE    Flora Elizabeth CORNISH    Dr C Campbell    Constructing an actionable environment: colelctive action for HIV prevention among Kolkata sex workers        MPhil
London, LSE 0.423157895    B P DUTIA        Economic aspects of production and marketing of cotton in India        PhD
London, LSHTM    Margaret J LEPPARD        Obstetric care in a Bangladeshi hospital: an organisational ethnography        PhD
London, LSHTM    Steven RUSSELL        Can households afford to be ill ? the role of the health system, maternal resources and social networks in Sri Lanka        PhD
London, LSHTM    Syed Mohd Akramuz ZAMAN        Cohort study of the effect of measles on childhood morbidity in urban Bangladesh        PhD
London, LSHTM    Mrigesh Roopchandra BHATIA        Economic evaluation od malaria control in Surat, India: bednets versus residual insecticide apray        PhD
London, SOAS    A B M MAHMOOD    Mr Harrison    The land revenue history of the Rajshahi zamindari, 1765-1793        PhD
London, SOAS    Oliver David SPRINGATE-BAGINSKY    Dr S I Jewitt    Sustainable development through particpatory forest management: an analysis of the long term role of the cooperative forest societies of Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh, India        PhD
London, SOAS    Isabella NARDI    Dr G Tillotson    The Citrasutras: the Indian theory of painting    1929?    MA
London, SOAS    Angela ATKINS    Dr R Snell    The Indian novel in English and Hindi        PhD
London, SOAS    Angela C EYRE        Land, language and literary identity: a thematic comparison of Indian novels in Hindi and English        MA
London, SOAS    Rajit Kumar MAZUMDER    Prof P G Robb    The making of Punjab: colonial power, the Indian army and recruited peasants, 1849-1939        MA
London, SOAS    Lalita Nath PANIGRAHI    Prof a l Basham    The practice of female infanticide in India and its suppression in the North Western Provinces        PhD
London, SOAS 0.318795181    Terumichi KAWAI        Freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law with special reference to the UK, US, India and Japan        MPhil
London, SOAS 0.3432    W P KINNEY    Dr M Caldwell; P C Ayre    Aspects of economic development in Malaya        MA
London, SOAS 0.35375    K D GAUR        Economic crimes relating to income tax in India: a critical analysis of tax evasion and tax avoidance        PhD
London, SOAS 0.35375    A GHAFFAR        Protection of personal liberty under the Pakistan constitution        BLitt
London, SOAS 0.35375    K P MISHRA    Dr J B Harrison    The administration and economy of the Banaras region, 1738-1795        BLitt
London, SOAS 0.382153846    K M KARIM        The provinces of Bihar and Bengal under Shabjahan    2003
Manchester    A BERADLEY    Prof Muir    Settlement of the Madras Presidency, 1765-1827        MA
Manchester    W A G HARRINGTON        The theory and practice of non-formal education in developing countries with case studies from India        PhD
Manchester    Jane HAGGIS        Professional ladies and working wives: female missionaries in the London Missionary Society and its South Travancoe District, South India, 1850-1900         MPhil
Manchester 0.401311475    S T G FERNANDO        A historical and analytical account of export taxation in Ceylon, 1802-1958        PhD
Manchester 0.411864407    R L KUMAR        India’s post-war balance of payments sincce 1945-1955        DPhil
Manchester 0.417413793    T S EPSTEIN        A comparative study of economic change and differentiation in two South Indian villages        PhD
Manchester Metropolitan    S PAREKH        Relationships between children with cerebral palsy and their siblings: an ethnography in Kolkata, India
Newcastle    Alice MALPASS    Dr P Phillimore    Hibred kala: the hybrid age of choice, dissent and imagination: contract faming and genetically modified cotton in Karnataka, South India        MSC
Newcastle 0.373432836    K K KHOSLA        Conditions of labour and labour legislation of industrial workers in India since 1947    2001
North London    Jasmin ARA    Ms R Glanville    Primary health care facilities in Bangladesh: a method of planning and design taking account of limited resources, local technology, future growth and change    2000
Oxford    W M KHAN        An economic evaluation of the alternative uses of land under state forests in Baluchistan    1999
Oxford, Campion Hall    P EKKE    Dr D F Brook    An ethnogaphic survey of the Oraons and the Mundas of Chota-Nagpur    1991
Oxford, Nuffield    Alistair McMILLAN    Dr N Gooptu; Prof A F Heath    Scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and party competition in India    1991
Oxford, St Hilda’s    H Vinita TSENG    Prof R F Gombrich    The Nidanavagga of the Saratthappakasini: the first two vaggas    1993
Oxford, Wolfson    Somadeva VASUDEVA    Prof A G J S Sanderson    The yoga of the Malinivijayottaratantra    1994
Reading 0.38671875    M A KAMAL        Balances and unbalanced growth as exemplified by a decade of planning experience in India    1994
Salford    S CHOWDHURY    Mr E K Grime    Housing in Bangladesh    1998
Sheffield    RITA SAIKIA    Prof M F Lynch    The utility of object-oriented domain specification in the context of a large organisation in India    1998
Southampton 0.369264706    Mohammad A MONDAL        A suggested approach to the solution of the profit measurement and asset valuation with reference to the developing economies of India and Pakisttan    1999
Strathclyde 0.37358209    T G GEHANI        A critical review of the work of Scottish Presbyterian missions in India, 1878-1914    1999
Sussex    R G HESELTINE        The development and impact of jute cultivation in Bengal, 1870-1930    2000
Wales    Animesh HALDER        Potential diversification in India’s export pattern    2000
Wales, Swansea    S S MUKHERJEE        Urban process in Calcutta: some planning implications    2004
Wales, Swansea    Julia CLEEVES        Gender and reproductive health: issues in hormonal contraception in India    2004
Wales, University College of Swansea 0.346621622    E A KUMARASINGHE        Information for health planning in Sri Lanka    1965

Bengal Legislative Council 1921

This is a 1921 photograph of the Bengal Legislative Council with the Governor of Bengal, the Earl of Ronaldshay (later Secretary of State for India and  known as the Marquess of Zetland) at the centre. To his immediate right is Surendranath Roy, then President of the Council. Seated second to the left of the Governor is Surendranath Banerjee, the eminent leader of the Indian National Congress (and mentor of GK Gokhale and other “moderates” in the national movement); he and Surendranath Roy were friends and political colleagues.

1921legcouncil3

A Brief History of Gilgit (2006)

A Brief History of Gilgit

by Subroto Roy

This is a rather self-contained excerpt from my two-part article in The Statesman of June 4-5, 2006 titled“Pakistan’s Allies”.

“Jammu & Kashmir and especially Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins the Pashtun regions whose capital has been Peshawar. In August-November 1947, a British coup d’etat against J&K State secured Gilgit-Baltistan for the new British Dominion of Pakistan.

The Treaty of Amritsar had nowhere required Gulab Singh’s dynasty to accept British political control in J&K as came to be exercised by British “Residents” in all other Indian “Native States”. Despite this, Delhi throughout the late 19th Century relentlessly pressed Gulab Singh’s successors Ranbir Singh and Partab Singh to accept political control. The Dogras acquiesced eventually. Delhi’s desire for control had less to do with the welfare of J&K’s people than with protection of increasing British interests in the area, like European migration to Srinagar Valley and guarding against Russian or German moves in Afghanistan.

“Sargin” or “Sargin Gilit”, later corrupted by the Sikhs and Dogras into “Gilgit”, had an ancient people who spoke an archaic Dardic language “intermediate between the Iranian and the Sanskritic”. “The Dards were located by Ptolemy with surprising accuracy on the West of the Upper Indus, beyond the headwaters of the Swat River (Greek: Soastus) and north of the Gandarae (i.e. Kandahar), who occupied Peshawar and the country north of it. This region was traversed by two Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hsien, coming from the north about AD 400 and Hsuan Tsiang, ascending from Swat in AD 629, and both left records of their journeys.”

Gilgit had been historically ruled by a Hindu dynasty called Trakane; when they became extinct, Gilgit Valley “was desolated by successive invasions of neighbouring rulers, and in the 20 or 30 years ending with 1842 there had been five dynastic revolutions. The Sikhs entered Gilgit about 1842 and kept a garrison there.” When J&K came under Gulab Singh, “the Gilgit claims were transferred with it, and a boundary commission was sent” by the British. In 1852 the Dogras were driven out with 2,000 dead. In 1860 under Ranbir Singh, the Dogras “returned to Gilgit and took Yasin twice, but did not hold it. They also in 1866 invaded Darel, one of the most secluded Dard states, to the south of the Gilgit basin but withdrew again.”

The British appointed a Political Agent in Gilgit in 1877 but he was withdrawn in 1881. “In 1889, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British Government, acting as the suzerain power of Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency”. The Agency was re-established under control of the British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir. “It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas”. In 1935, the British demanded J&K lease to them for 60 years Gilgit town plus most of the Gilgit Agency and the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkuman. Hari Singh had no choice but to acquiesce. The leased region was then treated as part of British India, administered by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi, first through the Resident in J& K and later a British Agent in Peshawar. J& K State no longer kept troops in Gilgit and a mercenary force, the Gilgit Scouts, was recruited with British officers and paid for by Delhi. In April 1947, Delhi decided to formally retrocede the leased areas to Hari Singh’s J& K State as of 15 August 1947. The transfer was to formally take place on 1 August.

On 31 July, Hari Singh’s Governor arrived to find “all the officers of the British Government had opted for service in Pakistan”. The Gilgit Scouts’ commander, a Major William Brown aged 25, and his adjutant, a Captain Mathieson, planned openly to engineer a coup détat against Hari Singh’s Government. Between August and October, Gilgit was in uneasy calm. At midnight on 31 October 1947, the Governor was surrounded by the Scouts and the next day he was “arrested” and a provisional government declared.

Hari Singh’s nearest forces were at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, a few miles downstream from where the Indus is joined by Gilgit River. The 6th J& K Infantry Battalion there was a mixed Sikh-Muslim unit, typical of the State’s Army, commanded by a Lt Col. Majid Khan. Bunji controlled the road to Srinagar. Further upstream was Skardu, capital of Baltistan, part of Laddakh District where there was a small garrison. Following Brown’s coup in Gilgit, Muslim soldiers of the 6th Infantry massacred their Sikh brothers-at-arms at Bunji. The few Sikhs who survived escaped to the hills and from there found their way to the garrison at Skardu.

On 4 November 1947, Brown raised the new Pakistani flag in the Scouts’ lines, and by the third week of November a Political Agent from Pakistan had established himself at Gilgit. Brown had engineered Gilgit and its adjoining states to first secede from J&K, and, after some talk of being independent, had promptly acceded to Pakistan. His commander in Peshawar, a Col. Bacon, as well as Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary in the new Pakistan and later to lead the first military coup détat and become President of Pakistan, were pleased enough. In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat.

Gilgit’s ordinary people had not participated in Brown’s coup which carried their fortunes into the new Pakistan, and to this day appear to remain without legislative representation. It was merely assumed that since they were mostly Muslim in number they would wish to be part of Pakistan ~ which also became Liaquat Ali Khan’s assumption about J&K State as a whole in his 1950 statements in North America. What the Gilgit case demonstrates is that J&K State’s descent into a legal condition of ownerless anarchy open to “Military Decision” had begun even before the Pakistani invasion of 22 October 1947 (viz. “Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, 1-3 December 2005). Also, whatever else the British said or did with respect to J & K, they were closely allied to the new Pakistan on the matter of Gilgit.”

Map of India, Afghanistan, Russia, China c. 1897

mapofindiaafghanistanrussiachinac18972

My American years Part One 1980-90: battles for academic integrity & freedom

see revised and expanded version

My American years: Part One 1980-90: battles for academic integrity & freedom

On the Blacksburg campus February 1982, my second year in America.

I had come to Blacksburg in August 1980 thanks to a letter Professor Frank Hahn had written on my behalf to Professor James M Buchanan in January 1980.

I was in an “All But Dissertation” stage at Cambridge when I got to Blacksburg; I completed the thesis while teaching in Blacksburg, sent it from there in September 1981, and went back to Cambridge for the viva voce examination in January 1982.

Professor Buchanan and his colleagues were welcoming and I came to learn much from them about the realities of public finance and democratic politics, which I very soon applied to my work on India.

Jim Buchanan had a reputation for running very tough conferences of scholars. He invited me to one such in the Spring of 1981. We were made to work very hard indeed. One of the books prescribed is still with me, In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland Yeager, Harvard 1962, and something I still recommend to anyone wishing to understand the classical liberal position on monetary policy. The week-long 1981 conference had one rest-day; it was spent in part at an excellent theatre in a small rural town outside Blacksburg. This photo is of Jim Buchanan on the left and Gordon Tullock on the right; in between them is Ken Minogue of the London School of Economics — who, as it happened, had been Tutor for Admissions when I became a freshman there seven years earlier.

(I must have learnt something from Jim Buchanan about running conferences because nine years later in May-June 1989 at the University of Hawaii, I made the participants of the India-perestroika and Pakistan-perestroika conferences work very hard too.)

My first rooms in America in 1980 were in the attic of 703 Gracelyn Court, where I paid $160 or $170 per month to my marvellous landlady Betty Tillman. There were many family occasions I enjoyed with her family downstairs, and her cakes, bakes and puddings all remain with me today.

A borrowed electric typewriter may be seen in the photo: the age of the personal computer was still a few years away. The Department had a stand-alone “AB-Dic” word-processor which we considered a marvel of technology; the Internet did not exist but there was some kind of Intranet between geeks in computer science and engineering departments at different universities.

It was at Gracelyn Court that this letter reached me addressed by FA Hayek himself.

Professor Buchanan had moved to Blacksburg from Charlottesville some years earlier with the Centre for Study of Public Choice that he had founded. The Centre came to be housed at the President’s House of Virginia Tech (presumably the University President himself had another residence).

I was initially a Visiting Research Associate at the Centre and at the same time a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Economics Department. I was very kindly given a magnificent office at the Centre, on the upper floor, perhaps the one on the upper right hand side in the picture. It was undoubtedly the finest room I have ever had as an office. I may have had it for a whole year, either 1980-81 or 1981-82. When Professor Buchanan and the Centre left for George Mason University in 1983, the mansion returned to being the University President’s House and my old office presumably became a fine bedroom again.

I spent the summer of 1983 at a long libertarian conference in the Palo Alto/Menlo Park area in California. This is a photo from a barbecue during the conference with Professor Jean Baechler from France on the left; Leonard Liggio, who (along with Walter Grinder) had organised the conference, is at the right.

The first draft of the book that became Philosophy of Economics was written (in long hand) during that summer of 1983 in Palo Alto/Menlo Park. The initial title was “Principia Economica”, and the initial contracted publisher, the University of Chicago Press, had that title on the contract.

My principal supporter at the University of Chicago was that great American Theodore W. Schultz, then aged 81,

to whom the Press had initially sent the manuscript for review and who had recommended its prompt publication. Professor Schultz later told me to my face better what my book was about than I had realised myself, namely, it was about economics as knowledge, the epistemology of economics.

My parents came from India to visit me in California, and here we are at Yosemite.

.

Also to visit were Mr and Mrs Willis C Armstrong, our family friends who had known me from infancy. This is a photo of Bill and my mother on the left, and Louise and myself on the right, taken perhaps by my father. In the third week of January 1991, during the first Gulf War, Bill and I (acting on behalf of Rajiv Gandhi) came to form an extremely tenuous bridge between the US Administration and Saddam Hussain for about 24 hours, in an attempt to get a withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait without further loss of life. In December 1991 I gave the widow of Rajiv Gandhi a small tape containing my long-distance phone conversations from America with Rajiv during that episode.

I had driven with my sheltie puppy from Blacksburg to Palo Alto  — through Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico and Arizona; my parents and I now drove with him back to Blacksburg from California, through Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia.  It may be a necessary though not sufficient condition to drive across America (or any other country) in order to understand it.

After a few days, we drove to New York via Pennsylvania where I became Visiting Assistant Professor in the Cornell Economics Department (on leave from being Assistant Professor at Virginia Tech). The few months at Cornell were noteworthy for the many long sessions I spent with Max Black. I shall add more about that here in due course. My parents returned to India (via Greece where my sister was) in the Autumn of 1983.

In May 1984, Indira Gandhi ruled in Delhi, and the ghost of Brezhnev was still fresh in Moscow. The era of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in America was at its height. Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India emerging from my doctoral thesis though written in Blacksburg and Ithaca in 1982-1983, came to be published by London’s Institute of Economic Affairs on May 29 as Occasional Paper No. 69, ISBN: 0-255 36169-6; its text is reproduced elsewhere here.

ppp1984

It was the first critique after BR Shenoy of India’s Sovietesque economics since Jawaharlal Nehru’s time. The Times, London’s most eminent paper at the time, wrote its lead editorial comment about it on the day it was published, May 29 1984.

londonti

It used to take several days for the library at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg to receive its copy of The Times of London and other British newspapers. I had not been told of the date of publication and did not know of what had happened in London on May 29 until perhaps June 2 — when a friend, Vasant Dave of a children’s charity, who was on campus, phoned me and congratulated me for being featured in The Times which he had just read in the University Library. “You mean they’ve reviewed it?” I asked him, “No, it’s the lead editorial.” “What?” I exclaimed. There was worse. Vasant was very soft-spoken and said “Yes, it’s titled ‘India’s Bad Example’” — which I misheard on the phone as “India’s Mad Example” 😀 Drat! I thought (or words to that effect), they must have lambasted me, as I rushed down to the Library to take a look.

The Times had said

“When Mr. Dennis Healey in the Commons recently stated that Hongkong, with one per cent of the population of India has twice India’s trade, he was making an important point about Hongkong but an equally important point about India. If Hongkong with one per cent of its population and less than 0.03 per cert of India’s land area (without even water as a natural resource) can so outpace India, there must be something terribly wrong with the way Indian governments have managed their affairs, and there is. A paper by an Indian economist published today (Pricing, Planning and Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India by Subroto Roy, IEA £1.80) shows how Asia’s largest democracy is gradually being stifled by the imposition of economic policies whose woeful effect and rhetorical unreality find their echo all over the Third World. As with many of Britain’s former imperial possessions, the rot set in long before independence. But as with most of the other former dependencies, the instrument of economic regulation and bureaucratic control set up by the British has been used decisively and expansively to consolidate a statist regime which inhibits free enterprise, minimizes economic success and consolidates the power of government in all spheres of the economy. We hear little of this side of things when India rattles the borrowing bowl or denigrates her creditors for want of further munificence. How could Indian officials explain their poor performance relative to Hongkong? Dr Roy has the answers for them. He lists the causes as a large and heavily subsidized public sector, labyrinthine control over private enterprise, forcibly depressed agricultural prices, massive import substitution, government monopoly of foreign exchange transactions, artificially overvalued currency and the extensive politicization of the labour market, not to mention the corruption which is an inevitable side effect of an economy which depends on the arbitrament of bureaucrats. The first Indian government under Nehru took its cue from Nehru’s admiration of the Soviet economy, which led him to believe that the only policy for India was socialism in which there would be “no private property except in a restricted sense and the replacement of the private profit system by a higher ideal of cooperative service.” Consequently, the Indian government has now either a full monopoly or is one of a few oligipolists in banking, insurance, railways, airlines, cement, steel, chemicals, fertilizers, ship-building, breweries, telephones and wrist-watches. No businessman can expand his operation while there is any surplus capacity anywhere in that sector. He needs government approval to modernize, alter his price-structure, or change his labour shift. It is not surprising that a recent study of those developing countries which account for most manufactured exports from the Third World shows that India’s share fell from 65 percent in 1953 to 10 per cent in 1973; nor, with the numerous restrictions on inter-state movement of grains, that India has over the years suffered more from an inability to cope with famine than during the Raj when famine drill was centrally organized and skillfully executed without restriction. Nehru’s attraction for the Soviet model has been inherited by his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi. Her policies have clearly positioned India more towards the Soviet Union than the West. The consequences of this, as Dr Roy states, is that a bias can be seen in “the antipathy and pessimism towards market institutions found among the urban public, and sympathy and optimism to be found for collectivist or statist ones.” All that India has to show for it is the delivery of thousands of tanks in exchange for bartered goods, and the erection of steel mills and other heavy industry which help to perpetuate the unfortunate obsession with industrial performance at the expense of agricultural growth and the relief of rural poverty.”…..

I felt this may have been intended to be laudatory but it was also inaccurate and had to be corrected. I replied dated June 4 which The Times published in their edition of June 16 1984:

timesletter-11

I was 29 when Pricing, Planning and Politics was published, I am 54 now. I do not agree with everything I said in it and find the tone a little puffed up as young men tend to be; it was also five years before my main “theoretical” work Philosophy of Economics would be published. My experience of life in the years since has also made me far less sanguine both about human nature and about America than I was then. But I am glad to find I am not embarrassed by what I said then, indeed I am pleased I said what I did in favour of classical liberalism and against statism and totalitarianism well before it became popular to do so after the Berlin Wall fell. (In India as elsewhere, former communist apparatchiks and fellow-travellers became pseudo-liberals overnight.)

The editorial itself may have been due to a conversation between Peter Bauer and William Rees-Mogg, so I later heard. The work sold 700 copies in its first month, a record for the publisher. The wife of one prominent Indian bureaucrat told me in Delhi in December 1988 it had affected her husband’s thinking drastically. A senior public finance economist told me he had been deputed at the Finance Ministry when the editorial appeared, and the Indian High Commission in London had urgently sent a copy of the editorial to the Ministry where it caused a stir. An IMF official told me years later that he saw the editorial on board a flight to India from the USA on the same day, and stopped in London to make a trip to the LSE’s bookshop to purchase a copy. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University had been a critic of aspects of Indian policy; he received a copy of the monograph in draft just before it was published and was kind enough to write I had “done an excellent job of setting out the problems afflicting our economic policies, unfortunately government-made problems!”  My great professor at Cambridge, Frank Hahn, would be kind enough to say that he thought my “critique of Development Economics was powerful not only on methodological but also on economic theory grounds” — something that has been a source of delight to me.

Siddhartha Shankar Ray told me when we first met that he had been in London when the editorial appeared and had seen it there; it affected his decision to introduce me to Rajiv Gandhi as warmly as he came to do a half dozen years later.

In the Autumn of 1984, I went, thanks to Edwin Feulner Jr of the Heritage Foundation,  to attend the Mont Pelerin Society Meetings being held at Cambridge (on “parole” from the US immigration authorities as my “green card” was being processed at the time). There I met for the first time Professor and Mrs Milton Friedman.

Milton Friedman’s November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India is referred to in my monograph as “unpublished” in note 1; when I met Milton and Rose, I gave them a copy of my monograph; and requested Milton for his unpublished document; when he returned to Stanford he sent to me in Blacksburg his original 1955-56 documents on Indian planning. I published the 1955 document for the first time in May 1989 during the University of Hawaii perestroika-for-India project I was then leading, it appeared later in the 1992 volume Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, edited by myself and WE James. (The results of the Hawaii project reached Rajiv Gandhi through my hand in September 1990, as told elsewhere here in “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”.) The 1956 document was published in November 2006 on the front page of The Statesman, the same day my obituary of Milton appeared in the inside pages.

Meanwhile, my main work within economic theory, the “Principia Economica” manuscript, was being read by the University of Chicago Press’s five or six anonymous referees. One of them pointed out my argument had been anticipated years earlier in the work of MIT’s Sidney Stuart Alexander. I had no idea of this and was surprised; of course I knew Professor Alexander’s work in balance of payments theory but not in this field. I went to visit Professor Alexander in Boston, where this photo came to be taken perhaps in late 1984:

Professor Alexander was extremely gracious, and immediately declared with great generosity that it was clear to him my arguments in “Principia Economica” had been developed entirely independently of his work. He had come at the problem from an American philosophical tradition of Dewey, I had done so from a British tradition of Wittgenstein. (CS Peirce was probably the bridge between the two.) He and I had arrived at some similar conclusions but we had done so completely independently.

Also, I was much honoured by this letter of May 1 1984 sent to Blacksburg by Professor Sir John Hicks (1904-1989), among the greatest of 20th Century economists at the time, where he acknowledged his departure in later life from the position he had taken in 1934 and 1939 on the foundations of demand theory.

He later sent me a copy of his Wealth and Welfare: Collected Essays on Economic Theory, Vol. I, MIT Press 1981, as a gift. The context of our correspondence had to do with my criticism of the young Hicks and support for the ghost of Alfred Marshall in an article “Considerations on Utility, Benevolence and Taxation” I was publishing in the journal History of Political Economy published then at Duke University. In Philosophy of Economics, I would come to say about Hicks’s letter to me “It may be a sign of the times that economists, great and small, rarely if ever disclaim their past opinions; it is therefore an especially splendid example to have a great economist like Hicks doing so in this matter.” It was reminiscent of Gottlob Frege’s response to Russell’s paradox; Philosophy of Economics described Frege’s “Letter to Russell”, 1902 (Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel, pp. 126-128) as “a document which must remain one of the most noble in all of modern scholarship; a fact recorded in Russell’s letter to Heijenoort.”

In Blacksburg, by the Summer and Fall of 1984 I was under attack following the arrival of what I considered “a gang of inert game theorists” — my theoretical manuscript had blown a permanent hole through what passes by the name of “social choice theory”, and they did not like it. Nor did they like the fact that I seemed to them to be a “conservative”/classical liberal Indian and my applied work on India’s economy seemed to their academic agenda an irrelevance. This is myself at the height of that attack in January 1985:

Professor Schultz at the University of Chicago came to my rescue and at his recommendation I was appointed Visiting Associate Professor in the Economics Department at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.

I declined, without thanks, the offer of another year at Virginia Tech.

On my last day in Blacksburg, a graduate student whom I had helped when she had been assaulted by a senior professor, cooked a meal before I started the drive West across the country. This is a photo from that meal:

In Provo, I gratefully found refuge at the excellent Economics Department led at the time by Professor Larry Wimmer.

It was at Provo that I first had a personal computer on my desk (an IBM as may be seen) and what a delight that was (no matter the noises that it made).  I recall being struck by the fact a colleague possessed the incredible luxury of a portable personal computer (no one else did) which he could take home with him.   It looked like an enormous briefcase but was apparently the technology-leader at the time.  (Laptops seem not to have been invented as of 1985).

In October 1985, Professor Frank Hahn very kindly wrote to Larry Wimmer revising his 1980 opinion of my work now that the PhD was done, the India-work had led to The Times editorial and the theoretical work was proceeding well.

I had applied for a permanent position at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, and had been interviewed positively at the American Economic Association meetings (in New York) in December 1985 by the department chairman Professor Fred C. Hung. At Provo, Dr James Moncur of the Manoa Department was visiting. Jim became a friend and recommended me to his colleagues in Manoa.

Professor Hung appointed me to that department as a “senior” Assistant Professor on tenure-track beginning September 1986. I had bargained for a rank of “Associate Professor” but was told the advertisement did not allow it; instead I was assured of being an early candidate for promotion and tenure subject to my book “Principia Economica” being accepted for publication. (The contract with the University of Chicago Press had become frayed.)

Hawaii was simply a superb place (though expensive).

Professor James Buchanan won the Economics “Nobel” in 1986 and I was asked by the Manoa Department to help raise its profile by inviting him to deliver a set of lectures, which he did excellently well in March 1988 to the University as well as the Honolulu community at large. Here he is at my 850 sq ft small condominium at Punahou Towers, 1621 Dole Street:

In August 1988, my manuscript “Principia Economica” was finally accepted for publication by Routledge of London and New York under the title Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason In Economic Inquiry. The contract with University of Chicago Press had fallen through and the manuscript was being read by Yale University Press and a few others but Routledge came through with the first concrete offer. I was delighted and these photos were taken in the Economics Department at Manoa by a colleague in September 1988 as the publisher needed them.

Milton and Rose Friedman came to Honolulu on a private holiday perhaps in January 1989; they had years earlier spent a sabbatical year at the Department.

Here is a luncheon that was arranged in their honour. They had in the Fall of 1988 been on their famous visit to China, and as I recall that was the main subject of discussion on the occasion.

Milton phoned me in my Manoa office and invited me to meet him and Rose at their hotel for a chat; we had met first at the 1984 Mont Pelerin meetings and he wished to know me better. I was honoured and turned up dutifully and we talked for perhaps an hour. I recall making a strong recommendation that he write his memoirs, especially so that the rumours and innuendo surrounding eg the Chile episode could be cleared up; I also said a “Collected Works” would be a great idea; when Milton and Rose published their memoirs Two Lucky People (Chicago 1998) I wondered if my first suggestion had come to be taken; as to the second, he wrote to me years later saying he felt no Collected Works were necessary.

From 1986 onwards, I had been requested by the University of Hawaii to lead a project with William E James on the political economy of “South Asia” .I had said there was no such place, that “South Asia” was a US State Department abstraction but there were India and Pakistan and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and Afghanistan etc. Sister projects on India and Pakistan had been sponsored by the University, and in 1989 important conferences had been planned by myself and James in May for India and in June for Pakistan.

I was determined to publish for the first time Milton’s 1955 memorandum on India which the Government of India had suppressed or ignored at the time. At the hotel-meeting, I told Milton that and requested him to come to the India-conference in May; Milton and Rose said they would think about it, and later confirmed he would come for the first two days.

This is a photo of the initial luncheon at the home of the University President on May 21 1989. Milton and India’s Ambassador to the USA at the time were both garlanded with Hawaiian leis. The first photo was one of a joke from Milton as I recall which had everyone laughing.

There was no equivalent photo of the distinguished scholars who gathered for the Pakistan conference a month later.

The reason was that from February 1989 onwards I had become the victim of a most vicious racist defamation, engineered within the Economics Department at Manoa by a senior professor as a way to derail me before my expected Promotion and Tenure application in the Fall. All my extra time went to battling that though somehow I managed to teach some monetary economics well enough in 1989-1990 for a Japanese student to insist on being photographed with me and the book we had studied.

I was being seen by two or three temporarily powerful characters on the Manoa campus as an Uppity Indian who must be brought down. This time I decided to fight back — and what a saga came to unfold! It took me into the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and then the Ninth Circuit and upto the United States Supreme Court, not once but twice.

Milton Friedman and Theodore Schultz stood valiantly among my witnesses — first writing to the University’s authorities and later deposing in federal court.

Unfortunately, government lawyers, far from wanting to uphold and respect the laws of the United States, chose to deliberately violate them — compromising a judge, suborning demonstrable perjury and then brazenly purchasing my hired attorney (and getting caught doing it). Since September 2007, the State of Hawaii’s attorneys have been invited by me to return to the federal court and apologise for their unlawful behaviour as they are required by law to do.

They had not expected me to survive their illegalities but I did: I kept going.

Philosophy of Economics was published in London and New York in September 1989

scan0001

scan0002

scan0004

The hardback quickly sold out on its own steam and the book went into paperback in 1991, and I was delighted to learn from a friend that it had been prescribed for a course at Yale Law School and was strewn along an alley in the bookshop:

scan0005

The sister-volumes on India and Pakistan emerging from the University of Hawaii project led by myself and James were published in 1992 and 1993 in India, Pakistan, Britain and the United States.

scan0013scan0011

As described elsewhere, the manuscript of the India-volume contributed to the origins of India’s 1991 economic reform during my encounter with Rajiv Gandhi in his last months; the Pakistan-volume came to contribute to the origins of the Pakistan-India peace process. The Indian publisher who had promised paperback volumes of both books reneged under leftwing pressure in Delhi; he has since passed away and James and I still await the University of Hawaii’s permission to publish both volumes freely on the Internet as copyright rests with the University President.

In 2004 from Britain, I wrote to the 9/11 Commission stating that it was possible that had the vicious illegalities against me not occurred at Manoa starting in 1989, we may have gone on after India and Pakistan to study Afghanistan, and come up with a pre-emptive academic analysis a decade before September 11 2001.

To be continued in Part Two.

RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks (2009)

RAND’s study of the Mumbai attacks

by

Subroto Roy  January 25, 2009

The conspicuously good thing that can be said about the RAND Corporation’s study of the Mumbai massacres (“The Lessons of Mumbai”, RAND January 2009) is that there is no sign of it having been affected by the powerful Pakistan lobby.  Far too many purported studies emerging from American or British “thinktanks” cannot say the same.

If anything, the ten American authors of the 25-pages of the RAND text have among them two prominent advocates of better US-India relations.  This is helpful to truthfulness because of the simple fact India has been in this case a victim of aggression that originated in Pakistan. Whether elements of the Pakistan Government were involved is almost the wrong question – if some retired underemployed former soldier drawing a Pakistan Army pension helped the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s commando training of the Mumbai terrorists, the existence of Pakistani state involvement is proved. Commando training requires technical skills of a sort that can only originate with a military.

In Pakistan as in any other large populous country including India, the state tends to be a hydra-headed monster and it may be foolish to imagine instead a rational, unified, well-informed or even a benevolent political entity.  State involvement in Pakistan, India, China or elsewhere is something hard to isolate when there is so much mixing of private and public property or misuse of resources arising from the public exchequer.

What Pakistan’s PR campaign has done after Mumbai is not so much raise the Kashmir dispute as to obfuscate things by shedding crocodile tears and pretending to share victimhood saying, oh we sympathise with you but please sympathise with us too as we have been victims of even bigger terrorist attacks by the same kind of people, we have lost Benazir, we have lost many more people than you have, therefore  cooperate with us and we will try to do what we can to help you in this matter.  English-speaking liberals educated at places like Karachi Grammar School have then appeared on Indian TV stations (owned by Delhi people from places like Doon School) purporting to represent Pakistan on “the Mumbai incident”; none of them can have much credibility because the real India-haters in Pakistan might cheerfully make them murder victims too given half a chance.

The RAND study deserves credit for avoiding all misleading Pakistani rhetoric about the Mumbai massacres and at least intending to try to get to the bottom of things in a systematic manner.  Beyond that, unfortunately, it has made logical and factual and methodological errors which cause it to fail to do so.

The key logical error made by the RAND authors arises from combining a central front-page statement

“Evidence suggests Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group based in Pakistan, was responsible for the attack”

with assertive suggestions about Mumbai’s police being backward, incompetent, cowardly etc (“passive”).  Yet how precisely did evidence about LeT culpability come to light?  Only because Mumbai’s police and the Railway police engaged, injured and then captured Kasab using their antiquated equipment the best they could.  There is no evidence of police cowardice at CST Station; to the contrary, it took courage to aim .303’s at adversaries firing back with assault rifles.  Kasab received his first hand injury there. ATS Chief Karkare and his fellow-officers may seem foolhardy in hindsight to have been driving in the same vehicle but they did engage their unknown enemy immediately they could and died doing so, crippling Kasab badly enough that he could be captured in due course at Chowpatty.  [Correction: it appears that though Kasab was fired upon by the police at CST Station  he  received both his hand injuries from the firing by the ATS squad.] And the Chowpatty police action showed obvious bravery in absorbing injury and death in order to kill Ishmail and capture Kasab.  (Kasab, among the youngest, had been paired with Ishmail, the apparent leader of the group.)

Furthermore, Kasab upon capture was treated humanely and lawfully.  His injuries were treated, he was produced before a magistrate within a week who asked him if he was being mistreated to which he said no.  Slumdog millionaire may get undeserved Oscars portraying torture of a British actor by Mumbai police but it is ridiculous fiction – Kasab the captured Pakistani terrorist mass murderer was not tortured by Mumbai’s police.

Contrast such Indian police behaviour with the “enhanced interrogation techniques” the Bush Administration used with negative results in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib – which President Obama has now started to end.  Kasab, an ignorant misguided youth, was grateful enough for the humane and civilized treatment to start singing like the proverbial canary.  The result of that has been precisely all the evidence the Government of India has now presented to the world and Pakistan about the LeT’s culpability.

As for the anti-terrorist actions of the Indian Army, Navy and NSG, the RAND study is right to point to multitudinous errors and it is useful to have these listed in orderly fashion.  But many of these errors were obvious to millions of lay Indian citizens who watched events on TV.  The central fault was the scarcity of trained NSG officers and men, and the failure to apply standard emergency management protocols.

The RAND study, by relying overly on government sources, has failed to point to what ordinary Indian citizens already know – the NSG is being utterly wasted protecting our politicians.  India has no proper equivalent of the US “Secret Service”, and even if we did, we would probably waste that by spreading it too thinly among politicians.  As it happens if almost any politician in India today did happen to be unfortunately assassinated, the main mourners would be family-members and not the general Indian public.  Despite politicians constituting rather “low-value targets” for terrorists, India’s scarce anti-terrorist and police resources have been misallocated to protecting them.

Finally, the RAND study makes the lazy-man’s methodological error of supposing outfits like the LeT think and behave in a manner explicable by American political science textbooks, or ought to do so.  What Western analysts may need to do instead is learn from the old Arabist and Orientalist traditions of how to think and see the world from Eastern points of view.    But that may require greater self-knowledge than the modern world tends to permit.

Postscript:

My December 6 2008 analysisA Quick Comparison Between the September 11 2001 NYC-Washington attacks and the November 26-28 2008 Mumbai Massacres (An Application of the Case-by-Case Philosophical  Technique of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough)” is republished below.  I have corrected “Rome Airport” with “Lod Airport” on the basis of  reading the RAND report, though may not have received the courtesy of aknowledement for the reminder of the  Japanese Red Army attack.

 

“In my book Philosophy of Economics (Routledge, 1989) and in my August 24  2004 public lecture  in England  “Science,  Religion, Art and the Necessity of Freedom”, both available elsewhere here, I described the “case-by-case” philosophical technique recommended by Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Wisdom and Renford Bambrough.  (Bambrough had also shown a common root in the work of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.)   Herewith an application of the technique to a contemporary problem that shows the “family resemblance” between two modern terrorist attacks, the September 11 2001 attack on New York and Washington and the Mumbai massacres last week.

Similarity:  In both, a gang of motivated youthful terrorists acted as a team against multiple targets; their willingness to accept  suicide while indulging in mass-murder may have, bizarrely enough, brought a sense of adventure and meaning to otherwise empty lives.

Difference: In the 9/11 attacks, Mohammad Atta seemed to have been a single predominant leader while each of the others also had complex active roles requiring decisions, like piloting and navigating hijacked jumbo-jets.  In the Mumbai massacres, the training and leadership apparently came from outside the team before and even during the operation  – almost as if the team were acting like brainwashed robots under long-distance control.

Similarity:  Both attacks required a long prior period of training and planning.

Difference: The 9/11 attacks did not require commando-training imparted by military-style trainers; the Mumbai massacres did.

Difference: In the 9/11 attacks, the actual weapons used initially were primitive, like box-cutters; in the Mumbai massacres, assault rifles and grenades were used along with sophisticated telecommunications equipment.

Difference: In 9/11, the initial targets, the hijacked aircraft, were themselves made into weapons against the ultimate targets, namely the buildings, in a way not seen before.  In the Mumbai massacres, mass-shooting of terrorized civilians was hardly something original; besides theatres of war, the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Japanese Red Army used these in the 1970s as terrorist techniques (e.g. at Rome Airport  Lod Airport; Postscript January 26 2009: I make this correction after reading and commenting on the RAND study which unfortunately  did not have the courtesy of acknowledging my December 6 2008 analysis) plus there were, more recently, the Columbine and Virginia Tech massacres.

Similarity: In both cases, Hollywood and other movie scripts could have inspired the initial ideas of techniques to be  used.

Similarity: In both cases, the weapons used were appropriate to the anticipated state of defence: nothing more than box-cutters could be expected to get by normal airport security; assault rifles etc could come in by the unguarded sea and attack soft targets in Mumbai.  (Incidentally, even this elementary example of strategic thinking  in a practical situation may be beyond the analytical capacity contained in the tons of waste paper produced at American and other modern university Economics departments under the rubric of  “game theory”.)

Similarity: In both cases, a high-level of widespread fear was induced for several days or more within a targeted nation-state by a small number of people.

Similarity: No ransom-like demands were made by the terrorists in either case.

Similarity: Had the single terrorist not been captured alive in the Mumbai massacres, there would have been little trace left by the attackers.

Difference: The 9/11 attackers knew definitely they were on suicide-missions; the Mumbai attackers may not have done and may have imagined an escape route.”

SEE ALSO

https://independentindian.com/2009/11/26/did-civil-military-conflict-contribute-to-the-2611-destruction/
https://independentindian.com/2009/11/26/on-decision-making-in-terrorist-hostage-situations/

The “three-state solution” for the Middle East (and why has Tony Blair not resigned when Israel attacked Gaza?) 2009

A few thousand years ago, Moses (whom Freud identified as likely to have been a monotheistic Egyptian nobleman) led the Hebrews out of Egypt. A year ago, Hamas blew up the much-hated wall between the Gaza Strip and Egypt with explosives, after secretly over months cutting heavy metal using oxyacetylene torches. Some three hundred and fifty thousand Gazans poured into Egypt’s Rafah town and market to buy food, medicine, cigarettes, petrol, cows, goats, sheep, camel, televisions, mobile phones etc. Israel’s wicked blockade of Gaza was broken. Hosni Mubarak apparently instructed Egyptian border guards not to resist the Palestinian crowds from entering Egypt, and stated that as long as they returned without weapons they were free to trade as they wished. Egypt could hardly have done anything else – Cairo had seen pro-Palestinian demonstrations and Mubarak’s police had arrested some 500 members of the  Muslim Brotherhood. The official Israeli response was “the free passage of Palestinians into Egypt and back, without any supervision, significantly increases the threat coming from the Strip”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry said “it is the responsibility of Egypt to ensure that the border operates properly, according to the signed agreements. We expect the Egyptians to solve the problem. Obviously we are worried about the situation. It could potentially allow anybody to enter.” But Egypt can hardly solve this problem other than by offering to extend Egyptian sovereignty to the whole of the Gaza Strip. Something similar would have to be done with the West Bank becoming absorbed officially into Jordan. The Palestinian people would then not have their own state after all but have been divided between the formal territories of Egypt, Jordan and of course Israel itself (is not Israel technically a secular country without a state religion?). Gaza and the West Bank could be autonomous regions within Egyptian and Jordanian sovereignty respectively. The Palestinians at least would be able to buy flour and have normal lives and not have been made to live in the open-air prison that they do now. The people of Gaza would have been spared the Israeli atrocity that has been going on in the last several weeks.

 

 

There are and have been uncountable quasi-nationalities who have not had their own nation-states. Kurds are divided between Turkey, Iraq and Iran;  Baloch are divided between Iran and Pakistan; Pashtuns are divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan;  Kashmiris  (and for that matter Punjabis and Sindhis) are divided between Pakistan and India; Bengalis are divided between India and Bangladesh;  Tamils are divided between India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore; Tibetans are divided between India and China etc etc, and that is only in half of Asia. There are multitudinous cases all over Europe (and Britain), Africa and also the Americas and elsewhere. The Palestinians would have become one such. And like Poland being divided between Germany and Russia, or between Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia even earlier (on this see the inimitable Joseph Conrad Notes on Life and Letters), a people who have been divided without a separate identity can sometimes find themselves independent again as history progresses.

 

 

Islamic Iran has wished a “one-state” solution with the Palestinians and Israelis living together harmoniously, something that seems utopian at best, devious at worst — though recall too Martin Buber’s letter to Tagore.   British foreign policy invented the “two-state” solution ever since the Balfour declaration. It has proved infeasible. Tony Blair became the so-called “Quartet envoy” or whatever immediately after being UK prime minister and was supposed to herald in the two-state solution. He palpably failed and should have resigned when Israel attacked Gaza last month but that may have been too much to expect. Israel today seems to want to impose the “zero-state” solution by extinguishing Gaza (though at one time, pre-PLO and pre-Arafat perhaps, Israel may have proposed itself the annexation of Gaza and the West Bank by Egypt and Jordan respectively).

 

 

All things considered, the “three-state” solution may be the only practical and civilized alternative in the circumstances. Palestine would indeed be remembered, as a place and a culture and a people, and at least the Palestinians would be able to live and thrive and not be attacked.

 

 

Subroto Roy

How to solve Kashmir (2009)

see

https://independentindian.com/2015/03/03/pakistans-indias-illusions-of-power-psychosis-vs-vanity/

https://independentindian.com/2011/10/13/my-seventy-one-notes-at-facebook-etc-on-kashmir-pakistan-and-of-course-india-listed-thanks-to-jd/

Also

from Jan 2009
It is excellent news Omar Abdullah has become the constitutionally elected Head of Government of the great Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir after a historic vote.  I had the privilege of meeting his esteemed father briefly once on 23 March 1991 at the residence of the late Rajiv Gandhi though it would be understandable if he did not recall it.  Farooq Abdullah’s father Sheikh Abdullah was not merely a Lion of Kashmir but a genuine hero of Indian history, a true Bharat Ratna, someone whose commitment to constitutional principles of law and politics I admire more and more as I learn more of it…

The purpose of this open letter is to describe the broad path I believe to be the only just and lawful one available to the resolution of what has been known universally as the Kashmir problem.

Very briefly, it involves recognizing that the question of lawful territorial sovereignty in J&K is logically distinct from the question of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.  The solution requires

(a)    acknowledging that the original entity in the world system known as Jammu & Kashmir arising on March 16 1846 ceased to exist on or about October 22 1947, and that the military contest that commenced on the latter date has resulted in fact, given all particular circumstances of history, in the lawful and just outcome in international law;
(b)    offering all who may be Indian nationals or stateless and who presently live under Article 370, a formal choice of nationality between the Republics of India, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: citizen-by-citizen, without fear or favour, under conditions of full information, individual privacy and security; any persons who voluntarily choose to renounce Indian nationality in such private individual decisions would be nevertheless granted lawful permanent residence in the Indian Republic and J&K in particular.

In other words, the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by the entities known today as the Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India  that occurred since October 22 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining democratic question has to do with free individual choice of nationality by inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who might wish to choose, for deeply personal individual reasons, not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead (or remain stateless).   Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India.  Indeed if Pakistan agreed to act similarly this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be resolved most appropriately. Pakistan and India are both wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused over decades by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

The full reasoning underlying this solution, which I believe to be the only lawful, just, efficient and stable solution that exists, is thoroughly explained in the following five  articles. The first four, “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice & J&K”, “History of J&K”, and “Pakistan’s Allies”, were published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and are marked ONE, TWO, THREE, and FOUR below, and are also available elsewhere here.  The fifth “An Indian Reply to President Zardari”, marked FIVE, was published for the first time here following the Mumbai massacres.  I believe careful reflection upon this entire body of reasoning may lead all reasonable men and women to a practically unanimous consensus about this as the appropriate course of action; if such a consensus happened to arise, the implementation of the solution shall only be a matter of relatively uncomplicated procedural detail.

Subroto Roy
January 7 2009

“ONE
SOLVING KASHMIR: ON AN APPLICATION OF REASON by Subroto Roy First published in three parts in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, December 1,2,3 2005, http://www.thestatesman.net

(This article has its origins in a paper “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir” which circulated in Washington DC in 1992-1995, including at the Indian and Pakistani embassies and the Carnegie Endowment, and was given as an invited lecture at the Heritage Foundation on June 23 1998. It should be read along with other articles also republished here, especially “History of J&K”, “Law, Justice and J&K” , “Understanding Pakistan”, “Pakistan’s Allies” and “What to Tell Musharraf”. The Washington paper and lecture itself originated from my ideas in the Introduction to Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, edited by WE James and myself in the University of Hawaii project on Pakistan 1986-1992.)

I. Give Indian `Green Cards’ to the Hurriyat et al
India, being a liberal democracy in its constitutional law, cannot do in Jammu & Kashmir what Czechoslovakia did to the “Sudeten Germans” after World War II. On June 18 1945 the new Czechoslovakia announced those Germans and Magyars within their borders who could not prove they had been actively anti-fascist before or during the War would be expelled — the burden of proof was placed on the individual, not the State. Czechoslovakia “transferring” this population was approved by the Heads of the USA, UK and USSR Governments at Potsdam on August 2 1945. By the end of 1946, upto two million Sudeten Germans were forced to flee their homes; thousands may have died by massacre or otherwise; 165,000 remained who were absorbed as Czechoslovak citizens. Among those expelled were doubtless many who had supported Germany and many others who had not — the latter to this day seek justice or even an apology in vain. Czechoslovakia punished none of its nationals for atrocities, saying it had been revenge for Hitler’s evil (”badla” in Bollywood terms) and the post Cold War Czech Government too has declined to render an apology. Revenge is a wild kind of justice (while justice may be a civilised kind of revenge).

India cannot follow this savage precedent in international law. Yet we must recognise there are several hundred and up to several hundred thousand persons on our side of the boundary in the State of Jammu & Kashmir who do not wish to be Indian nationals. These people are presently our nationals ius soli, having been born in territory of the Indian Republic, and/or ius sanguinis, having been born of parents who are Indian nationals; or they may be “stateless” whom we must treat in accordance with the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons. The fact is they may not wish to carry Indian passports or be Indian nationals.

In this respect their juridical persons resemble the few million “elite” Indians who have in the last few decades freely placed their hands on their hearts and solemnly renounced their Indian nationality, declaring instead their individual fidelity to other nation-states — becoming American, Canadian or Australian citizens, or British subjects or nationals of other countries. Such people include tens of thousands of the adult children of India’s metropolitan “elite”, who are annually visited abroad in the hot summer months by their Indian parents and relatives. They are daughters and sons of New Delhi’s Government and Opposition, of retired generals, air marshals, admirals, ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, public sector bureaucrats, private sector businessmen, university professors, journalists, doctors and many others. India’s most popular film-actress exemplified this “elite” capital-flight when, after a tireless search, she chose a foreign husband and moved to California.

The difference in Jammu & Kashmir would be that those wishing to renounce Indian nationality do not wish to move to any other place but to stay as and where they are, which is in Kashmir Valley or Jammu. Furthermore, they may wish, for whatever reason, to adopt, if they are eligible to do so, the nationality of e.g. the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

They may believe themselves descended from Ahmad Shah Abdali whose Afghans ruled or mis-ruled Kashmir Valley before being defeated by Ranjit Singh’s Sikhs in 1819. Or they may believe themselves of Iranian descent as, for example, are the Kashmiri cousins of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Or they may simply have wished to be, or are descended from persons who had wished to be on October 26 1947, citizens of the then-new British Dominion of Pakistan — but who came to be prevented from properly expressing such a desire because of the war-like conditions that have prevailed ever since between India and Pakistan. There may be even a few persons in Laddakh who are today Indian nationals but who wish to be considered Tibetans instead; there is, however, no Tibetan Republic and it does not appear there is going to be one.

India, being a free and self-confident country, should allow, in a systematic lawful manner, all such persons to fulfil their desires, and furthermore, should ensure they are not penalised for having expressed such “anti-national” desires or for having acted upon them. Sir Mark Tully, the British journalist, is an example of someone who has been a foreign national who has chosen to reside permanently in the Republic of India — indeed he has been an exemplary permanent resident of our country. There are many others like him. There is no logical reason why all those persons in Jammu & Kashmir who do wish not to be Indians by nationality cannot receive the same legal status from the Indian Republic as has been granted to Sir Mark Tully. There are already thousands of Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese nationals who are lawful permanent residents in the Indian Republic, and who travel back and forth between India and their home countries. There is no logical reason why the same could not be extended to several hundred or numerous thousand people in Jammu & Kashmir who may wish to not accept or to renounce their Indian nationality (for whatever personal reason) and instead become nationals, if they are so eligible, of the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, or, for that matter, to remain stateless. On the one hand, their renunciation of Indian nationality is logically equivalent to the renunciation of Indian nationality by the adult children of India’s “elite” settled in North America and Western Europe. On the other hand, their wish to adopt, if they are eligible, a foreign nationality, such as that of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, and yet remain domiciled in Indian territory is logically equivalent to that of many foreign nationals domiciled in India already like Sir Mark Tully.

Now if you are a permanent resident of some country, you may legally have many, perhaps most, but certainly not all the rights and duties of nationals of that country. e.g., though you will have to pay all the same taxes, you may not be allowed to (or be required to) vote in national or provincial elections but you may in local municipal elections. At the same time, permanently residing foreign nationals are supposed to be equal under the law and have equal access to all processes of civil and criminal justice. (As may be expected though from human frailty, even the federal courts of the USA can be notorious in their injustice and racism towards “Green Card” holders relative to “full” American citizens.) Then again, as a permanently resident foreigner, while you will be free to work in any lawful trade or profession, you may not be allowed to work in some or perhaps any Government agencies, certainly not the armed forces or the police. Many Indians in the USA were engineering graduates, and because many engineering jobs or contracts in the USA are related to the US armed forces and require US citizens only, it is commonplace for Indian engineers to renounce their Indian nationality and become Americans because of this. Many Indian-American families have one member who is American, another Indian, a third maybe Canadian, a fourth Fijian or British etc.

The same can happen in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir if it evolves peacefully and correctly in the future. It is quite possible to imagine a productive family in a peaceful Kashmir Valley of the future where one brother is an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, another brother a civil servant and a sister a police officer of the J&K State Government, another sister being a Pakistani doctor, while cousins are Afghan or Iranian or “stateless” businessmen. Each family-member would have made his/her choice of nationality as an individual given the circumstances of his/her life, his/her personal comprehension of the facts of history, his/her personal political and/or religious persuasions, and similar deeply private considerations. All would have their children going to Indian schools and being Indian citizens ius soli and/or ius sanguinis. When the children grow up, they would be free to join, if they wished, the existing capital flight of other Indian adult children abroad and there renounce their Indian nationality as many have come to do.

II Revealing Choices Privately with Full Information
For India to implement such a proposal would be to provide an opportunity for all those domiciled in Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Laddakh to express freely and privately as individuals their deepest wishes about their own identities, in a confidential manner, citizen by citizen, case by case. This would thereby solve the fundamental democratic problem that has been faced ever since the Pakistani attack on the original State of Jammu & Kashmir commenced on October 22 1947, which came to be followed by the Rape of Baramulla — causing the formal accession of the State to the then-new Dominion of India on October 26 1947.

A period of, say, 30 months may be announced by the Government of India during which full information would be provided to all citizens affected by this change, i.e. all those presently governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The condition of full information may include, for example, easy access to Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani newspapers in addition to access to Indian media. Each such person wishing to either remain with Indian nationality (by explicitly requesting an Indian passport if he/she does not have one already — and such passports can be printed in Kashmiri and Urdu too), or to renounce Indian nationality and either remain stateless or adopt, if he/she is so eligible, the nationality of e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan, should be administratively assisted by the Government of India to make that choice.

In particular, he/she should be individually, confidentially, and without fear or favour assured and informed of his/her new rights and responsibilities. For example, a resident of Kashmir Valley who chooses to become a Pakistani citizen, such as Mr Geelani, would now enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in the Indian Republic that Mr Tully enjoys, and at the same time no longer require a visa to visit Pakistan just as Mr Tully needs no visa to enter Britain. In case individual participants in the Hurriyat choose to renounce Indian nationality and adopt some other, they would no longer be able to legally participate in Indian national elections or J&K’s State elections. That is something which they say they do not wish to do in any case. Those members of the Hurriyat who chose e.g. Pakistani nationality while still residing in Jammu & Kashmir, would be free to send postal ballots or cross the border and vote in Pakistan’s elections if and when these occur. There are many Canadians who live permanently in the USA who cross home to Canada in order to cast a ballot.

After the period of 30 months, every person presently under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution would have received a full and fair opportunity to privately and confidentially reveal his/her preference or choice under conditions of full information. “Partition”, “Plebiscite”, and “Military Decision” have been the three alternatives under discussion ever since the National Conference of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his then-loyal Deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, helped the Indian Army and Air Force in 1947-1948 fight off the savage attack against Jammu & Kashmir State that had commenced from Pakistan on October 22 1947. When, during the Pakistani attack, the Sheikh and Bakshi agreed to the Muslim Conference’s demand for a plebiscite among the people, the Pakistanis balked — the Sheikh and Bakshi then withdrew their offer and decisively and irrevocably chose to accede to the Indian Union. The people of Jammu & Kashmir, like any other, are now bound by the sovereign political commitments made by their forebears. Even so, given the painful mortal facts of the several decades since, the solution here proposed if properly implemented would be an incomparably more thorough democratic exercise than any conceivable plebiscite could ever have been.

Furthermore, regardless of the outcome, it would not entail any further “Partition” or population “transfer” which inevitably would degenerate into a savage balkanization, and has been ruled out as an unacceptable “deal-breaker” by the Indian Republic. Instead, every individual person would have been required, in a private and confidential decision-making process, to have chosen a nationality or to remain stateless — resulting in a multitude of cosmopolitan families in Jammu & Kashmir. But that is something commonplace in the modern world. Properly understood and properly implemented, we shall have resolved the great mortal problem we have faced for more than half a century, and Jammu & Kashmir can finally settle into a period of peace and prosperity. The boundary between India and Pakistan would have been settled by the third alternative mentioned at the time, namely, “Military Decision”.

III. Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar and Gilgit
Pakistan has demanded its flag fly in Srinagar. This too can happen though not in the way Pakistan has been wishing to see it happen. A Pakistan flag might fly in the Valley just as might an Afghan and Iranian flag as well. Pakistan has wished its flag to fly as the sovereign over Jammu & Kashmir. That is not possible. The best and most just outcome is for the Pakistani flag to fly over a recognised Pakistani consular or visa office in Srinagar, Jammu and Leh. In diplomatic exchange, the Indian tricolour would have to fly over a recognised Indian consular or visa office in Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu.

Pakistan also may have to act equivalently with respect to the original inhabitants of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir that it has been controlling — allowing those people to become Indian nationals if they so chose to do in free private decisions under conditions of full information. In other words, the “Military Decision” that defines the present boundary between sovereign states must be recognised by Pakistan sincerely and permanently in a Treaty relationship with India — and all of Pakistan’s official and unofficial protégés like the Hurriyat and the “United Jehad Council” would have to do the same. Without such a sovereign commitment from the Government of Pakistan, as shown by decisive actions of lack of aggressive intent (e.g. as came to be implemented between the USA and USSR), the Government of India has no need to involve the Government of Pakistan in implementing the solution of enhancing free individual choice of nationality with regard to all persons on our side of the boundary.

The “Military Decision” regarding the sovereign boundary in Jammu & Kashmir will be so recognised by all only if it is the universally just outcome in international law. And that in fact is what it is.

The original Jammu & Kashmir State began its existence as an entity in international law long before the present Republics of India and Pakistan ever did. Pakistan commences as an entity on August 14 1947; India commences as an entity of international law with its signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 20 1918. Jammu & Kashmir began as an entity on March 16 1846 — when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh Dogra and the British, one week after the Treaty of Lahore between the British and the defeated Sikh regency of the child Daleep Singh.

Liaquat Ali Khan and Zafrullah Khan both formally challenged on Pakistan’s behalf the legitimacy of Dogra rule in Jammu & Kashmir since the Treaty of Amritsar. The Pakistani Mission to the UN does so even today. The Pakistanis were following Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru himself, who too had at one point challenged Dogra legitimacy in the past. But though the form of words of the Pakistan Government and the Nehru-Abdullah position were similar in their attacks on the Treaty of Amritsar, their underlying substantive reasons were as different as chalk from cheese. The Pakistanis attacked the Dogra dynasty for being Dogra — i.e. because they were Hindus and not Muslims governing a Muslim majority. Nehru and Abdullah denounced monarchic autocracy in favour of mass democracy, and so attacked the Dogra dynasty for being a dynasty. All were wrong to think the Treaty of Amritsar anything but a lawful treaty in international law.

Furthermore, in this sombre political game of great mortal consequence, there were also two other parties who were, or appeared to be, in favour of the dynasty: one because the dynasty was non-Muslim, the other, despite it being so. Non-Muslim minorities like many Hindus and Sikhs in the business and governmental classes, saw the Dogra dynasty as their protector against a feared communalist tyranny arising from the Sunni Muslim masses of Srinagar Valley, whom Abdullah’s rhetoric at Friday prayer-meetings had been inciting or at least awakening from slumber. At the same time, the communalists of the Muslim Conference who had broken away from Abdullah’s secular National Conference, sought political advantage over Abdullah by declaring themselves in favour of keeping the dynasty — even elevating it to become an international sovereign, thus flattering the already pretentious potentate that he would be called “His Majesty” instead of merely “His Highness”. The ancestry of today’s Hurriyat’s demands for an independent Jammu & Kashmir may be traced precisely to those May 21-22 1947 declarations of the Muslim Conference leader, Hamidullah Khan.

Into this game stumbled the British with all the mix of cunning, indifference, good will, impatience, arrogance and pomposity that marked their rule in India. At the behest of the so-called “Native Princes”, the 1929 Butler Commission had hinted that the relationship of “Indian India” to the British sovereign was conceptually different from that of “British India” to the British sovereign. This view was adopted in the Cabinet Mission’s 12 May 1946 Memorandum which in turn came to be applied by Attlee and Mountbatten in their unseemly rush to “Divide and Quit” India in the summer of 1947.

It created the pure legal illusion that there was such a thing as “Lapse of Paramountcy” at which Jammu & Kashmir or any other “Native State” of “Indian India” could conceivably, even for a moment, become a sovereign enjoying the comity of nations — contradicting Britain’s own position that only two Dominions, India and Pakistan, could ever be members of the British Commonwealth and hence members of the newly created UN. British pusillanimity towards Jammu & Kashmir’s Ruler had even extended to making him a nominal member of Churchill’s War Cabinet because he had sent troops to fight in Burma. But the legal illusion had come about because of a catastrophic misunderstanding on the part of the British of their own constitutional law.

The only legal scholar who saw this was B R Ambedkar in a lonely and brilliant technical analysis released to the press on June 17 1947. No “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Native Princes” of Indian India could occur in constitutional law. Paramountcy over Indian India would be automatically inherited by the successor state of British India at the Transfer of Power. That successor state was the new British Dominion of India as well as (when it came to be finalised by Partition from India) the new British Dominion of Pakistan (Postscript: the deleted words represent a mistake made in the original paper, corrected in “Law, Justice & J&K” in view of the fact the UN  in 1947 deemed  India alone the successor state of British India and Pakistan a new state in the world system).  A former “Native Prince” could only choose to which Dominion he would go. No other alternative existed even for a single logical moment. Because the British had catastrophically failed to comprehend this aspect of their own constitutional law, they created a legal vacuum whereby between August 15 and October 22-26 1947, Jammu & Kashmir became a local and temporary sovereign recognised only by the Dominion of Pakistan (until October 22) and the Dominion of India (until October 26). But it was not a globally recognised sovereign and was never going to be such in international law. This was further proved by Attlee refusing to answer the J&K Prime Minister’s October 18 1947 telegram.

All ambiguity came to end with the Pakistani attack of October 22 1947, the Rape of Baramulla, the secession of an “Azad Kashmir”declared by Sardar Ibrahim, and the Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on October 31 1947 followed by the massacre of Sikh soldiers of the J&K Army at Bunji. With those Pakistani actions, Gulab Singh’s Jammu & Kashmir State, founded on March 16 1846 by the Treaty of Amritsar, ceased to logically exist as an entity in international law and fell into a state of ownerless anarchy. The conflict between Ibrahim’s Muslim communalists backed by the new Dominion of Pakistan and Abdullah’s secularists backed by the new Dominion of India had become a civil war within a larger intra-Commonwealth war that itself was almost a civil war between forces of the same military.

Jammu & Kashmir territory had become ownerless. The Roman Law which is at the root of all municipal and international law in the world today would declare that in the ownership of such an ownerless entity, a “Military Decision” was indeed the just outcome. Sovereignty over the land, waters, forests and other actual and potential resources of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir has become divided by “Military Decision” between the modern Republics of India and Pakistan. By the proposal made herein, the people and their descendants shall have chosen their nationality and their domicile freely across the sovereign boundary that has come to result.

TWO
LAW, JUSTICE AND J&K by Subroto Roy First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, July 2 2006 and The Statesman July 3 2006 http://www.thestatesman.net Editorial Page Special Article

I.
For a solution to J&K to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion in Pakistan and India as well as all people and parties in J&K ~ those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others ~ will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

On August 14, 1947, the legal entity known as “British India”, as one of its final acts, and based on a sovereign British decision made only two months earlier, created out of some of its territory a new State defined in international law as the “Dominion of Pakistan”. British India extinguished itself the very next day, and the newly independent “Dominion of India” succeeded to all its rights and obligations in international law. As the legal successor of the “India” which had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the San Francisco Declaration of 1945, the Dominion of India was already a member of the new UN as well as a signatory to many international treaties. By contrast, the Dominion of Pakistan had to apply afresh to sign treaties and become a member of international organisations. The theory put forward by Argentina that two new States, India and Pakistan, had been created ab initio, came to be rejected and was withdrawn by Argentina. Instead, Pakistan with the wholehearted backing of India was made a member of the UN, with all except Afghanistan voting in favour. (Afghanistan’s exceptional vote signalled presence of conflict over the Durand Line and idea of a Pashtunistan; Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were imprisoned by the Muslim League regime of NWFP which later supported the tribesmen who attacked J&K starting October 22, 1947; that conflict remains unresolved to this day, even after the American attack on the Taliban, the restart of a constitutional process in Afghanistan, and the purported mediation of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.)

Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s distinguished first ambassador to the UN, claimed in September 1947: “Pakistan is not a new member of UNO but a successor to a member State which was one of the founders of the Organisation.” He noted that he himself had led India to the final session of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939, and he wished to say that Pakistan had been present “as part of India… under the latter name” as a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles. This was, however, logically impossible. The Treaty of Versailles long predated (1) Mohammad Iqbal’s Allahabad Address which conceptualised for the first time in the 20th Century a Muslim State in Northwest India; (2) Rahmat Ali’s invention of the word “PAKSTAN” on the top floor of a London omnibus; (3) M. A. Jinnah and Fazlul Haq’s Lahore Resolution; and (4) the final British decision of June 3, 1947 to create by Partition out of “British India” a Dominion named Pakistan. Pakistan could not have acted in international law prior to having come into being or been created or even conceived itself. Zafrullah Khan would have been more accurate to say that the history of Pakistanis until August 14, 1947 had been one in common with that of their Indian cousins ~ or indeed their Indian brothers, since innumerable North Indian Muslim families came to be literally partitioned, with some brothers remaining Indians while other brothers became Pakistanis.

Pakistan was created at the behest of Jinnah’s Muslim League though with eventual agreement of the Indian National Congress (a distant ancestor of the political party going by the same name today). Pakistan arose not because Jinnah said Hindus and Muslims were “two nations” but because he and his League wished for a State where Muslims would find themselves ruled by fellow-Muslims and feel themselves part of a pan-Islamic culture. Yet Pakistan was intended to be a secular polity with Muslim-majority governance, not an Islamic theocracy. That Pakistan failed to become secular was exemplified most poignantly in the persecution Zafrullah himself later faced in his personal life as an Ahmadiya, even while he was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. (The same happened later to Pakistan’s Nobel-winning physicist Abdus Salaam.) Pakistan was supposed to allow the genius of Indo-Muslim culture to flourish, transplanted from places like Lucknow and Aligarh which would never be part of it. In fact, the areas that are Pakistan today had in the 1937 provincial elections shown scant popular Muslim support for Jinnah’s League. The NWFP had a Congress Government in the 1946 elections, and its supporters boycotted the pro-Pakistan referendum in 1947. The imposition of Urdu culture as Pakistan’s dominant ethos might have come to be accepted later in West Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but it was not acceptable in East Bengal, and led inevitably to the Pakistani civil war and creation of Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujib in 1971.

In August 1947, the new Dominions of India and Pakistan were each supposed to protect their respective minority populations as their first political duty. Yet both palpably failed in this, and were reduced to making joint declarations pleading for peace and an end to communal killings and the abduction of women. The Karachi Government, lacking the wherewithal and administrative machinery of being a nation-state at all, and with only Liaquat and an ailing Jinnah as noted leaders, may have failed more conspicuously, and West Punjab, the Frontier and Sindh were soon emptied of almost all their many Sikhs and Hindus. Instead, the first act of the new Pakistan Government in the weeks after August 14, 1947 was to arrange for the speedy and safe transfer of the North Indian Muslim elite by air from Delhi using chartered British aeroplanes. The ordinary Muslim masses of UP, Delhi and East Punjab were left in danger from or were subjected to Sikh and Hindu mob attacks, especially as news and rumours spread of similar outrages against Pakistan’s departing minorities.

In this spiral of revenge attacks and counter-attacks, bloodshed inevitably spilled over from West and East Punjab into the northern Punjabi plains of Jammu, though Kashmir Valley remained conspicuously peaceful. Zafrullah and Liaquat would later claim it was this communal civil war which had caused thousands of newly decommissioned Mirpuri soldiers of the British Army, and thousands of Afridi and other Frontier tribesmen, to spontaneously act to “liberate” J&K’s Muslims from alleged tyranny under the Hindu Ruler or an allegedly illegal Indian occupation.

But the main attack on J&K State that began from Pakistan along the Manshera-Muzaffarabad road on October 22, 1947 was admittedly far too well-organised, well-armed, well-planned and well-executed to have been merely a spontaneous uprising of tribesmen and former soldiers. In all but name, it was an act of undeclared war of the new Dominion of Pakistan first upon the State of J&K and then upon the Indian Dominion. This became obvious to Field Marshall Auchinlek, who, as Supreme Commander of the armed forces of both India and Pakistan, promptly resigned and abolished the Supreme Command in face of the fact that two parts of his own forces were now at war with one another.

The invaders failed to take Srinagar solely because they lost their military purpose while indulging in the Rape of Baramula. Thousands of Kashmiri women of all communities ~ Muslim, Sikh and Hindu ~ were violated and transported back to be sold in markets in Peshawar and elsewhere. Such was standard practice in Central Asian tribal wars from long before the advent of Islam, and the invading tribesmen shared that culture. India’s Army and Air Force along with the militias of the secular democratic movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and those remaining loyal units of J&K forces, fought off the invasion, and liberated Baramula, Naushera, Uri, Poonch etc. Gilgit had a British-led coup détat against it bringing it under Pakistan’s control. Kargil was initially taken by the Pakistanis and then lost by them. Leh could have been but was not taken by Pakistani forces. But in seeking to protect Leh and to retake Kargil, the Indian Army lost the siege of Skardu ~ which ended reputedly with the infamous communication from the Pakistani commander to his HQ: “All Sikhs killed; all women raped.”

Legal theory
Now, in this grave mortal conflict, the legal theory to which both the Indian and Pakistani Governments have been wedded for sixty years is one that had been endorsed by the British Cabinet Mission in 1946 and originated with the Butler Commission of 1929. Namely, that “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Indian India” of the “Native States” could and did occur with the extinction of British India on August 15, 1947. By this theory, Hyderabad, J&K, Junagadh and the several other States which had not acceded to either Dominion were no longer subject to the Crown’s suzerainty as of that date. Both Dominions drew up “Instruments of Accession” for Rulers to sign upon the supposed “Lapse” of Paramountcy that was to occur with the end of British India.

Ever since, the Pakistan Government has argued that Junagadh’s Ruler acceded to Pakistan and Hyderabad’s had wished to do so but both were forcibly prevented by India. Pakistan has also argued the accession to India by J&K’s Ruler was “fraudulent” and unacceptable, and Sheikh Abdullah was a “Quisling” of India and it was not his National Conference but the Muslim Conference of Ibrahim, Abbas and the Mirwaiz (precursor of the Hurriyat) which represented J&K’s Muslims.

India argued that Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan or Hyderabad’s independence were legal and practical impossibilities contradicting the wills of their peoples, and that their integration into the Indian Dominion was carried out in an entirely legitimate manner in the circumstances prevailing.

On J&K, India has argued that not only had the Ruler requested Indian forces to fight off the Pakistani attack, and he acceded formally before Indian forces were sent, but also that democratic principles were fully adhered to in the unequivocal endorsement of the accession by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference and further by a duly called and elected J&K Constituent Assembly, as well as generations of Kashmiris since. In the Indian view, it is Pakistan which has been in illegal occupation of Indian territory from Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit to Skardu all the way to the Khunjerab Pass, Siachen Glacier and K2, some of which it illegally ceded to its Communist Chinese ally, and furthermore that it has denied the peoples of these areas any democratic voice.

Roman law
In June 1947, it was uniquely and brilliantly argued by BR Ambedkar in a statement to the Press that the British had made a catastrophic error in comprehending their own constitutional law, that no such thing as “Lapse” of Paramountcy existed, and that suzerainty over the “Native States” of “Indian India” would be automatically transferred in international law to the successor State of British India. It was a legal illusion to think any Native State could be sovereign even for a single logical moment. On this theory, if the Dominion of India was the sole successor State in international law while Pakistan was a new legal entity, then a Native State which acceded to Pakistan after August 15, 1947 would have had to do so with the consent of the suzerain power, namely, India, as may be said to have happened implicitly in case of Chitral and a few others. Equally, India’s behaviour in integrating (or annexing) Junagadh and Hyderabad, would become fully explicable ~ as would the statements of Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel before October 1947 that they would accept J&K going to Pakistan if that was what the Ruler and his people desired. Pakistan unilaterally and by surprise went to war against J&K on October 22, declared the accession to India “fraudulent”, and to this day has claimed the territory of the original State of J&K is “disputed”. Certainly, even if the Ambedkar doctrine is applied that no “Lapse” was possible under British law, Pakistan did not recognise India’s jurisdiction there as the suzerain power as of August 15, 1947. Altogether, Pakistan’s sovereign actions from October 22 onwards amounted to acting to annex J&K to itself by military force ~ acts which came to be militarily resisted (with partial success) by India allied with Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference and the remaining forces of J&K. By these military actions, Pakistan revealed that it considered J&K territory to have descended into a legal state of anarchy as of October 22, 1947, and hence open to resolution by “Military Decision” ~ as is indeed the just outcome under Roman Law, the root of all municipal and international law today, when there is a contest between claimants over an ownerless entity.

Choice of nationality
Hence, the present author concluded (“Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman December 1-3, 2005) that the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by India and Pakistan that has occurred since 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining “democratic” question described has to do with free individual choice of nationality by the inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who may choose not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead. Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of the Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed, if Pakistan agreed to act similarly, this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be peacefully resolved. Both countries are wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources.

THREE
HISTORY OF JAMMU & KASHMIR by Subroto Roy  First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29 2006 and The Statesman Oct 30 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

At the advent of Islam in distant Arabia, India and Kashmir in particular were being visited by Chinese Buddhist pilgrims during Harsha’s reign. The great “Master of Law” Hiuen Tsiang visited between 629-645 and spent 631-633 in Kashmir (”Kia-chi-mi-lo”), describing it to include Punjab, Kabul and Kandahar. Over the next dozen centuries, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and again Hindu monarchs came to rule the 85 mile long 40 mile wide territory on the River Jhelum’s upper course known as Srinagar Valley, as well as its adjoining Jammu in the upper plains of the Punjab and “Little Tibet” consisting of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit.

In 1344, a Persian adventurer from Swat or Khorasan by name of Amir or Mirza, who had “found his way into the Valley and in time gained great influence at the Raja’s court”, proclaimed himself Sultan Shamsuddin after the death of the last Hindu monarchs of medieval Kashmir. Twelve of his descendants formed the Shamiri dynasty including the notorious Sikander and the just and tolerant Zainulabidin. Sikander who ruled 1386-1410 “submitted himself” to the Uzbek Taimur the Lame when he approached Kashmir in 1398 “and thus saved the country from invasion”. Otherwise, “Sikander was a gloomy ferocious bigot, and his zeal in destroying temples and idols was so intense that he is remembered as the Idol-Breaker. He freely used the sword to propagate Islam and succeeded in forcing the bulk of the population to conform outwardly to the Muslim religion. Most of the Brahmins refused to apostatise, and many of them paid with their lives the penalty for their steadfastness. Many others were exiled, and only a few conformed.”

Zainulabidin who ruled 1417-1467 “was a man of very different type”. “He adopted the policy of universal toleration, recalled the exiled Brahmins, repealed the jizya or poll-tax on Hindus, and even permitted new temples to be built. He abstained from eating flesh, prohibited the slaughter of kine, and was justly venerated as a saint. He encouraged literature, painting and music, and caused many translations to be made of works composed in Sanskrit, Arabic and other languages.” During his “long and prosperous reign”, he “constructed canals and built many mosques; he was just and tolerant”.

The Shamiri dynasty ended in 1541 when “some fugitive chiefs of the two local factions of the Makri and the Chakk invited Mirza Haidar Dughlat, a relation of Babar, to invade Kashmir. The country was conquered and the Mirza held it (nominally in name of Humayan) till 1551, when he was killed in a skirmish. The line… was restored for a few years, until in 1559 a Chakk leader, Ghazi Shah, usurped the throne; and in the possession of his descendants it remained for nearly thirty years.” This dynasty marks the origins of Shia Islam in Srinagar though Shia influence in Gilgit, Baltistan and Laddakh was of longer standing. Constant dissensions weakened the Chakks, and in 1586, Akbar, then at Attock on the Indus, sent an army under Raja Bhagwan Das into Srinagar Valley and easily made it part of his Empire.

Shivaism and Islam both flourished, and Hindu ascetics and Sufi saints were revered by all. Far from Muslims and Hindus forming distinct nations, here they were genetically related kinsmen living in proximity in a small isolated area for centuries. Indeed Zainulabidin may have had a vast unspoken influence on the history of all India insofar as Akbar sought to attempt in his empire what Zainulabidin achieved in the Valley. Like Zainulabidin, Akbar’s governance of India had as its “constant aim” “to conciliate the Hindus and to repress Muslim bigotry” which in modern political parlance may be seen as the principle of secular governance ~ of conciliating the powerless (whether majority or minority) and repressing the bigotry of the powerful (whether minority or majority). Akbar had made the Valley the summer residence of the Mughals, and it was Jahangir, seeing the Valley for the first time, who apparently said the words agar behest baushad, hamee in hast, hamee in hast, hamee in hast: “if Heaven exists, it is here, it is here, it is here”. Yet like other isolated paradises (such as the idyllic islands of the Pacific Ocean) an accursed mental ether can accompany the magnificent beauty of people’s surroundings. As the historian put it: “The Kashmiris remained secure in their inaccessible Valley; but they were given up to internal weakness and discord, their political importance was gone…”

After the Mughals collapsed, Iran’s Turkish ruler Nadir Shah sacked Delhi in 1739 but the Iranian court fell in disarray upon his death. In 1747 a jirga of Pashtun tribes at Kandahar “broke normal tradition” and asked an old Punjabi holy man and shrine-keeper to choose between two leaders; this man placed young wheat in the hand of the 25 year old Ahmed Shah Saddozai of the Abdali tribe, and titled him “Durrani”. Five years later, Durrani took Kashmir and for the next 67 years the Valley was under Pashtun rule, a time of “unmitigated brutality and widespread distress”. Durrani himself “was wise, prudent and simple”, never declared himself king and wore no crown, instead keeping a stick of young wheat in his turban. Leaving India, he famously recited: “The Delhi throne is beautiful indeed, but does it compare with the mountains of Kandahar?”

Kashmir’s modern history begins with Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs who became a soldier at 12, and in 1799 at age 19 was made Lahore’s Governor by Kabul’s Zaman Shah. Three years later “he made himself master of Amritsar”, and in 1806 crossed the River Sutlej and took Ludhiana. He created a fine Sikh infantry and cavalry under former officers of Napoleon, and with 80,000 trained men and 500 guns took Multan and Peshawar, defeated the Pashtuns and overran Kashmir in 1819. The “cruel rule” of the Pashtuns ended “to the great relief of Kashmir’s inhabitants”.

The British Governor-General Minto (ancestor of the later Viceroy), seeing advantage in the Sikhs staying north of the Sutlej, sent Charles Metcalfe, “a clever young civilian”, to persuade the Khalsa; in 1809, Ranjit Singh and the British in the first Treaty of Amritsar agreed to establish “perpetual amity”: the British would “have no concern” north of the Sutlej and Ranjit Singh would keep only minor personnel south of it. In 1834 and 1838 Ranjit Singh was struck by paralysis and died in 1839, leaving no competent heir. The Sikh polity collapsed, “their power exploded, disappearing in fierce but fast flames”. It was “a period of storm and anarchy in which assassination was the rule” and the legitimate line of his son and grandson, Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh was quickly extinguished. In 1845 the Queen Regent, mother of the five-year old Dalip Singh, agreed to the Khalsa ending the 1809 Treaty. After bitter battles that might have gone either way, the Khalsa lost at Sobraon on 10 February 1846, and accepted terms of surrender in the 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore. The kingdom had not long survived its founder: “created by the military and administrative genius of one man, it crumbled into powder when the spirit which gave it life was withdrawn; and the inheritance of the Khalsa passed into the hands of the English.”

Ranjit Singh’s influence on modern J&K was even greater through his having mentored the Rajput Gulab Singh Dogra (1792-1857) and his brothers Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh. Jammu had been ruled by Ranjit Deo until 1780 when the Sikhs made it tributary to the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh, a great grand nephew of Ranjit Deo, had left home at age 17 in search of a soldierly fortune, and ended up in 1809 in Ranjit Singh’s army, just when Ranjit Singh had acquired for himself a free hand to expand his domains north of the River Sutlej.

Gulab Singh, an intrepid soldier, by 1820 had Jammu conferred upon him by Ranjit Singh with the title of Raja, while Bhimber, Chibal, Poonch and Ramnagar went to his brothers. Gulab Singh, “often unscrupulous and cruel, was a man of considerable ability and efficiency”; he “found his small kingdom a troublesome charge but after ten years of constant struggles he and his two brothers became masters of most of the country between Kashmir and the Punjab”, though Srinagar Valley itself remained under a separate Governor appointed by the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh extended Jammu’s rule from Rawalpindi, Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, across Laddakh and into Tibet. His General Zorawar Singh led six expeditions into Laddakh between 1834 and 1841 through Kishtwar, Padar and Zanskar. In May 1841, Zorawar left Leh with an army of 5000 Dogras and Laddakhis and advanced on Tibet. Defeating the Tibetans at Rudok and Tashigong, he reached Minsar near Lake Mansarovar from where he advanced to Taklakot (Purang), 15 miles from the borders of Nepal and Kumaon, and built a fort stopping for the winter. Lhasa sent large re-inforcements to meet him. Zorawar, deciding to take the offensive, was killed in the Battle of Toyu, on 11-12 December 1841 at 16,000 feet.

A Laddakhi rebellion resulted against Jammu, aided now by the advancing Tibetans. A new army was sent under Hari Chand suppressing the rebellion and throwing back the Tibetans, leading to a peace treaty between Lhasa and Jammu signed on 17 September 1842: “We have agreed that we have no ill-feelings because of the past war. The two kings will henceforth remain friends forever. The relationship between Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Lhasa (Dalai Lama) is now established. The Maharajah Sahib, with God (Kunchok) as his witness, promises to recognise ancient boundaries, which should be looked after by each side without resorting to warfare. When the descendants of the early kings, who fled from Laddakh to Tibet, now return they will not be stopped by Shri Maharajah. Trade between Laddakh and Tibet will continue as usual. Tibetan government traders coming into Laddakh will receive free transport and accommodations as before, and the Laddakhi envoy will, in turn, receive the same facilities in Lhasa. The Laddakhis take an oath before God (Kunchok) that they will not intrigue or create new troubles in Tibetan territory. We have agreed, with God as witness, that Shri Maharajah Sahib and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will live together as members of the same household.” The traditional boundary between Laddakh and Tibet “as recognised by both sides since olden times” was accepted by the envoys of Gulab Singh and the Dalai Lama.

An earlier 1684 treaty between Laddakh and Lhasa had said that while Laddakh would send tribute to Lhasa every three years, “the king of Laddakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngarees-khor-sum, that he may be independent there; and he sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kangree (Kailas), and the Holy Lakes of Mansarovar and Rakas Tal”. The area around Minsar village near Lake Mansarovar, held by the rulers of Laddakh since 1583, was retained by Jammu in the 1842 peace-treaty, and its revenue was received by J&K State until 1948.

After Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839, Gulab Singh was alienated from the Lahore Court where the rise of his brothers and a nephew aroused enough Khalsa jealousy to see them assassinated in palace intrigues. While the Sikhs imploded, Gulab Singh had expanded his own dominion from Rawalpindi to Minsar ~ everywhere except Srinagar Valley itself. He had apparently advised the Sikhs not to attack the British in breach of the 1809 Treaty, and when they did so he had not joined them, though had he done so British power in North India might have been broken. The British were grateful for his neutrality and also his help in their first misbegotten adventure in Afghanistan. It was Gulab Singh who was now encouraged by both the British and the Sikhs to mediate between them, indeed “to take a leading part in arranging conditions of peace”, and he formally represented the Sikh regency in the negotiations. The 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore “set forth that the British Government having demanded in addition to a certain assignment of territory, a payment of a crore and a half of rupees, and the Sikh Government being unable to pay the whole”, Dalip Singh “should cede as equivalent to one crore the hill country belonging to the Punjab between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and the Hazara”.

For the British to occupy the whole of this mountainous territory was judged unwise on economic and military grounds; it was not feasible to occupy from a military standpoint and the area “with the exception of the small Valley of Kashmir” was “for the most part unproductive”. “On the other hand, the ceded tracts comprised the whole of the hereditary possessions of Gulab Singh, who, being eager to obtain an indefeasible title to them, came forward and offered to pay the war indemnity on condition that he was made the independent ruler of Jammu & Kashmir.

A separate treaty embodying this arrangement was thus concluded between the British and Gulab Singh at Amritsar on 16 March 1846.” Gulab Singh acknowledged the British Government’s supremacy, and in token of it agreed to present annually to the British Government “one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed and three pairs of Kashmir shawls. This arrangement was later altered; the annual presentation made by the Kashmir State was confined to two Kashmir shawls and three romals (handkerchiefs).” The Treaty of Amritsar “put Gulab Singh, as Maharaja, in possession of all the hill country between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh and Gilgit; but excluding Lahoul, Kulu and some areas including Chamba which for strategic purposes, it was considered advisable (by the British) to retain and for which a remission of Rs 25 lakhs was made from the crore demanded, leaving Rs 75 lakhs as the final amount to be paid by Gulab Singh.” The British retained Hazara which in 1918 was included into NWFP. Through an intrigue emanating from Prime Minister Lal Singh in Lahore, Imamuddin, the last Sikh-appointed Governor of Kashmir, sought to prevent Gulab Singh taking possession of the Valley in accordance with the Treaty’s terms. By December 1846 Gulab Singh had done so, though only with help of a British force which included 17,000 Sikh troops “who had been fighting in the campaign just concluded”. (Contemporary British opinion even predicted Sikhism like Buddhism “would become extinct in a short time if it were not kept alive by the esprit de corps of the Sikh regiments”.)

The British in 1846 may have been glad enough to allow Gulab Singh take independent charge of the new entity that came to be now known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir”. Later, however. they and their American allies would grow keen to control or influence the region vis-à-vis their new interests against the Russian and Soviet Empires.

FOUR
PAKISTAN’S ALLIES  by Subroto Roy  First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, June 4 2006, The Statesman June 5 2006, Editorial Page Special Article, http://www.thestatesman.net

From the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar creating the State of Jammu & Kashmir until the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Britain and later the USA became increasingly interested in the subcontinent’s Northwest. The British came to India by sea to trade. Barren, splendid, landlocked Afghanistan held no interest except as a home of fierce tribes; but it was the source of invasions into the Indian plains and prompted a British misadventure to install Shah Shuja in place of Dost Mohammad Khan leading to ignominious defeat. Later, Afghanistan was seen as the underbelly of the Russian and Soviet empires, and hence a location of interest to British and American strategic causes.

In November 1954, US President Dwight Eisenhower authorized 30 U-2 spy aircraft to be produced for deployment against America’s perceived enemies, especially to investigate Soviet nuclear missiles which could reach the USA. Reconnaissance balloons had been unsuccessful, and numerous Western pilots had been shot down taking photographs from ordinary military aircraft. By June 1956, U-2 were making clandestine flights over the USSR and China. But on May 1 1960, one was shot or forced down over Sverdlovsk, 1,000 miles within Soviet territory. The Americans prevaricated that it had taken off from Turkey on a weather-mission, and been lost due to oxygen problems. Nikita Kruschev then produced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, who was convicted of spying, though was exchanged later for a Soviet spy. Powers had been headed towards Norway, his task to photograph Soviet missiles from 70,000 ft, his point of origin had been an American base 20 miles from Peshawar.

America needed clandestine “forward bases” from which to fly U-2 aircraft, and Pakistan’s ingratiating military and diplomatic establishment was more than willing to offer such cooperation, fervently wishing to be seen as a “frontline state” against the USSR. “We will help you defeat the USSR and we are hopeful you will help us defeat India” became their constant refrain. By 1986, the Americans had been permitted to build air-bases in Balochistan and also use Mauripur air-base near Karachi.

Jammu & Kashmir and especially Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins the Pashtun regions whose capital has been Peshawar. In August-November 1947, a British coup d’etat against J&K State secured Gilgit-Baltistan for the new British Dominion of Pakistan.

The Treaty of Amritsar had nowhere required Gulab Singh’s dynasty to accept British political control in J&K as came to be exercised by British “Residents” in all other Indian “Native States”. Despite this, Delhi throughout the late 19th Century relentlessly pressed Gulab Singh’s successors Ranbir Singh and Partab Singh to accept political control. The Dogras acquiesced eventually. Delhi’s desire for control had less to do with the welfare of J&K’s people than with protection of increasing British interests in the area, like European migration to Srinagar Valley and guarding against Russian or German moves in Afghanistan. “Sargin” or “Sargin Gilit”, later corrupted by the Sikhs and Dogras into “Gilgit”, had an ancient people who spoke an archaic Dardic language “intermediate between the Iranian and the Sanskritic”. “The Dards were located by Ptolemy with surprising accuracy on the West of the Upper Indus, beyond the headwaters of the Swat River (Greek: Soastus) and north of the Gandarae (i.e. Kandahar), who occupied Peshawar and the country north of it. This region was traversed by two Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hsien, coming from the north about AD 400 and Hsuan Tsiang, ascending from Swat in AD 629, and both left records of their journeys.”

Gilgit had been historically ruled by a Hindu dynasty called Trakane; when they became extinct, Gilgit Valley “was desolated by successive invasions of neighbouring rulers, and in the 20 or 30 years ending with 1842 there had been five dynastic revolutions. The Sikhs entered Gilgit about 1842 and kept a garrison there.” When J&K came under Gulab Singh, “the Gilgit claims were transferred with it, and a boundary commission was sent” by the British. In 1852 the Dogras were driven out with 2,000 dead. In 1860 under Ranbir Singh, the Dogras “returned to Gilgit and took Yasin twice, but did not hold it. They also in 1866 invaded Darel, one of the most secluded Dard states, to the south of the Gilgit basin but withdrew again.”

The British appointed a Political Agent in Gilgit in 1877 but he was withdrawn in 1881. “In 1889, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British Government, acting as the suzerain power of Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency”. The Agency was re-established under control of the British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir. “It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas”. In 1935, the British demanded J&K lease to them for 60 years Gilgit town plus most of the Gilgit Agency and the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkuman. Hari Singh had no choice but to acquiesce. The leased region was then treated as part of British India, administered by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi, first through the Resident in J& K and later a British Agent in Peshawar. J& K State no longer kept troops in Gilgit and a mercenary force, the Gilgit Scouts, was recruited with British officers and paid for by Delhi. In April 1947, Delhi decided to formally retrocede the leased areas to Hari Singh’s J& K State as of 15 August 1947. The transfer was to formally take place on 1 August.

On 31 July, Hari Singh’s Governor arrived to find “all the officers of the British Government had opted for service in Pakistan”. The Gilgit Scouts’ commander, a Major William Brown aged 25, and his adjutant, a Captain Mathieson, planned openly to engineer a coup détat against Hari Singh’s Government. Between August and October, Gilgit was in uneasy calm. At midnight on 31 October 1947, the Governor was surrounded by the Scouts and the next day he was “arrested” and a provisional government declared.

Hari Singh’s nearest forces were at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, a few miles downstream from where the Indus is joined by Gilgit River. The 6th J& K Infantry Battalion there was a mixed Sikh-Muslim unit, typical of the State’s Army, commanded by a Lt Col. Majid Khan. Bunji controlled the road to Srinagar. Further upstream was Skardu, capital of Baltistan, part of Laddakh District where there was a small garrison. Following Brown’s coup in Gilgit, Muslim soldiers of the 6th Infantry massacred their Sikh brothers-at-arms at Bunji. The few Sikhs who survived escaped to the hills and from there found their way to the garrison at Skardu.

On 4 November 1947, Brown raised the new Pakistani flag in the Scouts’ lines, and by the third week of November a Political Agent from Pakistan had established himself at Gilgit. Brown had engineered Gilgit and its adjoining states to first secede from J&K, and, after some talk of being independent, had promptly acceded to Pakistan. His commander in Peshawar, a Col. Bacon, as well as Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary in the new Pakistan and later to lead the first military coup détat and become President of Pakistan, were pleased enough. In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat.

Gilgit’s ordinary people had not participated in Brown’s coup which carried their fortunes into the new Pakistan, and to this day appear to remain without legislative representation. It was merely assumed that since they were mostly Muslim in number they would wish to be part of Pakistan ~ which also became Liaquat Ali Khan’s assumption about J&K State as a whole in his 1950 statements in North America. What the Gilgit case demonstrates is that J&K State’s descent into a legal condition of ownerless anarchy open to “Military Decision” had begun even before the Pakistani invasion of 22 October 1947 (viz. “Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, 1-3 December 2005). Also, whatever else the British said or did with respect to J & K, they were closely allied to the new Pakistan on the matter of Gilgit.

The peak of Pakistan’s Anglo-American alliance came with the enormous support in the 1980s to guerrilla forces created and headquartered in Peshawar, to battle the USSR and Afghan communists directly across the Durand Line. It was this guerrilla war which became a proximate cause of the collapse of the USSR as a political entity in 1991. President Ronald Reagan’s CIA chief William J. Casey sent vast sums in 1985-1988 to supply and train these guerrillas. The Washington Post and New Yorker reported the CIA training guerrillas “in the use of mortars, rocket grenades, ground-to-air missiles”. 200 hand-held Stinger missiles were supplied for the first time in 1986 and the New Yorker reported Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s “Hizbe Islami” guerrillas being trained to bring down Soviet aircraft. “Mujahideen had been promised two Stingers for every Soviet aircraft brought down. Operators who failed to aim correctly were given additional training… By 1986, the United States was so deeply involved in the Afghan war that Soviet aircraft were being brought down under the supervision of American experts”. (Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 1988, p. 234).

The budding US-China détente brokered by Pakistan came into full bloom here. NBC News on 7 January 1980 said “for the first time in history (a senior State Department official) publicly admitted the possibility of concluding a military alliance between the United States and China”. London’s Daily Telegraph reported on 5 January 1980 “China is flying large supplies of arms and ammunition to the insurgents in Afghanistan. According to diplomatic reports, supplies have arrived in Pakistan from China via the Karakoram Highway…. A major build-up of Chinese involvement is underway ~ in the past few days. Scores of Chinese instructors have arrived at the Shola-e-Javed camps.”

Afghan reports in 1983-1985 said “there were eight training camps near the Afghan border operated by the Chinese in Sinkiang province” and that China had supplied the guerrillas “with a variety of weapons including 40,000 RPG-7 and 20,000 RPG-II anti tank rocket launchers.” Like Pakistan, “China did not publicly admit its involvement in the Afghan conflict: in 1985 the Chinese Mission at the UN distributed a letter denying that China was extending any kind of help to the Afghan rebels” (Anwar, ibid. p. 234). Support extended deep and wide across the Arab world. “The Saudi and Gulf rulers … became the financial patrons of the Afghan rebels from the very start of the conflict”. Anwar Sadat, having won the Nobel Peace Prize, was “keen to claim credit for his role in Afghanistan…. by joining the Afghanistan jihad, Sadat could re-establish his Islamic credentials, or so he believed. He could thus not only please the Muslim nations but also place the USA and Israel in his debt.” Sadat’s Defence Minister said in January 1980: “Army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels; they are being supplied with weapons from Egypt” and Sadat told NBC News on 22 September 1981 “that for the last twenty-one months, the USA had been buying arms from Egypt for the Afghan rebels. He said he had been approached by the USA in December 1979 and he had decided to `open my stores’. He further disclosed that these arms were being flown to Pakistan from Egypt by American aircraft. Egypt had vast supplies of SAM-7 and RPG-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons which Sadat agreed to supply to Afghanistan in exchange for new American arms. The Soviet weapons, being light, were ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. … the Mujahideen could easily claim to have captured them from Soviet and Afghan troops in battle.… Khomeini’s Iran got embroiled in war (against Iraq) otherwise Kabul would also have had to contend with the full might of the Islamic revolutionaries.” (Anwar ibid. p. 235).

Afghanistan had been occupied on 26-27 December 1979 by Soviet forces sent by the decrepit Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov to carry out a putsch replacing one communist, Hafizullah Amin, with a rival communist and Soviet protégé, Babrak Karmal. By 1985 Brezhnev and Andropov were dead and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had begun his attempts to reform the Soviet system, usher in openness, end the Cold War and in particular withdraw from Afghanistan, which by 1986 he had termed “a bleeding wound”. Gorbachev replaced Karmal with a new protégé Najibullah Khan, who was assigned the impossible task of bringing about national reconciliation with the Pakistan-based guerrillas and form a national government. Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 having lost 14,500 dead, while more than a million Afghans had been killed since the invasion a decade earlier.

Not long after Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, Gregory Zinoviev had said that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, `Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). Now instead, the Afghan misadventure had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire itself, the USSR ceasing to be a political entity by 1991, and even Gorbachev being displaced by Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin in a new Russia.

What resulted for the people of the USA and Britain and the West in general was that they no longer had to live under threat of hostile Soviet tanks and missiles, while the people of Russia, Ukraine and the other erstwhile Soviet republics as well as Eastern Europe were able to throw off the yoke of communism that had oppressed them since the Bolshevik Revolution and instead to breathe the air of freedom.

What happened to the people of Afghanistan, however, was that they were plunged into further ghastly civil war for more than ten years. And what happened to the people of Pakistan was that their country was left resembling a gigantic Islamist military camp, awash with airfields, arms, ammunition and trained guerrillas, as well as a military establishment enlivened as always by perpetual hope that these supplies, provisions and personnel of war might find alternative use in attacks against India over J& K. “We helped you when you wished to see the Soviet Union defeated and withdrawing in Afghanistan”, Pakistan’s generals and diplomats pleaded with the Americans and British, “now you must help us in our wish to see India defeated and withdrawing in Kashmir”. Pakistan’s leaders even believed that just as the Soviet Union had disintegrated afterwards, the Indian Union perhaps might be made to do the same. Not only were the two cases as different as chalk from cheese, Palmerstone’s dictum there are no permanent allies in the politics of nations could not have found more apt use than in what actually came to take place next.

Pakistan’s generals and diplomats felt betrayed by the loss of Anglo-American paternalism towards them after 1989.

Modern Pakistanis had never felt they subscribed to the Indian nationalist movement culminating in independence in August 1947. The Pakistani state now finally declared its independence in the world by exploding bombs in a nuclear arsenal secretly created with help purchased from China and North Korea. Pakistan’s leaders thus came to feel in some control of Pakistan’s destiny as a nation-state for the first time, more than fifty years after Pakistan’s formal creation in 1947. If nothing else, at least they had the Bomb.

Secondly, America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do. In response, America attacked and removed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, once again receiving the cooperative use of Pakistani manpower and real estate ~ except now there was no longer any truck with the Pakistani establishment’s wish for a quid pro quo of Anglo-American support against India on J&K. Pakistan’s generals and diplomats soon realised their Anglo-American alliance of more than a half-century ended on September 11 2001. Their new cooperation was in killing or arresting and handing over fellow-Muslims and necessarily lacked their earlier feelings of subservience and ingratiation towards the Americans and British, and came to be done instead under at least some duress. No benefit could be reaped any more in the fight against India over Jammu & Kashmir. An era had ended in the subcontinent.

FIVE

“AN INDIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT ZARDARI: REWARDING PAKISTAN FOR BAD BEHAVIOUR LEADS  TO SCHIZOPHRENIC RELATIONSHIPS”  by Subroto Roy, December 17 2008

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani.  Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These  need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

1.  Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”.  It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”.  British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none.  (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule.  Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent.   Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan.  Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi.  (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.)  Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be.  The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is  fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919.  India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions.  An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN.  Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today.  Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later.  The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision.  It succeeded only partially.  Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949.  After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India.  The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947.  Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts  a fight does not get to finish it.

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem.  The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan.  This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law.  BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India.   It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~  forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

2.  Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres
Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago.  Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s.  Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war.  Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces.  Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists.  President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general.  Rather, it  serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

3.  Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

This may be overly simplistic.  As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”,  Gregory Zinoviev himself  after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213).   For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism.  Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback!  The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own.  Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over.  Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

4.  Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc –  President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals,  whether in thought, word or deed.  Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships.  (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory,  an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons
“We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use
“We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India
“We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
“We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them
“We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way
“We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan
“We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies
“We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works
“We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past
“We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks
“We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks
“We do not harbour any terrorists
“We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons
“We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country
“We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons
“We hate India and do not want to become like India
“We love India and want to become like India
“We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere
“We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives
“We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems
“We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up
“We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.”

 

Posted in Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Afghanistan, Akbar, anarchy and governance, Anglo-Russian Treaty 1907, Asia and the West, Balochistan, Bolsheviks, Britain, Britain in India, Britain's monarchy, British history, China-India Relations, China-Tibet problem, Constitutional law, Constitutional Politics, Diplomacy, Diplomatic recognition, Freedom, Gilgit and Baltistan, Himalayas, India in international law, India's Army, India's constitutional politics, India's Democracy, India's Diplomacy, India's History, India's independence, India's Land, India's Military Defence, India's Muslims, India's Nationalism, India's Partition, India's Polity, India's Rule of Law, India's secularism, India's Union-State relations, India-China relations, India-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, India-Pakistan peace process, India-Tibet Border, International diplomacy, International Law, International politics, Iqbal, Iran, Islam, Jahangir, Jammu & Kashmir, Karakorum Pass, Laddakh, Land and political economy, Laws of war, Laws of war applied to international terrorists, Life and death, MA Jinnah, Mumbai massacres, Muslim and Hindu communalism, Natural Justice, Nobel Prizes, Pakistan in international law, Pakistan's diplomacy, Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Pakistan's politics, Pakistan's terrorist masterminds, Pakistan, Balochistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pashtuns, Persia, Political Philosophy, Rajiv Gandhi, Regional cooperation, Roman Law, Russia, Schizophrenia in international relations, Secular governance, Secularism in practice, Sheikh Abdullah, Sinkiang, Sino-Indian Border, Srinagar, Sunnis and Shias, Tibet, US Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Espionage, US Pakistan policy, USA, United States, USSR, War, World History, Zafrullah Khan. 4 Comments »

An Indian Reply to President Zardari: Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationships

An Indian Reply to President Zardari:

 

Rewarding Pakistan for bad behaviour leads to schizophrenic relationships

 

by

Subroto Roy

 

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani.  Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These  need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

1.  Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”.  It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”.  British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none.  (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule.  Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent.   Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan.  Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi.  (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.)  Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be.  The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is  fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919.  India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions.  An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN.  Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today.  Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later.  The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision.  It succeeded only partially.  Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949.  After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India.  The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947.  Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts  a fight does not get to finish it.

 

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem.  The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan.  This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law.  BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India.   It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

 

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~  forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

 

 

2.  Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres

Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago.  Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

 

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s.  Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war.  Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces.  Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

 

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists.  President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general.  Rather, it  serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

 

 

3.  Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

 

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

 

This may be overly simplistic.  As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”,  Gregory Zinoviev himself  after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213).   For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism.  Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback!  The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own.  Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over.  Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

 

 

4.  Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

 

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc —  President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals,  whether in thought, word or deed.  Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships.  (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory,  an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons
“We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use
“We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India
“We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
“We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them
“We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way
“We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan
“We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies
“We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works
“We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past
“We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks
“We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks
“We do not harbour any terrorists
“We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons
“We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country
“We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons
“We hate India and do not want to become like India
“We love India and want to become like India
“We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere
“We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives
“We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems
“We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up
“We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.

Congratulations to Mumbai’s Police: capturing a terrorist, affording him his Habeas Corpus rights, getting him to confess within the Rule of Law, sets a new world standard

The full statement to police of the single captured terrorist perpetrator of the Mumbai massacres is now available. It tells a grim story. But Mumbai’s Police, from ordinary beat constables and junior officers to the anti-terrorism top brass, come off very well both with their heroism and their commitment to the Rule of Law.   In comparison to the disastrous failures of the Rule of Law in the United States and Britain since 9/11 in fighting terrorism, Mumbai’s Police may have set a new world standard.

The prisoner was several days ago afforded Habeas Corpus rights  and produced before a magistrate who asked him if he was being mistreated to which he replied he was not – though there might not be any Indian equivalent of America’s “Miranda”  law.

“Anger Management” needed? An Oxford DPhil recommends Pakistan launch a nuclear first strike against India within minutes of war

Some nine or ten years ago, Gohar Ayub Khan, as Pakistan’s foreign minister, had said the next war with India would be over in a few hours with an Indian surrender, presumably because Pakistan would immediately launch nuclear bombs. Now a leading Pakistani military scientist (who is said to have earned a doctoral degree in 1966 from Oxford University in Experimental Nuclear Physics) has apparently recommended his Government immediately launch nuclear bombs against India within minutes of a war.

[If the link does not work, as it seems not to, paste in http://dailytimes.com.pk

followed by

/default.asp?page=2008

followed by

12

followed by

05

followed by

story_5-12-2008_pg7_24

Viz., Daily Times, December 5 2008  “Nuclear missiles can be fired within minutes in case of war”.]

This is supposed to be responsible behaviour and talk from a serious nuclear weapons’ power ?  Whose leadership has assured its Western mentors and allies that its nuclear arsenal is kept in a disassembled state beyond the control of all irregular forces like potential terrorists?

And there is its cricket board suggesting business go about as usual with India!  While its liberal commentators go about shedding crocodile tears for victims of the systematic mass murder last week, describing it all as the “Mumbai incident” or the “Bombay event”!   Almost the Bombay soiree?

There is a sheer lack of reason, a lack of reasoning, and a lack of reasonableness here, as well as widespread need among Pakistan’s terrorist and military masterminds for what is known in popular psychology these days as “Anger Management”.

India’s Muslim Voices (Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent)

India’s Muslim Voices

 

 

(Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent)

 

 

by

 

 

Subroto Roy

 

 

Ill-informed Western observers, especially at purported “think tanks” and news-portals, frequently proclaim the Pakistan-India confrontation and Jammu & Kashmir conflict to represent some kind of savage irreconcilable division between Islamic and Hindu cultures.

For example, the BBC, among its many prevarications on the matter (like lopping off J&K entirely from its recently broadcasted maps of India, perhaps under influence of its Pakistani staffers), frequently speaks of “Hindu-majority India” and “Indian-administered Kashmir” being confronted by Muslim Pakistan.

And two days ago from California’s Bay Area arose into the Internet Cloud the following profundity: What we’re dealing with now, in the Pakistani-Indian rivalry, is a true war of civilizations, pitting Muslims against Hindus…. the unfathomable depths of the Muslim-Hindu divide….”.

Even President-elect Obama’s top Pakistan-specialists have fallen for the line of Washington’s extremely strong Pakistan lobby: “Pakistan… sees itself as the political home for the subcontinent’s Muslim population and believes India’s continued control over the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley and denial of a plebiscite for its inhabitants represent a lingering desire on India’s part to undo the legacy of partition, which divided the British Indian Empire into India and Pakistan.”

 

The truth on record is completely different and really rather simple: for more than a century and a half, Muslims qua Muslims on the Indian subcontinent have struggled with the question of their most appropriate cultural and political identity.

 

The starkest contrast may be found in their trying to come to terms with their partly Arabic and partly Hindu or Indian parentage (the words Hindu, Sindhu, Indus, Indian, Sindhi, Hindi etc all clearly have the same Hellenistic root).

For example, there was Wali Allah (1703-1762) declaringWe are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride”.

But here has been Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), in his 1930 Allahabad speech to the Muslim League, conceiving today’s Pakistan as a wish to become free of precisely that Arab influence: “I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.”

In an article “Saving Pakistan” published last year in The Statesman and available elsewhere here, it was suggested Iqbal’s “spirit of modern times” may be represented most prominently today by the physicist/political philosopher Pervez Hoodbhoy: in a December 2006 speech Hoodbhoy suggested a new alternative to MA Jinnah’s “Faith, Unity, Discipline” slogan: “First, I wish for minds that can deal with the complex nature of truth…. My second wish is for many more Pakistanis who accept diversity as a virtue… My third, and last, wish is that Pakistanis learn to value and nurture creativity.” He has spoken too of bringing “economic justice to Pakistan”, of the “fight to give Pakistan’s women the freedom which is their birthright”, and of people to “wake up” and engage politically. But Pakistan’s Iqbalian liberals like Hoodbhoy still have to square off with those of their compatriots who sent the youthful squad into Mumbai last week with assault rifles, grenades and heroic Arabic code-names, as well as orders to attack civilians with the ferocity of the original Muslims attacking caravans and settlements in ancient Arabia.

 

What the extremely strong Pakistan lobbies within the British and American political systems have suppressed in order to paint a picture of eternal Muslim-Hindu conflict is the voice of India’s nationalist Muslims, who historically have had no wish to have any truck with any idea of a “Pakistan” at all.

 

Most eminent among them was undoubtedly Jinnah’s fiercest critic: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad whose classic 1946 statement on Pakistan is available in his India Wins Freedom, the final version published only in 1988.

 

“I have considered from every possible point of view the scheme of Pakistan as formulated by the Muslim League. As an Indian, I have examined its implications for the future of India as a whole. As a Muslim, I have examined its likely effects upon the fortunes of Muslims of India. Considering the scheme in all its aspects, I have come to the conclusion that it is harmful not only for India as a whole but for Muslims in particular. And in fact it creates more problems than it solves. I must confess that the very term Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests that some portions of the world are pure while others are impure. Such a division of territories into pure and impure is un-Islamic and is more in keeping with orthodox Brahmanism which divides men and countries into holy and unholy — a division which is a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam. Islam recognizes no such division and the prophet says “God made the whole world a mosque for me”.

 

Further, it seems that the scheme of Pakistan is a symbol of defeatism, and has been built on the analogy of the Jewish demand for a national home. It is a confession that Indian Muslims cannot hold their own in India as a whole, and would be content to withdraw to a corner specially reserved for them.

 

One can sympathise with the aspiration of the Jews for such a national home, as they are scattered all over the world and cannot in any region have any effective voice in the administration.. The conditions of Indian Muslims is quite otherwise. Over 90 million in number, they are in quantity and quality a sufficiently important element in Indian life to influence decisively all questions of administration and policy. Nature has further helped them by concentrating them in certain areas.

 

In such a context, the demand for Pakistan loses all force. As a Muslim, I for one am not prepared for a moment to give up my right to treat the whole of India as my domain and to shape in the shaping of its political and economic life. To me it seems a sure sign of cowardice to give up what is my patrimony and content myself with a mere fragment of it.

 

As is well known, Mr. Jinnah’s Pakistan scheme is based on his two nation theory. His thesis is that India contains many nationalities based on religious differences, Of them the two major nations, the Hindus and Muslims, must as separate nations have separate States, When Dr Edward Thompson once pointed out to Mr. Jinnah that Hindus and Muslims live side by side in thousands of Indian towns, villages and hamlets, Mr. Jinnah replied that this is no way affected their separate nationality. Two nations, according to M Jinnah, confront one another in every hamlet, village and town, and he, therefore, desires that they should be separated into two States.

 

I am prepared to overlook all other aspects of the problem and judge it from the point of view of Muslim interest alone. I shall go still further and say that if it can be shown that the scheme of Pakistan can in any way benefit Muslims I would be prepared to accept it myself and also to work for its acceptance by others. But the truth is that even if I examine the scheme from the point of view of the communal interests of the Muslims themselves, I am forced to the conclusion that it can in no way benefit them or allay their legitimate fears.

Let us consider dispassionately the consequences which will follow if we give effect to the Pakistan scheme. India will be divided into two States, one with a majority of Muslims and the other of Hindus. In the Hindustan State there will remain 35 million Muslims scattered in small minorities all over the land. With 17 per cent in UP, 12 percent in Bihar and 9 percent in Madras, they will be weaker than they are today in the Hindu majority provinces. They have had their homelands in these regions for almost a thousand years and built up well known centres of Muslim culture and civilization there.

They will awaken overnight and discover that they have become alien and foreigners. Backward industrially, educationally and economically, they will be left to the mercies to what would become an unadulterated Hindu raj.

On the other hand, their position within the Pakistan State will be vulnerable and weak. Nowhere in Pakistan will their majority be comparable to the Hindu majority in the Hindustan States. ( NB Azad could hardly imagine even at this point the actual British Partition of Punjab and Bengal, let aside the later separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan, SR. )

In fact, their majority will be so slight that will be offset by the economical, educational and political lead enjoyed by non-Muslims in these areas. Even if this were not so and Pakistan were overwhelmingly Muslim in population, it still could hardly solve the problem of Muslims in Hindustan. Two States confronting one another, offer no solution of the problem of one another’s minorities, but only lead to retribution and reprisals by introducing a system of mutual hostages. The scheme of Pakistan therefore solves no problems for the Muslims. It cannot safeguard their rights where they are in minority nor as citizens of Pakistan secure them a position in Indian or world affairs which they would enjoy as citizens of a major State like the Indian Union.

It may be argued that if Pakistan is so much against the interest if the Muslims themselves, then why should such a large section of Muslims be swept away by its lure? The answer is to be found in the attitude of certain communal extremists among the Hindus. When the Muslim League began to speak of Pakistan, they read into the scheme a sinister pan-Islamic conspiracy and began to oppose it out of fear that it foreshadowed a combination of Indian Muslim and trans-Indian Muslim States. The opposition acted as an incentive to the adherents of the League. With simple though untenable logic they argued that if Hindus were so opposed to Pakistan, surely it must be of benefit to Muslims. An atmosphere of emotional frenzy was created which made reasonable appraisement impossible and swept away especially the younger and more impressionable among the Muslims. I have, however, no doubt that when the present frenzy has died down and the question can be considered dispassionately, those who now support Pakistan will themselves repudiate it as harmful for Muslim interests.

The formula which I have succeeded in making the Congress accept secures whatever merits the Pakistan scheme contains while all its defects and drawbacks are avoided. The basis of Pakistan is the fear of interference by the Centre in Muslim majority areas as the Hindus will be in a majority in the Centre. The Congress meets this fear by granting full autonomy to the provincial units and vesting all residuary power in the provinces. It also has provided for two lists of Central subjects, one compulsory and one optional, so that if any provincial unit so wants, it can administer all subjects itself except a minimum delegated to the Centre. The Congress scheme threescore ensures that Muslim majority provinces are internally free to develop as they will, but can at the same time influence the Centre on all issues which affect India as a whole.

The situation in India is such that all attempts to establish a centralized and unitary government are bound to fail. Equally, doomed to failure is the attempt to divide India into two States. After considering all aspects of the question, I have come to the conclusion that the only solution can be on the lines embodied in the Congress formula which allows room for development both to the provinces and to India as a whole. The Congress formula meets the fear of the Muslim majority areas to allay which the scheme of Pakistan was formed. On the other hand, it avoids the defects of the Pakistan scheme which would bring the Muslims where they are in a minority under a purely Hindu government.

I am one of those who considers the present chapter of communal bitterness and differences as a transient phase in Indian life. I firmly hold that they will disappear when India assumes the responsibility of her own destiny. I am reminded of a saying of Mr. Gladstone that the best cure for a man’s fear of the water was to throw him into it. Similarly, India must assume responsibilities and administer her own affairs before fears and suspicious can be fully allayed.

When India attains her destiny, she will forget the chapter of communal suspicion and conflict and face the problems of modern life from a modern point of view. Differences will no doubt persist, but they will be economic, not communal. Opposition among political parties will continue, but it will based, not on religion, but on economic and political issues. Class and not community will be the basis oaf future alignments, and policies will be shaped accordingly. If it be argued that this is only a faith which events may not justify, I would say that in any case the 90 million Muslims constitute a factor which nobody can ignore and whatever the circumstances, they are strong enough to safeguard their own destiny.”

 

 

 

Next must be Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s classic February 1948 Speech to the UN Security  Council,  four months into the initial Pakistani attack on Kashmir:

 

 

“Aggression, not accession, is the issue: I have heard with patience, attention and respect the statements made by the representative of Pakistan and members of the Security Council, as well as the statements made on various occasions by the members of my own delegation. The Security Council will concede that I am probably the one man most concerned in the dispute because I happen to come from that land which has become the bone of contention between the two Dominions of India and Pakistan.

I have been quoted profusely on either side, and rightly so, because I have had the fortune-or, should I say, misfortune of leading my countrymen to freedom from 1931 onwards. In this task, I have suffered a great deal. I have been imprisoned not once or twice, but seven times, and the last imprisonment carried with it an aggregate sentence of nine years.

There are many troubles in Kashmir. I have heard patiently the debate in the Security Council, but I feel that I am rather confused. After all, what is the point in dispute? The point in dispute is not that the sovereignty of the Prince is in question, as the representative of Pakistan stated yesterday. After all, I have suffered the punishment of being sentenced to nine years imprisonment for saying what the representative of Pakistan said with regard to the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846. I am glad that he said in the Security Council, where he is immune from any punishment. Therefore, I am not disputing that point and that it is not the subject of the dispute before the Security Council.

The subject of the dispute before the Security Council is not the mal-administration of the Princely State of Kashmir. In order to set right that mal-administration, I think I have suffered the most, and today, when for the first time, I heard the representative of Pakistan supporting my case, it gave me great pleasure.

After all, what is the dispute between India and Pakistan? From what I have learned from the complaint brought before the Security Council by my own delegation, the dispute revolves around the fact that Kashmir acceded legally and constitutionally to the Dominion of India. There was some trouble about the demarcation of the Kashmir administration within the State, and the tribesmen from across the border have poured into my country. They have been helped and are being helped by the Pakistan Government, with the result that there is the possibility of a greater conflagration between India and Pakistan. India sought the help of Security Council so that Pakistan might be requested to desist from helping the tribesmen, and to desist from supporting the inside revolt, should I say, against the lawful authority.

I should have understood the position of the representative of Pakistan if he had come boldly before the Security Council and maintained: “Yes, we do support the tribesmen; we do support the rebels inside the State because we feel that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan and not to India, and because we feel that the accession of Kashmir to India was fraudulent.” Then we might have discussed the validity of the accession of the State of Kashmir to India. But that was not the position taken by the representative of Pakistan. He completely denied that any support was being given by the Government of Pakistan to either the tribesmen or those who are in revolt within the State against the constituted authority.

How am I to convince the Security Council that the denial is absolutely untrue? I am sitting before the Security Council at a distance of thousands of miles from my country. I have fought many battles, along with my own men, on the borders of Jammu and Kashmir. I have seen with my own eyes the support given by the Pakistan Government, not only in supplying buses but in providing arms, ammunition, direction and control of the tribesmen and I have even seen the Pakistan Army forces from across the border.

The denial has come so flatly that it becomes very difficult for me to disprove it here before the Security Council, unless the Security Council accedes to our request to send a commission to the spot and to find out first whether the allegations brought before the Security Council with regard to the aid given by the Government of Pakistan are correct or incorrect. If they are incorrect, the case falls; if they are correct, then the Security Council should take the necessary steps to advise the Government of Pakistan to desist from such support.

But then, this simple issue has been confused. On the one hand, the Pakistan Government says, “We are not a party to the trouble within the State. The trouble within the State exists because the people are fighting against the mal-administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.” Yes, we are fighting, we have been fighting against the mal-administration of that State since 1931. We have been demanding democratisation of the Government there. But how is it that today Pakistan has become the champion of our liberty? I know very well that in 1946, when I raised the cry “Quit Kashmir,” the leader of the Pakistan Government, who is the Governor-General now, Mr.Mohammed Ali Jinnah, opposed my Government, declaring that this movement was a movement of a few renegades and that Muslims as such had nothing to do with the movement.

The Muslim Conference, which has been talked about so much, opposed my movement and declared its loyalty to the Prince. The representative of Pakistan now says that Sheikh Abdullah, once the supporter of “Quit Kashmir”, has joined hands with the Maharaja of Kashmir, and that in one of my public speeches I declared that I wanted the Maharaja to be the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir-not the Maharaja of Jammu only, but the Maharaja of entire State.

I should like to correct the misreporting of my speech. I did deliver that speech in Jammu, which is the winter capital of our country, but it was in a different context. As the members of the Security Council have already heard from the head of my delegation, some massacres did occur in the Jammu Province. After the Kashmir Province was raided by the tribesmen, and after thousands of Hindus and Sikhs were uprooted from the villages and towns in the Kashmir Province and found their way into the Jammu Province, there was some very bad retaliation. I could not go to Jammu Province to control that situation because I was busy with the raiders in Kashmir Province. However, as soon as I had some time, I flew down to Jammu Province, addressed a gathering of 60,000 Hindus and Sikhs in Jammu city, and gave them some plain advice.

I told them clearly that this policy of retaliation would bring no good to them as Hindus and Sikhs and would bring no good to their leader, because while they could retaliate in one or two districts where they formed the majority, and could even wipe out the Muslim population in these one or two districts, the State happens to have a population which is 80 per cent Muslim, and it would be impossible for them to wipe out the entire Muslim population. The result would be that the Prince, whom they wanted to support, would remain the Prince of only two districts, and not of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir. I told them that if they wanted him to be the Prince of Jammu and Kashmir, they would have to change their behaviour. That was the speech I delivered, and that was the context in which it was made.

However, I have already stated how this trouble started. It is probable that the representative of Pakistan would admit that when India was divided into two parts, my colleagues and I were all behind prison bars. The result of this division of India was to start massacre on either side. Where Muslims in the West Punjab formed the majority, the killing of Hindus and Sikhs started and this was retaliated in East Punjab. All along our border, massacres of Hindus and Sikhs, on the one hand, and Muslims on the other hand were a daily occurrence. But the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and its people, kept calm. The result was that thousands of refugees, both Muslims and Hindus, sought refuge in our State and we rendered every possible help to all of them.

Why was that so? It was because I and my organisation never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We do not believe in the two-nation theory, nor in communal hatred or communalism itself. We believed that religion had no place in politics. Therefore, when we launched our movement of “Quit Kashmir”, it was not only Muslims who suffered, but our Hindu and Sikh comrades as well. That created a strong bond of unity between all the communities, and the result was that while Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were fighting each other all along the border, the people of Jammu and Kashmir State — Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike-remained calm.

The situation was worsening day by day and the minority in our State was feeling very nervous. As a result, tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the State administration to release me and my colleagues. The situation outside demanded the release of workers of the National Conference, along with its leader, and we were accordingly set free.

Immediately we were liberated from prison we were faced with the important question of whether Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, accede to India, or remain independent, because under the partition scheme these three choices were open us as, indeed, they were open to every Indian State. The problem was a very difficult one, but I advised the people of my country that although the question was very important to us, it was a secondary consideration. The all important matter for us was our own liberation from the autocratic rule of the Prince for which we were fighting and had been fighting for the past seventeen years. We had not achieved that goal, and therefore I told my people that we must do so first. Then, as free men we should have to decide where our interest lay. Being a frontier State, Kashmir has borders with both Pakistan and India, and there are advantages and disadvantages for the people of Kashmir attached to each of the three alternatives to which I have referred.

Naturally, as I have indicated, we could not decide this all important issue before achieving our own liberation, and our slogan became “Freedom before accession”. Some friends from Pakistan met mein Srinagar. I had a heart- to- heart discussion with them and explained my point of view. I told them in plain words that, whatever had been the attitude of Pakistan towards our freedom movement in the past, it would not influence us in our judgement. Neither the friendship of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and of Congress, nor their support of our freedom movement, would have any influence upon our decision if we felt that the interests of four million Kashmiris lay in our accession to Pakistan.

I requested them not to precipitate this decision upon us but to allow us time, supporting our movement for the while. I added that once we were free they should allow us an interval to consider this all important issue. I pointed out that India had accepted this point of view and was not forcing us to decide. We had, in fact, entered into a standstill agreement with both Pakistan and India, but the leader of the Indian delegation has already explained to the Security Council what Pakistan did to us.

While I was engaged in these conversations and negotiations with friends from Pakistan, I sent one of my colleagues to Lahore, where he met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, and other high dignitaries of the West Punjab Government. He placed the same point of view before them and requested that they should allow us time to consider this vital question, first helping us to achieve our liberation instead of forcing us to declare our decision one way or the other. Then, one fine morning while these negotiations were proceeding, I received news that a full-fledged attack had been carried out by the raiders on Muzaffarabad, frontier town in the Kashmir Province.

The representative of Pakistan has stated that immediately upon my release I went down to Delhi to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. That is not a fact. He probably does not know that while in jail I was elected President of the All India States People’s Conference, and that immediately upon my release I had to take up my duties. Accordingly, I had called a meeting of the executive of that Conference in Delhi, a fact which I had conveyed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Indeed, I had told the Prime Minister of Pakistan that immediately upon my return from Delhi I should take the opportunity of meeting him personally to discuss my point of view with him. I did not go to Delhi to conclude any agreement on behalf of Kashmir because, although released, I was still considered a rebel.

I might inform the representative of Pakistan that although I am beyond doubt the head of the Administration of Kashmir State, I am not the Prime Minister. I am head of the Emergency Administration, and that not because the Maharaja of Kashmir wished it. In fact, I do not know whether the Maharaja wishes it even now. I hold the position because the people of my country wish me to be at the helm of affairs in Jammu and Kashmir State.

When the raiders came to our land, massacred thousands of people—mostly Hindus and Sikhs, but Muslims, too—abducted thousands of girls, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims alike, looted our property and almost reached the gates of our summer capital, Srinagar, the result was that the civil, military and police administrations failed. The Maharaja, in the dead of night, left the capital along with his courtiers, and the result was absolute panic. There was no one to take over control. In that hour of crisis, the National Conference came forward with its 10,000 volunteers and took over the administration of the country. They started guarding the banks, the offices and houses of every person in the capital. This is the manner in which the administration changed hands. We were de facto in charge of the administration. The Maharaja, later on, gave it a legal form.

It is said that Sheikh Abdullah is a friend of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Yes, I admit that. I feel honoured that such a great man claims me as his friend. And he happens to belong to my own country;he is also a Kashmiri, and blood is thicker than water. If JawaharLal Nehru gives me that honour, I cannot help it. He is my friend. But that does not mean that, because of his friendship, I am going to betray the millions of my people who have suffered along with me for the last seventeen years and sacrifice the interests of my country. I am not a man of that calibre.

I was explaining how the dispute arose—how Pakistan wanted to force this position of slavery upon us. Pakistan had no interest in our liberation or it would not also have opposed our freedom movement. Pakistan would have supported us when thousands of my countrymen were behind bars and hundreds were shot to death. The Pakistani leaders and Pakistani papers were heaping abuse upon the people of Kashmir who were suffering these tortures.

Then suddenly, Pakistan comes before the bar of the world as the champion of the liberty of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The world may believe this, but it is very difficult for me to believe. When we refused the coercive tactics of Pakistan, it started full fledged aggression and encouraged the tribesmen in this activity. It is absolutely impossible for the tribesmen to enter our territory without encouragement from Pakistan, because it is necessary to pass through Pakistan territory to reach Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds of trucks, thousands of gallons of petrol, thousands of rifles, ammunition, and all forms of help that an army requires, were supplied to them. We know this. After all, we belong to that country. What Pakistan could not achieve by the use of economic blockade it wanted to achieve by full-fledged aggression.

What do we request? We request nothing more than that the Security Council should send some members to this area to see for themselves what is happening there. If Pakistan comes forward and says, “We question the legality of accession”, I am prepared to discuss whether or not the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was legal. However, now they say, “We want a plebiscite, we want to obtain the free and unfettered opinion of the people of Kashmir. There should be no pressure exerted on the people and they should make the free choice as to the State to which they wish to accede.”

Not only this the offer that was made by the people of Kashmir to Pakistan long, long ago, but it is the offer made by the Prime Minister of India at a time, I think, he had not the slightest need for making it, as Kashmir was in distress.

We realised that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate of our kith and kin of Muzaffarabad, Baramulla, Srinagar and other towns and villages, or to seek help from some outside authority.

Under these circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept our accession. The Government of India could have easily accepted the accession and could have said, “All right we accept your accession and we shall render this help.” There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add the proviso, when accepting the accession, that India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We will accept this accession, without Kashmir’s acceding to the Indian Dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will be subject to ratification by the people. That was the offer made by the Prime Minister of India.

That was the same offer which was made by the people of Kashmir to the Government of Pakistan, but it was refused because at that time Pakistan felt that it could, within a week, conquer the entire Jammu and Kashmir State and then place the fait accompli before the world, just as happened some time ago in Europe. The same tactics were used.

But having failed in these tactics, Pakistan now comes before the bar of the world, pleading, “We want nothing, we only want our people to be given a free hand in deciding their own fate. And in deciding their own fate, they must have a plebiscite.”

They then continue and say, “No, a plebiscite cannot be fair and impartial unless and until there is a neutral administration in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” I have failed to understand this terminology with reference to a “neutral administration”. After all what does “neutral administration” mean?

The representative of Pakistan has stated that Sheikh Abdullah, because he is a friend of Jawahar Lal Nehru, because he has had sympathy for the Indian National Congress, because he has declared his point of view in favour of accession to India, and because he is head of the Emergency Administration, cannot remain impartial. Therefore, Sheikh Abdullah must depart.

Let us suppose that Sheikh Abdullah goes, who is to replace Sheikh Abdullah ? It will be someone amongst the 4 million people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But can we find anyone among these 4 million people whom we can call impartial? After all, we are not logs of wood, we are not dolls. We must have an opinion one way or the other. The people of Kashmir are either in favour of Pakistan or in favour of India.

Therefore, Pakistan’s position comes down to this that the 4 million people of that State should have no hand in running the administration of their own country. Someone else must come in for that purpose. Is that fair ? Is that just ? Do the members of the Security Council wish to oust the people of Kashmir from running their own administration and their own country ? Then, for argument’s sake, let us suppose that the 4 million people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir agree to have nothing to do with the administration of their country; some one else must be brought into the country for this purpose. From where do the members of the Security Council propose that such a neutral individual may be secured? From India? No, from Pakistan? No, from anywhere in the world? No, frankly speaking, even if the Security Council were to request Almighty God to administer the State of Jammu and Kashmir during this interim period, I do not feel that He could act impartially. After all, one must have sympathy either for this side or that side.

If elections were to be held in the United Kingdom sometime after tomorrow with the Labour Government in power, would anyone say to Mr Attlee: “The elections are now going on. Because you happen to belong to Labour Party, your sympathies will be in favour of the Labour vote. Therefore, you had better clear out. We must have a neutral man as Prime Minister until our elections are finished?

However, we have been told that Sheikh Abdullah must walk out because he has declared his point of view in favour of India. Therefore, he cannot be impartial. We must have some impartial man we must have some neutral man.

As I have submitted to the members of the Security Council, Sheikh Abdullah happens to be there because the people wish it. As long as the people wish it, I shall be there. There is no power on earth which can displace me from the position which I have there. As long as the people are behind me, I will remain there.

We have declared once for all, that there shall be freedom of voting and for that purpose we have said, “Let anyone come in, we have no objection. Let the Commission of the Security Council on India come into our State and advise us how we should take a vote, how we should organize it, and how it can be completely impartial. We have no objection.” My Government is ready to satisfy, to the last comma, the impartiality of the vote.

But to have an impartial vote is one thing; to have a say in the administration of the State is a different thing entirely. After all, with what are we concerned? We are concerned only with the fact that no influence shall be exercised over the voters, either in one way or in another. The people shall be free to vote according to their own interests. We are ready to accede to that.

It is then said: “You cannot have freedom of voting as long as the Indian Army remains in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” It is probably very difficult for me to draw a full picture of what is going on in that country. There is absolute chaos in certain parts of the country, fighting is going on and thousands of tribesmen are there ready to take advantage of any weakness on the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Once we ask the Indian Army, which is the only protective force in Kashmir against these marauders, to clear out, we leave the country open to chaos. After all, one who has suffered for the last seventeen years, in attempting to secure the freedom and liberation of his own country, would not like an outside army to come in and to remain in the country.

However, what is the present situation? If I ask the Indian Army to clear out, how am I going to protect the people from the looting, arson, murder and abduction with which they have been faced all these long months? What is the alternative? here need be no fear since the Indian Army is there, that this army will interfere in the exercise of a free vote. After all, a Commission of the Security Council will be there in order to watch. The Indian Army does not have to go into every village. It will be stationed at certain strategic points, so that in the event of danger from any border, the Army will be there to protect that border. The army is there to curb disorders anywhere in the State; that is all. The army will not be in each and every village in order to watch each and every vote.

It is then said: “Can we not have a joint control ? Can we not have the armies of Pakistan and India inside the State in order to control the situation ?” This is an unusual idea. What Pakistan could not achieve through ordinary means, Pakistan wishes to achieve by entering through the back door, so that it may have its armies inside the State and then start the fight. That is not possible. After all, we have been discussing the situation in Kashmir. I should say that we have been playing the drama of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. The people of Kashmir are vitally interested in this question. Four million people in Kashmir are keenly interested in this entire affair. I have sympathies with the people of Poonch and Mirpur. The representative of Pakistan will probably concede that I have suffered greatly for the people of Poonch as well as for the people of Mirpur. There is no difference on this part of international democratisation of the administration between me, my party and the people of Poonch. We are one, we want our own liberty, we want our own freedom, we do not want autocratic rule. We desire that the 4 million people in Jammu and Kashmir—Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims— shall have the right to change their destiny, to control their country, and to administer it as best as they can. On that point there is absolutely no difference.

However, it is not a question of internal liberation. The Security Council should not confine the issue. The question is not that we want internal freedom, the question is not how the Maharaja got his State, or whether or not he is sovereign. These points are not before the Security Council. Whether Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India—complaints on that score have been brought before the Security Council on behalf of Pakistan—is not the point at issue. If that were the point at issue, then we should discuss that subject. We should prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India and Pakistan has no right to question that accession. However, that is not the discussion before the Security Council.

Indian and Kashmiri forces are ready to deal with tribesmen, to come to an understanding with the people of Kashmir and to establish ademocratic form of government inside the State. We shall do all that. We do not want Pakistan to lend us support to suppress an internal revolt or to drive out the tribesmen. We do not seek any support from Pakistan in that connection. Since Pakistan is a neighbouring country, we desire to remain on the friendliest possible terms with this sister Dominion. But we do ask that Pakistan shall have no hand, directly or indirectly, in this turmoil in Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan has said: “We have no hand in this turmoil.” The only course left to the Security Council is to send out the commission and to see whether or not Pakistan has any hand in this turmoil. If Pakistan has had any hand in this turmoil, then the Government of Pakistan should be asked to desist from such activity. If Pakistan has had no hand in this turmoil, then that can be proved.

This issue has been clouded by very many other issues and interests. I suggested at informal talks that according to my understanding there are two points at issue, first, how to have this neutral impartial administration; second, whether or not the Indian Army shall remain. It is not at all disputed that we must have a plebiscite and that the accession must be ratified by the people of Kashmir, freely and without any pressure on this or that side. That much is conceded, there is no dispute about that. The dispute arises when it is suggested that in order to have the free vote, the administration must be changed. To that suggestion we say, “No.”

I do not know what course future events will take. However, I may assure the Security Council that, if I am asked to conduct the administration of this State, it will be my duty to make the administration absolutely impartial. It will be my duty to request my brothers, who are in a different camp at this time, to come to lend me support. After all, they are my own kith and kin. We suffered together, we have no quarrel with them. I shall tell them: “Come on; it is my country; it is your country. I have been asked to administer the State. Are you prepared to lend me support? It is for me to make the administration successful; it is for me to make the administration look impartial.” It is not for Pakistan to say “No, we must have an impartial administration.” I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir State. I refuse this point blank. Pakistan has no right to say that we must do this and we must do that. We have seen enough of Pakistan. The people of Kashmir have seen enough. Muzaffarabad and Baramulla and hundred of villages in Jammu and Kashmir depict the story of Pakistan to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. We want to have no more of this.

In concluding, I again request that in order to settle this issue of Kashmir, the Security Council should not confuse the point in dispute. The Security Council should not allow various other extraneous matters to be introduced. Very many extraneous matters have been introduced. The representative of Pakistan gave us the history of the Jammu and Kashmir State. He read to us some letters from Viceroys of India, asking the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to behave, giving the Maharaja good advice, et cetera. However, we cannot forget that these States are the creation of British imperialism in India who has supported these states and this misrule for these 150 years? It is not going to convince me or the world for the representative of Pakistan to say: “These events have happened and these letters were written.” We know how the Princes have acted, how the states were brought into existence, and how the Princes were supported. This was all a game in the British imperialist policy. But this legacy has now fallen upon us. We are not here to discuss whether or not the Maharaja lawfully became the ruler of the State, whether or not there is moral administration in this State, whether or not the Maharaja is sovereign and whether or not Kashmir has legally acceded to India. These issues are not before the Security Council. The only issue before the Security Council is that Pakistan must observe its international obligations and must not support any outside raiders.

Pakistan should not encourage inside revolt. Pakistan has denied that it has in order to verify the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan, the Security Council must send a commission to the spot to see whether the complaint brought before the Security Council is valid or invalid. If the Security Council finds that the complaint brought before it by India is valid, then Pakistan should be asked to desist or India should be permitted to use its means to carry out the decision of the Security Council.

As far as I can speak on behalf of India, India does not want the help of the armies of Pakistan. What it wants from Pakistan is that Pakistan should not supply bases to the raiders on Pakistan territory across the border from Jammu and Kashmir State. All along the border on Pakistan territory, there are huge concentrations of these tribesmen who are Pakistani nationals. We request Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used by these raiders.

Pakistan should not provide ammunition, arms, direction and control to these tribesmen. It should stop the passage of these tribesmen through its territory. Pakistan should not supply arms and ammunition to the people who are fighting within the State because all these matters fall under an international obligation. Therefore, Pakistan should desist from that practice. That is all. We do not want any armed help from Pakistan. If Pakistan does what we have requested, the Indian Army, I am quite sure, will be capable of driving out the raiders and tribesmen. If Pakistan does not meddle in our affairs, we will be capable of solving all our own internal disputes with the Maharaja of Kashmir. However, as long as this unofficial war continues, it is very difficult for us to do any thing. Our hands are tied.

What is happening? The raiders are concentrated just across the border. They enter our State in large number—four or five thousand strong. They raid four or five villages, burn them, abduct women and loot property. When our army tries to capture them, they go across the border, and can not fire a single shot across the border, because if it does, there is the immediate danger of a greater conflagration. So our hands are tied.

We do not want to create this difficult situation without informing the Security Council and we felt honour-bound to inform it of the actual position. The Indian Army could easily have followed the raiders across the border and could have attacked the bases, which were all in Pakistan territory, but it desisted. We thought it would be better to inform the Security Council of the situation.

However, I did not have the slightest idea that when the case came before the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan would so boldly deny that Pakistan supplied all this help. Everybody knows that Pakistan is aiding these raiders and tribesmen and the people who are fighting with the State. However, Pakistan chose boldly to deny all these charges.

What is left for me to do? After all, I do not have any magic lamp so that I might bring the entire picture of Jammu and Kashmir State, along with the borders of Pakistan, before the eyes of the members of the Security Council so that they might see who is fighting and who is not fighting. Therefore, somebody must go to the spot. Then at that time it would be for us to prove that the charges we have brought before the Security Council are correct to the last word. That is the only help we want and no other help.”

 

 

 

Thirdly, though by no means lastly, may be placed the 14 August 1951 Memorandum of  prominent Muslims led by Dr Zakir Hussain to the UN Representative Dr. Frank P. Graham:

“It is a remarkable fact that, while the Security Council and its various agencies have devoted so much time to the study of the Kashmir dispute and made various suggestions for its resolution, none of them has tried to ascertain the views of the Indian Muslims nor the possible effect of any hasty step in Kashmir, however well-intentioned, on the interests and well- being of the Indian Muslims. We are convinced that no lasting solution for the problem can be found unless the position of Muslims in Indian society is clearly understood.

Supporters of the idea of Pakistan, before this subcontinent was partitioned, discouraged any attempt to define Pakistan clearly and did little to anticipate the conflicting problems which were bound to arise as a result of the advocacy of the two-nation theory. The concept of Pakistan, therefore, became an emotional slogan with little rational content. It never occurred to the Muslim League or its leaders that if a minority was not prepared to live with a majority on the sub- continent, how could the majority be expected t o tolerate the minority.

It is, therefore, small wonder that the result of partition has been disastrous to Muslims. In undivided India, their strength lay about 100 million. Partition split up the Muslim people, confining them to the three isolated regions. Thus, Muslims number 25 million in Western Pakistan, 35 million to 40 million in India, and the rest in Eastern Pakistan. A single undivided community has been broken into three fragments, each faced with its own problems.

Pakistan was not created on a religious basis. If it had been, our fate as well as the fate of other minorities would have been settled at that time. Nor would the division of the sub- continent for reasons of religion have left large minorities in India or Pakistan.

This merely illustrates what we have said above, that the concept of Pakistan was vague, obscure, and never clearly defined, nor its likely consequences foreseen by the Muslim League, even when some of these should have been obvious.

When the partition took place, Muslims in India were left in the lurch by the Muslim League and its leaders. Most of them departed to Pakistan and a few who stayed behind stayed long enough to wind up their affairs and dispose of their property. Those who went over to Pakistan left a large number of relations and friends behind.

Having brought about a division of the country, Pakistan leaders proclaimed that they would convert Pakistan into a land where people would live a life according to the tenets of Islam. This created nervousness and alarm among the minorities living in Pakistan. Not satisfied with this, Pakistan went further and announced again and again their determination to protect and safeguard the interests of Muslims in India. This naturally aroused suspicion amongst the Hindus against us and our loyalty to India was questioned.

Pakistan had made our position weaker by driving out Hindus from Western Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us and our welfare. A similar process is in question in Eastern Pakistan from which Hindus are coming over to India in a large and large number.

If the Hindus are not welcome in Pakistan, how can we, in all fairness, expect Muslims to be welcomed in India ? Such a policy must inevitably, as the past has already shown, result in the uprooting of Muslims in this country and their migration to Pakistan where, as it became clear last year, they are no longer welcome, lest their influx should destroy Pakistan’s economy. Neither some of the Muslims who did migrate to Pakistan after partition, and following the widespread bloodshed and conflict on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border in the north- west, have been able to find a happy asylum in what they had been told would be their homeland. Consequently some of them have had to return to India, e.g. Meos who are now being rehabilitated in their former areas.

If we are living honourably in India today, it is certainly not due to Pakistan which, if anything, has by her policy and action weakened our position. The credit goes to the broadminded leadership of India, to Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to the traditions of tolerance in this country and to the Constitution which ensures equal rights to all citizens of India, irrespective of their religion caste, creed, colour or sex.

We, therefore, feel that, tragically as Muslims were misled by the Muslim League and subsequently by Pakistan and the unnecessary suffering which we and our Hindu brethren have to go through in Pakistan and in India since partition, we must be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of tolerance and understanding to the mutual benefit of Hindus and Muslims in our country – if only Pakistan would let us do it. To us it is a matter of no small consequence.

Despite continuous provocations, first from the Muslim League and since then from Pakistan, the Hindu majority in India has not thrown us or members of other minorities out of Civil Services, Armed Forces, the judiciary, trade, commerce, business and industry. There are Muslim Ministers in the Union and State cabinets, Muslim Governors, Muslim Ambassadors, representing India in foreign countries, fully enjoying the confidence of the Indian nation, Muslim members in Parliament and state legislatures, Muslim judges serving on the Supreme Court and High Courts, high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces and the Civil services, including the police.

Muslims have large landed estates, run big business and commercial houses in various parts of the country, notably in Bombay and Calcutta, have their shares in industrial production and enterprise in export and import trade. Our famous sacred shrines and places of cultural interest are mostly in India.

Not that our lot is certainly happy. We wish some of the state Governments showed a little greater sympathy to us in the field of education and employment. Nevertheless, we feel we have an honourable place in India. Under the law of the land, our religious and cultural life is protected and we shall share in the opportunities open to all citizens to ensure progress for the people of this country.

It is, therefore, clear that our interest and welfare do not coincide with Pakistan’s conception of the welfare and interests of Muslims in Pakistan.

This is clear from Pakistan’s attitude towards Kashmir. Pakistan claims Kashmir, first, on the ground of the majority of the State’s people being Muslims and, secondly, on the ground, of the state being essential to its economy and defence. To achieve its objective it has been threatening to launch “Jihad” against Kashmir in India. It is a strange commentary on political beliefs that the same Muslims of Pakistan who like the Muslims of Kashmir to join them invaded the state, in October 1947, killing and plundering Muslims in the state and dishonouring Muslim women, all in the interest of what they described as the liberation of Muslims of the State. In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the 3 million Muslims from what it describes as the tyranny of a handful of Hindus in the State, Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40 million Muslims in India – a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare of fellow- Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realise that if Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India.

Does Pakistan seriously think that it could give us any help if such an emergency arose or that we would deserve any help thanks to its own follies ? It is incapable of providing room and livelihood to the 40 million Muslims of India, should they migrate to Pakistan. Yet its policy and action, if not changed soon, may well produce the result which it dreads.

We are convinced that India will never attack our interests. First of all, it would be contrary to the spirit animating the political movement in this country. Secondly, it would be opposed to the Constitution and to the sincere leadership of the Prime Minister. Thirdly, India by committing such a folly would be playing straight into the hands of Pakistan.

We wish we were equally convinced of the soundness of Pakistan’s policy. So completely oblivious is it of our present problems and of our future that it is willing to sell us into slavery – if only it can secure Kashmir.

It ignores the fact that Muslims in Kashmir may also have a point of view of their own, that there is a democratic movement with a democratic leadership in the State, both inspired by the progress of a broad minded, secular, democratic movement in India and both naturally being in sympathy with India. Otherwise, the Muslim raiders should have been welcomed with open arms by the Muslims of the State when the invasion took place in 1947.

Persistent propaganda about “Jihad” is intended, among other things, to inflame religious passions in this country. For it would, of course, be in Pakistan’s interests to promote communal rioting in India to show to Kashmiri Muslims how they can find security only in Pakistan. Such a policy, however, can only bring untold misery and suffering to India and Pakistan generally and to Indian Muslims particularly. Pakistan never tires of asserting that it is determined to protect the interests of Muslims in Kashmir and India. Why does not Pakistan express the same concern for Pathans who are fighting for Pakhtoonistan, an independent homeland of their own ? The freedom-loving Pathans under the leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib, both nurtured in the traditions of democratic tolerance of the Indian National Congress, are being subjected to political repression of the worst possible kind by their Muslim brethren in power in Pakistan and in the NWFP. Contradictory as Pakistan’s policy generally is, it is no surprise to us that while it insists on a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir, it denies a fair and impartial plebiscite to Pathans.

Pakistan’s policy in general and her attitude towards Kashmir is particular thus tend to create conditions in this country which in the long run can only bring to us Muslims widespread suffering and destruction. Its policy prevents us from settling down, from being honourable citizens of a State, free from suspicion of our fellow-countrymen and adapting ourselves to changing conditions to promote the interests and welfare of India. Its sabre-rattling interferes with its own economy and ours. It expects us to be loyal to it despite its impotence to give us any protection, believing at the same time that we can still claim all the rights of citizenship in a secular democracy.

In the event of a war, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be able to protect the Muslims of East Bengal who are completely cut off from Western Pakistan. Are the Muslims of India and Eastern Pakistan to sacrifice themselves completely to enable the 25 million Muslims in Western Pakistan to embark upon mad, self-destructive adventures?

We should, therefore, like to impress upon you with all the emphasis at our command that Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir is fraught with the gravest peril to the 40 million Muslims of India. If the Security Council is really interested in peace, human brotherhood and international understanding, it should heed this warning while there is still time.

Dr. Zakir Hussain (Vice Chancellor Aligarh University); Sir Sultan Ahmed (Former Member of Governor General’s Executive Council); Sir Mohd. Ahmed Syed Khan(Nawab of Chhatari, former acting Governor of United Provinces and Prime Minister of Hyderabad); Sir Mohd. Usman (Former member of Governor General’s Executive council and acting Governor of Madras); Sir Iqbal Ahmed (Former Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court); Sir Fazal Rahimtoola (Former Sheriff of Bombay); Maulana Hafz-ur-Rehman M.P.; Col. B.H. Zaidi M.P.; Nawab Zain Yar Jung (Minister Gcvernment of Hyderabad); A.K. Kawaja (Former President of Muslim Majlis); T.M. Zarif (General Secretary West Bengal Bohra Community)”.

Such have been the most eminent voices of India’s Muslims in times past. Sadly, they have no equivalent today when India’s Muslims need them with greater urgency. (Bollywood or cricketing celebrities hardly substitute!) This fault in the intellectual history of the modern subcontinent has been a principal factor causing the misapprehensions and distortions of Pakistan’s and J&K’s political reality to continue worldwide.

Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until this sad day

Jews have never been killed in India for being Jews until today.   For two thousand years, in fact perhaps as long as there have ever been Jews in the world, there had been Jews living peacefully in India.  I used to say that proudly to my Jewish friends, adding that the Indian Army had even had a Jewish general.  Today, November 28 2008, or perhaps yesterday November 27 2008, that changed.  Five Hasidic Jews who had been peaceful residents of Nariman House in Mumbai, came to be murdered by terrorists, merely for being Jews, or died in explosions or in the cross-fire between the terrorists and Indian security forces.   The Israeli Government had offered India their well-known technical expertise in trying to save their fellow-nationals.  I believe the Government of India made a tragic mistake by not accepting it.  Yes certainly our national prestige would have taken the slightest of blows if Israeli commandos had helped to release Israeli hostages in India.  But our national prestige has taken a much vaster and more permanent blow instead, now that we can no longer say that Jews have never in history been killed for being Jews in India.  I am especially sad on this already very sad day to see that proud record destroyed.

Subroto Roy

Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists suppose Maulana Azad, Dr Zakir Hussain, Sheikh Abdullah were Pakistanis (or that Sheikh Mujib wanted to remain one)?

Once upon a time, half a century ago, the son of a Pakistani president married the daughter of an American ambassador to Pakistan and moved to Washington.  That might be as good a time as any from which to mark the start of the grip Pakistan’s military and political/bureaucratic elite have managed to have on the process of defining official American policy towards Pakistan and indeed the subcontinent as a whole.

Four young and   doubtless well-meaning Democratic Party “think tank” analysts have now produced a document Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region (Center for American Progress November 2008) that is the latest edition emerging out of that process.

It is hard to find the most simplistic of the statements contained in the document.  My runner-up candidate would be the recommendations that what should happen in Pakistan now is

“Dismantle militant groups and reduce regional tensions;
Bolster civilian governance;
Strengthen Pakistan’s economy and advance development”.

Bravo!  What else to say?

My winning candidate for naiveté though must be this on page 16:

“Pakistan… sees itself as the political home for the subcontinent’s Muslim population and believes India’s continued control over the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley and denial of a plebiscite for its inhabitants represent a lingering desire on India’s part to undo the legacy of partition, which divided the British Indian Empire into India and Pakistan.”

Now someone really ought to explain to these soon-to-be-Obama-Administration-Pakistan-specialists that, once upon a  time, there were men named Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr Zakir Hussain and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and many others like them (let aside Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) who were all not merely devout Muslims but also leaders who had no wish to have any truck with any idea of a “Pakistan”. And furthermore, that some years later there came to be another man named Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and many others like him, who were Pakistanis but who no longer wished to remain so.

How is it possible for  four young scholars from places like the Fletcher School to not know this and yet pretend to expertise on Pakistan or the subcontinent?   Pakistanis and Indians and Bangladeshis who actually live in Pakistan and India and Bangladesh all know this from mother’s knee.  But the powerful Potomac/CFR/Houston etc Pakistan lobby which has heavily influenced if not controlled the discussion of America’s Pakistan-India policy-thinking has hidden away such inconvenient facts, and may have thus misled our young authors entering these woods for the first time. The inevitable result of such repression has been the set of neuroses and psychoses that have beset the US-Pakistan relationship for decades on end and seem likely to continue now under President Obama.

(As for official New Delhi, its own infirmities, like allowing organized business lobbies to define and control India’s relationship with the United States, as well as its delusions of grandeur, causes it too to fail History 101 miserably, which explains the shallow depths that Indian diplomatic discussion manages to reach on the subject.)

What the Center for American Progress has to say expectedly contains contradictions that have been long seen before.  For example, the authors are unable to reconcile their own explicit statements (A) and (B), revealing what a clinical psychologist might follow Gregory Bateson to identify as a classic “double-bind” leading to schizophrenia in the Pakistan-US relationship:

(A) “The United States should continue supporting and working with the Pakistani military despite strains in the relationship. The stakes are too high to walk away from Pakistan’s military establishment. Not only does most of the materiel for the US war effort in Afghanistan go through Pakistan, but the ISI is almost the exclusive source of information about international terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan.”

(B) “Pakistan’s powerful military establishment has launched four outright coups d’etat in the country’s 60-year history. And through its control of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, or ISI, Pakistan’s premiere intelligence service, the military continues to carry out subtler manipulations of the political system during the periods when it has not held power directly…. The military establishment also has expanded far beyond its national security portfolio, entrenching itself in the Pakistani economy…. .The United States shares some of the blame for imbalance between military and civilian institutions in Pakistan. During the 1960s, 1980s, and since 9/11, the Pakistan military has been richly rewarded by the United States based on its status as a front-line state in the Cold War and then in the war against extremist terrorist networks. The United States has created perverse incentives by richly rewarding the Pakistani military in its promotion of unstable and insecure geopolitical situations on the other side of its borders, and then withdrawing our support if peace and stability return. The Pakistan military, meanwhile, uses the threat of India and the dispute over the Kashmir region to legitimize its leading role in Pakistan’s domestic politics and budget…. Ties between the Pakistani security establishment (or at a minimum individuals within it) and specific militant groups have not been severed. The militants that now form the core of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Army have long-standing connections and shared interests….”

What may be recommended by way of therapy?

For starters, a book created under immense adversity at an American university almost 20 years ago: Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, Edited and with an Introduction by one William E James and one Subroto Roy.  (Yes, I too once was as young as these authors are now but we   We may have produced a more substantial piece of work.)  A prominent Pakistani author in the book thanked me for creating it because, he said, it was the first time Pakistan had been treated seriously at a Western university, not merely seen as a source of real-estate or manpower for Anglo-American interests.

Besides the book, I would, most immodestly, recommend any fraction of my subsequent publications in the field, listed alphabetically as below and all most easily available at this site.

America’s Pakistan-India Policy
History of Jammu & Kashmir
India and Her Neighbours
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Merchandise Exports
Iqbal & Jinnah vs Rehmat Ali in Pakistan’s Creation
Is Balochistan Doomed?
Justice & Afzal
Lal Masjid ≠ Golden Temple
Law, Justice and J&K
On Hindus and Muslims
Pakistan’s Allies
Pakistan’s Kashmir obsession
Racism New and Old
Saving Pakistan
Separation of Powers: India, the USA, Pakistan
Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason
The Greatest Pashtun: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Two cheers for Pakistan
Understanding Pakistan
What To Tell Musharraf

Etc

https://independentindian.com/2011/10/13/my-seventy-one-notes-at-facebook-etc-on-kashmir-pakistan-and-of-course-india-listed-thanks-to-jd/

In such matters, naiveté is too expensive a luxury to indulge in.

Subroto Roy

Postscript:  I had erroneously (and patronisingly) brushed all four authors as “young”; that has now been corrected; I hope it will not distract from the substance of the critique.

Of a new New Delhi myth and the success of the University of Hawaii 1986-1992 Pakistan project (with 2015 Postscript)

A leading Indian commentator says in this morning’s paper (November 15 2008) about Manmohan Singh:

“His formulation on Kashmir (“I have no mandate to change borders, but we can make borders irrelevant”), became the obvious solution once he articulated it.”

Such may be how  modern New Delhi’s myths and self-delusions  get born — since in fact there is no evidence that Manmohan Singh  or any of his acolytes had anything to do with originating the Pakistan-India peace process in recent decades, just as there has not been that Manmohan Singh or  any of his acolytes had anything to do with originating the  Congress Party’s new economic thinking in 1990-1991.

(Lest I be misunderstood I should add at the outset that I have the highest personal regard for Dr Singh, he has been  in decades past a friend of my father’s, he at my father’s request consented to discuss economics with me in Paris in 1973 when I was a callow lad of 18, he himself has not claimed the originality that has been frequently mis-attributed to him by others for whatever reason, etc.)

The origins of  the idea  about India-Pakistan and J&K expressed by Manmohan Singh’s words are to be found in the last paragraph of the Introduction by the Editors of a book which arose from the University of Hawaii’s 1986-1992 Pakistan project, which read:

“Kashmir… must be demilitarised and unified by both countries sooner or later, and it must be done without force. There has been enough needless bloodshed on the subcontinent… Modern Pakistanis and Indians are free peoples who can voluntarily agree in their own interests to alter the terms set hurriedly by Attlee or Mountbatten in the Indian Independence Act 1947. Nobody but we ourselves keeps us prisoners of superficial definitions of who we are or might be. The subcontinent could evolve its political identity over a period of time on the pattern of Western Europe, with open borders and (common) tariffs to the outside world, with the free movement of people, capital, ideas and culture. Large armed forces could be reduced and transformed in a manner that would enhance the security of each nation. The real and peaceful economic revolution of the masses of the subcontinent would then be able to begin.”

The University of Hawaii’s Pakistan project, involving Pakistani and other scholars, including one Indian, led to the volume Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s published in Karachi, New Delhi and elsewhere. The book reached Nawaz Sharif and the Islamabad elite, including the most hawkish of Islamabad’s hawks, and Pervez Musharraf’s 2006 proposal on J&K, endorsed warmly by the US State Department,  may have grown from that paragraph. The Editors of the book, as economists themselves, decried the waste of resources involved in the Pakistan-India confrontation, saying it had

“greatly impoverished the general budgets of both Pakistan and India. If it has benefited important sections of the political and military elites of  both countries, it has done so only at the expense of the general welfare of the masses.”

Such words were impossibly bold in the  late 1980s-early 1990s.  However,  as stated in  a special editorial article “What to tell Musharraf”     in The Statesman of December 16 2006, they seemed  in recent years incomplete and rather naïve even to their author, who was myself, the only Indian in that project and the one who had conceived it. Most significantly, the position in international law in the context of historical facts had been wholly neglected. So had been the manifest nature of the Pakistani state (as it had become prior to the splendid 2008 elections).

The Hawaii project had involved top Pakistani economists, political scientists and other commentators but had deliberately chosen to keep the military and the religious clergy out of its chapters.  And it was the military and religious clergy who in fact came to dominate Pakistan’s agenda in the 1990s, at least until the 9/11 attacks in America indirectly  altered the political direction of the country.

The peaceful and mundane economic agenda outlined for Pakistan in the Hawaii project  has come into its own  by way of  relevance ever since.  A few weeks ago, the first trucks filled with fruit, woolens and many other goods traversed across the “Line of Control” in J&K for the first time in sixty years.   The Pakistan project that James and I led at the University of Hawaii in the late 1980s may be now declared a success.   Among other things, our book explained to Indians that there does exist a Pakistani point of view and perhaps explained to Pakistanis that there does exist an Indian point of view.  That  is something that had not existed before our book.

pak

Postscript 18 Nov 2015:  I have made clear at Twitter that I find the K.M. Kasuri book promoted and publicized in India by MS Aiyar, S Kulkarni, B Dutt and others in Delhi and Mumbai is mendacious where it is not merely self-serving.  Its clear intent is to get India to accept the (false) ISI/Hurriyat narratives about 1947, Kashmir, Bangladesh, terrorism etc.  Its purported ideas of demilitarisation and a borderless Kashmir are essentially lifted from my earlier 1980s work in America cited above — which I myself have rejected as naive since the Pakistani aggression in Kargil in 1999.  More anon.

Protected: Jawaharlal Nehru invites my father to the Mountbatten Farewell 20 June 1948

This content is password-protected. To view it, please enter the password below.

Rai Bahadur Umbika Churn Rai (1827-1902)

Umbika Churn Rai (1827-1902) my great great grandfather, was the founder of the modern Roy family of Behala. He himself was the great grandson of Raja Daibaki Nandan Rai who is said to have brought the family to Behala from Anarpur at the time of the Mahratta invasions. Daibaki Nandan was probably gifted land at Behala as was customary towards Brahmins. The legend is that upon his arrival, a famed band of local dacoits/robbers gave him an ultimatum to surrender the family’s jewels or fight. Daibaki Nandan stood and fought, had his arm cut off by a scimitar, and died bleeding. The family then fell materially for two generations and were “toll pandits” or “tree-shade teachers” under Jagat Ram Rai and Durga Prasad Rai.

Umbika Churn was Durga Prasad’s third son. He was a brilliant ambitious man, well-built and over 6 ft tall, who taught himself English, attended the madrassa started by Warren Hastings to learn Persian, and was well-versed in Sanskrit. Being knowledgeable of Sanskrit, Persian and English at a time of conflict of laws between English, Muslim and Hindu systems, he started as a translator in the Alipore Court under Sir Barnes Peacock (1810-1890). When Peacock went to the new Supreme Court in Calcutta in 1859 as its first Chief Justice, Umbika Churn went with him and rose to become the first Chief Translator. He was made a Rai Bahadur at the time of Queen Victoria’s Jubilee. Rai Bahadur Road in Calcutta is named after him.

The Golden Book of India published at the time of the Victoria Jubilee said Umbika Churn was a descendant of one Raja Gajendra Narayan Rai, Rai-Raian, a finance official under the Great Mughal Jahangir.

There will be much more about him here in due course. Most interesting is the fact that Chief Justice Peacock who had been  his mentor, when he returned to England in 1870, later wrote asking him and his eldest son Surendranath for help on behalf of his son, a lawyer, being sent to Calcutta from England. Suren, himself a lawyer at the time, wrote back and assured him he would help find the son work in Calcutta!

I shall upload that correspondence when I am able to.

From Facebook 18 June 2013:

How interesting to find an 1847 depiction of the famous Calcutta Madrassa originated by Warren Hastings (1732–1818) ! … My paternal great great grand-father breached Brahminical rules by insisting on learning Persian there — it was a time of much confusion of laws: Persian was still the, or at least an, official language of the courts, just giving way to English while Hindu law required Sanskrit… Umbik Churn Rai (1827-1902) had had Sanskrit lessons at home, acquired English, and now learnt Persian: he started as a young man as a Court translator in the Alipore Court, came to the attention of the newly arrived Judge, Sir Barnes Peacock (1810-1890), who took him with him in due course when he became the first Chief Justice of the new Calcutta High Court in 1859? 1862?, and made him Chief Translator … We have a fragmentary letter somewhere from Peacock, after retirement in England, written to Umbik’s son, my great grand father, saying his son was coming to Calcutta from England and could be please try to help him find work! A time of camraderie…

 
madrassa
 

And along with Hastings’s Madrassa came Hindu College too, also depicted as of 1847, which became in due course Presidency… Associated to it was a Hindu School too, and our family legend went that Vidyasagar (1820-1891) himself, took his friend Umbik’s eldest son, SN Roy (1860-1929), my great grand father, by hand as a child to attend it.

HinduCollege1847

Indira Gandhi in Paris, 1971

This is a photograph of Indira Gandhi emerging with Andre Malraux for a press-conference at the Embassy of India in Paris  in the Autumn of 1971.   (My father, pictured in the centre, had been posted to the Embassy  just a few weeks earlier in anticipation of the visit.  [My father recalls her asking him during or between one of these meetings, “Mr Roy, I am very hungry, can you please get me something to eat?”, and he went and grabbed a small hotel plate full of peanuts which she devoured…])  Indira was making the serious diplomatic effort that she did in world capitals to avert war with West Pakistan over its atrocities in East Pakistan.  War could not be averted and within a few weeks, in December 1971, Bangladesh was born.

 

“Indira Gandhi’s one and paramount good deed as India’s leader and indeed as a world leader of her time was to have fought a war that was so rare in international law for having been unambiguously just. And she fought it flawlessly. The cause had been thrust upon her by an evil enemy’s behaviour against his own people, an enemy supported by the world’s strongest military power with pretensions to global leadership. Victims of the enemy’s wickedness were scores of millions of utterly defenceless, penniless human beings. Indira Gandhi did everything right. She practised patient but firm diplomacy on the world’s stage to avert war if it was at all possible to do. She chose her military generals well and took their professional judgement seriously as to when to go to war and how to win it. Finally, in victory she was magnanimous to the enemy that had been defeated. Children’s history-books in India should remember her as the stateswoman who freed a fraternal nation from tyranny, at great expense to our own people. As a war-leader, Indira Gandhi displayed extraordinary bravery, courage and good sense.” (From my review article of Inder Malhotra’s Indira Gandhi, first published in The Statesman May 7 2006 and republished elsewhere here under “Revisionist Flattery”.)

 

“She had indeed fought that rarest of things in international law: the just war. Supported by the world’s strongest military, an evil enemy had made victims of his own people. Indira tried patiently on the international stage to avert war, but also chose her military generals well and took their professional judgement seriously as to when to fight if it was inevitable and how to win. Finally she was magnanimous (to a fault) towards the enemy ~ who was not some stranger to us but our own estranged brother and cousin.  It seemed to be her and independent India’s finest hour. A fevered nation was thus ready to forgive and forget her catastrophic misdeeds until that time….” (From  “Unhealthy Delhi” first published in The Statesman June 11 2007,  republished elsewhere here).

Origins of India’s Constitutional Politics: Bengal 1913

This is a 1913 photograph of the Indian members of the  first Bengal Legislative Council elected (in 1912)  after the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms; the members apparently were being greeted by gentlemen of the sub-urban areas south of Calcutta.  The Englishman sitting at the centre  seems to be Sir Henry Cotton (1845-1915), the 1904 President of the Indian National Congress and a  great political friend of India.   To his right sits Surendranath Roy, who may have been the Council’s first President.

 

Academic studies include notably those by JH Broomfield, “The Vote and the Transfer of Power: A Study of the Bengal Election 1912-1913” Journal of Asian Studies, Feb 1962, his book Elite Conflict in a   Plural Society: 20th Century Bengal (Berkeley 1968); and Rajat Kanta Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal 1875-1927 (Oxford 1984).  Professor Ray writes about the 1912 election: “Only  a few candidates of the “Popular Party” — Surendranath Banerjea, Abul Kasim, Byomkesh Chakravarti and Surendranath Ray — scraped through…. (A) sympathetic moderate wrote in 1919: ‘The Popular Party is a bundle of disjoined units which cannot resist the slightest pressure from without.’  This charge was eventually disproved by the stand taken by (the Popular Party) in the Bengal Legislative Council.  It showed no sign of wilting under the pressure exerted by the European group…”

 

Other studies of the period include John R McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress (Princeton 1977), Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1971),  Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1973) etc.

By way of incidental reference, the young Jawaharlal Nehru had returned from his studies in England in 1912; MK Gandhi was still in South Africa and would not be returning until 1915.  The Tilak-Gokhale clash though had been in full swing since 1907.

 

 

Subroto Roy

Nota Bene: The text and photograph in this post may be considered in the public domain and may be freely used for purposes of a Wikipedia article or any other publication in the common interest.

Govt of India: Please call in the BBC and ask them a question

The BBC has unilaterally decided that Jammu & Kashmir has nothing to do with India.  On its 1530 Indian Standard Time broadcast of purported “World News” today, it unilaterally lopped off all of J&K from the map of the Republic of India (shown attached to mention of a Delhi bomb-blast). Usually, the BBC at least makes pathetic reference to something it has invented called “Indian-Administered Kashmir”.

There are senior BBC staff-members who are dual Pakistani/British nationals and who may be counted on to have been pushing such a line within the organisation, but lopping off all of J&K unilaterally may be a novelty. There are several “Indian-origin” staff-members too but perhaps they have renounced their Indian nationality, and apparently they have no ability to make any editorial protest.

Does the Government of India have the sense, and the guts, to call in the local BBC and ask them for an explanation about their insult of history?   For that matter, what is the BBC’s formal position on the J&K  problem?  The same as that of the UK Government?  What is that of the UK Government for that matter?  Has it remained constant since Clement Attlee in October 1947?

BBC staff may like to refer to my articles “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice and J&K”, “Pakistan’s Allies”, “History of Jammu & Kashmir”, etc for enlightenment.

Subroto Roy

MK Gandhi, SN Roy, MA Jinnah in March 1919: Primary education legislation in a time of protest

In March 1919, Indian politics were extremely tense over the draconian “anti-terrorist” law known as the Rowlatt Act.  On March 23, MK Gandhi called for the general strike or hartal on April 6 that came to be known as the Rowlatt Satyagraha (and was soon to be followed by the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in Amritsar on April 13).  On March 28, MA Jinnah resigned his membership of the Viceroy’s Imperial Council  in protest  that  the Rowlatt Act had not been amended as demanded by the Indian members of the Council.   In midst of such tumultuous events, my great grandfather Surendranath Roy, on March 27 1919, seems to have quietly managed to get his  “Bengal Primary Education Bill” passed in the Bengal Legislative Council.

From India in 1918: A Chronological Record of the Phases of Developments in Indian Polity During 1918, HN Mitra (ed),  Annual Register Office, Sibpur, 1921.

Manindranath Roy 1891-1958

Manindranath Roy (1891-1958) was a quiet enigmatic literary figure and artistic benefactor in Calcutta; he wrote very well and had excellent taste and manners (though was of foolish judgement in money and friends). This photograph is from about 1922 at Allahabad where he used to take his family on annual holiday. (The little boy to the left behind his mother would grow up to become my father.)

My grandfather is dressed in fine post-Edwardian fashion; at the time, his father, Surendranath Rai, was at the peak of his political career as first Deputy President and then President of the new Bengal Legislative Council. Surendranath was an orthodox Brahmin and chose never to wear Western-style suits and neck-ties, and he was thoroughly averse to the idea of dining with Europeans. Manindranath was the first to wear Western clothes, as well as to dine in Calcutta’s Western restaurants. There was tension between father and son due to such matters.

Manindranath’s notebook of poetry Mandakini (found in 2008) contains some 51 poems and poetic songs composed between 1914 and 1936,  from when he was  aged about 23 to when he was 45.  Between about 1933 and 1943  Manindranath had found himself facing trials and tribulations  of such gravity and magnitude (caused in part by his own foolish squandering of his inheritance from his father) that he may have wished to  forget, ignore or even regret his creative  period. Many of the poems are recorded  as having been published in literary journals of the time, like Bharatbarsha and Bichitra, and some are recorded as having been sung or performed  on the new radio service of the time, especially around 1931. Here is poem number 48 titled “Saratchandra” in honour of his friend, the novelist Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya.   Manindranath as a poet would have been certainly inspired  in his modernity by his association with Sarat  — while Sarat benefitted economically by the association and also may have found characters and plots for his novels (he apparently dedicated one at least to Manindranath’s wife, my grandmother). When all of Mandakini is published in due course, it is not impossible Manindranath  will come to  be recognised  as among the finest modern   poets of his era in Bengal.

Buju was my parents’ firstborn, Manindranath’s first grandchild and the apple of his eyes.  MK Roy tho’ the second son of Manindranath had wed before his older brother: Buju brought new life to everyone around her. SN Roy’s death in 1929, six months after being injured by Bhagat Singh’s bomb, left a vast personal estate inherited from his father but with unclear succession.  His brothers took control.  His younger son Manindranath, a poet keen only to broadcast his poetry on the newly created radio and win the love of his beautiful angry wife, came to be  quickly and foolishly entangled in the grip of unscrupulous relatives and vicious business acquaintances; incredibly, the vast inherited fortune was purloined or dissipated through egregious frauds within a handful of years, leaving Manindranath broke and broken.  A decade went to discharge him from insolvency, a police team travelling from Calcutta to Singapore to bring him back under arrest. My parents’ wedding in the blackout of Calcutta under Japanese aerial bombardment in May 1942 coincided with the end of Manindranath’s pathetic ordeal.  Manindranath a broken man when Buju, his first grandchild, brought him joy:

003

My grandfather came to visit us in Ottawa in May 1958, and here we are on a day’s outing to show him the sights. I recall it well though I was three years old. My mother had stayed home to arrange our meal.

Manindranath in Ottawa would come back from his walks and see me his grandson being pummeled into the lawn by my bigger neighbour Richard Landis…. Becoming very cross he would tap his walking stick loudly on the ground and say loudly, “Dadu… tumi o mere dao, tumi o okey mere dao…” “Grandson! You fight back too, you hit him back too”…

Manindranath Roy died in Ottawa on September 3 1958, the first Hindu gentleman known to have done so, it was said; he had to be cremated in Montreal as no one was cremated in Ottawa back then.

There will be more of his eventful and interesting life here in due course. For example, he was a benefactor of Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya and many others including Uday Shankar, and he was a close friend and colleague at Grace and Co of Rabindranath Tagore’s son-in-law, Nagen Gangulee. Rabindranath apparently visited the Swaraj Party’s political meetings where Surendranath was an old friend of CR Das. Another close and respected friend of Surendranath’s was Jagdish Chandra Bose.

See too

https://independentindian.com/2008/10/06/a-literary-find-modern-poetry-in-bengali-1914-1936/

https://independentindian.com/life-of-mk-roy-19152012-indian-aristocrat-diplomat-birth-centenary-concludes-7-nov-2016/

Leadership vacuum

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, June 7 2008, http://www.thestatesman.net

Leadership vacuum

Time & Tide Wait For No One In Politics: India Trails Pakistan & Nepal!

Subroto Roy

The Karnataka legislative elections, as well as to lesser extent the Bengal panchayat polls, have revealed the vacuum that exists across the leadership of India’s national-level politics today.

To start with the BJP: had India been a normal democratic country on the Western pattern, Mr Arun Jaitley would have rocketed to the top of his party’s leadership by now. Besides being articulate in both Hindi and English and in his fifties (the age-group of most leaders in democratic countries), Mr Jaitley’s political acumen and organisational skills have been acknowledged even by his Congress adversaries after the Karnataka result. He himself has been frank and expansive about his formula for winning in Karnataka, which was simply to focus on real issues, especially state-specific ones, as well as to project a single credible leader. Had the BJP been a normal political party in a normal country, Mr Jaitley would have been given the task of leading it to victory in the next General Election and, assuming he won a Lok Sabha seat, to become its prime ministerial candidate.

Dadagiri

Instead, the BJP chooses to remain backward, backward, backward in the majority of its thought-processes and behaviour-patterns ~ from its kneejerk anti-Muslim psychology via its hyperinflationary macroeconomics and protectionist trade to its embrace of astrology and bovine exclusiveness. The idea of uniting behind someone relatively modern-minded in his politics like Mr Jaitley would be simply unacceptable not merely to people in the party within his own age-cohort (including the present party president) but even more so to those in age-cohorts decades older (including the party’s present prime ministerial candidate).

The opposition of the first group would arise from, in a word, jealousy. The opposition of the second group would arise from, in a word, dadagiri, i.e. the gerontocratic idea that merely because one is older, one is owed respect, authority and the plums of office in precedence over someone who is younger. Jealousy is a universal emotion not something specific to Indian politics, but dadagiri and the lack of meritocracy in our political culture is one reason India remains an abnormal polity in the modern democratic world.

LK Advani, driven by his unfulfilled personal ambition, will likely lead the BJP in the next election and do so with Mr Jaitley’s explicit support; Mr Advani may lead it into defeat or even to a victory in which he, given his age, is not as successful a PM as a Jaitley might have been. Yet our sclerotic political culture is such that neither Mr Advani nor Mr Rajnath Singh will simply stand aside now and hand over the reins to a newer, more competent and progressive leadership.

The same idea of dadagiri pervades what passes for the official “Left” in India as exemplified by the CPI-M. Mr Jyoti Basu has in a recent letter to Harkishen Singh Surjeet reminisced of their times together, and in doing so remarked that he remained the Chief Minister of West Bengal for as many years as he did because the Party had instructed him to do so, and when he handed over power to Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, he did so with the Party’s agreement.

Those who believe in India’s parliamentary democracy might have thought that what our system requires is for a Chief Minister to hold the confidence of the legislative assembly from the bottom up but clearly that is not so because what a CM or PM seems to need are Party instructions from the top down. When Mr Bhattacharjee was anointed the new CM, the present author had remarked to the then Editor of The Statesman that the transition seemed to take place even without a formal vote of confidence in the Assembly. Does anyone in fact recall the last confidence vote debated and passed in the West Bengal Assembly? Democratic legislatures the world over routinely begin their new sessions with a debate and vote of no confidence being brought by the Opposition against the Government-of-the-day.

Does that happen with us, purportedly the world’s largest democracy? Let aside State legislatures, even our Parliament sees only the rare vote of confidence, and LK Advani specifically as Leader of the Opposition seems to have introduced none. Oppositions that do not wish to properly oppose are of course complicit in a government’s misdeeds.

It is the dadagiri culture shared by the official Communists that has caused the generational handover of power from Mr Basu and Mr Surjeet to the JNU coterie of the Karats and Mr Sitaram Yechuri. The “Left” like the “Right” and everyone else in Indian politics, can only handle cherubic “known” faces at the top ~ genuine grassroots activists like Binayak Sen or Medha Patkar must languish in jail or starve on hunger-strike in seeking to represent the politically and economically powerless in India while the entrenched dadas of Indian politics continue with their dissimulation.

Puppet-masters

In case of the Congress, it is an even deeper aspect of the Indian joint family system than dadagiri that has dominated its political culture, namely, the question who is the karta of the family and, if the karta is or seems too young or naïve or inexperienced, who will act as Regent on the karta’s behalf? Indira Gandhi was successfully guided in international politics for several years by a coterie led by PN Haksar. Rajiv Gandhi was attempted to be guided by several different competing coteries of senior party dadas ~ one of whom first brought up the name of Manmohan Singh in Indian politics on 22 March 1991 in a challenge addressed to the present author on liberalisation plans that Rajiv had authorised.

It is almost true to say that Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi have been in recent years played by puppet-masters of whose personal interests and intrigues they remain clueless. As has been said before by this author, the most salubrious thing Sonia Gandhi could have done for the Congress Party was to remain steadfast in her decision to stay out of Indian politics, and to have organised a fair, tough intra-party contest among its putative senior leaders based on differences of political and economic ideology.

Instead there is now paralysis in decision-making induced by Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh each mistakenly relying upon the other’s purported economic wisdom and political acumen. This confusion came to be most clearly illustrated in the choice of Head of State last year though that was something politically costless ~ the failures of which Karnataka is the current example may lead the Congress to lose what it, like other Indian parties, loves most of all, namely political power in Lutyens’ Delhi.

Indians should make no mistake: our good neighbours in Pakistan and Nepal (Muslim in Pakistan, Hindu and Buddhist and communist in Nepal) have been through healthy cathartic political experiences in recent months and years of a kind we have not. There continues to remain a dangerous intellectual vacuum around the throne of Delhi.

China’s force and diplomacy: The need for realism in India (2008)

China’s force & diplomacy: The need for realism In India

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, May 31, 2008

It is almost as large an error to overestimate Chinese military aims and capabilities as it has been to underestimate them. On 8 May 2008 at Tokyo’s Waseda University, China’s President Hu Jintao declared in a speech broadcast live “China has taken a defensive military policy and will not engage in any arms race. We will not become a military threat to any country and we will never assert hegemony or be expansionistic”. This was as clear and authoritative a reply as possible to the June 2005 statement in Singapore of the then American defence minister Donald Rumsfeld: “China appears to be expanding its missile forces, allowing them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the Pacific region, while also expanding its missile capacities here in the region. Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: why this growing investment?”

By 2006, Rumsfeld’s generals were saying China had “the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States,” and could “field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies”. The “sizing” of China’s military by American and other Western analysts became a parlour game ~ one with major business implications since the threat perceived or misperceived from China affects American decisions on the size of its own military.

As recently as 13 May 2008, the Wall Street Journal carried opinion that China’s military expansion demanded America have a 1000-ship navy not a 280-ship one, 40 aircraft-carriers not 11, 1000 F-22 aircraft not 183. Exaggerating China’s military and the threat posed by it to the world can mean big business for militaries opposing it!

Dominating India

Communist China’s physical, political and psychological domination of independent India since the 1950s has been achieved more by diplomacy, subterfuge and threat of force than actual military conflict. In its first phase, the policy was expressed clearly by the Chinese Ambassador to New Delhi on 16 May 1959 when he told India’s Foreign Secretary: “Our Indian friends, what is your mind? Will you agree to our thinking regarding the view that China can only concentrate its main attention eastward of China but not south-westward of China, nor is it necessary for it to do so?…. Friends, it seems to us that you, too, cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over?” (BN Mullick, Chinese Betrayal, p. 229).

At the time, Pakistan was in military alliances with the USA through CENTO and SEATO, and the Pakistan-China alliance was still years away. The Chinese had used subterfuge to construct their road linking Tibet and Sinkiang through Aksai Chin, ignoring India’s sovereignty, and were now suggesting they had no interest in fighting India because their major military interests were to their east as India’s were towards Pakistan.

The second phase was the short border conflict itself in 1962-63, which consolidated China’s grip on occupied territory in Aksai Chin while establishing its threat to the Brahmaputra Valley that has been perpetuated to this day. The third phase is represented by the 27 November 1974 conversation between Henry Kissinger and Deng Xiaoping, recently made publicly available:

Deng : There’s something very peculiar about Indian policy. For example, that little kingdom Sikkim. They had pretty good control of Sikkim. Why did they annex it?
Kissinger : It is a good thing India is pacifist, I hate to think (of what they would do) if they weren’t. (Laughs).
Deng : Sikkim was entirely under the military control of India.
Kissinger : I haven’t understood Sikkim. It is incomprehensible.
Deng : After the military annexation, their military position was in no way strengthened.
Kissinger : They had troops there already.
Deng : And they haven’t increased their troops since. We published a statement about it. We just spoke for the cause of justice.
Kissinger : Is it true that you set up loudspeakers to broadcast to the Indian troops on the border? It makes them very tense. (Laughs)
Deng : We have done nothing new along the borders, and frankly we don’t fear that India will attack our borders. We don’t think they have the capability to attack our borders. There was some very queer talk, some said that the reason why the Chinese issued that statement about Sikkim was that the Chinese were afraid after Sikkim that India would complete the encirclement of China. Well, in the first place we never feel things like isolation and encirclement can ever matter very much with us. And particularly with India, it is not possible that India can do any encirclement of China. The most they can do is enter Chinese territory as far as the Autonomous Republic of Tibet, Lhasa. And Lhasa can be of no strategic importance to India. The particular characteristic of Lhasa is that it has no air-because the altitude is more than 3,000 metres.
Kissinger : It’s a very dangerous area for drinking mao tai (a Chinese hard liquor).
Deng : Frankly, if Indian troops were able to reach Lhasa, we wouldn’t be able to supply them enough air! (Laughter)
Kissinger : I don’t think their intention is with respect to Tibet, their immediate intention is Nepal.
Deng : That is correct. They have been recently exercising pressure on Nepal, refusing to supply them oil. It is the dream of Nehru, inherited by his daughter, to have the whole subcontinent in their pocket.
Kissinger : And to have buffer zones around their border…. It is like British policy in the 19th Century. They always wanted Tibet demilitarized.
Deng : I believe even the British at that time didn’t make a good estimate of whether there was enough air. (Laughter)
Kissinger : I think an Indian attack on China would be a very serious matter that cannot be explained in terms of local conditions, but only in terms of a broader objective….”

Our self-delusion

The attitude that is revealed speaks for itself, and has been essentially continued by Deng’s successors in the next decades, especially Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It is because China does not perceive a military threat from India that it has agreed to military exercises with us ~ exercises which, if anything, reinforce their psychological dominance by helping to spook our military’s morale. During this third phase also, China went about systematically creating a major military threat to India in its support of Pakistan’s military, exploiting our subcontinent’s communal conflicts fully to its own strategic advantage.

China has been engaged for more than a decade now in a massive exercise of modernisation of its armed forces, improving productivity, technology, organisation and discipline while trying to cut corruption. It has a right to do so, and such modernisation does not in and of itself signal aggressive intent. The last aggressive war China fought was almost 30 years ago against Vietnam. It is possible that what simply explains the military modernisation (besides conflict with Taiwan) is China’s awful history of being exploited by foreign powers over the centuries.

Indian analysts have expressed concern about nuclear submarines based in Hainan; but where else would China put them? We delude ourselves if we think we are the guardians of the Straits of Malacca. We may do better being concerned to try to modernise, improve productivity and reduce corruption in our own forces, as well as integrate them better with national goals as China has done instead of continuing to maintain them in a rather old-fashioned colonial / imperial manner.

John Wisdom, Renford Bambrough: Main Philosophical Works

John Wisdom (1904-1993), Main Philosophical Works:

 

Interpretation and Analysis, 1931

Problems of Mind and Matter 1934

Other Minds, 1952

Philosophy & Psychoanalysis, 1953

Paradox & Discovery, 1965

Logical Constructions (1931-1933),1969

Proof and Explanation (The Virginia Lectures 1957), 1991

Secondary literature:

Wisdom: Twelve Essays, R. Bambrough (ed) 1974

Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom, I. Dilman (ed) 1984.

(Foreword) The Structure of Metaphysics, Morris Lazerowitz, 1955

“Epilogue: John Wisdom”, The later philosophy of Wittgenstein, David Pole, 1958

 

 

Renford Bambrough (1926-1999), Main Philosophical Works:

“Socratic Paradox”, Philosophical Quarterly, 1960

“Universals and Family Resemblances”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1960-61

“Plato’s Modern Friends and Enemies”, Philosophy 1962

The Philosophy of Aristotle, 1963

“Principia Metaphysica”, Philosophy 1964

New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (edited by R. Bambrough), 1965

“Unanswerable Questions”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 1966

Plato, Popper and Politics (edited by R. Bambrough), 1967

Reason, Truth and God 1969

“Foundations”, Analysis, 1970

“Objectivity and Objects”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1971-72

“How to Read Wittgenstein”, in Understanding Wittgenstein, Royal Institute of Philosophy 1972-3

“The Shape of Ignorance”, in Lewis (ed) Contemporary British Philosophy, 1976

Introduction & Notes to Plato’s Republic (Lindsay trans.), 1976

Conflict and the Scope of Reason, 1974; also in Ratio 1978

“Intuition and the Inexpressible” in Katz (ed) Mysticism & Philosophical Analysis, 1978

Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, 1979

“Thought, Word and Deed”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplement 1980

“Peirce, Wittgenstein and Systematic Philosophy”, MidWest Studies in Philosophy, 1981

“The Scope of Reason: An Epistle to the Persians”, in Objectivity and Cultural Divergence, Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1984

“Principia Metaphysica: The Scope of Reason” also known as “The Roots of Reason”; a work and manuscript mentioned several times but now unknown.

A personal note by Subroto Roy for a public lecture delivered at the University of Buckingham, August 24 2004:

“Renford Bambrough and I met once on January 31 1982, when I had returned to Cambridge from the USA for my PhD viva voce examination. He signed and gave me his last personal copy of Reason, Truth and God. Three years earlier, in 1979, I, as a 24 year old PhD student under F.H. Hahn in economics, had written to him expressing my delight at finding his works and saying these were immensely important to economics; he invited me to his weekly discussion groups at St John’s College but I could not attend. Between 1979 and 1989 we corresponded while I worked in America on my application of his and Wisdom’s work to problems in economics, which emerged in Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (Routledge, International Library of Philosophy 1989, 1991), a work which got me into a lot of trouble with American economists (though Milton Friedman and Theodore W. Schultz defended it). Bambrough said of it “The work is altogether well-written and admirably clear”. On another occasion he said he was “extremely pleased” at the interest I had taken in his work. The preface of my book said he was not responsible for the use I had made of his writings, which I reiterate now. Returning to Britain in 2004, I find the work of Wisdom and Bambrough unknown or forgotten, even at the great University North East of Buckingham where they had lived and worked. In my view, they played a kind of modern-day Plato and Aristotle to Wittgenstein’s Socrates; in terms of Eastern philosophy, the wisdom they achieved in their lives and have left behind for us in their work to use and apply to our own problems, make them like modern-day “Boddhisatvas” of Mahayana Buddhism. My lecture “Science, Religion, Art, and the Necessity of Freedom” purports to apply their work to current international problems of grave significance, namely the cultural conflicts made apparent since the September 11 2001 attacks on America. As I am as likely to fail as to succeed in making this application, the brief bibliography given above is intended to direct interested persons to their work first hand for themselves.”

April 2007, March 2020:

See also

Is “Cambridge Philosophy” dead, in Cambridge? Can it be resurrected, there? Case Study: Renford Bambrough (& Subroto Roy) preceded by decades Cheryl Misak’s thesis on Wittgenstein being linked with Peirce via Ramsey…

https://independentindian.com/2017/10/27/cambridge-philosophy-rest-in-peace-yes-bambrough-i-preceded-misaks-link-by-deacades/

*Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry*, “Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom”
*Physics and Reasoning*

 

Two cheers for Pakistan! (2008)

Two cheers for Pakistan!

by

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman Editorial Page Special Article

April 7, 2008

A century has passed since British rulers in India like Curzon and Minto became self-styled interlocutors between Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent. Up through the 19th century there had been no significant national political conversation between India’s main communities. The “Chief Translator” of the High Court in Calcutta was highly prized for his knowledge of Sanskrit, Persian and English because at least three different sets of laws governed different people in the country. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad wrote of his experience in the Bankim-inspired revolutionary societies of Bengal who treated him with extreme suspicion because they could hardly believe a Muslim wanted to join them as an anti-British rebel.

Jinnah vs Azad

Then came MA Jinnah, Iqbal, Rahmat Ali and others, initial creators of Pakistan whether through greater or lesser motives. Azad, Zakir Hussain, Sheikh Abdullah and other Muslims were equally firm the Pakistan idea was not only bad for India in the world it was bad for Muslims in particular. The Azads condemned the Jinnahs as greedy megalomaniacs, the Jinnahs condemned the Azads as minions of the Hindus. Larke lenge Pakistan, marke lenge Pakistan, khoon se lenge Pakistan, dena hoga Pakistan was the mob-cry during the bloody Partition, while the British, weakened by war and economics and bereft of their imperial pretensions, made haste to leave “this beastly country” to its fate ~ rather hoping the bloodshed would be such someone might hire them to stay on.

Certainly, having used the Indian Army for imperial purposes in the War, Britain (represented locally by a series of smartly dressed blundering fools) behaved irresponsibly in not properly demobilizing that Army during a period of intense communal tension. There were no senior Indian officers ~ KM Cariappa became a Brigadier only in 1946, Ayub Khan was a Colonel under him. Then there were the fatuous “princes” the British had propped up in “Indian India”, few being more than cardboard creatures. Among them was J&K’s ruler who was a member of Churchill’s War Cabinet and had come to harbour illusions of international grandeur. Once J&K’s Muslim soldiers returned to their Mirpuri homes, Jammu and Punjab were in communal conflict, months before the decision that Pakistan would indeed be created out of designated areas of British India just before British India extinguished itself. Army-issued Bren guns came to be used by former soldiers in communal massacres of the convoys of refugees going in each direction.

Part of the problem over J&K since then has been that it seems a dialogue of the deaf. Pakistanis since Zafrullah Khan claimed it was communal violence against Muslims in Jammu and Punjab that prompted the Pashtun invasion of Srinagar Valley beginning 22 October 1947; Indians have always claimed the new (and partly British-officered) Pakistan Army organized and instigated the invasion, coinciding with the planned takeover of Gilgit.

As in all complex moral problems, there was truth on all sides though no one doubts the invasion was savage and that the Pashtuns carried off Kashmiri women, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh. J&K descended into civil war, Abdullah’s secularists backed by the new India, Ibrahim’s communalists by the new Pakistan. Field Marshall Auchinlek, who commanded both Indian and Pakistani armies, had the decency to resign when he realized his forces were at war with one another. That J&K could not be independent in international law was sealed when the 15 October 1947 telegram sent by Hari Singh’s regime went unanswered by Attlee. The tribal invasion from Pakistan caused the old State of J&K to become an ownerless entity in international law, whose territories were then carved up by force by the two new British Dominions (later republics) and the result has been the “LOC”.

ZA Bhutto was perhaps Pakistan’s only politician after that time. The years between the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan and the rise of Bhutto saw Pakistan’s military begin its liaison with the Americans ~ from the US Ambassador’s daughter marrying the Pakistan President’s son to the leasing of Peshawar’s airfields for U-2 flights over the USSR. Yet Bhutto’s deep flaws also contributed to the loss of Bangladesh and to brutality, supported by the Shah of Iran’s American helicopters, against the Baloch.

Bhutto’s daughter now may have succeeded in death where she could not in life. Like Indira Gandhi, there seemed a shrill almost self-sacrificial air about Benazir in her last days, and, like Indira, her assassination caused all her countrymen including her enemies to undergo an existential experience. Perhaps the public death of a woman in public life touches some chivalrous chord in everyone.

Benazir’s husband was transformed from seeming a rather dubious self-seeker to becoming a national leader of some sobriety. Her old adversary Nawaz Sharif, brought to power by one Army Chief and removed by another, is now a constitutional democrat – seemingly adamant that there be the Rule of Law and not of generals. Most of all, Benazir’s death seemed to completely shut up that most loquacious of Pakistanis: Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf seemed stunned and promised free, fair and transparent elections; though no one believed he would deliver, he somehow did. He would like now to be a senior statesman though it seems as likely his countrymen will not forgive his misdeeds and instead exile him to America.

Afghanistan

Pakistan’s main international problem is not and has never been J&K. It has been and remains its unsettled western border and identity vis-à-vis Afghanistan (as India’s problem has been the eastern border with China). Dr Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan knew this but they were not allowed to speak by Pakistan’s Kashmir-obsessed elite. Zaheer Shah’s Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan joining the UN sixty years ago.

The present author has said before that Osama bin Laden may well be safely and comfortably in the deserts of North Africa while NATO and the Americans raise hell in Afghanistan and Waziristan pretending to look for him. It is not in India’s interest as it is not in Pakistan’s interest that Western militaries, who seem to have nothing better to do, brutalize Afghans of all descriptions in the name of nation-building or fighting “terrorism”. Afghan nation-building can only ultimately come from the Afghans themselves, no matter how many loya jirgas it takes. What Pakistan dislikes emerging from New Delhi is the sometimes rather supercilious and ignorant condescension that our officialdom is infamous for. Instead, with a new, seemingly clear-headed and well-intentioned Government in Pakistan elected for the first time ever, it may be time for all good people in the subcontinent to raise a glass of fruit juice and say “Two cheers for Pakistan!”

Lessons from the 1962 War: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended (2007)

Prefatory Note: This is part of a series of articles published in The Statesman since October 2007 and republished here, viz., Understanding China, India-USA Interests, China’s India Aggression, Surrender or Fight?, China’s Commonwealth, Nixon & Mao vs India, China’s India Example and China’s Force and Diplomacy. See https://independentindian.com/2009/09/19/my-ten-articles-on-china-tibet-xinjiang-taiwan-in-relation-to-india/

 

 

Lessons from the 1962 War

Beginnings of a solution to the long-standing border problem: there are distinct Tibetan, Chinese and Indian points of view that need to be mutually comprehended.

SUBROTO ROY

First published in The Sunday Statesman, January 13 2008,  Editorial Page Special Article

WAR is an existential experience from which nations emerge altered, reflective and sometimes more mature. Germany tried to purge anti-Jewish hatred, Japan to adopt pacifism, Britain to break class-structures, Russia to explode Stalin’s cult. America learnt little from its Vietnam debacle, creating new tactics and technologies to reduce American casualties in war but not showing any improved capacity to comprehend the world beyond its shores and borders.

India after the 1962 defeat by Mao’s China learnt less than was possible and necessary to do. The Government’s official history concluded: “In a fundamental sense, the origins of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict lay in Chinese expansionism and occupation of Tibet. The issue got further aggravated due to failure of the Chinese to win over the Tibetans. Indian asylum to the Dalai Lama raised Chinese suspicions about ultimate Indian intentions. On the other hand, India, while tacitly accepting the Chinese occupation of Tibet through a treaty in 1954, failed to obtain any quid pro quo on the border issue.” This is true enough but a deeper probe is also possible.

India’s 20th Century political and intellectual leadership may have grossly failed to comprehend critical world events in a realistic manner, specifically Vladimir Ulyanov’s German-assisted Bolshevik coup d’etat, the Kuomintang and Maoist takeovers in China, as well as India’s own struggle for Independence. After BG Tilak, Annie Besant, GK Gokhale and other founders of Indian nationalism passed from the scene, leaders arose like MK Gandhi, MA Jinnah, SC Bose and J Nehru who tended to be consumed, to lesser or greater extent, by their own hubris and were less able to see India’s fortunes and capacities in context of a larger world. None had military, administrative or public finance experience needed for practical government; instead there arose almost a new hereditary caste of the “professional politician” who has no other vocation or anything better to do in life. Nazi-admirers like Mashriqi and Rahmat Ali among Muslims and the Mahasabha and RSS among Hindus also lent mainstream Indian nationalism a harsh distasteful colouration.

Czechoslovakia’s great nationalist Masaryk (who famously denounced Austro-Hungary as a “corrupt, pretentious, senseless relic”) was said to be “a leader who planned further ahead than his contemporaries, understood the corroding effects of power, the vital need of restraint in the ruler, and above all the need for taking the nation into his confidence, educating it in the sense of drawing out all its innate qualities and sharing its manifold aspirations” (Seton-Watson). India’s clear-headed statesmen of that calibre were not among its most visible or ambitious. Vallabhbhai Patel, MAK Azad, C Rajagopalachari and others were left on the sidelines of free India’s politics ~ as Plato predicted, the genuine pilot of the ship of state will be hardly invited to take its wheel nor even want to do so.

Nehru alone, as chosen by Gandhi, came to wield actual power in the 1950s, having maneuvered Rajendra Prasad to being President. And Nehru, besotted in middle age with a married British woman, seemed awestruck by appearance of a victorious Maoist communism in China just as he had been adoring of Stalin’s Russia two decades earlier. The Congress’s friends among India’s official Communists and fellow-travelers never had much original indigenous grassroots support and always looked abroad for guidance. Non-alignment needed to be made of sterner stuff.

Nehru’s flawed management of the relationship with Communist China included not merely choosing a favourite like Krishna Menon to head India’s military, but also imagining himself a competent world diplomatist. Girja Shankar Bajpai would have been far superior as India’s first Foreign Minister. In 1952, Bajpai, then Governor of Bombay, wrote to Nehru saying India should inform Zhou Enlai the McMahon Line was firm in law and non-negotiable.

Was the McMahon Line firm and just? Nehru was no Curzon but it was as a Curzonian imperialist that Mao and Zhou saw him. All Chinese, whether Communist or Nationalist, chafed at the way the Manchu-dynasty’s Empire had been carved up. “China is our India” was Czarist Russia’s intent towards China itself. China had an awful political and military history from when foreign depredations began in the 1840s all the way until the Mao-Zhou era ended in the 1970s. Indeed China’s polity between the 1840s and 1940s suffered far greater chaos and anarchy than India’s in the same period.

From a Chinese standpoint, Younghusband’s diplomatic and military invasion of Gyantze and Lhasa in 1903-1904 was an insult they had been unable to militarily confront. Curzon sent Younghusband’s expedition because there appeared to be Russian intrigues with the Dalai Lama via the Russian/Mongolian agent Dorjiev who had transmitted Russian ideas of extending its new Siberian railway to Lhasa and posting Cossack soldiers there. The Russians seemed to want to adopt the Dalai Lama given his religious influence over Mongolia. The British were alarmed and determined to annihilate the influence of Dorjiev which they did. Thence came the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 which specified British and Russian spheres of influence in Iran and Afghanistan, and stated Tibet would be dealt with internationally only through the Chinese Empire. The McMahon Line, as a recognition of the traditional boundary, flowed naturally from the legitimacy of the Anglo-Russian Treaty. As for Sinkiang, though a Chinese province since 1884 it came to be ruled by warlords under Russian influence.

The Mao-Zhou war machine was determined to take over and militarily hold both Sinkiang and Tibet as an assertion of new China’s self-definition against Russia and Britain; hence their denunciation of Nehru as a pawn first of Britain and then of Russia. China building a road surreptitiously between Sinkiang and Tibet through Aksai Chin was reminiscent of Russia’s coercive behaviour against China in building the Trans-Siberian Railway through Chinese territory to Vladivostok. At worst, the Indians would have to admit that erstwhile J&K State since October 1947 had become an ownerless entity whose unclaimed territory had been carved up by force by the new Pakistan, new India and new China.

From an Indian standpoint, the traditional recognised boundary placed Aksai Chin clearly in Ladakh and not Tibet. Aksai Chain is a salt pit without “a blade of grass” but for all anyone knows, it could be rich in minerals. Karakorum Pass is also newly valuable to the Chinese as they seek to develop a land-route from Baluchistan’s Gwadar Port through Pakistan to China. If India has lost Aksai Chin and Karakorum Pass by force of arms without compensation, force of arms may be the only means of retrieval. Due compensation from China could be Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, and China seems once to have mentioned mutual perpetual lease of Aksai Chin and Chumbi Valley.

From a Tibetan point of view, the Amban representing the Chinese Emperor was driven out of Lhasa in 1912 and Tibet was independent of China for 38 years. Tibet has as much of a claim to be independent of China as Poland or Ukraine have had to be of Russia. As for the McMahon Line, it is indeed legally non-negotiable between China and India as it flowed directly out of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, and it was under that Treaty that China received international recognition of its formal suzerainty over Tibet since 1720 until that time. Mao once likened Tibet to the palm of a hand with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam as five fingers. Modern China must decide between such a metaphor of Maoist expansionism (which India would have to militarily resist) and joining the world of international law created since Grotius. Democratic conditions in Tibet would also have to be insisted upon so the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans may return home from India in peace and freedom.

Map of Asia c. 1900

Nixon & Mao vs India: How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression

Nixon & Mao vs India

How American foreign policy did a U-turn about Communist China’s India aggression. The Government of India should publish its official history of the 1962 war.

by

SUBROTO ROY

First published in The Sunday Statesman, Jan 6 2008, The Statesman Jan 7 2008

Editorial Page Special Article

THE 1972-74 conversations between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger on one hand and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping on the other, especially about India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have been public for a few years now. They make disturbing reading for Indians and Bangladeshis, and for Pakistanis too who may be concerned about the political health of their country. Yahya Khan, Pakistan’s debauched military dictator, made the Nixon-Mao meeting possible and received much praise from Zhou and support from Nixon and Kissinger. Pakistan’s official assessment of Yahya following the 1971 military defeat and secession of Bangladesh was far more candid and truthful, giving the lie to the praise bestowed upon him by Nixon and Zhou in their conversation.

Nixon and Kissinger were decidedly second-rate intellects in political power who believed themselves first-rate ~ a dangerous circumstance. Their policy caused Chiang Kaishek’s Republic of China to be expelled from the UN, its veto-wielding seat taken by Mao’s People’s Republic. The Government of India, under influence of communist sympathisers like Krishna Menon, KM Pannikar, KPS Menon et al, had been pleading the same case at the UN since 1949/1950, rebuffed each time by American veto. Now Nixon and Kissinger yielded to the idea to the delight of Mao-Zhou, and ganged up with Pakistan’s military against democratic India and the new Bangladesh.

Nixon went to Beijing at a time the catastrophic American involvement in Vietnam had reached a peak ~ something that itself was an outcome of the Dulles-Nixon doctrine of a “domino effect” in South East Asia. The Americans failed to comprehend Vietnamese nationalism against France or recognise how that had been historically directed at imperial China. Nixon’s carpet-bombing of Cambodia in needless extension of the Vietnam conflict was to cause the rise to power of Pol Pot and his vicious Khmer Rouge (to remove whom Vietnam attacked, causing China to attack Vietnam in 1979).

Nixon was in Beijing in February 1972 ostensibly to seek Chinese cooperation in ending the Vietnam War, as well as opening an Eastern Front in the Cold War against the USSR. Nixon fancied himself a Metternich-like statesman whose wisdom and brilliance would redesign the international order for a century. What was plain to unsentimental observers was that his underlying purpose was greedy and hardly statesmanlike, namely, winning re-election in November 1972 by outflanking domestic left-wing criticism using photos of having been toasted by Mao himself. That Nixon was no Machiavelli, Metternich or Bismarck but more likely just delusional and paranoid came to be revealed in his subsequent political debacle over Watergate.

The US attitude towards China’s 1959-1962 aggression against India changed drastically because of Nixon’s Beijing visit. Tibet’s people and culture had not been attacked and brutalised by Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Army nor by India’s soldiers ~ the Mao-Zhou Communist war machine, fresh from their Korean adventures, did that. There would have been no border conflict between China and India today in 2008 if Communist China had not first invaded and occupied Tibet.

All such fundamental facts used to be perfectly clear to the Americans as to everyone else. India’s Defence Ministry’s excellent official history of the 1962 war acknowledges the vital aid sent by President Kennedy with the help of Ambassador Galbraith. Ten years later, in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger in Beijing changed all that completely and did a U-turn against India using the dubious book of a single journalist as cover for their dissimulation:

“ZHOU: …. Actually the five principles (of peaceful coexistence) were put forward by us, and Nehru agreed. But later on he didn’t implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr Kissinger, I mentioned a book by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.
NIXON: I read the book.
KISSINGER: I gave it to the President.
NIXON: I committed a faux pas ~ Dr Kissinger said it was ~ but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the (1971) war, I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn’t react very favourably when I said that. (Zhou laughs)
ZHOU: Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn’t faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev. He encouraged them. In looking at 1962, the events actually began in 1959. Why did he go to Camp David? In June of that year, before he went to Camp David, he unilaterally tore up the nuclear agreements between China and the Soviet Union. And after that there were clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the western part of Sinkiang, the Aksai Chin area. In that part of Sinkiang province there is a high plateau. The Indian-occupied territory was at the foot of the Karakorums, and the disputed territory was on the slope in between.
KISSINGER: It’s what they call Ladakh.
NIXON: They attacked up the mountains.
ZHOU: We fought them and beat them back, with many wounded. But the TASS Agency said that China had committed the aggression against India…..They just don’t want to listen to reason. Anyway, the TASS Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon Line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if (Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon Line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused. He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out. You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.
NIXON: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question with regard to Bangladesh recognition. We have delayed recognition though Britain and other countries have done so.
ZHOU: France has also recognised Bangladesh.
NIXON: Before we make a decision on that, we have tried to find the attitude of (Zulfikar Ali) Bhutto. And Bhutto indicated he does not object to recognition. In fact he could see that we would have some advantage in not leaving the field clear to the Soviet Union in that region. It is our understanding that India is supposed to withdraw all its forces from Bangladesh by the 24th of March. And based on what we have for consideration, we have for consideration the possibility of recognising Bangladesh about that time….”
“ZHOU: …. we truly wish to see (India) truly withdraw their troops in East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. We wish to see them truly do this and not just with words. Of course they can only do that superficially, because if they get some Bengali forces to remain and join Mujibar Rahman, there would be no way to be sure because the Bengalis all look the same. But that would trouble to the future of India and Mrs Gandhi herself. The Indians said they have no territorial ambitions, but the development of events is that they have remained in their place and refused to withdraw. Once again we can only cite the events of Indian aggression in the 1962 war. At that time our troops pressed to the foothills quite close to Tezpur in Assam, and when they reached that place, Chairman Mao ordered that all troops should turn back. We turned back to the Indians ~ this is in Maxwell’s book ~ and we withdrew all troops back north of the so-called McMahon Line because one must show one can be trusted and must not wait for others to act…. India should withdraw its troops from the areas it is occupying in West Pakistan, and Pakistan should also withdraw from the lesser areas it occupies in India. Bhutto agrees. These two things, at least, the Indian side should abide by. If the US recognises Bangladesh after this situation is brought about, then we believe this would raise the prestige of the US in the United Nations.
After all, what you want is to bring about the withdrawal of all troops from Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Also, you will be able to encourage Mr Bhutto and give him some assistance. That is what they need. You said your actions should be parallel to ours, and we don’t mind that. We said this both to Yahya, the former President, and to the present President. Both of us owe something to Yahya, although he didn’t show much statesmanship in leading his country, for (bridging) the link between our two countries.
NIXON: He is a bridge.
ZHOU: We should not forget and we cannot forget, especially that Dr Kissinger was able through him to come secretly for talks here. And when a man makes a contribution to the world, we should remember him.
KISSINGER: Actually the President sent a message to Bhutto that he should treat Yahya well in retirement and we would not look favourably on any retribution. It was a personal message from Pakistan.
ZHOU: …. At the time of the ceasefire they (the Pakistanis) still had 80,000 troops in East Pakistan. It was not a situation in which they couldn’t keep fighting….. Yahya should have concentrated his troops to win a victory, and once the Indians had suffered a defeat they would have stopped because West Bengal was not very secure either. So at that time even our Vice Foreign Minister still believed they could win the war. Bhutto too…. .
KISSINGER: (Reading from a cable) Mr President, you were speaking of military shipments. We have information that the Soviet Union has shipped since November 150 tanks from Poland and 100 armored personnel carriers from Czechoslovakia. They were shipped in two ships each month in November and December. In January a third ship was to bring military equipment to India.
NIXON: To India?
KISSINGER: To India.
NIXON: The problem is to find some way that West Pakistan can find some military equipment and assistance. On our side, what we will do is to supply substantial amounts of economic assistance to West Pakistan. That would enable West Pakistan to ~ we would think in the interest of its defence ~ to acquire arms from other sources. As a matter of fact, that is the tragedy of our policy in India. We supplied almost 10 billion dollars in assistance to India in the last 20 years ~ very little was military assistance, it was economic ~ and that relieved India so it could purchase very substantial amounts of arms from the Soviet Union, and also manufacture arms. That was not our intent, but that’s what happened. With regard to our aid to India on this point ~ economic assistance ~ we are going to move in a very measured way. I am resisting considerable pressure from the public and the press to rush in and resume economic assistance at former levels. We are going to wait and see what India does with regard to the border problem and our relations generally.
ZHOU: And India actually is a bottomless hole. (Nixon laughs)
NIXON: When the Prime Minister referred to the problem India has with Bangladesh, as I look at India’s brief history, it has had enough trouble trying to digest West Bengal. If now it tries to digest East Bengal it may cause indigestion which could be massive.
ZHOU: That’s bound to be so. It is also a great pity that the daughter (Madame Gandhi) has also taken as her legacy the philosophy of her father embodied in the book Discovery of India (in English). Have you read it?
KISSINGER: He was thinking of a great India empire?
ZHOU: Yes, he was thinking of a great Indian empire ~ Malaysia, Ceylon, etc. He would probably also include our Tibet. When he was writing that book in a British prison, but one reserved for gentlemen in Darjeeling. Nehru told me himself that the prison was in Sikkim, facing the Himalayan mountains. At the time I hadn’t read the book, but my colleague Chen Yi had, and called it to my attention. He said it was precisely the spirit of India which was embodied in the book. Later on when I read it I had the same thought.
NIXON: …. Germany and Japan, received US aid…. why (they) have done so well, it is because they have qualities of drive and are willing to work hard, whereas some other countries we have helped do not have this quality. This brings me to the point: it is not the help that is provided a country that counts, it is whether the people of that country have the will to use this help. If they don’t have that, the money just goes down a rathole. A pretty good example is aid to India. (Zhou laughs)… India is not able to do much with aid because as compared with Japan, it does not have the drive, or the spirit of determination that the Japanese people have…..”

Genocide
Every Bangladeshi knows the causal role Z A Bhutto had in Pakistan’s civil war yet it is upon the word of such a man that Nixon’s recognition of their nation seemed based. The famous “Archer Blood telegram” by the American Consul-General in Dhaka reporting the genocidal Yahya-Tikka assault on East Pakistan starting March 25 1971 meant nothing to Nixon and Kissinger. Benazir retained her charm in Washington’s power circles because she was Bhutto’s daughter. Similarly, as recently as the 1999 Kargil conflict, Bill Clinton flatteringly referred to China for advice on how to deal with India and Pakistan.

Perversely enough, many in New Delhi, Kolkata etc express so much confused love for both China and the United States that they have accepted as their own the biased baseless opinions about India expressed by Nixon, Kissinger and the Communist Chinese. They would do well to read instead the Defence Ministry’s excellently researched historical account of the 1962 war, which the Government of India should not only publish properly at once but have translated into Mandarin as well.

Dr Manmohan Singh has as recently as 29 November 2007 expressed the opinion: “The type of leadership that China has produced since the days of Deng, I think, is the greatest asset that China has”. Dr Singh might have said, but did not, that China’s greatest asset has been in fact the preservation of Confucian values despite decades of communist tyranny and destruction. With such deep misapprehension about post-1949 China on the part of India’s present Head of Government, it may be unlikely that New Delhi or Kolkata acquires a realistic view of our neighbour or of a healthy China-India relationship in the 21st Century.

China’s Commonwealth: Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang (2007) (plus a link to a Mandarin translation)

China’s Commonwealth

Freedom is the Road to Resolving Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang

by

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, December 17, 2007

Editorial Page special article

Mandarin translation: https://twishort.com/Bd7nc

 

 

 

War between China and Taiwan would lead to nothing but disaster all around. Everyone recognises this yet China’s military and political establishment threaten it sporadically when provoked by Taiwan’s leaders, and both sides continue to arm heavily and plan for such a contingency. China’s military is mostly congregated in its North West, North, East and South East with between one third and one half of its total forces facing Taiwan alone in an aggressive posture for an amphibious invasion. Taiwan faces 900 Chinese missiles targeted at it. China’s South West has been left relatively unguarded as no threat has been perceived from India or the Tibetans in fifty years.

Cross-strait relations

The 23 million people of Taiwan have made themselves relatively secure across the 100 miles of sea that separate them from the Mainland. A sea-borne Communist invasion following a heavy missile barrage and blockade would undoubtedly leave the Taiwanese badly bruised and bleeding. But there is enough experience from World War II to suggest that trying to invade and occupy islands turns out as badly for the invader as it does for the defender. The Taiwanese military are confident they may be able to defeat an attempted invasion after two or three weeks of fierce fighting even if their promised American ally fails to materialize by their side.

In any case, for China to succeed in forcibly establishing its rule someday over Taiwan would be a pyrrhic victory, since it would lead to tremendous political and economic costs upon all Chinese people. Gaining control after a terrible war would rule out the Hong Kong “One Country Two Systems” model, with nominal Chinese sovereignty being established over an otherwise unchanged Taiwan. Instead the Chinese would have to institute a highly repressive political system, which will incorrigibly damage Taiwan’s flourishing technologically advanced economy, as well as lead to drastic irreparable political and economic retrogression on the Mainland.

The alternative to war is “peaceful reunification” which is the official policy of the CPC, and which also has been a major plank of United States foreign policy since the time of George C Marshall. Unlike Britain, Japan, Russia, France, Germany, even Sweden and Belgium, the Americans were not among the 19th Century powers that exploited China, and that is something that has left some residual goodwill, implicit as it may be, since all Chinese despise the fact their country was humiliated by greedy foreign powers in the past. The USA has subscribed to “One China” and peaceful unification even after its cynical near-betrayal of Taiwan since 1972, having normal diplomatic and trade relations with Communist China while agreeing to help Taiwan if the Communists attempted a military invasion.

Communist China’s strategy towards peaceful reunification with Taiwan has been unlimited allurement: offer Taiwanese businessmen a free hand in investing in China, offer Taiwan students places in Mainland universities, offer Taiwanese airlines flying rights etc. The Taiwanese see their giant ominous neighbour offering such allurements on one hand and threatening a missile attack and invasion and occupation on the other, as if they are animals who will respond to the carrots and sticks of behaviourism.

Taiwan in recent decades has seen its own history and future much more clearly than it sees the Communists being able to see theirs. A marriage can hardly occur or be stable when the self-knowledge of one party greatly exceeds the self-knowledge of the other. It is thus no wonder that the Taiwan-China talks get stalled or retrogress, as the root problem has failed to be addressed which has to do with the political legitimacy of a combined regime.

Political China consisted historically of the agricultural plains and river-valleys of “China Proper” and the arid sparsely populated mountainous periphery of Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang. The native people of Formosa (Taiwan) had their own unique character distinct from the Mainland until 1949 when Chiang Kaishek’s Kuomintang moved there after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s Communists.

Today the Hong Kong Model of “One Country Two Systems” can be generalized to “One Commonwealth/ Confederation of China, Six Systems”, whose constituents would be Mainland China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Chinese Hong Kong, Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. A difference between a commonwealth and a confederation is that a commonwealth permits different heads of state whereas a confederation would have one head of state, who, in view of Mainland China’s predominance, could be agreed upon to be from there permanently.

Taiwan is the key to the peaceful creation of such a Chinese commonwealth or confederation, and Taiwan may certainly agree to “reunification” on such a pattern on one key condition ~ the abolition of totalitarian Communist one-party rule on the Mainland.

The CPC’s parent party was the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which became the Bolshevik Party which became the All-Union Communist Party in 1925. This still exists today but to its great credit it agreed sixteen years ago, more or less voluntarily, to abandon totalitarian power and bring in constitutional democracy in the former USSR. East European Communist Parties did the same, mostly transforming themselves back to becoming Social Democrat or Labour Parties ~ so much so that Germany’s present elected head of government is a former East German.

Hearts and minds

Mainland China must follow a similar path if it wishes to win the hearts and minds and political loyalties of all Chinese people and form a genuine confederation ~ which means the CPC must lead the way towards its own peaceful dissolution and transformation.

Historically, China’s people followed an admixture of three non-theistic religious cultures, namely, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, individually choosing whichever aspects of each that they wished to see in their daily lives. Lamaist Buddhism governed Tibet and Mongolia and deeply affected parts of Mainland China too. China’s theists include the Uighurs of Sinkiang who were and remain devout Muslims, as well as the many Catholics and other Christians since the first Jesuits arrived five hundred years ago. Sun Yatsen himself was a Christian. Marx, Engels, Stalin, Mao and even Deng have never really been able to substitute as a satisfactory new Chinese pantheon.

A free multi-party democracy in Mainland China, flying the Republican or some combined flag and tracing its origin to the 1911 Revolution, even one in which Communists won legitimate political power through free elections (as has been seen in India’s States), would earn the genuine respect of the world, and be able to confidently lead a new Chinese Confederation. The Chinese people who have been often forced against their will to resettle in Tibet and Sinkiang under the present totalitarian regime would be free to move or stay just as there are many Russians in Ukraine or Kazakhstan today. And of course the Dalai Lama would be able to return home in peace after half a century in exile. Freedom is the road to the peaceful resolution of China’s problems. Let freedom ring.

Surrender or Fight? War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must? (2007)

Surrender or fight?


War is not a cricket match or Bollywood movie. Can India fight China if it must?

By Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Dec 4 2007, Editorial Page Special  Article

Armies of the subcontinent, all deriving from rather antiquated British military traditions, have only once since 1947 fought an external army ~ when China’s Communists, using Lin Biao’s military doctrines, attacked India in 1962 and India lost territory, soldiers and self-respect, gaining ignominy for half a century instead. India and Pakistan have fought wars against each other, India’s army has fought Kashmiri, Naga and other rebels, Pakistan’s army has brutalised Bangladeshi and Baluchi civilians and fought Pashtuns in Waziristan, Bangladeshi soldiers have brutalised tribal minorities and shot at Indian border guards, Sri Lanka’s military has fought Tamil rebels, Nepal has fought communist rebels, etc. Other than the 1962 Chinese attack, all warfare in the subcontinent has been domestic and internecine.

Official 1962 history

The official Government of India history of the 1962 war frankly says: “The Indian Army trained and fought like the British Army, unimaginative, elephantine, rule-bound and road-bound. Armies of Germany, Japan, USSR or China were vastly better war machines, and patterned very differently.” During the 1962 war, the US Ambassador JK Galbraith wrote to President Kennedy: “The great question is what the Chinese intend…. The Indians have consistently underestimated Chinese intentions…. the Indian Army in its command, organisation, tactics and equipment is extremely old-fashioned. The individual soldiers carry personal arms that are sixty years old and this can hardly give them the feeling of equality with opponents carrying modern light automatic weapons. The tactics are stuffy and rigid… Some of the commanders are very good. More still are the amiable frauds that rise to the top in any peacetime Army… ”

When diplomacy is exhausted and international conflict arises, there is always an option of surrendering or yielding sovereignty instead of standing up to fight, e.g. Vichy France yielding before Nazi Germany. There is always a choice between submission and fighting. Pakistan’s military has geared itself over decades only to fight India, and chosen to serve the West and China as desired towards that end. Whatever America wants in Pakistan, America gets, e.g., if American missiles need to enter Pakistani airspace to hit Afghan targets, the US Government does not seek Pakistani permission but merely informs them not to think offensive missiles have been sent from India, and they say okay.

India’s Army may be under some suspicion of being similarly geared to fight only Pakistan ~ and when India and Pakistan are armed and obsessed only with fighting one another, they can hardly think of taking on other adversaries. “India’s soldiers now stand sentinel along India’s frontiers; but they perform guard-duties and are not spear-heads for her advancing armies”, Peter Lyon in FS Northedge (ed), Foreign Policies of the Powers, 1973.

Certainly India’s military has not seemed keen to have anything but a highly defensive posture against Communist China. On 23 March 1991, Rajiv Gandhi at his residence released a fat book by a retired Army Chief on Indian military defence titled Prepare or Perish. The book’s author and the present author had been working together for Rajiv, and the former was asked why in the hundreds of pages of the book there was barely a mention of Indian military preparation against China. He replied that our strategy against China would have to be a defensive holding action which relied on the international community’s intervention before matters escalated ~ revealing a rather wild optimism about the efficacy of international relations. Another Army Chief years before him, General Thimayya himself, is reported to have said “as a soldier he could not think of a total war with China and would leave the dispute to be settled by the diplomats” (BN Mullick, The Chinese Betrayal, p. 318).

Thimayya realised India was weak after World War II facing Mao’s Communists who had two and a half million armed men, had acquired large stocks of American and Japanese weapons after defeating Chiang Kaishek, and were aggressive and experienced after decades of fighting culminating in the Korean war. (Three divisions were trained in India by the Americans and sent for Chiang in 1942-45 with supplies along the Stilwell Road or flown across the “hump”.) Indian soldiers had fought mostly under British or American commanders; in 1947, they disintegrated in chaos into the new armies of India and Pakistan who went to war with one another immediately over J&K.

Not only was India militarily weak until 1962, our political and diplomatic policies since 1949 had been consistently ones of flattery and appeasement, betraying our interests as well as our relationships with Chiang’s Nationalist Chinese and, most cruelly of all, with the Tibetans who shared India’s culture. Our first Ambassador to Beijing was a communist sympathiser, his son-in-law a leading Indian communist. India was the first country outside the Soviet bloc to recognise Communist China, the first to help Mao diplomatically in the Korean war, the pioneer of many UN resolutions to have Communist China admitted as a veto-holding Security Council member in place of Chiang’s Nationalists. We bent over backwards to accommodate and appease them over Tibet. All this got us less than nothing ~ Communist China soon enough joined hands with Pakistan’s greedy generals against us.

Zhou Enlai was said to be “one of those men who never tell the truth and never tell a lie. For them there is no distinction between the two. The speaker says what is appropriate to the circumstances. Zhou Enlai was a perfect gentleman; he was also a perfect Communist” (Father Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 1921-1985, Stanford 1988). Zhou enforced India’s political and diplomatic surrender, and then we failed to fight adequately on the military front. Communist China thus established its dominance over India. After Nixon and Kissinger made their devious opening to Mao and Zhou using Pakistan, American policy changed too, almost betraying Taiwan and certainly stamping American approval on the idea that between Communist China and India, China shall be seen as dominant.

For recent Chinese Ambassadors to New Delhi to brazenly use today the same language as Zhou did half a century ago is not a good sign but an indication of Communist China’s wish not to have a relationship with modern India on the basis of sovereign equality. For them to say Tawang must be theirs because the monastery there was where the sixth Dalai Lama was born and the Dalai Lama is Chinese and not Indian, is to reveal an aggressive subconscious against us. We may next hear it said Buddha himself was Chinese since he was probably born in Nepal, as an excuse for further Communist encroachment.

Diplomatic relations

The last time China’s Communists attacked India the world was distracted by the Cuban missile crisis just as it is distracted today with Iran and Iraq. The Tawang monastery issue today is symbolic of India’s entire relationship with China since 1949. There is no economic reason why bilateral trade in goods and services cannot continue but it may be high time India gathers some remaining self-respect and downgrades and then considers ending diplomatic relations with this aggressive dictatorship, awaiting instead the development of democracy and a free society for all of China’s great people, perhaps on the Taiwan-model. The Dalai Lama was greeted with great warmth in Taiwan and there is no doubt a free democratic China will seek a healthy new relationship with Tibet as befits great cultures. Militarily, India must indeed prepare for the next Communist aggression or perish, which requires real modernisation and efficiency in the armed forces and an end to corruption, indiscipline and incompetence.

China’s India Aggression (2007)

China’s India Aggression

German Historians Discover Logic Behind Communist Military Strategy

by

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, Nov 5 2007

There are four main aspects to the China-Tibet-India problem over the last century, some of which are only now becoming apparent. The first is historical prior to the 1949 Communist takeover, in which the British, Tibetans and Kuomintang were participants in background discussion and events. The second is historical too, namely, the appeasement by Nehru and his diplomats of the Mao-Zhou Communists and betrayal of normal Tibetan and Indian interests in the period 1949-1959. The third is political, to do with reaction, confusion and conflict among Indian Communists leading to the CPI/CPI-M split in response to Communist attacks upon Tibet and India. The fourth is military, to do with the 1962 war itself, the nature of the surprise Chinese attack and Indian defeat.

Chinese claims

A 1954 Beijing publication not only claimed Tibet but alleged vast areas of Asia to be Chinese: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA (Arunachal), Assam, the Andaman Islands, Burma (Myanmar), Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, Indo-China, the Sulu Islands, the Ryukyus, Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), the whole of East Turkestan (Sinkiang), Kazakhstan, Siberia west of the Amur River, maritime provinces east of the Amur down to Vladivostok, and Sakhalin (viz., Coral Bell in FS Northedge (ed) Foreign Policies of the Powers, 1973).

America’s CIA reported in a secret 1962 analysis, declassified in May 2007, that the Left faction of India’s Communists had been repeating what Mao Zedong said to Ajoy Ghosh: “that Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA are provinces peopled by the same race, that China had a historic right to these territories, that the McMahon line was not valid, and that the Indian government’s raising of ‘the bogey of Chinese aggression’ had resulted from its realisation that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India would be deeply affected by the social and economic revolution in Tibet” (CIA The Indian Communist Party and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Feb 1962, page 76). Referring to Chinese designs on Mongolia, Kruschev’s USSR condemned its fellow-Communists: “… The true schemes of the Chinese leaders (are) obvious. They are permeated through and through with great-power chauvinism and hegemonism”, Pravda 2 Sep 1964, quoted by Bell, op.cit.

China’s 1962 India war was rationally consistent with carrying out precisely such an expansionist policy in Sinkiang and Tibet. As the German historians Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund have stated most succinctly, the NEFA conflict was merely a deliberate diversionary tactic which has worked brilliantly for decades:

“The consolidation of the Chinese hold on Tibet, as well as on other areas of Central Asia… (required military infrastructure) to maintain it and a ring road was constructed which led from China to Tibet and from there via the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. At a crucial point some Indian territory (Aksai Chin) obstructed this connection. Beyond Aksai Chin was the terrible desert, Takla Makan, which was a major obstacle. Faced with the dilemma of violating Indian territory or getting stuck in the desert, the Chinese opted for the first course and quietly built a road through Aksai Chin. In the meantime, they provoked incidents on the northeastern border so as to divert attention from their real aims. They also published maps which showed the border in Assam at the foot of the mountains rather than on the watershed. The watershed line had been settled by the McMahon border commission, which had also included a Chinese delegate who initialled the protocol, although it was not subsequently ratified by the Chinese government. Actually, there was no disagreement about the watershed line at that time when debate was focused on a different line, supposed to divide Tibet into an Inner and Outer Tibet on the same pattern as Inner and Outer Mongolia. Inner Tibet was to be under Chinese influence and Outer Tibet under British influence. But Communist China made use of the fact that the agreement had not been ratified and accused India of clinging to the imperialist heritage with regard to the Himalayan boundary. This harping on the legal position in the northeast was a tactical move made in order to build up a bargaining position with regard to Aksai Chin where the Chinese could not raise similar claims… Finally, a border war broke out in October 1962. It was a typical demonstration war conducted with great finesse by the Chinese. They completely perplexed the Indian generals by pushing a whole division through the mountains down to the valley of Assam and withdrawing it again as quickly as it had come. The Indian strategic concept of defending the Himalayan boundary by cutting off the supply lines of the enemy if it ventured too far beyond the border could not be put into operation: the Chinese were gone before the supply lines could be cut. But why did they do this? They wanted to divert attention from their moves in the northwest, where they did reach the Karakorum Pass in a swift offensive and did not withdraw as they had done in the east.” (History of India, 1998, pp 321-322).

Chinese casualties were some 1,460 dead, 1,697 wounded, Indian casualties some 3,128 dead, 3,968 captured, 548 wounded, each as reported by itself. JK Galbraith, the friendliest and fairest observer India may have hoped for, found our Army populated by “tragically old-fashioned” peacetime generals full of bluster, while brave soldiers under them remained woefully ill-equipped and came to be outgunned and out-manoeuvred.

Mao Zedong’s racist reference to the people populating NEFA being of Chinese origin was misguided, even nonsensical. On such a basis, China might claim Japan or Korea next, as might West Africa claim sovereignty over North and South American blacks or Mongolia over Turks and Afghans. NEFA’s five administrative divisions ~ Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit and Tirap ~ are populated by indigenous animistic tribes including the Momba, Mishmi, Abor, Miri, Dafla and Aka, each with defined areas. The 1883 Survey of India showed these areas administered de facto by British India from Assam. The 1908 Edinburgh Geographical Institute’s map by JG Bartholomew showed most of the same to be part of Bhutan, a British Indian protectorate, as did earlier 18th Century maps.

 

 

Less than legitimate

Communist China’s claims of sovereignty over NEFA (Arunachal) in any case derive from its claims of sovereignty over Tibet. Britain, India and other nations guided by international law have allowed that Lhasa, though long independent, may acknowledge Chinese suzerainty ~ but only subject to the condition of traditional autonomy. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty stipulated Tibet would be dealt with officially through China, leading to the Henry McMahon Commission of 1914 which followed the normal international cartographic practise of the watershed defining the boundary in NEFA. That came to be generally followed by British and Indian maps of NEFA since. The CIA’s official 1959 map of the region concurred and the United States Government explicitly instructed Galbraith, its New Delhi Ambassador during the 1962 war, that the American position was the same as the British and Indian. There appears to be no record of any serious Chinese cartography of the region ever ~ Chinese maps prior to 1935 agreeing with the British Indian position but disputing it afterwards, placing Tibet’s boundary along the margin of the Assam plain. China was ravaged by war, civil war and revolutionary excesses during much of the 20th Century and hardly had well-preserved national archives at a time when its own capital and central government was changing several times.

China’s Communists, being themselves in political power for decades somewhat less than legitimately as a one-party dictatorship, have been loath to admit all such inconvenient facts, and instead continue in their hegemonic mode. A new liberal democratic China guided by law on the Taiwan pattern may have to be awaited before this conflict comes to be resolved.

See also https://independentindian.com/2009/09/19/my-ten-articles-on-china-tibet-xinjiang-taiwan-in-relation-to-india/

India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy (2007)

India-USA interests: Elements of a serious Indian foreign policy

by

 

Subroto Roy

 

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, Oct 30 2007

If there is a “natural alliance” between India and the United States, it arises to the extent that both are large democracies and more or less free societies that happen to be placed half way across the globe and pose no perceptible military threat to one another. The real long-term strategic and political dimensions of such an alliance are quite independent of the business interests driving the “nuclear deal” or selfish interests of the few million “elite” Indians who have fled to the USA as immigrants in recent decades. The interests of Indian immigrants in the USA and interests of the vast masses in India are, after all, quite distinct. Also, America derives most if its own energy not from nuclear reactors but from abundant hydroelectric resources. If the nuclear deal has been ill-conceived and fails in implementation at any stage, India will not import expensive nuclear reactors but can still learn much from the USA in developing hydroelectric power which constitutes India’s greatest energy potential as well.

 

 

China and Pakistan

Key strategic interests of India and the USA are fully convergent in East Asia, especially in respect of Communist China. But in West Asia, American attitudes and actions towards the Muslim world, specifically the invasion and occupation of Iraq and now a possible assault on Iran, have been deeply disconcerting for India which has some 120 million Muslim citizens.

 

It is not a coincidence that Pakistan, an overtly religious Muslim state, has had a marriage of convenience with Communist China, an overtly atheistic anti-religious state. Both have been militarist dictatorships that have seen democratic India as a strategic adversary, especially over territorial claims. It was Pakistan that facilitated President Nixon’s desired opening to Communist China and later permitted President Reagan’s attack on the soft underbelly of the USSR in the Afghan civil war (an attack in which China participated too). With the USSR’s collapse, the USA removed its main strategic adversary only to be left with two new adversaries: Islamic fundamentalism in the short run and China in the long run!

 

Indian diplomacy can credit a rare (indeed exceptional) success in having warned the USA from the early 1990s onwards of the dangers brewing in the jihadist camps in Pakistan sponsored by the ISI. The US Government has now declassified its assessments of those dangers and what it tried to do as early as 1995 and as late as 2000 through the Saudis with the Taliban’s Mullah Omar ~ who refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia and openly spoke of plans for revenge against American interests. With a continuing Cold-War mindset, US policy-makers thought state-actors like Saddam Hussein were a graver risk to Israel than non-state or  pan-state actors like Osama could be to the American mainland. Having distracted itself with Saddam, the US Government’s response to Osama has been far too much far too late ~ the maddened bull chasing the matador’s cape, in Stephen Holmes’s recent metaphor.

 

Pakistan’s consistent motivation was one of gaining advantage with the Americans in the hope of undermining India, and indeed the nexus created in Washington by Pakistan’s bureaucrats, politicians and military over decades has been the envy of all lobbyists. But Pakistan overplayed its hand, and once the 9/11 genie was let out of the bottle it could not be put back in again. Meanwhile, Pakistan allowing Gwadar port to become a haven for China’s Navy would have obvious new strategic repercussions.

 

American interests in West Asia are to protect Israel, to protect trade-routes and to defend against non-state or pan-state terrorism. American interests in East Asia are to protect Japan, South Korea and Taiwan from communist attack, to protect trade-routes and to defend against new terrorism arising from places like Indonesia or the  Philippines. All American interests in Asia would be facilitated by appearance of genuine multiparty democracy and free societies in China and Pakistan.

 

China as a two-party or multi-party democracy and a free society, even on the Taiwan-model, is unlikely to be an expansionist militarist aggressor in the way it has been as a dictatorship and unfree society. Communist China in the early 21st Century makes the same outrageous unlawful claims on Indian territory as it did half a century ago. Only the USA came to India’s assistance in a tangible way when Communist China attacked in Ladakh and Arunachal in the late months of 1962. John Kenneth Galbraith was President Kennedy’s Ambassador in New Delhi and his memoirs tell the tale of the landings of C-130 aircraft in Kolkata carrying infantry weapons, light artillery and quartermaster stores for the beleaguered Indian Army in Tezpur and Leh.

 scan0010

Nehru, Krishna Menon and India’s whole political and diplomatic leadership revealed gross incompetence as did the Army’s top brass. Indian Communists virtually betrayed the country. The Chinese massed in the Chumbi Valley near Nathu La, and had they attacked all the way to Siliguri, India’s North East would have been cut off. As a demonstration, the Chinese in division strength took and held the whole of Arunachal for a month, withdrawing before there could be anyIndian attempt to retaliate or cut supply lines. The geography has not changed in fifty years. What can yet change is the ideology, away from the communism that has ruined China’s great people, to a new and bold commitment to liberal democracy and the Rule of Law.

 

As for Pakistan, its people under crude military rule have hardly allowed themselves to become the source of Muslim culture that Iqbal had dreamt of. Pakistan today is not a place even the most ardent pro-Pakistani person in Jammu & Kashmir can find very appealing or inspiring. If there was multiparty democracy and a free society in which the military had a normal small role of defence (as opposed to a large purportedly offensive role against India), Pakistan could calm down from its neuroses and become a normal country for the first time~ one in which the so-called “extremists” of today are transformed into a politically legitimate religious conservatism, who could seek to take power responsibly through the ballot box.

 

 

Neutrality

India should be a friendly neutral in the conflict between the West and Muslim world, doing whatever we can to bring better understanding between the two sides. Both have been invaders in Indian history, bringing both evil and good in their wake. India’s culture absorbed and assimilated their influences and became more resilient as a consequence. India also was a haven for Jews and Zoroastrians fleeing persecution. India as a country must condemn fanatical terrorist attacks on the West and bizarre reactionary attempts to return to a caliphate in the world of modern science. Equally, India must condemn vicious racist bombing and warfare unleashed by technologically advanced countries upon ancient societies and cultures struggling to enter the modern world in their own way.

 

As for the central issue of Israel in Palestine, Martin Buber (1878-1965), the eminent Zionist scholar and philosopher of Judaism, said to Rabindranath Tagore in 1926 that the Jewish purpose should be one of “pursuing the settlement effort in Palestine in agreement, nay, alliance with the peoples of the East, so as to erect with them together a great federative structure, which might learn and receive from the West whatever positive aims and means might be learnt and received from it, without, however, succumbing to the influence of its inner disarray and aimlessness.” If India could guide the region towards such a “great federative structure” of reason and tranquillity, while encouraging democracy in China and Pakistan, the aim of our “natural alliance” with the United States half way across the globe would have been fulfilled.

see also

Diplomatic Wisdom (2006)

https://independentindian.com/2006/10/09/new-foreign-policy-kiss-up-kick-down/
https://independentindian.com/2006/06/05/pakistans-allies/

https://independentindian.com/2011/10/13/my-seventy-one-notes-at-facebook-etc-on-kashmir-pakistan-and-of-course-india-listed-thanks-to-jd/

https://independentindian.com/2009/09/19/my-ten-articles-on-china-tibet-xinjiang-taiwan-in-relation-to-india/

https://independentindian.com/2007/08/19/to-clarity-from-confusion-on-indo-us-nuclear-deal/

https://independentindian.com/2009/11/25/on-the-zenith-and-nadir-of-us-india-relations/

 

Understanding China (2007)

Understanding China

The World Needs to Ask China to Find Her True Higher Self

by Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, October 22, 2007, Editorial Page Special Article

The most important factors explaining China’s progress since the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have been the spread and quick absorption of modern Western technology under conditions of relative peace and tranquillity. The “capitalist road” came to be taken after all and the once-denounced Liu Shaoqui was posthumously rehabilitated by his shrewd old friend Deng Xiaoping.

To be sure, the new technology itself has combined with democratic hatred felt by young Chinese against the corrupt elitist police-state gerontocracy, and this produced first a Wei Jingsheng and Democracy Wall and later the Tiananmen Square protests. There have been also in recent years many thousands of incidents of peasants resisting State-sponsored brutality, fighting to prevent their lands being stolen in the name of purported capitalist industrialisation, in an economy where, as in India, land is an appreciating asset and the paper-currency remains weak because inflation by money-printing is the basis of public finance. China’s multitudinous domestic tensions continue to boil over as if in a cauldron, and it seems inevitable Chinese Gorbachevs and Yeltsins will one day emerge from within the Communist Party to try to begin the long political march towards multiparty democracy and a free society ~ though of course they may fail too, and China will remain condemned to being a dictatorship of one sort or other for centuries more.

Absence of war

What has been seen in recent decades is the relative absence of war. The last military war the Chinese fought was a month-long battle against fellow-Communist Vietnamese in 1979, after Vietnam had run over and destroyed the Chinese (and Western) backed Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Before that, fellow-Communists of the USSR were fought in a border war in 1969. Before that was the border-war with India in 1959-1963 and occupation of Tibet 1950-1959.

The really savage, fierce large-scale fighting in 20th Century Chinese history was seen in the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, the Civil War of 1945-1949 and the Korean War of 1950-1953. The occupation of Tibet and fighting against India resulting from Tibet’s occupation were really, from a Chinese Communist point of view, merely light follow-ups to those major wars of the Mao-Zhou era, especially fighting the USA and UN in Korea. Peaceful Tibet and naïve non-violent India stood no chance against the aggressive highly experienced Mao-Zhou war-machine at the time.

It may even be that Mao could live only with incessant external tumult ~ after fighting military wars, he orchestrated domestic conflicts in the Little and Great Leap Forward of 1949-1963 and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1964-1969, all among the failures of a cruel ill-educated man who led his people into social, political and economic disaster from which trauma they have been slowly recovering over the last thirty years.

Today, Communist China’s military is geared to fight the non-Communist Chinese of Taiwan in a continuation of the Civil War. It seems unlikely there will be an actual invasion for the simple reason that Taiwan, though much smaller, may not suffer eventual defeat but instead inflict a mortal wound upon invading forces. Mao succeeded in driving Chiang Kaishek across the Taiwan Straits but it is post-Chiang Taiwan that displays the model of how strong, prosperous, democratic and self-confident Chinese people really can strive to be in the modern world. Everyone agrees Taiwan and China must one day unite ~ the interesting question is whether Taiwan will get absorbed into China or whether China shall take Taiwan as its new model! Just as Liu Shaoqi had the last word over Mao on the question of taking the capitalist road, Chiang Kaishek may yet have the last word over Mao on the best constitutional method for modern China’s governance.

Peculiarly enough, China’s Kuomintang and Communists were both allies of Russian Bolshevism (not unlike India’s Congress Party and Communists). Sun Yatsen’s collaboration with Comintern’s founders began as early as 1921. By 1923 there was a formal agreement and Stalin sent Gruzenberg (alias Borodin) to China as an adviser, while Sun sent many including Chiang to Russia on learning expeditions. “In reorganising the party, we have Soviet Russia as our model, hoping to achieve a real revolutionary success”, said Sun hopefully. But by March 1926, Sun’s successor Chiang, had begun purging Communists from the Kuomintang-Communist alliance; in July 1927 Borodin returned to Russia after failing at reconciliation; and by July 1928 Chiang had unified China under his own leadership, and Moscow had repudiated the Kuomintang and ordered Chinese Communists to revolt, starting the Civil War and instability that invited the vicious Japanese aggression and occupation.

China’s problems today with Taiwan and with Tibet (and hence with India) will not come to be resolved until China looks hard in the mirror and begins to resolve her problems with herself. No major country today possesses a more factually distorted image of its own history, politics and economics than does China since the Communist takeover of 1949. “Protect the country, destroy the foreigner” was the motto of the Boxer revolts in 1900, a natural defensive reaction to the depredations and humiliations that Manchu-dynasty China suffered at the hands of the British, French, Germans, Russians, Japanese etc for more than a century. The Boxer motto seemed to implicitly drive Mao, Deng and his modern successors too ~ hence the “One China” slogan, the condemnation of “splittism” etc. But the ideology that Mao, Liu, Deng et al developed out of Stalin, Lenin and Marx seems base and stupid when it is unsentimentally compared to the great political philosophy and ethics of ancient China, which emerged out of wise men like Mo Tzu, Meng Ko (Mencius) and the greatest genius of them all, K’ung Fu Tzu, Confucius himself, undoubtedly among the few greatest men of world history.

Tibet

India has not been wrong to acknowledge Outer Tibet as being under China’s legal suzerainty nor in encouraging endogenous political reform among our Tibetan cousins. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 undertook that Tibet would not be dealt with except through China, and the Indian Republic has been the legal successor of British India. Lhasa may be legitimately under Beijing as far as international relations goes ~ the more profound question is whether Beijing’s Communists since 1949 have not been themselves less than legitimate, and if so whether they can now transform themselves in the post Mao-Zhou era through good deeds towards greater legitimacy.

The root problem between China and India has not been the Tibet-India border which was almost always a friendly one and never a problem even when it remained imprecise and undefined over centuries. The root problem has been the sheer greed and aggressiveness of Chinese Communists ~ who now demand not merely Aksai Chin but also a minimum of some 2000 sq km of Tawang and Takpa Shiri in Arunachal. The CIA’s 1959 map of the region, which would be acceptable to the USA, UK, Taiwan and the international community in general as depicting the lawful position, shows the Communist Chinese territorial claim to be baseless and Indian position to be justified.

Nehru’s India was naïve to approach the Mao-Zhou Communists with the attitude of ahimsa and a common Buddhism. But Mao-Zhou Communism is dead, and the Deng capitalist road itself has lost its ethical way. What India and the world need to do now is ask China or help guide China to find her true higher self. China’s Tibet problem and hence border-dispute with India would have been solved peacefully by application of the ways of great men like Confucius, Mencius and Mo Tzu, who are and will remain remembered by mankind long after petty cruel modern dictators like Mao, Zhou and Deng have been long forgotten. Why China’s Communist bosses despise Taiwan may be because Taiwan has sought to preserve that memory of China’s true higher self.

see also https://independentindian.com/2009/09/19/my-ten-articles-on-china-tibet-xinjiang-taiwan-in-relation-to-india/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VHUhy9pJyys

Iran, America, Iraq: Bush’s post-Saddam Saddamism — one flip-flop too many?

Iran, America, Iraq: Bush’s post-Saddam Saddamism — one flip-flop too many?

by Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page, October 16 2007

All cultures generally, and Eastern cultures invariably, require utmost politeness towards an invited guest.The behaviour of the President of New York’s ColumbiaUniversity on 24 September was thus inexplicable when he gratuitously insulted his guest Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, even before allowing him to deliver the speech he had been invited to give at the university.Iran’s President has become the new hate-figure of choice in the popular American media ever since 2005 when he was mistranslated as having said he wished Israel “wiped off the map”.He has chosen to contribute to his own predicament by seeming to associate with and encourage those known as “Holocaust-deniers” – people who stretch from those who deny any systematic mass-murder took place of Jews by Nazi Europe to those who want evidence for the number of six million such victims that has passed into school textbooks.

Attack plan

Modern Iran’s foreign policy should not have come to depend on the precise history of the atrocities against Jews by Christendom over the centuries. But that is what President Ahmadinejad has now, rather ineptly, made it depend on, jeopardising the lives of tens of thousands of his fellow-citizens from destruction caused by a massive and unlawful American, British, Israeli and possibly French attack. He has been quite needlessly provocative enough to allow himself to be painted by the American popular media, unscrupulous and unthinking as that can be, as some kind of Hitler-figure who plans some day to use nuclear bombs on Israel. Iran has been plaintively pleading in official circles that it wishes to use nuclear-power generated electricity at home while exporting its petroleum, that it has a right to do so as a member in good standing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that it has neither wish nor capacity to develop nuclear bombs. But no matter the merits of its position with the IAEA, Iran has succeeded in isolating itself and seems to have almost no official allies on the world’s stage (though China, Russia, Royal Dutch Shell etc all have large investments there!).

The US has detailed contingency plans to attack Iran though no American official or military officer has admitted or stated that any such intention exists. The outlines are an open secret. There would be sudden massive bombing of Iran’s military and general infrastructure, including its assumed nuclear installations. US Marines would make seaborne assaults on Iranian islands to prevent Iran from mining or closing the Straits of Hormuz or from attacking American bases or interests in the Gulf. US Army forces based in Iraq would launch massive long-range artillery and rocket attacks preventing Iranian ground forces attempting to manoeuvre or approach them. There may be an amphibious Anglo-American attack from the Caspian Sea towards Tehran. “Special Forces” by way of spies, saboteurs and agents provocateur would have already been placed within Iran to help targeting and other war-aims.

One aim would be to permanently cripple Iran’s nuclear industry.A second aim would be “regime change” though without any attempt at a large-scale ground occupation of Iran which is recognised as impossible to achieve.The more extreme members of the Bush Administration led by Vice President Cheney aim to see Iran becoming a “failed state”, reversing whatever has taken place by way of nation-building, leaving an emasculated Iran, like an emasculated Iraq, that poses no threat to Israel for the next century and more.

The traditional Christian ethics of a just war are planned to be practically ignored by the United States, and there would not be any formal declaration of war. America’s people either have barely heard of Iran as a place on the map and will mostly continue with their usual lives, or have no idea of the intricacies of the US-Iran relationship in the last 80 years, or have no wish to support their Government machinery’s intent to go to war but have no control over its behaviour.

Three factors have held back an American attack though forces apparently can be made ready within days if not hours of a Presidential order. One has been top military officers, including Admiral Fallon, the head of US Central Command, who have said that Iran’s attempted retaliation on the ground could jeopardize 160,000 US troops now in more than a dozen bases spread across Iraq (besides Israel being threatened by Iran’s Hezbollah ally in Lebanon). A second factor has been the American Jewish community, who have apparently warned that a large bloody counterproductive war against Iran may have negative repercussions on their standing in American society. A third factor has been America’s foreign ministry which knows enough international law, politics and history to realise such aggression would be wholly unlawful, widely condemned by the world, and return the international system to the pre-1914 days of an imperialist free-for-all or destroy it altogether. The UN system would permanently end, and all methods and precedents of international cooperation, law and diplomacy would have been rendered irrelevant and deserving only to be flushed away and forgotten. The UN today seems to be led by an incompetent unknown who will produce even less of a squeak in protest than did his predecessor. Imperialism and Colonialism would return formally except in an age of advanced technology in which some nations have a right and ability to use nuclear weapons in pursuing dominance. The Geneva Conventions and even a medieval right like habeas corpus have already seen breaches; the Vienna Convention and other similar treaties and norms would all be effectively over.The international retrogression may be not merely back to 1914 or 1907 but to the tumult and savagery of Napoleon’s wars which ended with the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Political plan

War-planning aside, what is most interesting is that in recent months the USA has apparently gone back to developing, as an alternative, something like Saddam Hussein’s own strategy for containing Iranian influence! Iraq’s Anbar province sits on vast oil reserves which are not going to be pumped as that would lower the price of oil from its current high near $83 a barrel. It is a Sunni-majority area which has now made its Shias refugees, just as Shia-dominated areas of Baghdad have seen forced evictions of Sunnis. The Sunni tribal chiefs of Anbar are now having their loyalty purchased by the Americans just as Saddam had once done, especially by playing an anti-Iran card as Iran is a common enemy. At the same time, the Bush Administration is hard-pressed to try to persuade Iraq’s Shia majority to resist what might seem the inevitability of Iranian hegemony — which can only be done by reminding them of their Arab anti-Persian roots again just as Saddam had tried to do. Anglo-American policy once was to build up the Arabs against the Turks, then the Pehlavis against the Arabs, then Saddam against the Ayatollahs who had toppled the Pehlavis. Saddam himself was then toppled and killed and now post-Saddam Iraq is being built up against an Islamic Iran that may be struggling in its own way to enter the modern world. Perhaps the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been one flip-flop too many for the USA and UK to cope with over the last century.

Karl Georg Zinn’s 1992 Review of *Philosophy of Economics* Routledge: 1989 (English translation, 1994, by Nihar Bhattacharya).

Review of  Philosophy of Economics  by Karl Georg Zinn

Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Zeitschrift für Wirtschaft und Statistik. Vol. 209, Nr. 5/6 (May 1992), p 573-574

(translated from the German by Nihar Bhattacharya, 1994)

KGZ

daifsa6vwaaxwgp

daiftklv0aaiqj_

“The author intends to discuss some of the central philosophical questions facing modern economic theory. In the foreground is a disposition of the conventional problem of value-independence. Roy sees the value-independence postulate as “Hume’s Scepticism”. He defines Hume’s First and Second Laws on the basis of two signified propositions taken from R. M. Hare.

(1) From positive empirical premises, no normative postulate can be derived; in order to establish obligatory propositions, at least one normative proposition is needed.

(2) In a specified economic context, after all empirical and formal/logical matters are resolved, little scope exists for further intersubjectively valid answers. Valuations beyond this limit are based on the subjective feelings of the economist to the concerned problem.

The scientific/theoretical attitude representative of most economists of the 20th century has been based on this characteristic Humean scepticism. To show this, the author reviews short representative quotations from some of the known names of recent economic theory: Friedman, Myrdal, Lionel Robbins, P. A. Samuelson, Hicks, Joan Robinson, Hayek, Oskar Lange, Schumpeter, Arrow, Blaug, Frank Hahn.

Subsequently, the author raises the point as to what explains this scientific-theoretical approval. A cursory survey of important real and virtual historical developments since antiquity confirms that the essential reason for the reported wide acceptance of a humean position by the economic scientist indeed could have been as a defensive posture against dogmatism and political dictatorship (“It is part of the democratic reaction against medieval authoritarianism” p.45).

Conditioned by their “disgust with the tyrannies and ideologies of the twentieth century”, these authorities tried to protect economic science and guarantee the objectivity of research by resort to moral scepticism.

Hence the author arrives at the starting position of his actual subject: After using Hume to escape from dependence on Plato e tutti quanti, has not value-free economics gotten into a fresh dependence, namely, moral scepticism and its philosophical consequence, moral indifference? Here too a contradiction is shown to arise, namely, that each argumentation against the normative can stand its ground only through normative premises. Thus ultimately something like correct standards become necessary. This however is only a marginal problem compared to a very much more important point: whether the moral scepticism permeating the strict scientific-theoretical position, is not just part of a very much more comprehensive scepticism, which includes Hume’s own criticism of induction as well. But then the same scepticism makes positive theory dubious as well: “Either all of positive economics is attacked with just as much scepticism as anything in normative economics, or we accept one and reject the other when instead there are reasons to think they share the same ultimate grounds and must be accepted or rejected together”(p.47).

The author illustrates the difficulties with radical scepticism in a continental traversal of economic theory: micro and macroeconomics, mathematical economic theory and welfare theory are stations on this tour. A solution of the problem in the strict sense is not given nor could have been expected. But Roy delivers a methodical rule which permits a more exact definition of the limits to which normative discussion can take place precisely and objectively: first, to distinguish always whether an objective answer is at all possible to certain questions, and secondly, to ask who is competent or in the best position to give an answer.

For readers interested in a new, thoroughly subtle discussion of a basic yet customary problem, this book will be profitable reading. However, the author could have argued some matters slightly more elaborately and others less redundantly, and set forth the central idea more clearly through appropriate summaries.”

See also:  https://independentindian.com/thoughts-words-deeds-my-work-1973-2010/introduction-and-some-biography/philosophy-of-economics-on-the-scope-of-reason-in-economic-inquiry-1989/apropos-philosophy-of-economics/
https://independentindian.com/2013/01/31/i-have-a-student-called-suby-roy-reflections-on-frank-hahn-1925-2013-my-master-in-economic-theory/

Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times”

Saving Pakistan: A Physicist/Political Philosopher May Represent Iqbal’s “Spirit of Modern Times”

by Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article, August 13 2007,

Pakistan’s Nobel winning particle physicist Abdus Salam (1926-1996) was, like Pakistan’s most eminent jurist Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), treated badly by his country and compatriots merely because of his religious beliefs as an Ahmadiya/Qadiani. This itself may be an adequate reason for secular thinking when it comes to identifying Pakistan’s or any country’s interests. Pakistan has had eminent poets and writers but there have been no dedicated first-rate technical economists ~ and no serious political philosophers other than, recently, Pervez Hoodbhoy who is a physicist. Most political economy by Pakistanis about Pakistan has tended to be at the level of World Bank bureaucratic reports or traveller’s tales, which have their uses but hardly amount to profound insight or significant scholarship. (We in India also have had numerous minor World Bank/UN bureaucrats, with or without PhDs about anything, passing themselves off as experts on India’s political economy.)

Yet during Pakistan’s present national crisis (and Pakistan has continually faced crises ever since 1947) people must go back to first principles of political economy and ask questions like “Who are we?”; “What are we doing to ourselves?”; “What is our future?” etc ~ questions about national identity and national viability and national purpose.

Abu Dhabi Pact

On 29-30 July, a deal was reportedly struck in Abu Dhabi after a secret face-to-face meeting between Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto: he would stay on as President for five years, she would be PM and Head of Government, have prosecutions against her dropped and get back her enormous frozen wealth. Such would be the intended outcome of the long-touted return to fair competitive elections later this year. The deal was brokered by British, American, Saudi and other go-betweens outside Pakistan, and is an overt way of keeping Musharraf in power while also seeming to allow a large concession by way of the return of a purported symbol of democracy like Benazir.

But Benazir seems out of touch with reality. When she returned two decades ago as a young unmarried woman confronting General Zia ul-Haq, she was a genuine popular hero. Her father’s judicial execution at Zia’s hands was still fresh in public memory, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, no matter how misguided his ideologies, had some makings of a serious modern Pakistani nationalist politician.

Benazir as a middle aged matron is not her father and has lost almost all political credibility with her flip-flopping opportunism, and is now seen merely as a face agreeable to the West. Her good looks were discussed on American TV by the comedian Bill Maher while Musharraf’s publicity agent had him sharing jokes on a rival TV comedy – however, American TV audiences are or should not be a Pakistani constituency.

Benazir also forgets that Zia had set up Nawaz Sharif as an ally of the Pakistan military against her own populism in the late 1980s, just as she is being set up now as an ally of the same military against people like Sharif, Javed Hashmi, Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Imran Khan. Musharraf overthrew Sharif and jailed Hashmi and they are his declared foes; the other two have expressed opinions hostile to Western military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Maulana made a nationalistic overture towards India, while Imran has openly praised Indian democracy despite its faults. But Indian foreign policy has not responded and seems under manifest influence of the Western powers ~ had we felt and thought with genuine independence we could have, for example, easily declared and implemented large-scale humanitarian food-aid from the FCI’s wheat-stocks for the people of Afghanistan and Iraq as was suggested in these pages a year ago.

A Musharraf-Benazir alliance is hardly destined to save Pakistan and will be no more than a cynical example of short-term opportunism: we in India can expect them to use J&K as traditional rhetorical camouflage for their own continuing misgovernance and corruption. As in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, the Western powers face the dilemma that any government they support in Pakistan will be perceived as lacking legitimacy while a genuine hands-off policy could result in legitimate popular governments which seem to Western Governments beyond their control and hence seemingly adverse to Western interests.

The West has long ill-understood Pakistan, partly because it has seen Pakistan merely to be used as a source of convenient military manpower and real-estate for itself as and when necessary. American diplomats were reporting as early as November 1951 that Maulana Maududi’s Jamaat were hostile to the “evils” of Western materialism which they wanted to “do away with root and branch” in the country. In January 1976, American diplomats were reporting Pakistan’s “crash program to develop nuclear weapons”, and by June 1983 that Pakistan was close to nuclear test capability, intended to deter aggression by India “which remains Pakistan’s greatest security concern”. For Islamic revivalism to coincide with nuclear weapons in the last decade has been something long-predictable if there had been adequate will to do so.

Right wing politicians and religious fundamentalists have come to power in countries with nuclear weapons without untoward results, e.g., Likud in Israel or the BJP/RSS in India. (It is America’s present leaders, as well as all main Democrat and Republican presidential candidates except Ron Paul, who have unilaterally threatened nuclear attacks on a non-nuclear country that has not committed aggression against anyone.) There is no obvious reason why an elected legitimate “conservative” or right wing government in Pakistan must come to pose a special nuclear danger to anyone. If it is serious about governance (which Musharraf-Benazir may not be), it may even succeed in finding enough sobriety and political honesty to start to face up to Pakistan’s real economic and social problems which are vast in size and scope.

Wali Allah vs Iqbal

“We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride,” said Wali Allah (1703-1762). Two centuries later, Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), in his 1930 Presidential Speech to the Muslim League in Allahabad conceptualising today’s Pakistan, wished precisely to become free of that Arab influence: “I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.”

That “spirit of modern times” is today represented most prominently in Pakistan by Pervez Hoodbhoy. In a December 2006 speech, Hoodbhoy suggested a new alternative to MA Jinnah’s ”Faith, Unity, Discipline” slogan: “First, I wish for minds that can deal with the complex nature of truth…. My second wish is for many more Pakistanis who accept diversity as a virtue… My third, and last, wish is that Pakistanis learn to value and nurture creativity.” And he has spoken of bringing “economic justice to Pakistan”, of the “fight to give Pakistan’s women the freedom which is their birthright”, and of people to “wake up” and engage politically. We shall witness a most engaging battle if Benazir and her new military friends all representing the jaded and corrupt old political power structures, come to face in the elections a new conservative alliance of people like Sharif, Hashmi, Fazlur Rahman and Imran all infused with Hoodbhoy’s scientific liberalism representing Iqbal’s ”spirit of modern times”.

Martin Buber on Palestine and Israel (with Postscript)

The eminent Zionist scholar and Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) said to  the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore in 1926 that the Jewish purpose should be:

 

“pursuing the settlement effort in Palestine in agreement, nay, alliance with the peoples of the East, so as to erect with them together a great federative structure, which might learn and receive from the West whatever positive aims and means might be learnt and received from it, without, however, succumbing to the influence of its inner disarray and aimlessness.”

 

(This was part of a letter to the New York Times I wrote on January 23 1995 from Scarsdale where I lived at 36 Lynwood Road, the house of an aunt, for two years or so, while working in Greenwich and battling in the Ninth Circuit and US Supreme Court in a battle against racism and corruption that continues to this day.)

 

Postscript January 23 2008:

 

I had lost the reference to these words of Martin Buber.  I have now found them again thanks to Dr Martin Kaempchen:

 

Dear Dr Roy,

The quote by Martin Buber is indeed in my book, viz. in the short essay „A Talk with Tagore“. In my „Rabindranath Tagore and Germany: A Documentation“ (Max Mueller Bhavan, Calcutta 1991), the quotation is on page 96. `The original German essay is titled „Ein Gespräch mit Tagore“ (Martin Buber: Nachlese. Lambert Schneider Verlag, Heidelberg 1965, 202-204.) The English translation is to be found in the periodical „India and Israel”. vols. X/XI, 1950. Special Recognition Issue 15.10.1950, p.18 (no translator mentioned). So, the quotation is not in a letter to Tagore; and the essay was not written in 1926 (when the meeting between Tagore and Buber took place in Prague), but in 1950, as the beginning of the essay bears out. I hope this will help you. With my best wishes, Martin Kaempchen”

An Open Letter to Professor Amartya Sen about Singur etc (2007)

A letter to Prof. Sen (2007)

First published in The Statesman 31 July 2007, Editorial Page Special Article

Professor Amartya Sen, Harvard University

Dear Professor Sen,

Everyone will be delighted that someone of your worldwide stature has joined the debate on Singur and Nandigram; The Telegraph deserves congratulations for having made it possible on July 23.

I was sorry to find though that you may have missed the wood for the trees and also some of the trees themselves. Perhaps you have relied on Government statements for the facts. But the Government party in West Bengal represents official Indian communism and has been in power for 30 years at a stretch. It may be unwise to take at face-value what they say about their own deeds on this very grave issue! Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, and there are many candid communists who privately recognise this dismal truth about themselves. To say this is not to be praising those whom you call the “Opposition” ~ after all, Bengal’s politics has seen emasculation of the Congress as an opposition because the Congress and communists are allies in Delhi. It is the Government party that must reform itself from within sua sponte for the good of everyone in the State.

The comparisons and mentions of history you have made seem to me surprising. Bengal’s economy now or in the past has little or nothing similar to the economy of Northern England or the whole of England or Britain itself, and certainly Indian agriculture has little to do with agriculture in the new lands of Australia or North America. British economic history was marked by rapid technological innovations in manufacturing and rapid development of social and political institutions in context of being a major naval, maritime and mercantile power for centuries. Britain’s geography and history hardly ever permitted it to be an agricultural country of any importance whereas Bengal, to the contrary, has been among the most agriculturally fertile and hence densely populated regions of the world for millennia.

Om Prakash’s brilliant pioneering book The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal 1630-1720 (Princeton 1985) records all this clearly. He reports the French traveller François Bernier saying in the 1660s “Bengal abounds with every necessary of life”, and a century before him the Italian traveller Verthema saying Bengal “abounds more in grain, flesh of every kind, in great quantity of sugar, also of ginger, and of great abundance of cotton, than any country in the world”. Om Prakash says “The premier industry in the region was the textile industry comprising manufacture from cotton, silk and mixed yarns”. Bengal’s major exports were foodstuffs, textiles, raw silk, opium, sugar and saltpetre; imports notably included metals (as Montesquieu had said would always be the case).

Bengal did, as you say, have industries at the time the Europeans came but you have failed to mention these were mostly “agro-based” and, if anything, a clear indicator of our agricultural fecundity and comparative advantage. If “deindustrialization” occurred in 19th Century India, that had nothing to do with the “deindustrialization” in West Bengal from the 1960s onwards due to the influence of official communism.

You remind us Fa Hiaen left from Tamralipta which is modern day Tamluk, though he went not to China but to Ceylon. You suggest that because he did so Tamluk effectively “was greater Calcutta”. I cannot see how this can be said of the 5th Century AD when no notion of Calcutta existed. Besides, modern Tamluk at 22º18’N, 87º56’E is more than 50 miles inland from the ancient port due to land-making that has occurred at the mouth of the Hooghly. I am afraid the relevance of the mention of Fa Hiaen to today’s Singur and Nandigram has thus escaped me.

You say “In countries like Australia, the US or Canada where agriculture has prospered, only a very tiny population is involved in agriculture. Most people move out to industry. Industry has to be convenient, has to be absorbing”. Last January, a national daily published a similar view: “For India to become a developed country, the area under agriculture has to shrink, urban and industrial land development has to take place, and about 100 million workers have to move out from agriculture into industry and services. This is the only way forward for bringing prosperity to the rural population”.

Rice is indeed grown in Arkansas or Texas as it is in Bengal but there is a world of difference between the technological and geographical situation here and that in the vast, sparsely populated New World areas with mechanized farming! Like shoe-making or a hundred other crafts, agriculture can be capital-intensive or labour-intensive ~ ours is relatively labour-intensive, theirs is relatively capital-intensive. Our economy is relatively labour-abundant and capital-scarce; their economies are relatively labour-scarce and capital-abundant (and also land-abundant). Indeed, if anything, the apt comparison is with China, and you doubtless know of the horror stories and civil war conditions erupting across China in recent years as the Communist Party and their businessman friends forcibly take over the land of peasants and agricultural workers, e.g. in Dongzhou.

All plans of long-distance social engineering to “move out” 40 per cent of India’s population (at 4 persons per “worker”) from the rural hinterlands must also face FA Hayek’s fundamental question in The Road to Serfdom: “Who plans whom, who directs whom, who assigns to other people their station in life, and who is to have his due allotted by others?”

Your late Harvard colleague, Robert Nozick, opened his brilliant 1974 book Anarchy, State and Utopia saying: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)”. You have rightly deplored the violence seen at Singur and Nandigram. But you will agree it is a gross error to equate violence perpetrated by the Government which is supposed to be protecting all people regardless of political affiliation, and the self-defence of poor unorganised peasants seeking to protect their meagre lands and livelihoods from state-sponsored pogroms. Kitchen utensils, pitchforks or rural implements and flintlock guns can hardly match the organised firepower controlled by a modern Government.

Fortunately, India is not China and the press, media and civil institutions are not totally in the hands of the ruling party alone. In China, no amount of hue and cry among the peasants could save them from the power of organised big business and the Communist Party. In India, a handful of brave women have managed to single-handedly organise mass movements of protest which the press and media have then broadcast that has shocked the whole nation to its senses.

You rightly say the land pricing process has been faulty. Irrelevant historical prices have been averaged when the sum of discounted expected future values in an inflationary economy should have been used. Matters are even worse. “The fear of famine can itself cause famine. The people of Bengal are afraid of a famine. It was repeatedly charged that the famine (of 1943) was man-made.” That is what T. W. Schultz said in 1946 in the India Famine Emergency Committee led by Pearl Buck, concerned that the 1943 Bengal famine should not be repeated following dislocations after World War II. Of course since that time our agriculture has undergone a Green Revolution, at least in wheat if not in rice, and a White Revolution in milk and many other agricultural products. But catastrophic collapses in agricultural incentives may still occur as functioning farmland comes to be taken by government and industry from India’s peasantry using force, fraud or even means nominally sanctioned by law. If new famines come to be provoked because farmers’ incentives collapse, let future historians know where responsibility lay.

West Bengal’s real economic problems have to do with its dismal macroeconomic and fiscal position which is what Government economists should be addressing candidly. As for land, the Government’s first task remains improving grossly inadequate systems of land-description and definition, as well as the implementation and recording of property rights.

With my most respectful personal regards, I remain

Yours ever

 

Suby

America’s Pakistan-India Policy (2007)

US Pak-India Policy
Delhi & Islamabad Still Look West In Defining Their Relationship

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article,

July 27, 2007

by

Subroto Roy

“Balance of power” between other nations while pursuing one’s own commercial and political self-interest, was the leitmotif of British foreign policy throughout the 19th Century and up until World War I. This came to be broadly absorbed and imitated by US foreign policy-makers afterwards. It remains the clear leitmotif of US policy between and towards Pakistan and India in recent years, especially since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Pakistan’s armed forces have been induced through the usual incentives of modern weapons like F-16s, comfortable officer-visits to US military academies, and hard cash to behave cooperatively with perceived American objectives.

Osama bin Laden
For some bizarre and unknown reason (though it might be as simple as ignorance and thoughtlessness), the USA has made itself believe that arch-enemy Osama bin Laden has remained in the Pashtun areas ever since the American attack took place on the-then Taliban Government in late 2001. The Taliban’s leader Mullah Omar certainly remained there or in Balochistan, but anyone who recalls the reported last conversation between Omar and Osama at the time may well have surmised that Osama was planning a long and permanent trip away from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The present author’s own speculation has been that Osama bin Laden probably moved westwards and has been in a safe and comfortable hideout somewhere in the deserts of North Africa ~ while everyone continues to frantically and ridiculously look for him very far away from where he is.

American policy towards Pakistan has been determined by the parameters of the new policy towards Afghanistan ~ which has been to prop up the Hamid Karzai Government in the hope a pro-American “moderate” “modern” Pashtun like Mr Karzai might one day become a constructive role model for all other Pashtuns, while NATO extends itself “pacifying” any new Pashtun insurgency and attacking poppy-crops on the pattern of the anti-narcotics war in Colombia, and US “Special Forces” continue to look for Osama and friends. Pakistan’s Musharraf has been expected to play along with this, and, in order for him to release and transfer some 80,000 soldiers towards that end, India has been requested not to give him a reason not to want to do so.

General Musharraf was one of the major beneficiaries of the officer-exchange programmes between the US and Pakistan militaries in the past. Like Benazir Bhutto, he is a “known” quantity, well-understood and hence rendered predictable by the American military and diplomatic establishment. Both are also explained and advocated for by their go-betweens, the extremely influential Pakistani bureaucrats within the Washington Beltway and their K-Street lobbyists. Musharraf’s departure to a nice retirement/exile in the USA helped by royalties from his book etc as well as his already-exported son, presumably constitutes a well-planned exit strategy for him personally.

The American problem is that Musharraf may be among the last if not the last of such pliable old-style Pakistani generals ~ the officer-exchange programmes came to slow down or end after the USA pulled out following the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan, and at the same time Zia ul-Haq had initiated an overt Islamisation of younger officers of the Pakistan military. With such a level of uncertainty as to where the post-Musharraf Pakistan military can or would take itself (along with the country and its nuclear weapons), the only strategy has been to buy them out.

In the current Foreign Affairs, Daniel Markey of the US State Department and Council on Foreign Relations says as much (amid the usual little rhetoric about supporting Pakistani democracy): “Washington must win the trust and confidence of Pakistan’s army. This goal can only be achieved through closer working relationships and tangible investments that lock the United States into a long-term commitment to the region” (italics added).

If American policy towards Pakistan has been to pay to pacify Pakistan’s unpredictable nuclear-armed military, the policy towards India has been one of business, business, and more business. The “US-India Business Council” is merely an official Washington lobbyist protecting American business interests in India such as getting the Governments of India and Maharashtra to pay several hundred million dollars over the Dabhol-Enron fiasco. Yet that is where senior Indian politicians, like the Finance and Commerce Ministers, feel the need to routinely visit on pilgrimage if only to be made to feel important while in the USA. Even Dr Manmohan Singh felt the need to send a personal emissary to gift Condoleeza Rice a basket of Indian mangoes not at her office in the US State Department but when she was addressing a closed-door meeting of that business-lobbyist.

Certainly in case of the so-called “nuclear deal”, there is a political motivation on the American side that India must be prevented from conducting future nuclear explosions, although this may be something mostly symbolic as US intelligence agencies had notoriously failed to predict Pokhran I and Pokhran II. And there is doubtless some reliance that the Indian side to the negotiations has not really properly understood the intricacies of the American political and administrative system, e.g. the insignificance of a Presidential “signing statement”. Hence, if the deal goes through as seems likely now, it will certainly indicate the American side is more than comfortable that if a future Indian Government does not do what the US-side has intended in the nuclear deal (whether or not the Indian negotiators have understood that now), a future US Congress and President will be able to reverse the deal without too much difficulty.

What has mainly driven the deal on the American side is the prospect of very large nuclear business ~ specifically, that India will import six to eight American lightwater reactors. As I have said before in these pages, India’s national energy outlook will barely improve through the nuclear deal (given the miniscule size of the nuclear sector compared to coal and hydro), though a few favoured metros, and Delhi for sure, may see improvement after a decade or two when and if these expensive nuclear reactors become operational.

Short-sightedness
The short-sightedness and indeed sheer imbecility of Indian and Pakistani foreign policy is made clear by the fact we are unable to properly communicate with one another about our common interests as neighbouring countries with the same history and geography except through Washington. The elites of both countries have either fled already or would like to flee or at least travel to the USA to visit their exported adult children as often as possible. It is not dissimilar to our imperial relationship with Britain, where Indians had to travel to London to have their Round Table Conference, England being of course a place of national pilgrimage as the USA has now become. The result is not merely that the militaries and polities of Pakistan and India have wasted vast immeasurable resources in struggles against one another and continue to do so, but also and as importantly, have failed to define robust national identities after six decades.

 

Has America Lost? War Doctrines of Kutusov vs Clausewitz May Help Explain Iraq War

Has America Lost?
War Doctrines Of Kutusov vs Clausewitz May Help Explain Iraq War

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page, Special Article, July 3 2007, http://www.thestatesman.net

By Subroto Roy

Has the United States lost the war in Iraq? How would we tell if it has or not? If American commanding officers of general rank, once they go into retirement, say the Iraq war is lost or if the vast majority of the American people say it is not worth fighting, does that mean the USA has lost? When someone loses someone else wins ~ there are no “draws” or runners-up in war. If America has lost, does that mean Saddam won? How can a man who was hanged in sight of the whole world win a war from beyond his grave? It is all very strange in this most abominable of all wars.

Battle of Borodino

In the Battle of Borodino in 1812, the Russians under Marshall Mikhail Kutusov withdrew and the French held the field of battle at end of day ~ the single bloodiest day of warfare in modern times with between 66,500 and 125,000 casualties including several dozen generals. Though the French won, it signalled the end of French power and fall of Napoleon. Borodino was a Pyrrhic victory.

Marshall Kutusov, against his generals’ advice, and courting extreme unpopularity with St Petersburg, continued to withdraw after Borodino and declined to give battle to defend Moscow itself. His remaining forces and most of the civilian population withdrew beyond Moscow. The city was emptied and allowed to burn. The French took it without a fight, Napoleon entered and tried to feel himself its ruler, his generals tried to create a cooperative local government from among the remaining residents.

Kutusov waited, waited and waited some more without giving battle. Then one day, some months later, just as Kutusov had been praying, news came that Napoleon and the French had gotten up and left. Napoleon’s retreat was the biggest catastrophe his Grande Armée suffered, and they were harassed by Russian attacks all the way to the border.

Saddam was reported to have had two Russian generals advising his army, who quietly left before the Anglo-American attack occurred. Russian generals learn about Kutusov on mother’s knee. Even Stalin invoked Kutusov’s name when his 1939 pact with Hitler had failed and Hitler attacked Russia on 22 June 1941. (Iraq had both Nazi and Soviet influences: Stalin tried to appease Hitler in June 1941 by recognising the then pro-Nazi Government of Iraq.)

Saddam’s propaganda spokesmen in the early stages of the March 2003 invasion alluded to a Kutusov-like defensive doctrine: “the US and British administrations have depended on their strategy and planning based on the information obtained from the traitors, whom they call opposition, and from some intelligence services of some Arab countries…. They said: ‘Let some missiles be fired for the maximum of three days and then everything would be over.’ Therefore, we find them in a state of confusion. They prevent the media from having access to the facts about the military operations under security pretexts. They say that they are heading towards Baghdad and that they covered more than 160 or 180 km towards Baghdad. I would like to tell them, that in the course that they are following, let them continue up to 300 km and let them mobilise all the tanks and marines they have, and we will not clash with them soon. We will give them enough time. However, in any contact with any Iraqi village or city, they will find what they are now witnessing in Umm Qasr and Suq al-Shuyukh.” Iraq’s Army did a vanishing act, men and materials disappeared, Baghdad fell without fighting.

By contrast, the USA has followed textbook doctrines from Baron Clausewitz’s On War ~ a work influenced by Napoleon’s successful campaigns though Clausewitz himself fought at Borodino as part of Kutusov’s armies. Like Napoleon and now the Americans, Clausewitz was unable to reconcile his notion of war as aggression and destruction with his notion of war as a means of politics. Clausewitz’s “Absolute War” is “an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will…as each side in war tries to dominate the other, there arises a reciprocal action which must escalate to an extreme”. Hence “disarming or destruction of the enemy … or the threat of this…must always be the aim in warfare”. But Clausewitz’s “Real War” sees war as “a political act… an effective political instrument, a continuation of political commerce and a carrying out of this by other means”

What we may have been witnessing ever since the Bush/Blair attack on Iraq is the outcome of a clash between the doctrines of Clausewitz on the American side and Kutusov on the Iraqi/ Russian side.

American forces began with “Shock and Awe”, followed by disbanding Iraq’s Army and banning the Baathists. Then came “Light Footprint” or “War Tourism”, where American forces left their bases only for specific jaunts outside, while attempting to create a new “Iraqi” Army in an American image. Recently, the purported strategy has changed again to “Clear, Hold, Build” requiring the current infantry “surge” of 30,000 extra troops to try to pacify specific Baghdad neighbourhoods and then “build” political institutions.

Thirty years ago, Professor WB Gallie pointed to the contradiction Clausewitz had been unable to reconcile: “All commentators are agreed that Clausewitz’s greatest difficulty was to explain the relationship between (Absolute War and War as a Political Instrument)”, Philosophers of peace and war, Cambridge Univesity Press 1978. War-making as destruction and war-making as politics are incompatible. The cruelties of Iraq may explain and demonstrate the root of this contradiction most clearly: defeated, disarmed and destroyed victims of an Absolute War are hardly going to feel themselves agreeable to then being manipulated into any political institutions or agreements designed by the perpetrators of the violence. You cannot declare “Absolute War” on Fallujah, kill or arrest every able-bodied male citizen there, and then expect Fallujah’s women, children and old people to participate happily in town hall meetings you wish them to hold. “America has lost because it has not behaved like a great nation”, said one ordinary Iraqi initially in favour of Saddam’s overthrow. America’s retired generals are saying Iraq has been America’s greatest strategic defeat.

Resistance

The result of the clash between the two doctrines of war has been 30,000 American casualties (dead and wounded at about 1:8), while Iraqi dead exceed 650,000 with millions more wounded, rendered homeless or made refugees. Future historians may speak of a genocide having occurred in Iraq.

Did Saddam win if the Americans have lost? Of course not. Iraq had its Mir Jafars, and Saddam was at most a Shiraj, not even that given his odious past. Iraq now has its Tippus, Bhagat Singhs and Khudi Rams as well.

“The Resistance is the natural reaction to any occupation. All occupations in history faced a resistance. Occupation is not for developing people and making them better. It is for humiliating people, and chaining them and taking their freedom and fortunes away. These are my convictions which make me feel that this occupation is an insult to me and my people.” Such was what an anonymous Resistance officer told the Australian journalist Michael Ware.

It seems impossible for one nation to govern another in the 21st Century. The cycle of imperialism followed by nationalism and socialism/ communism may merely restart. What Iraq needs urgently is for its Tilaks, Gokhales, Jinnahs, Gandhis, Jawaharlals and Vallabhais to arise, or it may be condemned to extinction and being consumed by its neighbours. As for the United States, its military may find a need to revise its war doctrines.

American Turmoil: A Vice-Presidential Coup — And Now a Grassroots CounterRevolution?

American Turmoil: A Vice-Presidential Coup – And Now a Grassroots CounterRevolution?

First published in

The Statesman, Editorial Page, Special Article June 18 2007

by

Subroto Roy

The Cold War was lost by Soviet and East European communism, and the laurelled victor was the USA along with its loyal allies. Russia and East Europe then transformed themselves. Once there had been Dubcek in the Prague Spring and Sakharov in his apartment. Then there was Lech Walesa the electrician, who, on 14 August 1980, climbed over a fence and led an 18-day strike from which arose the first independent trade union ~ Walesa said “the very basic things: he stood on the shipyard gate and called things by their real names”. Then came Gorbachov and Yeltsin. The despised Berlin Wall was smashed into small saleable bits in November 1989 and people just walked across. That was the end of communism. An unknown student stood down the tanks in Tiananmen Square — though a dozen years earlier the death-watch of Chinese communism had begun with Wei Jingsheng’s “Democracy Wall”. Communist apparatchiks everywhere (except New Delhi and Kolkata) started to unlearn communism; communist societies and economies began to be placed on a road to health and taken off the road to misery.

Winner’s curse

What happened to the victors? Germany quietly unified. Italy’s politics stabilised a little. France achieved its wish of being undominated in Europe. Britain, already forlorn from loss of empire, was left trying to arbitrage between Europe and America (though there too there was new competition from the Irish Republic).

Some political learning, reconciliation and growth took place in Europe but there was none in America ~ the biggest victor of all, the one country but for whose efforts all of Europe might have become and remained communist. Instead, the USA chose to gorge itself on self-accolades, bloated, then started to choke on its own hubris.

The result is that as the 2008 Presidential election campaign gets underway, and the Second Iraq War is at its peak, America’s polity at its highest level may be in turmoil of a sort not seen since the student revolts at the peak of the Vietnam War.

Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were an interregnum after the Vietnam and Watergate traumas. It was during the Reagan “restoration” that communism collapsed and Osama bin Laden was befriended. Carter’s military mission to rescue American hostages in Iran notoriously failed; Reagan restored American pride by sending in the US Army’s crack Rangers to defeat an almost non-existent enemy ~ in Grenada. It was the first successful American military action in a long time. But there was also failure in Beirut where Reagan withdrew after 241 US soldiers were killed by a suicide-bomber.

George Bush Sr glided into the Presidency in Reagan’s wake. He felt sure of being re-elected when Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait gave him a war with which to seal his chances. For his part, Saddam had primly and properly called in the US Ambassador to Iraq, the top career diplomat April Glaspie, and told her he had accounts to settle with Kuwait over the Iran-Iraq war. Glaspie, under instructions of the Bush-Baker State Department, famously told him the USA had no opinion on inter-Arab conflicts. Saddam took this to be a green signal, or at least not a red signal, from America and went ahead with his attack on Kuwait.

The American President worked himself into an angry indignation ~ and soon there were large numbers of American troops in Saudi Arabia, soon Iraq was forced to retreat with thousands slaughtered in a turkey-shoot from the air, soon there would be severe sanctions and bombings by the USA and UK. Bush was sure he would be re-elected in 1992, and indeed he led all the polls ~ except an oddball surprise Ross Perot pulled away his votes, and caused the third man running, a young governor of a minor State, to push through to victory instead. Bill Clinton was as surprised as anyone that he was President of the USA in 1992. Dissimulation and mendacity reached new heights during his time yet he came to be re-elected in 1996.

Osama bin Laden started to rant against his former ally. Remove your troops from our holy land, he said. Clinton and Madelaine (“It’s worth it”) Albright continued to bomb Saddam instead ~ who after all had launched a few backward Scuds at Israel during the First Iraq War of 1991. Somehow or other, Osama and/or someone else then designed the destruction of Manhattan’s tallest buildings on September 11 2001; it remains unclear what projectile hit the Pentagon or exactly what happened over a field in Pennsylvania the same morning. The mass murder of thousands remains unsolved.

America, under Bush’s elder son, attacked Osama’s hosts in Afghanistan (but not so as to upset their common Pakistani friends too much), then turned their really motivated firepower against their old foe, Saddam Hussein. Iraq by the summer of 2003 was destroyed as a nation-state, and today in 2007 under American occupation has been almost wholly destroyed as a culture and a society. The new US Embassy in Baghdad is as large as the Vatican. Fourteen permanent American military bases have been built. The US Government has spoken of moving troops from Saudi Arabia to Iraq, and of being in Iraq for ever on the Korean pattern.

United States history and political culture had never seen a Vice President as being anything more than an invisible silent shadow of the President of the land. That has changed drastically. Indeed in recent months there has been much serious Washington talk of the incumbent Vice President having unlawfully usurped political power from the President himself. Cheney’s people throughout the Bush Administration have been in almost open battle against the official foreign and diplomatic policy of Condoleeza Rice and the professional military represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before the attack on Iraq they had overturned the CIA’s official intelligence assessments. There is a general perception that Cheney’s people have been far shrewder and more experienced of the Washington Beltway than Bush’s.

Attack on Iran?

Now the central issue has been whether to attack Iran, and if so how and when. Cheney’s people and their think-tank friends are determined America must do so, perhaps with a new Netanyahu Government in Israel early in 2008 or sooner. The President was apparently warned by his generals in December 2006 that such an attack would gravely endanger the supply lines of US troops who would face a Shia insurrection in Iraq; that may have been the sole reason no attack occurred, and also one reason for the present infantry “surge”. Three aircraft carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf indicate a potential strike, and that level of force has been coming and going from there for months.

The main Democratic Presidential candidates, especially Mrs Clinton, have said nuclear weapons are “not off the table” in reference to striking Iran without provocation. Nine out of ten of the Republican Presidential candidates agree. The exception is Ron Paul who has recognised the United States was not intended by its founders to be launching aggressive nuclear war against non-nuclear countries in the 21st Century. The Reagan-era economist Paul Craig Roberts has said such war will leave America more reviled than Hitler’s Third Reich.

A grassroots democratic counter-revolution could be starting to overturn the elitist coup d’etat that may have occurred in Washington. “People power” beat organised State power in many times and places. Can it win here? Or could there be tanks in Dupont Circle forty years after the tanks in Wenceslas Square?

Home Team Advantage (2007)

Home Team Advantage

On US-Iran talks and Sunni-Shia subtleties: Tehran must transcend its revolution and endorse the principle that the House of Islam has many mansions

First published in The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page, Special Article, June 3 2007


By SUBROTO ROY

On Monday 28 May in Baghdad,the American and Iranian Governments held their first official face-to-face talks in some 26 or 27 years. This sheer fact is a good thing. For more than two years there has been incessant sabre-rattling and gunboat diplomacy by the USA against Iran, as well as provocative words and deeds by Iran’s President against America’s Israeli ally (though it is apparently false his words included saying he wished Israel “wiped off the map”). Palmerston said there are no permanent allies among nations. The last unofficial transactions had to do with the notorious “Iran-contra” affair which blighted Ronald Reagan’s second term as President. Iran was sold American weapons from Israel (yes, the same Iran and same Israel) for use against Iraq (the same Saddam’s Iraq which had been Rumsfeld’s friend and which apparently received American intelligence and logistics help against yes, the same Iran); the moneys the Americans received were then used to pay for anti-Sandinista “contra” forces in Nicaragua (so they could, for example, buy American weapons too). Apart from that unofficial and embarrassing “Iran-contra” affair, the American and Iranian Governments had not had face-to-face discussion since diplomatic relations broke in 1980 during the “hostage crisis”.

Arthur Millspaugh, an American invited by the Iranians to help their public finances, once wrote: “Persia cannot be left to herself, even if the Russians were to keep their hands off politically.… Persia has never yet proved its capacity for independent self-government.” The title of his 1925 book America’s Task in Persia reflected the old paternalist attitude that an imperialist power must necessarily know better than local people what happens to be in their interest in the way a parent knows better than a child. Even that otherwise great libertarian JS Mill himself once suggested that contact with a “superior people” allowed rapid advancement. India’s “Lenin Peace Prize” winner and Soviet sympathiser KPS Menon Sr (grandfather of our present top diplomat) said the same after the 1979 invasion and occupation by the USSR of Afghanistan. Nationalists of all colours and times ~ from Tom Paine, Patrick Henry (“Give me liberty or give me death”) and George Washington to Bal Gangadhar Tilak (“Swaraj is my birthright and I shall have it”), Ho Chi Minh and Ayatollah Khomeini ~ would disagree.

Indeed, in the Iranian case, the Khomeini Revolution was the antithesis of the imperialist doctrine. But Iranian revolutionaries then seized the American Embassy on 4 November 1979 and took 66 hostages. Thirteen women and black Americans were released two weeks later; one man was released due to ill-health in July 1980. In a failed attempt to rescue the remaining 52, eight American military personnel died on 25 April 1980. The 52 hostages, including two women and one black, were released on 20 January 1981 under the “Algiers Accord”, a day before Reagan became President. Even if the US Embassy in Tehran had been a den of spies, as the Iranians claimed, the Revolutionary Government could have ordered them all to leave and ended diplomatic relations.

Instead hostages were taken in deliberate violation of international law. The United States Government under duress on 19 January 1981 had to sign the “Algiers Accord”, the first point of which stated: “Non-Intervention in Iranian Affairs: The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” That was the “blowback” from the coup d’etat against Iran’s democratic government under Mossadeq in 1953 which the CIA had engineered. Modern US-Iran relations have been about two wrongs ~ indeed multiple wrongs ~ not making a right.

From Algiers until the Baghdad meeting there was no official interaction between the USA and Iran (besides the Iran-contra affair and American relief supplies during an Iranian earthquake). The present US-Iran talks had to do with the catastrophic mess in Iraq, and were held via the current Al-Maliki Government of Iraq which is beholden to both as patrons.

Saddam’s Iraq had been officially secular not an “Islamic Republic”. But its Baathist national-socialism (with yes, a few silly Nazi aspects) had been populated mostly by Saddam’s fellow Sunnis, and there was some vicious anti-Shia persecution.
Doctrinally, the Sunni-Shia conflict may have originated during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime. “In the words of al-Baghdadi, a Sunni is one who believes in the creation of the universe, the unity and pre-existence of its Maker, the apostolate of Muhammad, recognizes and observes the duties of the five prayers, fast of Ramazan, poor-rate and pilgrimage, and does not adulterate his faith with an abominable innovation which leads to heresy.” (Imtiaz Ahmad in Grewal ed. Religious Movements and Institutions in Medieval India, p.277). Shias claim that exegetical authorities, both Sunni and Shia, record the Prophet on 10 March 632 AD at the pool of Ghadir “while returning from his last pilgrimage to Mecca… delivered his farewell address” in which he declared Ali ibn Abi Talib his successor (S. Ali Nadeem Rezavi, ibid., p. 281). No logical contradiction between Sunnis and Shias seems obvious from this.

But there also have been racial and cultural aspects to the division. Arabs, though not Iraqi Arabs, are mostly Sunni while Iranians are mostly Shia. At the same time, Persian culture and history has had incorrigibly Zoroastrian roots just as Egypt was the land of the Pharoahs and Arabia of Meccan paganism. Mesopotamian culture has had Sumerian and Babylonian roots, and Indian Islam has grown among the cultures of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Intra-Muslim conflict will be reduced only when it becomes generally recognised that the House of Islam has had many mansions.

Saddam’s war against Khomeini’s Iran was not a religious war but one between two putative nation-states. In Iraqi junior schools during the war, a class of 40 pupils could be divided by academic merit such that the top 20 would play brave Iraqis in the school-play ~ the hapless bottom 20 had to play the wicked Persians, leaving them in tears as well as in simulated defeat.

What the current US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq has quite deliberately accomplished is the destruction of Iraq as a putative nation-state and the fanning of mostly suppressed Shia-Sunni differences instead. The idea of “regime-change” in Teheran in the old way of the CIA coup against Mossadeq also has not been far from Anglo-American thinking in the current confrontation with Iran. “Who lost Iran?” was an American political slogan in the 1980s, and there are day-dreamers in Washington think-tanks today who have fantasies of Iran being run by compliant “Iranian-American” émigrés from Los Angeles. But instead the destruction of Saddam’s regime inevitably has led to Iran’s strengthening, as all Iraqi Shia forces made dominant as a result are, at least from a doctrinal standpoint within Islam, united with Tehran to greater or lesser degree. A new Iraq-Iran war is hard to imagine as along as Shias dominate Baghdad’s Government. Iran for its part needs to demonstrate that it has transcended its revolution and that it unequivocally endorses the principle that the House of Islam has many mansions.

The British and Americans are great lovers of sports and inventors of many modern games played on fields around the world, from cricket and soccer to basketball. Their Governments seem to have forgotten in their foreign policy theorising that there is such a thing as “home-team advantage”. Imperialists ultimately can never defeat nationalists, because, at the end of the day, imperialists have to either go home or (as Conrad and Coppola knew) “go native”. In the new Iran-USA talks, both sides may have sensed Iran has the home-team advantage. The most the United States can do to Iran is bomb it and leave.

 

On Indian Nationhood (2007)

On Indian Nationhood
From Tamils To Kashmiris And Assamese And Mizos To Sikhs And Goans

First published in The Statesman, Editorial Page

May 25 2007

By Subroto Roy

In the decades before 1947, imperialist critics of Indian nationalism accused the movement of being less about creating Indian nationhood than about supplanting British rule with local Indian oligarchies. Sydenham, for example, in the upper house of Britain’s Parliament in August 1918, gleefully quoted from the “Madras Dravidian Hindu Association” (forerunners of today’s DMK etc): “We shall fight to the last drop of our blood any attempt to transfer the seat of authority in this country from British hands to so-called high-caste Hindus, who have ill-treated us in the past and will do so again but for the protection of British laws.” Also quoted were “Namasudras of Bengal”, allegedly numbering “ten million men”, protesting “gross misrepresentation” by “so-called high-caste leaders” of the desirability of “Home Rule or self-government”. Besides caste and class there was always religion too by which India’s inhabitants could be classified and divided, and it must have delighted Sydenham to quote the “South Indian Islamic League” saying “Nothing should be done which will weaken British authority in any manner whatsoever, and hand over the destinies of the Moslem community to a class which has no regard for their interests and no respect for their sentiments”.

Home Rule League

Sydenham was attacking the Montagu-Chelmsford Report which had stated that India had “a core of earnest men who believe sincerely and strive for political progress; around them a ring of less educated people to whom a phrase or a sentiment appeals; and an outside fringe of those who have been described as attracted by curiosity to this new thing, or who find diversions in attacking a big and very solemn Government as urchins might take a perilous joy at casting toy darts at an elephant.”

Annie Besant, herself an Englishwoman, was, along with BG Tilak and MA Jinnah, a pioneer of Indian nationalism at the time and headed the new Indian Home Rule League on the Irish pattern. The League stated its membership at 52,000. Sydenham multiplied that by five and asked if a quarter million could purport to rule 244 millions in an Indian democracy. Where, he demanded, was the “voice that cannot yet be heard, the voice of the peoples of India”? The imperialist jibe was that the British Raj would be replaced at best by a “Vakil Raj” of “high-caste” Hindus and at worst by anarchy and bloodshed.

Thirty years later India’s was partitioned and independent under Attlee’s Labour Party. Churchill took over the imperialist mantle and found solace in the new India agreeing to remain in Britain’s “Commonwealth”, saying that India doing so as a Republic did not impair “the majesty of the Crown or the personal dignity of the King”.

The ghosts of Churchill and Sydenham today would heartily cheer our Republic’s current President APJ Abdul Kalam agreeing to receive the “King Charles II Medal” from the Royal Society, and our current PM Manmohan Singh accepting honorary British degrees also while in office. Britain’s Crown Prince has proposed a cricket match between India and Pakistan to mark the 60th anniversary of 1947, and what, after all, could be less inappropriate to mark the event in British eyes? All that Indian nationalism would have been firmly put in its place.

Now Pakistan mostly goes unmentioned in the history of Indian nationalism because the new Pakistanis as of 14 August 1947 hardly felt or even wished to be independent of the British. Instead they longed only to acquire control over any kind of Muslim-majority Government that they could, and as much of the resources and joint military assets of the old India they could get their hands on.

The Kashmir dispute and India-Pakistan conflict have not been ones between Hindus and Muslims, regardless of what the BBC, CNN etc make themselves believe. As much as for any other reason, Kashmir escalated out of control because of British irresponsibility during the process of disintegration of the old Indian Army between the two new Dominions. Newly demobilised Mirpuri soldiers who had formed loyal British battalions were drawn into the cycle of Partition-related communal violence and reprisals in Punjab, which inevitably spilt over into Jammu and culminated in the attack on J&K State that commenced from Pakistan’s NWFP in October 1947 ~ plunging J&K into civil war with Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s National Conference allied to the new secular India and Sardar Ibrahim’s Muslim Conference allied to the new and soon to be Islamic Pakistan. Field Marshal Auchinlek, the Supreme Commander of both Indian and Pakistani Armed Forces, had the decency to resign and abolish the so-called “Supreme Command” as soon as he realised his own forces were at war with one another.

It would not be too inaccurate to say Pakistan and Britain continued in a neo-colonial relationship throughout the 1950s and 1960s ~ all the way until Ayub Khan (who had been warmly entertained at Chequers during the Christine Keeler-Profumo matter), overplayed his hand by attacking India in 1965. That war followed by the East Pakistan cyclone in 1969 brought to a head the inherent political contradictions of the Pakistani state accumulated until that time, and soon led to Bangladesh’s creation in 1971. Britain has had no real interest in Bangladesh but as Pakistan had allowed dual nationality with Britain, Britain found itself with a lot of Bangladeshi immigrants whose “Indian” restaurants give modern Britons today something to look forward to every weekend.

Britain and its American ally continued to have deep interests in Pakistan, mostly because of the geopolitical importance of Pakistani real estate and the generally obsequious and compliant nature of the Pakistani military and diplomatic elite. All that began to change fundamentally when the real declaration of Pakistani independence occurred in the world with the AQ Khan nuclear bombs exploding in 1998 followed by the September 11 2001 attacks upon the USA.

Nationalism today

As for ourselves in India, we have developed some coherent and recognisable design of a modern political economy with a Union Government and more than two dozen State Governments, and we have abolished the imperialist lackeys known as the “princes”. Our Governments at Union and State levels change peacefully by periodic elections under the 1950 Constitution. This in itself would be seen as an astonishing democratic achievement relative to where we were one hundred years ago at the time of the Morley-Minto policies. Thanks to Jawaharlal Nehru, we have had universal franchise since 1952 (at a time when the USA still had its Jim Crow laws against black citizens) ~ yet the imperialist jibe of an infinitesimally small elite purporting to represent hundreds of millions of India’s people remains to be addressed.

It would be interesting to know how many descendants of the 52,000 members of Annie Besant’s Home Rule League remain in India and how many have emigrated to the USA, Britain, Australia etc. The children of our top military, bureaucratic, business, professional and academic elite have cheerfully led an exodus out of the country. E.g. the son of a former commanding general of the Indian Army’s Artillery Regiment is now a British businessman and member of Tony Blair’s new House of Lords. Indian Nationhood in the 21st Century no longer has to include Bangladeshis and Pakistanis who have ended up seeking to develop their own nationalisms, but it remains hard enough to try to include everyone else ~ from Tamils to Kashmiris and from Assamese and Mizos to Sikhs and Goans. Cleaning up our government accounting and sorting out our public finances nationwide so as to establish a sound money for everyone to use for the first time in sixty or seventy years, is among the first steps in defining our common goals as an independent nation.

(Postscript: The original text stated Independence and Paritition came “forty years” after the only date mentioned until that point in the text, which is of the 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford period.   Unconsciously, I was counting from the Morley-Minto period of 1906-1908 which was the constitutional precedent to Montagu-Chelmsford.)

India and “Energy Security”

First published in India’s Energy Security edited by Anant Sudarshan and Ligia Noronha, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi 2007

“On the Political Economy of India’s Energy Policy: One Citizen’s Viewpoint”

by

Subroto Roy

For the idea of “energy security” to have meaning, “energy insecurity” must hold meaning as well.  Looking back a generation, the average American, European and  Japanese citizen became anxious and insecure when the cartel power of the oil exporting countries was first exercised, and energy prices quadrupled.   The idea of the US Government accumulating a “strategic reserve” of petroleum originated due to the oil crisis, and amounted to no more than a buffer-stock or commodity price-stabilisation scheme so “cheap gasoline” could be had always, and lifestyles would not be suddenly inconvenienced, and hence presidential popularity ratings would not suddenly drop.

In many ways energy insecurity has been a creation of bad design.  Hawaii is a good example of this.  Hawaii’s renowned climate is cooled by the magnificent trade-winds which blow all year long except in September.   Architecture suitable to those trade-winds would have created homes a few stories high with windows which could be opened.   Instead, Honolulu has become a city of high-rises and skyscrapers in the middle of the Pacific Ocean — many with New York-style permanently closed windows and centralised airconditioning.

Energy Insecurity, and hence Energy Security, may be notions mostly relevant to advanced Western economies.  North American, European and Japanese homes, lifestyles, architectures and urban sprawls are all highly capital-intensive and inelastically dependant on domestic or imported energy.   The reason a vague undefined notion of “Energy Security” tends to make New Delhi anxious is because many inside the Delhi Beltway live in dreamlands or fantasy-worlds where they would like to imitate Western lifestyles in their personal lives.    But New Delhi is not Europe or America and certainly India is not New Delhi.

There are hundreds of millions of Indians in rural India.  What is the appropriate National Energy Policy for them?   It quite simply is for there to be genuine electrification of India’s 600,000 villages (where more than 70% of the rural Indian population still have no electric lighting even according to Government data), as well as better trains, better all-weather feeder-roads to reach bus routes and primary schools, and conditions to arise for technological change and normal prosperity among ordinary people, so those who are today transporting a whole family of four on a bicycle, are able in a few years to do so on a motor-scooter, and some years after that perhaps in a small private car.      Economic theory speaks of preferences, resources and technologies.   Preferences define and give rise to the demand-side; resources and technologies define and give rise to the supply-side.   Relative prices (which include interest-rates, reflecting the force of the present relative to the future) tend to intermediate equilibria between demand and supply conditions.    In policy-making, private preferences for public goods and services must somehow become translated through a tolerable political process into reasonable public preferences.   It must have seemed a good idea privately to someone to create skyscrapers with closed windows in Honolulu forgetting the trade winds and ignoring the energy-dependence of the Hawaiian Islands, yet in retrospect that may seem to have been publicly unwise.   Similarly, India is a coal-abundant coal-exporting and diesel-importing country yet we got rid of all our steam locomotives and replaced these with diesel engines – if there were enough reasons to do so, I at least remain ignorant of what they were.   One problem with our energy policy-making that has emerged in the current nuclear deal-making with American businessmen and politicians, is that it has seemed to lack rational assessments being made of relative costs and benefits in the Indian case of nuclear/fossil fuel/renewable energy, especially hydroelectric energy.  Indeed it reveals the same lack of transparency as other policy-making in this country – like the $12 billion worth of commercial aircraft from Boeing and Airbus bought for our bankrupt nationalized airlines.

Moving from preference-formation to resources and technologies, it will be recalled that no economist of any school of thought anywhere ever backed the Club of Rome/“Limits to Growth” idea a generation ago that mankind was doomed in some sense to run out of resources.   There are always alternatives, each with a relative cost attached to it, and there are always new and unpredictable opportunities and ingenuities arising which dynamically change the set of alternatives on offer at a given time.   Prices and costs tend to adjust when possible to make myriad individual decisions consistent with one another, and in fact, futures, forward and option markets for petroleum products are among the most active and well-traded that there are in the world.  Design improvements in nuclear reactors will also improve productivity; e.g.  “fast breeder” reactors “breed” more fissile material than they use, and may get 100 times as much energy from a kilogram of uranium as existing reactors do.    We in India also have one innovatively designed thorium reactor under construction.

Coming to the nuclear deal, the plausible part of the Government of India’s official line on the Indo-US nuclear deal is that removing these international restrictions will — through importation of new technologies, inputs, fuel etc — improve the functioning of the 14 existing nuclear plants that are going to be designated as “civilian”.   However, those purchasing decisions involved in enhancing India’s efficiency gains must be made by the Government’s nuclear scientists on technical grounds of improving the working of our existing nuclear infrastructure.

It would be a different animal altogether to be purchasing new nuclear reactors on a turnkey basis from American, French or any other foreign businessmen in a purported attempt to improve India’s “energy security”.   The central question over such massive foreign purchases no longer would be the technical one of using the Indo-US deal to improve efficiency or productivity of our existing inefficient and even crippled nuclear infrastructure.   Instead it would become a question of calculating social costs and benefits of our newly investing in nuclear power relative to other sources like hydroelectric power.   The contribution of nuclear power to India’s electricity production has been close to negligible.  Among India’s energy sources, the largest growth-potential has remained hydroelectric.  Even if all other sources of electricity remained constant, and our civilian nuclear capacity alone was made to grow by 100% under the deal that Dr Manmohan Singh and Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia have been promoting, that would still make up less than 8% of total Indian electricity produced.

In 2004, the International Energy Agency’s estimated that the new energy capacity required by rising economic growth in 2020 will derive 1400 GW from burning coal (half of it in China and India), 470 GW from burning oil, 430 GW from hydro, and 400 GW from renewable sources like solar or wind power.  Because gas prices are expected to remain low worldwide, construction of new nuclear reactors for electricity will mostly remain  unprofitable.   By 2030, new energy expected to be required worldwide is 4700 GW, of which only 150 GW is expected from new nuclear plants which in any case will replacing existing plants due to be retired.   I am afraid the thought cannot be avoided that a proper cost-benefit analysis may reveal that the reason why potential American, French and other sellers of new nuclear reactors to India are becoming so keen on India using civilian nuclear energy is that they are unable to sell these reactors under free market principles elsewhere in the world  economy.    There is enough circumstantial evidence that the current nuclear deal-making has been promoted mostly by big business lobbies and has had little to do with anything else.    The nuclear deal was promoted by the US-India Business Council and the US-India CEO Forum. The Confederation of Indian Industry registered as an official lobbyist in Washington, and went about spending half a million dollars lobbying American politicians for the nuclear deal.  After President Bush’s visit to India, the US Foreign Commercial Service reportedly said American engineering firms, equipment suppliers and contractors faced a $1,000 billion opportunity in India, and the US Chamber of Commerce said the nuclear deal can cause $100 billion worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone.

If the Indo-US nuclear deal helps India improve or maintain its existing nuclear infrastructure, well and good.  If in fact the underlying motivation of the local and foreign business lobbies driving the deal has been to sell India nuclear reactors on a turnkey basis at a time when nuclear energy is uneconomical elsewhere in the world because of low gas prices, then India’s ordinary citizens may demand to know from the Government whether the deal is principally aimed at allowing such importation of new nuclear reactors, and if so, why such an expensive alternative is being considered.  Thus must include a realisation that while the transactions, organisation and political costs of getting new hydroelectric power investments off the ground are high, it is hydroelectric and not nuclear power where India’s real future potential exists.   As a general rule, I put it to you that we need to be less worried about “Energy Security” anywhere and more worried about thoughtless irresponsible corrupt governments everywhere.     There is no shortage of energy or resources as such anywhere in the world; what should be making us feel insecure is the shortage of  wisdom in political decision-making.  That there is everywhere.

Mob Violence and Psychology (2006)

Mob Violence and Psychology

Mob violence remains a monthly occurrence in modern India; it gives the lie to our claims of political maturity and democratic development.

By SUBROTO ROY

First published in The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Special Article

December 10 2006

Mob violence certainly signals collapse of the Rule of Law and absence of normal political conversation and decision-making. Mob violence in modern India remains a monthly occurrence: a child is killed by a speeding bus, the driver if he is caught is thrashed to death by a mob of onlookers and the bus burnt down; a factory closes and workers go on a rampage; a statue or political personality or religious figure is perceived to have been insulted or desecrated, and crowds take to the streets to burn vehicles and cause mayhem; a procession is said to be insulted, and rival mobs go to battle with one another. (In fact, elected legislators in Parliament and State Assemblies frequently conflate mob behaviour like slogan-shouting with political conversation itself, carrying into the House the political methods they have learned to employ outside it. And contrary to what our legislators may suppose, they do need to be constantly lectured to by the general citizenry whose paid servants they are supposed to be).

Such may be relatively simple cases to describe or diagnose. More complex cases include the deliberate burning alive of Graham Staines and his two young sons by a mob in 1999 as they slept in their vehicle in rural Orissa, or countless deeds of similar savagery during Partition and the innumerable other riots we have seen in the history of our supposedly tolerant and non-violent culture.

We are not unique in our propensity for evil. French women knitted and gossiped watching the guillotine do its bloody work during the Jacobin terror. Long before them, as the Catholic scholar Eamon Duffy reports in Faith of our fathers, Pope Gregory IX in 1233 had initiated the “Inquisition”: two anonymous witnesses could cause any person to be arrested as a heretic, tortured and then burnt alive. In 1484, Pope Innocent VIII endorsed “witches” to be burnt, causing “deaths of countless thousands of harmless or eccentric women over the next 300 years. In all, as many as 25,000 people, most of them women may have been burnt as witches in Germany” alone. American history has seen countless cases of mob violence, from witch-burnings and other religious violence to cold-blooded lynching on trees of individual black men by white mobs, black mobs looting inner cities, street clashes between political groups etc. Soviet Russia and Maoist China saw systematic ideologically driven violence by Party cadres and “Red Guards” against countless individuals ~ forced to confess to imaginary misdeeds, then assaulted or shot. Nazi Germany, Czarist Russia and many other countries saw mobs attacking, dispossessing or killing individual Jews and innumerable others, again in systematic ideologically motivated pogroms. Indeed as Hannah Arendt and others have noted, the similarities between totalitarian regimes as outwardly different as Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia or Communist China included the ideologically driven targeting of identifiable small minorities for systematic violence by majorities in power. Even Tony Blair’s supposedly Cool Britannia today, besides having the most notorious soccer hooligans in the world, is also a place where no individual, non-white or white, will pass a drunken mob of adolescent school-children on the streets on a Friday night without trepidation.

Every case of mob violence is different; yet what could be common is a temporary, if deliberate, suspension of the normal human sense of responsibility on part of a mob’s individual members. Reason and responsibility return if at all only after the evil has been accomplished ~ whether it is killing or assaulting someone or destroying something ~ and it can be accompanied by a sense of remorse and regret. Even where mob tyranny has been systematic, long-term, ideologically-driven and state-sponsored, as with the Inquisition or French Revolution or Nazi, Soviet or Chinese terrors, future generations look back at the past misdeeds of their ancestors and say: “That was wrong, very wrong, it should never have happened”. Moral learning does take place at some time or other, even if it is long after the evil has occurred. It is as if, when sobriety and rationality return, an individual participant in a mob realises and recognises himself/herself to have revealed a baser ignoble side which is shameful.

“Sometimes a society acts as if all power lay in the hands of the most babyish and animal members, and sometimes as if all power lay in the hands of strict old men, and sometimes it acts more as a whole ~ mostly when there’s a war on. Sometimes a man is not himself and acts as if a babyish or cunning animal had gained control ~ that’s the id ~ sometimes as if an exacting parent, a sarcastic schoolmaster, or an implacable deity possessed him ~ that’s the super-ego. Sometimes a man is more himself and acts more as a whole, a new whole which is not a combination but a synthesis of the id and the super-ego. Some are constantly at the mercy of the id, some are slaves to the super- ego, and in some first one and then the other gains an unhappy victory in a continual struggle, and in some conflict and control have vanished into cooperation…” Such was the description the Cambridge philosopher John Wisdom gave in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis in the 1940s and 1950s, when he translated into normal idiomatic language some of the difficult technical findings and theories of the mind propounded by Sigmund Freud in the previous half-century.

When the mob forms itself, its members individually choose to suppress their normal rational personalities and sense of adult responsibility, and permit instead their cunning animal or babyish instincts to take over and reign supreme within themselves. It must be a collective decision even if silently taken: for one person to behave in such a manner would look identifiably stupid and criminal but for him/her to do so in a group where everyone has simultaneously decided to abandon reason (whether spontaneously or shouting slogans together) allows the loss of individual responsibility to become hidden in the mass, and the collective to take on features of a hydra-headed monster, capable of the vilest deeds without the slightest self-doubt. The victim of their violence or abuse will often be an individual who stands out in some way ~ perhaps by natural or social attributes or even by heroic deeds: indeed Freud suggested that primitive tribes sometimes engaged in parricide and regicide, cannibalising their individual heroes in the belief that by consuming something of the hero’s remains those attributes might magically reappear in themselves.

In modern India, the presence of mob violence on a monthly basis somewhere or other in the country gives the lie to our claims of maturity of our political and democratic development. Those posing as our political leaders may make as many foreign trips and wooden prepared speeches on TV as they wish to, but their actual cowardice is manifest in having failed to address the real disjunction that exists in this country between political interests and political preferences at the grassroots on the one hand, and the lack of serious parliamentary conversation addressing these within our representative institutions on the other. The reliance by the Executive on often brutal police or paramilitary forces reflects failure of the Legislative and Judicial branches of our Government, as well as a lack of balance between them arising from our political and constitutional immaturity.

Milton Friedman: A Man of Reason, 1912-2006

A Man of Reason


Milton Friedman (1912-2006)

 

First published in The Statesman, Perspective Page Nov 22 2006

 

Milton Friedman, who died on 16 November 2006 in San Francisco, was without a doubt the greatest economist after John Maynard Keynes. Before Keynes, great 20th century economists included Alfred Marshall and Knut Wicksell, while Keynes’s contemporaries included Irving Fisher, AC Pigou and many others. Keynes was followed by his younger critic FA Hayek, but Hayek is remembered less for his technical economics as for his criticism of “socialist economics” and contributions to politics. Milton Friedman more than anyone else was Keynes’s successor in economics (and in applied macroeconomics in particular), in the same way David Ricardo had been the successor of Adam Smith. Ricardo disagreed with Smith and Friedman disagreed with Keynes, but the impact of each on the direction and course both of economics and of the world in which they lived was similar in size and scope.

 

Friedman’s impact on the contemporary world may have been largest through his design and advocacy as early as 1953 of the system of floating exchange-rates. In the early 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system of adjustable fixed exchange-rates collapsed and Friedman’s friend and colleague George P. Shultz was US Treasury Secretary in the Nixon Administration, the international monetary system started to become of the kind Friedman had described two decades earlier. Equally large was Friedman’s worldwide impact in re-establishing concern about the frequent cause of macroeconomic inflation being money supply growth rates well above real income growth rates. All contemporary talk of “inflation targeting” among macroeconomic policy-makers since the 1980s has its roots in Friedman’s December 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association. His main empirical disagreement with Keynes and the Keynesians lay in his belief that people held the intrinsically worthless tokens known as “money” largely in order to expedite their transactions and not as a store of value – hence the “demand for money” was a function mostly of income and not of interest rates, contrary to what Keynes had suggested in his 1930s analysis of “Depression Economics”. It is in this sense that Friedman restored the traditional “quantity theory” as being a specific theory of the demand for money.

 

Friedman’s main descriptive work lay in the monumental Monetary History of the United States he co-authored with Anna J. Schwartz, which suggested drastic contractions of the money supply had contributed to the Great Depression in America. Friedman made innumerable smaller contributions too, the most prominent and foresighted of which had to do with advocating larger parental choice in the public finance of their children’s school education via the use of “vouchers”. The modern Friedman Foundation has that as its main focus of philanthropy. The emphasis on greater individual choice in school education exemplified Friedman’s commitments both to individual freedom and the notion of investment in human capital.

 

Friedman had significant influences upon several non-Western countries too, most prominently India and China, besides a grossly misreported episode in Chile. As described in his autobiography with his wife Rose, Two Lucky People (Chicago 1998), Friedman spent six months in India in 1955 at the Government of India’s invitation during the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan. His work done for the Government of India came to be suppressed for the next 34 years. Peter Bauer had told me during my doctoral work at Cambridge in the late 1970s of the existence of a Friedman memorandum, and N. Georgescu-Roegen told me the same in America in 1980, adding that Friedman had been almost insulted publicly by VKRV Rao at the time after giving a lecture to students on his analysis of India’s problems.

 

When Friedman and I met in 1984, I asked him for the memorandum and he sent me two documents. The main one dated November 1955 I published in Hawaii on 21 May 1989 during a project on a proposed Indian “perestroika” (which contributed to the origins of the 1991 reform through Rajiv Gandhi), and was later published in Delhi in Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, edited by myself and WE James.

 

The other document on Mahalanobis is published in The Statesman today for the first time, though there has been an Internet copy floating around for a few years. The Friedmans’ autobiography quoted what I said in 1989 about the 1955 memorandum and may be repeated: “The aims of economic policy (in India) were to create conditions for rapid increase in levels of income and consumption for the mass of the people, and these aims were shared by everyone from PC Mahalanobis to Milton Friedman. The means recommended were different. Mahalanobis advocated a leading role for the state and an emphasis on the growth of physical capital. Friedman advocated a necessary but clearly limited role for the state, and placed on the agenda large-scale investment in the stock of human capital, encouragement of domestic competition, steady and predictable monetary growth, and a flexible exchange rate for the rupee as a convertible hard currency, which would have entailed also an open competitive position in the world economy… If such an alternative had been more thoroughly discussed at the time, the optimal role of the state in India today, as well as the optimum complementarity between human capital and physical capital, may have been more easily determined.”

 

A few months before attending my Hawaii conference on India, Friedman had been in China, and his memorandum to Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and two-hour dialogue of 19 September 1988 with him are now classics republished in the 1998 autobiography. Also republished there are all documents relating to Friedman’s six-day academic visit to Chile in March 1975 and his correspondence with General Pinochet, which speak for themselves and make clear Friedman had nothing to do with that regime other than offer his opinion when asked about how to reduce Chile’s hyperinflation at the time.

 

My association with Milton has been the zenith of my engagement with academic economics, with e-mails exchanged as recently as September. I was a doctoral student of his bitter enemy yet for over two decades he not only treated me with unfailing courtesy and affection, he supported me in lonely righteous battles: doing for me what he said he had never done before, which was to stand as an expert witness in a United States Federal Court. I will miss him much though I know that he, as a man of reason, would not have wished me to.

Subroto Roy

Milton Friedman on the Mahalanobis-Nehru “Second Plan”

Note by Dr Subroto Roy: Milton Friedman, who died last week (obituary: page 7) , gave me this document (dated 15 February 1956) in 1984. I did not publish it in Hawaii in May 1989 in Foundations of India’s Political Economy along with his November 1955 Memorandum to the Government of India because it was rather more candid and personal in tone. The Berlin Wall had not yet fallen, and I was at the time being attacked by prominent Indian and foreign economists and political scientists for wanting to publish the 1955 Memorandum at all. Today, we in India are well on our way to making more objective studies of our intellectual and political history than was possible two decades ago. Friedman’s candid observations, from the Cold War era of Krushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, seem as fascinating as the tales of travellers from courts of olden times.

Mahalanobis’s  Plan
by Milton Friedman

First published in The Statesman front page http://www.thestatesman.net November 22 2006

“I met PC Mahalanobis in 1946 and again at a meeting of the International Statistical Institute in September 1947, and I know him well by reputation. He was absent during most of my stay in New Delhi, but I met him at a meeting of the Indian Planning Commission, of which he is one of the strongest and most able members.

Mahalanobis began as a mathematician and is a very able one. Able mathematicians are usually recognized for their ability at a relatively early age. Realizing their own ability as they do and working in a field of absolutes, tends, in my opinion, to make them dangerous when they apply themselves to economic planning. They produce specific and detailed plans in which they have confidence, without perhaps realizing that economic planning is not the absolute science that mathematics is. This general characteristic of mathematicians is true of Mahalanobis but in spite of the tendency he is willing to discuss a problem and listen to a different point of view. Once his decision is reached, however, he has great confidence in it.

Mahalanobis was unquestionably extremely influential in drafting the Indian five-year plan. There were four key steps in the plan. The first was the so-called “Plan Frame” drafted by Mahalanobis himself. The second was a tentative plan based on the “Plan Frame”. The third step was a report by a committee of economists on the first two steps, and the fourth was a minority report by BR Shenoy on the economists’ report. The economists had no intention of drafting a definitive proposal but merely meant to comment on certain aspects of the first two steps. Shenoy’s minority report, however, had the effect of making the economists’ report official.

The scheme of the Five Year Plan attributed to Mahalanobis faces two problems; one, that India needs heavy industry for economic development; and two, that development of heavy industry uses up large amounts of capital while providing only small employment.

Based on these facts, Mahalanobis proposed to concentrate on heavy industry development on the one hand and to subsidize the hand production cottage industries on the other. The latter course would discriminate against the smaller manufacturers. In my opinion, the plan wastes both capital and labour and the Indians get only the worst of both efforts. If left to their own devices under a free enterprise system I believe the Indians would gravitate naturally towards the production of such items as bicycles, sewing machines, and radios. This trend is already apparent without any subsidy.

The Indian cottage industry is already cloaked in the same popular sort of mist as is rural life in the US. There is an idea in both places that this life is typical and the backbone of their respective countries. Politically, the Indian cottage industry problem is akin to the American farm problem. Mohandas Gandhi was a proponent of strengthening the cottage industry as a weapon against the British. This reason is now gone but the emotions engendered by Gandhi remain. Any move to strengthen the cottage industry has great political appeal and thus, Mahalanobis’ plan and its pseudo-scientific support for the industry also has great political appeal.  I found many supporters for the heavy industry phase of the Plan but almost no one (among the technical Civil Servants) who really believes in the cottage industry aspects, aside from their political appeal.

In its initial form, the plan was very large and ambitious with optimistic estimates. My impression is that there is a substantial trend away from this approach, however, and an attempt to cut down. The development of heavy industry has slowed except for steel and iron. I believe that the proposed development of a synthetic petroleum plant has been dropped and probably wisely so. In addition, I believe that the proposed five year plan may be extended to six years. Other than his work on the plan, I am uncertain of Mahalanobis’ influence. The gossip is that he has Nehru’s ear and potentially he could be very influential, simply because of his intellectual ability and powers of persuasion. The question that occurs to me is how much difference Mahalanobis’ plan makes. The plan does not seem the important thing to me. I believe that the new drive and enthusiasm of the Indian nation will surmount any plan, good or bad. Then too, I feel a wide diversity in what is said and what is done. I believe that much of Nehru’s socialistic talk is simply that, just talk. Nehru has been trying to undermine the Socialist Party by this means and apparently the Congress Party’s adoption of a socialistic idea for industry has been successful in this respect.

One gets the impression, depending on whom one talks with, either that the Government runs business, or that two or three large businesses run the government. All that appears publicly indicates that the first is true, but a case can also be made for the latter interpretation. Favour and harassment are counterparts in the Indian economic scheme. There is no significant impairment of the willingness of Indian capitalists to invest in their industries, except in the specific industries where nationalization has been announced, but they are not always willing to invest and take the risks inherent in the free enterprise system. They want the Government to support their investment and when it refuses they back out and cry “Socialism”.”

 

History of Jammu & Kashmir (2006)

History of Jammu & Kashmir

by

Subroto Roy

First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, Oct 29 2006

and The Statesman Oct 30 2006, Editorial Page Special Article.

At the advent of Islam in distant Arabia, India and Kashmir in particular were being visited by Chinese Buddhist pilgrims during Harsha’s reign. The great “Master of Law” Hiuen Tsiang visited between 629-645 and spent 631-633 in Kashmir (“Kia-chi-mi-lo”), describing it to include Punjab, Kabul and Kandahar. Over the next dozen centuries, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and again Hindu monarchs came to rule the 85 mile long 40 mile wide territory on the River Jhelum’s upper course known as Srinagar Valley, as well as its adjoining Jammu in the upper plains of the Punjab and “Little Tibet” consisting of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit.

In 1344, a Persian adventurer from Swat or Khorasan by name of Amir or Mirza, who had “found his way into the Valley and in time gained great influence at the Raja’s court”, proclaimed himself Sultan Shamsuddin after the death of the last Hindu monarchs of medieval Kashmir. Twelve of his descendants formed the Shamiri dynasty including the notorious Sikander and the just and tolerant Zainulabidin. Sikander who ruled 1386-1410 “submitted himself” to the Uzbek Taimur the Lame when he approached Kashmir in 1398 “and thus saved the country from invasion”. Otherwise, “Sikander was a gloomy ferocious bigot, and his zeal in destroying temples and idols was so intense that he is remembered as the Idol-Breaker. He freely used the sword to propagate Islam and succeeded in forcing the bulk of the population to conform outwardly to the Muslim religion. Most of the Brahmins refused to apostatise, and many of them paid with their lives the penalty for their steadfastness. Many others were exiled, and only a few conformed.”

Zainulabidin who ruled 1417-1467 “was a man of very different type”. “He adopted the policy of universal toleration, recalled the exiled Brahmins, repealed the jizya or poll-tax on Hindus, and even permitted new temples to be built. He abstained from eating flesh, prohibited the slaughter of kine, and was justly venerated as a saint. He encouraged literature, painting and music, and caused many translations to be made of works composed in Sanskrit, Arabic and other languages.” During his “long and prosperous reign”, he “constructed canals and built many mosques; he was just and tolerant”.

The Shamiri dynasty ended in 1541 when “some fugitive chiefs of the two local factions of the Makri and the Chakk invited Mirza Haidar Dughlat, a relation of Babar, to invade Kashmir. The country was conquered and the Mirza held it (nominally in name of Humayan) till 1551, when he was killed in a skirmish. The line… was restored for a few years, until in 1559 a Chakk leader, Ghazi Shah, usurped the throne; and in the possession of his descendants it remained for nearly thirty years.” This dynasty marks the origins of Shia Islam in Srinagar though Shia influence in Gilgit, Baltistan and Laddakh was of longer standing. Constant dissensions weakened the Chakks, and in 1586, Akbar, then at Attock on the Indus, sent an army under Raja Bhagwan Das into Srinagar Valley and easily made it part of his Empire.

After the Mughals collapsed, Iran’s Turkish ruler Nadir Shah sacked Delhi in 1739 but the Iranian court fell in disarray upon his death. In 1747 a jirga of Pashtun tribes at Kandahar “broke normal tradition” and asked an old Punjabi holy man and shrine-keeper to choose between two leaders; this man placed young wheat in the hand of the 25 year old Ahmed Shah Saddozai of the Abdali tribe, and titled him “Durrani”. Five years later, Durrani took Kashmir and for the next 67 years the Valley was under Pashtun rule, a time of “unmitigated brutality and widespread distress”. Durrani himself “was wise, prudent and simple”, never declared himself king and wore no crown, instead keeping a stick of young wheat in his turban. Leaving India, he famously recited: “The Delhi throne is beautiful indeed, but does it compare with the mountains of Kandahar?”

Kashmir’s modern history begins with Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs who became a soldier at 12, and in 1799 at age 19 was made Lahore’s Governor by Kabul’s Zaman Shah. Three years later “he made himself master of Amritsar”, and in 1806 crossed the River Sutlej and took Ludhiana. He created a fine Sikh infantry and cavalry under former officers of Napoleon, and with 80,000 trained men and 500 guns took Multan and Peshawar, defeated the Pashtuns and overran Kashmir in 1819. The “cruel rule” of the Pashtuns ended “to the great relief of Kashmir’s inhabitants”.

The British Governor-General Minto (ancestor of the later Viceroy), seeing advantage in the Sikhs staying north of the Sutlej, sent Charles Metcalfe, “a clever young civilian”, to persuade the Khalsa; in 1809, Ranjit Singh and the British in the first Treaty of Amritsar agreed to establish “perpetual amity”: the British would “have no concern” north of the Sutlej and Ranjit Singh would keep only minor personnel south of it. In 1834 and 1838 Ranjit Singh was struck by paralysis and died in 1839, leaving no competent heir. The Sikh polity collapsed, “their power exploded, disappearing in fierce but fast flames”. It was “a period of storm and anarchy in which assassination was the rule” and the legitimate line of his son and grandson, Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh was quickly extinguished. In 1845 the Queen Regent, mother of the five-year old Dalip Singh, agreed to the Khalsa ending the 1809 Treaty. After bitter battles that might have gone either way, the Khalsa lost at Sobraon on 10 February 1846, and accepted terms of surrender in the 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore. The kingdom had not long survived its founder: “created by the military and administrative genius of one man, it crumbled into powder when the spirit which gave it life was withdrawn; and the inheritance of the Khalsa passed into the hands of the English.”

Ranjit Singh’s influence on modern J&K was even greater through his having mentored the Rajput Gulab Singh Dogra (1792-1857) and his brothers Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh. Jammu had been ruled by Ranjit Deo until 1780 when the Sikhs made it tributary to the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh, a great grand nephew of Ranjit Deo, had left home at age 17 in search of a soldierly fortune, and ended up in 1809 in Ranjit Singh’s army, just when Ranjit Singh had acquired for himself a free hand to expand his domains north of the River Sutlej.

Gulab Singh, an intrepid soldier, by 1820 had Jammu conferred upon him by Ranjit Singh with the title of Raja, while Bhimber, Chibal, Poonch and Ramnagar went to his brothers. Gulab Singh, “often unscrupulous and cruel, was a man of considerable ability and efficiency”; he “found his small kingdom a troublesome charge but after ten years of constant struggles he and his two brothers became masters of most of the country between Kashmir and the Punjab”, though Srinagar Valley itself remained under a separate Governor appointed by the Lahore Court. Gulab Singh extended Jammu’s rule from Rawalpindi, Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, across Laddakh and into Tibet. His General Zorawar Singh led six expeditions into Laddakh between 1834 and 1841 through Kishtwar, Padar and Zanskar. In May 1841, Zorawar left Leh with an army of 5000 Dogras and Laddakhis and advanced on Tibet. Defeating the Tibetans at Rudok and Tashigong, he reached Minsar near Lake Mansarovar from where he advanced to Taklakot (Purang), 15 miles from the borders of Nepal and Kumaon, and built a fort stopping for the winter. Lhasa sent large re-inforcements to meet him. Zorawar, deciding to take the offensive, was killed in the Battle of Toyu, on 11-12 December 1841 at 16,000 feet.

A Laddakhi rebellion resulted against Jammu, aided now by the advancing Tibetans. A new army was sent under Hari Chand suppressing the rebellion and throwing back the Tibetans, leading to a peace treaty between Lhasa and Jammu signed on 17 September 1842: “We have agreed that we have no ill-feelings because of the past war. The two kings will henceforth remain friends forever. The relationship between Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Lhasa (Dalai Lama) is now established. The Maharajah Sahib, with God (Kunchok) as his witness, promises to recognise ancient boundaries, which should be looked after by each side without resorting to warfare. When the descendants of the early kings, who fled from Laddakh to Tibet, now return they will not be stopped by Shri Maharajah. Trade between Laddakh and Tibet will continue as usual. Tibetan government traders coming into Laddakh will receive free transport and accommodations as before, and the Laddakhi envoy will, in turn, receive the same facilities in Lhasa. The Laddakhis take an oath before God (Kunchok) that they will not intrigue or create new troubles in Tibetan territory. We have agreed, with God as witness, that Shri Maharajah Sahib and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will live together as members of the same household.” The traditional boundary between Laddakh and Tibet “as recognised by both sides since olden times” was accepted by the envoys of Gulab Singh and the Dalai Lama.

An earlier 1684 treaty between Laddakh and Lhasa had said that while Laddakh would send tribute to Lhasa every three years, “the king of Laddakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngarees-khor-sum, that he may be independent there; and he sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kangree (Kailas), and the Holy Lakes of Mansarovar and Rakas Tal”. The area around Minsar village near Lake Mansarovar, held by the rulers of Laddakh since 1583, was retained by Jammu in the 1842 peace-treaty, and its revenue was received by J&K State until 1948.

After Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839, Gulab Singh was alienated from the Lahore Court where the rise of his brothers and a nephew aroused enough Khalsa jealousy to see them assassinated in palace intrigues. While the Sikhs imploded, Gulab Singh had expanded his own dominion from Rawalpindi to Minsar ~ everywhere except Srinagar Valley itself. He had apparently advised the Sikhs not to attack the British in breach of the 1809 Treaty, and when they did so he had not joined them, though had he done so British power in North India might have been broken. The British were grateful for his neutrality and also his help in their first misbegotten adventure in Afghanistan. It was Gulab Singh who was now encouraged by both the British and the Sikhs to mediate between them, indeed “to take a leading part in arranging conditions of peace”, and he formally represented the Sikh regency in the negotiations. The 9 March 1846 Treaty of Lahore “set forth that the British Government having demanded in addition to a certain assignment of territory, a payment of a crore and a half of rupees, and the Sikh Government being unable to pay the whole”, Dalip Singh “should cede as equivalent to one crore the hill country belonging to the Punjab between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and the Hazara”.

For the British to occupy the whole of this mountainous territory was judged unwise on economic and military grounds; it was not feasible to occupy from a military standpoint and the area “with the exception of the small Valley of Kashmir” was “for the most part unproductive”. “On the other hand, the ceded tracts comprised the whole of the hereditary possessions of Gulab Singh, who, being eager to obtain an indefeasible title to them, came forward and offered to pay the war indemnity on condition that he was made the independent ruler of Jammu & Kashmir.

A separate treaty embodying this arrangement was thus concluded between the British and Gulab Singh at Amritsar on 16 March 1846.” Gulab Singh acknowledged the British Government’s supremacy, and in token of it agreed to present annually to the British Government “one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed and three pairs of Kashmir shawls. This arrangement was later altered; the annual presentation made by the Kashmir State was confined to two Kashmir shawls and three romals (handkerchiefs).” The Treaty of Amritsar “put Gulab Singh, as Maharaja, in possession of all the hill country between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh and Gilgit; but excluding Lahoul, Kulu and some areas including Chamba which for strategic purposes, it was considered advisable (by the British) to retain and for which a remission of Rs 25 lakhs was made from the crore demanded, leaving Rs 75 lakhs as the final amount to be paid by Gulab Singh.” The British retained Hazara which in 1918 was included into NWFP. Through an intrigue emanating from Prime Minister Lal Singh in Lahore, Imamuddin, the last Sikh-appointed Governor of Kashmir, sought to prevent Gulab Singh taking possession of the Valley in accordance with the Treaty’s terms. By December 1846 Gulab Singh had done so, though only with help of a British force which included 17,000 Sikh troops “who had been fighting in the campaign just concluded”. (Contemporary British opinion even predicted Sikhism like Buddhism “would become extinct in a short time if it were not kept alive by the esprit de corps of the Sikh regiments”.)

The British in 1846 may have been glad enough to allow Gulab Singh take independent charge of the new entity that came to be now known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir”. Later, however. they and their American allies would grow keen to control or influence the region vis-à-vis their new interests against the Russian and Soviet Empires.

see also

A Brief History of Gilgit

My Seventy-One Articles, Notes Etc on Kashmir, Pakistan, & of course, India (plus my undelivered Lahore lectures)

Pakistan’s & India’s Illusions of Power (Psychosis vs Vanity)

New Foreign Policy? (8-9 Oct 2006)

NEW FOREIGN POLICY? “Kiss Up, Kick Down”?

Seven phases of Indian foreign policy may be identifiable since Nehru; the current phase seems to involve subservience to the strong, jingoism otherwise

 

by Subroto Roy

 

First published in The Sunday Statesman 8 Oct 2006, The Statesman 9 Oct 2006 Editorial Page Special Article

 

 

The outlines of a new tri-partisan Indian foreign policy may be becoming discernible. That it is “new” or that it commands near unanimity among the Congress, BJP and “Left” and their respective friends in the Indian media and political classes, does not make it sound or robust in any way. In fact, its basis in the history, geography and economics of India is wholly inadequate, and it is also entirely divorced from any clearly enunciated new Indian political ethics for the modern world.

 

 

The new policy, which may be fairly dubbed the Jaswant-Manmohan policy after the BJP and Congress politicians who have been its putative authors and leading practitioners, is as likely as not to lead to an India that is no longer a free decision-maker in any meaningful way in world affairs by 2047, one hundred years after Independence. Our great grandchildren may well be taught that for some decades in Indian history a sovereign unitary republic actually existed which then came to be effectively lost.

 

 

Indeed the new policy may amount to being less a coherent new doctrine of India’s role in international relations than a mere change in attitude on the part of politicians, bureaucrats and their intelligentsia friends: from seeming universally arrogant in the world to becoming pliant and subservient towards those world powers perceived (accurately or inaccurately) as strong, combined with a vainglorious jingoism towards all others. It is an application to international diplomacy and politics of the classic bureaucratic principle of “kiss up, kick down” in an organisation, and may reflect the fact the two main institutions the Mughals and British used to run their empires were the bureaucracy and military ~ both of which have grown and continued to run New Delhi (and Islamabad) afterwards, co-opting whatever domestic political development that has arisen. There is plenty of wishful waffling too about India becoming a “great power” or being a “swing state in the global balance of power”, and about how well the economy is supposedly doing ~ as if what Government spokesmen say about the economy is to be believed at face-value. Indian Leftists and their fellow-travellers ~ as great lovers themselves of bureaucracy, collectivist groupthink and propaganda on the USSR or PRC pattern, and fearful or envious of all individual criticism, creativity and achievement – have taken to the same principle like fish to water.

 

 

The first phase of Indian foreign policy was Nehruvian in that it began with Nehru’s Fabian misperception of Stalin’s USSR, and ended with the military debacle he led the country into at the hands of Zhou’s “human wave” armies in the mountains of Ladakh and NEFA.

 

 

A second phase was Kashmir-centric, overlapping with the first insofar as it may be traced to Karan Singh’s iniquitous dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah’s first Government, but really beginning after Nehru’s death with the Ayub-Abdullah summit, and being marked by Ayub’s 1965 attack in J&K ~ Shastri’s riposte reaching the Ichogil Canal signalled that no longer would war over J&K be confined to J&K.

 

 

A third phase was forced on India by the Pakistani civil war that led to Bangladesh’s creation, and was marked by the Indira/ Haksar alliance with Brezhnev’s USSR, as well as by Pokhran-I.

 

 

A fourth phase of Indian foreign policy may be identified in the late 1970s and 1980s, marked by rebellion of the fundamentalist Sikhs whom Indira and Sanjay Gandhi had provoked, which led in due course to her assassination. The turmoil that followed in Punjab and North India was financed by anti-Indian Sikhs from Vancouver,California and Britain, with gleeful help from the Pakistanis, and Indian diplomats had their hands full in trying to counter that phenomenon. It was during this phase of domestic Indian turmoil that New Delhi wholly missed the seismic changes occurring in the USSR, East Europe and international relations generally, and completely failed to predict its consequences for India.

 

 

The phase came to end when the Narasimha Rao Government (upon advice of a well-known communist cabal in the IFS and JNU) instantly showered praise on the anti-Yeltsin coup in August 1991. When Yeltsin returned to power, the new anti-communist Russians took their revenge on New Delhi, exacting hard dollars for the soft rouble-trade of friendlier times.

 

 

A fifth phase may be seen in retrospect as one of relative success.The main plank of Indian foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s was to get Pakistan designated a “terrorist state” in American eyes, as well as to warn of the dangers of a Pakistani nuclear bomb. It had been prompted by the end of American involvement in the Afghan war, which caused the ISI to shift the jihadis to J&K, and the Indian policy was destined not to succeed. No matter how hard Kanwal Sibal tried in 1992-1993 as Minister-Political in the Washington Embassy to tell the Americans that their Pakistani friends were dangerous, he was destined to fail as the MEA had entirely failed to realise how far ahead the Pakistanis were in their lobbying power in Washington ~ the Pakistani super-elite has been entrenched among the K-Street lobbyists and in expensive real-estate along the Potomac River for more than two generations. Yet after the 9/11 attacks several years later, the Indians were able to look back at that fifth phase and say to the Americans, “We told you so”.

 

 

In the late 1990s came a short-lived sixth phase of Pokhran-II and the Lahore bus-trip, which may be credited as Vajpayee successes, and also contained the Kargil War and Kandahar hijacking, which were more dubious. This overlapped with the last and currently continuing seventh phase of Indian foreign policy with Jaswant Singh breaking the ice with the Americans when they had recovered from the fact the CIA’s failures included not foreseeing Pokhran-II; it coincided too with Osama bin Laden’s declarations of jihad against the USA. The Americans enlisting themselves on the side of the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban after 9/11 was beneficial from an Indian standpoint since Afghanistan had been effectively lost to secular Indian influence for two decades, and the Taliban had shown themselves no friends of India during the Kandahar hijacking.

 

 

But the BJP’s anti-Muslim thought processes quickly took over, as did its proximity to organised business lobbies. When Iraq was attacked and occupied in 2003, there was hardly a whimper from the BJP leadership, and instead their businessmen friends started to fly to Amman hopeful of “reconstruction” contracts. The Sonia/ Manmohan Congress/Leftist combine has effectively continued and expanded that trend, though now the business lobbies have been much more muted and subtle, especially in their backroom dealings and payoffs with respect to the nuclear deal. There is also an occasional burst of anti-Americanism from leftists though it is hard of course to beg for American foreign investment in Marxist-run areas while also being sincere in quaint street demos or agitprop.

 

 

Running through the new foreign policy is a fiction that it is driven by a new economic motivation to improve development and mass well-being in India. The bizarre idea of creating hundreds of so-called “Special Economic Zones” (reminiscent of 17th and 18th Century colonial fortifications) illustrates this. India’s ordinary anonymous masses ~ certainly the 850 million people entirely outside the organised sector ~ have little or nothing to do with any of this. Benefits will accrue only to the ten million Indian nomenclatura controlling or having access to the gaping exit holes to the outside world in the new semi-closed economy with its endless deficit finance paid for by unlimited printing of an inconvertible domestic currency.

 

 

It is as fallacious to think private investment from foreign or domestic businessmen will support public “infrastructure” creation as it is to think foreign exchange reserves are like tax revenues in being available for Government expenditure on “infrastructure”. Such fallacies are intellectual products of either those who know no economics at all or those who have forgotten whatever little they might have been once mistaught in their youth. What serious economics does say is that Government should generally have nothing to do with any kind of private business, and instead should focus on properly providing public goods and services, encourage competition in all avenues of economic activity and prevent or regulate monopoly, and see to it all firms pay taxes they are due to pay.

 

 

That is it. It is as bad for Government to be pampering organised foreign or domestic business or organised labour with innumerable subsidies, as has been happening in India for decades, as it is to make enterprise difficult with red tape and hurdles. Businessmen are grown ups and should be allowed to freely risk their capital and make their profits or their losses without public intervention.

 

 

An economics-based policy would have single-mindedly sought to improve the financial condition of every governmental entity in the country, with the aim of improving the provision of public goods and services to all 1,000 million Indians. If and when budgets of all governmental entities become sound, foreign creditors would automatically line up before them with loans to sell, and ambitious development goals can be accomplished. As long as public budgets (and public accounts) remain in an outrageous shambles, nothing can be in fact achieved and only propaganda, corruption and paper-money creation results instead. Whatever economic growth does occur is due to new enterprise and normal technological progress, and is mostly despite and not because of New Delhi’s bureaucrats (see “The Dream Team: A Critique”, The Statesman 6-8 January 2006).

 

 

The first aspect of the new Indian foreign policy has been for Government to become wholly ingratiating towards any and all “First World” members visiting India who may deign to consider any kind of collaboration whatsoever. The long line of foreign businessmen and heads of government having photo-ops with the Indian PM began with Vajpayee and has continued with Manmohan, especially when there is a large weapons’ or commercial aircraft or other purchase to be signed. The flip-side has been ministerial and especially Prime Ministerial trips abroad ~ from Vajpayee’s to a Singapore golf-cart immediately after commiserating Gujarat, to Manmohan receiving foreign honorary doctorates while still holding public office.

 

 

Subservience to foreign business interests in the name of economic policy extends very easily to Indian naval, military or diplomatic assets being used to provide policing or support services for the great powers as and when they may ask for it. Hence, Indian naval forces may be asked by the Americans to help fight pirates in the Indian Ocean, or escort this vessel or that, or India may be asked to provide refuelling or base facilities, or India may be requested to vote against Iran, Venezuela or whomever here or there. But there would be absolutely no question of India’s role in international politics being anything greater than that of a subaltern or comprador whose response must be an instant “Ji, Huzoor”. The official backing of the Tharoor candidacy was as futile and ridiculous as the quest for UN veto-power or the willingness to attend G-8 summits as an observer.

 

 

While subservience towards the First World’s business and military interests is the “kiss up” aspect of the new foreign policy, an aggressive jingoism towards others is the “kick down” aspect. One influential voice among the media friends of the new foreign policy states it as follows: “The search for `equity oil’ has been the single most important new element of Indian economic diplomacy in recent years… Equity oil raises India’s stakes in the stability of regimes or even individuals who preside over these resources… the big question is how far would India go in defence of `regime stability’ elsewhere? And if it’s assets fall into hostile hands, would India be prepared to consider promoting `regime change’?” Just as surely as a pacifist Fabian socialist Nehru misperceived Stalin’s USSR, New Delhi’s new capitalistic jingoists have misperceived the Cheney-Rumsfeld grab for “equity oil” and have even defined Bush-Blair adventurism as being “the side of the angels”. How they must love to want to project Indian military force ~ paratroopers in the Maldives perhaps, though they need to recall what happened with the LTTE too!

 

 

Multiple Jallianwalla Bagh massacres may have been occurring in front of us in Iraq, Afghanistan and Balochistan, and there may soon be an attack on Iran too. New Delhi’s new “kiss up, kick down” attitude has rendered India’s once-dignified and sober voice silent, our eyes closed or our face turned away.

 

 

The obvious alternative to bureaucratic “kiss up, kick down” would be “kick up, kiss down” loved by all individualists and anti-bureaucrats. In other words, it would be for India to take each case and circumstance in international politics on its merits; be seen to stand up seriously to the powerful in world politics wherever and whenever necessary; seek to protect those who may be vulnerable to international or other brutality in world affairs, while getting on properly with the mundane business of ordinary government and commerce at all other times. That mundane business may call for a gradual withdrawal of India from all or most of the fancy, corrupt international bureaucracies in New York, Washington, Geneva etc, focussing calmly but determinedly instead on improved administration and governance at home. Such was what Rajiv Gandhi was advised in January 1991 (see “Memos to Rajiv,” The Statesman 31 July-2 August 1991; Freedom First October 2001), when for one futile moment he even formed a peaceful bridge between the Americans and Saddam during the first Gulf War. The New Delhi establishment may be too intoxicated with power and insecure intellectually to be able to reflect on such sober alternatives.

Racism New and Old (2006)

Racism New and Old

Subroto Roy

Editorial page, The Statesman September 8, 2006

When Iraqi Sunni terrorists killed 11 Pakistani and three Indian Shia pilgrims on the same bus to Karbala the other day, they did not check passports or wait to hear discourses from their victims about the validity of Jinnah’s Two-Nations Theory or the RSS’s views on Akhand Bharat and Bharat-Mata. All Indians and Pakistanis of whatever religion are pretty much “Hindis” to the average Arab. If Pakistanis (much to their own chagrin) are indistinguishable from Indians in many Arab eyes, Hindus and Sikhs are (much to their own chagrin) indistinguishable from Muslims in many North American and British eyes. Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, the San Francisco Chronicle’s Religion Writer (and whose own splendid ethnicity may appear obvious to us from his name), reports Paul Silverstein, an American anthropologist, saying “Muslims are the new Jews… They are the object of a series of stereotypes, caricatures and fears which are not based in a reality and are independent of a person’s experience with Muslims.” Kuruvila says: “The Muslim caricature has ensnared Hindus, Mexicans and others” across the USA “with violence, suspicion and slurs”, giving new form to America’s “age-old dance around racial identity”.

Assimilation

The subcontinent’s Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and others are from pretty much similar racial populations, so when we wish to distinguish ourselves from one another as we tend to do on the subcontinent, we wear turbans, beards, long hair, veils, bindis etc ~ symbols about which the average New Jersey “dot-buster” or British “Paki-basher” cares not a hoot. London last year even saw Jean Charles de Menezes, a young Brazilian electrician on his way to work in the morning, pinned down by an elite squad of Britain’s much-vaunted policemen and receive seven bullets point-blank in the back of his skull ~ merely for having “looked Asian”.

Subcontinental immigrant families in the West experience a defining moment when the wife first bobs her long hair and takes to wearing slacks, skirts or even shorts, just so she can leave home and assimilate better in the workplace or shopping mall. The saris, salwars and real jewellery are kept for the weekends when she meets people who will understand her as herself, namely, her friends and kith and kin in the immigrant community. When salwar or sari-clad women start fake-kissing one another in Western-style greeting at those weekends, the alternation of their identities (and confusion in their self-knowledge) may have become complete. A limiting point of such attempts at assimilation is reached perhaps when an Asian woman becomes a BBC or CNN newsreader, reading what she has been told to yet still narcissistically indulging in the extent of her external transformation.

Muslim-Hindu differences of religious and cultural beliefs and practices between racially similar peoples may be contrasted with the main fault-lines that have existed in Western societies in recent centuries: fault-lines of race and colour between European and African, and of race and religion between Jew and Gentile.

An eminent American legal scholar once said African slavery had been “the living lie” in America’s official heritage of democracy and individual freedom. Black America took one hundred years from Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation to Martin Luther King Jr., to begin to overcome the impossible odds against it. Sports, music, show-biz and the arts were obvious arenas for public demonstration of individual genius. Athletes like Jesse Owens, Joe Louis and Arthur Ashe, musicians like Duke Ellington, Nat King Cole and Eartha Kitt, “in-your-face” satirists like Sammy Davis Jr, Richard Pryor and Eddie Murphy upto and including modern rapsters and many thousands of others demonstrated that Black America was not going away anywhere, certainly not returning to Liberia, was going to stay in and permanently alter American life and culture, and wondered if anyone thought otherwise. The degree of assimilation into non-black cultures would be a matter of personal choice, not social or economic compulsion. During the Bush invasion of Iraq, Harry Belafonte re-ignited an old controversy when he referred to his fellow West Indian and perfectly assimilated Colin Powell in context of the “plantation slave”/”house slave” dichotomy: plantation slaves were externally oppressed but felt free within while house slaves had more comforts but were docile compradors inside their souls.

Immigrant communities from the subcontinent have had their share of the same. It has been all too easy for young people to reach academic highs in New Delhi or Kolkata only to escape to obscure corners of America and lead docile subservient unfulfilling lives forever afterwards, in exchange for material and ultimately meaningless rewards. It might be called the Madhuri Dixit Phenomenon of being transformed from celebrity-status in India to becoming a complete unknown in America.

Jewish-Gentile divide

The Jewish-Gentile divide in Western civilisation has been more insidious and damaging to mankind, and potentially remains so as the anger it generates has been transferred onto modern Muslims instead. At its unspoken roots is the frank Jewish theological assessment that Jesus of Nazareth was at most a wise and honest rabbi, not Christ Immanent ~ a veracious blow that seems to remove the corner-stone of all European culture and civilisation. The length of mutual recriminations and miscomprehensions as well as self-deceptions and cruelties over the millennia that have resulted on both sides, remains endless. On the Christian side there has been the vile persecution of Jews for centuries. On the Jewish side, there has arisen the vast myth that today’s Israel has something to do with the ancient Hebrews, when contemporary Jews likely descend mostly from the conversion to Judaism of the Khazar Khanate in the second half of the 9th Century (see e.g. Paul Meerts, “Assessing Khazaria”, International Institute for Asian Studies July 2004). In between Jewish and Christian self-deceptions and mutual misunderstandings has arisen Anti-Semitism, Zionism, and also Anti-Zionism (many thoughtful Jews having opposed the creation of Israel). As George Eliot, Hannah Arendt and many others noticed, the assimilation of 19th Century Jews into elite society in Vienna or London was only permitted where some exceptional individual genius was displayed, most prominently perhaps in case of Benjamin Disraeli who became Victoria’s Prime Minister. Even that acceptance of assimilated “exceptional” Jews came to disintegrate into the horrors of the 20th Century, from which we are yet to recover. Modern American foreign policy has been partly driven by the East and West Coasts’ understanding or misunderstanding of that history.

Understanding Pakistan

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN

First published in The Sunday Statesman & The Statesman Editorial Page Special Article

30-31 July, 2006

by

Subroto Roy

 

 

 

 

Pakistan’s political institutions have failed to develop properly over sixty years. Yet in the last ten years or more, its Government has acquired weapons of mass destruction and in 1998-99 its Foreign Minister half-threatened to use these against India in a first strike. As a religious and cultural phenomenon and as a putative nation-state, Pakistan needs to be sought to be understood in as unbiased and objective a manner as possible, not least by Pakistanis themselves, as well as by Afghans, Bangladeshis, Chinese, Americans,Israelis, Arabs, Iranians etc. besides ourselves in India.

 

The slogan “Islam in danger” has always had some substance since orthodox Muslims constantly face temptations in the world existing around them from materialism, scepticism, syncretism, pantheism etc. Some responded defensively to the Westernisation/modernisation of India’s Hindus, Parsees and Christians by becoming insular and separatist in outlook, and anti-individualist or communal in behaviour.

 

“We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride,” declared Wali Allah (1703-1762), a contemporary of Nejd’s founder of Wahhabism. “We must repudiate all those Indian, Persian and Roman customs which are contrary to the Prophet’s teaching”, declared Barelvi (1786-1831), who also initiated the idea of a religious mass migration of North Indian Muslims. His movement saw “jihad as one of the basic tenets of faith… it chose as the venue of jihad the NW Frontier of the subcontinent, where it was directed against the Sikhs. Barelvi temporarily succeeded in carving out a small theocratic principality which collapsed owing to the friction between his Pathan and North Indian followers…” (A. Ahmed, in Basham (ed) Cultural History of India).

 

Political and psychological tensions between Pakistan’s Pashtun/Baloch tribal people and Punjabi/ Urdu elite continue to this day, even when many of the former have integrated into industries and vocations controlled by the latter. The highlanders were never part of Hindu societies, while the plainsmen, whether they admit it or not, ethnically were converts for the most part from India’s native religions (though here again the religious syncretism of Sindhis, both Muslim and Hindu, may be contrasted with orthodoxy). Barelvi’s theocracy, named Tariqa-yi Muhammadiya, had remnants near Sittana until the First World War, and his followers are still a major component of Pakistan’s most orthodox today.

 

Muslim separatism in North India would have been futile without British political backing. As early as 1874, the British saw their advantage: “The existence side by side of these hostile creeds (Hindu and Muslim) is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are a source of strength to us and not of weakness. They constitute a comparatively small but an energetic minority of the population whose political interests are identical with ours.” When the Agha Khan’s 1906 delegation first pleaded for communal representation, Minto agreed with them, and Minto’s wife wrote in her diary the effect was “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty two millions (of Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” The slogan “If you are not with us you are against us” was always widely applied by the British in India in the form “If you dare to not be with us, we definitely will be with your adversaries”.

 

One obscure ideological current of today’s Pakistan came via the enigmatic personage of Inayatullah Mashriqi (1888-1963), who, from being a Cambridge Wrangler, became a friend of Adolf Hitler in 1926, received a Renault as a gift from Hitler (possibly housed in a Lahore museum today) and claimed to have affected Hitler’s ideology. Mashriqi created the Khaksars, modelled on the Nazi SA, and was often jailed for violence.

 

But the official ideology of today’s Pakistan came from Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), an admirer of Friedrich Nietzsche. Indeed, “Pakistan” would have been better named “Iqbalistan” and its nationals “Iqbalians”, just as countries like Colombia, the USA, Israel, Saudi Arabia etc. have been named after an individual person. Iqbal’s 1930 Presidential Speech to the Muslim League in Allahabad conceptualised the country that exists today: “I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state…the formation of a consolidated NW Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of NW India… India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… “

 

Though Kashmiri himself, Iqbal was silent about J&K being any part of this new entity. Nor did he see this Muslim country being theocratic or filled with anti-Hindu bigotry: “A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities…. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and my behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture,and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operating factor, in my present consciousness… Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states…. I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.” Iqbal clearly wished to be rid of the same stamp of Arabian Imperialism that Wali Allah had extolled.

 

In 1937, Iqbal added an economic dimension referring to Shariat in order that “at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody”. A “free Muslim state or states” was “the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India.”

 

Iqbal persuaded MA Jinnah (1876-1948), who had settled once again into his London law practice, to return to India in 1934. But when, following the 1935 Government of India Act, India experienced its first democratic elections in 1937, the Muslim League’s ideology promoted by Iqbal and Jinnah failed miserably in the very four provinces that Iqbal had named.

 

Three days after Hitler’s attack on Poland, the British chose to politically empower Jinnah. Until September 4 1939, the British “had had little time for Jinnah and his League. The Government’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September, however, transformed the situation. A large part of the army was Muslim, much of the war effort was likely to rest on the two Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The following day, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks on an equal footing with Gandhi…. because the British found it convenient to take the League seriously, everyone had to as well” (F. Robinson, in James & Roy (eds) Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy). Jinnah himself was amazed: “suddenly there was a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi.”

 

Britain at war was faced too with intransigence from the Congress — Gandhi, for example, rudely dismissing the 1942 Cripps offer as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank”. It was unsurprising this would contribute to the British tilt towards Congress’s adversary. Suddenly, Rahmat Ali’s acronym “PAKSTAN” , supposedly invented on the top floor of a London bus, was becoming a credible possibility.

 

By 1946, Muslim electoral opinion had changed drastically in the League’s favour. By 1947, Iqbal’s lofty philosophical vision of a cultured Muslim state had degenerated into irrational street mobs shouting: “Larke lenge Pakistan; Marke lenge Pakistan; Khun se lenge Pakistan; Dena hoga Pakistan”.

 

Events remote from India’s history and geography, namely, Hitler’s rise and the Second World War, had contributed between 1937 and 1947 to the change of fortune of Jinnah’s League, and hence the fate of all the people of the subcontinent. Even so, thanks to AK Azad’s diplomacy, the May 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan denying Partition and Pakistan did come to be accepted by Jinnah’s Muslim League, and it was doubtless the obduracy and megalomania of Azad’s Congress colleagues which contributed equally to the failure to find a political solution ~ along with the vapid behaviour of a pompous, vacuous Mountbatten who caused infinite uncertainty until June 3 1947, as to what was going to happen to the lives of scores of millions of ordinary people within a few weeks.

 

In August 1947, the new Pakistani elite hardly felt or even wished to feel free of the British ~ they merely felt independent of what they saw as Congress domination, and had now acquired some power for themselves. Far from any nation-building taking place, Pakistan’s early years were marked by political, legal, constitutional and military chaos and trauma. Both Dominions made a grab for the Raj’s common assets, especially the armed forces.

 

Indeed, how did the Kashmir problem originate? As much as any other factor, it occurred because of the incompetent partitioning of military assets and hurried decommissioning of British Indian armies ~ causing thousands of Mirpuri soldiers to return to a communally inflamed Punjab/ Jammu region.

 

The first J&K war started within weeks of Partition and was in all but name a civil war ~ somewhat like the American Civil War. It was a civil war not merely between Kashmir’s National and Muslim Conferences but also between Army regiments who had been jointly fighting Britain’s enemies until very recently.

 

Pakistan’s leadership vacuum started at once. Jinnah was ill and died shortly. Liaquat Ali Khan was the only politician of any experience left. He faced on one side Pashtuns having no wish to be dominated by a new Karachi/ Rawalpindi elite, and on the other side, the Kashmir conflict. The most basic functions of governance never got started. Taking a Census has been one such function since Roman times, yet Pakistan has never had one. Writing a Constitution is another, but Maududi and others demanded “That the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to God Almighty alone and that the Government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent”. As a result, Pakistan’s few constitutionalists have been battling impossibly ever since to overcome the ontological mistake made of assuming that any earthly government, no matter how pious, can be in communication with God Almighty as easily as it can be with foreign governments.

 

The Rule of Law is another basic function. But when Liaquat was himself assassinated in 1951, his assassin was killed on the spot yet the murder remained unsolved. Mashriqi was immediately arrested because of his hostility to the Muslim League, but later released. Because the assassin was Pashtun, Afghanistan was blamed but the Afghan Government proved otherwise. The investigating policeman was killed in an aircrash, and all documents went with him. Final suspicion pointed towards Akbar Khan, the renegade Army general who had led the attack on J&K and was in jail for the Rawalpindi conspiracy. Years later, Liaquat’s widow (the former Irene Pant of Naini Tal) rued the fact no one was ever prosecuted.

 

After Liaquat’s assassination, the period of Ghulam Mohammad, Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, and most importantly, Iskander Mirza leading up to Ayub Khan’s Martial Law in 1958, was simply appalling in its display of the sheer irresponsibility of Pakistan’s new super-elite. Instead of domestic nation-building or fulfilling the basic functions of governance, close comprador relations came to be established with the US and British Governments ~ exemplified by Mirza’s elder son taking the American Ambassador’s daughter as his (first) wife and moving to a lifelong career with the World Bank in Washington. This comprador relationship between Washington, London and Pakistan’s super-elite flourishes and continues to this day. E.g., the current World Bank head and architect of the 2003 Bush invasion of Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz, remains in a mentoring relationship with Shaukat Aziz, a former American bank executive, who is General Musharraf’s Prime Minister. For better or worse, Pakistan’s Government will never veer from the side of Anglo-American policy while such comprador relationships remain intact.

 

Before the 1971 war, West Pakistan was in a frenzy from a propaganda campaign of “Crush India” and “Hang Mujib”. General Niazi’s surrender to General Arora in Dhaka Stadium ~ causing 90,000 PoWs whom India then protected from Bangladeshi revenge ~ shocked Pakistan and shattered the self-image of its Army. ZA Bhutto was the only populist politician of the country ever, and his few years held vanishing promise of a normal political agenda (no matter how economically misguided) finally arising. But Bhutto suppressed the new Baloch revolt with the Shah of Iran’s military help; at the same time he failed to protect his own back against Zia ul Haq’s coup, leading to his judicial murder in 1979. Zia tried to rebuild the Army’s shattered esprit de corps the only way he knew how, which was by indoctrinating the Punjabi officer corps with Sunni dogmatism. This coincided with the Afghan civil war, influx of refugees, and US-Saudi-Chinese plan to defeat the USSR. Pakistan’s super-elite in their comprador role were happy to allow themselves to be used again and be hung out to dry afterwards.

 

All normal branches of Pakistan’s polity, like the electorate,press, political parties, Legislature and Judiciary, have remained at best in ill-formed inchoate states of being. The economy remains, like India’s, one fed on endless deficit finance paid for by unlimited printing of inconvertible paper money, though Pakistan has had relatively more labour emigration and much less foreign investment and technological progress than India. Both are wracked by corruption, poverty, ignorance and superstition.

 

Over half a century, the military has acquired vast economic and political interests and agendas, on pretext of protecting Pakistan from India or gaining “Kashmeer” for it. With few and noble exceptions, academics, politicians and journalists have remained timid in face of fascistic State-power with its militarist/Islamist ideology ~ causing a transferance of the people’s anger and frustration onto an easier target, namely ourselves in India. Anti-Indianism (especially over J&K) remains the sole unifying factor of Pakistan’s super-elite, regardless of what history’s objective facts may have to say. Much political courage and understanding will be needed for that to be reversed.

 

All countries hunger for genuine national heroes who take upon themselves individual risks on behalf of ordinary people. Wali Khan stood up to his father’s jailors, and young Benazir of 1980s vintage to her father’s executioner. But Pakistan has had few such heroes,certainly none among its bemedalled generals. Why AQ Khan is seen as a hero is because he at least took some personal risks, and finally brought Pakistan a kind of respect and independence in the world with his Bomb.

The Greatest Pashtun: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan

THE GREATEST PASHTUN

First published in The Sunday Statesman Editorial Page Special Article, July 16 2006

By

SUBROTO ROY

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988) was without a doubt the greatest political genius the Pashtun people have yet produced.

Understanding the political economy of the Pashto/Pakhto speaking peoples, as well as the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen and other inhabitants of Afghanistan, remains a top intellectual challenge for everyone including themselves. Afghans have hardly lived a peaceful decade since Genghiz Khan destroyed them avenging his grandson in the 13th Century.  Ghazni, Ghor, Peshawar etc. were launch-pads for attacks against the settled people of India’s fertile plains (most recently, the October 1947 attack on Kashmir Valley) while Herat saw wars by and against Iran.

Lyall, one of the architects of 19th Century British policy, thought Afghans “wretched”, “treacherous barbarians with whom it was an unfortunate necessity to have any dealings at all”… “I can only sympathise with the Afghan’s love for his country and his hatred against those who disturb him, although he has no scruple in disturbing others to the best of his savage ability”. Yet the British idea of Russian armies marching into India through Afghanistan was always a wild exaggeration, especially after joint boundary commissions demarcated the imperial spheres of influence. When the Russians did finally enter and occupy Afghanistan in 1978-79, they lived to regret it; and they arrived in independent India on passenger aircraft, were greeted as fraternal socialists selling weapons, and remain so today. Pakistan’s generals exaggerated the prospect of Russia seeking warm water ports, first to Nixon (as Vice President) then to Carter and Reagan, causing the Americans to happily supply weapons which the generals promptly turned against India.

Ghaffar Khan was and remains the only thoughtful figure in Pashtun history who invented a new, living political philosophy as a constructive force for his people’s peace and progress. Even though his ideology failed to take permanent root or survive among them, he commanded universal respect among all Pashtuns and Afghans and became “Badshah Khan” or “Bacha Khan” to them. Afghanistan’s civil war, in which the USSR was pit against the USA, Pakistan etc, stopped with a ceasefire in 1988 for his burial to take place in Jalalabad, with a funeral procession that was miles long.

Pashtun and other Afghan and Arab tribal people have become notorious today by their association with the dogmatism, intellectual insularity and retrograde ideology of Muslim extremism. Yet Osama bin Laden and his Taliban and other friends have been unable to make any moral argument for the cause of violence other than one built on revenge for perceived or misperceived injustices against Muslims. “Because you have done this and this to Muslim people, we are bound by the code of vengeance to do this to you” is just about the entire quantum of moral reasoning contained in Al-Qaida’s statements. “Revenge is a wild kind of justice” and circumstances can exist where injustice is so deep that only revenge suffices in rectification. The current case of the rape-murder of an Iraqi girl and her family by a group of renegade American soldiers may be one such, which explicitly led to the kidnap, torture and murder of some of the soldiers by Iraqis seeking vengeance. But justice too is a civilised kind of revenge, and the transition from a code of revenge to a code of justice is precisely the transition from tribal warfare to civilisation. In Western countries, it occurred recently enough when duelling with swords or pistols came to be banned, giving way to the law of torts.

Ghaffar Khan attempted to change the Pashtun code in this one fundamental and all-important direction by abolishing the right to revenge. In its place he brought the doctrine of non-violence. “I am going to give you such a weapon that the police and the army will not be able to stand against it. It is the weapon of the Prophet, but you are not aware of it. That weapon is patience and righteousness. No power on earth can stand against it.”Patience and righteousness are not political virtues that seem to find much mention in Islamic or Afghan folklore, and doubtless they arose in Ghaffar Khan’s thought and actions at least partly through his encounter with Christian altruism, first with Rev. Wigram his schoolmaster, and later in adult life with the Tolstoy-Thoreau doctrines applied along with Jain ahimsa by MK Gandhi in the movement for Indian independence.

“It is the weapon of the Prophet” was Ghaffar Khan making explicit he was and remained at all times the most devout of Muslims and none could say otherwise; “but you are not aware of it” was his new move to tell his people they had misled themselves by sacerdotalism and needed to read the Prophet’s life and message afresh. He once told M. K. Gandhi how he explained to amazed Punjabi Muslim Leaguers the precise evidence in favour of non-violence from the Prophet’s life in Mecca, leaving his audience speechless.

Today’s “Taliban” were named for their purported piety; Lashkar-e-Taiba even means “Army of the Pious”, the typical image being of pious studious youth seated memorising scriptures in a Pakistani madrassa, and later waving AK-47s in a moving truck. Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar “Servants of God” were their polar opposite. Each of some 120,000 members of the order took a fierce oath to non-violence and renunciation: “I am a Servant of God, and as God needs no service, but serving his creation is serving him, I promise to serve humanity in the name of God; to refrain from violence and from taking revenge; to forgive those who oppress me or treat me with cruelty; to refrain from taking part in feuds and quarrels and from creating enmity; to treat every Pathan as my brother and friend; to refrain from antisocial customs and practices; to live a simple life, to practice virtue, and to refrain from evil; to practice good manners and good behaviour and not to lead a life of idleness… I will sacrifice my wealth, life, and comfort for the liberty of my nation and people… side with the oppressed against the oppressor… live in accordance with principles of nonviolence… serve all God’s creatures alike… my object shall be the attainment of the freedom of my country and my religion. … will never desire any reward whatever for my service. All my efforts shall be to please God, and not for any show or gain.”

In their founder’s words, the Khudai Khidmatgars were to be ready to lay down their own lives for their cause and never take any life doing so. They became far more forceful practitioners of non-violence than their Gandhian Indian counterparts in the struggle for political freedom from the British, and hundreds of them died in Peshawar under British brutality.

In 1893, Durand’s controversial boundary-line gave the British control over the three mountain passes between Afghanistan and India in exchange for raising the annual British subsidy to the Afghan Amir by 50% from Rs 8 lakhs to 12 lakhs. Today, the Durand Line roughly separates perhaps 10 million Pashtun comprising 40% of Afghanistan’s population from perhaps 8 million Pashtun who are Pakistani nationals (no one has exact figures as there has been no census). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Afghan Government backed by the USSR, on pretence that the Durand Line had not been freely accepted by Afghans, wished for a “Pakhtoonistan” under its sway.

Though jailed by the new and nervous Pakistanis, Ghaffar Khan was averse to any truck with the Afghan Government ~ he had not demanded erasing the Durand Line but had demanded a separate and distinct “Pashtunistan”. A mature self-confident federal Pakistan today would bifurcate itself vertically into one or two mountainous western provinces on one side, and two or three river valley eastern provinces on the other. The former could be named “East Pashtunistan” if the Baloch agreed, or East Pashtunistan and Baluchistan otherwise, and extend to the port of Gwadar, while the latter would remain Punjab, Sindh and “Northern Kashmir”.

Along with an Afghan “West Pashtunistan” and an Indian “Southern Kashmir”, a stable design of peaceful nation-states from Iran through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India would be then finally in place. Badshah Khan’s influence in death may yet become greater than his influence in life.

Law, Justice and J&K (2006)

LAW, JUSTICE AND J&K

by SUBROTO ROY

First published in two parts inThe Sunday Statesman, July 2 2006 and The Statesman July 3 2006 Editorial Page Special Article

 

I.

For a solution to J&K to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion in Pakistan and India as well as all people and parties in J&K ~ those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others ~ will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

On August 14, 1947, the legal entity known as “British India”, as one of its final acts, and based on a sovereign British decision made only two months earlier, created out of some of its territory a new State defined in international law as the “Dominion of Pakistan”. British India extinguished itself the very next day, and the newly independent “Dominion of India” succeeded to all its rights and obligations in international law. As the legal successor of the “India” which had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the San Francisco Declaration of 1945, the Dominion of India was already a member of the new UN as well as a signatory to many international treaties. By contrast, the Dominion of Pakistan had to apply afresh to sign treaties and become a member of international organisations. The theory put forward by Argentina that two new States, India and Pakistan, had been created ab initio, came to be rejected and was withdrawn by Argentina. Instead, Pakistan with the wholehearted backing of India was made a member of the UN, with all except Afghanistan voting in favour. (Afghanistan’s exceptional vote signalled presence of conflict over the Durand Line and idea of a Pashtunistan; Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were imprisoned by the Muslim League regime of NWFP which later supported the tribesmen who attacked J&K starting October 22, 1947; that conflict remains unresolved to this day, even after the American attack on the Taliban, the restart of a constitutional process in Afghanistan, and the purported mediation of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.)

Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s distinguished first ambassador to the UN, claimed in September 1947: “Pakistan is not a new member of UNO but a successor to a member State which was one of the founders of the Organisation.” He noted that he himself had led India to the final session of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939, and he wished to say that Pakistan had been present “as part of India… under the latter name” as a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles. This was, however, logically impossible. The Treaty of Versailles long predated (1) Mohammad Iqbal’s Allahabad Address which conceptualised for the first time in the 20th Century a Muslim State in Northwest India; (2) Rahmat Ali’s invention of the word “PAKSTAN” on the top floor of a London omnibus; (3) M. A. Jinnah and Fazlul Haq’s Lahore Resolution; and (4) the final British decision of June 3, 1947 to create by Partition out of “British India” a Dominion named Pakistan. Pakistan could not have acted in international law prior to having come into being or been created or even conceived itself. Zafrullah Khan would have been more accurate to say that the history of Pakistanis until August 14, 1947 had been one in common with that of their Indian cousins ~ or indeed their Indian brothers, since innumerable North Indian Muslim families came to be literally partitioned, with some brothers remaining Indians while other brothers became Pakistanis.

Pakistan was created at the behest of Jinnah’s Muslim League though with eventual agreement of the Indian National Congress (a distant ancestor of the political party going by the same name today). Pakistan arose not because Jinnah said Hindus and Muslims were “two nations” but because he and his League wished for a State where Muslims would find themselves ruled by fellow-Muslims and feel themselves part of a pan-Islamic culture. Yet Pakistan was intended to be a secular polity with Muslim-majority governance, not an Islamic theocracy. That Pakistan failed to become secular was exemplified most poignantly in the persecution Zafrullah himself later faced in his personal life as an Ahmadiya, even while he was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. (The same happened later to Pakistan’s Nobel-winning physicist Abdus Salaam.) Pakistan was supposed to allow the genius of Indo-Muslim culture to flourish, transplanted from places like Lucknow and Aligarh which would never be part of it. In fact, the areas that are Pakistan today had in the 1937 provincial elections shown scant popular Muslim support for Jinnah’s League. The NWFP had a Congress Government in the 1946 elections, and its supporters boycotted the pro-Pakistan referendum in 1947. The imposition of Urdu culture as Pakistan’s dominant ethos might have come to be accepted later in West Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but it was not acceptable in East Bengal, and led inevitably to the Pakistani civil war and creation of Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujib in 1971.

In August 1947, the new Dominions of India and Pakistan were each supposed to protect their respective minority populations as their first political duty. Yet both palpably failed in this, and were reduced to making joint declarations pleading for peace and an end to communal killings and the abduction of women. The Karachi Government, lacking the wherewithal and administrative machinery of being a nation-state at all, and with only Liaquat and an ailing Jinnah as noted leaders, may have failed more conspicuously, and West Punjab, the Frontier and Sindh were soon emptied of almost all their many Sikhs and Hindus. Instead, the first act of the new Pakistan Government in the weeks after August 14, 1947 was to arrange for the speedy and safe transfer of the North Indian Muslim elite by air from Delhi using chartered British aeroplanes. The ordinary Muslim masses of UP, Delhi and East Punjab were left in danger from or were subjected to Sikh and Hindu mob attacks, especially as news and rumours spread of similar outrages against Pakistan’s departing minorities.

In this spiral of revenge attacks and counter-attacks, bloodshed inevitably spilled over from West and East Punjab into the northern Punjabi plains of Jammu, though Kashmir Valley remained conspicuously peaceful. Zafrullah and Liaquat would later claim it was this communal civil war which had caused thousands of newly decommissioned Mirpuri soldiers of the British Army, and thousands of Afridi and other Frontier tribesmen, to spontaneously act to “liberate” J&K’s Muslims from alleged tyranny under the Hindu Ruler or an allegedly illegal Indian occupation.

But the main attack on J&K State that began from Pakistan along the Manshera-Muzaffarabad road on October 22, 1947 was admittedly far too well-organised, well-armed, well-planned and well-executed to have been merely a spontaneous uprising of tribesmen and former soldiers. In all but name, it was an act of undeclared war of the new Dominion of Pakistan first upon the State of J&K and then upon the Indian Dominion. This became obvious to Field Marshall Auchinlek, who, as Supreme Commander of the armed forces of both India and Pakistan, promptly resigned and abolished the Supreme Command in face of the fact that two parts of his own forces were now at war with one another.

II.

The invaders failed to take Srinagar solely because they lost their military purpose while indulging in the Rape of Baramula. Thousands of Kashmiri women of all communities ~ Muslim, Sikh and Hindu ~ were violated and transported back to be sold in markets in Peshawar and elsewhere. Such was standard practice in Central Asian tribal wars from long before the advent of Islam, and the invading tribesmen shared that culture. India’s Army and Air Force along with the militias of the secular democratic movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and those remaining loyal units of J&K forces, fought off the invasion, and liberated Baramula, Naushera, Uri, Poonch etc. Gilgit had a British-led coup détat against it bringing it under Pakistan’s control. Kargil was initially taken by the Pakistanis and then lost by them. Leh could have been but was not taken by Pakistani forces. But in seeking to protect Leh and to retake Kargil, the Indian Army lost the siege of Skardu ~ which ended reputedly with the infamous communication from the Pakistani commander to his HQ: “All Sikhs killed; all women raped.”

Legal theory

Now, in this grave mortal conflict, the legal theory to which both the Indian and Pakistani Governments have been wedded for sixty years is one that had been endorsed by the British Cabinet Mission in 1946 and originated with the Butler Commission of 1929. Namely, that “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Indian India” of the “Native States” could and did occur with the extinction of British India on August 15, 1947. By this theory, Hyderabad, J&K, Junagadh and the several other States which had not acceded to either Dominion were no longer subject to the Crown’s suzerainty as of that date. Both Dominions drew up “Instruments of Accession” for Rulers to sign upon the supposed “Lapse” of Paramountcy that was to occur with the end of British India.

Ever since, the Pakistan Government has argued that Junagadh’s Ruler acceded to Pakistan and Hyderabad’s had wished to do so but both were forcibly prevented by India. Pakistan has also argued the accession to India by J&K’s Ruler was “fraudulent” and unacceptable, and Sheikh Abdullah was a “Quisling” of India and it was not his National Conference but the Muslim Conference of Ibrahim, Abbas and the Mirwaiz (precursor of the Hurriyat) which represented J&K’s Muslims.

India argued that Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan or Hyderabad’s independence were legal and practical impossibilities contradicting the wills of their peoples, and that their integration into the Indian Dominion was carried out in an entirely legitimate manner in the circumstances prevailing.

On J&K, India has argued that not only had the Ruler requested Indian forces to fight off the Pakistani attack, and he acceded formally before Indian forces were sent, but also that democratic principles were fully adhered to in the unequivocal endorsement of the accession by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference and further by a duly called and elected J&K Constituent Assembly, as well as generations of Kashmiris since. In the Indian view, it is Pakistan which has been in illegal occupation of Indian territory from Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit to Skardu all the way to the Khunjerab Pass, Siachen Glacier and K2, some of which it illegally ceded to its Communist Chinese ally, and furthermore that it has denied the peoples of these areas any democratic voice.

Roman law

In June 1947, it was uniquely and brilliantly argued by BR Ambedkar in a statement to the Press that the British had made a catastrophic error in comprehending their own constitutional law, that no such thing as “Lapse” of Paramountcy existed, and that suzerainty over the “Native States” of “Indian India” would be automatically transferred in international law to the successor State of British India. It was a legal illusion to think any Native State could be sovereign even for a single logical moment. On this theory, if the Dominion of India was the sole successor State in international law while Pakistan was a new legal entity, then a Native State which acceded to Pakistan after August 15, 1947 would have had to do so with the consent of the suzerain power, namely, India, as may be said to have happened implicitly in case of Chitral and a few others. Equally, India’s behaviour in integrating (or annexing) Junagadh and Hyderabad, would become fully explicable ~ as would the statements of Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel before October 1947 that they would accept J&K going to Pakistan if that was what the Ruler and his people desired. Pakistan unilaterally and by surprise went to war against J&K on October 22, declared the accession to India “fraudulent”, and to this day has claimed the territory of the original State of J&K is “disputed”. Certainly, even if the Ambedkar doctrine is applied that no “Lapse” was possible under British law, Pakistan did not recognise India’s jurisdiction there as the suzerain power as of August 15, 1947. Altogether, Pakistan’s sovereign actions from October 22 onwards amounted to acting to annex J&K to itself by military force ~ acts which came to be militarily resisted (with partial success) by India allied with Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference and the remaining forces of J&K. By these military actions, Pakistan revealed that it considered J&K territory to have descended into a legal state of anarchy as of October 22, 1947, and hence open to resolution by “Military Decision” ~ as is indeed the just outcome under Roman Law, the root of all municipal and international law today, when there is a contest between claimants over an ownerless entity.

Choice of nationality

Hence, the present author concluded (“Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman December 1-3, 2005) that the dismemberment of the original J&K State and annexation of its territories by India and Pakistan that has occurred since 1947, as represented first by the 1949 Ceasefire Line and then by the 1972 Line of Control, is indeed the just and lawful outcome prevailing in respect of the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. The remaining “democratic” question described has to do with free individual choice of nationality by the inhabitants, under conditions of full information and privacy, citizen-by-citizen, with the grant of permanent residency rights by the Indian Republic to persons under its jurisdiction in J&K who may choose not to remain Indian nationals but become Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani nationals instead. Pakistan has said frequently its sole concern has been the freedom of the Muslims of J&K under Indian rule, and any such genuine concern shall have been thereby fully met by India. Indeed, if Pakistan agreed to act similarly, this entire complex mortal problem of decades shall have begun to be peacefully resolved. Both countries are wracked by corruption, poverty and bad governance, and would be able to mutually draw down military forces pit against one another everywhere, so as to begin to repair the grave damage to their fiscal health caused by the deleterious draining away of vast public resources .

Pakistan’s Allies

PAKISTAN’S ALLIES

First published in two parts in The Sunday Statesman, June 4 2006, The Statesman June 5 2006, Editorial Page Special Article

by Subroto Roy

From the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar creating the State of Jammu & Kashmir until the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Britain and later the USA became increasingly interested in the subcontinent’s Northwest. The British came to India by sea to trade. Barren, splendid, landlocked Afghanistan held no interest except as a home of fierce tribes; but it was the source of invasions into the Indian plains and prompted a British misadventure to install Shah Shuja in place of Dost Mohammad Khan leading to ignominious defeat. Later, Afghanistan was seen as the underbelly of the Russian and Soviet empires, and hence a location of interest to British and American strategic causes.

In November 1954, US President Dwight Eisenhower authorized 30 U-2 spy aircraft to be produced for deployment against America’s perceived enemies, especially to investigate Soviet nuclear missiles which could reach the USA. Reconnaissance balloons had been unsuccessful, and numerous Western pilots had been shot down taking photographs from ordinary military aircraft. By June 1956, U-2 were making clandestine flights over the USSR and China. But on May 1 1960, one was shot or forced down over Sverdlovsk, 1,000 miles within Soviet territory. The Americans prevaricated that it had taken off from Turkey on a weather-mission, and been lost due to oxygen problems. Nikita Kruschev then produced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, who was convicted of spying, though was exchanged later for a Soviet spy. Powers had been headed towards Norway, his task to photograph Soviet missiles from 70,000 ft, his point of origin had been an American base 20 miles from Peshawar.

America needed clandestine “forward bases” from which to fly U-2 aircraft, and Pakistan’s ingratiating military and diplomatic establishment was more than willing to offer such cooperation, fervently wishing to be seen as a “frontline state” against the USSR. “We will help you defeat the USSR and we are hopeful you will help us defeat India” became their constant refrain. By 1986, the Americans had been permitted to build air-bases in Balochistan and also use Mauripur air-base near Karachi.

Jammu & Kashmir and especially Gilgit-Baltistan adjoins the Pashtun regions whose capital has been Peshawar. In August-November 1947, a British coup d’etat against J&K State secured Gilgit-Baltistan for the new British Dominion of Pakistan.

The Treaty of Amritsar had nowhere required Gulab Singh’s dynasty to accept British political control in J&K as came to be exercised by British “Residents” in all other Indian “Native States”. Despite this, Delhi throughout the late 19th Century relentlessly pressed Gulab Singh’s successors Ranbir Singh and Partab Singh to accept political control. The Dogras acquiesced eventually. Delhi’s desire for control had less to do with the welfare of J&K’s people than with protection of increasing British interests in the area, like European migration to Srinagar Valley and guarding against Russian or German moves in Afghanistan. “Sargin” or “Sargin Gilit”, later corrupted by the Sikhs and Dogras into “Gilgit”, had an ancient people who spoke an archaic Dardic language “intermediate between the Iranian and the Sanskritic”. “The Dards were located by Ptolemy with surprising accuracy on the West of the Upper Indus, beyond the headwaters of the Swat River (Greek: Soastus) and north of the Gandarae (i.e. Kandahar), who occupied Peshawar and the country north of it. This region was traversed by two Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hsien, coming from the north about AD 400 and Hsuan Tsiang, ascending from Swat in AD 629, and both left records of their journeys.”

Gilgit had been historically ruled by a Hindu dynasty called Trakane; when they became extinct, Gilgit Valley “was desolated by successive invasions of neighbouring rulers, and in the 20 or 30 years ending with 1842 there had been five dynastic revolutions. The Sikhs entered Gilgit about 1842 and kept a garrison there.” When J&K came under Gulab Singh, “the Gilgit claims were transferred with it, and a boundary commission was sent” by the British. In 1852 the Dogras were driven out with 2,000 dead. In 1860 under Ranbir Singh, the Dogras “returned to Gilgit and took Yasin twice, but did not hold it. They also in 1866 invaded Darel, one of the most secluded Dard states, to the south of the Gilgit basin but withdrew again.”

The British appointed a Political Agent in Gilgit in 1877 but he was withdrawn in 1881. “In 1889, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British Government, acting as the suzerain power of Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency”. The Agency was re-established under control of the British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir. “It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas”. In 1935, the British demanded J&K lease to them for 60 years Gilgit town plus most of the Gilgit Agency and the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkuman. Hari Singh had no choice but to acquiesce. The leased region was then treated as part of British India, administered by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi, first through the Resident in J& K and later a British Agent in Peshawar. J& K State no longer kept troops in Gilgit and a mercenary force, the Gilgit Scouts, was recruited with British officers and paid for by Delhi. In April 1947, Delhi decided to formally retrocede the leased areas to Hari Singh’s J& K State as of 15 August 1947. The transfer was to formally take place on 1 August.

On 31 July, Hari Singh’s Governor arrived to find “all the officers of the British Government had opted for service in Pakistan”. The Gilgit Scouts’ commander, a Major William Brown aged 25, and his adjutant, a Captain Mathieson, planned openly to engineer a coup détat against Hari Singh’s Government. Between August and October, Gilgit was in uneasy calm. At midnight on 31 October 1947, the Governor was surrounded by the Scouts and the next day he was “arrested” and a provisional government declared.

Hari Singh’s nearest forces were at Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, a few miles downstream from where the Indus is joined by Gilgit River. The 6th J& K Infantry Battalion there was a mixed Sikh-Muslim unit, typical of the State’s Army, commanded by a Lt Col. Majid Khan. Bunji controlled the road to Srinagar. Further upstream was Skardu, capital of Baltistan, part of Laddakh District where there was a small garrison. Following Brown’s coup in Gilgit, Muslim soldiers of the 6th Infantry massacred their Sikh brothers-at-arms at Bunji. The few Sikhs who survived escaped to the hills and from there found their way to the garrison at Skardu.

On 4 November 1947, Brown raised the new Pakistani flag in the Scouts’ lines, and by the third week of November a Political Agent from Pakistan had established himself at Gilgit. Brown had engineered Gilgit and its adjoining states to first secede from J&K, and, after some talk of being independent, had promptly acceded to Pakistan. His commander in Peshawar, a Col. Bacon, as well as Col. Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary in the new Pakistan and later to lead the first military coup détat and become President of Pakistan, were pleased enough. In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat.

The peak of Pakistan’s Anglo-American alliance came with the enormous support in the 1980s to guerrilla forces created and headquartered in Peshawar, to battle the USSR and Afghan communists directly across the Durand Line. It was this guerrilla war which became a proximate cause of the collapse of the USSR as a political entity in 1991. President Ronald Reagan’s CIA chief William J. Casey sent vast sums in 1985-1988 to supply and train these guerrillas. The Washington Post and New Yorker reported the CIA training guerrillas “in the use of mortars, rocket grenades, ground-to-air missiles”. 200 hand-held Stinger missiles were supplied for the first time in 1986 and the New Yorker reported Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s “Hizbe Islami” guerrillas being trained to bring down Soviet aircraft. “Mujahideen had been promised two Stingers for every Soviet aircraft brought down. Operators who failed to aim correctly were given additional training… By 1986, the United States was so deeply involved in the Afghan war that Soviet aircraft were being brought down under the supervision of American experts”. (Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 1988, p. 234).

The budding US-China détente brokered by Pakistan came into full bloom here. NBC News on 7 January 1980 said “for the first time in history (a senior State Department official) publicly admitted the possibility of concluding a military alliance between the United States and China”. London’s Daily Telegraph reported on 5 January 1980 “China is flying large supplies of arms and ammunition to the insurgents in Afghanistan. According to diplomatic reports, supplies have arrived in Pakistan from China via the Karakoram Highway…. A major build-up of Chinese involvement is underway ~ in the past few days. Scores of Chinese instructors have arrived at the Shola-e-Javed camps.”

Afghan reports in 1983-1985 said “there were eight training camps near the Afghan border operated by the Chinese in Sinkiang province” and that China had supplied the guerrillas “with a variety of weapons including 40,000 RPG-7 and 20,000 RPG-II anti tank rocket launchers.” Like Pakistan, “China did not publicly admit its involvement in the Afghan conflict: in 1985 the Chinese Mission at the UN distributed a letter denying that China was extending any kind of help to the Afghan rebels” (Anwar, ibid. p. 234). Support extended deep and wide across the Arab world. “The Saudi and Gulf rulers … became the financial patrons of the Afghan rebels from the very start of the conflict”. Anwar Sadat, having won the Nobel Peace Prize, was “keen to claim credit for his role in Afghanistan…. by joining the Afghanistan jihad, Sadat could re-establish his Islamic credentials, or so he believed. He could thus not only please the Muslim nations but also place the USA and Israel in his debt.” Sadat’s Defence Minister said in January 1980: “Army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels; they are being supplied with weapons from Egypt” and Sadat told NBC News on 22 September 1981 “that for the last twenty-one months, the USA had been buying arms from Egypt for the Afghan rebels. He said he had been approached by the USA in December 1979 and he had decided to `open my stores’. He further disclosed that these arms were being flown to Pakistan from Egypt by American aircraft. Egypt had vast supplies of SAM-7 and RPG-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons which Sadat agreed to supply to Afghanistan in exchange for new American arms. The Soviet weapons, being light, were ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. … the Mujahideen could easily claim to have captured them from Soviet and Afghan troops in battle.… Khomeini’s Iran got embroiled in war (against Iraq) otherwise Kabul would also have had to contend with the full might of the Islamic revolutionaries.” (Anwar ibid. p. 235).

Afghanistan had been occupied on 26-27 December 1979 by Soviet forces sent by the decrepit Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov to carry out a putsch replacing one communist, Hafizullah Amin, with a rival communist and Soviet protégé, Babrak Karmal. By 1985 Brezhnev and Andropov were dead and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had begun his attempts to reform the Soviet system, usher in openness, end the Cold War and in particular withdraw from Afghanistan, which by 1986 he had termed “a bleeding wound”. Gorbachev replaced Karmal with a new protégé Najibullah Khan, who was assigned the impossible task of bringing about national reconciliation with the Pakistan-based guerrillas and form a national government. Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 having lost 14,500 dead, while more than a million Afghans had been killed since the invasion a decade earlier.

Not long after Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, Gregory Zinoviev had said that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, `Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). Now instead, the Afghan misadventure had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire itself, the USSR ceasing to be a political entity by 1991, and even Gorbachev being displaced by Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin in a new Russia.

What resulted for the people of the USA and Britain and the West in general was that they no longer had to live under threat of hostile Soviet tanks and missiles, while the people of Russia, Ukraine and the other erstwhile Soviet republics as well as Eastern Europe were able to throw off the yoke of communism that had oppressed them since the Bolshevik Revolution and instead to breathe the air of freedom.

What happened to the people of Afghanistan, however, was that they were plunged into further ghastly civil war for more than ten years. And what happened to the people of Pakistan was that their country was left resembling a gigantic Islamist military camp, awash with airfields, arms, ammunition and trained guerrillas, as well as a military establishment enlivened as always by perpetual hope that these supplies, provisions and personnel of war might find alternative use in attacks against India over J& K. “We helped you when you wished to see the Soviet Union defeated and withdrawing in Afghanistan”, Pakistan’s generals and diplomats pleaded with the Americans and British, “now you must help us in our wish to see India defeated and withdrawing in Kashmir”. Pakistan’s leaders even believed that just as the Soviet Union had disintegrated afterwards, the Indian Union perhaps might be made to do the same. Not only were the two cases as different as chalk from cheese, Palmerstone’s dictum there are no permanent allies in the politics of nations could not have found more apt use than in what actually came to take place next.

 

 

Pakistan’s generals and diplomats felt betrayed by the loss of Anglo-American paternalism towards them after 1989.

Modern Pakistanis had never felt they subscribed to the Indian nationalist movement culminating in independence in August 1947. The Pakistani state now finally declared its independence in the world by exploding bombs in a nuclear arsenal secretly created with help purchased from China and North Korea. Pakistan’s leaders thus came to feel in some control of Pakistan’s destiny as a nation-state for the first time, more than fifty years after Pakistan’s formal creation in 1947. If nothing else, at least they had the Bomb.

Secondly, America and its allies would not be safe for long since the civil war they had left behind in Afghanistan while trying to defeat the USSR now became a brew from which arose a new threat of violent Islamism. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, whom Pakistan’s military and the USA had promoted, now encouraged unprecedented attacks on the American mainland on September 11 2001 ~ causing physical and psychological damage which no Soviet, Chinese or Cuban missiles ever had been allowed to do. In response, America attacked and removed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, once again receiving the cooperative use of Pakistani manpower and real estate ~ except now there was no longer any truck with the Pakistani establishment’s wish for a quid pro quo of Anglo-American support against India on J&K. Pakistan’s generals and diplomats soon realised their Anglo-American alliance of more than a half-century ended on September 11 2001. Their new cooperation was in killing or arresting and handing over fellow-Muslims and necessarily lacked their earlier feelings of subservience and ingratiation towards the Americans and British, and came to be done instead under at least some duress. No benefit could be reaped any more in the fight against India over Jammu & Kashmir. An era had ended in the subcontinent.

A Philosophical Conversation between Prof. Sen & Dr Roy

A Philosophical Conversation between Prof Sen & Dr Roy

First published in The Sunday Statesman, “8th Day”, May 14 2006 (this is now reproduced also as Wittgenstein & Economic Theory II 2006 : Subroto Roy Amartya Sen dialogue)

ROY: …The philosophers Renford Bambrough and John Wisdom would have been with you at Cambridge….

SEN: Wisdom I knew better; he was at my College; but you know my philosophy was not an important thing at the time. Among the philosophers there, it was C. D. Broad with whom I chatted more. But Wisdom I knew, and he mainly tried to encourage me to ride horses with him, which I didn’t.

ROY: You went to Cambridge in …

SEN: I went to Cambridge in 1953.

ROY: So Wittgenstein had just died…

SEN: Wittgenstein had died.

ROY: Only just in 1952 (sic; in fact he died in 1951).

SEN: But I knew a lot about the conversations between Wittgenstein and Sraffa because Sraffa was alive; I did a paper on that by the way.

ROY: Well that’s what I was going to ask, there is no trace of your work on Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinians.

SEN: I don’t know why. My paper was published in the Journal of Economic Literature a couple of years ago. Now mind you it’s not a conclusion, just an interpretation, what was the role of Gramsci in the works of Sraffa and Wittgenstein, what is it that Sraffa actually did in intermediating between them.

ROY: In your book Identity and Violence, I was curious to find you call yourself a “dabbler” in Philosophy yet at the same time you are an eminent Professor of Philosophy at Harvard for decades. The question that arose was, were you being modest, and if so, truly or falsely?

SEN (laughs): I think if you make a statement which you suspect might have been made out of modesty and then I said it was because of modesty I think I would have eliminated the motivation for the statement as you identify it. I am not going to answer the question as to what I think.

ROY: But surely you are not a “dabbler” in Philosophy?

SEN: I am interested in Philosophy is what I meant, and whether I am a dabbler or whether I’ve succeeded in making some contribution is for others to judge. But not for me to judge.

ROY: Okay.

SEN: As for me, the right description is that I am a dabbler in Philosophy. But then that diagnostic is… mine, and I won’t go to war with others if someone disputes that. But it’s not for me to dispute it.

ROY: Would you, for example in reference to our discussion about Wittgenstein, say that you have contributed to Philosophy in and of itself regardless of Economics?

SEN: Most of my work on Philosophy has got nothing to do with Economics. It is primarily on Ethics, to some extent on Epistemology. And these are not “economic” subjects. I have never written on the “Philosophy of Economics” at all.

ROY: How about Ontology? I mean the question “What there is” would be…..

SEN: I am less concerned with Ontology or with Metaphysics than some people are. I respect the subject but I have not been involved.

ROY: You have not been involved?

SEN: Well, I have read a lot but I haven’t worked on it. I have worked on Ethics and Political Philosophy and I have worked on Epistemology and I have worked a little bit on Mathematical Logic. Those are the three main areas in which I have worked.

ROY: Why I say that is because, if the three main philosophical questions are summarised as “What is there?” (or “Who am I?”), “What is true?”, “What should I do?”, then the question “Who am I?” is very much a part of your concern with identity and a universal question generally, while “Is this true?” is relevant to Epistemology and “What should I do?” is obviously Ethics. Morton White summarised philosophy in those three questions. It seems to me you have in this book had to look at…

SEN: At all three of them.

ROY: Well, some Ontology at least.

SEN: But you know I agree with your diagnostic that the second question “What I regard myself to be, is that true?”, is a question of Epistemology, because that’s the context in which “Is it true?” comes in. The second is primarily an epistemological question. The third is, as you said, primarily an ethical question, though I do believe that the dichotomy between Epistemology and Ethics is hard to make. On that subject I would agree with Hilary Putnam’s last book, namely when he speaks of “the collapse of the fact-value dichotomy” which is sometimes misunderstood and described as the collapse of the fact-value distinction, which is not what Hilary Putnam is denying, he’s arguing that the dichotomy is very hard to sustain, because the linkages are so strong, that pursuit of one is always taking you into the other. But the first question you are taking to be an ontological question, “Who am I?”, and at one level you can treat it as that, but there is a less profound aspect of “Who am I?”, namely what would be the right way of describing me, to myself and to others, and that has a deep relationship with the second question. If the separation or dichotomy between the second and third raises some philosophical questions of significance, the dichotomy between the first and second would too. So “Who am I?” can be interpreted at a profound ontological level but it could also be interpreted at a level which is primarily fairly straightforward Epistemology. And it is at that level that I am taking that question to be. Namely: Am I a member of many different groups? Do I see myself as members of many different groups? If I do not see myself as members of many different groups, am I making a mistake in not seeing that I belong to many different groups? Is it the case that implicitly I often pursue things which are dependant on my seeing myself as being members of other groups than those which I explicitly acknowledge? These are the central issues of the “Who am I?” question in this book.

ROY: Well you haven’t used the word “identity” here but when you speak in your book of people having a choice of different identities, you are plainly not referring to multiple identities in the sense of the psychologist; are you not merely saying that everyone has different aspects or dimensions to his or her life, and is required to play different roles at different times in different contexts? Or is there something beyond that statement in your notion of “choice of identities”?

SEN: What I mean by “multiple identities” is, at one level, the most trivial, common but, at another level, most profoundly important recognition that we belong to many different groups: I’m an Indian citizen, I’m a British or American resident, I’m a Bengali, the poetry I like is Bengali poetry, I’m a man, I’m an economist, I belong to all these groups. Nothing complicated about that, and the multiple identity issues of the psychologist that you’re referring to indicate a certain level of complexity of humanity, and sometimes even of pathology perhaps, but that’s not what I am concerned with here, it’s just a common fact that there are many different groups to which any person belongs. And it’s on that extraordinarily simple fact that I am trying to construct a fairly strong, fairly extensive set of reasonings, because that forces us to see the importance of our own choice, our own decisions in deciding on how should I see myself, how would it be correct to see myself given the problems I am facing today, and given the priorities that I will have to examine.

ROY: But if we don’t use the word “groups” just for a minute, then we are not too far wrong to just say that everyone has different aspects or dimensions to their lives, so one dimension could be nationality, one dimension sexuality, one dimension one’s intellectual upbringing, then any person, any character in a novel would have different dimensions….

SEN: The difficulty with that, Subroto, is that in the same aspect we may have more than one…

ROY: Dimension?

SEN: Well dimension tries to capture in a Cartesian space a rather more complex reality, and you know I don’t think this is a metric space we are looking at, so dimensionality is not a natural thought in this context. One thing I am very worried about is when something which is very simple appears to people as being either profoundly right or profoundly mistaken. I’ll try to claim that it is right and it is not very profound but that it is not very profound does not mean people don’t miss it and end up making mistakes. In terms of the aspects of my life which concern my enjoying poetry, there may be many different groups to which I belong, one of them is that I can appreciate Bengali poetry in a way that I will not be able to appreciate poetry in some language which I speak only very little, like Italian poetry for example. But on the other hand, in addition to that, in the same aspect of my appreciating poetry, there may be the fact that I am not as steeped into historical romance which also figures in poetry or patriotic poetry and these are all again classifications which puts me in some group, in the company of some and not in the company of others, and therefore an aspect does not quite capture with the precision the group classification that I was referring to does capture.

ROY: Well, groups we can quarrel about perhaps because groups may not be well- defined…

SEN: Don’t go away Subroto but that does not make any difference, because many groups are not well-defined but they are still extremely important…

ROY: Of course there are overlapping groups…

SEN: Not only overlapping, but you know that is a different subject on the role of ambiguity, that is a very central issue in Epistemology, and the fact of the matter is that there are many things for which there are ambiguities about border which are nevertheless extremely important as part of our identity. Where India begins and China ends or where China begins and India ends may not be clear, but the distinction between being an Indian and being Chinese is very important, so I think that this border dispute gets much greater attention in the social sciences than it actually deserves.

ROY: Well, one of the most profoundly difficult and yet universally common dilemmas in the modern world has to do with women having to choose between identities outside and inside the home. Does your theory of identity apply to that problem, and if so, how?

SEN: I think the choice is never between identities, the choice is the importance that you attach to different identities all of which may be real. The fact of the matter is that a woman may be a member of a family, a woman is also a member of a gender, namely being a woman, a woman may also have commitment to her profession, may have commitment to a politics…

ROY: Does your theory help her in any way, specifically?

SEN: The theory is not a do-it-yourself method of constructing an identity. It is an attempt to clarify what are the questions that anyone who is thinking about identity has to sort out. It is the identification of questions with which the book is concerned, and as such, insofar as the woman is concerned… indeed the language that you use Subroto, that what you have to choose between identities, I would then say that what I am trying to argue is that’s not the right issue, because all these would remain identities of mine but the relative importance that I attach to the different identities is the subject in which I have to make a choice, and that’s the role of the theory…

ROY: They are all different aspects of the same woman.

SEN: Yes indeed. If not explicitly then implicitly, but that is part of the recognition that we need, it is not a question that by giving importance to one of those compared with the others you’re denying the other identities. To say that something is more important than another in the present context is not a denial that the other is also an identity. So I think the issue of relative importance has to be distinguished from the existence or non-existence of these different identities.

ROY: Well, you’ve wished to say much about Muslims in this book….

SEN: That’s not entirely right. I would say that I do say something about the Muslims in this book….

ROY: … yet one gets the impression that you have not read The Quran. Is that an accurate impression?

SEN: No, it’s not.

ROY: You have read The Quran?

SEN: Yes.

ROY: In English, presumably?

SEN: In Bengali to be exact. Not in Arabic, you probably have read it in Arabic.

ROY (laughs): No, just in English. Is it possible to understand a Muslim’s beliefs until and unless one sees the world from his/her perspective? I had to read The Quran to see if I could understand — attempt to understand — the point of view of Muslims. Does one need to read The Quran in order to see their perspective?

SEN: Well it depends on how much expertise you want to acquire. That is, if you have to understand what the Quranic beliefs are, to which Muslims as a group – believing Muslims, who identify themselves as believing and practising Muslims – as opposed to Muslims by ancestry and therefore Muslims in a denominational sense, yes indeed, if you want to pursue what practising and believing Muslims practise and believe then you would have to read The Quran. But a lot of people would identify themselves as Muslim who do not follow these practises or for that matter beliefs, but who would still identify themselves as Muslims because in the sense of a community they belong to that. I mean even Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not follow many of the standard Muslim practises, that did not make him a non-Muslim because a “Muslim” can be defined in more than one way. One is to define somebody who is a believing and practising Muslim, the other is somebody who sees himself as a Muslim and belongs to that community, and in the context of the world in which he lives that identity has some importance which it clearly had in the case of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

ROY: Well, Muslims like Jews and Christians believe the Universe had a deliberate Creation; Hindus and Buddhists may not quite agree with that. Muslims will further believe that the Creator spoke once and only once definitively through one man, namely Muhammad in the 7th Century in Arabia. Would you not agree that no person can deny that and still be a Muslim?

SEN: I think you’re getting it wrong Subroto. It said Muhammad was the last prophet, it does not deny that there existed earlier prophets. Therefore it’s not the case as you said that God spoke alone and uniquely and only once.

ROY: Definitively?

SEN: No, no, Muslims believe that it was definitely spoken at each stage — as a follow up, like Christians misunderstood what message the prophet called Jesus was carrying and they deified Jesus, there was a need for turning a page, that’s the understanding; it’s not the case that’s what Muslims believe, that is not the Quranic view at all, that God spoke only once to Muhammad, that’s not the Quranic belief

ROY: True, true enough..

SEN: But you said that Subroto!

ROY: What I meant was “definitively”, the word “definitively” meaning that…
SEN: Definitively they would say that at each stage there was a memory, and the memory and the understanding got corrupted over time and that’s why they were also so wild about idolatry for example

ROY: Well the Ahmadiyas, for example, are considered non-believers by many Muslims because they claim that there …

SEN: That also brings out the point I was making, that Ahmadiyas see themselves as Muslim….

ROY: Indeed.

SEN: …and in terms of one of the definitions of Muslim that I am giving you, namely as a person who sees himself as a Muslim, or herself as a Muslim, and regards that identity to be important is a Muslim according to that definition; another one would apply a test which is what many of the more strict Sunnis and Shias do, namely, that whether they accept Muhammad as the last prophet, and insofar as Ahmadiyas don’t accept that, then they would say then you are not Muslim…

ROY: Well they do actually…

SEN: Well they do, but in terms…I think what I am telling you is that in terms of the Shia-Sunni orthodox critique they say that in effect they don’t accept that, that is the charge against them, but those who believe that would say that on that ground Ahmadiyas are not Muslim. So I think there is a distinction in the different ways that Muslims can be characterised….

see also

Modern World History

MODERN WORLD HISTORY

by Subroto Roy

First published in The Sunday Statesman, Editorial Page Special Article May 7 2006

MUCH as we in India might like to think we were the central focus of Britain’s national life in the 19th and 20th Centuries, we were not. India’s matters were handled mostly by a senior cabinet minister to whom the governor-general or viceroy reported. Though possession and control of India gave the British a sense of mission, self-importance and grandeur, and events in India (mostly bad ones) could hog the newspapers for a few days, it was never the case that India dominated Britain’s political consciousness or national agenda for any length of time. British prime ministers and diplomatists, from Pitt through Canning, Palmerston, Peel, Gladstone, Granville, Disraeli and Salisbury, mostly had other concerns of foreign policy, mostly in Europe and also in the Americas, Africa, and the Near and Far East. India was peripheral to their vision except as a place to be held against any encroachment.

A French historian used to begin lectures on British history saying “Messieurs, l’Angleterre est une ile.” (“Gentlemen, Britain is an island.”) The period of unambiguous British dominance of world diplomacy began with Pitt’s response to the French Revolution, and unambiguously ended in 1917 when Britain and France could have lost the war to Germany if America had not intervened. Since then, America has taken over Britain’s role in world diplomacy, though Lloyd George and Churchill, to a smaller extent Harold Wilson, and finally Thatcher, were respected British voices in world circles. Thatcher’s successor Major failed by seeming immature, while his successor Blair has failed by being immature to the point of being branded America’s “poodle”, making Britain’s loss of prestige complete.

Between Pitt and Flanders though, Britain’s dominance of world affairs and the process of defining the parameters of international conduct was clear. It was an era in which nations fought using ships, cannon, cavalry and infantry. The machine-gun, airpower and  automobile had been hardly invented. Yet it is amazing how many technological inventions and innovations occurred during that era, many in Britain and the new America, vastly improving the welfare of masses of people: the steam-engine, the cotton gin, railways, electricity, telecommunications, systems of public hygiene etc. The age of American dominance has been one of petroleum, airpower, guided missiles and nuclear energy, as well as of penicillin and modern medicine.

It was during the period 1791-1991, between the French Revolution and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that world diplomacy created the system of “Western” nation-states, from Canning’s recognition of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia etc to the emergence of the European Union. There is today peace in Europe and it has become unthinkable there will be war between e.g. France and Germany except on a soccer pitch. Even the unstable Balkans have stabilised. The transition from British to American dominance occurred during and because of the 1914-1918 World War, yet that war’s causes had nothing to do with America and hence America’s rise has been somewhat fortuitous. The War superficially had to do with those unstable Balkans in the summer of 1914 and the system of alliances developed over the previous 100 years; beneath was the economic rise of the new Germany.

Austro-Hungary went to war against Serbia, causing Germany its ally into war with Russia, Serbia’s ally. Belgium’s neutrality was guaranteed through British diplomacy by the Treaty of London in 1839 signed by Austria, France, Britain, Russia and Prussia. This “scrap of paper” Germany tore up to invade Belgium on 4 August 1914, because it was easier to attack France through Belgium than directly as most French generals had expected. Though Germany had no dispute with France, France was Russia’s ally, and the Germans had long-feared fighting on two fronts against larger but more slowly mobilising forces. Violation of Belgian neutrality caused Britain into war with Germany. So all Europe was at war from which it would fail to extricate itself without American intervention. This arrived in 1917 though it too had been provoked by German submarines sinking American ships in the Atlantic. The actual impact of American forces entering the battlefields was small, and it was after the Armistice, when the issue arose of reparations by Germany to everyone and repayments by Britain and France to America, that America’s role became dominant. New York took over from London as the world’s financial capital.

Woodrow Wilson longed to impose a system of transparent international relations on the Europeans who had been used to secret deals and intrigues. He failed, especially when America’s Senate vetoed America’s own entry into the League of Nations. America became isolationist, wishing to have nothing more to do with European wars ~ and remains to this day indifferent towards the League’s successor. But the War also saw Lenin’s Bolsheviks grab power after Russia extricated itself from fighting Germany by the peace of Brest-Litovsk. And the Armistice saw the French desire to humiliate and destroy German power for ever, which in turn sowed the seeds for Hitler’s rise. And the War also had led to the British making the Balfour Declaration that a Jewish “National Home” would arise in Palestine in amity and cooperation with the Arabs. The evolution of these three events dominated the remainder of the 20th Century ~along with the rise and defeat of an imperialist Japan, the rise of communist China, and later, the defeat of both France and America in Vietnam.

Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September. The next day in faraway India, the British in a panic started to place Jinnah on an equal footing as Gandhi ~ astounding Jinnah himself as much as anyone since his few supporters had lost the 1937 elections badly, especially in the provinces that today constitute the country he wished for. After the defeat and occupation of Germany and Japan, America’s economic supremacy was unquestionable. Utterly exhausted from war, the British had no choice but to leave India’s angry peoples to their own fates, and retreated to their fortified island again ~ though as brown and black immigration increased with the end of Empire, many pale-skinned natives boarded ships for Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  America came to have much respect for its junior British ally during the fight against Hitler and later in the political battle against the USSR. It was Thatcher who (after battling Argentina in the South Atlantic) led Reagan to make peace with Gorbachov. With the end of Soviet communism, Germany would be unified again. All across Christendom there was peace for the first time ever, and a militarily powerful nuclear-armed Israel had been created too in the old Palestine. In this new period of world history, the Security Council’s permanent members are the modern version of the “Great Powers” of the 19th Century. The American-led and British-supported destruction of Baathist Iraq, and threatened destruction of Khomeinist Iran mark the final end of the League of Nations’ ethos which had arisen from the condemnation of aggression. In Osama bin Laden’s quaint idiom, there seems a battle of “Crusaders” and “Zionists” against Muslim believers. Certainly Muslim believers (which means most Muslims as there are relatively few agnostics and atheists among them) think that it is obvious that the Universe was created, and that its Creator finally and definitively spoke through one human being in 7th Century Arabia. Many people from North Africa to the Philippines are not often able to conceive how things might have been otherwise. The new era of history will undoubtedly see all kinds of conversations take place about this rather subtle question.

Iran’s Nationalism (2006)

IRAN’S NATIONALISM

 

Is America close to breaking its pledged word?

  First published in The Statesman Editorial Page, 6 April 2006

 

by

 

Subroto Roy

 

 

Ayatollah Khomeini was the Ho Chi Minh of Iran. Ho was both a communist and a Vietnamese nationalist, but America’s Presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon failed to see the latter. Khomeini was both a devout Shia Muslim and an Iranian nationalist yet America’s Presidents from Carter to W. Bush refused to see his Revolution being as much about Iranian nationalism as about creating an Islamic Republic. As a general rule, Western countries allow for nationalism among other Western countries but not among non-Western countries. Immanuel Kant’s dictum of treating everyone as an end in himself/herself and not as a means towards one’s own ends, is applied in intra-Western international relations but often not when the West deals with others. But Indians did not have to be communists to sympathise with Vietnam’s struggle against first France and then America, and Indians do not have to be Shia Muslims to sympathise with Iran’s struggle against an impending Anglo-American aggression. The opaque Manmohan- Montek deal-making with America on behalf of India’s people may need to be set aside in such a context — while it might benefit several dozen businesses on both sides and several hundred bureaucrats may become even fatter with bribes, it may have next to nothing to do with any dimension of India’s national interests.

 

 

US pledge 1981, policy 2006

 

On January 19 1981, the Government of the United States signed what came to be called the Algiers Accord, the first point of which stated: “Non-Intervention in Iranian Affairs: The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” This was part of a comprehensive truce between Khomeini’s Iran and the USA in regard to the war-like conditions then prevailing between them. That pledge now seems about to be broken. British newspapers reported on April 2 2006 that the Blair Government is holding “secret talks” with its own Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of Defence Intelligence and others to discuss “an American-led attack, designed to destroy Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear bomb… if Tehran’s leaders fail to comply with United Nations demands to freeze their uranium enrichment programme.” This is despite the British foreign minister saying last month “that a military attack against Iran was ‘inconceivable’”. America’s “National Security Strategy” dated March 16 2006 states the policy clearly: “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to ‘be wiped off the face of the earth’. The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided. As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The problems lie with the illicit behavior and dangerous ambition of the Iranian regime, not the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people. Our strategy is to block the threats posed by the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing.“

 

 

 

Attack scenario

 

In one scenario, America will make a surprise cruise-missile attack on Iranian buildings “suspected” of producing biological weapons. If the Iranians respond in any way other than total submission, it will be sufficient to launch a major bombing of Iran’s military facilities using B-2 bombers based in Diego Garcia, England and other American bases, possibly using nuclear “earth penetrating” weapons to attack underground facilities. Of course it is not impossible the British and Americans are merely setting up a bluff to scare the Iranians into complying without a fight, but the existence of aggressive war plans and preparations cannot be doubted.

 

Now it is possible the Americans will say they are not bound by the pledge made in the Algiers Accord in January 1981 to not intervene in Iran’s affairs. In breach of all diplomatic law, 66 Americans had been taken captive by Iranians seizing the American Embassy on November 4 1979. Six others escaped with the help of the Canadian and Swedish embassies. Of the 66, 13 women and black Americans were released two weeks later; one man was released due to ill-health in July 1980. The remaining 52 including two women and one black American were released on January 20 1981 by the terms of the Algiers Accord just before Ronald Reagan took over as President of the United States. Eight American military personnel were killed on April 25 1980 in a failed attempt to rescue them. The official designations of the 52 (who had been held captive for 444 days) included 10 military attachés; 6 “communications and electronics specialists”; 8 political and administrative officers, and 12 diplomatic/consular staff. In addition there were 12 guards and 4 others. Even if the US Embassy in Tehran was a den of spies as the Iranians claimed, the Revolutionary Government could have ordered them all to leave and to have ended diplomatic relations in accordance with international law. What explained Iranians’ anger for them to have violated international law so brazenly? That was the age before terrorism, and nor was Iran a player in the conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

 

Iran’s anger stemmed from having felt being used by Britain, America and Soviet Russia for half a century before the 1979 Khomeini Revolution – from having been merely means towards their ends in violation of the Kantian dictum. It was almost as if Britain and America had said to Iran and the entire Middle East, “We invented the internal combustion engine and the automobile which uses it, and we also discovered the petroleum that runs it; the mere fact you happen to sit on this petroleum does not make you own it; we own it too and we will take it by force whenever necessary.” During the Cold War, the USSR followed suit, and now after the Cold War has ended, the new Russia is a Western ally in the same kind of attempted domination over non-Western countries like Iran (or Pakistan and India, who get sold a lot of useless weapons to fight each other with).

 

 

 

Mossadeq the democrat

 

Specifically, if the January 1981 Algiers Accord was signed by the USA under duress, the Iranians could say that Iran had been cheated into signing the 25 year agreement of September 1954 with an international oil consortium led by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Iran would receive 50% profit on all Iranian oil exported, after paying the AIOC ₤25 million in compensation for having nationalised it in 1951 under the democratic government of Mohammad Mossadeq which had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain. Mossadeq was overthrown by an Anglo-American coup détat in August 1953, and replaced by the compliant General Fazlollah Zahedi and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Arthur Millspaugh, an American invited by the Iranians to help their public finances, once wrote: “Persia cannot be left to herself, even if the Russians were to keep their hands off politically. …Persia has never yet proved its capacity for independent self-government.” Millspaugh’s 1925 book titled America’s Task in Persia seems to have remained the handbook of Western policy towards Iran. Khomeini’s Revolution was its antithesis.

Imperialism redux

IMPERIALISM REDUX

Business, Energy, Weapons And Foreign Policy

First published in The Statesman March 14 2006 Editorial Page Special Article

By Subroto Roy

If souls can transmigrate, so may souls of companies, and future historians might well look back and say that the new US-India “CEO Forum” heralded the modern rebirth of the East India Company. Like the old Company, the new Forum has many ambitious, competent people. The American side includes heads of AES Corporation, Cargill Inc., Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Honeywell, McGraw-Hill, Parsons Brinckerhoff Ltd, PepsiCo, Visa International and Xerox Corporation. The Indian side includes heads of Tata Group, Apollo Hospitals Group, Bharat Forge Ltd, Biocon India Group, HDFC, ICICI One Source, Infosys, ITC Ltd, Max India Group and Reliance Industries — all stalwarts of what Mr Kanu Sanyal’s Naxals would have termed India’s “comprador bourgeoisie”.

Business advocacy
Presiding over the Indian side has been Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trusted confidante, Montek Singh Ahluwalia (whose family moved to the USA after 20 years in India). Indeed it may have been his idea to have a government-sponsored business initiative. A “US-India Business Council” has existed for thirty years in Washington as “the premier business advocacy organization promoting US commercial interests in India.… the voice of the American private sector investing in India”. But for both Governments to sponsor private business via the Forum was “unprecedented” as noted by Washington’s press during Dr Singh’s visit in July 2005. The State Department (America’s foreign ministry) announced it saying: “Both our governments have agreed that we should create a high-level private sector forum to exchange business community views on key economic priorities…”

The Forum seems to have gone well beyond exchanging business community views, and has had a clear impact in the sudden redefinition of the direction of India’s foreign, military and energy policy. When Dr Singh addressed America’s legislature, the main aspect of the speech he read there had to do with agreeing with the American President “to enhance Indo-US cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology”. And nuclear energy has suddenly begun to dominate India’s news and national political agenda — even though the 2503MW of nuclear power produced in the country accounts for merely 4% of our civilian energy needs, barely significant. But before nuclear or any other deals could be contemplated with American business, the Dabhol payouts were required to be made. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board — or rather, its sovereign guarantor the Government of India — paid out at least $140-$160 million each to General Electric and Bechtel Corporations in “an amicable settlement” of the Dabhol affair. (When is the last word going to be said on that?) Afterwards, General Electric’s CEO for India was kind enough to say “India is an important country to GE’s global growth. We look forward to working with our partners, customers, and State and Central Governments in helping India continue to develop into a leading world economy”.

A weak and corrupt Delhi
Such nice rhetoric was on close display during the deal-making leading up to and beyond President George W. Bush’s recent India visit. America’s Ambassadors are mostly political appointees and special friends of the President of the day; the present Ambassador to India is a prominent Texas businessman, and business has been driving American thinking with India all the way. After Dr Singh’s visit, the US Foreign Commercial Service reportedly said American engineering firms, equipment suppliers and contractors faced a $1000 bn (1 bn = 100 crore) opportunity in India. Before the Bush visit, Dr Singh signed vast purchases of commercial aircraft from Boeing and Airbus, as well as large weapons’ deals with France and Russia. After the Bush visit, the US Chamber of Commerce has said the nuclear deal can cause $100 bn worth of new American business in India’s energy-sector alone. Getting American legislators to agree will require “massive grassroots efforts” at lobbying politicians, saying that “energy-starved” India will now become open “to US investment in key areas from IT and telecom to pharmaceuticals and insurance”. Mr Bush’s foreign minister Condoleezza Rice (who has authored the political aspects of the new India-orientation) and her pointman Nicholas Burns have said, “we are suggesting India-specific amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954… It’s a waiver authority … We are not seeking relief from US law for any country in the world except India and we don’t anticipate putting any country forward. So it is India specific.” India will separate by 2014 closely entwined civilian and military nuclear facilities and put 14 of 22 civilian nuclear reactors under international inspection.

Now the East India Company had not intended to rule India but ended up dictating to a weak and corrupt Delhi, waging wars across Bengal, the Deccan and North India, and inducing “regime change” all over the place among local satraps. In the modern context, the American Government and its businessman Ambassador to the Delhi Court have made it crystal-clear India’s support has been expected in the matter of American policy towards Iran. Dr Singh has been his own Foreign Minister, crafting his America policy aided by Mr Ahluwalia on one hand and Mr M. K. Narayanan on the other. None of the three has diplomatic, historical or foreign policy-making experience. Mr Narayanan is a retired officer of domestic counter-intelligence (which is traditionally Pakistan-specific). Dr Singh and Mr Ahluwalia are retired economic officials. None has ever outlined for public scrutiny any views on India’s history, politics or foreign policy in any book or essay. India’s historians and career diplomats (and not just the most loquacious and greedy ones) have been silenced. Yet this is a time when a well-respected Indian world figure (though unfortunately there may be none, except Zubin Mehta) could have brought Iran and Israel to the conference table together. Iran must recognise Israel and the two countries must exchange ambassadors if the present tension is not to degenerate into more war in our region. Israel needs to declare itself a nuclear weapons’ power and not be belligerent towards Muslims, and Iran could be allowed to pursue its nuclear research within reason. It is in India’s and Pakistan’s common interests to see that Jimmy Carter’s extension of the Monroe doctrine to include the Persian Gulf be replaced by the Zionist philosopher Martin Buber’s idea of a “federative structure” for the peoples of the East. Instead the reverse is happening.

What economics does say
Dr Singh and Mr Ahluwalia may say economics has been driving their new foreign policy. But what economics actually says is that Government should have nothing to do with any kind of business. Government should encourage competition in all avenues of economic activity and prevent or regulate monopoly, and also see to it that firms pay taxes they are due to pay. But that is it. It is as bad for Government to pamper organised business and organised labour with subsidies of any kind as it is to make enterprise difficult with red tape and hurdles. Businessmen are grown ups and should be allowed to freely risk their capital and make their profits or their losses without public intervention. Government’s role is to raise taxes and provide public goods and services properly. We need to remind ourselves that India is a large, populous country with hundreds of millions of materially poor ill-informed citizens, a weak tax-base, a humongous internal and external public debt (i.e. debt owed by the Government to domestic and foreign creditors), a non-investment grade credit-rating in world financial markets, massive annual fiscal deficits, an inconvertible currency, nationalized banks, and runaway printing of paper-money. There is plenty of serious economics that has yet to begin to be done in the country. New Delhi must wake up from its self-induced dreaming.

War or Peace (2006)

WAR OR PEACE

By SUBROTO ROY

First published in The Statesman

Editorial Page Special Article, February 23-24, 2006

An American Attack On Iran Will End The Post-1945 System Of Nation-States

The relevance of the Iran-USA conflict to India’s energy, nuclear and strategic future is obvious, yet it appears ill understood by New Delhi’s bureaucrats and politicians, whether neo-communist or neo-fascist. It is understood even less by Islamabad’s army generals, all of whose official brainpower has been perpetually consumed by one subject alone: how to obtain J&K for Pakistan by hook or by crook from India. Yet Iran’s potential nuclear weapons arose entirely thanks to sales by Pakistan’s AQ Khan and the ISI — friends or allies of the USA, just like Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein once had been. We may surmise that a possible war will be quite catastrophic for the world, and India’s and Pakistan’s region of it in particular.

Israel’s piecemeal strategy
The Americans and Israelis may be assumed to have developed over years contingency plans to attack Iran by air and/or sea, though Israel is unlikely to take any offensive role in view of the circumstances of the end of Ariel Sharon’s political career. For one hundred years, the security and prosperity of the Zionist migration to Palestine, which came to be transmuted into the Israeli Republic in the middle of the 20th Century, has been defined as a matter of vital national interest first by Britain and then by America. Badly outnumbered by hostile Muslim countries, Israel after the 1973 Yom Kippur war adopted a long-term piecemeal strategy of diplomacy with Egypt, Jordan and North Africa; co-existence with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; battle with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians leading to co-existence; and indirect war, using the USA and UK as proxies, with Iraq and Iran leading in due course to co-existence.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Revolution in 1978-1979 caused Iran’s Islamic Republic to start to pose a major ideological threat to Israel. But during the decade of the Iran-Iraq war that started immediately after the Iranian Revolution, neither could pose any possible military threat to Israel. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was a result of the Iran-Iraq war, and since then Saddam has been neutralised by the Americans as a military threat to Israel. A new Iran, torn between a modern future for itself and a return to its revolutionary origins, is the last Muslim nation-state that could possibly threaten Israel. Pakistan would never dare to do so, nor wish to do so in view of its single-minded obsession for almost sixty years with trying to obtain J&K from India, or to dominate India any which way it can. The Pakistanis — having been Indians previously (even A Q Khan was born in Bhopal) — want to rule or dominate Delhi, or at least display their self-styled superiority to Hindus. They are uninterested from a psychological perspective in what happens to European and American Jews in the Middle East because they are mostly of Indian origin themselves.

Pakistanis’ explicit hatred (or implicit love) of India is at least in part a hatred (or love) of themselves. The US State Department and Pentagon have realised that as long as they tilt towards Pakistan on J&K now and then, the Pakistani Government will stay obsessed with its relationship with India alone, and also remain an American ally.

Possible nuclear strike
The questions to be asked now are when the Americans will make an attack on Iran, what manner it will take, and what Iranian and Muslim and world reaction will be. Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear facilities a quarter century ago taught the Iranians to go underground and disperse their facilities around the country. Conventional heavy B52, B2 or Stealth bombing or cruise-missile attacks using ships, submarines and carrier-based aircraft from American forward bases in Diego Garcia, the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, Turkey or former Soviet Republics will kill at least 10,000 Iranians even if there are American warnings to evacuate human populations. Much physical havoc will be caused to Iran’s two dozen main nuclear installations, delaying or crippling Iran’s ambitions by years. But it is unlikely such attacks will succeed in wiping out Iran’s capacity. America’s warplans may thus include exploding small nuclear warheads on Iran’s suspected installations. If that happens, it would be the first use of atomic weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  It is doubtful if the world as a whole will actually condemn American use of heavy bombing or even small nuclear weapons against Iran in anything but words. Permanent changes in the post-1945 system of international institutions will certainly result. Kofi Annan (or his successor) will resign, ending the UN staff’s effete pontificating. Indeed, all the inefficient, corrupt international bureaucracies in New York, Washington, Geneva and elsewhere may come to close down. The Japanese Left will weep and wring their hands while the Right will renew calls for Japan’s re-militarization.  North Korea’s Kim will issue warnings of how crazy he is. India’s PMO and MEA will express deepest concern, sorrow and tears; after the communists bluster about in Delhi and Kolkata, this will be enlarged to unequivocal condemnation. But India’s anti-Muslim brigades will remain silent and smiling and the VHP/Bajrang Dal will say it is revenge for Nadir Shah and assorted other Iranian plunderers in India’s past. JNU, AMU etc. historians and Bollywood and Tollywood showbiz personalities will hold seminars and processions and shake their fists at America. Pakistan’s Government will issue strong condemnations and call in the American Ambassador for a talking to, then explain to the Karachi street-mobs how important it is to continue the alliance with America so that J&K may be gained for Pakistan one day. The Hurriyat and other friends of Pakistan will agree with Pakistan and demonstrate in Srinagar against India and America. Russia will privately regret its impotence while Putin will refuse to turn up at a G-8 meeting in protest. The Chinese will shake their heads, warning Taiwan not to think itself as loved by America as Israel is. Muslim countries will rant and rave Death to America, and recruit thousands of new suicide bombers. France and Britain will look for new reconstruction or weapons contracts once the smoke clears. Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, Canada and New Zealand will hold candle-light peace vigils. South America’s leftists will decry Il Nord from high in the Andes or deep in the Amazon. Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Dalai Lama and the Pope will condemn the inhumanity of it all. Australia will agree with America. That may be just about all, except the oil price will reach $200 a barrel momentarily, then settle at $150 for ever, causing large macroeconomic problems for several years in the world economy.

The new ideology
Iran itself will be plunged into greater political and economic disarray than it is in already. It is unlikely to be intimidated into accepting Western conditions straightaway. Nor will it experience any kind of “regime-change” with Non-Resident Iranian-Americans coming back from Los Angeles to try their hand at a little government and money-making at home. Iran would launch conventional war against the 140,000 American infantry in Iraq as well as missiles against Israel, but is unlikely to make much successful war against American or Israeli interests. But Iraq’s Shia majority would join with them, and make America’s departure more prompt from an anarchic, chaotic and disintegrating Iraq, hanging Saddam Hussein before they go. Essentially, Iran’s ability to pose any conceivable military threat to Israel will have been militarily neutralized, just as has happened to Iraq recently, and to Egypt, Jordan etc. by diplomacy and foreign aid ever since Jimmy Carter’s Sadat-Begin summit in 1978. Syria and Lebanon’s Hezbollah will remain but Israel can on its own battle them defensively anytime.

The cost of having eliminated all possible military threats to Israel permanently will have been rendering chaos and immense destruction upon the erstwhile Republics of Iran and Iraq. But that is not a cost that America’s public cares very much about, and so will not appear much on American TV screens or America’s public memory for very long. Iraq and Iran will have been neutralised and destroyed as legal entities and modern nation-states, being left instead as large oil-fields and chaotic/anarchic polities and societies under sway of American and Western military forces. The return in the 21st Century to the pre-1945 world of imperialism would entail an end of the system of worldwide nation-states that was attempted with the United Nations experiment (the progeny of US President Woodrow Wilson’s “League of Nations”), and the imposition of a new ideology of the West vs. the Rest.

A Mature Israel Is The Key To Averting An American Attack On Iran

It would be better for everyone in the world, including Israel and America, if an American attack against Iran could somehow be averted. Muslim cultures have much long-term patience — a virtue modern American culture most conspicuously lacks. There are Iraqi mothers who have promised their unborn sons for vengeance against America and Iranian mothers may well join them. America’s TV-driven culture can barely remember who said or did what last week, whereas ideological Muslims rehearse and revisit endlessly every day what supposedly happened in Muslim history over 1200 years ago. Indeed ideological Muslims and their orthodox Jewish and Christian fundamentalist adversaries have all tended to be obsessed with the purported ancient histories of the three faiths that arose in the deserts of Palestine and Arabia — though none of these religious histories or any other may be able to withstand very much rigorous academic or scientific scrutiny.

Martin Buber
What has been forgotten too has been the early joint history of Zionists and Palestinians together. Founders of Zionism, including Theodor Herzl himself, who began his campaign in Vienna about 1897 in response to European anti-Jewish behaviour, envisioned “brotherhood” and “cooperation” with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, where new Jewish immigrants were to find refuge from the decades of tyranny against them in Europe long before Hitler arose. Martin Buber, the profound Hasidic philosopher and Zionist, corresponded with Rabindranath Tagore about the need to build a strong “federative” structure among all the peoples of the East — because the peoples of the West seemed to Buber to have become lost and aimless. (It is not impossible America’s entry into the First World War in 1917, which thwarted a possible German victory, was part of a complicated trade-off in which the Balfour Declaration by Britain promising creation of an Israel, living peacefully with the Arabs in Palestine, was another part.) It was only later revisionist Zionists, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, who proposed a complete separation of Jew from Arab in that small land — which is where we seem to have been headed now decades later. Israel and Pakistan were the only two countries created in the 20th Century, and about the same time, supposedly as “homelands” for people based on religious definitions alone. The Zionist Movement was ongoing by the early 1930s, and young Rahmat Ali, the lonely ideological inventor of the term “PAKSTAN” on the top floor of a London bus in 1934, might well have been influenced by what he heard of it.

The one way war may be preventable today is if Israel’s political centre and right-wing (i.e. the Kadima and Likud parties) came to obtain and declare a clear and justifiable view that (a) an American attack on Iran would be counter- productive; and/or (b) that an Iran, even a nuclear armed Iran, shall not be a tangible threat to Israel. If an American attack on Iran is ultimately premised on the defence of Israel, and if the Israelis themselves come to justifiably believe such an attack overall could be a very bad thing and told the Americans so publicly or privately, there would no longer be reason for the Americans to be preparing to make such an attack, and instead could keep their almost 600 warships and submarines in harbour or on normal patrol around the world.

Israeli security assessment

There may be enough reason on both these points for Israel’s toughest hawks to agree that superior alternatives to war need to be and can be found. On the first, Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel’s domestic security agency, Shin Bet, has recently said that Israel may yet come to regret the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. His confidential speech to students preparing for military service came to be secretly recorded and was then broadcast on Israeli TV. “When you dismantle a system in which there is a despot who controls his people by force, you have chaos… I’m not sure we won’t miss Saddam”, saying a strong dictatorship may have been better than the present “chaos” in Iraq. Israeli security assessments are likely to be far more astute than what gets to be produced in America’s East Coast think tanks. The near-chaos the Bush-Blair invasion of Iraq in 2003 has caused will be multiplied several fold if there was now a major attack on Iran, let aside use of atomic bombs against it. Such an attack may be in fact wholly counterproductive.

Secondly, Israel needs to abandon her feigned immaturity and coyness with respect to her erstwhile Anglo-American guardians, and instead demonstrate to the world and her neighbours in particular that she is a mature and responsible adult in international politics. Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr. have said in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists May/June 2004 that Israel had promised the USA “it [would] not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East…A taboo was created… By September 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and President Richard Nixon had reached a new secret understanding of the issue. Meir pledged that Israel would not declare its nuclear status, would not test its weapons, and would not use its nuclear capability for diplomatic gains. Rather, the Israeli bomb would be kept in the basement, for use only as a last resort. Israel would not join the NPT, but it would not defy it either. What had begun as a taboo turned into a symbiotic policy. The United States stopped pressuring Israel and accepted a de facto policy of `don’t ask, don’t tell’. …Today … Israel’s policy of nuclear secrecy stands in profound tension with the basic values upon which the country’s democracy rests: the principles of accountability, oversight, and the public’s right to know. In the absence of public debate (and public debate requires some factual information) the taboo only reinforces and perpetuates itself….By becoming more transparent and by associating itself in some way with the nonproliferation regime — from which it indirectly benefits — Israel could gain an important element of legitimacy for its program and for its security posture…. The basic technology needed to create nuclear weapons is increasingly available. Capabilities once possessed only by a few governments can now be purchased in stores and marketplaces around the world. If nuclear weapon states are ever to achieve deep cuts in their nuclear stockpiles — an important part of the basic bargain of the NPT and essential to the long-term viability of the treaty — some account has to be taken of Israel, India, and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. They must be integrated into the non- proliferation regime”.

The road to peace
Israel declaring itself a nuclear weapons power of long-standing with an independent deterrent the size of France or Britain (with perhaps 500 nuclear warheads, more than China, India and Pakistan combined), would be more than enough by way of military warning to its potential adversaries. Indeed even if Iran (having bought from Pakistan’s programme which itself had bought from North Korea and China) was allowed over the next dozen years to crawl towards half a dozen nuclear warheads of its own, recognition and normal diplomatic relations between Israel and Iran, and Israel and Pakistan, could be followed by a new protocol between Israel, India, Pakistan and Iran. Israel, India and Pakistan are not signatories to the existing NPT and Iran has now declared its intent, as a sovereign signatory, to exit the NPT as well. To get Iran and Israel to recognise one another and establish diplomatic relations would be of course a masterly feat of international diplomacy. But it is not impossible if adequate knowledge and determination can be mustered in good time before it becomes too late. Finally of course, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned in his Farewell Address to the American people in 1961, an “alert and knowledgeable citizenry” must also rein in America’s “military industrial complex”.

see also https://independentindian.com/2006/04/06/irans-nationalism/

Separation of Powers: India, the USA, Pakistan

SEPARATION OF POWERS (2006)

Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws outlined a doctrine that applies to India, the USA and all constitutional democracies: there is no monopoly of political wisdom.

By SUBROTO ROY
First published in The Sunday Statesman, The Statesman Editorial Page,

Special Article Feb 12-13 2006

The Speaker’s noble office is that of the single member of the House, traditionally chosen by unanimity, whose task it is to self-effacingly maintain order in Parliamentary debate and proceedings, so that the House’s work gets done. C’est tout. Once chosen Speaker, he ipso facto retires from partisan politics for life. The Speaker neither contributes to the substance of Parliamentary debate (except in the rare case of a tie) nor has to feel personally responsible for Parliament’s conduct.

Our Parliament has tended to become so dysfunctional since Indira Gandhi and her sycophants destroyed its traditions 30 years ago, that supervising its normal work is an onerous enough task for even the finest of Speakers to handle.

The Lok Sabha’s incumbent Speaker has tended to see himself as the champion of Parliament.  He need not.  He does not command a majority in the Lok Sabha; the Government Party does. We have had the oddest peculiarity unfolding in India at present where the person who does command the Lok Sabha’s majority, and therefore who would be normally defined as Prime Minister of India, has chosen to nominate someone who is not a member of the Lok Sabha to act as Prime Minister, i.e. to command the Lok Sabha’s majority. (The Rajya Sabha was and remains irrelevant to most things important to Indian democracy, regardless of its narcissism and vanity). Someone with access to 10 Janpath should have told Sonia Gandhi in May 2004 that if she did not wish to be PM and wanted to gift the job to someone else, she should do so to someone who, like herself, had been elected to the Lok Sabha, like Pranab Mukherjee (elected for the first time) or Kamal Nath or Priya Ranjan (both veterans).

Manmohan Singh, a former Lok Sabha candidate, may as Finance Minister have been able to progress much further with economic reforms. But sycophancy has ruled the roost in the Congress’s higher echelons, and nobody had the guts to tell her that. Indeed as early as December 2001, Congress leaders knew that in the unlikely event they won the polls, Manmohan Singh would likely be PM by Sonia Gandhi’s choice (though he was not expected to last long at the top), and yet he did not contest the Lok Sabha polls in 2004.

The Government of the day, not the Speaker, is Parliament’s champion in any discussion with the Supreme Court over constitutional rights and Separation of Powers. And the Government has in fact quietly and sensibly requested the Supreme Court to set up a Constitutional Bench for this purpose. Such a Constitutional Bench shall have cause to ask itself how far Kesavananda Bharati needs to be tweaked if at all to accommodate the contention that Parliament has a right to judge its own members. The Court may well likely say that of course Parliament has a right to judge its own members but even that right is not an absolute right, (nothing is). Even Parliament’s right to judge its own members must be in accordance with natural law, with principles of justice, with due and clearly defined processes. E.g. the established Privileges Committee and not the ad hoc Bansal Committee had to do the needful.

Imagine a hypothetical case of fantastic fiction where half a dozen independent MPs are elected to a future Lok Sabha, and then take it upon themselves to expose corruption and shenanigans of all major political parties. Our fantastic super-heroes become whistleblowers within Parliament itself while remaining totally incorruptible as individuals — like Eliot Ness’s team who jailed Al Capone and other gangsters, and came to be depicted in Hollywood’s The Untouchables. These Untouchables would come to be feared and despised by everyone from Communists on one side of the political spectrum to Fascists on the other. They would upset everybody precisely because they were so clean and were not purchasable. The Government and Opposition of the day might wellgang up to expel such troublemakers and even fabricate charges to do so. (Now there’s a script for a Bollywood movie!)

What our Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench decides now in the matter at hand will determine the fate of our super-heroes in such a future fantasia. The present case is a polar opposite — where MPs have been caught on camera with their sordid fingers in the cookie-jar, and then made to walk the plank immediately by their peers. Yet natural law applies here as it will to our fantastic future fighters, and this is what the Bench would have to speak on.

Why the present situation continues to be disconcerting is because the whole country heard all the holier-than-thou protestations, yet everyone continues to take a very dim view of what they see of politicians’ behaviour. There remain strong suspicions that only a few very tiny tips of very large icebergs were or can be caught on camera. Large-scale deals and contracts involve payments into invisible bank accounts, not petty cash into pockets or even suitcases filled with cash sloshing around Delhi.

What we have desperately needed in the situation is modern prime ministerial leadership which could intelligently and boldly guide national debate in the right direction on the whole matter of probity in public life. Why a distinguished parliamentarian like the Speaker has found himself in the limelight is because neither the de jure nor de facto Prime Ministers of India are anywhere to be seen thinking on their feet on these central issues of constitutional procedure and practice. They tend to use prepared scripts and may be temperamentally disinclined to do what has been called for by these unscripted circumstances. (Indeed the much-maligned H. D. Deve Gowda could be alone among the bevy of recent PMs who has been able to think on his feet at all.)

Collapse Before Executive Power

In the meantime, the United States is going through its own Separation of Powers’ crisis. As explained in these columns previously, the American system is distinctly different from the British, and our own system is midway between them. Yet similar principles may be discerned to apply or fail to be applied in all.

Winston Churchill once perspicaciously observed:

“The rigid Constitution of the United States, the gigantic scale and strength of its party machinery, the fixed terms for which public officers and representatives are chosen, invest the President with a greater measure of autocratic power than was possessed before (the First World War) by the Head of any great State. The vast size of the country, the diverse types, interests and environments of its enormous population, the safety-valve function of the legislatures of fifty Sovereign States, make the focussing of national public opinion difficult, and confer upon the Federal Government exceptional independence of it except at fixed election times. Few modern Governments need to concern themselves so little with the opinion of the party they have beaten at the polls; none secures to its supreme executive officer, at once the Sovereign and the Party Leader, such direct personal authority.”

America’s Legislative Branch has, on paper, strong powers of advice and consent to control errors, excesses or abuse of power by the Executive President. But (with rare and courageous exceptions like Sen. Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia) the Legislature cravenly collapsed before the father-son Bush presidencies in regard to the Middle East wars of recent years. America’s once-revered federal judiciary has also tended to lose its independence of mind with overt politicisation of judicial appointments in recent decades.

Bush the First went to war against Saddam Hussein (a former American ally against Islamic Iran) at least partly with an eye to winning re-election in 1992 (which he would have done as a result but for a random shock known as Ross Perot; Bill Clinton became the beneficiary). Bush the Second obsessively wished to follow up on the same, to the point of misjudging the real threat to America from Bin Laden and fabricating a false threat from an emasculated Saddam.

America’s Legislature palpably failed to control her Presidents. Now, late in the day, after all the horses have bolted, the Senate Judiciary Committee began tepid hearings on February 5 2006 into whether the President authorized laws to be broken with impunity in regard to wire-tapping some 5,000 citizens (doubtless mostly non-white and Muslim) without judicial warrants. Republican Senator Arlen Specter, the Committee’s Chairman, has said he believes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been “flatly” violated, and “strained and unrealistic” justifications are now being offered. Bush’s men, from his Vice President and Attorney General to political intelligence operatives, have brazenly placed in the dustbin the traditional principle fiat justitia pereat mundus — let justice be done even if the world perishes — saying that the Sovereign can do just as he pleases to save the realm from external enemies as he might perceive and define them to be.

What this kind of collapse in current American practice reveals is a new aspect unknown at the time of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws. In the modern world, Separation of Powers involves not merely constitutional institutions like Executive, Legislature and Judiciary but also the normal civil institutions of a free and open society, especially academic institutions and the press. In America, it has been not merely the Legislature and Judiciary which have tended to collapse before Executive Power in regard to the recent Middle East wars, but the media and academia as well.

“Embedded reporters” and Fox TV set the tone for America’s official thought processes about Iraq and the Muslim world — until it has become too late for America’s mainstream media or academics to recover their own credibility on the subject. On the other hand, unofficial public opinion has, in America’s best traditions, demonstrated using vast numbers of Internet websites and weblogs, a spirited Yankee Doodle individuality against the jingoism and war-mongering of the official polity.

Neither the press nor academia had collapsed the same way during America’s last major foreign wars in Vietnam and Cambodia forty years ago, and it may be fairly said that America’s self-knowledge was rather better then than it is now, except of course there were no Internet websites and weblogs.

Our Pakistani Cousins
Across the border from us, our Pakistani cousins are, from a political and constitutional point of view, cut from the same cloth as ourselves, namely the 1935 Government of India Act, and the Montague-Chelmsford and Morley-Minto reforms earlier. However, ever since Jinnah’s death, they have refused to admit this and instead embarked haplessly on what can only be called an injudicious path of trying to write a Constitution for a new Caliphate. The primary demand of the main scholars influencing this process was “That the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to God Almighty alone and that the Government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent”. By such a view, in the words of Rashid Rida and Maulana Maududi, Islam becomes “the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Lawmaking is their prerogative and legislation must correspond to the mood and temper of their opinion… Islam… altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the viceregency (Khilafat) of man.” (Rosenthal, Islam & the Modern National State, Cambridge 1965.) Pakistan’s few modern constitutionalists have been ever since battling impossibly to overcome the ontological error made here of assuming that any mundane government can be in communication with God Almighty. In the meantime, all normal branches of Pakistan’s polity, like the electorate, press, political parties, Legislature and Judiciary, have remained at best in ill-formed inchoate states of being — while the Pakistan Armed Forces stepped in with their own large economic and political interests and agendas to effectively take over the country and the society as a whole, on pretext of protecting Pakistan from India or of gaining J&K for it. Pakistan’s political problems have the ontological error at their root. Pakistan’s political parties, academics and press, have with rare exceptions remained timid in face of the militaristic State — directing their anger and frustration at an easier target instead, namely ourselves in India. The Pakistan Government’s way of silencing its few political, academic or press dissidents has been to send them into comfortable exile abroad.

Sheikh Abdullah Contrasted
Pakistan’s perpetual constitutional confusion deserves to be contrasted with the clarity of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s thinking, e.g. his 5 November 1951 speech to the Constituent Assembly of J&K: “You are the sovereign authority in this State of Jammu & Kashmir; what you decide has the irrevocable force of law. The basic democratic principle of sovereignty of the nation, embodied ably in the American and French Constitutions, is once again given shape in our midst. I shall quote the famous words of Article 3 of the French Constitution of 1791:- ‘The source of all sovereignty resides fundamentally in the nation. Sovereignty is one and indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptable. It belongs to the nation.’ We should be clear about the responsibilities that this power invests us with. In front of us lie decisions of the highest national importance which we shall be called upon to take. Upon the correctness of our decisions depends not only the happiness of our land and people now, but the fate as well of generations to come.”

Contrasting the Pakistani views of constitution-making with those of Sheikh Abdullah may help to explain a great deal about where we are today on the delicate and profound subject of J&K. (See “Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, December 1—3, 2005)

India’s current debate about Separation of Powers needs to keep at a distance the clear negative examples of our American friends, who have brought upon themselves in recent times a craven collapse of Legislature, Judiciary, press and academia to the Executive President (as Churchill had seemed to predict), as well as of our Pakistani cousins who have continued with general political and civil collapse for half a century. Because our universities are all owned by the State, India’s academics, from Communist to Fascist, have tended to be servile towards it. In respect of the press, the power of independent newspapers has been dwindling, while the new TV anchors have created their own models of obsequiousness and chummery towards New Delhi’s ruling cliques of the day. It thus becomes India’s Supreme Court which remains the ultimate guardian of our Constitution and the safest haven of our very fragile freedoms — besides of course our own minds and hearts.

The Sunday Statesman 12 February 2006
The Statesman 13 February 2006

Diplomatic Wisdom (2006)

DIPLOMATIC WISDOM

by Subroto Roy

Editorial page, The Statesman, January 31 2006

 

Indian diplomacy has, almost accidentally, shown some wisdom. The King of Saudi Arabia should have been long ago invited to be Chief Guest on Republic Day. His Majesty immediately reciprocated with the most gracious words possible: “I consider myself to be in my second homeland. The relationship between India and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an historic one, we have been old friends and, God willing, this visit will renew these historic ties”. Indeed the King should be invited to make a full State visit in the near future travelling all over India, including Srinagar Valley ; where Khruschev and Bulganin went in 1955!

 

India has the second largest population of Muslim believers in the world after Indonesia, and it is only right the Keeper of the Holy Places of Islam should see for himself that India is indeed dar-ul-aman, not the dar-ul-harb that the propaganda of the Pakistanis and their terroristic protégés have made it out to be in Saudi and Gulf power circles.

 

Kalam and the King

The Vajpayee Government deserves a little credit for the present success, because it was they who caused the fact that His Majesty Faisal Ibn Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Al-Saud was hosted by an Indian rocket scientist born in a Muslim family in an impecunious fishing village of Tamil Nadu. The King and his princes would not have failed to feel the poignancy in that. India is also the second largest country of Shiá Islam after Iran, and Ayatollah Khatami was Chief Guest a few years ago when he was President of Iran. It has been argued in these columns (“Solving Kashmir”, The Statesman, December 1-3, 2005) that the solution to J&K requires Indian diplomacy with Iran and Afghanistan as well ; which, incidentally, will make the hollowness of Pakistan’s claims in J&K most obvious.

 

Now the President of the United States is due to visit India shortly. George W Bush is the third Republican President to come to India after Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. His predecessor Bill Clinton came as a single man at the end of his second term, on holiday from a rocky marriage, to dance with Rajasthani women and indulge his love of Indian food. Before Clinton in 2000, the last American President to visit was Jimmy Carter in 1978, who gave a stirring speech to Parliament about democracy after Morarji Desai had defeated Indira Gandhi’s Emergency. George Bush, also in his second term, will come to India amid controversy.

 

“You’re a good man”, Bush condescendingly said to Manmohan Singh in Washington, half-remembering that morning’s intelligence briefing memo. Had our PM been more experienced of the world he could have replied equally loudly: “Thanks, you’re not so bad yourself. Let’s chop some wood next time”. It is almost definite there will be no agreement on the nuclear collaboration deal, and that the dispute erupting over Iran may have enlarged itself. Platitudes will be exchanged but the fact that the President has chosen to combine his visit to India with a visit to his buddies in the Pakistani Government will not go unnoticed in the MEA.

 

“Balance of power” has been the motif of Anglo-American foreign policy in Asia at least ever since the Arabs were induced to revolt against the Turks by Allenby and Lawrence, followed by pitting Iran and the Arabs against each other. The same goes for India and Pakistan. Also, our rather uncouth Communists have vowed to make their presence felt in street-protests and boycotts of Parliament when Bush comes.

 

FDR & Martin Luther King Jr

In this tense atmosphere, where the summit may actually falter rather badly on substance, Manmohan Singh will need to make some important symbolic gestures. Going to meet the Saudi King at the airport was an appropriate gesture. Clinton had expected the Indian PM to meet him too, and was visibly disappointed to land in the middle of the night only amidst the lights of the TV cameras. The Bushes should be met at the airport by our PM and his spouse. The President is our honoured guest and guests are to be treated like gods.

 

In the same vein, four boulevards across India’s largest cities deserve to be named after four American heroes: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Martin Luther King Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower and Abraham Lincoln. The first two were Democrats, the latter two Republicans.

 

Naming a boulevard in New Delhi after FDR would belatedly acknowledge his small, spontaneous yet critical and principled role in support of Indian independence that, shockingly, remains unrecognised in India. Britain could not expect American support against German and Japanese imperialism while expecting the Americans not to support Indian aspirations for national freedom. India’s own academic historians, mostly under influence of either Communist or RSS methodologies, have failed even to produce objective biographies of major national leaders, let aside candid accounts of British rule, the development of the Indian nation-state, the Transfer of Power or Partition.

 

The same intellectual sloppiness has extended to economics too, and underlies the gross misunderstanding of India’s monetary and fiscal histories as was outlined recently in these columns. It has required a young American scholar, Dinyar Patel, writing in an official American Government publication to outline Roosevelt’s role during India’s independence (Span, March 2005).

 

Where FDR helped India’s struggle for freedom, Martin Luther King Jr adopted India’s method to lead America’s blacks (“Negroes” and “coloureds” as they were then called) to freedom within their own country. MK Gandhi had corresponded with Tolstoy after beginning his campaign of passive resistance to unjust South African laws, and he read Henry Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedience when he was already in jail for that very same offence. Many years later, the young Alabama preacher put to use Gandhi’s example of courageous peaceful defiance of injustice in his own sweet land of liberty. On receiving the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 1964, King said: “Non-violence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time – the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilisation and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that non-violence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation”. Of course, King like Gandhi would have been appalled by the religious, colour, caste and racial prejudices of contemporary Indians, Pakistanis etc today, and naming a boulevard in King’s name may do more for our own moral well-being than anything else.

 

Eisenhower and Lincoln

As for Dwight Eisenhower and Abraham Lincoln, the former may well be seen in later centuries as the greatest of 20th Century American Presidents as the latter was of the 19th. Though they had nothing to do with India, naming boulevards after them would remind Indians of the existence of great men in world history.

Jyoti Basu’s Communists once named streets in Kolkata after Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, and still pay annual obeisance at Lenin’s statue with clenched fists and garlands. Ho Chi Minh was a great nationalist and may have deserved an Indian street but it was a cheap and gratuitous insult by the Communists to name the very street on which the American Consulate stood after the Vietnamese leader who was then their enemy. The Americans were mature enough at the time to ignore it and not pull out their Consulate from Kolkata — the very same Consulate that is so highly in demand with Basu’s successor, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee.

Under influence of the well-known academic apologists for Communist China, Bhattacharjee has been recently extolling the virtues of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai too – apparently ignorant of the 40 million Chinese that Mao killed and apparently forgiving Zhou’s hatred of and perfidy against India. Before any further such nonsense occurs, we should name roads after FDR, King, Eisenhower and Lincoln, and the time to do it would be when George W. Bush makes his visit.

Solving Kashmir: On an Application of Reason (2005)

SOLVING KASHMIR: ON AN APPLICATION OF REASON

by

Subroto Roy

First published in three parts in The Statesman

Editorial Page Special Article 1, 2, 3 December 2005

This article has its origins in a paper “Towards an Economic Solution for Kashmir” which circulated in Washington DC in 1992-1995, including at the Indian and Pakistani embassies and the Carnegie Endowment, and was given as an invited lecture at the Heritage Foundation on June 23 1998. It should be read along with other articles also republished here, especially “History of J&K”, “Law, Justice and J&K” , “Understanding Pakistan”, “Pakistan’s Allies” and “What to Tell Musharraf”.  See https://independentindian.com/2011/10/13/my-seventy-one-notes-at-facebook-etc-on-kashmir-pakistan-and-of-course-india-listed-thanks-to-jd/  The Washington paper and lecture itself originated from my ideas in the Introduction to Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy, edited by WE James and myself in the University of Hawaii project on Pakistan 1986-1992.

Postscript 30 Dec 2015:  I have made clear at Twitter that I find the K.M. Kasuri book, promoted and publicized in India by Mani Shankar Aiyar, Sudheendra Kulkarni, Barkha Dutt and others in Delhi and Mumbai, to be mendacious where it is not merely self-serving.  Its clear intent is to get India to accept the (entirely false) ISI/Hurriyat narratives about 1947, Kashmir, Bangladesh, terrorism etc.  Its purported ideas of demilitarisation and a borderless Kashmir are essentially lifted without the decency of normal acknowledgement from my earlier 1980s work in America cited above — which I myself have rejected as naive since the 1999 Pakistani aggression in Kargil…

NB: https://independentindian.com/2006/07/03/law-justice-and-jk/

https://independentindian.com/2006/10/30/history-of-jk/

 

I. Give Indian `Green Cards’ to the Hurriyat et al

India, being a liberal democracy in its constitutional law, cannot do in Jammu & Kashmir what Czechoslovakia did to the “Sudeten Germans” after World War II.

On June 18 1945 the new Czechoslovakia announced those Germans and Magyars within their borders who could not prove they had been actively anti-fascist before or during the War would be expelled — the burden of proof was placed on the individual, not the State. Czechoslovakia “transferring” this population was approved by the Heads of the USA, UK and USSR Governments at Potsdam on August 2 1945. By the end of 1946, upto two million Sudeten Germans were forced to flee their homes; thousands may have died by massacre or otherwise; 165,000 remained who were absorbed as Czechoslovak citizens. Among those expelled were doubtless many who had supported Germany and many others who had not — the latter to this day seek justice or even an apology in vain. Czechoslovakia punished none of its nationals for atrocities, saying it had been revenge for Hitler’s evil (“badla” in Bollywood terms) and the post Cold War Czech Government too has declined to render an apology. Revenge is a wild kind of justice (while justice may be a civilised kind of revenge).

India cannot follow this savage precedent in international law. Yet we must recognise there are several hundred and up to several hundred thousand persons on our side of the boundary in the State of Jammu & Kashmir who do not wish to be Indian nationals. These people are presently our nationals ius soli, having been born in territory of the Indian Republic, and/or ius sanguinis, having been born of parents who are Indian nationals; or they may be “stateless” whom we must treat in accordance with the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons. The fact is they may not wish to carry Indian passports or be Indian nationals.

In this respect their juridical persons resemble the few million “elite” Indians who have in the last few decades freely placed their hands on their hearts and solemnly renounced their Indian nationality, declaring instead their individual fidelity to other nation-states — becoming American, Canadian or Australian citizens, or British subjects or nationals of other countries. Such people include tens of thousands of the adult children of India’s metropolitan “elite”, who are annually visited abroad in the hot summer months by their Indian parents and relatives. They are daughters and sons of New Delhi’s Government and Opposition, of retired generals, air marshals, admirals, ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, public sector bureaucrats, private sector businessmen, university professors, journalists, doctors and many others. India’s most popular film-actress exemplified this “elite” capital-flight when, after a tireless search, she chose a foreign husband and moved to California.

The difference in Jammu & Kashmir would be that those wishing to renounce Indian nationality do not wish to move to any other place but to stay as and where they are, which is in Kashmir Valley or Jammu. Furthermore, they may wish, for whatever reason, to adopt, if they are eligible to do so, the nationality of e.g. the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

They may believe themselves descended from Ahmad Shah Abdali whose Afghans ruled or misruled Kashmir Valley before being defeated by Ranjit Singh’s Sikhs in 1819. Or they may believe themselves of Iranian descent as, for example, are the Kashmiri cousins of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Or they may simply have wished to be, or are descended from persons who had wished to be on October 26 1947, citizens of the then-new British Dominion of Pakistan — but who came to be prevented from properly expressing such a desire because of the war-like conditions that have prevailed ever since between India and Pakistan. There may be even a few persons in Ladakh who are today Indian nationals but who wish to be considered Tibetans instead; there is, however, no Tibetan Republic and it does not appear there is going to be one.

India, being a free and self-confident country, should allow, in a systematic lawful manner, all such persons to fulfil their desires, and furthermore, should ensure they are not penalised for having expressed such “anti-national” desires or for having acted upon them. Sir Mark Tully, the British journalist, is an example of someone who has been a foreign national who has chosen to reside permanently in the Republic of India — indeed he has been an exemplary permanent resident of our country. There are many others like him. There is no logical reason why all those persons in Jammu & Kashmir who do wish not to be Indians by nationality cannot receive the same legal status from the Indian Republic as has been granted to Sir Mark Tully. There are already thousands of Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese nationals who are lawful permanent residents in the Indian Republic, and who travel back and forth between India and their home countries. There is no logical reason why the same could not be extended to several hundred or numerous thousand people in Jammu & Kashmir who may wish to not accept or to renounce their Indian nationality (for whatever personal reason) and instead become nationals, if they are so eligible, of the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, or, for that matter, to remain stateless. On the one hand, their renunciation of Indian nationality is logically equivalent to the renunciation of Indian nationality by the adult children of India’s “elite” settled in North America and Western Europe. On the other hand, their wish to adopt, if they are eligible, a foreign nationality, such as that of Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, and yet remain domiciled in Indian territory is logically equivalent to that of many foreign nationals domiciled in India already like Sir Mark Tully.

Now if you are a permanent resident of some country, you may legally have many, perhaps most, but certainly not all the rights and duties of nationals of that country. e.g., though you will have to pay all the same taxes, you may not be allowed to (or be required to) vote in national or provincial elections but you may in local municipal elections. At the same time, permanently residing foreign nationals are supposed to be equal under the law and have equal access to all processes of civil and criminal justice. (As may be expected though from human frailty, even the federal courts of the USA can be notorious in their injustice and racism towards “Green Card” holders relative to “full” American citizens.) Then again, as a permanently resident foreigner, while you will be free to work in any lawful trade or profession, you may not be allowed to work in some or perhaps any Government agencies, certainly not the armed forces or the police. Many Indians in the USA were engineering graduates, and because many engineering jobs or contracts in the USA are related to the US armed forces and require US citizens only, it is commonplace for Indian engineers to renounce their Indian nationality and become Americans because of this. Many Indian-American families have one member who is American, another Indian, a third maybe Canadian, a fourth Fijian or British etc.

The same can happen in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir if it evolves peacefully and correctly in the future. It is quite possible to imagine a productive family in a peaceful Kashmir Valley of the future where one brother is an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, another brother a civil servant and a sister a police officer of the J&K State Government, another sister being a Pakistani doctor, while cousins are Afghan or Iranian or “stateless” businessmen. Each family-member would have made his/her choice of nationality as an individual given the circumstances of his/her life, his/her personal comprehension of the facts of history, his/her personal political and/or religious persuasions, and similar deeply private considerations. All would have their children going to Indian schools and being Indian citizens ius soli and/or ius sanguinis. When the children grow up, they would be free to join, if they wished, the existing capital flight of other Indian adult children abroad and there renounce their Indian nationality as many have come to do.

II Revealing Choices Privately with Full Information

For India to implement such a proposal would be to provide an opportunity for all those domiciled in Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Laddakh to express freely and privately as individuals their deepest wishes about their own identities, in a confidential manner, citizen by citizen, case by case. This would thereby solve the fundamental democratic problem that has been faced ever since the Pakistani attack on the original State of Jammu & Kashmir commenced on October 22 1947, which came to be followed by the Rape of Baramulla — causing the formal accession of the State to the then-new Dominion of India on October 26 1947.

A period of, say, 30 months may be announced by the Government of India during which full information would be provided to all citizens affected by this change, i.e. all those presently governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The condition of full information may include, for example, easy access to Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani newspapers in addition to access to Indian media. Each such person wishing to either remain with Indian nationality (by explicitly requesting an Indian passport if he/she does not have one already — and such passports can be printed in Kashmiri and Urdu too), or to renounce Indian nationality and either remain stateless or adopt, if he/she is so eligible, the nationality of e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan, should be administratively assisted by the Government of India to make that choice.

In particular, he/she should be individually, confidentially, and without fear or favour assured and informed of his/her new rights and responsibilities. For example, a resident of Kashmir Valley who chooses to become a Pakistani citizen, such as Mr Geelani, would now enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in the Indian Republic that Mr Tully enjoys, and at the same time no longer require a visa to visit Pakistan just as Mr Tully needs no visa to enter Britain. In case individual participants in the Hurriyat choose to renounce Indian nationality and adopt some other, they would no longer be able to legally participate in Indian national elections or J&K’s State elections. That is something which they say they do not wish to do in any case. Those members of the Hurriyat who chose e.g. Pakistani nationality while still residing in Jammu & Kashmir, would be free to send postal ballots or cross the border and vote in Pakistan’s elections if and when these occur. There are many Canadians who live permanently in the USA who cross home to Canada in order to cast a ballot.

After the period of 30 months, every person presently under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution would have received a full and fair opportunity to privately and confidentially reveal his/her preference or choice under conditions of full information. “Partition”, “Plebiscite”, and “Military Decision” have been the three alternatives under discussion ever since the National Conference of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his then-loyal Deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, helped the Indian Army and Air Force in 1947-1948 fight off the savage attack against Jammu & Kashmir State that had commenced from Pakistan on October 22 1947. When, during the Pakistani attack, the Sheikh and Bakshi agreed to the Muslim Conference’s demand for a plebiscite among the people, the Pakistanis balked — the Sheikh and Bakshi then withdrew their offer and decisively and irrevocably chose to accede to the Indian Union. The people of Jammu & Kashmir, like any other, are now bound by the sovereign political commitments made by their forebears. Even so, given the painful mortal facts of the several decades since, the solution here proposed if properly implemented would be an incomparably more thorough democratic exercise than any conceivable plebiscite could ever have been.

Furthermore, regardless of the outcome, it would not entail any further “Partition” or population “transfer” which inevitably would degenerate into a savage balkanization, and has been ruled out as an unacceptable “deal-breaker” by the Indian Republic. Instead, every individual person would have been required, in a private and confidential decision-making process, to have chosen a nationality or to remain stateless — resulting in a multitude of cosmopolitan families in Jammu & Kashmir. But that is something commonplace in the modern world. Properly understood and properly implemented, we shall have resolved the great mortal problem we have faced for more than half a century, and Jammu & Kashmir can finally settle into a period of peace and prosperity. The boundary between India and Pakistan would have been settled by the third alternative mentioned at the time, namely, “Military Decision”.

 

III. Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar and Gilgit

Pakistan has demanded its flag fly in Srinagar. This too can happen though not in the way Pakistan has been wishing to see it happen. A Pakistan flag might fly in the Valley just as might an Afghan and Iranian flag as well. Pakistan has wished its flag to fly as the sovereign over Jammu & Kashmir. That is not possible. The best and most just outcome is for the Pakistani flag to fly over a recognised Pakistani consular or visa office in Srinagar, Jammu and Leh. In diplomatic exchange, the Indian tricolour would have to fly over a recognised Indian consular or visa office in Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu.

Pakistan also may have to act equivalently with respect to the original inhabitants of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir that it has been controlling — allowing those people to become Indian nationals if they so chose to do in free private decisions under conditions of full information. In other words, the “Military Decision” that defines the present boundary between sovereign states must be recognised by Pakistan sincerely and permanently in a Treaty relationship with India — and all of Pakistan’s official and unofficial protégés like the Hurriyat and the “United Jehad Council” would have to do the same. Without such a sovereign commitment from the Government of Pakistan, as shown by decisive actions of lack of aggressive intent (e.g. as came to be implemented between the USA and USSR), the Government of India has no need to involve the Government of Pakistan in implementing the solution of enhancing free individual choice of nationality with regard to all persons on our side of the boundary.

The “Military Decision” regarding the sovereign boundary in Jammu & Kashmir will be so recognised by all only if it is the universally just outcome in international law. And that in fact is what it is.

The original Jammu & Kashmir State began its existence as an entity in international law long before the present Republics of India and Pakistan ever did. Pakistan commences as an entity on August 14 1947; India commences as an entity of international law with its signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919  20 1918. Jammu & Kashmir began as an entity on March 16 1846 — when the Treaty of Amritsar was signed between Gulab Singh Dogra and the British, one week after the Treaty of Lahore between the British and the defeated Sikh regency of the child Daleep Singh.

Liaquat Ali Khan and Zafrullah Khan both formally challenged on Pakistan’s behalf the legitimacy of Dogra rule in Jammu & Kashmir since the Treaty of Amritsar. The Pakistani Mission to the UN does so even today. The Pakistanis were following Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru himself, who too had at one point challenged Dogra legitimacy in the past. But though the form of words of the Pakistan Government and the Nehru-Abdullah position were similar in their attacks on the Treaty of Amritsar, their underlying substantive reasons were as different as chalk from cheese. The Pakistanis attacked the Dogra dynasty for being Dogra — i.e. because they were Hindus and not Muslims governing a Muslim majority. Nehru and Abdullah denounced monarchic autocracy in favour of mass democracy, and so attacked the Dogra dynasty for being a dynasty. All were wrong to think the Treaty of Amritsar anything but a lawful treaty in international law.

Furthermore, in this sombre political game of great mortal consequence, there were also two other parties who were, or appeared to be, in favour of the dynasty: one because the dynasty was non-Muslim, the other, despite it being so. Non-Muslim minorities like many Hindus and Sikhs in the business and governmental classes, saw the Dogra dynasty as their protector against a feared communalist tyranny arising from the Sunni Muslim masses of Srinagar Valley, whom Abdullah’s rhetoric at Friday prayer-meetings had been inciting or at least awakening from slumber. At the same time, the communalists of the Muslim Conference who had broken away from Abdullah’s secular National Conference, sought political advantage over Abdullah by declaring themselves in favour of keeping the dynasty — even elevating it to become an international sovereign, thus flattering the already pretentious potentate that he would be called “His Majesty” instead of merely “His Highness”. The ancestry of today’s Hurriyat’s demands for an independent Jammu & Kashmir may be traced precisely to those May 21-22 1947 declarations of the Muslim Conference leader, Hamidullah Khan.

Into this game stumbled the British with all the mix of cunning, indifference, good will, impatience, arrogance and pomposity that marked their rule in India. At the behest of the so-called “Native Princes”, the 1929 Butler Commission had hinted that the relationship of “Indian India” to the British sovereign was conceptually different from that of “British India” to the British sovereign. This view was adopted in the Cabinet Mission’s 12 May 1946 Memorandum which in turn came to be applied by Attlee and Mountbatten in their unseemly rush to “Divide and Quit” India in the summer of 1947.

It created the pure legal illusion that there was such a thing as “Lapse of Paramountcy” at which Jammu & Kashmir or any other “Native State” of “Indian India” could conceivably, even for a moment, become a sovereign enjoying the comity of nations — contradicting Britain’s own position that only two Dominions, India and Pakistan, could ever be members of the British Commonwealth and hence members of the newly created UN. British pusillanimity towards Jammu & Kashmir’s Ruler had even extended to making him a nominal member of Churchill’s War Cabinet because he had sent troops to fight in Burma. But the legal illusion had come about because of a catastrophic misunderstanding on the part of the British of their own constitutional law.

The only legal scholar who saw this was B R Ambedkar in a lonely and brilliant technical analysis released to the press on June 17 1947. No “Lapse of Paramountcy” over the “Native Princes” of Indian India could occur in constitutional law. Paramountcy over Indian India would be automatically inherited by the successor state of British India at the Transfer of Power. That successor state was the new British Dominion of India as well as (when it came to be finalised by Partition from India) the new British Dominion of Pakistan (Postscript: the deleted words represent a mistake made in the original paper, corrected in “Law, Justice & J&K” in view of the fact the UN  in 1947 deemed  India alone the successor state of British India and Pakistan a new state in the world system). A former “Native Prince” could only choose to which Dominion he would go. No other alternative existed even for a single logical moment. Because the British had catastrophically failed to comprehend this aspect of their own constitutional law, they created a legal vacuum whereby between August 15 and October 22-26 1947, Jammu & Kashmir became a local and temporary sovereign recognised only by the Dominion of Pakistan (until October 22) and the Dominion of India (until October 26). But it was not a globally recognised sovereign and was never going to be such in international law. This was further proved by Attlee refusing to answer the J&K Prime Minister’s October 18 1947 telegram.

All ambiguity came to end with the Pakistani attack of October 22 1947, the Rape of Baramulla, the secession of an “Azad Kashmir”declared by Sardar Ibrahim, and the Pakistani coup détat in Gilgit on October 31 1947 followed by the massacre of Sikh soldiers of the J&K Army at Bunji. With those Pakistani actions, Gulab Singh’s Jammu & Kashmir State, founded on March 16 1846 by the Treaty of Amritsar, ceased to logically exist as an entity in international law and fell into a state of ownerless anarchy. The conflict between Ibrahim’s Muslim communalists backed by the new Dominion of Pakistan and Abdullah’s secularists backed by the new Dominion of India had become a civil war within a larger intra-Commonwealth war that itself was almost a civil war between forces of the same military.

Jammu & Kashmir territory had become ownerless. The Roman Law which is at the root of all municipal and international law in the world today would declare that in the ownership of such an ownerless entity, a “Military Decision” was indeed the just outcome. Sovereignty over the land, waters, forests and other actual and potential resources of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir has become divided by “Military Decision” between the modern Republics of India and Pakistan. By the proposal made herein, the people and their descendants shall have chosen their nationality and their domicile freely across the sovereign boundary that has come to result.

US Espionage Failures (2005)

US Espionage Failures

(There is a hippopotamus in the room)

First published in The Statesman Perspective Page under the title “Flunking inteligence” Oct 26 2005

by

Subroto Roy

There have been three or four enormous failures of American espionage (i.e. intelligence and counter-intelligence) in the last 20 years. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet communism were salubrious events but they had not been foreseen by the United States which was caught unawares by the speed and nature of the developments that took place. Other failures have been catastrophic.

First, there was the failure to prevent the attack that took place on the American mainland on September 11 2001. It killed several thousand civilians and caused vast, perhaps irreparable, psychological and physical destruction to the United States.

The attack was without precedent. The December 7 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, though a surprise, was carried out by one military against another military and did not affect very many civilians (except that thousands of American civilians of Japanese ancestry came to be persecuted and placed in concentration camps for years by the US Government). And the last time the American mainland had been attacked before 2001 was in 1814 when British troops marched south from Canada and burnt down the Capitol and the US President’s house in Washington.

Secondly, there has been a failure to discover any reasonable justification for the American-led attack on Iraq and its invasion and occupation. Without any doubt, America has lost, at the very least, an incalculable amount of international goodwill as a result of this, let aside suffering two thousand young soldiers killed, fifteen thousand wounded, and an unending cost in terms of prestige and resources in return for the thinnest of tangible gains. India at great cost liberated East Pakistan from the brutal military tyranny of Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan in December 1971 but the average Bangladeshi today could hardly care less. Regardless of what form of government emerges in Iraq now, there is no doubt the mass of the Iraqi people will cheer the departure of the bulk of foreign troops and tanks from their country (even if a permanent set of a dozen hermetically sealed American bases remain there for ever, as appears to have been planned).

When things go wrong in any democracy, it is natural and healthy to set up a committee to investigate, and America has done that several times now. For such committees to have any use at all they must be as candid as possible and perhaps the most candid of the American committees has been the US Government’s 9/11 Commission. But it too has appeared no closer to finding out who was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks or who financed it and who, precisely, executed it. Osama Bin Laden may have been the ideological head of a movement allied to the perpetrators, and Bin Laden undoubtedly expressed his glee afterwards, but it beggars the imagination that Bin Laden could have been executive president in charge of this operation while crawling around Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If not him, then whom? Mossad the Israeli spy agency was supposed to have pointed to a super-secret invisible Lebanese terrorist but nobody really knows. The biggest modern mass murder remains unsolved.

As for solutions, the American 9/11 Commission went into the same politically correct formulae that came to be followed in 2005 by British PM Tony Blair’s New Labour Cabinet, namely, that “moderate” peace-loving Muslims must be encouraged and bribed not to turn to terrorism (indeed to expose those among them who do), while “extremist” Muslims must be stamped out with brute force. This rests on a mistaken premise that an economic carrot-and-stick policy can work in creating a set of external incentives and disincentives for Muslims, when in fact believing Muslims, like many other religious believers, are people who feel the power of their religion deep within themselves and so are unlikely to be significantly affected by external incentives or disincentives offered by non-believers.

Another committee has been the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence which reported in July 2004, and from whose findings have stemmed as an offshoot the current matter about whether high government officials broke the law that is being investigated by Special Prosecutor Patrick J. Fitzgerald.

Bertrand Russell said in his obituary of Ludwig Wittgenstein that he had once gone about looking under all the tables and chairs to prove to Wittgenstein that there was not a hippopotamus present in the room. In the present case, however, there is in fact a very large hippopotamus present in the room yet the entire American foreign policy establishment has seemed to refuse to wish to see it. Saddam Hussain and OBL are undoubtedly certifiable members of the international gallery of rogues – but the central fact remains they were rogues who were in alliance with America’s defined strategic interests in the 1980s. Saddam Hussain’s Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and gassed the Kurds in 1986; an Iraqi Mirage on May 17 1987 fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark killing 37 American sailors and injuring 21. The Americans did nothing. The reason was that Saddam was still in favour at the time and had not yet become a demon in the political mythology of the American state, and it was expedient for nothing to be done. Indeed Saddam’s Iraq was explicitly removed in 1982 from the US Government’s list of states sponsoring terrorism because, according to the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, it had “moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbours”.

The very large hippopotamus that is present in the room at the moment is April Glaspie, the highly regarded professional career diplomat and American Ambassador to Iraq at the time of the 1990 Gulf War. Saddam Hussein as President had a famous meeting with her on July 25 1990, eight days before he invaded Kuwait. The place was the Presidential Palace in Baghdad and the Iraqis videotaped the meeting:

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – “I have direct instructions from President (George Herbert Walker) Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship – not confrontation – regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?

Saddam Hussein – As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.

U. S. Ambassador Glaspie – What solutions would be acceptable?

Saddam Hussein – If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab – our strategic goal in our war with Iran – we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam’ s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States’ opinion on this?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – We have no opinion on your Arab – Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960’s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)

Saddam had seen himself fighting Islamic Iran on behalf of the Kuwaitis, Saudis and other Arabs, and Islamic Iran was of course the sworn adversary of the USA at least since Khomeini had deposed America’s ally, the Shah. Therefore Saddam could not be all bad in the eyes of the State Department. On August 2 1990, the Iraqi troops seen by American satellites amassed on the border, invaded and occupied Kuwait.

On September 2 1990, the Iraqis released the videotape and transcript of the July 29 Saddam-Glaspie meeting and Glaspie was confronted by British journalists as she left the Embassy:

Journalist 1 – Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador? (No answer from Glaspie)

Journalist 2 – You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn’t warn him not to. You didn’t tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite – that America was not associated with Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You encouraged this aggression – his invasion. What were you thinking?

U.S. Ambassador Glaspie – Obviously, I didn’t think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.

Journalist 1 – You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed , he would give up his Iran(Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as a historic part of their country!

Journalist 1 – America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signalling Saddam that some aggression was okay – that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) – the territories claimed by Iraq?

Glaspie said nothing, the car door closed behind her, the car drove off. Nothing has been apparently heard from Glaspie ever since, and we may have to wait for her memoirs in 25 years when they are declassified to come to know what happened. It is astonishing, however, that the 521 page report of the US Senate’s Select Committee on espionage about Iraq before the 2003 war finds no cause whatsoever to mention Glaspie at all (at least in its public censored version). It is almost as if Glaspie has never existed and her conversation with Saddam never happened. Glaspie has disappeared down an Orwellian memory-hole. Yet her conversation with Saddam was the last official, recorded conversation between the Americans and Saddam while they were still on friendly terms.

There may be many causes explaining how such serious failures have come to occur in a country where billions of dollars have been annually spent on espionage. Among them must be that while America’s great strengths have included creation of the finest advanced scientific and technological base on earth, America’s great intellectual weaknesses in recent decades have included an impatience with historical and philosophical reflection of all sorts, and that includes reflection about her own as well as other cultures. This is exemplified too in the third palpable failure of intelligence of the last 20 years, which has been to have not foreseen or prevented atomic weapons from being developed by America and Britain’s Islamist ally and client-state, Pakistan, and thence to have failed to prevent the proliferation of such weapons in general. The consequences of that may yet turn out to be the most grave.

The Mitrokhin Archives II from an Indian Perspective: A Review Article

The Mitrokhin Archives II from an Indian Perspective: A Review Article

by Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Oct. 11 2005, Perspective Page

Vasili Mitrokhin’s defection from the former Soviet Union to Britain in 1992 caused a treasure-trove to reach MI-6 and the CIA and FBI, because he exposed many dozens of Soviet agents and their plots and intrigues around the world. But this fact that his material greatly helped Anglo-American counter-intelligence does not per se make it a source of accurate evidence with which a historian’s history book can be created. Rather, what this monumental and extremely informative volume amounts to being is a vast documentation, from an Anglo-American perspective, of what MI-6 and its allies have agreed to make public about what they now know of Soviet foreign policy and KGB practices, and of how Russian diplomacy and the KGB’s successors might function in the future.

That this is not a detached and disinterested history of intelligence is revealed by the three chapters on the subcontinent which have been causing a stir in India for the wrong reasons.

Everyone in the 1970s and through the 1980s knew of the tight grip around New Delhi’s policy-making circles of top bureaucrats, academics, journalists etc who were blatantly and incorrigibly pro-Soviet, some being active communists or fellow- travellers. Some of those complaining today know fully well that a cardinal implicit reason the CPI(M) broke from its parent party had to do precisely with Moscow’s control of the CPI. Moreover, while it might have been newsworthy when the KGB honey-trapped a senior diplomat or a junior cipher clerk in the Indian Embassy now and then, there were also hundreds of public sector bureaucrats, military personnel, journalists, technology professors, writers, artists, dancers et al who were treated most hospitably by the Soviet state – getting freebies flying to Soviet cities, being greeted by singing Young Pioneers, touring L’Hermitage with Intourist, receiving dollar honoraria and splendid gifts, sitting in on “technical training”, even receiving bogus Soviet doctoral degrees to allow themselves to be called “Dr” etc. Purchasing influence in New Delhi or any other capital city has never been merely a crude matter of cash-filled suitcases sloshing around in the middle of the night. Much of what Mitrokhin’s material says about the KGB’s penetration of India should, candidly speaking, generate but a desultory yawn from us –although even this book seems not to know that Narasimha Rao’s infamous, catastrophically damaging remarks in August 1991, in favour of the abortive KGB coup led by Kryuchkov against Gorbachev and Yeltsin, had been prompted by a staunchly pro-Soviet retired Indian diplomat at his side long-associated with the CPI.

Yes there are many titbits in this book that may be of interest from an Indian perspective — such as that Sanjay Gandhi’s entourage contained both a Soviet and an American mole in it (where are they now?). But what may be far more interesting to us today is what can be deduced from what Mitrokhin is silent about. For example, India and the Soviets were close allies in 1971 when Kissinger had teamed up with Yahya Khan and Bhutto to send Nixon to China. It is well known our Army Chief, General Maneckshaw, had demanded and received from Indira Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram enough time to prepare to go to war, and when Maneckshaw finally did move to liberate Bangladesh in December, it surprised Yahya and the Americans. Were the Soviets also quite surprised? If so, it would mean that although the Indian establishment was as porous as a sieve with respect to arms’ deals etc, on a matter of paramount national interest, namely, the just war on our own against Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan’s brutality in East Pakistan condoned by Nixon and Kissinger, India had kept her secrets secure. If, as seems likely, Indira Gandhi and her overtly communistic advisers had kept India’s war plans from not leaking to the KGB between March and December 1971, we may not have been in fact too badly compromised despite the widespread “shallow” penetration that occurred through corruption all around in the bureaucracy, academic institutions, media, political parties, etc.

Mitrokhin’s material describes this kind of shallow corrupt penetration that everyone knew was (and still remains) part of the lobbying process in Delhi. But there is no evidence in the book that the KGB knew of General Maneckshaw’s military preparations or plan of action until the lights went out in a blackout in Delhi on the night of December 2 1971 — that at least is something of which Indians may be slightly proud today. The same goes for the Pokhran nuclear tests. It is well known the CIA was caught by surprise by Pokhran-II in 1998; was the KGB caught by surprise by Pokhran-I in 1974? Probably so. Equally, the book says the KGB had at one point cracked Pakistani codes; did the Soviets share this information with India? Almost certainly not. Our Government’s chummery with the Soviets during the Cold War probably stopped well short of complete incest.

Unfortunately, many questions of interest to India or other countries have simply not been asked in the book. The Soviets (and Harold Wilson) had seemed to broker the India-Pakistan ceasefire in 1965, and Lal Bahadur Shastri died the day after he signed the Tashkent Declaration. What is the inside KGB information on that?

We do not know from this book. What do Soviet archives say about communist influence through the 1940s in Jammu & Kashmir (upon some of the very names who became Indira Gandhi’s inner circle later in Delhi)? Or about the uncritical adoption in the 1950s of Sovietesque economic models by the Planning Commission (and the suppression of Milton Friedman’s November 1955 memorandum to the Government of India, as well as the tarnishing of BR Shenoy as a CIA agent)? The answers are not present in this book because these and analogous questions of interest to India or many other countries simply have not been asked. Mitrokhin’s material has been mined only from an Anglo-American point of view, and until it is thrown open completely to everyone, a detached and disinterested history of permanent and universal interest on the important matters it touches upon is not available.

Several factual and methodological problems result as a consequence, and these need to be identified for purposes of future progress in understanding. For example, the book speaks many times of the KGB having forged or fabricated documents around the world as a technique of spreading disinformation.

Doubtless this was standard operating procedure for intelligence agencies but it is left completely impossible for the average reader to come to any assessment whether a given document mentioned was genuine or forged.

Consider a case in Iran. The book states that in February 1958, the KGB “forged a letter from the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to his ambassador in Tehran belittling the Shah’s ability and implying that the United States was plotting his overthrow. The Teheran residency circulated copies of the letter to influential Iranian parliamentarians and editors in the confident expectation that one would come to the attention of the Shah – which it duly did. According to the KGB files on the operation, the Shah was completely taken in by the fabricated Dulles letter and personally instructed that a copy be sent to the US embassy with a demand for an explanation. Though the embassy dismissed it as a forgery, the Teheran residency reported that its denials were disbelieved. Dulles’s supposedly slighting references to the Shah were said to be a frequent topic of whispered conversation among the Iranian elite.” (p. 171)

It is impossible for anyone who has not seen this document or other supporting evidence to come to any assessment of what actually happened here. Matters are made worse by a note that says the KGB “claimed improbably that the Americans blamed the forgery not on the KGB but the British, who were said to be jealous of the strength of US influence in Iran”.

Was the document genuine or was it forged and if so by whom? If forged, must we believe the KGB was so astute in 1958 in its knowledge of American idiom that it could achieve the tremendous deception of mimicking the greatest of Cold Warriors writing to his own ambassador, enough to fool the Shah of Iran who had been placed in power by the very same Americans? No one can really tell unless the documents are opened up completely.

Another example is of more topical interest, and also reveals that this book must be seen as a contribution to a continuing (if friendly and academic) battle between rival intelligence agencies. Yevgeny Primakov, the former KGB chief and reformist Prime Minister (and Soviet Ambassador to India) is quoted as saying about the American help to the Pakistan-based guerrillas against the Soviets in Afghanistan: “the idea of deploying the Stingers (shoulder-held ground-to- air-missiles) was supplied by Osama bin Laden, who had been cooperating closely with the CIA at the time.” (Russian Crossroads, Yale University Press, 2004.)

Professor Andrew denies this flatly: “There is no support in the Mitrokhin material (or any other reliable source) for the claim that the CIA funded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who came to support the mujahideen. Most were funded through charities and mosques in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and were frequently viewed with suspicion by the Afghan mujahideen.” (p. 579)

It is obvious why this question is important: if Primakov is right and Andrew is wrong the Americans must be acutely embarrassed in having been allies or supporters or financiers not long ago of the very same Bin Laden who has now become their most bitter enemy. The United States Government’s “9/11 Commission” in 2004 made a much weaker statement than Professor Andrew: “Saudi Arabia and the United States supplied billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to rebel groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet occupation. This assistance was funnelled through Pakistan: the Pakistani military intelligence (ISID) helped train the rebels and distribute the arms. But Bin Laden and his associates had their own sources of support and training and they received little or no assistance from the United States…. In his memoirs, (Bin Laden’s deputy) Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab mujahideen were financed (even `one penny’) or trained by the United States… CIA officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regarded Bin Laden and his `Arab Afghans’ as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little to do with him.”

Bin Laden was a callow youth when he got to Afghanistan shortly after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Yet his contributions of funds, military effort and religious zealotry made him emerge age 33-34 as the “Emir” of Al Qaeda by the time the Soviets were compelled to withdraw in 1989, having suffered 14,500 dead. The Americans then began to lose interest in the region and in their Pakistani clients, and it was in that atmosphere that Pakistan decided to declare its independence in the world with its clandestine nuclear programme (never having felt part of the nationalist movement which led to Indian independence in 1947). It was in the same period that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda grew to become implacable and formidable enemies of the West, which culminated in the 9/11 mass murders in 2001. The claim that while the CIA certainly supported “Afghan” jihadists, it did not support Arab or African ones like Bin Laden and his friends is highly implausible. The New Yorker and Washington Post reported in 1986 the CIA supplying and training Hekmatyar’s “Hizbe-Islami” in the use of Stinger missiles to bring down Soviet aircraft. It is impossible to imagine the admittedly myopic American policy at the time included checking passports of these trainee- beneficiaries, saying “OK, you’re an Afghan resistance fighter you get a Stinger, you’re an Arab/African terrorist-of-the-future-who-may-attack-New York, you don’t”. Professor Andrew quotes positively the work on Bhutto of Raza Anwar, the Pakistani socialist, but he may have been unaware of Anwar’s The Tragedy of Afghanistan (Verso, 1988) where the precise nature of the American, Chinese and Arab support for the thousands of guerrillas in the dozens of camps in Zia’s Pakistan is quite fully and objectively documented. Foreign jihadists in Jammu & Kashmir came to be known as “Afghans” because they were veterans of the Afghan conflicts, not because they were Afghan nationals. Unlike Britain’s MI-6, the United States Government’s 9/11 Commission has made no bones about the connection between Bin Laden and the Pakistani ISI whose intent has been to attack India: “Pakistan’s rulers found these multitudes of ardent young `Afghans’ a source of potential trouble at home but potentially useful abroad. Those who joined the Taliban movement, espousing a ruthless version of Islamic law, perhaps could bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally. They thus might give Pakistan greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called `strategic depth’ (…. Pakistan’s need for a friendly, pliable neighbour on the west due to its hostile relationship with India on the east.)… It is unlikely that Bin Laden could have returned to Afghanistan (in 1996) had Pakistan disapproved. The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel. During his entire time in Sudan, he had maintained guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These were part of a larger network used by diverse organisations for recruiting and training fighters for Islamic insurgencies in such places as Tajikistan, Kashmir and Chechnya. Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced Bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, their main base of power, to aid his reassertion of control over camps near Khowst, out of an apparent hope that he would now expand the camps and make them available for training of Kashmiri militants.”

Regardless of the fondness of the very strong lobby of British apologists (led by a former British High Commissioner to Pakistan) for the ISI and Pakistani Army, no detached history of modern intelligence in our part of the world can be written which whitewashes the misdeeds of Pakistan’s generals over several decades. Aside from what The Mitrokihn Archive II signifies about our region, there is a great amount of invaluable material on other parts of the world too, from Chile and Peru to Cuba and Nicaragua, to South Africa and Egypt and Israel, to China and Korea and Japan.

Indeed the keenest pages have to do with the internecine tensions between communists, like Castro and Gorbachev, or Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, in which no Anglo-American interests were involved. We in India have had our share of academic apologists and fellow travellers for totalitarian communist China, but the roots of the Sino-Soviet split have never come to be aired in Indian discussion. Professor Andrew is a leading member of the vitally important Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, whose website displays new and vitally important data from formerly communist countries (like Mongolia, Russia and East Germany) about how Chinese communists saw and felt about India, Pakistan, Tibet etc, which needs urgent attention from serious Indian observers. The Mitrokhin Archive II gives us a privileged glimpse of some of what happened: “The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s brought to an acrimonious end the deference from the PRC which Stalin had taken for granted. The first public attack on Moscow was made by Mao’s veteran security chief, Kang Sheng, whose ferocious purges during Mao’s Great Leap Forward were largely modelled on techniques he had learned in Moscow during the Great Terror. On the Soviet side, the ideological dispute with China was compounded by personal loathing for Mao – the `Great Helmsman’ – and a more general dislike of the Chinese population as a whole, Khrushchev `repeatedly’ told a Romanian delegation shortly before his overthrow in 1964 that `Mao Zedong is sick, crazy, that he should be taken to an asylum, etc.” An assessment of Chinese national character circulated to KGB residencies by the Centre twelve years later claimed that the Chinese were `noted for their spitefulness’. What most outraged both the Kremlin and the Centre was Beijing’s impudence in setting itself up as a rival capital of world Communism, attempting to seduce other Communist parties from their rightful allegiance to the Soviet Union. Moscow blamed the horrors of Pol Pot’s regime… on the takeover of the Cambodian Communist Party by `an anti-popular, pro-Beijing clique’.

If nothing else, The Mitrokhin Archives II provides an honest opportunity for India’s Left to come clean with their frank and non-ideological opinions about Soviet, Chinese and other communist histories, and hence to candidly gain self-knowledge. Will they take it? Are there any George Orwells out there?

Kolkata, October 5 2005

Can India Become an Economic Superpower or Will There Be a Monetary Meltdown? (2005)

In 2005, I returned to Britain thanks to an invitation from Professor Patrick Minford of the Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, to deliver a lecture on India’s Money at his Economics Seminar. http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/research/seminars.html
“Wednesday 13 April 2005 Dr Subroto Roy /India’s Money/ 4.30pm, Room S01 (Economics Seminar Series)

The same lecture was delivered at the Institute of Economic Affairs, London, a fortnight later under the title “Can India Become an Economic Superpower or Will There Be a Monetary Meltdown?”. The IEA’s summary of the lecture was as follows
http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=263
27 April 2005

“Leading Indian economist, Dr. Subroto Roy discusses the prospects of the Indian economy and warns of dangers ahead.

Can India become an economic superpower or will there be a monetary meltdown?

Dr. Roy discussed the prospects for the Indian economy at a lecture at the IEA on 27th April. Below is a synopsis of his lecture, outlining his hopes and concerns.

New technological progress in a myriad of ways, as well as the discovery of new resources, plus a possible peace-dividend arising from reduced regional tensions and conflict, are all important factors contributing to real economic growth in India today.

While the real side of the economy does well, the “nominal” economy, within the Government’s control, displays disconcerting trends. Continual deficit financing for half a century has led to exponential growth of public debt and broad money. The vast growth of time-deposits in banks may have been misinterpreted as indicating a real phenomenon such as unusual savings behaviour when it is more likely to be a nominal phenomenon resulting from increasing amounts of government debt being held by the largely nationalised banking sector. (The same may be true of China).

Twenty-one years ago, the author’s IEA Occasional Paper No. 69, Pricing, planning and politics: a study of economic distortions in India, proposed microeconomic reforms provoking the Times‘ lead editorial of May 29 1984. Some of these came to be implemented following the author’s role as a senior adviser to Rajiv Gandhi in 1990-1991. Now, monetary and fiscal reforms of a classical liberal nature are vitally necessary if a macroeconomic meltdown is to be prevented. Important among these are complete budgetary transparency, fiscal discipline improving the social productivity of all public expenditure, and monetary and financial policies to restore the integrity of the currency at home and abroad. Dr. Roy was Wincott Professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Buckingham last year. He is editor of Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution available from the recommended books page of the IEA’s website.”

When I returned to India, I was invited to give the same lecture on May 5 2005 to the Reserve Bank of India’s Monetary Economics Seminar, chaired by Chief Economist Dr Narendra Jadav; the invitation came thanks to the intervention of Dr S. S. Tarapore. I subsequently informed a few of India’s key monetary policy decision-makers of these lectures, and I was happy to see policy talk emanating from Delhi and Bombay becoming a little less drunken and disorderly than it had been before.

Subroto Roy, April 14 2007

Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom (2004)

Science, Religion, Art & the Necessity of Freedom: Reason’s Response to Islamism

by
Subroto Roy

PhD (Cantab.), BScEcon (London)

(A public lecture delivered as the Wincott Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Buckingham on August 24 2004, based on a keynote address to the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, Manila, November 16 2001.)

I am most grateful to the University of Buckingham for allowing me to refresh and carry forward my research these last several months. For some 25 years I have been learning of and reflecting upon the work of two great modern British philosophers, John Wisdom (1904-1993) and Renford Bambrough (1926-1999). In the 1980s in America, I came to apply their thinking in Philosophy of Economics (Routledge 1989), a book which got me into a lot of trouble there. Returning to Britain in 2004, I am dismayed to find their work almost forgotten or unknown today, even at the Ancient University that had been their home. “Orientalists” from the West once used to comprehend and highlight the achievements of the East for the peoples of the East who were unaware of them; I am happy to return the favour by becoming an “Occidentalist” in highlighting a little of the work of two of Britain’s finest sons of which she has become unaware. Wisdom and Bambrough played a kind of modern-day Plato and Aristotle to the Socrates played by Wittgenstein (1889-1951); the knowledge they achieved in their lives and have left behind for us to use and apply to our own problems make them, in terms of Eastern philosophy, rather like the “Boddhisatvas” of Mahayana Buddhism. I do not expect anyone to share such an extravagant view, and will be more than satisfied if I am able to suggest that we can have a grasp of the nature and scope of human reasoning thanks to their work which may help resolve the most intractable and seemingly irreconcilable of all current international problems, namely the grave cultural conflicts made apparent since September 11 2001.

2. The September 11 attacks aimed to cripple one of the world’s largest and most important countries in a new kind of act of war. The perpetrators apparently saw themselves — subjectively in their own minds — acting in the name of one of the world’s largest and most important religions. Since the attacks, the world has become an unusually bewildering place, as if notions of freedom, tolerance and the rule of law have been proven a lie overnight, as if virtues like patience, common reasoning and good humour have all become irrelevant, deserving to be flushed away in face of a resurgence of ancient savageries. The attackers and their friends taunt the West saying their love of death is greater and more powerful than the West’s love of life; the taunts and the counter-taunts of their powerful adversaries have had the effect of spraying panic, mutual fear, hatred or destruction across the surface of everyday life everywhere, so we now have bizarre scenes of people taking off their shoes and clothes and putting them on again while travelling, and of the British public being advised on how to cope with nerve gas attacks when they might have much rather been watching “reality TV” instead. An Age of Unreason appears upon us.

The very simple proposition I put forward here is this: there are, indeed there cannot be, any conflicts that are necessarily irresoluble. To put it differently, the logical scope of common reasoning is indefinite and limitless. There is no question to which there is not a right answer. If I was asked to answer in one sentence what has been the combined contribution to human thought of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough, indeed of modern British philosophy as a whole, I would say it has been the proof that there are no unanswerable questions, that there is no question to which there is not a right answer.
By “common reasoning” I shall mean merely to refer to the structure of any conversation well-enough described by F. R. Leavis’s operators in literary criticism:

“This is so, isn’t it?,

Yes, but….”.

My “yes” to your “This is so, isn’t it?” indicates agreement with what you have said while my “but…” tells you I believe there may be something more to the matter, some further logical relation to be found, some further fact to be investigated or experiment carried out, some further reflection necessary and possible upon already known and agreed upon facts. It amounts to a new “This is so, isn’t it?” to which you may respond with your own, “Yes, but…”; and our argument would continue. Another set of operators is:

“You might as well say…”;

“Exactly so”;

“But this is different…”

This was how Wisdom encapsulated the “case-by-case” method of argument that he pioneered and practised. It requires intimate description of particular cases and marking of similarities and differences between them, yielding a powerful indefinitely productive method of objective reasoning, distinct from and logically prior to the usual methods of deduction and induction that exhaust the range of positivism. We are able to see how common reasoning may proceed in practice in subtle fields like law, psychology, politics, ethics, aesthetics and theology, just as objectively as it does in natural science and mathematics. Wittgenstein had spoken of our “craving for generality” and our “contemptuous attitude towards the particular case”. Wisdom formalised the epistemological priority of particular over general saying: “Examples are the final food of thought. Principles and laws may serve us well. They can help us to bring to bear on what is now in question what is not now in question. They help us to connect one thing with another and another and another. But at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to cases.” And “Argument must be heard”.

In all conflicts – whether within a given science, between different sciences, between sciences and religion, within a given religion, between different religions, between sciences and arts, within the arts, between religion and the arts, between quarrelling nations, quarrelling neighbours or quarrelling spouses, whether in real relationships of actual life or hypothetical relationships of literature and drama – an approach of this kind tells us there is something further that may be said, some improvement that can be carried out, some further scope for investigation or experiment allowing discovery of new facts, some further reflection necessary or possible upon known facts. There are no conflicts that are necessarily irresoluble. Where the suicide-bombers and their powerful adversaries invite us to share their hasty and erroneous assumption that religious, political or economic cultures are becoming irreconcilable and doomed to be fights unto death, we may give to them instead John Wisdom’s “Argument must be heard.”

Parties to this or any conflict may in fact fail to find in themselves enough patience, tolerance, good humour, courage to take an argument where it leads, or they may fail to find enough of these qualities in adequate time, as Quesnay and the Physiocrats failed to find solutions in adequate time and were swept away by the French Revolution. But the failures of our practical human powers and capabilities do not signal that the logical boundaries of the scope of reason have been reached or even approached or come to be sighted.

3. The current conflict is said to be rooted in differences between religious cultures. We may however wish to first address whether any religious belief or practice can survive the devastating onslaught of natural science, the common modern adversary of all religions. What constitutes a living organism? What is the difference between plants and animals? What is the structure of a benzene ring or carbon atom or subatomic particle? What is light? Sound? Gravity? What can be said about black holes or white dwarfs? When did life begin here and when is it likely to end? Are we alone in being the only form of self-conscious life? Such questions about the world and Universe and our place in it have been asked and answered in their own way by all peoples of the world, from primitive tribes in hidden forests to sophisticated rocket scientists in hidden laboratories. Our best common understanding of them constitutes the state of scientific knowledge at a given time. Once we have accounted for all that modern science has to say, can any reasonable explanation or justification remain to be given of any religious belief or practice from any time or place?

Bambrough constructed this example. Suppose we are walking on the shore of a stormy sea along with Homer, the ancient Greek poet, who has been restored to us thanks to a time machine. We are walking along when Homer looks at the rough sea and says, “Poseidon is angry today”. We look at the waves loudly hitting the rocks and nod in agreement saying, “Yes, Poseidon is angry today”. We may be using the same words as Homer but Homer’s understanding of and expectations about the words “Poseidon is angry today” and our understanding of and expectations about the same words would be utterly different, a difference moreover we are able to understand but he may not. To us with our modern meteorology and oceanography, and the results of the television cameras of Jacques Cousteau and David Attenborough, we know for a fact there is no god-like supernatural being called Poseidon living within the ocean whose moods affect the waves. But to Homer, Poseidon not only exists in the ocean but also leaves footprints and descendants on the land, when Poseidon is angry the sea is vicious, when Poseidon is calm the seas are peaceful. We use the words “Poseidon is angry today” as an accurate description of the mood of an angry sea; Homer uses the same words to mean there was a god-like supernatural being inside the ocean whose anger was being reflected in the anger of the waves.

My second story is from 7th century AD located here in Buckingham, from a spot a few hundred yards behind the Economics Department of the University where there is St Rumbwald’s Well. In 650 AD — just a short while after The Recital of the Prophet of Islam (570-632AD) had been written down as The Q’uran, and just a little while before the Chinese pilgrim I-Ching (635-713AD) would be travelling through India recording his observations about Buddhism – here 12 miles from Buckingham was born the babe known as Rumwold or Rumbwald. England was hardly Christian at the time and the first Archbishop of Canterbury had been recently sent by the Pope to convert the Anglo-Saxons. Rumbwald’s father was a pagan prince of Northumbria; his mother the Christian daughter of the King of Mercia. St Rumbwald of Buckingham or Brackley is today the patron saint of fishermen at Folkestone, and he has been historically revered at monasteries in Mercia, Wessex and distant Sweden. Churches have been dedicated to him in Kent,Essex, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire, Dorset and North Yorkshire. Pilgrims have washed themselves at St Rumwald’s Well over centuries and it is said Buckingham’s inns originated in catering to them. What is the legend of St Rumbwald? It is that on the day he was born he declared three times in a loud voice the words “I am a Christian, I am a Christian, I am a Christian”. After he had been baptised, he, on the second day of his life, was able to preach a sermon on the Trinity and the need for virtuous living, and foretold his imminent death, saying where he wished to be buried. On the third day of his life he died and was buried accordingly.

When we hear this story today, we might smile, wishing newborn babes we have known waking up in the middle of the night might be more coherent too. Professor John Clarke has shown Catholic hagiography over the centuries has also registered deep doubts about the Rumbwald story. We might be tempted to say the whole thing is complete nonsense. If a modern person took it at face value, we would look on it sympathetically. We know for a fact it is impossible, untrue, there has to be some error.

At the bar of reason, all religions lose to science where they try to compete on science’s home grounds, which are the natural or physical world. If a religious belief requires that a material object can be in two places at the same time, that something can be made out of nothing, that the Sun and planets go around the Earth to make Night and Day, that the Earth is flat and the sky is a ceiling which may be made to fall down upon it by Heavenly Wrath, that the rains will be on time if you offer a prayer or a sacrifice, it is destined to be falsified by experience. Natural science has done a lot of its work in the last few centuries; all the major religions pre-date this expansion so their physical premises may have remained those of the science understood in their time. In all questions where religions try to take on scientific understanding head on, they do and must lose, and numerous factual claims made by all religions will disappear in the fierce and unforgiving heat of the crucible of scientific reasoning and evidence.Yet even a slight alteration of the St Rumbwald story can make it plausible to modern ears. Just the other day Radio 4 had a programme on child prodigies who were able to speak words and begin to master language at age of one or two. It is not impossible a child prodigy of the 7th Century AD in his first or second year of life spoke the words “I’m a Christian”, or that as a toddler with a devout Christian mother, he said something or other about the Holy Trinity or about virtue or that he wished to be buried in such and such place even if he had had no real understanding of what he was talking about. If such a prodigious infant of royal blood then died from illness, we can imagine the grief of those around him, and how word about him might spread through a countryside in an era 1200 years before the discovery of electricity and invention of telecommunications, and for that information to become garbled enough to form the basis of the legend of St Rumbwald through the centuries.

The Rumbwald story is a typical religious story that has its parallels in other times and places including our own. It is impossible for it to have been factually true in the way it has come down to us, but it is completely possible for us with our better knowledge of facts and science today to reasonably explain its power over the beliefs of many generations of people. And if we are able to reasonably explain why people of a given time and place may have believed or practised what they did, we have not reason to be disdainful or scornful of them. The mere fact such religious stories, beliefs, experiences and practices of human beings over several thousand years across the globe have been expressed in widely different and far from well-translated or well-understood languages – Egyptian, Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Hawaiian, Samoan, Apache, Kwa Zulu, Hausa, Swahili – let aside English, Arabic, Yiddish or a thousand others, provides more than ample explanation of how miscomprehension and misapprehension can arise and continue, of how a vast amount of mutual contempt and scorn between peoples of different cultures is able to be irrationally sustained. The scope for the reasonable “demythologisation” of all these stories in all these languages from all these religions, in the way we have sought to “demythologise” the Rumbwald story here obviously remains immense and indefinite.

Next consider religious practice in the modern world, and the universal act of praying. (Economists have not seemed to look much at this before though a lot of mankind’s energy and resources are rationally spent towards it every day across the world.) Some weeks ago, on the 60th Anniversary of D-Day, Lady Soames, the daughter of Churchill, recalled the incredible fear and tension and uncertainty felt during the buildup to the invasion of Normandy; she said that when she finally heard the roar of the aeroplanes as they started across the English Channel: “I fell to my knees and prayed as I’d never prayed before or since” (BBC 1 June 6 2004, 8.40 am). A policeman’s wife in Costa Rica in Central America is shown making the sign of the cross upon her husband before he goes to work in the morning into a crime-ridden area from which he might not return safely at the end of the day. Footballers and boxers and opening batsmen around the world say a prayer before entering the field of contest. So do stockbrokers, foreign exchange dealers, businessmen, job-candidates and students taking examinations, and of course hospital-patients entering operating theatres. Before a penalty shootout between England and Portugal or Holland and Sweden, many thousands of logically contradictory prayers went up.

All this praying is done without a second thought about the ultimate ontological character of the destination of such prayers, or even whether such a destination happens or happens not to exist at all. The universal ubiquitous act of praying might be a rational human response to fear, uncertainty, hopelessness, and despair, as also to unexpected joy or excessive happiness.

Blake said: “Excess of joy, weeps, Excess of sorrow, laughs”. When there is excess of sorrow or excess of joy, praying may contribute mental resources like courage, tranquillity and equanimity and so tend to restore emotional equilibrium in face of sudden trauma or excitement. A provisional conclusion we may then register is that religious beliefs and practices of people around the world are open to be reasonably comprehended and explained in these sorts of straightforward ways, and at the same time there is a good sense in which progress in religious understanding is possible and necessary to be made following growth and improvement of our factual understanding of the world and Universe in which we live.

We still speak of the Sun “rising in the East” and “setting in the West” despite knowing since Copernicus and Galileo and the testimony of Yuri Gagarin, John Glenn and Neil Armstrong that the Sun has in fact never done any such thing. Our understanding of the same words has changed fundamentally. Tycho Brahe thought the Sun went around Earth; his disciple Kepler the opposite; when Tycho Brahe looked East at dawn he understood something different from (and inferior to) what Kepler understood when Kepler looked East at dawn. It is similar to Homer and us with respect to whether Poseidon’s moods affect the waves of the sea. Examples of traditional religious belief and understanding may get modified by our scientific knowledge and understanding such that the same words may mean something quite different as a result and have a new significance for our consciousness.

Indeed it extends well beyond natural science to our understanding of literature, art and psychology as well. With the knowledge we have gained of ourselves — of our conscious waking minds as well as of our unconscious dreaming minds — after we have read and tried to grasp Blake, Goethe, Dostoevsky or Freud, we may quite well realise and comprehend how the thoughts and feelings residing in the constitutions of actual beings, including ourselves, are more than enough to describe and explain good and evil, and without having to refer to any beings outside ourselves residing elsewhere other than Earth. It is like the kind of progress we make in our personal religious beliefs from what we had first learned in childhood. We do not expect a person after he or she has experienced the ups and downs of adult life to keep to exactly the same religious beliefs and practises he or she had as a child at mother’s knee, and we do not expect mankind to have the same religious beliefs today as it did in its early history.

Bambrough concluded: “There is no incompatibility between a refurbished demythologised Homeric polytheism, a refurbished demythologised Christianity, and a refurbished demythologised Islam…. The Creation and the Resurrection, the Ascension and the Virgin Birth…may be very differently conceived without being differently expressed….we can still learn from the plays and poems of the ancient Greeks, although we reject the basis of the mythological structure through which they express their insight and their understanding. The myths continue to teach us something because they are attached to, and grounded in, an experience that we share. It would therefore be astonishing if the Christian religion, whether when considered as a united and comprehensive body of doctrine it is true or false, did not contain much knowledge and truth, much understanding and insight, that remain valuable and accessible even to those who reject its doctrinal foundations. In and through Christianity the thinkers and writers and painters and moralists of two thousand years have struggled to make sense of life and the world and men…. What is more, the life that they wrestled with is our life; the world they have portrayed is the world that we live in; the men that they were striving to understand are ourselves.”

Bambrough was addressing Church of England clergy forty years ago but in his reference to a refurbished demythologised Islam he might as well have been addressing Muslim clergy today — indeed his findings are quite general and apply to other theists as well as to atheists, and provide an objective basis for the justification of tolerance.

Judaism, Christianity and Islam each starts with a “religious singularity”, a single alleged moment in the history of human beings when a transcendental encounter is believed to have occurred: the Exodus of God’s Chosen People led by Moses; the Birth, Life, Death and Resurrection of God’s Only Son, Jesus Christ; the Revelation of God’s Book to His Messenger, Muhammad, Peace Be Unto Him, the Seal of the Prophets. Each speaks of a transcendental Creator, of just rewards and punishments awaiting us in a transcendental eternal life after mortal earthly death.

A different fork in the road says, however, that the wind blowing in the trees may be merely the wind blowing in the trees, nothing more; it is the path taken by Buddhism and Jainism, which deny the existence of any Creator who is to be owed our belief or reverence. It is also the path taken by Sigmund Freud the ultra-scientific rationalist of modern times: “It seems not to be true that there is a power in the universe, which watches over the well-being of every individual with parental care and brings all his concerns to a happy ending…. it is by no means the rule that virtue is rewarded and wickedness punished, but it happens often enough that the violent, the crafty and the unprincipled seize the desirable goods of the earth, while the pious go empty away. Dark, unfeeling and unloving powers determine human destiny; the system of rewards and punishments, which, according to religion, governs the world, seems to have no existence.”

We then seem to have a choice between a Universe Created or Uncreated, Something and Nothing, One and Zero, God and No God. Pascal said we have to bet on the Something not on the Nothing, bet on the One not on the Zero, bet on God being there rather than not being there. Pascal’s reasoning was clear and forms the basis of “decision theory” today: if you bet on God’s existence and God does not exist, you lose nothing; if you bet on God’s lack of existence and God exists, you’ve had it. The philosophies of my own country, India, speak of Zero and One, Nothing or Something, and almost leave it at that. Perhaps we know, or perhaps we do not says the Rg Veda’s Hymn of Creation.. Does our self-knowledge end with our mortal death or perhaps begin with it? Or perhaps just as there is an infinite continuum of numbers between 0 and 1, there is also an infinite continuum of steps on a staircase between a belief in Nothing and a belief in Something, between the atheism of Freud and the Buddhists and the theism of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Generalising Bambrough’s findings, it would be surprising if we did not find each and every religion, whether theistic or atheistic, to contain some knowledge and truth, some understanding and insight, that remains valuable and accessible even to those who may otherwise reject the doctrinal foundations of any or all of them. In and through the religions, the thinkers, writers, painters, poets, sculptors and artists of thousands of years have struggled to make sense of our life and the world that we live in; the men and women they were striving to understand are ourselves.

4. Just after the September 11 attacks, I said in the Philippines that the perpetrators of the attacks would have been surprised to know of the respect with which the religious experience of the Prophet of Islam had been treated by the 19th Century British historian Thomas Carlyle: “The great Mystery of Existence… glared in upon (Mohammad), with its terrors, with its splendours; no hearsays could hide that unspeakable fact, ‘Here am I!’. Such sincerity… has in very truth something of divine. The word of such a man is a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart. Men do and must listen to that as nothing else; all else is wind in comparison.” Carlyle told stories of Mohammad once not abiding by his own severe faith when he wept for an early disciple saying “You see a friend weeping over his friend”; and of how, when the young beautiful Ayesha tried to make him compare her favourably to his deceased wife and first disciple the widow Khadija, he had denied her: “She believed in me when none else would believe. In the whole world I had but one friend and she was that!” Carlyle’s choice of stories suggested the simple humanity and humility of Mohammad’s life and example, even an intersection between Islamic belief and modern science (”a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart”). Carlyle quoted Goethe: “If this be Islam, do we not all live in Islam?”, suggesting there might be something of universal import in the message well beyond specifically Muslim ontological beliefs.

In general, the words and deeds of a spiritual leader of mankind like that of secular or scientific leaders like Darwin, Einstein, Aristotle, Adam Smith or Karl Marx, may be laid claim to by all of us whether we are explicit adherents, disciples or admirers or not. No private property rights attach upon their legacies, rather these remain open to be discussed freely and reasonably by everyone. Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, politics is too important to be left to the politicians, economics is definitely too important to be left to the economists; even science may be too important to be left to the scientists — certainly also, the religions are far too important to be left to the religious.

Yet Mr Osama Bin Laden and his friends, followers and potential followers, indeed any believing Muslims, are unlikely to be impressed with any amount of “external” praise heaped on Islam by a Carlyle or a Goethe, let aside by a President Bush or Prime Minister Blair. They may be wary of outsiders who bring so much praise of Islam, and will tell them instead “If you like Islam as much as you say you do, why not convert? It’s so easy. You have merely to say ‘God is One and Mohammad is the Seal of the Prophets’ – that’s all, you are Muslim, God is Great”.

Indeed Mr Bin Laden and friends are unlikely to be impressed with any kind of economic or carrot-and-stick policy of counter-terrorism, where incentives and disincentives are created by Western authorities like the US 9/11 Commission or the Blair Cabinet telling them: “If you are ‘moderate’ in your thoughts, words and deed you will earn this, this and this as rewards from the Government, but if you are ‘extremist’ in your thoughts, words and deeds then you shall receive that, that and that as penalties from the Government. These are your carrots and here is the stick.” It is Skinnerian behavioural psychology gone overboard. The incentives mean nothing, and the disincentives, well, they would merely have to be more careful not to end up in the modern Gulags.

We could turn from carrot-and-stick to a more sophisticated mode of negative rhetoric instead. If a doctrine C, declares itself to be resting upon prior doctrines B and A, then C’s reliability and soundness comes to depend on the reliability and soundness of B and A. If Islam declares itself to depend on references to a historical Moses or a historical Jesus, and if the last word has not been spoken by Jews, Christians, sceptics or others about the historical Moses or the historical Jesus, then the last word cannot have been spoken about something on which Islam declares itself to depend.

We can be more forceful too. Suicide-bombers combine the most sordid common crimes of theft and murder with the rare act of suicide as political protest. Suicide as political protest is a dignified and noble and awesome thing – many may remember the awful dignity in the sight of the Buddhist monks and nuns of South Vietnam immolating themselves in 1963 in protest against religious persecution by Diem’s Catholic regime, which led to the start of the American war in Vietnam. Six years and half a world away, Jan Palach, on January 19 1969, immolated himself in Wenceslas Square protesting the apathy of his countrymen to the Soviet invasion that had ended the Prague Spring. Socrates himself was forced to commit suicide for political reasons, abiding by his own injunction that it would be better to suffer wrong oneself than to come to wrong others — suicide as political protest is not something invented recently. And certainly not by Bin Laden and friends, whose greed makes their intentions and actions merely ghastly lacking all dignity: they are not satisfied like the Buddhist monks or like Jan Palach with political protest of their own suicides by self-immolation; they must add the sordid cruelty that goes with the very ordinary crimes of theft and mass murder as well.

Yet this kind of negative rhetorical attack too may not cut much ice with Mr Bin Laden and his friends. Just as they will dismiss our praise for Islam as being a suspicious trick, they will dismiss our criticism as the expected animus of an enemy.

To convict Mr Bin Laden of unreason, of contradicting himself, of holding contrary propositions x and ~x simultaneously and so talking meaninglessly and incoherently, we will have to bring out our heaviest artillery, namely, The Holy Q’uran itself, the Recital of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him). We may have to show explicitly how Mr Bin Laden’s own words contradict what is in The Q’uran. He and his followers would then be guilty of maintaining x and its contrary ~x at the same time, of violating the most basic law of logical reasoning, the law of excluded middle, of contradicting themselves, and therefore of speaking meaninglessly, incoherently, nonsensically regardless of their language, culture, nationality or religion. The Q’uran is a grand document and anyone reading it must be prepared to either considering believing it or having powerful enough reasons not to do so. “The great Mystery of Existence”, Carlyle said, “glared in upon (Mohammad), with its terrors, with its splendours; no hearsays could hide that unspeakable fact, ‘Here am I!’. Such sincerity… has in very truth something of divine. The word of such a man is a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart. Men do and must listen to that as nothing else; all else is wind in comparison.”

Certainly, as in many other religions, the believers and unbelievers are distinguished numerous times in the Prophet’s Recital; believers are promised a Paradise of wine and many luxuries, while unbelievers are promised hell-fire and many other deprivations. But who are these unbelievers? They are the immediate local adversaries of the Prophet, the pagans of Mecca, the hanifs, the local tribes and sceptics arrayed against the Prophet. It is crystal clear that these are the people being named as unbelievers in The Q’uran, and there is absolutely no explicit or implicit mention or reference in it to peoples of other places or other times. There is no mention whatsoever of Anglo-Saxons or Celts, Vikings, Goths, or Gauls, of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, Confucians or Shintos, no mention of Aztecs, Incas, or Eskimos. There is no mention of any peoples of any other places or of any later times. Certainly there is no mention of the people of modern America or Israel or Palestine or Britain or India. Yet Mr Bin Laden evidently sent an email to the head of the Taliban on October 3 2001, in which he referred to “defending Islam and in standing up to the symbols of infidelity of this time” (Atlantic Monthly, Sep. 2004). We are then able to say to him or any of his friends: “Tell us, Sir, when you declare a war between believers and unbelievers in the name of Islam, whom do you mean to refer to as “unbelievers”? Do you mean to refer to every person in history who has not been a Muslim, even those who may have been ignorant of Islam and its Prophet? Or do you mean to refer to the opponents and enemies the Prophet actually happened to encounter in his struggles during his mission as a proselytiser, i.e., the Arabic idolaters of Mecca, the hanifs and Qureshis, this local Jewish tribe or that local Christian or pagan tribe against whom the early Muslim believers had to battle strenuously and heroically in order to survive? If it is these local enemies of the Prophet and his early disciples whom you mean to refer to as “unbelievers” destined for Hell’s fires, there is textual evidence in The Recital to support you. But if you mean by “unbelievers” an arbitrary assortment of people across all space and all time, you are challenged to show the verses that give you this authority because there are none. Certainly you may have military or political reasons for wishing to engage in conflict with A or B or C — because you feel affronted or violated by their actions — but these would be normal secular reasons open to normal discourse and resolution including the normal laws of war as known by all nations and all peoples. There may be normal moral arguments to be made by radical Muslims against the US Government or against the Israeli Government or the British or Indian or some other Government — but there are no generalised justifications possible from within The Q’uran itself against these modern political entities. We should expose Mr Bin Laden and his friends’ lack of reason in both maintaining that Prophet Muhammad is the Seal of the Prophets, and also maintaining that they can extrapolate from The Q’uran something that is not in The Q’uran. The Q’uran speaks of no unbelievers or enemies of the Prophet or the early Muslims who are not their local enemies in that time and place.

Pritchard, the distinguished Oxford philosopher, once wrote an article called “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” We today may have to ask a similar question “Does Islamist Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”

5. If all this so far has seemed too clinical and aseptic in approaching the mystical matters of the spirit, I hasten to add finally that a decisive counterattack upon natural science may be made by both religion and art together. Our small planet is a satellite of an unexceptional star in an unexceptional galaxy yet we are still the centre of the Universe in that it is only here, as far as any of us knows, that such things as reason, intelligence and consciousness have come to exist. (Finding water or even primitive life elsewhere will not change this.) We alone have had an ability to understand ourselves and be conscious of our own existence — the great galaxies, black holes and white dwarfs are all very impressive but none of them can do the same. What responsibility arises for us (or devolves upon us) because of this? That is the perfectly good question asked by art and religion on which science remains silent. Life has existed for x million years and will be extinguished in y million more years, but we do not know why it arose at all, or what responsibility falls on those beings, ourselves, who have the consciousness to ask this. Religion and art cannot battle and win on science’s home ground but they can and do win where science has nothing left to say.

That is what DH Lawrence meant when he said the novel was a greater invention than Galileo’s telescope. Other artists would say the same. Art expresses life, and human cultures can be fresh and vigorous or decadent and redolent of death. The culture that evaluates its own art and encourages new shoots of creativity will be one with a vibrant life; the culture that cannot will be vulnerable to a merger or takeover. There is and has been only one human species, no matter how infinitely variegated its specimens across space and time. All have a capacity to reason as well as a capacity to feel a range of emotions in their experience of the world, something we share to an extent with other forms of life as well. And every human society, in trying to ascertain what is good for itself, finds need to reason together about how its members may be best able to survive, grow, reproduce and flourish, and this vitally demands freedom of inquiry and expression of different points of view. The lone voice in dissent needs to be heard or at least not suppressed just in case it is the right voice counselling against a course that might lead to catastrophe for all. To reason together implies a true or right answer exists to be found, and so the enterprise of truth seeking requires freedom as a logical necessity. It takes guts to be a lone dissenter, and all societies have typically praised and encouraged the virtues of courage and integrity, and poured shame on cowardice, treachery or sycophancy. Similarly, since society is a going concern, justice and fairplay in the working of its institutions is praised and sought after while corruption, fraud or other venality is condemned and punished. Leavis spoke of the need for an educated public if there was not to be a collapse of standards in the arts, since it was only individual candour that could expose shallow but dominant coteries.

Freedom is logically necessary to keep all potential avenues to the truth open, and freedom of belief and experience and the tolerance of dissent, becomes most obvious in religion, where the stupendous task facing everyone is to unravel to the extent we can the “Mystery of Existence”. The scope of the ontological questions is so vast it is only wise to allow the widest search for answers to take place, across all possible sources of faith, wherever the possibility of an insight into any of these subtle truths may arise, and this may explain too why a few always try to experience all the great religions in their own lifetimes. A flourishing culture advances in its science, its artistic creativity and its spiritual or philosophical consciousness. It would be self-confident enough to thrive in a world of global transmissions of ideas, practices, institutions and artefacts. Even if it was small in economic size or power relative to others, it would not be fearful of its own capacity to absorb what is valuable or to reject what is worthless from the rest of the world. To absorb what is valuable from outside is to supercede what may be less valuable at home; to reject what is worthless from outside is to appreciate what may be worthwhile at home. Both require faculties of critical and self-critical judgement, and the flourishing society will be one that possesses these qualities and exercises them with confidence. Words are also deeds, and deeds may also be language.

The crimes of September 11 2001 were ones of perverse terroristic political protest, akin on a global scale to the adolescent youth in angry frustration who kills his schoolmates and his teachers with an automatic weapon. But they were not something inexplicable or sui generis, but rather signalled a collapse of the old cosmopolitan conversation with Islam, and at the same time expressed an incoherent cry of stifled people trying to return to an austere faith of the desert. Information we have about one another and ourselves has increased exponentially in recent years yet our mutual comprehension of one another and ourselves may have grossly deteriorated in quality. Reversing such atrophy in our self-knowledge and mutual comprehension requires, in my opinion, the encouragement of all societies of all sizes to flourish in their scientific knowledge, their religious and philosophical consciousness and self-discovery, and their artistic expressiveness under conditions of freedom. Ultra-modern societies like some in North America or Europe may then perhaps become more reflective during their pursuit of material advancement and prosperity, while ancient societies like those of Asia and elsewhere may perhaps become less fearful of their capacity to engage in the transition between tradition and modernity, indeed, may even affect the direction or speed of change in a positive manner. To use a metaphor of Otto Neurath, we are as if sailors on a ship, who, even while sailing on the water, have to change the old planks of the ship with new planks one by one. In due course of time, all the planks get changed one at a time, but at no time has there not been a ship existing in the process — at no time need we have lost our history or our identity.

The Case For and Against *The Satanic Verses*: Evaluating Diatribe and Dialectic as Art (2001)

Preface 14 August 2022:

The attempted murder of #SalmanRusdhie #Rushdie deserves to be punished with all severity…
Rushdie & I had a meeting at Senate House London c 1974 when he was about 26, I 18/19. I’d done a good job as a reporter on the London Univ student paper “Sennet” (?) on a story about the Greek military coup, or revolt or whatever, and the extreme leftist demos outside the Greek embassy…. I recall a formidable bunch of bulky bearded Macedonians (they made clear they were Macedonians not Greeks) came to the paper’s office to check on what we were going to say about them as they were leaders of the leftist demo — (these, incidentally, may have been the core of the Nov 17 terrorist group later!)… I had to leave but the editor insisted I stay as Salman Rushdie (who’s he? I asked) was due in the office too after the Greek leftists left… The editor thought it would be good for me an Indian to meet Rushdie a Pakistani, with the Dec 1971 events still fresh. Rushdie charged in in due course, nattily dressed, said he had just come down from a visit to Cambridge. We were introduced by the editor who then left us to talk, tho’ there may have been some food and a meal too. Rushdie learning I was Indian, and the son of a diplomat at that, started with a vicious anti-Indian tirade; I sat thru silently assuming he was a Pakistani (which he was I think); the Dec 1971 defeat of Pakistan was still fresh; he then started a critique, perhaps a bigger critique, of Pakistan & ended saying he was in process of becoming British; the meeting ended sweetly with him saying he had a flat and a phone — both rarities back then, gave me his phone no in sweet Big Brotherly (dadagiri) fashion, invited me to call for help anytime; a few years later when I’d left London for Cambridge I did call him in London, as I needed a place to “doss” the night, but he couldn’t put me up… Decades later I found myself writing the definitive review of his most notorious book…
https://www.facebook.com/notes/10157728274867285/

The Case For and Against *The Satanic Verses*: Evaluating Diatribe and Dialectic as Art

by Subroto Roy

June 2001, Kolkata, India. First published at www..com on December 23, 2002. First appearance in print in The Statesman Festival Volume, October 2006. (Note, April 2007: this article is an example of how the Internet age has transformed meanings: before the Internet, to be published and to be printed referred to practically simultaneous events; but this article was published on the Internet almost four years before it came to be republished in print.)

Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses is a manifold document; in reading it more than a dozen years after publication, what is brought to mind is the relation between art and criticism described by Lawrence and advertised by Leavis:

”We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon. A critic must be able to feel the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and its force. To do so, he must be a man of force and complexity himself, which few critics are. A man with a paltry, impudent nature will never write anything but paltry, impudent criticism. And a man who is emotionally educated is rare as a phoenix…”

The sincere and vital emotions most obviously provoked by Rushdie’s book are nausea, anger and irritation. It appears at first sight an abusive, incoherent masquerade of a novel with little artistic value, a mere moneymaking vehicle for a preening, self-seeking author and his publisher. The decisions of the Republics of India and Pakistan to ban it for being gratuitously offensive to the religious sentiments of millions of people, or the finding against it of blasphemy by the Islamic authorities of Iran seem understandable.

Yet such an initial response may be followed by another very different set of sincere and vital emotions. Upon reflection and a second reading, it is possible to feel exhilaration, delight, even the calm of a Shia Muslim spiritual experience from the book. These may be accompanied by a conviction that Rushdie has produced a significant work of art even if he himself remains unaware of its nature. This kind of unusual and dichotomous critical experience needs to be explained. College professors around the world have been writing theoretical essays portraying Rushdie as a “magic realist” or some such oxymoron. The truth may be more prosaic: The Satanic Verses is nothing if it is not a second, perhaps definitive, autobiographical experiment in which Rushdie has attempted to reconcile himself with his own experiences, a task in which he has achieved at best partial success. It is as if he has tried to comprehend his own life as an English-speaking Indo-Pakistani Muslim in the Western world, and in that process the words of The Satanic Verses just came tumbling out. And there is little even a bitter enemy can say about one’s search for self-knowledge, especially on matters of religious belief.

The cover says The Satanic Verses is a novel; what may be called its superficial plot amounts to something a giggling adolescent might have written for an undergraduate essay. Here is its outline:

Once there were two young Muslim boys of Bombay, Najmuddin and Chamchawalla. N. is born poor and raised in the slums; from delivering tiffins he becomes a small-time and then a major screen idol of Hindi cinema, a kind of Muslim NTR/Bachan mixture. In his profligacy he has an affair with R. who later murders her young children and commits suicide because of her unrequited love for him; N. travels in an aeroplane to England which is blown up midair by Sikh hijackers at 30,000 ft; he falls unharmed to the ground, is found on the English coast by an old woman whose lover he becomes until her death; then he returns to a lovely Jewish girlfriend who seems to have no reason to want to be with him, he returns to India, murders the Jewish girlfriend and kills himself, all along being tormented by a notion he may have invited divine wrath for having willfully eaten pork. In parallel, the other young Muslim boy, C. grows up in a privileged Bombay neighbourhood, is sexually molested by a dhoti-clad street-vendor, has peculiar and perverse parents and servants, is sent to a public school and University in England, ends up in London advertising, is on the same aeroplane which explodes in the sky, also falls unharmed to the ground and is found by the same old woman, but is taken in by British police and immigration authorities, and, most oddly, finds himself transmogrified gradually into a goat like being and then Satan himself, is forced by British police to eat his own goat-pellets, escapes to find refuge among a generous Bangladeshi family in London’s immigrant ghettos, is re-transformed into a human being again after his hatred becomes focused on a single individual, his fellow Mumbaikari, Najmuddin. C attempts to avenge himself on N. for no particular reason except jealousy, yet N. saves his life and there is supposed to be a moral of good and evil there. C. also at some point acquires a splendid English wife who divorces him — again a woman whom we see no reason to want to be with a jerk like him (though we are not told he might have wanted her for the British passport). C. finally returns to Bombay, is reconciled with his dying father, meets up with an old girlfriend, and the book ends with these two being together.

This is not “magic realism”, it is palpably poor writing. If the superficial plot suffices to make The Satanic Verses a novel, then your or my singing in the shower suffices for us to be in grand opera.

Seen as an autobiographical experiment, however, the superficial plot begins, ever so slightly, to make sense as Rushdie appears himself as both Muslim boys whose lives are traced from Bombay to London and back. He is Najmuddin to the extent he torments himself throughout for having willfully violated Muslim practice

 

“his mouth full of unclean meat ”(p. 31);

 

in his relationship with at least one of Najmuddin’s three women, the Jewish girlfriend Allie; and perhaps more generally in his having

 

”managed to bury his greatest talent so deep that it might easily have been lost forever, his talent, that is, for loving genuinely, deeply and without holding back, the rare and delicate gift which he had never been able to employ” (p.26)

 

Rushdie is Chamchawalla more obviously in having grown up in a privileged Bombay neighbourhood, been sent to school and university in England, gotten married to and divorced from an English woman named Pamela. Both Najmuddin and Chamchawalla are left with their fathers after their mothers’ early deaths, and Rushdie is original and most authentic in describing these father-son relationships where he appears to draw deeply on his own emotional life. There is a short delightful scene of him teaching his own son to ride a bicycle. Then he makes rare records of the terrible conflicts possible between fathers and adult sons:

 

(N.) “would understand how much the older man had resented him, and how important it was for the father to defeat the son and regain, thereby, his usurped primacy in the affections of his dead wife”. (p.19)

 

(C.) “wrote his father a letter full of cruelty and anger, whose violence was of the type that exists only between fathers and sons, and which differs from that between daughters and mothers in that there lurks behind it the possibility of actual, jaw-breaking fisticuffs. “(p.47)

 

The son returns to India to be tenderly reconciled with the emaciated dying old man from whom he has been estranged:

 

”Abba, I came back because I didn’t want there to be trouble between us anymore.

 

That doesn’t matter any more. It’s forgotten, whatever it was.”

 

Whatever it was. Death makes family feuds seem petty and inconsequential in retrospect. The old man is just happy to see the boy, his own life, once again. The son unexpectedly finds in himself love, devotion and respect for the old man whom he had long feared and despised:

 

”First one falls in love with one’s father all over again, and then one learns to look up to him, too…. He is teaching me how to die… He does not avert his eyes, but looks death right in the face…” (pp. 543 et. seq, italics original)

 

A child sees his parents initially as God-like beings said Sigmund Freud; an aspect of maturity arrives when the child begins to see them no longer as deities but as humans, warts and all. When Rushdie has applied himself to his own inner life and relationships with his father and his son, he delves into a vast pool of expressiveness, and, ever so briefly, discovers and establishes his artistry. His poignant reconciliation with a dying father is a small treasure.

Another episode worth notice in the superficial plot of The Satanic Verses has to do with the growth to maturity of the character of the young Bangladeshi-British adolescent, Mishal Sufyan, and her marriage to the white-fathered, Pakistani(?)-mothered Hanif Johnson. Their love signals fresh hope and new life in Britain’s grim immigrant neighborhoods filled with fear and hatred. The race riots in England in 2001 could have been taken from a chapter of The Satanic Verses. Rushdie has been a self-conscious observer here as nice boys from Rugby School don’t normally go slumming even if they are wogs themselves, yet even so the Indian preppie from Rugby or Harvard must still reconcile the continuous threads which bind him to the people cleaning the lavatories at Heathrow or pumping gas or running motels in America.

In parallel with this superficial plot, The Satanic Verses contains a theological dialectic mostly on the origins, beliefs and practices of Islam, the faith in which Rushdie was born and raised. This is practically independent of the superficial plot, or at best the two have been clumsily pasted together. The link is once more Rushdie himself. While he appears as the main protagonists Najmuddin and Chamchawalla in the superficial plot, he makes a triple appearance in the theological treatise, at three different levels of Muslim doubt or faith.

At the greatest level of scepticism, Rushdie appears as the infidel poet and satirist Baal who gives his life to the cause of an absolute artistic and intellectual freedom, mocking Prophet Muhammad and The Quran, saying he recognizes no authority except his artistic Muse:

 

A poet’s work (is to) name the unnameable, to point at frauds, to take sides, start arguments, shape the world and stop it from going to sleep. “(p. 100)

Under the sword of his Muslim captors, Baal ends with

“I’ve finished. Do what you want”;

he is beheaded but dies a spiritually free unbroken man. Rushdie may have relied on Islamic legend here though his fellow Anglo-Pakistani, the social anthropologist Akbar Ahmed, has apologetically said that as a matter of historical fact:

“The conquest of Makkah cost less than 30 lives…. The charge of those critics who accuse the Prophet of the (death) of a poet who wrote satirical verse… will not hold. An over-zealous Muslim infuriated by his verses set out to silence the poet.”

At a lesser level of scepticism or a greater level of Muslim belief, Rushdie appears in the theological dialectic as a fictional Salman Farsi, supposed to be the “calmest” (p. 107), and “most highly educated” (p. 377) of the Prophet’s intimate disciples. This character becomes in course of time a drunken apostate after starting to doubt the authenticity of The Quran as Divine Revelation, as well as the transcription of the Hadith.

As a safety measure perhaps, Rushdie put in

 ”Where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy” (p. 393).

But in real life the authorities of contemporary Iran were not amused or impressed by legal niceties as to whether young Salman sitting in England had renounced Islam or his Pakistani passport for a British one. In 1989 they roundly pronounced The Satanic Verses to be blasphemous to Islam and sentenced Rushdie to death in absentia, causing as we know a significant recent incident of international law.

Ironically, Rushdie`s experience since might have been scripted by himself:

 

”Your blasphemy, Salman, can’t be forgiven.”

 

In response, Salman Farsi is

 

”unable to muster the smallest scrap of dignity, he blubbers whimpers pleads beats his breast abases himself” (p. 387)

 

and escapes death only by promising to denounce Baal, the idolatrous satirist.

In real life Rushdie blubbered, whimpered, pleaded and abased himself to win a reprieve without avail. If the Iranian authorities have since reduced their hatred of him, it seems because they became bored and found him less consequential as time went by, not because of anything he said or did in repentance. In June 2001, Ayatollah Khatami, then President of Iran, said the blasphemy case was “closed”, and that Iran had always seen Rushdie’s book as part of a modern Western assault on Islam.

Yet one must be grateful the Iranian death sentence did not get carried out because there is evidence to reasonably conclude that, all things considered, Rushdie may well be innocent of blasphemous intent. Though he may be guilty of several literary crimes and misdemeanors, he may have been wrongly placed on Iran’s death row for a dozen years.

The evidence suggests that what The Satanic Verses has attempted to be is a genuine Muslim dialectic between faith and doubt — albeit one not expressed in Arabic, Farsi or Urdu to attract serious Islamic scholars, but one done in English in the manner of a Hollywood screenplay designed to attract as much hard currency as possible for Rushdie and his publisher. Commercial English comedy as hermeneutics you might say: Monty Python meets Prophet Muhammad.

That Rushdie has lacked blasphemous intent is evident from his third appearance in the theological treatise, this time as the secular Indian Muslim, Mirza Saeed Akhtar, who loves and lusts after both his sick wife, Mishal, and her new friend, the epileptic orphan woman Ayesha. The two women are dogmatic Shia Muslims, who insist on leading a vast, pious pilgrimage from central India into the Arabian Sea in the belief their faith will miraculously make the waters part and allow them to walk to Mecca.

 

Rushdie does not identify them as Shia Muslims but the story is based on actual events in 1981-1983 in the Naseem Fatima “Hawkes Bay” case in Pakistan. According to the sociologist Akbar Ahmed, Naseem Fatima,

“a shy, pleasant looking girl with an innocent expression on her face, who had a history of fits,”

after a series of miraculous religious experiences which were scorned by Sunni Muslims but were not inconsistent with Shia doctrine, led 38 people into the Arabian Sea at Karachi believing the waters would part and they would be transported miraculously to Shia holy sites in Karbala in Iraq.

 “(The women and children locked) in five of the six trunks died. One of the trunks was shattered by the waves and its passengers survived. Those on foot also survived; they were thrown back onto the beach by the waves… The survivors were in high spirits — there was neither regret nor remorse among them. Only a divine calm, a deep ecstasy. The Karachi police in a display of bureaucratic zeal arrested the survivors. They were charged with attempting to leave the country without visas…. Rich Shias, impressed by the devotion of the survivors, paid for their journey by air for a week to and from Karbala. In Iraq, influential Shias, equally impressed, presented them with gifts, including rare copies of the Holy Quran.”

In The Satanic Verses, Rushdie has altered and transformed these facts into a rich allegorical dialectic between rationalism and scepticism on the one hand, and dogmatic faith and ecstatic religious experience on the other. The husband Mirza Saeed, representing Rushdie himself, condemns what he says is the foolishness of the faith-filled women, begs them, pleads with them to change their minds, and finally when they cannot be stopped, follows behind them in his Mercedes, collecting stragglers, hypocrites and apostates on the way. The intellectual and spiritual tension between the rationalist and believer is built up excellently. The reader is finally certain that Ayesha and the other pilgrims walk to their earthly deaths in the Arabian Sea, but is left uncertain whether the miracle may have in fact occurred even so, whether they have in fact walked into Paradise itself on the strength of their faith. It is a splendid, exhilarating and unexpected spiritual experience emerging from the book. Moreover, the Rushdie-character, though he survives the pilgrimage, tempers his scepticism by the end of his life, and eventually dies in fusion with the ghost of his love, the believer Ayesha, and, we are led to think, is finally absorbed with her into the Paradise described in The Quran.

Thus in the attempted theological treatise that is contained within The Satanic Verses,

Rushdie appears

(i) as Baal the disbelieving, mocking, satirist who gives his life for artistic freedom;

 

(ii) as Salman Farsi the Muslim believer who turns to apostasy; and

 

(iii) as Mirza Saeed Akhtar, the rationalist and sceptic who turns eventually towards Muslim faith and belief.

In making this triple appearance, Rushdie has tried to construct a genuine Muslim dialectic between scepticism and dogmatism; if the sceptical parts have outraged Muslim believers, some of his descriptions of Muslim belief and practice might do no less than add new sympathisers or converts to Islam among the heathen and infidels. It is a creative achievement for a modern English-speaking Muslim, perhaps unintentionally, to try to turn the tide of hostile opinion that exists against Islam in the English-speaking world, through a sympathetic rendering of aspects of Islam. E.g., a practice like halal, which seems cruel or at least pointless to the non-Muslim, is given new meaning by Rushdie, and made into a point of existential philosophy:

 ”(The Prophet)… required animals to be killed slowly, by bleeding, so that by experiencing their deaths to the full they might arrive at an understanding of the meaning of their lives, for it is only at the moment of death that living creatures understand that life has been real, and not a sort of dream.“(p. 376).

It is only at the moment of death that life may make its fullest sense. Such would be to look back at life from the point of death; T. S. Eliot in Burnt Norton seemed to speak of looking forward at life all the way to the point of death:

 “At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;

Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,

 …Except for the point, the still point,

There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.”

Leavis drew attention to the religious meaning assigned to these lines by the critic D. W. Harding:

“For the man convinced of spiritual values, life is a coherent pattern in which the ending has its due place, and, because it is part of a pattern, itself leads into the beginning.”

The Satanic Verses is preoccupied with the possibility of such patterns of birth, death and rebirth, conflict and its resolution, tension and its relaxation.

“To be born again … first you have to die” (p. 1)

Rushdie was raised a Muslim exposed to the university of critical thought and dialogue; as such he owed himself a responsibility to examine Islam to determine whether he would render it his individual allegiance, not by fiat or blind faith but by the canons of reasonableness. In The Satanic Verses he has traversed a range of logical possibilities between disbelief, doubt and faith in Islam. On the strength of the Mirza Saeed Akhtar character in the book, he may have been truthful in declaring himself a genuine believing Muslim who was innocent of the charges of blasphemy against him. He needs to be absolved of the charges, and his conviction by the Iranians set aside, as in effect has been done by Iran’s President Ayatollah Khatami in June 2001. Here ends the case for The Satanic Verses.

The case against Rushdie however must continue. He has produced a few ounces of artistic and philosophical gold but these are contained in mountains of muck, which remain to be disposed of. Rushdie shows himself emotionally alive and expressive as a son to his father and a father to his son, as well as a keen social observer of Britain and a thoughtful and philosophical Muslim believer; but at the same time he also reveals himself immature, dishonest and cowardly as a writer. These aspects are summarily revealed in Rushdie’s desire to be gratuitously abusive or offensive towards a wide range of chosen targets, from the memory of Prophet Muhammad to the innocuous Chinese.

For example, for no discernible reason except to show that little Salman can say bad words and get away with it, a Mallory-like ghost on Mt. Everest is made to converse about “Goddamn Chinese” and “Little yellow buggers”. Then an implausible Sikh woman terrorist (named after the Delhi journalist Tavleen Singh though reminiscent more of Leila Khaled, the pioneer Palestinian hijacker) leads Khalistanis to hijack an Air India jumbo (numbered 420) and explode it mid-air.

In June 1985 an Air India jumbo did explode mid-air killing all 329 lives on board, and it took painstaking work by the Canadian police to arrest and prosecute (unsuccessfully) the major suspects who were Canadian Sikhs. The victims’ families whose tragedies are trivialized in The Satanic Verses join the list of people Rushdie has wished to pointlessly upset by his personal fantasy of two survivors falling unharmed from that aircraft.

Then, Rushdie’s Khalistanis go about yelling

”those mother-f…..g Americans and sister-f…..g British”,

when in fact Khalistan seemed plausible mostly to North American and British Sikhs in Vancouver or California who (unlike perhaps Rushdie himself at the time he authored the book), tend not to be abusive of America or Britain in that kind of way. The cursing merely shows how our purportedly great British writer keeps despoiling the possibility of his own artistry.

 

Hindus and India come in for special abuse in Rushdie’s worldview. India is that rather amusing and grotesque country

 

”of hundreds of millions of believers…. in which, to this day, the human population outnumbers the divine by less than three to one,”

 

where a Muslim NTR/Bachan cinema star can become

“the most acceptable, instantly recognisable, face of the Supreme” (p. 17).

A Hindu character

 ”coming as she did from a polytheistic tradition”

 

is considered

 

plainly… incapable” (p. 334)

 

of comprehending the scriptures of the Semitic faiths.

Rushdie reveals himself incompetent here in his purported role of theologian, as he has failed to see that the secular outlook of Hinduism and its heterodox descendants like Buddhism does not imply belief in more than one god. Rushdie is not alone in this prejudice for the most venerable Oxford English Dictionary itself announces

“Hinduism is the polytheistic religion of the Hindus”.

In fact, Indian traditions always have freely allowed questioning whether there is any God at all, let alone whether there is one God or many gods. I.e., there always has been space freely available within orthodox Hinduism and its heterodox offshoots for all manner of religious scepticism, including nihilism and pyrrhonism. This is highly problematic for a believing member of any of the Semitic faiths like Rushdie, or the author of the entry on Hinduism in the Oxford English Dictionary. Thus even Pope John Paul VI said Buddhism is not a religion in his sense of what a religion must be, namely, a doctrine entailing belief in God.

The Hindu, or at least the philosophical Hindu, is very troublesome to all others because he is somehow able to accommodate all of them within his own folds.

“You want to worship the sun, the seas, the mountains, rivers, trees, snakes or stones as God Immanent?; that’s fine with me,”

he says to the animist.

“You think there is no God as such?; that’s cool”,

he says to the Buddhist.

“You’re telling me Jesus of Nazareth was God’s incarnated Son?; okay that’s great, I like that,”

he says to the Christian.

“You’re telling me the Holy Quran was revealed by Al-Lah to Prophet Muhammad near Makkah?; I’ll accept that,”

he says to the Muslim. And so on. The Hindu’s all-inclusive catholicity can drive other believers up the wall, especially those closest to him like Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs who may most urgently want to differentiate themselves from Hindu practice.

Rushdie momentarily accepts the Hindu view when Najmuddin

”is often filled with resentment by the non-appearance, in his persecuting visions, of the One who is supposed to have the answers, He never turns up, the one who kept away when I was dying, when I needed needed (sic) him. The one it’s all about, Allah Ishvar God. Absent as ever while we writhe and suffer in his name” (p. 113)

Here Rushdie momentarily acknowledges his secular Indian childhood as well as his Christian schooling about Christ on the Cross. But mostly he has taken the easy path of branding the Hindu a rather silly polytheistic idolater or animist. There is a reminder of the destruction of religious idols by the new Muslims in pre-Islamic Mecca (Jahilia). Then there is a long development of the wickedness of the character of the chief idolater, the female Hind. The real Hind was a foe turned convert of Prophet Muhammad; Rushdie’s Hind converts, is forgiven by Prophet Muhammad, then secretly continues as an idolatrous witch who plots and causes the Prophet’s demise. Her name “Hind” is the Urdu/Persian name for India and the root of “Hindu”, so it is possible Rushdie’s years as a Pakistani have led him to absorb some of the views prevalent in that country about Hindus and Hindustan being implacable foes of Islam.

Then, Rushdie makes pornographic allusions to Ganesh and Hanuman, and a pointed reference to

”these Shiv Sena bastards in control”

of contemporary Bombay. A Brahmin and an “Untouchable” (there can be no Harijans or Dalits in Rushdie’s British world) seem to convert to Islam only to retract, while pious Muslim pilgrims are attacked by the wicked VHP and RSS in scenes Rushdie might have lifted from Attenborough’s Gandhi. No mention here of East Pakistan, Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan or Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto — just

“Bungleditch”

for Bangladesh. In Rushdie`s view, the ominous forces of Hindu nationalism (the folks who gave him a visa to finally visit India in 2000) are to be kept at bay only by arm-in-arm socialism. It all amounts to a rather stale politically correct ideology fashionable in the 1970s, which crashed with the Berlin Wall one year after The Satanic Verses was published. Rushdie, a one-time child citizen of India, knows in his middle age next to nothing about modern Indian society or its political economy, yet apparently longs to prove his correct Limousine Socialism credentials to his Western publishers and clientele. He keeps putting his thumb in the pan.

He also has been cowardly. Living in Britain, he did not set out to write a modern diatribe against all religious traditions he had encountered which might have amounted to a nihilism or pyrrhonism worth examining. Jews and Christians are conspicuous by their absence from his target-list, allowing him to duck away from the savage criticism he would have received from within the Judeao-Christian countries where he has led his adult life. The Satanic Verses has been received with considerable applause there, and earned him a lot of money. The few characters identified as Jews in the book (Mimi, Cohen, his wife, and daughter) are all normal and sympathetically drawn (Cohen is even made a Holocaust survivor who survived Nazi “monsters” but now commits suicide). There is one identified Christian, who, consistent with Rushdie’s ideology of Limousine Socialism, is made a comical American creationist who bites off his own tongue in fear during the hijacking.

The Satanic Verses was banned in India and Pakistan after its publication; but had Rushdie attacked Jewish or mainstream Christian beliefs and characters with the same kind of parody he hurls at Muslim and Hindu beliefs and practices, he likely would not have been published at all in the West, drying up his dollar-income.

It was simply too risky for Salman Rushdie to be as offensive towards Jews and Christians in Britain or America as he has been to Muslims and Hindus in India or Pakistan. Much easier and more lucrative to write “Monty Python meets Prophet Muhammad” or some Peter-Sellers pidgin Indian English dialogue or dig up some dowry-deaths from reading the Indian newspapers. Goes down well with the people who matter. Fits in with their own post-Imperial pretensions about the state of the wogs today. Even better that the Chief Wog himself is saying so. That has been the principal point made by the Iranian authorities against Rushdie, as for example when Ayatollah Khattami said in June 2001 in “closing” the blasphemy case, that Iran always took The Satanic Verses to be a part of the Western assault on Islam.

Indeed Rushdie’s single worst and most pointless example of offensiveness has to do with his distortion of the memory of Prophet Muhammad himself.

Muhammad (572-632 AD) was without doubt one of the greatest men of history, as may be measured by his vast impact on human civilization. His greatness was marked by a magnificent humility; at his death, it was famously said:

“If you are worshippers of Muhammad, know that he is dead. If you are worshippers of God, know that God is living and does not die”;

indicating the total self-effacement of the man to his mission. Arabic is the language of Islam, but even in Rushdie’s chosen language of English there has been a vast literature over the centuries on Prophet Muhammad’s life and example. One of the best known is Carlyle’s fully sympathetic 1842 account , which made the message of the Prophet’s religious experience one of universal import well beyond Muslim ontological beliefs:

 “The great Mystery of Existence… glared in upon (Muhammad), with its terrors, with its splendours; no hearsays could hide that unspeakable fact , “Here am I!”. Such sincerity… has in very truth something of divine. The word of such a man is a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart. Men do and must listen to that as nothing else; all else is wind in comparison.”

 

Carlyle quoted Goethe:

“If this be Islam, do we not all live in Islam?”

And Carlyle told the stories of how Muhammad could not abide by his own severe faith when he wept over the dead body of an early disciple:

“You see a friend weeping over his friend”;

and of how the young beautiful Ayesha once tried to get Muhammad to compare her favourably to his deceased wife and first disciple the widow Khadija, and how Muhammad had denied her:

 ”She believed in me when none else would believe. In the whole world I had but one friend and she was that!”

In face of such an enormous wealth of rich legendary material to select from to write about Prophet Muhammad, what does Salman Rushdie, purportedly a major British-educated 20th Century Muslim novelist, choose to do? He invents a pointless sequence of pornographic allusions and events to do with how a Mecca whorehouse increases its business! It makes highly offensive reading, not just to Muslim believers but to decency and the truth of Muhammad’s life; rather like the person who associated Christ on the Cross with a urinal and claimed artistic freedom for himself, outraging Christian opinion in the United States of America a few years ago. Why do it, one may ask? Where is the art in it? Where could the art in it possibly be? Why should it not be seen as merely base and revolting?

In putting together then, the case for and against The Satanic Verses, it may be seen how Rushdie’s artistry might have made him a great writer and also how his vast incorrigible faults have kept him permanently from becoming one. To draw a contrast, in The Brothers Karamasov one hundred years ago, Dostoevsky wrote perhaps the definitive internal critique of Christianity, of how Jesus Christ had made true Christian practice impossibly difficult, of how Christianity demanded too much of mankind, more than man’s nature could possibly achieve. Lawrence said of it:

 “As always in Dostoevsky, the amazing perspicacity is mixed with ugly perversity. Nothing is pure. His wild love for Jesus is mixed with perverse and poisonous hate of Jesus: his moral hostility to the devil is mixed with secret worship of the devil. Dostoevsky is always perverse, always impure, always an evil thinker and a marvellous seer.”

Rushdie would have liked a similar comparison in respect of Prophet Muhammad and Islam; but he does not deserve it because he lacks the honesty possessed by the great writers while he possesses a greed and cupidity they disowned. As a novel, The Satanic Verses is about as far from The Brothers Karamasov as the music of David Bowie or Boy George or Madonna is from the music of Tchaikovsky or Beethoven. Superficially, it paints nauseous grotesque absurd accounts of incoherent events, mostly with cartoons and caricatures where real people should have been, forcing the reader to take a most unpleasant journey largely because Rushdie`s deliberately cultivated notoriety pleads for his book to be read. The nausea comes to be suspended for a page here, a handful of pages there, when Rushdie demonstrates that a splendid artistry does exist within him even if he finds it impossibly difficult to muster enough discipline to maintain it. That other Indian writers have been imitating his style in the last few decades often without his substance may merely go to show how far critical editorial standards have collapsed in the book-publishing industry.

It is only when The Satanic Verses is seen as a tortured self-exploration by Rushdie to reconcile his Western life with his Islamic upbringing that it begins to become sensible and comprehensible. Madonna or Boy George’s music is not that of Beethoven and everyone has forgotten it already while no one forgets Beethoven, but it is still a kind of music. Similarly, no one forgets Anna Karenina or Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor and everyone will forget Salman Rushdie, but even so his work still needs to be tested for the presence of significant art. That there is some art in it, perhaps hitherto undiscovered, has been the purpose of this essay to reveal.

 

References

Akbar Ahmed, Discovering Islam; Pakistan Society

Thomas Carlysle, Heroes and Hero Worship

D. H. Lawrence, Phoenix

F. R. Leavis, The Living Principle; Valuation in Criticism (G. Singh ed.)

Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses

 

SUBROTO ROY’s works include Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (Routledge, London & New York, International Library of Philosophy, 1989, 1991).

A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism (2001)

A General Theory of Globalization & Modern Terrorism with Special Reference to September 11

Subroto Roy

This was a keynote address to the Council of Asian Liberals & Democrats meeting on November 16 2001, Manila, Philippines, and was published in Singapore in 2002, Alan Smith, James Gomez & Uwe Johannen (Eds.) September 11 & Political Freedom: Asian Perspectives. It was republished in the West on January 26 2004 on the University of Buckingham website, when the author was Wincott Visiting Professor of Economics there. It came to be followed a few months later by a public lecture at the University, titled “Science, Religion, Art and the Necessity of Freedom: Reason’s Response to Islamism” which has also been published here.

1. Globalization Through a Wide-Angle Lens
2. Suicide, Terrorism & Political Protest
3. Science, Religion, Art, and the Necessity of Freedom
4. Asia’s Modern Dilemmas: Named Social Life or Anonymous Markets
5. September 11: the Collapse of the Global Conversation
6. Envoi

Synopsis: The world after September 11 2001 has seemed a very bewildering place — as if all liberal notions of universal reason, freedom, tolerance and the rule of law since the Enlightenment have been proven a lie overnight, deserving only to be flushed away in the face of a resurgence of ancient savageries. One aim of this essay is to show this would be too hasty an assessment; another is to provide a general theory of “globalization”, a notion which often has seemed lost for meaning.

1. Globalization Through a Wide-Angle Lens
The perpetrators of September 11 subjectively acted in the name of Islam. It would have surprised them to know of the great respect with which the religious experience of Prophet Muhammad (572-632 AD) had been treated in the English language by Carlyle in 1842:

“The great Mystery of Existence… glared in upon (Muhammad), with its terrors, with its splendours; no hearsays could hide that unspeakable fact, ‘Here am I!’. Such sincerity… has in very truth something of divine. The word of such a man is a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart. Men do and must listen to that as nothing else; all else is wind in comparison.” 1

Carlyle told the story of Muhammad once not abiding by his own severe faith when he wept for an early disciple saying “You see a friend weeping over his friend”; and of how, when the young beautiful Ayesha tried to make him compare her favourably to his deceased wife and first disciple the widow Khadija, Muhammad had denied her:

“She believed in me when none else would believe. In the whole world I had but one friend and she was that!”

Carlyle suggested the simple humanity and humility of Muhammad’s life and example, and even an intersection between Islamic belief and modern science (“a Voice direct from Nature’s own Heart”). He quoted Goethe: “If this be Islam, do we not all live in Islam?”, suggesting there might be something of universal import in Muhammad’s message well beyond specifically Muslim ontological beliefs.
In general, the life or words of a spiritual leader of mankind like Muhammad, Christ, or Buddha, as indeed of discoverers of the physical world like Darwin or Einstein, or explorers of secular human nature like Aristotle, Adam Smith or Karl Marx, may be laid claim to by all of us whether we are explicit adherents, disciples or admirers or not. No private property rights may be attached upon their legacies, but rather these remain open to be discussed freely and reasonably by everyone.

A second example is more proximate. It is of M. K. Gandhi the Indian sitting in South Africa reflecting on the Christian ideas of Thoreau the American and Tolstoy the Russian, synthesizing these with Hindu-Jain notions of “ahimsa” or “non-hatred” into a technique of political action to be applied eventually to end British rule in India; then transferred a decade after Gandhi’s assassination to the U. S. Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King Jr, and later, after King’s assassination, back to Nelson Mandela languishing in prison, who ends apartheid and brings in its place a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in South Africa.2
Construing globalization to mean merely Westernization of the East has been a commonplace error, leading to a narrow cramped perspective and reflecting ignorance of both East and West. There are countless examples of the Easternization of the West including the exportation of Judaism and Christianity, and of Indian and Arab mathematics and astronomy in the Middle Ages. There have been and will be countless cross-fertilizations between East and West, let aside the subtle influences of Africa and other cultures and continents on art, music, dance, sports and beliefs around the world. In general, whenever an idea, practice, institution or artifact transmits itself from its origin elsewhere, we have a little piece of globalization taking place. The speed and volume of such transmissions may have vastly increased in recent decades thanks to the growth of modern transport and communications but that is not to say some of the most important transmissions have not already taken place or may not yet take place. Ours like every generation may be biased in favour of its own importance.

2. Suicide, Terrorism & Political Protest
Global transmissions can be as soft and salubrious as Americans learning to enjoy football which is not American football. But they can be grim and desperate too — like the transfer of “suicide bombing” techniques from Sri Lanka’s civil war to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; or the idea of schoolboys firing automatic weapons germinating from A Clockwork Orange to actuality thirty years later in an American or a German school.

In fact the Thoreau-Tolstoy-Gandhi techniques of civil disobedience or a hunger-strike inflicting pain or sacrifice on oneself to show an adversary his folly, slide naturally to a limit of suicide as political protest — as when the Buddhist Superior Thich Quang Duc, protesting religious persecution by Diem’s regime in South Vietnam, immolated himself on June 2 1963, soon to be followed by other Buddhist monks and nuns, leading to the end of the Diem regime and start of the American war in Vietnam. Six years and half a world away, Jan Palach, on January 19 1969, immolated himself in Wenceslas Square protesting the apathy of his countrymen to the Soviet invasion that had ended the Prague Spring. Suicide as political protest still abides by the Socratic injunction that it would be better to suffer wrong than to wrong others.3

Terrorism by suicide killing crosses that line — over into a world of utilitarian calculation on the part of the perpetrator that his or her suicide as political protest would be inadequate, and must be accompanied by causing death among the perceived adversary as well.

Gandhi, King and Mandela each had conservative, accommodative currents on one side, as well as radical dissident or parallel terrorist offshoots on the other, and we will return to ask why no non-violent political movement seems identifiable of which September 11 was the violent terrorist offshoot.

Where political protest is absent from the motivation, and killing the adversary becomes the aim with suicide merely the means, as with Japan’s kamikaze pilots, we have passed into a realm of international war between organized authorities in contrast with mere terrorism against some organized authority. A suicide-killer may of course subjectively believe himself/herself to be making a political protest though his/her principals may see him/her as an instrument of war.

Also, if it is correct to distinguish between kamikaze pilots and the perpetrators of September 11 by absence and presence of political protest in their motivation, terrorism typically arises as rebellion against some organized authority, and is to be contrasted precisely with war between organized authorities. “State terrorism” can then only refer to an organized authority being repressive to the point of using its power to cause terror, physical or mental, upon a people or individuals under its control. “State-sponsored” terrorism would be something else again, where an organized authority assists a terroristic rebellion against some other organized authority, amounting effectively to an undeclared international war.4

3. Science, Religion, Art, and the Necessity of Freedom
The question arises whether anything in human nature or society may be identified to help analyse, explain or predict the myriad transmissions of globalization taking place, whether salubrious or not. If such a theory claims to be “general”, it will need to be wide enough to try to explain the motivation for modern terrorism and September 11 2001 in particular.

We could start with the observable fact there is and has been only one human species, no matter how infinitely variegated its specimens across space and time. All have a capacity to reason as well as a capacity to feel a range of emotions in their experience of the world, something we share to an extent with other forms of life as well. And every human society, in trying to ascertain what is good for itself, finds need to reason together about how its members may be best able to survive, grow, reproduce and flourish. This process of common reasoning and reflection vitally requires freedom of inquiry and expression of different points of view. The lone voice in dissent needs to be heard or at least not suppressed just in case it is the right voice counselling against a course which might lead to catastrophe for all. To reason together implies a true or right answer exists to be found, and the enterprise of truth-seeking thus requires freedom as a logical necessity. It takes guts to be a lone dissenter, and all societies have typically praised and encouraged the virtues of courage and integrity, and poured shame on cowardice, treachery or sycophancy. Similarly, since society is a going concern, justice and fairplay in the working of its institutions is praised and sought after while corruption, fraud or other venality is condemned and punished.

A flourishing society may be viewed as one advancing in its scientific knowledge, its artistic achievements, and its religious or philosophical consciousness. Each of these dimensions needs to be in appropriate balance in relation to the others during the process of social and economic growth, and each has a necessity for its own aspect of freedom.

Science is our public knowledge regardless of culture or nationality gained of ourselves as members of the world and the Universe, and has been the most important common adversary of all religions. Who or what is homo sapiens relative to other living species? What is the difference between plants and animals? What constitutes a living organism? What is the structure of a benzene ring or a carbon atom or any atom or subatomic particle? What is light, sound, gravity? What can we say about black holes or white dwarfs? When did life begin on Earth and when is it likely to end? Are we alone in the Universe in being the only form of self-conscious life? Such questions have been asked and attempted to be answered in their own way by all peoples of the world, whether they are primitive tribes in hidden forests or sophisticated rocket scientists in hidden laboratories. Our best common understanding of them constitutes the state of scientific knowledge at a given time.
At the bar of reason, all religions lose to science wherever they try to compete on science’s home grounds, namely, the natural or physical world. If a religious belief happens to imply a material object can be in two places at the same time, that something can be made out of nothing, that the Sun and planets go around the Earth, that if you offer a sacrifice the rains will be on time, then it is destined to be falsified by experience. Science has done a lot of its work in the last few centuries, while the religions pre-date this expansion so their physical premises may have remained those of the science understood in their time. In all questions where religions try to take on the laws of scientific understanding head on, they do and must lose, and numerous factual claims made by all religions will disappear in the fierce and unforgiving heat of the crucible of scientific reasoning and evidence.
With the enormous growth of science, some scientists have gone to the limit of declaring no religious belief can possibly survive — that we are after all made up of dust and atoms alone, that there is no real difference between a mechanical talking doll and a gurgling baby who has just discovered her hands and feet.

Yet reasonable religious belief, action and experience does exist and may need to make its presence felt. Religion may not battle science and expect to win on science’s home ground but can and does win where science has nothing and can have nothing to say. It has been reasonable everywhere for men or women faced with death or personal tragedy to turn to religion for strength, courage or comfort. Such would be a point where religion offers something to life on which science has nothing of interest to say. These include the ultimate questions of life or death or the “Mystery of Existence” itself, in Carlyle’s term.

In fact the ultra-scientific prejudice fails ultimately to be reasonable enough, and is open to a joint and decisive counter-attack by both the religious believer and the artist. Modern science has well established that our small planet orbits an unexceptional member of an unexceptional galaxy. Copernicus by this started the era of modern science and began the end of the grip on Western culture of astrology, which was based on a geocentric Ptolomaic worldview (many Asian cultures like India and perhaps China still remain in that grip).

Yet the pre-modern geocentrism contained a subtle truth which has formed the foundation of both art and religion: to the best of scientific knowledge to this day, Earth is the centre of the Universe inasmuch as it is only here that reason and intelligence and consciousness have come to exist, that there is such a thing as the power to think and the power to love.5

We are, as far as anyone knows, quite alone in having the ability to understand ourselves and to be conscious of our own existence. The great galaxies, black holes and white dwarfs are all very impressive, but none of them is aware of its own existence or capable of the thought or love of any human baby or for that matter the commonest street dog.

What responsibility arises for human beings because of the existence of this consciousness? That is the common and reasonable question addressed by both religion and art, on which science is and must remain silent. We may come to know through science that life has existed for x million years and is likely to be extinguished in y million more years, but we do not know why it arose at all, or what responsibility devolves on those beings, namely ourselves, who have consciousness and reason to comprehend their own existence in the Universe.
D. H. Lawrence meant to raise this when he said the novel was a greater invention than Galileo’s telescope. Great painters, composers, or other artists can be imagined saying something similar. Art is the expression of life, and human cultures, like plants, may be fresh and vigourous with life or decadent and doomed to death. The society which both recognizes and comprehends its own artistic traditions through reasonable evaluation while encouraging new shoots of artistic creativity, will be one with a vibrant cultural life; the society incapable of evaluating its own art self- critically enough will be likely also to kill new creativity from within itself, and become vulnerable to a merger or takeover.

Science, religion and art each vitally requires freedom in order to thrive. In art, the function of reason arises in critical evaluation of literature, paintings, cinema, drama, music, dance, architecture and other aspects of aesthetics. Swimming against a full tide of majority opinion here often may be the right thing to do. The critic F. R. Leavis spoke of the importance of there being an educated public to maintain serious cultural standards; he meant that the freedom to be vigourously critical, often against shallow entrenched coterie opinions, may be the only safeguard preventing artistic or cultural standards from collapse. In science, the activity of reasoning whether in public with one another or privately within oneself, dispels scientific illusions (like astrology) and so enlarges the area occupied by a common empirical understanding. Freedom is logically necessary here to keep potential avenues towards the truth open; it extends also to protecting through tolerance those factual beliefs which may be manifestly false — it may be a crime to steal or commit murder but it is not a crime to hold erroneous factual beliefs about the world as such (e.g. astrology is wrong because Copernicus is right, but it would be illiberal to jail people for believing in astrology.) Such a need for freedom of belief and experience, as well as the tolerance of dissent, becomes most obvious in religion, where the stupendous task facing all human beings is of attempting to unravel the “Mystery of Existence”. The scope of these ontological questions, unanswered and unanswerable by science, is so vast it would be only wise to allow the widest search for answers to take place, across all possible sources and religious faiths, wherever the possibility of an insight into any of these subtle truths may arise. Perhaps that is why some solitary thinkers have sought to experience all the great religions in their own lifetimes, sometimes by deliberate conversion from one faith to the next.

A flourishing society, then, would be one which grows along the three planes of science, religion and art under conditions of freedom. And such a notion may be measured at different scales of social life. It starts with the family as the author of Anna Karenina knew in its famous opening sentence: “All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”. It could then move to flourishing tribes, neighborhoods or local communities, to flourishing towns, provinces, or whole nations. At any of these levels, the flourishing society is one which inhales deeply the fresh air of natural science, and so sees its knowledge of the material world grow by leaps and bounds; it encourages religious and philosophical discussions and tolerance so does not fail to comprehend its own purpose of being; and it lives creatively and self-critically in trying to improve the expressiveness of its artistic achievements. Such a society would be self-confident enough to thrive in a world of global transmissions of ideas, practices, institutions and artifacts. Even if it was small in economic size or power relative to others, it would not be fearful of its own capacity to absorb what is valuable or to reject what is worthless from the rest of the world. To absorb what is valuable from outside is to supercede what may be less valuable at home; to reject what is worthless from outside is to appreciate what may be worthwhile at home. Both require faculties of critical and self-critical judgement, and the flourishing society will be one which possesses these qualities and exercises them with confidence.

4. Asia’s Modern Dilemmas: Named Social Life or Anonymous Markets
Actual societies, whether small like families or large like nations, in East or West, now or in the past, typically display these qualities in relative balance, excess, or shortage.6 Broadly speaking, throughout the vast span of Asia, there has been unstinting admiration over the last two hundred years for the contribution of the modern West to art, architecture and the growth of scientific knowledge. Where it has come to be known and applied, there has been admiration for liberal Western political thought; while ancient Asian nations which hastily imported ideologies like fascism and communism have lived to regret it. Western political morality at its finest derives from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that rational beings recognise one another’s autonomy and treat one another as ends in themselves, not as means towards each other’s ends. 7 We see this in action today in for example the cordial relations between the USA and Canada, or between North America and Europe, or in recent attempts at European integration.

Asian nationalists in the 20th Century struggled to try to establish individual autonomous national identities, as the West had done in the 18th and 19th centuries. Asian nationalism represented an unwillingness to be treated as mere means towards the ends of Western nations, something we still see today when country B is used to counter A, then C used to counter B, then D used to counter C, etc in the old imperial manner of divide and rule This remains a serious problem of international relations but is something Asia can resolve independently by seeking to create for herself free societies which flourish in science, religion and the arts which would then be robust, self-confident and autonomous enough to decline to be used as means towards others’ ends. Furthermore, Asian societies in some respects all resemble one another and pre-modern Western societies more than they do the contemporary West. These pre-modern societies were ones in which a person was identified by rights and obligations flowing from the place he or she came to occupy through inheritance or brave achievement, and centred around the loyalty of friendship and kinship, as well as fidelity of the household. The relationships between the sexes, between generations, between friends, all these across Asia today may still perhaps resemble one another and the pre-modern West more than they do some trends in the contemporary West. History and identity continue to predominate our cultures in Asia: everyone is someone’s son or daughter, someone’s brother or sister or friend or relative, everyone is from some place and is of some age; and every deed has a history to it which everyone knows about or wants to talk about.

In contrast, the modern Western financial economics which the present author teaches his students, describes a world of anonymous “efficient markets” with no memory; where anyone can thrive as long as he or she brings something of value to trade; where all information needed to determine prices tomorrow is contained in today’s prices and events; where nothing from yesterday is necessary to determine anything in the future; where the actual direction of price-change is random and cannot be consistently foretold, so we cannot in general make any prediction which will lead to profit without risk. We are to imagine a large number of players in such a market, each with only a tiny bit of market-power itself, and none able to move the terms of trade on its own. Each of these players then, according to the textbooks, seizes every chance to improve his or her own position regardless of all else, he or she will “buy low” and “sell high” whatever and whenever possible, until price differences between identical assets vanish and no extra profit remains to be squeezed out from anything. Such briefly is the pure theory of the efficient market economy which one teaches as an economist. One tells one’s students it is a good thing, and it is to be found, if anywhere in the best international financial markets, and that what globalization refers to is the whole world becoming like one big efficient marketplace.8

Yet, privately, Asia may have watched with dismay the near-collapse of family and social life which has sometimes accompanied the modern prosperity and technological advancement. The war in Vietnam brought obvious physical destruction to parts of Asia but may also have had more subtle corrosive long-term effects on the social fabric of the West. If there has been something liberal and humane about Western politics while Asian politics have been cruel and oppressive, there may also be something stable and chaste about traditional Asian family life while modern Western societies have sometimes seemed vapid and dissolute. Specifically, if it is fair to say there has been too little autonomy experienced by women and children in many Asian societies, it may be fair as well to observe a surfeit of choices may have arisen in some Western societies, greater than many women and children there may privately wish for. How does a society find its right balance on the question of the autonomy, modesty and protection of family life and other social relationships? The divorce courts of the ultra-modern world are places of deep misery for everyone except the lawyers involved in the trade, and as some Asian leaders have observed, something the globalization of Asia could well seek to avoid. Thus the dilemma faced by many Asians today may be how to absorb the efficiency of markets and sound governance of liberal political institutions, without the kind of private social collapse that seems to have occurred in many ultramodern societies, nor the kind of loss of political sovereignty against which Asian nationalists had struggled during the age of imperialism. We may now see how far this brief but general theory of globalization may be applied in explaining the bewildering events of September 11 2001.

5. September 11 : the Collapse of the Global Conversation
Words are also deeds while deeds may also convey meaning.9 The words and deeds of the perpetrators of September 11 2001, and of the nation-states organized against them since that date, are both components of a complex and subtle global conversation taking place as to the direction of our common future.
In earlier times, Gandhi, King and Mandela each led successful non-violent political protests of “non-white” peoples against “white” organized authorities. Their protests assumed a level of tolerance arising out of mutual respect between rebel and authority. None was a totalitarian revolutionary out to destroy his adversary in toto but rather each intended to preserve and nurture many aspects of the existing order. Each had first become the master of the (Christian?) political idiom of his adversary and was willing and able to employ this idiom to demonstrate the selfcontradiction of his opponent, who was typically faced with a charge of hypocrisy, of maintaining both x and its contrary ~x and so becoming devoid of meaning. Such political conversations of words and deeds required time and patience, and the movements of Gandhi, King and Mandela each took decades to fructify during the 20th Century. They had more conservative accommodative currents on one side, and more impatient radical terroristic offshoots on the other.

All such aspects seem absent from September 11 and its aftermath, which seems at first sight sui generis. No patient non-violent political protest movement can be identified of which September 11 was a violent terroristic offshoot or parallel. Tolerance has not merely vanished but been replaced by panic, mutual fear and hatred. Violence appears as the first and not last recourse of political discussion. The high speed of the modern world almost demands a winner to be declared instantly in conflicts with subtle and unobvious roots, and the only way to seem to win at speed is by perpetrating the largest or most dramatic amount of violence or cruelty. The world after September 11 2001 has seemed a very bewildering place — as if all liberal notions of universal reason, freedom, tolerance and the rule of law since the Enlightenment have been proven a lie overnight, deserving only to be flushed away in face of a resurgence of ancient savageries.

But this would be too hasty an assessment. The global conversation clearly collapsed very badly from the time of e.g. Carlyle’s effort in 1842 to understand Islam’s legacy to the point of September 11 2001 being carried out against the United States or Western civilisation in general in Islam’s name. Even so, the universal liberal virtues of patience, tolerance and common reasoning can still find use here — in identifying possible deep, long-term historical factors which may have accumulated or congregated together to cause such a crime to take place.
One such historical factor has been technological and economic: the invention and immense use of the internal combustion engine throughout the 20th Century, coupled with discovery of petroleum beneath the sands of Arabia — all of which has made the material prosperity of the modern West depend, in the current state of technology, on this link not becoming ruptured. A second and independent factor has been the history of Christian Europe’s alternating persecution and emancipation of the Jewish people, which leads in due course to the Balfour declaration of 1919 and, following the Nazi Holocaust, to the creation of modern Israel among the Arabic- speaking peoples. The history between Christianity and Judaism is one in which the Arabic-speaking peoples were largely passive bystanders. Indeed, they may have been almost passive bystanders in creation of their own nation-states as well — for a third historical factor must be the lack of robust development of modern political and economic institutions among them, with mechanisms of political expression and accountability often having remained backward perhaps more so than in many other parts of Asia.

The end of World War I saw not only Balfour’s declaration but also Kitchener, Allenby and T. E. Lawrence literally designing or inventing new nationstates from areas on a desert-map:

“Our aim was an Arab Government, with foundations large and native enough to employ the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of the rebellion, translated into terms of peace. We had to … carry that ninety percent of the population who had been too solid to rebel, and on whose solidity the new State must rest…. In ten words, (Allenby) gave his approval to my having impertinently imposed Arab Governments… upon the chaos of victory…”

“(The secret Arab societies) were pro-Arab only, willing to fight for nothing but Arab independence; and they could see no advantage in supporting the Allies rather than the Turks, since they did not believe our assurances that we would leave them free. Indeed, many of them preferred an Arabia united by Turkey in miserable subjection, to an Arabia divided up and slothful under the easier control of several European powers in spheres of influence.” 10

Beginning with the Allied-induced Arab revolt against the Turks, the classic imperial doctrine of “balance of powers” or “divide and rule” has seemed to continue to be applied in rather more subtle diplomatic form up until the present: with post-Mossadeq Iran against any incipient Arab nationalism, then with Iraq against post-Revolutionary Iran, then against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. It is only during and after the Gulf War that Osama Bin Laden, as a totalitarian revolutionary, arose as an adversary of the West.

Throughout these decades, little or no spontaneous cosmopolitan political conversation seems to have occurred from which a mature, sustained indigenous Arab or other Muslim nationalism may have arisen as the basis for nation-states, as had done e.g. with Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian or Vietnamese nationalism.11

From 1919 to 1945, the global conversation became preoccupied with other matters, and from 1945 to the end of the Cold War, with yet other matters again. While the three long-term factors unfolded themselves through these turbulent decades, the natural vibrant free conversation vitally necessary for the political life of any people continued for the Arabic-speaking peoples to remain mostly stifled, dormant, inchoate or abortive. Expectedly enough, whatever little current it had turned inward to the insular austere roots of a faith of the desert:

“The Beduin of the desert…found himself indubitably free…. In his life he had air and winds, sun and light, open spaces and a great emptiness. There was no human effort, no fecundity in Nature: just the heaven above and the unspotted earth beneath. There unconsciously he became near God…. The Beduin could not look for God within him: he was too sure that he was within God. He could not conceive anything which was or was not God, Who alone was great…. This creed of the desert seemed inexpressible in words, and indeed in thought. It was easily felt as an influence, and those who went into the desert long enough to forget its open spaces and its emptiness were inevitably thrust upon God as the only refuge and rhythm of being…. This faith of the desert was impossible in the towns…” 12

But this attempt to return inevitably became something reactionary in the late 20th Century. Finding the Beduin and the original deserts of Arabia transformed over the intervening decades, it could only try to recreate itself among the Pashtoon in the barrenness of Afghanistan, and led to the bizarre scenes of the Taliban attempting to destroy televisions and cassette-tapes in the name of Islam.

6. Envoi
The crimes of September 11 2001 were ones of perverse terroristic political protest, akin on a global scale to the adolescent youth in angry frustration who kills his schoolmates and his teachers with an automatic weapon. But they were not something inexplicable or sui generis. They represented a final collapse of the centuries-old cosmopolitan conversation with Islam, while at the same time it was an incoherent cry of a stifled people trying to return to the austere faith of the desert. Words are also deeds, and deeds may also be language. What September 11 has demonstrated is that even while the information we have about one another and ourselves has increased exponentially in recent years, our mutual comprehension of one another and ourselves may well have grossly deteriorated in quality.

Reversing such atrophy in our self-knowledge and mutual comprehension requires, in the opinion of the present author, the encouragement of all societies of all sizes to flourish in their scientific knowledge, their religious and philosophical consciousness and self-discovery, and their artistic expressiveness under conditions of freedom. Ultra-modern societies like some in North America or Europe may then perhaps become more reflective during their pursuit of material advancement and prosperity, while ancient societies like those in Asia or elsewhere may perhaps become less fearful of their capacity to engage in the transition between tradition and modernity, indeed, may even affect the direction or speed of change in a positive manner.

To use a metaphor of Otto Neurath, we are as if sailors on a ship, who, even while sailing on the water, have to change the old planks of the ship with new planks one by one. In due course of time, all the planks get changed one at a time, but at no time has there not been a ship existing in the process — at no time need we have lost our history or our identity.

© Subroto Roy, November 16 2001; January 26 2004

1 Thomas Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, London 1842.
2 In fact, “Gandhi’s correspondence with Tolstoy… only started after passive resistance had begun, and he only read Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedience when he was in prison for that very offence”. Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power,Indian Politics 1915-1922, Cambridge University Press 1972.
3 Cf. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Princeton, 1961, Gorgias 474b, 483a, b.Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Thinking, pp. 181-182, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971
4 Applying this to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the precise question would be
how far the present Palestinian authority may be objectively considered the organized authority of a nation-state: if it is, then Palestinian suicide-killings are acts of war; if it is not, they are acts of terrorism. The rhetoric on each side
5 Finding water or even primitive life elsewhere will not change this.
6 For example, the relatively new nation-states created upon the ancient societies of the Indian subcontinent to which the present author belongs, apparently display a surfeit of religiosity combined with a shortage of rational scientific growth, including the sciences of governance and economics. Despite the examples of solitary thinkers from Kabir and Nanak to Gandhi, the political and economic benefits of social tolerance still seem badly understood in the subcontinent. Equally, the mechanism of holding those in power accountable for their actions or omissions in the public domain has often remained extremely backward. A mature grasp of the division between the private and public spheres may also have been absent in Asia; the distinction between private and public property is often fuzzy or opaque; the phenomena of corruption and pollution are then easily explained as mirror-images of one another: corruption is the transmutation of something valuable from the public domain into private property; pollution is the expulsion of private waste into the public domain. Each is likely to be found with the other.
7 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton, Oxford
8 The contrast between “named” and “anonymous” societies occurred to the
author on the basis of the theoretical work of Professor Frank Hahn of Cambridge University, Cf. Equilibrium and Macroeconomics, MIT 1984.
9 This was emphasized by the late Cambridge philosopher Renford Bambrough, “Thought, word and deed”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol.
LIV, 1980, pp. 105-117.
10 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph, 1926, Doubleday 1935, pp. 649, 659; pp. 46-47
11 The most may have been Attaturk’s Turkey, M. A. Jinnah’s creation of a Pakistan separate from India, and Algeria’s independence from France — all distant from the fulcrum of Arabia. In case of Pakistan, it was Hitler’s invasion of Poland that led the British, in something of a panic, to begin on September 3 1939 to treat Jinnah’s Muslim League on par with Gandhi ‘s Indian National Congress. The 1937 provincial election results had shown little support for Pakistan in the areas which today constitute that country. Cf. F. Robinson, “Origins” in Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, edited by William E. James & Subroto Roy, Hawaii MS 1989, Sage 1992, Karachi OUP 1993.
12 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 40-41

Fable of the Fox, the Farmer, and the Would-Be Tailors (circa Oct 1998)

Fable of the Fox, the Farmer, and the Would-Be Tailors

In the Land of Milk and Honey, there was once a great shortage of Tailors. So the King called for Tailors from all other Lands to come, and they would be each paid the princely sum of forty gold ducats for their work…

A Fox who lived in the Land of Stones and Dust heard of this. In the Land of Stones and Dust, people were hardworking but were mostly poor and destitute. If they worked hard all year, they could manage to keep only a half or maybe one ducat of gold. The Fox had an idea. Maybe he could start sending people to be Tailors in the Land of Milk and Honey. So he called a big gathering of the people and said: “People of the Land of Stones and Dust! I want to make you wealthy. All year long you toil and make only a few ducats under the blazing sun! I will make you into Tailors and send you within a few short weeks to the cool and lovely Land of Milk and Honey! Do you know how much a Tailor makes there? Forty gold ducats in a year! Think of that! You and your family will live in the lap of luxury!“ There was a sigh of disbelief mixed with happiness in the crowd at the mention of such an unearthly large sum of money. Nobody, not even the richest, could earn such amounts here, which mere Tailors could make over there! None of the people had been to the Land of Milk and Honey but they had heard many stories of its riches before.

“Come right up, sign right here, sign right here!” said the Fox, and many people crowded to sign on. “It will cost you a couple of ducats, just a couple, that’s all, and we will soon have you off to the Land of Milk and Honey where forty gold ducats are yours for the taking! Isn’t that something?!” When he mentioned the two ducats they had to pay, a lot of people stopped. “But how can we pay so much, you know that in our country we only earn a pittance every year; two ducats are beyond our reach, it means our life’s savings!” “Come now my friends,” said the Fox, “what kind of spirit is that? Can’t you see that soon within a few short weeks you will be in the Land of Milk and Honey, and as a Tailor you will be making forty ducats, now isn’t that truly a princely sum the likes of which you’ve never seen? Think about that! You are being asked to contribute a little something to that goal, what’s one or two ducats here and there, think of your future! If you don’t have the two ducats in your pocket, sell a few things you don’t need, even your house for soon you will be on your way to the Land of Milk and Honey!”

The Fox spoke so persuasively and with such a kind voice and generosity in his eyes that as many as one hundred and sixty people sold their belongings, and each confidently put two ducats into the Fox’s hands. The three hundred and twenty gold ducats brought tears of joy to the Fox as he counted them; this could become such a pleasant activity he thought to himself!

But now, he thought, I have a problem; the King of the Land of Milk and Honey has asked for Tailors, and these people I have are all woodcutters, weavers and candlestick-makers. Somehow, I have to make them all Tailors. Let me go to my friend the Farmer, maybe he can teach them some tailoring for a few ducats!

The Old Farmer listened to the Fox’s offer with increasing anticipation. He had always liked a good sum of money in hand though he was careful not to show it by any ostentation. He had many mouths to feed, and besides if something was left over he would like to visit the Land of Milk and Honey just once himself with all his family. “Certainly, my good friend,” he told the Fox, “give me the money and soon I’ll make tailors out of these people. Oh what fun we shall have together!” The fact he was a farmer and not a tailor himself or that he had never been to the Land of Milk and Honey and knew nothing about it did not seem to bother him. He was a man who felt he knew the substance of almost all the subjects under the sun beneath which he had toiled. Why, even on the subject of tailoring in the Land of Milk and Honey, he had an opinion or two which he felt to be surely among the very best. Besides, he said to himself, what he knew not himself he would rely on his many friends and relatives to provide. So he brought together his wife, who did some sewing, and a cousin who had once cut cloth for a coat, and three nephews who were apprenticed to a weaver, and two of his nieces who were supposed to knit wool so fast that it was said they could make a whole blanket in half a day, as well as a few trusted friends here and there, including one who had once been a tailor’s apprentice many years ago but had not succeeded because of his poor eyesight.

And the Fox brought all the Would-be Tailors to the Old Farmer, who put them all in a room with his kith and kin so they could be taught their skills every day and night for some weeks. A Traveller happened to pass through and find this in progress. “But will this help these woodcutters, weavers and candlestick-makers to become Tailors?” he innocently asked the Old Farmer. The Old Farmer made no reply. Instead, in the deep of night when the Traveller slept, the Farmer and the Fox arranged to have the hapless fool’s throat cut and then threw his body into the sea.

When the Would-Be Tailors came out of the room into the sunlight, the Fox had ships ready for them at the harbour to take them to the Land of Milk and Honey. He bundled them on board, and almost before they could say their farewells to their loved ones, the ships were quickly on their way. “But are we Tailors now?” shouted one from the decks. “What?”, the Fox said over all the noise, “are you Tailors now? Yes, yes, of course you are Tailors, what else do you think you are, don’t worry about anything, you are Tailors all right, you are just what they want in the Land of Milk and Honey, work hard now, and all the best to you, good luck!”

Alas, it was not to be. Some of the Would-Be Tailors never reached as their ships sank en route. Others reached but could not find work or were killed by the locals in the Land of Milk and Honey or were sent in slave ships back to the Land of Stones and Dust. A few Would-Be Tailors did manage to stay on somehow and per chance learned to become tailors and earn a modest living, but they too yearned for their homes and families and even the hot sun of their own Land of Stones and Dust. As for the Fox and the Old Farmer, life went on nicely enough, as they went from town to town speaking to people about the glories and riches that awaited them in the cool and lovely Land of Milk and Honey, and many crowds gathered to hear them everywhere they went.

Moral: Do not interfere with people when they are making money (or, for that matter, when they are eating, or making love).

Three Memoranda to Rajiv Gandhi 1990-1991

THREE MEMORANDA TO RAJIV GANDHI 1990-1991

I. PAKISTAN, SECULARISM AND HINDU COMMUNALISM

II. FOREIGN POLICY

III. ECONOMIC POLICY

by

SUBROTO ROY

Author’s Note, April 2007: As told elsewhere here, in September 1990 I was appointed by Rajiv Gandhi to advise on the long-term agenda for the country. These advisory memoranda were first written by me in that capacity. The Economic Policy Memo was written in September-October 1990; the Foreign Policy Memo was written in February 1991 (during and after the Gulf War); the one on Secularism was a compendium of several smaller ones written in late 1990. These were confidential at the time though were based on the work of the perestroika projects on India and Pakistan that I had been leading since 1986 at the University of Hawaii.  As has been told elsewhere, I warned against Rajiv’s vulnerability to assassination.  My warnings went in vain.  When he was killed, I published these documents in The Statesman Editorial Pages of July 31, August 1, August 2 1991. The published subtitles were “Stronger Secular Middle”, “Saving India’s Prestige”, and “Salvation in Penny Capitalism” respectively. Needless to say, I do not today at age 52 agree with everything I wrote in these documents some 16 years ago at age 35-36, and my perspectives on the economy, Pakistan etc have matured further as may be seen from my current writings; but I am pleased to find I am today not  embarrassed more than very slightly by any statement I made back then.  My most recent writings relevant to the change in my thought since these documents include “What to tell Musharraf”, “Solving Kashmir”, “Law, Justice and J&K”, “India’s Macroeconomics”, “Fiscal Instability” and “India’s Trade and Payments”.

I. PAKISTAN, SECULARISM, AND HINDU COMMUNALISM (“Stronger Secular Middle”)

The world political order has seen immense structural changes recently. The most important of these are the result of the collapse of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and its replacement there by free and self-critical thought and  debate, with all the risks and responsibilities that these carry. As a result, the world economy too is on the verge of major change. There may well be by 2000 a pact led by people of European descent from Australia via the Americas and Europe to Siberia, and a smaller pact of East Asian peoples from the Sea of Japan to the Straights of Malacca. Competition between the powers in such a world will be for new markets and cheap sources of labour, energy and natural resources.  Given the fragmentation of the Islamic world and the overall weakness of Africa, it is China and our subcontinent which may be the only significant counterweights in this new balance of power. Both have long histories, resilient cultures, and vast populations, which make others apprehensive. But the future of China is far from clear to anyone. The collapse of totalitarianism seems certain after the passing of the present gerontocracy, but what will follow is anybody’s guess. At best, it may be the emergence after a power struggle of a Chinese Gorbachev who will free the domestic economy, restore political freedom, and restore Tibet’s self-governance. At worst, it may be a civil war between the remnants of the communists and some new Kuomingtang nationalists backed by Taiwan and Hong Kong. The one thing certain about China’s near term future is the oncoming uncertainty. This leaves our subcontinent, and here the key is India-Pakistan relations.

There is little doubt that the post-Partition configuration of India, Pakistan, and a divided and disputed Kashmir has been extremely detrimental to the welfare of all the people of the subcontinent, and has impoverished the general budgets and distorted the economies of both countries. If it has benefited important sections of the political and military elites of both countries, it has done so only at the expense of the general welfare of the masses. So long as the arms-race and elite-rivalry continues, the economies of both countries are likely to remain severely distorted, and there is little genuine prospect of improvements in mass welfare or the large-scale economic development of either country.

It seems hard to remember that little more than a generation or two ago, there was no problem of Kashmir on the subcontinent, or that, for the most part, the Muslims and Hindus lived in amity in undivided India. Partition came about because of the failure of the political dialogue between the Congress and Jinnah. This dialogue failed for three sets of reasons: the British role in the middle, the specific international context at the time, and the fact Congress and Jinnah were more often at cross-purposes than addressing the same issues. The proof they were largely at cross-purposes is indicated by the fact that Kashmir was never on the agenda of any serious discussion before Partition, yet ever since it has come to precisely symbolize the crisis over national identity in both India and Pakistan.
Now, in general, a country cannot have large land and naval forces at the same time. If it is assumed Pakistan and India must remain the perpetual military enemy of one another, both may have today more than adequate land and naval forces. But if that assumption is mistaken, then the real military weakness of the subcontinent taken as a whole becomes immediately apparent. This is made clear by the recent Gulf War, which is a defining event of the last half-century, and even perhaps of the whole century. If India and Pakistan are to protect themselves adequately in the modern world, they must do so by combined forces.

From a practical point of view, this cannot happen so long as each has its army trained at the other and calling it the “dushman”. On the other hand, the combination of both forces would immediately make the resulting force one of significant power, even though there would have to be further transition towards naval forces while infantries are transformed towards amphibious, airborne, reserve, and civil duties.

In the modern age, the defence of our subcontinent as a whole has to be naval and strategic, and such a defence cannot be made adequately so long as there are instead large rival armies facing one another in anger across a disputed border in Kashmir. The lesson of the Gulf War for the people of the subcontinent is that our bitter problems must be resolved, and resolved completely and permanently, in the way the bitter problems between France and Germany came to be resolved by De Gaulle and Adenauer.

Eventually, Kashmir (with or without Jammu and Ladakh) has to be united and demilitarized by both countries. But Kashmir cannot be independent any more than Punjab, Sind or Assam. Nor can a united Kashmir “go” to either India or Pakistan without further needless bloodshed. So the solution must be to try to mutually re-define the foundational basis of the sovereign states of our subcontinent after Partition. Indians and Pakistanis are free peoples who can voluntarily agree together to alter in their own interests the terms set hurriedly by Attlee or Mountbatten in the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Nobody but we ourselves keeps us prisoners of British or American definitions of who we are or might be.

For such a redefinition to take place, there has to be recognition that the configuration which occurred after Partition was a monumental mistake, which even Jinnah — the chain-smoking secular-minded Muslim nationalist — had not wanted at the time. (Jinnah’s cheerless speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan is, incidentally, as secular a document as any.) The solution must be to reopen the dialogue where it failed almost fifty years ago, and to work towards a major constitutional revision for a new and stable configuration to emerge in all of our subcontinent. Fifty years is, after all, not a long time in the history of our peoples. This kind of a solution is further implied by an understanding of the nature of the three nationalist forces on the subcontinent: secular nationalism as is supposed to be represented by the Congress and its offshoots; Muslim nationalism as represented today by Pakistan; and Hindu nationalism as represented today by the BJP. For the whole of the present century, these have been the three permanent political forces on the subcontinent. Congress has been the most important and central force. But the fact Congress was started mostly by Hindus was enough for a Muslim political force in the form of the Muslim League to get created on one side of it. Muslim politicization had its own reaction of an explicitly Hindu politicization in the form of the Hindu Mahasabha on the other side of Congress. It is not long ago, relative to the length of our history, that the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha were just factions of the Congress in its struggle for independence, and many people like Jinnah had joint membership of both a communal and a secular organization.

The fact these three forces are permanent fixtures of our politics is of the highest importance. Each has changed in name, form and strength from time to time. The Muslim force went into the hands of Jinnah who, in course of bluffing his way with Congress and the British in the hope of gaining maximum advantage for his constituents, inadvertently created a moth-eaten Pakistan, which soon collapsed into military rule, foreign domination, civil war and secession. The Hindu political force became associated in the public mind with the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, was eclipsed for a short while, then re-emerged in the form of the RSS, the Jana Sangha and now the BJP. Congress has stayed more or less in the middle. But with a frequent policy of expediency instead of a clear and convincing national philosophy, during decades of extreme economic and political crisis, Congress has been experiencing continuous factionalism and splintering into various disunited and opportunistic groups.

Nevertheless, a permanent configuration of political forces on the subcontinent can be identified of a secular middle, with Hindu and Muslim communal interests on either side of it. Each force is of such a size and importance that it must be respected and cannot be ignored. None of the three can be destroyed or converted by any one or combination of the other two. Congress and the BJP cannot destroy Muslim communalism as represented today by Pakistan. Congress and the Muslims cannot destroy Hindu communalism as represented today by the BJP. And the BJP and Pakistan will destroy one another and the whole of our subcontinent with them before they destroy secularism. Much as they might like to, neither can the RSS impose universal Hindu domination nor can the Pakistani ulema impose Islamic law over all parts of the subcontinent. Nor, for that matter, can Congress and its offshoots expect to spread secularism everywhere on the subcontinent.

These are the fundamental facts of political life on the subcontinent. They have not changed for 100 years, and, come what may, they are not likely to change for the next 50 years. If the forces are not recognised correctly and accomodated and reconciled properly, all that will happen is that the real and emotional resources of all sides will be drained against each other, until such a time as there is perhaps a break-up of the subcontinent and a repeat of the 18th century, with elites panicking and fleeing abroad if they can, mass blood-letting, while foreigners roam the country competitively in search of aluminium, manganese, coal, iron ore, oil, women, cheap labour, quick profits or whatever. Both the national movement for Independence from European rule and Jinnah’s desire to preserve the cultural identity of Indian Muslims will have become ghastly long-term failures. So long as the conflict between the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent continues, with secular forces caught in the middle, it is certain that the people of our subcontinent will not experience genuine mass economic improvement or be able to take their proper position in the world. Instead, we shall be completely vulnerable and defenceless with respect to predaory foreign powers in the post-Cold War world.

A genuine reconciliation between Pakistan and Hindu communalism is possible only via the revitalised leadership of a secular centre, with a clear-headed understanding of the facts and the way forward. It will require courage and calm statesmanship of a high order, of the kind shown by Willy Brandt, Sadat and Gorbachev in recent years. (Postscript: Rajiv Gandhi may have been able to show such statesmanship in his second term.)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (“Saving India’s Prestige”)
A key principle by which to guide the foreign policy of a large and potentially great nation like ours can be stated simply as follows:

An action of the Government of India outside the territory of India, i.e., an act of foreign policy, should be undertaken if and only if it protects or promotes Indian interests outside the territory of India.

Indian interests outside India encompass the private interests of Indian businessmen, Indian migrant workers and their descendants, Indian pilgrims, Indian students, Indian tourists etc, as well as the public interests of the Indian Republic such as the defence of the territory and property of India and the promotion overseas of the culture, languages and values of India.

It is a fact that Indian prestige on the world-stage has declined steadily since Independence. India’s share of world trade and finance used to be large in the 1750s, considerable in the 1850s, small but significant in the 1950s. It is close to insignificant today as we approach 2000. Accurately or not, we are perceived by those who think about us at all as a complex mess of a society, rife with caste, class and religious conflicts; moralistic and hypocritical beggars and braggarts on the world stage; very weak relative to our potential and our pretensions; with all talk and little ability. True or false, whether we like it or not, that is how we are perceived by many people outside India.

Repercussions of this view that the world has of us today are felt everywhere. A cynical Pakistani foreign minister once said about Non-Alignment: “Zero plus zero equals zero”. He was wrong then but would be right today. In public international circles, the Government of India is mostly ignored, and not even humoured or flattered the way some are because of their oil. Many Indians outside India face harrassment, hostility and discrimination of various degrees. This is related not only to the fact they are often competent and successful relative to local populations, but also to the perception that India is a weak and flabby country unable to protect her citizens abroad or offer them a proper life at home. If we are to formulate a new and effective foreign policy for India, we have to be first candid and realistic in our assessment of the facts and circumstances of the world situation and our present place in it.

Ideally, the foreign policy and defence of the subcontinent should be common. Differences between private Indians, Pakistanis, etc tend to disappear outside the subcontinent in face of common opportunities and adversities. If we are not able to persuade our neighbours about this in the short run, we may nevertheless act as far as possible as if we have a common policy, hoping to thereby persuade our neighbours by our example of the gains from such a policy. With this in mind, the broad aims of a new foreign policy may be formulated as follows:

A. Independence from so-called “foreign aid”. We do not ask for or accept public foreign aid from foreign Governments or international organizations at “concessional” terms. Requiring annual foreign aid is an indication of economic maladjustment, having to do with the structure of imports and exports and the international price of the Indian rupee. Receiving the so-called aid of others, e.g. the so-called Aid-India Consortium or the soft-loans of the World Bank, diminishes us drastically in the eyes of the donors, who naturally push their own agendas and gain leverage in the country in various ways in return. Self-reliance from so-called foreign aid would require making certain economic adjustments in commercial and exchange-rate policies, as well as austerity in foreign-exchange spending by the Government. Emergency aid from abroad (e.g. for disaster relief) or private voluntary aid need not be affected.

B. Promotion of amity and demilitarisation on the subcontinent. The idea would be to aim towards a more or less common foreign and military policy on the pattern of Western Europe within five or ten years. This will require some outstanding statesmanship and domestic political courage vis-a-vis Pakistan on the lines suggested in the previous memorandum.

C. Resolving the border-dispute with China by treaty. This too will require some clear-thinking statesmanship. The general trade-off between sectors may be a commonsensical way of breaking the impasse. Prima facie at least, Arunachal which we already have is probably more valuable to us than Aksai Chin which they already have, unless there are defence reasons to the contrary. A sound settlement should allow us to take a firm if quiet stand with them on Tibet. What they do at Tiannanmen may be not be our affair but what they do in Tibet is. Our position on Tibet has not been an altogether honourable one in the last 40 years.  Also we should seek to protect those of Indian descent in Hong Kong from the chaos that is likely to occur in 1997.

D. Promotion of emigration and reverse migration to and from e.g. North America, Hong Kong, Africa etc. On the one hand, we should export our most exportable product, which is inexpensive good quality labour skills. At the same time, any Indian or descendant of an Indian living abroad should be encouraged to return at will. This is important for economic reasons, in effect adding value to the stock of human capital in the country. It is even more important for political reasons, as it will undercut to some extent the overseas financing of domestic terrorism. Nationality laws have to be amended giving Indian nationality to as many people as possible of Indian descent. Every Indian abroad who has taken a foreign passport but wishes to retain or re-acquire Indian nationality at the same time should be encouraged by us to do so. This may go to isolate extremist opinion, as thousands of moderate emigrants in Britain and North America will presumably prefer to maintain or freely re-acquire Indian nationality alongside their new nationalities. Many may rediscover patriotism for their homeland, where they now feel rootless in alien cultures which is what subconsciously motivates the demand for an abstract separatism.

E. Promotion of commerce, finance and investment abroad — exports, imports, capital flows in and out, tourism, contacts and exchanges. This is of fundamental importance for economic reasons. It will entail establishing as quickly as possible conditions favourable for the freeing of the rupee, as will be described in the next memorandum.

F. Achievement of tolerable standards in sports, music, and the arts. Our sporting prowess has become laughable. This contributes to our dismal image in the outside world. The present system is utterly hopeless, because of the heavy and completely unnecessary Government involvement in sports. Sports can be and must be privatized as completely as possible. Let commercial advertising and private sponsorship help our athletic development with minimum Government involvement. For example, Government can give tax breaks to sponsors who finance athletes for competitive international sport. There is plenty of black money in the economy which can be induced to come out to support sports in the country. To a lesser extent, the state of music and the arts and the culture in general have also become hopeless due to the unnecessary Government involvement.

For these six new objectives of an effective Indian foreign policy to be achieved, there must be a clear-headed and consistently formulated long-term view. The basic means would be to make a major and distinct move away from multilateralism towards bilateralism in international affairs. This would begin with Pakistan, on the lines discussed in the previous memorandum. Our most active foreign policy must be on the subcontinent, followed by South East Asia to where we once exported Buddhism, Islam, Sanskrit and Hinduism. South East Asia is today thriving economically and is quite stable politically. We have to learn what we can from them and offer whatever we have in exchange. Then there are the major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, Britain and France. Then there is the Islamic crescent from Morocco to Indonesia. Then there are the countries where Indians have gone or can still go as emigrants or where there are significant Indian interests. These include Australia, Canada, South Africa, East Africa, Fiji and the West Indies. Then there are continental powers like Brazil, Argentina, Egypt and Nigeria. Then there are regional groups like the European Community and Scandinavia as collectivities.

On the subcontinent, the relationship should be made domestic and familiar with the aim of identifying common interests and forging a common policy as soon as possible. With the others, a rational bilateralism would involve starting with a thorough assessment of bilateral relations country-by-country. What are the principal components of imports and exports and their rates of expansion or contraction? What are Indian assets and liabilities in each of these countries and how liquid are these? How significant are private Indian interests in each — immigrants, tourists, students, businesses, etc.? What is the scope for expansion of ties in view of our objectives? Etc. Long-term foreign policy requires a constant stock of reliable information and also a continuous flow into and out of that stock. This may require overhauling some of the civil services. For good foreign policy to be made and implemented, there should be easy flow between the IFS and IAS, academia and the military and intelligence services. The aim would be to have a pool of highly qualified people voluntarily pursuing foreign languages and research of national importance with respect to the different countries of the world. The dozens of unthinking think-tanks in Delhi may have to be drastically overhauled to actually produce something useful after all.

Having determined what are the priorities and what are not, a reallocation of the foreign exchange resources of the Government of India will be called for to achieve stated foreign policy objectives. This has to accompany the process of economic reform, as well as the vigourous pursuit of reasonable solutions to the subcontinent’s continuing political problems. Obtaining a broad national consensus on the objectives is very important. Once the thinking has been clarified and the pieces put in place, this may not be so hard to achieve.

III. ECONOMIC POLICY (“Salvation in Penny Capitalism”)
Our economic problems have to do with the misdefinition which has occurred since Independence of the role of government in the economy. Partly under the influence of numerous domestic and foreign economists and pseudo-economists, our Government since the 1950s has frequently done things which need not or should not be done by government at the expense of things which have to be done or can only be done by government. The prime indicator of economic mismanagement today is not the annual deficit, but rather the vast public debt today of more than Rs. 273,000 crores. Our Government has borrowed something like Rs. 3500/- on behalf of each man, woman and child in the country — and spent it. A pile of rupee coins adding up to the public debt of India would stretch 4.55 million km into the sky, or be as long as six trips to the moon and back. That is the size of the problem.
Commonsense says that for the individual family or business or the nation as a whole, if you borrow funds for productive purposes which repay their worth, the size of the debt incurred is immaterial. If you borrow on the credit of the Government of India and then add to the country’s capital stock (whether human capital via better health and education or physical capital like roads and bridges), then the size of the debt does not matter, as long as the payments of interest on the debt are matched by increases in the capital stock. But if Government spends borrowed funds recklessly without a thought to rates of return, no capital gets created and instead the economy approaches technical bankruptcy at which time foreign creditors come knocking at the door.

The roots of the crisis may be traced to the following:

(A) Politicians in democratic systems make competitive soft promises of cash and immediate benefits, without thinking of where the revenue is going to come from. It is recognition of this which this has led to the turnaround in the Western economies since 1979, and made politics there much more sober from an economic point of view.
(B) Our closed economy with a captive Reserve Bank and credit market has caused any amount of the currency to be debased internally. To correct the problem at the roots, these two factors have to be faced squarely.

Short Run Policy (0-6 months) All political parties, national or regional, whether they have been in power or not, are mutually responsible for the crisis. It has been one of the unintended side-effects of the democratic system we have chosen. Therefore, all parties have a responsibility to set things right, and the way to do so was thoughtfully placed in the Constitution by its framers in Article 360: in a situation in which the “financial stability or credit” of India is threatened, the President is entitled to declare a financial emergency. This would permit freezing all levels and increases in Government spending outside essential functions (defence, law and order, roads, transport and comunications, basic education and health), initiate cost-cutting in all non-essential parts of the Government, and create the appropriate mood of seriousness in the country.
Next there will have to be an increase in revenue without increasing taxes. Can this be done? (Bush had once called this Reagan/Thatcher idea “voodoo economics”.) In our economy it may be possible via the appropriate use of two facts — the vast black economy of undeclared income of perhaps Rs. 43,000 crores, and the vast Government-owned industrial and services sector plus any amount of Government-owned land and capital. The black economy has made our businessmen waste their enterprise in trying to cheat or buy out the Government. The Government-owned sector has led our workers to waste their skills and learning abilities in overmanned and unproductive occupations. Any reform-minded Government must be prepared to tackle corrupt or lazy businessmen, union bosses and Government employees, while creating a system which rewards initiative, honesty, enterprise and effort on the part of business, labour and the bureaucracy.
As part of the financial emergency, every Government department can be instructed to reduce costs by 10-25% every year for the next five years. Much of this may be possible without layoffs but by internal economies and tough administration — freezing wages and benefits, saving office-space, more clatter and less chatter, etc.

More crucially, there must be an absolute moratorium on strikes in the public sector. Only if an industry is vital to the national interest should it be in the public sector, e.g. space research, defence production or oil. Strikes in such industries damage the whole country and not just the individual employer. Therefore, either there are no strikes, or the industry is not vital to the nation and can be safely placed in the private sector.

This will set the example for more fundamental changes in industrial relations. Labour laws have to be applied or amended to ensure unions are run for the benefit of their members and not of union bosses or political parties. Unions are vital in industrial society to protect individual workers from exploitation, discrimimation and safety hazards. They are not supposed to be empires for unelected union bosses, arenas for party politics, or excuses for overmanning. Our productivity is shockingly low relative to international standards, and without crucial improvements in it we shall be wiped out if and when the economy is opened as it will have to be for other reasons.

Increasing productivity per head throughout the economy is therefore a vital preparatory step, and must be tackled in the first few months. The device of a strike has to be made a last resort. Workers have to be free to elect their leaders by secret ballot without fear or intimidation. Political parties have to be removed from the workplace. The power of toughs and vandals has to be broken by the ballot box.

At the same time, employment can be made to increase by leaps and bounds by freeing all domestic enterprise from licensing, controls and permits. Freeing domestic enterprise from retrograde Central and State laws may be again most easily done via the Constitution. Subject only to local laws of safety, morality and environmental protection, all trade, commerce and enterprise throughout the territory of India should be made free from Government interference or restriction. That was what was envisioned by Articles 19 and 301 of the Constitution.

The increase may be incalculable in employment, wages and income, and hence the consumption of the masses of our people. Important side-benefits will be that urban discontent, political vandalism and communalism will be reduced. An idle mind is the devil’s workshop — with increased employment via enterprise, there will be less time and inclination for political or communal crimes.

Special notice has to be given to banking policy, as banks affect all other enterprises. Our nationalised banks are in disastrous shape. Private banks are responsible to their share-holders; if bad loans are made or bad risks taken, or if costs are too high or service poor, then managements get replaced by the power of share-holders. In public sector banks this does not happen. Costs are very high, profit rates low or negative, loans are not repaid or should not have been made in the first place, and service is appalling. Small depositors place their confidence in them because they have no other place to put their meagre savings, and because they believe the Government knows best and is not itself bankrupt. If a serious opening of the economy is to be planned in the medium and long-term, there has to be adequate preparation of the monetary system, else there may be a run on the banks and a collapse in public confidence in the currency.

It becomes essential that costs in the public sector banks are slashed, loans get repaid, loan melas stop, and banks are run as banks and not as public charities or employment agencies. At the same time, the Reserve Bank has to be made independent of the Ministry of Finance and of parliamentary pressure, and preferably made constitutionally independent like the UPSC or the Auditor-General. The task of any central bank is to maintain a currency in which the domestic public can have confidence in making their economic transactions, and to reflect a realistic price on international currency markets. The Reserve Bank’s role has been severely distorted by it being forced practically at gunpoint to hold massive amounts of the Government’s debt, and to finance this by printing more and more paper money. Instead, the currency has to reflect real economic transactions, and the Reserve Bank can be instructed (as its own 1985 report said) to follow a non-inflationary monetary rule of expanding the money-supply only relative to the rate of growth of real income and output in the economy.
Similarly, markets for insurance and life-insurance have to be rescued from the bankruptcy of nationalisation. Insurance is a highly complicated industry involving the correct assessment and sharing of business and personal risks. The present industry is in a shambles and will probably have to learn the modern business almost from scratch. Yet reforming it is vital to a new and invigorated economy, and also to laying the basis for heath-insurance for the masses.

Medium-Run Policy (6-18 months) Next, a concerted effort will have to be made to raise revenue without raising taxes. To the contrary, tax rates have to be simplified and reduced if possible, and especially the system of invisible indirect excise taxes (which tend to hurt the poor most heavily) gradually changed as far as possible to visible direct income and wealth taxes. If revenues are to be raised without increasing taxes, it is black money and the public sector which must be made to come to the rescue of the country. The public sector belongs to the public — not to the IAS, not to the public sector unions and certainly not to local politicians.  Ideally, the most efficient and equitable means of share-holding of the public sector would be for every Indian adult to receive at the address of his or her domicile (or voter registration), upon a simple application and a processing fee, oe share-certificate in each enterprise being run by the Government of India. (An even better model would be to have a poverty-citerion, and give the shares to the poorest of the poor villages or village panchayats.) The shares would become tradeable; markets of penny-capitalism would spread throughout the villages of India, as each penny-capitalist decided whether to hold or sell the share-certificates thus received, and the Government would have safely handed over the ownership of the public sector to its rightful owners.

It would be a historic move for the distribution of national wealth, as scores perhaps hundreds of millions of new shareholders are created. The hidden hoards of black money would come out and become distributed equitably. Of course the shares of some public sector enterprises will not be worth much, but they will not be worth less than nothing. Nor would anyone be obliged to sell until it was privately profitable to do so. Future entrepreneurs (domestic or foreign) who wished to take over or turn around the fortunes of a bankrupt public sector firm would have to solicit the shares from a vast population of penny-capitalists.

Long-Run Policy (18+ months) Thus the key objective would be to control wasteful Government spending in order to place the Government in a position to redirect public resources towards the fundamental sources of economic growth for the common people of India. One further step would be necessary. This would be to make the rupee a hard currency of the world.
This will have to be done with utmost care and proper preparation of economic and political expectations. It will mean making every Indian — high or lowly, rich or poor — free to hold his or her assets, small as these may be, in any currency or precious metal of choice without Government intervention. Government would use its own reserves of foreign exchange and gold for its own purchases and obligations abroad — e.g. defence, diplomacy, or emergency reserves.  Success or failure will depend squarely on the credibility and resolve of the Government that there will be no U-turn. If the Government is steadfast and is believed, the rupee will fall some distance for some months and then turn upwards and rise some lesser distance, at which point it would have become a hard currency. The initial fall will bring out black money and pent-up demand, and may reduce the present (October 26 1990) artificial price of Rs. 20 to the dollar to even Rs. 40 or Rs 50 to the dollar. The import bill will become enormous, and immediate relief will have to be given by cutting back on import duties and excise taxes on petroleum equivalently, leading to a fall in revenue from these sources. Export incentives should be immediately withdrawn, as Indian exporters will face an unprecedented boom as the dollar prices of their goods tumble, and goods which were previously high-cost and unexportable become very exportable. The export boom may be so huge as to be inflationary in the short term, requiring the same steady monetary policy plus corrective action by release of food and other stocks. The critical burden will fall on expansion of supply and production — it is here that the importance of first establishing domestic free enterprise and cooperative industrial relations is seen, as domestic enterprise must be in a position to respond to an export boom when the rupee becomes a hard currency. The rupee would become a hard currency the moment its initial fall comes to an end and it starts upwards at a new and steady equilibrium value. At this value, our credit-worthiness in the world would be firm, our export-led boom would have begun, capital owned by Indians abroad would have begun to flow freely in, and the Government would be in a position to embark on fundamental changes for long term economic growth and welfare of the masses — specifically, village-based economic development and school-based village development. Most important, as people gain more control over their own individual futures, the mood and momentum should make the position one of strong confidence.

Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India (1984)

Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India Subroto Roy

First published on May 29 1984 as Occasional Paper No. 69 of the Institute of Economic Affairs, London

Preface March 2007

A quarter century has passed since my 1982 doctoral thesis at Cambridge University under Frank Hahn, examined by Christopher Bliss and Terence Hutchison, and titled “On liberty and economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India.” I wrote what follows shortly afterwards in Blacksburg, Virginia, and Ithaca, New York, and it was published on May 29 1984 in London by the Institute of Economic Affairs as Occasional Paper No. 69, ISBN: 0-255 36169-6. The day it was published it turned out to be the subject of the main editorial of The Times, then London’s leading newspaper. (I learnt later this had been due to Peter Bauer, and also that 700 copies sold in the first month, a record for the publisher.) The Times editorial though laudatory was misleading, and I had to clarify the contents of the monograph in a letter published on June 16 1984; both documents are available elsewhere at this site.

This work was the first explicit critique of post-Mahalanobis Indian economic thought from a classical liberal perspective since B. R. Shenoy’s initial criticism decades previously. I was 29 when it was published, I am 52 now. I do not agree with everything I wrote back then and find the tone a little puffed up as young men tend to be; it was five years before publication of my main “theoretical” work Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (Routledge: London & New York, 1989, also now republished here). My experience of life in the years since has also made me far less sanguine both about human nature and about America than I was then. But I am glad to find I am not embarrassed by what I said as a young man, indeed I am pleased I said what I did in favour of classical liberalism and against statism and totalitarianism well before it became popular to do so after the Berlin Wall fell. (In India as elsewhere, former communist apparatchiks and fellow-travellers became pseudo-liberals overnight.)

The famous November 1955 Milton Friedman memorandum is referred to herein for the first time as “unpublished” in note 1; I was to meet Milton and Rose Friedman at the Mont Pelerin Society meetings held at Cambridge later that year, where I gave them a copy of this monograph; when Milton returned to Stanford he sent to me in Blacksburg his original 1955-56 documents on Indian planning. I published the 1955 document for the first time in May 1989 during the University of Hawaii perestroika-for-India project that I was then leading, it appeared later in the 1992 volume Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, edited by myself and WE James. The results of the Hawaii project reached Rajiv Gandhi through my hand in September 1990, as told elsewhere in “Rajiv Gandhi and the Origins of India’s 1991 Economic Reform”. The 1956 document was published in November 2006 on the front page of The Statesman, on the same day my obituary of Milton appeared in the inside pages (both are republished here too).

It is apparent from this monograph that I knew almost nothing then about Pakistan or Islam; that has changed as may be seen especially from the other book I created with WE James at the University of Hawaii, Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, as well as my more recent work on Pakistan and Islam. It is of course impossible to understand India without understanding Pakistan and vice versa.

In general, this monograph had to do with India’s microeconomics and theory of value and resource allocation while my latest work – “India’s Macroeconomics”, “Fiscal Instability”, “India’s Trade and Payments”, “Our Policy Process”, “Fallacious Finance”, “The Dream Team: A Critique” . “Against Quackery”, “Growth & Government Delusion” etc – has to do with India’s macroeconomics and monetary and fiscal theory and policy. Part of the criticism of “distorted incentives” prevailing in Indira Gandhi’s India may still be relevant to India today, while the discussion of ethnic problems, agriculture, the “public choice” factors that stymie Indian progress, misgovernance etc will almost certainly be found so.

Pricing, Planning and Politics:

A Study of Economic Distortions in India

First published on May 29 1984 as Occasional Paper No. 69 of the Institute of Economic Affairs, London

“The economic laws which operate in India are the same as in other countries of the world; the causes which lead to wealth among other nations lead to prosperity in India; the causes which impoverish other nations impoverish the people of India. Therefore, the line of enquiry which the economist will pursue in respect of India is the same which he adopts in inquiring into the wealth or poverty of other nations.” Romesh Chunder Dutt, 1906, The Economic History of India

“Satyameva Jayathe” (“Let truth be victorious”), Motto of the Indian Republic

I. INTRODUCTION

IN THE last 15 years, considerable evidence has accumulated to suggest that the most important policies pursued by successive governments of independent India have not been conducive to economic development, and have indeed gone against some of the most basic lessons that political economy has to offer. Forewarnings of the present predicament of India had come from a few economists in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but their arguments were either ignored or maligned as dogmatic and motivated by`ideology’.[1] My thesis in this Occasional Paper will be that, if the basic and commonsensical lessons of political economy had been acknowledged early on in the history of the Indian Republic, we might have found today a much more prosperous economy and a much healthier body politic than is the case.

To argue this, it is first necessary to describe an economy where the pursuit of the individual good by rational agents is conducted within some set of orderly political institutions which is conducive to both civil peace and sustained mass prosperity. Accordingly, Part I of this short Paper begins by describing the broad and familiar features of what may be called a neo-classical or liberal model, and then proceeds briefly to contrast it with a model in which individual incentives and public institutions have been distorted from their efficient characterizations.

The practical question that arises is: Where in practice have independent India’s policies led most conspicuously to distorted incentives and institutions? This will be the subject of Part III. Part II places the discussion in context by briefly describing a few relevant aspects of the political history of the Indian Republic.

I have argued elsewhere that every normative proposal for action is, in principle, open to question and criticism on the logical and factual grounds upon which it is founded. Whenever two people disagree about what ought to be done, it will be found either that at least one of them has made a mistake of logic or that they are also in disagreement about the facts of the case.[2] In Part IV, a tentative manifesto for political and economic reform in India is proposed, and I hope these proposals too will be subjected to critical scrutiny on the positive grounds upon which I shall seek to establish them.

Part I: Theory

2. EFFICIENT INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS

A `FACT’ may be understood as the opposite of that which could have been the case but is not. A basic fact of the study of men and society – one which was acknowledged first by Aristotle and then, very importantly, by Adam Smith, and which has been emphasized in modern times by Friedrich Hayek – is that, while we are able to study and speak of the nature of human decision and action in general terms, we do not and cannot have a knowledge of how particular actions are moved by particular causes and circumstances.[3]

We might certainly know, for instance, that every household in an economy views some horizons, wants to fulfill some aspirations, and faces some constraints. But if we were asked to specify what all these characteristics happened to be as a matter of fact at any one moment, we would certainly not be able to do so. Men are concerned almost wholly with (and are experts at) living their own lives as best they can – foraging for food, shelter and work, celebrating weddings and births, rearing children, and mourning deaths. For the most part, they are neither interested in, nor competent at judging, what others happen to be doing in their private lives. Neither benevolence nor envy extends much beyond a man’s immediate vicinity, and, certainly, neither can extend to people he does not know or come to know of in the course of a lifetime.

This fact is also acknowledged in modern microeconomics, when it is said that, for the individual agent to be able to make decisions and act upon them, it is sufficient for him to know (besides his own desires, abilities and constraints) only of the relative prices prevailing locally of the goods and skills he wishes to trade.`Efficient incentive’ defined We might then provisionally define an `efficient incentive’ as a set of relative prices and wages such that, when economic agents act upon them, three conditions are fulfilled:(i) the difference between the total demand for and the total supply of every good and skill is zero; (ii) every consumer succeeds in trading the amounts of different goods that he desires, and so obtains the highest utility he can within the constraint of his budget; (iii) every private enterprise maximizes the difference between its total revenues and total costs, that is, its profits. [4]

Rational action, however, occurs within a particular institutional context. Which action is rational and which is not will depend on what institutions there are and how well or poorly they function. As both classical liberals and Marxists argue, the neo-Walrasian tradition in modern economics – as exemplified by the Arrow-Debreu model – is practically devoid of any explicit institutional description, and so may best be regarded as a useful but grossly incomplete metaphor in the economist’s inquiry.

The institutions most relevant to economic activity are those of government. We might therefore add a fourth condition to characterize an efficient economy, namely, that government institutions work in such a way as to allocate tax revenues towards providing public goods in the amounts desired by citizens. This must be an institutional assumption implicit in the general equilibrium construction, without which it would be impossible to see the sense of that model.

The question that follows is how we are to ascertain the composition of the set of public goods to be provided. As is commonly known, this seems to confront the economist with numerous conceptual and practical problems. I propose here to circumvent all the typical difficulties of how to discover and combine individual preferences for public goods, or how to prevent free-riders, and to take a somewhat different route.

Functions of civil government: protection, public goods, education

To answer the question `What should be public goods first and foremost? I suggest we look for the kind of answer Adam Smith or Jeremy Bentham or J. S. Mill might have given to a related but different question : `What should be the functions of government in a large civil society, regardless of whether or not it is constituted democratically?’ This was the relevant question before the modern era of mass democracy. And it is still interesting because, first, it probably remains the appropriate question for the many countries today which either do not have democratic governments or do not have long histories of democracy, and, secondly, because the kinds of answer given by classical authors were very similar to those we might expect from individual citizens in modern democracies as well.

The most important practical functions of civil government include defence against external aggression, the dispensing of civil and criminal justice, the protection of life, property and trade – broadly, the Rule of Law – and the pursuit of a judicious foreign policy. All are different aspects of the same broad objective of ensuring the survival of the community and the security of individual life.

Yet no pretext has been more common than that an imminent danger to the security of the community requires the government to take despotic measures. The guarantee by a civil government of the freedom of inquiry, discourse, criticism, and historical research should take precedence, therefore, even over ensuring security and survival, for it is probably the only final check there can be on whether what a government says is or is not in fact the case. Where this freedom is forcibly denied, or where it exists but people are too apathetic, ignorant or busy with their daily lives to exercise it, public life soon becomes self deceptive and absurd, with propaganda taking the place of discourse, and pretensions and appearances diverging more and more from attainments and reality. Wherever the questions `What is true?’ or `What is the case?’ are not asked frequently enough, there will be fewer and fewer correct answers as to what the case happens to be.[5]
After collective and individual security, the functions of government include the building of dams, embankments, bridges and canals, the provision of roads and fresh water, and so on – activities which, as Adam Smith put it, “. . . though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain.” [6]

Each may be more or less a “pure” public good in the modern sense :“that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good”.[7]

Such a list could be extended to include activities as diverse as: the prevention of soil erosion; the public finance of school education, and’ of measures of basic public health such as vaccinations against contagious diseases; the issuing of currency; sewage disposal; population censuses; the standardization of weights and measures; and so on. It is unnecessary to be more specific here since some people will find even this list controversial. Dogmatists will deny the need for free inquiry; pacifists will dispute that defence is a public good; communists will protest against the public protection of private property; `anarcho-capitalists’ will contest the public dispensation of justice; and so on. To these critics, I would offer merely the following short and incomplete reply.

First, a sound argument can be made that what functions civil government should have can be ascertained, without prejudice, by reasonable citizens, though which particular functions these are may well vary according to circumstances. Secondly, if we could spend time in thoughtful and leisured conversation with every citizen of a large community, it might be predicted – as a matter of cold, empirical fact – that practically everyone would agree with the suggestion that the first destinations of tax revenues should indeed be activities like defence, civil protection and the Rule of Law, the provision of roads, and so on. If such a prediction is correct, my thesis is plainly much more democratic than it might appear to modern economists, though I shall later claim that an objective defence of democratic institutions can be made on quite different grounds as well.

If there is a clear family resemblance between classical liberal authors – from Smith and Mill through to Hayek, Robbins, Friedman, Buchanan, Bauer and many others – it has to do, not so much with the denunciation of government activity in the market-place, as with the recognition of the existence of certain duties of government outside it, the fulfillment of which are indispensable to civil life, let alone the pursuit of economic prosperity. Their protest is at the high opportunity cost of the alternatives foregone.

This raises the question of how we might tell whether government is working well or badly in a particular country at a particular time, or, generally, how we might tell whether different public goods are provided in too small or large amounts. For present purposes it will again be sufficient to suggest a very rough and common sense way of proceeding: let us look first, and think second.

For example, the Iran-Iraq war has clearly been a perfect public bad as far as the ordinary citizenry in either country are concerned. Similarly, if there happen to be millions of cases queuing outside the courts waiting to be heard, or if crime is rampant and police protection ineffective, that may constitute prima facie evidence that too few public resources have been devoted to civil order and justice. Or, if heavy rainfall annually causes landslides in the hills and floods in the plains, devastating crops and leaving innumerable citizens destitute, that also might prompt us to ask whether sufficient public resources have gone towards precautions against such havoc. And so on.[8]

Which goods happen to be public goods depends on the circumstances and the level of government being discussed. For similar circumstances and levels, similar goods will most likely be public goods in different countries. The state ordinarily consists not only of the national government but also of several provincial governments and a myriad of local governments. In particular, a premise of the liberal state would be that public goods should in fact be provided by various levels of government, financed through taxes paid respectively at those levels. The citizen is a taxpayer at a variety of levels, and accordingly public goods are due to be provided at a variety of levels. Just as the national government may not usurp the power to tax for, or spend money on, a public good which is best provided by a provincial government to the citizens of a province, so a provincial government may not tax for, or spend on, a public good best provided by a local government to the citizens of a locality.

The broad principle involved has two aspects: first, a recognition that knowledge of particular circumstances – and hence the ability to act – is infinitesimally dispersed within a population; and, secondly, as direct and visible a matching as possible of the benefits a citizen receives from a particular public good with the taxes he pays towards it, thereby perhaps reducing his incentive to be a free rider on the contributions of others.8Uncertainty and ignoranceProvisionally, therefore, efficient incentives may be thought to consist of a set of market-clearing relative prices and wages, occurring within an institutional context in which the basic and indispensable functions of government have been adequately performed at a variety of appropriate levels.

Such a definition would still be seriously incomplete in one major respect. For we must now recognise: (i) that history is unique and irretrievable, that the present consists only of the fleeting moment, and that the future, by its very nature, cannot be fully known; (ii) that such a thing as human freedom exists; and (iii) that, as a consequence, uncertainty and ignorance are ubiquitous.

Some of the uncertainty derives from the unfolding of natural events (like the rains) over which man has little or no control. The rest derives from the fact that the individual is a free agent who is affected by the actions of others but who cannot predict those actions completely because they too are free agents like himself. Game theory would have had no appeal for the economist if the existence of human freedom had not been a fact. It is this which makes it impossible to read everything in another person’s mind and thus makes it impossible to predict everything he might do. The lasting contribution of Keynesian economics could be its emphasis that such uncertainty and ignorance are important to the economist’s inquiry.

Mathematical economists have been saying for several years that what is required if we are to be realistic are models which reflect the sequential character of actual decision-making and account for the past being immutable and the future uncertain.[9] However, they have proceeded to write even more complex mathematics than we already have – disregarding Aristotle’s advice not to seek more precision from the subject of an inquiry than it may be capable of yielding.[10] My question is the more mundane one of what becomes of the classical liberals’ concept of efficient incentives and institutions in a dynamic world. I shall answer it too in a pedestrian way.

The single overwhelming reason why uncertainty and ignorance are relevant to the economist’s descriptions is that they make real the possibility of mistakes by economic agents. To extend the previous discussion to a dynamic context, what we can do is to ask which institutions are most likely to reduce or mitigate the social consequences of mistaken decisions, whether made by private agents or by those in public office. And it is here that the classical liberals advocate two important institutional features: competition and the decentralisation of decision-making.

The major value of democratic institutions over authoritarian ones is that they encourage these two principles to be put into effect. Because, in a large economy, particular knowledge is infinitesimally dispersed, it may be better for adjustments to a multitude of variables to be made continuously in response to changing circumstances by a vast number of small economic agents, rather than for adjustments to a few variables to be made at political intervals by a small group of very powerful agents. The concentration of power to make major decisions among a few fallible men is a much more ominous prospect than the distribution of power in small amounts among a large number of fallible men. It is much more dangerous for a monopoly of ideas to be claimed about where the political good of a country lies than for there to be free and open competition among such ideas at the bar of reason.

D. H. Robertson put it well when he warned “that all the eggs should not be in the same basket – that in this highly uncertain world the fortunes of a whole trade, or a whole area, should not depend on the foresight and judgement of a single centre of decision”.[11] The presumption in favour of democratic institutions is that they reduce the potential damage from wrong political decisions damage which can be rationally expected in an uncertain world.[12] Elections, in the liberal understanding, are then not so much the means to promote the interests of one’s confederates as to remove from office without bloodshed rulers who fail to do what they are entrusted with, and to replace them by those from whom better is expected. Economic efficiency in an uncertain worldThe economic notion of efficient incentives is also modified by uncertainty and ignorance. In the theory, a set of prices is market clearing only relative to unchanging preferences, resources and technologies. In a dynamic world, however, demand and supply functions are themselves changing and the notion of efficient incentives must accordingly be adapted to one in which relative prices move in the direction of the excess demand: that is, if the parameters change so that the total demand for a good or skill comes to exceed the total supply, we should want to see its relative price rising (and, conversely, if total supply exceeds total demand, we should want to see its relative price falling). During such a process of adjustment, many people may suffer very considerable hardship – something which reasonable Keynesians do well to emphasise.

If changing preferences, resources or technologies cause the demand for a product to diminish, we should want to see the firms which manufacture it either entering different markets, or improving its quality by technological innovation, or lowering prices. Similarly, we should want to see workers in these firms whether blue- or white-collar – who have skills specific to a product whose price is falling either increasing their productivity or retraining themselves in different skills more specific to the manufacture of goods whose prices are rising. Numerous enterprises can go bankrupt, and numerous workers can find themselves unable to sell the skills they possess, if they fail to adapt quickly enough to changing market conditions. The more specialised the product and the more specific the skill, the more hardship there may be. There could well be orthodox Keynesian consequences whereby laid-off workers reduce their consumption expenditures and firms on the verge of bankruptcy reduce their investment expenditures, leading to lower incomes for others, and thus to lower expenditures by them too, and so on. An anti-Keynesian who denied the existence of such hardship would be closed to the facts. He might also not be doing his own theory justice: for it is not unreasonable to argue that, while adjustments are inevitable in an uncertain world, the classical response of prices moving in the direction of excess demand probably minimises the hardship in the transition from one equilibrium to the next.

In a dynamic world, therefore, in which supply and demand functions are shifting continually and unpredictably (though probably incrementally, and not drastically), efficient incentives are better thought of as relative prices which are not stagnant but which are moving – and moving quickly – in the direction of excess demand. It should, in general, be continually profitable at the margin for firms and workers to be innovating technologically and improving productivity. As everyone knows from experience, the principle goad to such activity is fair and free competition. If a job or contract is sought badly enough, and if better quality or lower price are known to be the only criteria of selection, the expected outcome is a differentiation and improvement by competitors of the individual quality or price of what is sold.

In broad summary, the liberal understanding of how material well-being can be improved rests on the assumption that the basic functions of civil government are performed satisfactorily. Government provides the backdrop of civil order and protection necessary for private citizens freely and fairly to conduct their own lives and their transactions with one another. It is a theory which acknowledges a fundamental fact in the study of society, namely, that the individual household : (a) most commonly defines its own horizons; (b) knows the particular opportunities available to it to produce, trade and consume; (c) recognises the particular constraints which prevent it from doing all that it may desire; and(d) perceives how these opportunities and constraints may be changing. Where, as in the liberal picture, there are large numbers of producers and consumers, sellers and buyers – each family acting more or less independently – the efforts of one family do not directly make for other than its own success, while at the same time the repercussions of its mistakes are felt by itself and do not reverberate throughout the whole community. Such has been, as I see it, the American secret to mass prosperity.

3. DISTORTED INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS

DISTORTED INCENTIVES are the logical opposites of efficient ones. Relative prices and wages send distorted signals to individual economic agents when they do not move in the direction of excess demand, so that there is no general tendency for markets to clear. A long-run or endemic excess demand for a good reveals itself in rationing, queueing and black markets. The price at which trade nominally takes place is too low and shows no tendency to move upwards.

Conversely, in a product market, a long-run or endemic excess supply reveals itself in surpluses and spoilages. In a labour market, it reveals itself, on the one hand, in armies of tenured employees who have no incentive to improve productivity, and, on the other hand, in lines of involuntarily or disguised unemployed who cannot sell all the skill they possess and have to settle for selling their less-specialised ones. The price at which trade nominally takes place is too high and shows no tendency to move downwards. In practical terms, firms do not find it profitable to be continually entering new markets or improving quality or enhancing technology or reducing price in order to attract and retain customers. Farmers in particular may face output and input prices which make technological improvements unprofitable.

In politics, distorted incentives are ones which make it profitable for politicians and government officials to be corruptible and taxpayers to be evasive. Because corruption is not penalised and honesty not rewarded, the pursuit of private interest may make it rational to be corrupt and irrational to be honest.

Individualism and statism

A neo-classical economic model like the one outlined above presupposes among citizens a political attitude of individualism. This may be defined as a condition in which citizens have the idea (a) that it is the individual household itself which is principally responsible for improvements in its own well-being, and (b) that government merely “is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people …”, and that government officials are merely the citizens’ “trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.” [13]

Its logical opposite may be called an attitude of statism – defined as prevailing when various classes of citizens have the idea that it is government which is and should be principally responsible for improvements in individual and public well-being. A good sense in which `power’ can be defined in political and economic contexts is as “the capacity to restrict the choices open to other men”.[14] An attitude of statism entails a willingness, or at least an acquiescence, on the part of citizens to relinquish to those in government, with little or no questioning, the power to make decisions which may affect their lives intimately. At the same time, responsibility for relapses or lack of progress in individual well-being is also thought to be the consequence of governmental and not private decision-making. Whereas individualism is a self-assertive attitude, statism is a self abnegating one. For those in government to have a statist mentality is the same as saying they are paternalistic, that is, making the presumption that the citizen is often incapable of judging for himself what is for his own good.

The suggestion that government should have the principal responsibility for improvements in individual and collective economic well-being – in the sense that the collectivity can and should satisfy the material aspirations of every individual – appears straightaway to be self contradictory. An individual can have enough difficulty trying to articulate his own horizons, aspirations and constraints, let alone trying to do the same for others. For a politician (or economist) to claim (or imply) not only that he knows(or can know) the relevant characteristics of everyone at once, but also that he knows how to ameliorate the condition of humanity at a stroke, as if by magic, would have been considered ridiculous in more candid times than ours. If we understand `collective effort’ to mean the sum of individual labours engaged in a common pursuit or endeavour, then for the collectivity to try materially to satisfy every individual would amount to imposing a duty on everyone to try materially to satisfy everyone else – an absurd state of affairs, flying in the face of the fact that most people most of the time do not wish to, or cannot, cope with much else except their private lives.

Exhorting government directly to improve the material wellbeing of `the people’ cannot mean what it seems to because it cannot refer to literally all the people but only to some of them perhaps only a majority, or only the well-organised. That the state is endogenous to the polity implies that no government has resources of its own out of which to disburse the amounts a politician may promise or an economist recommend. To fulfil new promises, given an initial condition of budgetary equilibrium, a government is only able either to print more fiat money or to tax the resources of individual citizens more heavily. Leaving aside the first alternative, fulfillment of the exhortation amounts to using public institutions to transfer resources from some people in order to keep promises made to others.

When the attitude spreads that, in politics, one man’s gain is another man’s loss, and where political control is to be had by winning majorities in elections, the citizen comes to face a perverse incentive to try to coalesce with more and more others in the hope of capturing the public revenues in his favour – instead of thinking critically about the nature of the political good as the institutions of democracy require him to. Political power becomes less dispersed, and the size of the polity diminishes in the sense that it comes to have fewer and fewer constituent agents, each of which is a larger and larger coalition of like-minded confederates intent on acquiring control for its own benefit.

Perhaps the worst consequence of a general attitude of statism, however, is that the basic, commonsensical functions of government are obscured, ignored, and neglected. Instead of requiring politicians and government officials to fulfill these functions, a citizenry allows its public agents to become brokers and entrepreneurs – trading not only in the products of government controlled industries but also in an array of positions of power and privilege, all in the name of directing a common endeavour to help the poor. The state places itself at every profitable opportunity between private citizens who might otherwise have conducted their transactions themselves perfectly well. The result is that governments do, or try to do, what either does not need to be done or ought not to be done by government, while they neglect that which only governments can do and which therefore they ought to be doing.

Part II: History

4. INDIVIDUALISM AND STATISM IN INDIA

AN ATTITUDE of statism has probably been present in India since Mughal times at least. If anything, it spread during the British period since the raison d’être of British rule in India would have vanished without paternalism (as in the course of time it did) and the existence of British rule was the raison d’être of the nationalist movement. Paternalism towards India was espoused even by those Englishmen known for their liberal views at home. Thomas Macaulay, for instance, declared to the House of Commons in 1833: “It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future stage, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history.”[15]

Less than a hundred years later, in 1930-31, the Indian National Congress – to the considerable chagrin of the British Government – resolved to bring about an independent India in which every citizen would have the right to free speech, to profess and practise his faith freely, and to move and practise his profession anywhere in the country. There would be universal adult suffrage and no-one would be unjustly deprived of his liberty or have his property entered, sequestered or confiscated. In particular, all citizens in the future republic would be `equal before the law, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sex’, and no disability would attach`to any citizen by reason of his or her religion, caste, creed or sex, in regard to public employment, office of power or honour, and in the exercise of any trade or calling’.[16]

These resolutions were made in the thick of the battle for independence, and underscored the fundamental argument of the nationalists that, in spite of the infinitely diverse characteristics of the inhabitants of the sub-continent, a free and secular India was possible in which all would be ruled by a common law. That argument had been in contradistinction to the frequent taunt from British Conservatives that an
India without Britain would disintegrate in internecine bloodshed, and also to the later `two nations’ theory of the Muslim League which led eventually to the creation of
Pakistan. With the departure of the British and the Pakistanis, in 1950 the Constitution of the first Indian Republic was finally able to bring into force the idea of secularity which had inspired the nationalist cause. Thus, among the Fundamental Rights established by the Constitution, Article 14 provided that the state `shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India’. Articles 15.1, 15.2, 16.1, 16.2 and 29.2 went on to prohibit discrimination on the arbitrary grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth in matters of public employment or access to publicly-funded education.

The century between Macaulay and the resolutions for independence was by far the most important to the country’s intellectual history since earliest antiquity. While it took its turbulent course, long severed since the time of the early Greeks – came to be re-established. The common interest and the common contribution became one of admiring and learning from Europe and from India’s own past what there was to be admired and learnt, whilst forsaking and resisting what was self contradictory or base. The maxim for a century might have been : learn the good and let the evil be buried in history. As Tagore wrote :`The lamp of Europe is still burning; we must rekindle our old and extinguished lamp at that flame and start again on the road of time. We must fulfill the purpose of our connection with the English. This is the task we face in the building up of a great India.’[17]

The ideal aspired to was swaraj, or `self rule’. It literally meant not only a government of India by Indians accountable to Indians, but also the governance of the individual by himself. Not only was the country to be sovereign vis-à-vis other states; its individual citizens were to be free vis-à-vis each other and equal before its laws. Swaraj meant, in other words, a condition of political autonomy where the citizen constrained his own free actions so as not to harm others, and where the Rule of Law would protect him when he acted autonomously and resist him when he did not. Given a backdrop of civil order, the infinite number of ways to individual happiness and prosperity in an infinitely diverse sub-continent could then be pursued. Statism all pervading

An attitude of statism, however, has pervaded all public discourse in independent India, and has been reinforced by the social and economic policies pursued by successive governments.

In the first place, a ghost from earlier controversies with the British was to remain in the 1950 Constitution. Immediately after the provisions establishing equality before the law and equality of opportunity in public employment and publicly funded education, the following caveats appeared. Article 15.3 said that the state could make “any special provision for women and children”; and then, of more significance, Article 15.4 allowed the state to make “any special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes”.

Article 16.4 allowed it to make “any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.” Lastly, Article 335 said that “the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts [under the State] . . .” Who was to decide who was `backward’ and who was not, or which group was to be `scheduled’ and which not? Article 341.1 said that `The President may . . . by public notification specify the castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes’, and Article 341.2 added that `Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified under 341.1 any caste, race or tribe or part of or any group within any caste, race or tribe . . .’ Articles 342.1 and 342.2 said the same for the Scheduled Tribes.

Subsequently, two Presidential Orders named no fewer than 1,181 different groups in the country as `Scheduled Castes’ and more than 583 other groups as `Scheduled Tribes’. Roughly a sixth of the population thus came to be termed `backward’ by executive decree and were segregated by statute from the rest of the citizenry.

The direct precursor of these provisions was the `Communal Award’ by the British Government in 1932, who had taken it to be their duty “to safeguard what we believe to be the right of Depressed Classes to a fair proportion in Legislatures ”.[18] (`Depressed Classes’ was the official name for those misleadingly called `untouchables’ outside the Hindu fold.)

The complex customs of the Hindus call for endogamy and commensality among members of the same caste, thus making anyone outside a caste somewhat `untouchable’ for its members. In marriage and dining habits, many orthodox Hindus would hold foreigners, Muslims, and even Hindus of other castes at the same distance as those formally classified as `Depressed Classes’. Indeed, non-Hindus in India -including the British often maintained social protocols that were equally as strict.

No serious Indian historian would doubt that members of the `Depressed Classes’ had been oppressed and had suffered countless indignities throughout Indian history at the hands of so-called`caste Hindus’. At various times, persecution had led to mass conversions to the more secular faiths. But the ancient wrongs of the Hindu practices had to do not so much with the lack of physical contact in personal life which the word `untouchability’ connotes for Indian society has always consisted of a myriad of voluntarily segregated groups – but rather with open and obvious inequities such as the denial of equal access to temples, public wells, baths and schools.

Gandhi, who by his personal example probably did more for the cause of the `Depressed Classes’ than anyone else, protested against the Communal Award with one of his most famous fasts. Privately, he suspected that `…the communal question [was] being brought deliberately to the forefront and magnified by the government because they did not intend to part with power’.[19] Publicly, he argued that the pernicious consequence would be a further exacerbation of the apartheid under which the `Depressed Classes’ had suffered for so long, when the important thing was for their right to be within the Hindu fold to be acknowledged by `caste’ Hindus.[20]

The Fundamental Rights in the 1950 Constitution establishing the equality of all citizens before the law evidently had the 1930-31 resolutions as their precursors; while Article17 – which specifically declared `untouchability’ to be `abolished’ and its practice `forbidden’ – was part of Gandhi’s legacy, placing those who had for centuries been denigrated and persecuted on exactly the same footing in the eyes of the laws of the Republic as their denigrators and persecutors. The subsequent clauses authorizing the state to discriminate in favour of `Scheduled Castes’, and allowing it to define by executive decree who was to be so called, were evidently the remnants of the Communal Award of 1932. Discrimination by the state was initially to last for a period of 10 years only. It has, however, been extended three times -for another 10 years on each occasion – and so continues to the present day. We shall examine a few of the consequences in Part III.‘A socialistic pattern of society’As for economic policy, while the original 1950 Constitution had ambiguously stated certain ends – such as that government was `to strive to promote the welfare of the people’ – it made no mention at all of any specific economic institutions, statist or liberal, which the new Republic was to nurture as means towards those ends. In spite of this omission, successive governments have explicitly avowed their espousal of` socialism’ as the means to the good and prosperous society.

For instance, a “socialistic pattern of society where the principal means of production are under social ownership or control” was declared to be a national objective at the ruling Congress Party’s convention in 1955; and, in 1976, the notorious 42nd Amendment purported to change the very description of the country in the preamble to the original Constitution from the sober `Sovereign, Democratic Republic’ to the awkward `Sovereign, Secular, Socialist Democratic Republic’. It is an open and important issue of constitutional practice whether a temporary majoritarian government can change the legal description of a republic so fundamentally that it necessarily begs every question now and in the future about the efficacy of socialism as the route to mass prosperity.[21]

Even so, `socialism’ is a vague and equivocal word, meaning different things to different people. Briefly, what happened in the Indian context seems to have been that the Nationalist Government explicitly took upon itself the responsibility of becoming the prime mover of the economic growth of the country. This was in addition to its other fundamental and urgent political responsibilities at the time, namely, to establish peace and civil order in the aftermath of a bloody partition, re-settle several million destitute refugees, integrate into the Republic the numerous principalities and fiefdoms run by the princes and potentates, re-draw provincial boundaries on a sensible linguistic criterion, and generally educate people about their rights and responsibilities as individual citizens in a new and democratic republic.

In a poor country which had just ended a long period of alien rule, it was understandable, if in advisable, that a nationalist government led by cultured, educated men among unlettered masses should take upon itself the responsibility for economic growth. Part of the nationalists’ critique of British rule had been precisely that it had worked to the considerable detriment of the Indian economy. And, certainly, whatever the exact calculation of the benefits and costs of the British presence in India, while there had been obvious benefits, there had also been obvious costs such as iniquitous taxes and overt racial discrimination in employment. [22]Thus, when the nationalists practically swore themselves to provide better government for the economy, it was certainly a very praiseworthy aim; 1947 would indeed be the year of India’s `tryst with destiny’.

Better government not necessarily more government
What the Nehru Government came to believe, however, was that better government for the economy necessarily meant more government activity in the economy. A similar nationalist government led by cultured, educated men among an unlettered public had chosen differently in 1776 at Philadelphia, but the times and circumstances were very different. The Indian nationalists, and most especially Prime Minister Nehru, had just witnessed what they took to be, on the one hand, the collapse of the market economy in the Great Depression and, on the other, the rapid growth to greatness of Bolshevik Russia. In his presidential address to the Congress in 1936, for instance, Nehru spoke of the immediate past in these terms: `Everywhere conflicts grew, and a great depression overwhelmed the world and there was a progressive deterioration, everywhere except in the wide flung Soviet territories of the USSR, where, in marked contrast with the rest of the world, astonishing progress was made in every direction . . .’ Thus, it seemed to him, there was`. . . no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation, and the subjection of the Indian people except through Socialism”. Socialism meant, inter alia, ` the ending of private property, except in a restricted sense, and ttte repla emenr of the ,private profit system by a higher ideal of co-operative service. It means ultimately a change in our instincts and habits and desires. In short, it means a new civilisation, radically different from the present capitalist order. Some glimpse we can have of this new civilisation in the territories of the USSR. Much has happened there which has pained me greatly and with which I disagree, but I look upon that great and fascinating unfolding of anew order and a new civilisation as the most promising feature of our dismal age. If the future is full of hope it is largely because of Soviet Russia and what it has done, and I am convinced that, if some world catastrophe does not intervene, this new civilisation will spread to other lands and put an end to the wars and conflicts on which capitalism feeds’.[23]
Equally as certain and deep as his admiration for the liberal values of the West was Nehru’s evident misunderstanding of the causes and consequences of Stalin’s Russia. The political and economic history of India in the past 30 years cannot be understood without regard to her most powerful leader’s ambivalence about the nature of the political and economic good.
By the mid-1950s, many of India’s other prominent statesmen had died or retired from public life, and there was hardly a public figure of’ stature left (with the exception of Rajagopalachari) to challenge Nehru’s socialist vision of the country’s future. Moreover, men who were ostensibly `expert economists’, but whose writings revealed no knowledge of prices or markets or the concept of feasibility, were encouraged to endorse and embellish this vision, which they did without hesitation in the secure knowledge that they were shielded from critics by the intellectual patronage of a charismatic and elected leader.[24]
The choice between alternative models of mass economic prosperity must have seemed quite clear at the time. The cold fact did not, however, vanish that one of the oldest objective lessons of political economy has been that more government is not necessarily better government. It is to the consequences of ignoring this lesson that we now turn.

Part III: Practice
ECONOMIC POLICIES IN INDEPENDENT INDIA

INDIA TODAY is a bizarre maze of distorted incentives, which I (and no doubt others) have found very difficult to untangle and understand. I shall, however, list and discuss the most significant of them as methodically as I can.

(i) Industry
The Indian Government has declared a large `public sector’ in commerce and industry to be a national objective. Towards this end, it has therefore progressively acquired numerous enterprises, large and small, so that it now has either a full monopoly in an industry or is one of a few oligopolists. These industries range from banking, insurance, railways, airlines, cement, steel, chemicals, fertilisers and ship-building to making beer, soft drinks, telephones and wrist-watches. There are no explicit penalties for indefinite loss-making; indeed, bankrupt private enterprises have often been nationalised to serve politicians’ ends. And, certainly, there has been no general rule of marginal-cost pricing. In public utilities, like electricity generation and distribution or city buses and trams, prices appear to be well below marginal cost, leading to severe rationing and queueing. Sudden stoppages of electricity for hours at a time and monumental congestion on buses and trams have become endemic facts of life for millions of urban Indians.
At the same time, private industry in India has been made to face labyrinthine controls. The government has continually exhorted private firms to work in the `national interest’ – which means accepting the constraints of centralised planning. It has left no doubt that, while there is a `role’ for the min the growth of the economy, they exist at the sufferance of government and had better realise it, otherwise the dark forces of revolution which have so far been kept at bay will inevitably sweep them away altogether, as happened in Russia and China.
The constraints imposed on the operation of a private business are legion, and would make a businessman from the West or Far East reach for a psychiatrist or a pistol. An entrepreneur may not enter numerous industries without government approval of the `technical’ viability of his project; once it is approved, he cannot find credit except from a government bank; and he cannot buy raw materials and machinery of the highest quality at the lowest price since, if they are produced in India, he will be denied a licence to import better and/or cheaper foreign substitutes. The onus is on him to satisfy the government that no production occurs within India of the input he requires; only then will an import licence conceivably be granted, subject to periodic review by the government. He may be compelled to export a specified proportion of his output as a condition for the renewal of his import licence, which therefore places him at a disadvantage with foreign buyers who, of course, are aware of this restraint. He may be unable to compete internationally because the rupee is priced above its likely equilibrium and some of the inputs he uses are high-cost, low-quality domestic substitutes. As a result, he may be compelled practically to dump his output abroad at whatever price it will fetch.

The entrepreneur’s factory may be subject to random cuts in electricity for hours at a time. He may require government approval before he can increase his fixed capacity, modernise his plant, change a product-line, or even change the number of labour shifts. He may face minimum-wage and stringent unfair dismissal laws on the one hand, and price controls on the other. If he fails to meet credit obligations to the nationalised banks, he may be penalised by the appointment of one or more government directors to his board – a form of `creeping’ nationalisation. Further, he may be subjected to a constant threat of full nationalisation as and when the government decides that his industry should be in the public sector in the interests of national planning.[25]

The consequence of all these controls has been a monumental distortion of incentives away from encouraging private firms to try to attract customers by improving technology and quality or reducing prices towards encouraging them to concentrate on `rent-seeking’, in the term made familiar by Professors Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan.[26]

As Anne Krueger says in her excellent study of the automobile ancillary industry, the very notion of entrepreneurial efficiency changes in such circumstances: `Under conditions in India, the most important problem confronting entrepreneurs is that of assuring that production will continue. The combined effects of import licensing and investment licensing give virtually every firm a monopoly or quasi-monopoly position. The entrepreneur who is most successful in getting licences of greater value and/or in getting licences more quickly than his fellow producers will have higher profits. `The producer who does not compete successfully for licences cannot produce at all, no matter how skilled he is in achieving engineering efficiency, unless he enters the “open market” and pays a premium to the successful licence applicant for some materials . . . Successful entrepreneurs are therefore those who are best at obtaining the greatest number of licences most expeditiously . . .’ [27]

Moreover, firms which are low-cost and efficient (in the free market sense) and which are successful at rent-seeking as high-cost, inefficient firms may still not be able to compete the latter out of business because government will not usually allow a particular firm to expand – regardless of its efficiency – if there is excess capacity in the industry of which it is a part. High-cost firms can thereby rationally count on staying in business simply by maintaining significant excess capacity.

(ii) Foreign trade
The Government of India has always claimed that foreign exchange is a `scarce’ resource which must be rationed by fiat in the national interest. The total foreign-exchange revenue (at an exchange rate which was fixed until 1971 and has since been on a managed `peg’) has been allocated in the following order of priorities: first, to meet foreign debt repayments and government expenditures in the conduct of foreign policy, such as the maintenance of embassies (G1); secondly, to pay for imports of defence equipment, food, fertilisers and petroleum (G2); thirdly, to meet ear-marked payments for the imported inputs of public sector industries so that they may achieve projected production targets (G3); fourthly, to pay for the imported inputs of private sector firms which are
successful in obtaining import licences (P1); and, lastly, to satisfy the demands of the public at large for purposes such as travel abroad (P2).
Foreign exchange is `scarce’ in India, or elsewhere, in precisely the same sense that rice or petrol or cloth is scarce. Just as there exists some positive price for rice, petrol or cloth which, at any moment, will match total supplies with total demands, so there exists some positive price for rupees relative to dollars which, at any moment, will match the transaction and asset demands of Indians for dollars with the transaction and asset demands of foreigners for rupees. Underlying that market-clearing price would be (a) the demands of Indians for foreign goods whose f.o.b. prices were lower than those of domestic substitutes, and, similarly, the demands of foreigners for goods in which India has had a comparative advantage; and (b) the expectations of Indians and foreigners about the future purchasing power of the rupee relative to the dollar, using as a proxy, say, the difference between interest rates in India and abroad.

A free market in foreign exchange would first have encouraged India’s traditional exports, like jute manufactures and textiles, and then (if the positive theory of international trade is broadly correct)progressively encouraged the export of other non traditional goods which used India’s relatively inexpensive labour relatively intensively and thereby enabled Indian entrepreneurs to compete successfully in foreign markets. At the same time, capital flows into and out of India would have given the monetary authorities an incentive to keep domestic interest rates in line with the real opportunity cost of forgoing consumption in favour of savings.

Thus, the case against a free market in foreign exchange has always been, to say the least, far from obvious.[28] But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept the presumed superiority of rationing, the elementary theory of optimisation which underlies the so-called theory of `planning’ dictates that the government should allocate dollars between alternative uses such that the marginal dollar yields the same increase in social utility in any use. The Indian Government, however, appears to have allocated foreign exchange simply on the basis of giving a higher priority to its own foreign expenditures (categories Gl, G2 and G3) than to private foreign expenditures (categories Pl and P2). That is to say, regardless of how much social utility might have been derived from a particular increase in private-sector imports, it would not be considered until after the government had met all its own expenditures abroad.[29]
Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan put it as follows : `The allocation of foreign exchange among alternative claimants and users in a direct control system . . .would presumably be with reference to a well-defined set of principles and criteria based on a system of priorities. In point of fact, however, there seem to have been few such criteria, if any, followed in practice.’[30]
With respect to imported inputs for private- and public-sector industries, a rule of `essentiality’ (that is, the input must be technically `essential’ to the production process) and a rule of `indigenous availability’(that is, there must be absolutely no domestically-produced physical substitutes, regardless of cost and quality)seem to have been followed. But, as Bhagwati and Srinivasan report, `. . . the sheer weight of numbers made any meaningful listing of priorities extremely difficult. The problem was Orwellian: all industries had priority and how was each sponsoring authority to argue that some industries had more priority than others? It is not surprising, therefore, that the agencies involved in determining allocations by industry fell back on vague notions of “fairness”, implying pro rata allocations with reference to capacity installed or employment, or shares defined by past import allocations or similar rules of thumb’. [31]

Clearly, in abjuring the free market and claiming a monopoly over foreign-exchange transactions, government planners have accepted certain premises as unquestionable: (a) that government sponsored industrialisation is the best means to mass prosperity; (b) that a policy of indefinite import-substitution is the best means to industrialisation; and (c) that such a policy requires all foreign expenditures by government to take precedence over all private foreign expenditures. The trade and foreign-exchange policies pursued cannot be understood except by reference to domestic economic policies and, in particular, to the view held about the proper functions of government in and out of the market-place.

In addition to a plethora of controls, tariffs and outright bans on imports, there have been erratic policies, subsidising the export of `new’, non-traditional manufactures like engineering goods, and taxing- and even banning – the export of goods in which India has traditionally enjoyed a comparative advantage.[32]

Moreover, the rupee has been continuously over-valued. From 1949 to 1959, the official exchange rate of Rs. 4.76 to the US dollar was, on average, 12..3 percent above the black-market rate, a figure which rose to 61 per cent between 1960 and 1965. From 1966 to 1970, the devalued official rate of Rs. 7.50 to the dollar was above the black-market rate by an average of 47.6 per cent, while from 1971 onwards the managed-peg rate has been above the black-market rate by an average of 24.3 per cent.[33]

Simple economics suggests that a free-market equilibrium rate would be somewhere between the black-market and official rates. An official exchange rate for the rupee fixed above that warranted by underlying relative demands for Indian and foreign goods, as well as by relative degrees of confidence in the rupee and the dollar, subsidises imports at the expense of exports. By discriminating in favour of its own foreign expenditures and against those of the private sector, the government has been the principal beneficiary of an over-valued rupee. If capital-intensive goods are the main imports and labour-intensive ones the main exports, an over-valued rupee further distorts incentives so as to favour the use of capital-intensive production processes over labour intensive ones – in a country with a demonstrable abundance of relatively inexpensive labour!
With an eye to India, Krueger has argued the general issue in these terms:`Subsidies can make any industry an export industry, even one that would not produce at all in an efficient allocation. Similarly, taxes can be levied on an industry that has comparative advantage which will penalize it enough to render domestic production entirely unprofitable. When taxes and subsidies are used, therefore, it is possible not only to distort the structure of production, but to distort it so much that the “wrong” commodities are exported.”[34]

The Indian Government’s planners have had the idea of forcibly effecting a reversal in the comparative advantage of the country, as if by magic overnight. The hope might have been that a forced pace of industrialisation would somehow allow economies of scale to be reaped and thus soon make Indian industrial goods competitive enough in international markets to be the country’s principal source of foreign exchange, displacing traditional manufactures like jute and textiles. In practice, however, as the evidence given by Bela Balassa
and other economists demonstrates, such a policy has not succeeded to date and is most unlikely ever to do so.
India’s import bill has risen continuously, most drastically after the 1973-74 quadrupling of petroleum prices; non-traditional manufactures have hardly been able to compete successfully in foreign markets; and the traditional exports of jute and textiles have suffered very severe setbacks. Balassa contrasts the consequences of the freer, outward-looking trade policies of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan with those of the inward-looking, controlled regime of India as part of a study of 11 countries(including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Israel and Yugoslavia) which, along with Hong Kong, account for most of the manufactured exports of developing countries. India’s share of the total manufactured exports of these countries has fallen steadily from 65.4 per cent in 1953 to 50.7 per cent in1960, to 31.2 per
cent in 1966 and to a mere 10.3 per cent in 1973. The proportion exported of India’s total manufactured output fell from 9.7 per cent in 1960 to 9.4 per cent in 1966 and to 8.6 per cent in1973. In contrast, during the same two periods, the proportion of manufactured output exported rose from1 to 14 to 41 per cent in South Korea, from 11 to 20 to 43 per cent in Singapore, and from 9 to 19 to 50 per cent in Taiwan.[35]
Balassa cogently argues that the adverse effects of a sudden change in external factors, such as the quadrupling of petroleum prices in 1973-74 or the 1974-75 Western recession, were absorbed much more easily by developing countries with large foreign-trade sectors than by those like India with relatively small ones: `Outward orientation is associated with high export and import shares that permit reduction in non-essential imports without serious adverse effects on the functioning of the economy. By contrast, continued inward orientation involves limiting imports to an unavoidable minimum, so that any further reduction will impose a considerable cost in terms of growth. Furthermore, the greater flexibility of the national economies of countries pursuing an outward-oriented strategy, under which firms learn to live with foreign competition, makes it possible to change the product composition of exports in response to changes in world market conditions, whereas inward orientation entails establishing a more rigid economic structure.’[36]
In other words, if imports are both high in total value and diverse in composition, a rise in the relative price of a particular import for which home demand is relatively inelastic (like petroleum and its products) can be accommodated by a substitution of expenditure towards it and away from inessential imports for which demand is relatively elastic. A similar argument had typically been advanced by advocates of import-substitution when they maintained that the exports of a small country should be diverse and not concentrated on only a few goods since a decline in world prices would otherwise lead to serious falls in export revenues. This suggests that both critics and advocates of import substitution might agree that, for a country which is a price-taker in world markets, the encouragement of a large foreign-trade sector is a way of diversifying the risk of adverse effects from changes in world prices. The question remains as to whether the positive theory of trade is correct in saying that the encouragement of comparative advantage is superior to import-substitution as a means of achieving a large foreign sector. From the contrasting experiences of, say, South Korea on the one hand and India on the other, the answer seems overwhelmingly to be that it is.

(iii) Agriculture
The Indian Government has instituted a multiple-pricing system for the major food-grains, especially rice and wheat. Farmers are compelled to sell a specified fraction of their output to the government, at a price fixed by the government which is significantly lower than that warranted by underlying supply and demand conditions. Farmers may sell the remainder of their output freely. The quantities the government acquires in this way, plus any it imports (imports being subsidised by the over-valuation of the exchange rate), are sold by ration at lower than free-market prices in the so-called `fair-price’ shops – which happen to be mainly in urban areas. Urban consumers may purchase part of their requirements from such shops and the remainder on the open market at higher prices. Astute middle-class urban housewives know that rationed grain is often of poorer quality than that sold on the open market. Accordingly, the former often constitutes part of the wages of the domestic servants of the urban household, while the family consumes the latter. Insofar as this is true, it suggests that farmers distinguish quality much better than do government officials, and that they use this advantage somewhat to partition their output into low- and high-quality, selling the first under compulsion to the government and the second on the open market.
While such is the general food policy of India, the compulsory procurement of grains and their distribution to the ration-shops is implemented by individual State governments and not by the Union Government. There have usually been numerous restrictions on inter-State movements of grain, so the States do not form a full customs union; instead, the Union Government tries to be a central clearing-house, matching the desired imports of one State with the desired exports of another.[37]

Economic effects of ban on futures contracts
Furthermore, futures contracts in grains have been banned by law, in the belief that futures trading is conducive to speculation and that speculation is undesirable. A futures contract in grain consists simply of a promise by a seller to deliver an amount of grain to a buyer at some specified date in the future in return for payment at a price agreed today. The seller’s incentive to enter into the contract is the guarantee of a certain sale, and the availability of funds now; the buyer’s incentive is the guarantee of a certain price for future deliveries. The contract may be entered into because buyer and seller have different expectations about what the spot price will be in the future. The buyer minimises his expected costs and the seller maximises his expected revenues; both are able to balance their budgets inter-temporally. Even if they have the same expectations about future spot prices, buyer and seller may still find it mutually profitable to enter into a futures contract as a way of insuring against risk. Forbidding such contracts by decree thus forces more risk onto both buyer and seller than they would normally be prepared to carry, and also induces them to balance their accounts in each period rather than it inter-temporally. Alternative kinds of credit markets become it relatively more lucrative, with the potential seller and buyer of futures wheat respectively borrowing and lending more than they would otherwise have done.[38]
The government has also expressed its determination to keep prices in ration-shops low. It has accordingly stockpiled large inventories of grain, apparently regardless of the costs of storage and spoilage or the alternative of holding larger foreign-exchange reserves to permit increased imports when necessary.

The ostensible, declared objective of all such policies has been to ensure that the poor do not suffer severe adverse income effects from sudden rises in the price of food resulting (it has been thought) from the contingencies of rainfall and the actions of speculative traders. It is, however, an open secret that the policies have really been a means of (a) taxing farmers, who pay a smaller percentage of their income in direct and indirect taxes than do urban dwellers, and (b) subsidising urban consumers, who broadly comprise the industrial working class and the middle in classes.
At the same time, however, the government and its advisers — after the considerable hesitation recorded by David Hopper [39]- have also accepted that the best long-run prospects for increasing agricultural productivity lie in modernising traditional farming techniques. Given the outstanding results of the Green Revolution in wheat, they could hardly have arrived at any other conclusion. The problem from the government’s point of view has been, as a sympathetic economist puts it “…how to procure a sufficient quantity of food grains at reasonable prices without jeopardising the farmers’ incentives to produce more”.[40]

Thus, while taxing farmers de facto on their output, on the one hand, the government has tried, on the other, to promote the use of modern inputs by subsidizing them both directly and through low-interest loans from the banks for such investment.
Distortions of incentives in agriculture
The distortions of efficient incentives caused by such policies are not difficult to see. First, the low output prices of wheat and rice have, in effect, been discriminatory taxes on wheat. As Edward Schuh remarks, these discourage the production of `. . . the very crops that policy-makers believe the vulnerable groups should have greater access to . . .’[41]

Vasant Sukhatme and Theodore Schultz have argued that, even between wheat and rice, there has been severe discrimination in favour of the former. At the official over-valued exchange rate, the price of domestic wheat has been significantly higher than imported, while at open-market rates for the rupee, the domestic price approximated the import price. For rice, however, the domestic price has been consistently below the import price. Sukhatme estimated that the dead weight loss in welfare from the under pricing of rice amounted to 8.5 per cent of total agricultural income in 1967-68 and to 2.2 per cent in 1970-71. He also calculated effective rates of protection, which were strongly negative for rice whether at official or open-market exchange rates and positive for wheat at the official exchange rate. Both he and Schultz conclude that the discrimination against rice has been a major factor in explaining the absence of a Green Revolution in rice on the scale of that in wheat.[42]
Secondly, the main beneficiaries of government subsidies for modern inputs have evidently been not the many small farmers but the fewer relatively large ones. As Gilbert Brown reports :`Large-scale farmers buy most subsidised inputs. Poorer farmers usually lack the money to buy adequate amounts of fertiliser and pesticides, and are commonly unable to get credit except at near-prohibitive rates of often 60% to 100% per year. Even in countries with subsidised bank credit for agriculture, rich farmers get most of the credit because of legal or administrative restrictions and/ or through open or disguised bribery. Credit and subsidy programmes for tractors, tube wells and other fixed investments also go mostly to the largest and richest farmers . . .Water is also a subsidised input . . . The farmers who receive this subsidised water generally have substantially higher incomes (because of the water) than farmers without access to public irrigation. Thus, claims that water should be subsidised to help small farmers misses the point that most farmers with irrigation have higher incomes than those who do not.’[43]
Brown argues that subsidies for inputs have been made necessary only to offset the forced depression of output prices. Moreover, the social benefit from subsidising inputs is limited to when the input is first introduced: ‘Once the benefits and technique of using the input are widely known, however, the continuation of such subsidies serves largely to increase the benefit-cost ratio of using the input . . .’.
Whether it is better to continue with artificially low input and output prices or to adjust towards a free market in both must take into account that the subsidies have encouraged more capital-intensity in production, and also that the `. . . low prices of certain inputs, particularly water, are often associated with widespread waste and inefficient use of the resource’.[44]
Thirdly, the farmer who is too small to find investment in storage facilities profitable may also consider it not worth his while to hold any of his output for sale on the open market. He will then sell it all to the government – at a below-market price.
A general conclusion would seem to be that, if the combined effect of input subsidies and forced grain sales to government has been a net subsidy to agriculture, then it has been a progressive subsidy; whereas if the combined effect has been a net tax on agriculture, then it has been a regressive tax. The Marxists may be quite right to protest that what gains there have been in agriculture have accrued to the relatively larger farmers, while smaller peasants and farmers are becoming landless labourers in growing numbers as a result of bankruptcy (that is, there has been increasing `rural proletarianisation’, to use the Marxists’ picturesque phrase). But if this is true, the cause can be traced unambiguously to the Indian Government’s belief – vociferously shared by the Marxists – that the way towards the declared objective of helping the poor is by extensive interference in the price system. Besides, the industrial working class demonstrably benefits from low food prices, so the honest Marxist must face up to being torn by divided loyalties between the rural and the urban proletariats.

Srinivasan put it as follows in a 1974 survey article :`The public distribution system with respect to foodgrains . . . operated to the benefit of all those living in metropolitan cities and other large urban concentrations while all others, including rich and poor in relatively small urban and almost all rural areas, did not benefit at all. When one recalls that the rural population includes the most abject among the poor, namely landless workers, the inequity of the system becomes glaring. And in urban areas, the existence of the system and the fact that the ration is often inadequate provides incentives for a household to falsify the data on its size and age composition given to the rationing authorities, as well as to create bogus or ghost ration-cards, not to speak of the corruption of the personnel manning the rationing administration.’[45]

The history of the extensive control of agriculture – which has included a partial government monopsony, forcibly-depressed output prices, inter-State restrictions on grain movements, and urban ration-shops – can be traced to the last years of British rule, as an attempt to bolster the popularity of the imperial regime. [46] The continuation and reinforcement of statism in agriculture in independent India has evidently rested on certain premises, namely, that the private market would be grossly inefficient and would be dominated by a few traders continually reaping large speculative profits, with both the small farmer and the ordinary consumer suffering in consequence.

Uma Lele’s fine study of the private grain trade, however, shows the real picture to be quite different. She found that the trade was highly competitive, that individual traders were rational agents (given the constraints of technology and government policy), that location price differences closely reflected transport costs, and that temporal price differences closely reflected storage costs. She argued that, while there was considerable scope for government activity, it should be in the form, not of interfering in the competitive market, but rather of encouraging the market to work – by, for example, disseminating relevant information such as crop forecasts, standardising weights and measures, constructing or improving roads and encouraging efficiency in the market for the transport of grain, etc.[47]

The evident neglect of such findings as these, and the continued application of policies inimical to competition and the free market, suggest that successive governments of independent India have been hardly more concerned for the rural poor – whether as farmer or consumer – and hardly less concerned with bolstering their popularity in the urban areas than were the British.

(iv) Employment
An obvious consequence of the economic policies described above has been the distortion of the individual citizen’s calculation of the expected benefits and costs of living and working in urban areas compared with the rural countryside. The forced depression of output prices in agriculture and the plethora of foreign-trade policies which discriminate against agriculture certainly seem to have artificially depressed the expected incomes of farmers. At the same time, a large `public sector’ in industry, plus the array of foreign-trade policies which have protected private industry, plus the indirect subsidisation of food sold in urban ration-shops certainly seem to have artificially raised expected urban incomes. Predictably, the reaction has been a vast and continuing net migration from the villages to the towns and cities, even after adjusting for the seasonal nature of agriculture. This drift has been the subject of much inquiry and discussion by development economists.[48] I propose to set it aside and examine instead a different aspect of employment policy which has not received nearly as much attention, namely, the consequences of putting into effect the clauses in the 1950 Indian Constitution mentioned above which authorised discrimination in employment and public education in favour of the `Scheduled’ castes and tribes, as well as other policies which discriminate on grounds of ethnic origin.

The consequences have been similar in several respects to those in America of `affirmative action’ towards so-called `racial minorities’, and it will be useful to draw out the analogy a little. As Thomas Sowell has cogently argued in recent years, the racial composition of contemporary American society is a complex mosaic, and no-one can say with certainty how it has come to be what it is today. In such circumstances, for the government to try to isolate a single contingent characteristic like `race’, partition society on the basis of census data according to this characteristic, and then construct public policies accordingly, is to introduce an enormous arbitrariness into economic life. By merely defining a group by reference to a single contingent characteristic, which all its members seem to possess, the intrinsic complexity of the individual person is lost or overlooked. Two members of the same race may be very different from each other in every relevant characteristic (income, education, political preference, and so on), and indeed resemble members of other races more closely in them. A policy which introduces a citizen’s race as a relevant factor in the assignment of jobs or college places partitions the citizenry into vague groups : members of groups who are very different from members of other groups in characteristics other than race rarely competing with each other anyway, while the burden and beneficence of the state’s policies fall on members of groups who are not very different from members of other groups in characteristics other than race: `. . . costs are borne disproportionately by those members of the general population who meet those standards with the least margin and are therefore most likely to be the ones displaced to make room for minority applicants. Those who meet the standards by the widest margin are not directly affected – that is, pay no costs. They are hired, admitted or promoted as if blacks did not exist. People from families with the most general ability to pay also have the most ability to pay for the kind of education and training that makes such performance possible. The costs of special standards are paid by those who do not. Among the black population, those most likely to benefit from the lower standards are those closest to meeting the normal standards. It is essentially an implicit transfer of wealth among people least different in non-racial characteristics. For the white population it is a regressively graduated tax in kind, imposed on those who are rising but not on those already on top.’[49]
At the same time, there is, in effect, a progressively graduated subsidy for members of the `minority’ group in favour of those who are already closest to meeting the general standards. Those in the mainstream of each group are largely unaffected; it is at the margins of competition that the bitterness caused by such policies will be felt and will manifest itself. It would seem that the situation in India – where the racial mosaic is if anything more complex than in America – is somewhat analogous. In recent years there has been civil tension and violence in the streets as poor Muslims, `caste’ Hindus, Sikhs and others have protested at being edged out of jobs and promotions by equally poor, or wealthier, members of the `Scheduled Castes’. In March-April 1981, for instance, there was widespread civil tension and violence in Gujarat over the reservation of places in the State’s medical colleges. A quarter of these places were statutorily reserved for members of the `Scheduled Castes’, with any not taken up by qualified candidates from these groups accruing to them in the future, thereby rapidly excluding from general competition as many as half the total number of places.[50]

The cruel paradox is that, while the position of many members (perhaps the vast majority) of the `Scheduled Castes’ vis-à-vis `caste’ Hindus remains one of degradation and persecution – quite regardless of the constitutional guarantees of equality in the eyes of the law – the relatively few who have succeeded in taking advantage of the discriminatory statutes have aroused the indignation of those who have not -causing even more animosity towards the `Scheduled Castes’ in general. One commentator observes the emergence of a `new elite’ among the `Scheduled Castes’ which `ceases to identify with its caste brethren’; while, at the same time, the law on equality `is so widely flouted precisely because the Scheduled Castes have not the means or courage to seek its protection . . .’ He concludes :`Contrived gestures such as are now popular will either not benefit [the Scheduled Castes] . . . or will do so only by further lowering already deplorable academic and administrative standards’. [51]
Moreover, when all government posts are advertised with a caveat that 10 or 15 per cent of themare reserved for members of the `Scheduled Castes’ and `Scheduled Tribes’, there is a considerable incentive for people to persuade Parliament to declare them as being such. And that also has happened. Discrimination in employment on the ground of caste has not been the only kind of discrimination practised by the Indian state. In what may be the most thorough study currently available on the origins, consequences and legal history of official discrimination in India, Weiner, Katzenstein and Rao have described the plethora of policies pursued by the central and state governments which have used not caste but ethnic origin as a criterion for public employment (with the private sector also often being `encouraged’ to follow suit) :`Preferences are given to those who belong to the “local” community, with “local” understood as referring to the numerically dominant linguistic group in the locality.’ [52] The authors conclude that what is emerging in India is`. . . a government-regulated labour market in which various ethnic groups are given a reserved share of that market. Competition for employment is thus not among all Indians, but within specified linguistic, caste, and tribal groups.`. . . various ethnic groups, therefore, fight politically for a share of that labour market. The major political struggles are often over who should get reservations, how the boundaries of the ethnic groups should be defined, and how large their share should be. There are also political struggles over whether there should be reservations in both education and employment, in private as well as in public employment, and in promotions as well as hiring. The preferential policies themselves have thus stimulated various ethnic groups to assert their “rights” to reservations.’[53]

It is not difficult to understand the general economic argument against discrimination on grounds such as caste or ethnic origin. If a private employer indulges a personal preference to hire only people of an kind A when there are more able or better qualified candidates of other ethnic kinds B, C, D, . . . ,available, and if the product of his firm is subject to competition in the market from other enterprises which do not discriminate on criteria which are irrelevant to economic efficiency, we may confidently expect the discriminating employer’s product to become uncompetitive and his profits to fall. The best and most obvious example of this would be in the professional sports industry in the USA : a `whites-only’ basketball or football team would be immediately vanquished on the games-field into bankruptcy. If government pursues employment policies which discriminate according to economically irrational criteria such as caste or ethnic origin, or if it forces all private firms to do likewise, there will certainly be inefficiency resulting in a loss of real aggregate output in the economy. In the terms of modern economics, a vector of total outputs which would be feasible given the parameters of the economy, and which would leave everyone either better off or at least no worse off, would not be achieved. In sum, the consequence of direct and widespread government interference in the labour market in India appears to have been, not only a disregard for the principle of equality before the law for every citizen (in a nascent republic of immensely diverse peoples), but also a loss of real output and an enormous `politicisation’ of economic life whereby individual success becomes increasingly tied to political power and increasingly removed from personal merit, enterprise and effort. In addition, the composition of occupations in the economy has been indirectly distorted by the set of industrial, agricultural and foreign-trade policies pursued by successive governments.

6. THE MALFUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT

IT MIGHT be thought that a large and flabby `public sector’ in industry and commerce, labyrinthine controls on private industry, a government monopoly of foreign-exchange dealings, the overvaluation of the currency, indefinite import-substitution, forcibly depressed output and input prices in agriculture, enormous politicization of the labour market, disregard for equality before the law, and distortion of the composition of occupations would constitute a sufficient catalogue of symptoms of grave illness in the political economy of a nation. Sadly, however, there are in modern India other symptoms too which I can mention only briefly here.
An opinion frequently encountered among urban Indians (as well as among the majority of Western development economists) is that government control over the size of the population is a necessary condition for economic development, and indeed that it is the failure of government to do this that has dissipated the economic growth that would otherwise have resulted from the economic policies pursued. The urban Indian witnesses the hovels and shanty-towns inhabited by migrant families from the countryside attracted by the policies discussed previously, and he experiences the resulting congestion. So does the Western development economist when he ventures out of his hotel into the city streets. Very often, that is his only personal experience of the legendary `poor masses’ of India. It is understandable that such princely discomfiture should lead him to the opinion that the poor are mindless in their breeding habits and that they must be persuaded, bullied or compelled to change. If this opinion were true, it would seem to point to a neat and simple solution to many of the woes of poor countries, and India in particular. But if the opinion is false and yet widely believed, it would cause governments to be, as it were, barking up the wrong tree.
It is, however, far from established, and certainly not at all obvious, that demographic control is either necessary or desirable in India or elsewhere. In the first place, when the rate of infant mortality is known and experienced by rural people to be high, there will be mare births than there would have been otherwise. Secondly, it is perfectly clear that children are an investment good in traditional societies such as those of rural India. Even young children are a source of family income, either directly by working outside the home or indirectly by working at domestic chores and thereby releasing adult members of the family for outside work. For a child to be absent from primary school or to drop out within a few years is not necessarily truancy; it may be the outcome of a rational economic calculation about where his time may be better spent towards increasing the household’s income. Furthermore, in traditional societies adult children are the principal source of support for elderly and retired parents.
To know of the existence of artificial measures of contraception certainly enlarges the alternatives open to a couple. Assuming that such knowledge is not in itself a cause of unhappiness (as it can be if there are conflicting religious commitments), a couple may certainly be better off with that knowledge because of their ability to control the number and timing of their children. The couple might also have fewer children – though there is no necessary or causal connection between a knowledge of contraception and the number of children born to a couple. Rational calculation may produce the same number of children as the caprice of nature, the implication being that in general there is no causal connection between the availability of contraceptives and the rate of growth of the population. The value of a public policy which encourages the use of artificial contraception is not so much that it reduces the number of births as that it may allow couples more control over their own lives. Whether or not artificial contraception should be publicly subsidised is quite another question.
The Indian Government has expended considerable resources in propagating and subsidizing artificial birth control. The results appear to have been, at best, indifferent (coupled as birth control has been with indirect incentives for large families and, at worst, cruel – as when frenetic zeal spilled over into demands for, and the implementation of, compulsory sterilisation. For this author, however, the important consideration would seem to be not so much the exact costs and benefits of the demographic policies pursued as the critical acknowledgement that they have little or nothing to do with the fundamental causes of mass economic development.[54]
It remains a stark paradox that, with a general literacy rate of perhaps 30 per cent [NB: In 2007, this has grown to 73% for males and 48% for females] India still produces the third largest absolute number of science and engineering graduates in the world. This reflects the lopsidedness of the educational system, continued from British times, in which higher education is enormously subsidised relative to primary education. In addition, entry into the civil services requires a college or university education, which in turn requires a good private secondary school education, which in turn requires a good preparatory school education. Strenuously competing to enter prep. school, with the help of outside tutoring, is the unhappy fate of many a five- or six-year-old in the towns and cities, followed by strenuous competition in secondary school, college and university, and finally at the doorstep of government (or a foreign university).
A job in government – any job in government – has carried prestige since Mughal times. In addition to the prestige and the obvious benefits of tenure where ether `decent’ jobs are scarce, there has been in recent times the inner satisfaction from a belief that a person can truly do his best for his country only by being in government. Tens of thousands of youths spend significant personal resources (such as whole years in cramming schools) to compete for a few annual openings in government. It is only to be expected that the competent, ambitious, patriotic youth who succeeds will mature into a respected mandarin with an unshakeable conviction in the good his government has done for the masses, and in the further good yet in prospect.
Failure to anticipate monsoon damage and disarray of the judicial system
The most serious examples of the malfunctioning of civil government in India are probably the failure to take feasible public precautions against the monsoons and the disarray of the judicial system. Official estimates, for instance, of the damage caused by flooding to homes, crops and public utilities in a few weeks of July-August 1981 alone amounted to over Rs 1 billion, with 10.8 million people `affected’, 35,000 head of cattle lost, and 195,000 homes damaged. The full magnitude of the devastation which annually visits vast areas can be understood perhaps only by those in rural India, although the towns and cities also regularly suffer considerable chaos. [55] [NB 2007: Monsoon prediction appears far better today than it was when these words were written.]
As for the disarray of the judicial system, The Statesman lamented in July 1980:`The simplest matter takes an inordinate amount of time, remedies seldom being available to those without means or influence. Of the more than 16,000 cases pending in the Supreme Court, about 5,000 were introduced more than five years ago; while nearly 16,000 of the backlog of more than 600,000 cases in our high courts have been hanging fire for over a decade. Allahabad is the worst offender but there are about 75,000 uncleared cases in the Calcutta High Court in addition to well over a million in West Bengal’s lower courts.”[56] Such a state of affairs has been caused not only by lazy and corrupt policemen, court clerks and lawyers, but also by the paucity of judges and magistrates. In addition, however,`. . . a vast volume of laws provokes endless litigation as much because of poor drafting which leads to disputes over interpretation as because they appear to violate particular rights and privileges. Land legislation offers an example of radical zeal running away with legal good sense, giving rise to thousands of suits against the Government . . .’ [57] When governments determinedly do what they need not or should not do, it may be expected that they will fail to do what civil government positively should be doing. In a sentence, that has been the tragedy of modern India.

Part IV : Reform
A LIBERAL AGENDA

IT WILL by now have become evident to the reader from the descriptions and arguments given above that, in the judgement of the present author, only a set of radical changes in policy can put the Indian economy on a path to higher mass prosperity within a free and healthy body politic. I shall therefore put forward a tentative manifesto for reform, adding some predictions about which classes of citizens would be most likely to support or oppose a particular proposal. The scope and intention of such a manifesto should be made clear at the outset. As Aristotle taught, a set of actions which are the means towards certain ends may themselves be the ends towards which other prior means have to be taken.[58]
The ultimate ends of economic advice in India are to seek to bring about mass prosperity under conditions of individual freedom. The proposals I which follow are to be construed as means towards those ultimate ends. But they also constitute a set of intermediate ends, and their implementation would require further judgement about the best means towards achieving them. In economic policy, for instance, a firm but gradual phasing-in over a period of three or four years may be the best way to minimise the hardships entailed by the adjustment. For reasons which will become clear, however, I shall not here try to answer the question as to how the proposals might best be implemented.

(a) Effects of foreign policy on the domestic economy
It will be useful to begin with a short and very incomplete consideration of foreign policy insofar as it may bear upon domestic economic policies. It is a settled fact of international politics that, while there is no obvious connection between a nation’s economic and political institutions and the choice of strategic allies it faces, people’s subjective perceptions and opinions of the social arrangements in a foreign country can be deeply influenced by whether that country is seen as a potential ally or adversary. A related and equally settled fact is that war, or the fear of war, can make for the most incongruous of bed-fellows. In contemporary India, it is quite evident that the antipathy and pessimism towards market institutions found among the urban public, and the sympathy and optimism to be found for collectivist or statist ones, has been caused to a very significant extent by the perception that the United States is relatively hostile towards India while the Soviet Union is relatively friendly. This was not always so. The official affection between the United States and India in the early years of the Republic was grounded in sincerity and goodwill. The roots of its demise are probably to be found in the split between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1950s which, in a short period of time, made the latter a valuable strategically for the United States against the former. By the early 1970s, the spectre of a joint military threat to India from a totalitarian China and a militarist Pakistan – and especially a threat which it was perceived democratic America would do little or nothing to thwart – made it prudent for democratic India to become the virtual ally of totalitarian Russia.
Such a configuration on the international chess-board need not have been detrimental to India’s economic development. It is possible to imagine a liberal state allied to a totalitarian one for strategic reasons, yet maintaining liberal economic policies domestically and internationally. In practice[58], however, the extent of `economic collaboration’, bilateral trading arrangements, `joint ventures’, barter agreements, `cultural exchanges’, and the like into which the Indian Government has entered with the Soviet bloc, appears significantly to exceed what it has achieved with the Western powers. In particular, Soviet arms have in recent years been purchased more often and then manufactured under licence. This too need not have been economically detrimental if the Soviet products had in practice been competitive on international markets in terms of price and quality. As is common knowledge, however, this is often not so. It therefore appears that part of the price India has had to pay for the strategic support of the Soviet Union has been the foisting on her of low-quality, high-priced Soviet goods, whether arms or steel mills or technical know-how. At the same time, for reasons which are partly historical and partly related to these considerations, direct foreign investment by private Western firms has been treated with, at best, coolness and, at worst, open hostility.

A change in India’s foreign policy
If the economic liberalisation that will be proposed here for India is to be effective, a truly independent yet prudent foreign policy may be required to accompany it. A change in the present strategic configuration – in which the United States is perceived in India to be virtually the ally of both China and Pakistan, while India is perceived in the United States to be virtually the ally of the Soviet Union – is unlikely until and unless the United States finds it in her best interests in the region to distance herself from China and Pakistan, which is unlikely to happen without a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China. A drastic alternative way for India to reduce her dependence upon the Soviet Union would be the kind of divorce Egypt effected some years ago, followed by an alliance with the Western powers. This might, however, undermine once more the independence of foreign policy and be perceived in India as a move from the devil to the deep sea. The prudent remaining alternative would appear to be an earnest and vigorous pursuit of serious no-war pacts with Pakistan and China, combined with an appropriately small independent nuclear deterrent. It seems to the author that the reasons which commend this course are closely analogous to those offered by the present American and British governments for pursuing serious no-war negotiations with the Soviet bloc whilst simultaneously improving the Western nuclear deterrent.
(b) Liberalisation of foreign trade
Not only would the truly independent foreign policy proposed in the preceding paragraph allow India to distance herself from the Soviet Union; it would probably also prompt the Western powers to end the intergovernmental transfers which go by the name of `foreign aid’. For reasons that Peter Bauer has emphasised over many years, an end to such transfers might be a boon in disguise for India.[59] In particular, it would require the government to seek to balance the foreign-exchange accounts without becoming obligated to the Western powers, and this in turn would require a major economic transformation from a closed and protectionist economy to an open one which harnessed India’s comparative advantages.
An initial liberalisation of foreign trade, involving a transition from quotas to tariffs, would probably be supported by private industry as a whole. It would, however, be opposed by incumbent politicians and government officials since it would dissipate the rents they receive under the closed regime. A subsequent reduction in tariffs, a withdrawal of export subsidies, and the free floating of the rupee would be opposed by those private firms (and their labour unions) which would be uncompetitive internationally – probably those in `non-traditional’ industries. The measures would, however, be supported by ordinary consumers, by private firms in traditional industries like jute manufactures and textiles, and particularly by farmers.
Once private industry became subject to the strict discipline of international competition again, there would be no reason whatsoever for government-imposed internal controls which were not conducive to free and fair competition among firms for the consumer’s rupee. The repeal of the plethora of licensing policies would dissipate the large rents attached to the controls under the present regime. Since these rents are paid by private industry and received, directly or indirectly, by incumbent politicians and government officials, the former could be expected to welcome repeal and the latter to oppose it vigorously.

(c) Privatisation of `public-sector’ industries
At the same time, for the so-called `public-sector’ industries to face international competition, when they are currently monopolists or oligopolists, would demand such an improvement in economic discipline as probably to require the shares of most of them to be sold on the open market, with marginal-cost pricing imposed on the remainder. There is no economic reason why the Government of India shouldbe engaged in commercial or merchant banking and insurance, or in industries from steel, machine-tools, ship-building and fertilisers to wrist-watches, hotels and beer. Nor is there any cogent reason why it should be a major producer, let alone a monopolist, in the road, rail, air and sea transport industries. Large-scale privatisation would be supported by private citizens in general, and would also draw out the reputedly vast private funds which circulate in the untaxable underground economy. But such measures would probably be opposed vigorously by the government officials who currently manage these industries, aswell as by the public-sector labour unions.

(d) Free-market pricing in agriculture
With the repudiation of the mistaken premise that government sponsored industrialisation is the best means to mass economic development, the free-market pricing of agricultural outputs and the removal of all controls that are not conducive to free competition among farmers should follow. This would be welcomed by all farmers and perhaps by the rural population in general. It could also be expected to provide much encouragement to the technological transformation of traditional agriculture. The abolition of ration-shops in urban areas would be opposed by the industrial working class, by the urban middle classes in general, and by government officials and employees engaged in the present regime of public distribution. Further, farmers, especially relatively large ones, might be expected to oppose the concomitant free-market pricing of agricultural inputs, including credit and fertilisers, as would those government employees presently charged with distributing these inputs.
The ending of the distortions in agricultural output and input prices would establish a conclusive case for uniform systems of taxation in the economy, and especially for income from agriculture to be treated on a par with income from other occupations. These systems could locally include direct subsidies to those (whether in rural or urban areas) who are unable to provide any income for themselves, such as the insane and the severely disabled – all of whom are currently cared for, if at all, by private charity, and none of whom, strangely enough, appears to enter the moral calculations of socialist and Marxist economists.

(e) Tax revenues for public goods
The first and most important destination of tax revenues, whether raised centrally, provincially or locally, must be the provision of public goods – central, provincial and local. In an earlier section, we have seen what kinds of goods these should be. Among the most urgent in India are more effective precautions against the monsoons and improvements in the efficiency of the systems of civil and criminal justice. The former might include measures to prevent soil erosion and the building of better dams, embankments, canals and roads. Such programmes would be likely to command practically unanimous support in the localities in which they were implemented.
Reforms of the judicial system might include raising the salaries of judges and policemen, as well as the penalties for their misconduct; improving the training and morale of the police, with the object of increasing public confidence in them (especially in the villages); and expanding the number of courts, at least temporarily until the monumental backlog of cases has been reduced and brought under control. A general reduction in the political and administrative direction of economic life would lead to fewer lawsuits being brought against the government itself, and thus provide further relief for the judiciary. Widespread prison reform may also be required if the reports are true that a large proportion of those held prisoner for a number of years have yet to be brought to trial, and that potential prosecution witnesses, if they are poor and uneducated, are themselves sometimes kept in jail until a case comes to court. Such reforms would command the support of everyone except criminals, capricious litigants and corrupt or incompetent members of the police and judiciary, none of which groups, it must be supposed, comprises apolitical constituency.

Together with improvements in the system of justice, the principle of equality before the law would have to be taken seriously. This would require the dispensation of justice by the state to be, as it were, a process blind to the infinitely diverse caste and ethnic characteristics of the citizenry, which in turn would imply the repeal of all laws – whether central, provincial or local – permitting governmental authorities to discriminate in favour of a particular politically-specified caste or ethnic group. Merely to have written `equality before the law’ into the Constitution without really believing it either possible or desirable is to allow the mutual caste and ethnic bigotry of private citizens to be exploited for political ends. That innumerable members of a caste, or religious or ethnic community have suffered at the hands of another, and that members of the `Scheduled Castes’ in particular have been victims of enormous cruelty, should not prevent acknowledgement of the sober fact that the past is irretrievable, or that it is similar cruelty in the present and future against any citizen at the hands of any other, or the state, that the declaration of Fundamental Rights was intended to prevent.

(f) Other reforms
Other proposals could also be suggested : the introduction of vouchers for primary and secondary education; a serious assessment of the benefits from and costs of subsidies to higher education; an end to the government monopoly of radio and television; a revision of government pay-scales to make them competitive with the private sector, together with equivalent reductions in non pecuniary benefits; a decentralisation of public spending decisions from New Delhi to the State capitals and from there to the districts; and so on. However, it is hardly necessary to go further, since even a limited liberal agenda would appear doomed to be still-born.
Incumbent politicians, government officials, and the public sector unions in general would vigorously oppose any reduction in government intervention in the economy for fear of losing the rents and sinecures of the status quo. Indeed, professional politicians in general could be expected to be averse to any lessening of the politicisation of economic life.
In other countries, a political party proposing such a reduction in government intervention would usually enjoy the backing of private industry. In India, however, private industry in general would probably see it in its own interest to support only the reduction of internal controls, whilst vigorously opposing reductions in the neo-mercantilist external controls. In July 1981, for example, I asked a prominent industrialist to imagine first a free-market regime at home : `That would be very welcome indeed’, he replied enthusiastically. I then asked him to imagine a policy of free trade : `That would wipe us out’, he replied gravely. His answers indicate very well what is perhaps the single most important feature of the equilibrium that has emerged in India: by accepting without significant protest the constraints and costs imposed upon it by the government and its `planners’, the private corporate sector has traded the freedom of enterprise for mercantilist monopoly profits in the home market.
When Indian Marxists rail about collusion between the `national bourgeoisie’ (that is, the governmental class) and the `comprador bourgeoisie’ (that is, the private sector), they make a cogent point as old as Adam Smith’s critique of mercantilism.[60] But, again, they fail to see that the fortunes of the industrial working-class have also risen with those of the private and public industries that have gained from the present regime. Moreover, a large proportion of industrial workers and blue-collar government employees are migrants with families left behind in rural areas; these rural families might also oppose reductions in the transfers currently received by their migrant relatives. Finally, while joining other farmers in welcoming a free market in grain, the politically influential larger farmers could be expected to oppose the direct taxation of agricultural incomes and the elimination of subsidies for inputs.

Who is left who would gain from the kinds of reforms proposed here? Only the ordinary citizen qua consumer, the rural poor and the residuum of severely disabled citizens unable to create any income for themselves. None of these has been or is likely to become an effective political force.

India’s `unhappy equilibrium’
The economy of the first Indian Republic has tended towards a broad and increasingly unhappy equilibrium. Distortions of efficient relative prices and wages lead to both substitution and income effects. Those who lose from one distortion rationally seek another from which they may gain; those who lose from the second seek a third; and so on ad infinitum until a maze of distorted incentives are in place and a60Adam Smith, host of income transfers are in progress – sometimes offsetting losses, sometimes not. Tullock has emphasised that the problem is not only that there are dead-weight losses in welfare, but also that people are led `. . . to employ resources in attempting to obtain or prevent such transfers.’[61] In modern India, the waste of productive resources put to the pursuit of such transfers has been incalculable. The reforms pro-posed here would cut through the maze of distorted incentives and institutions all at once – for which very reason it seems unlikely they can come to be implemented.

The economic significance of a political attitude of individualism is that it clearly recognises the relationship between individual effort and reward, and the relationship between cause and consequence generally. An attitude of statism obscures or obliterates this relationship. In republican India, statism has pervaded all public discourse and prompted most public policy. Successive groups of politicians and government officials seem never to have recognised the fundamental nature of those functions of government which are the indispensable prerequisites of civil peace and mass prosperity. Nor have they understood that it is no part of government’s agenda to be the driving force to mass prosperity, and that this can come (if it will) only from innumerable individual efforts in the pursuit of private rewards. This is not at all to say that those in government have been ill-intentioned. On the contrary, they may have sincerely sought the public good whilst introducing a Leviathan government into the market-place and neglecting the proper duties of government outside it. As Bauer has remarked in a related context :`Their financial benefits may appear to be fortuitous, as if Adam Smith’s invisible hand were to work in reverse, so that those who sought the public good achieve what was no part of their intention, namely personal prosperity.’[62] It is indeed possible that the basic fact of human nature that individual households every where ordinarily know most about, and are only concerned with, their own well-being has never been acknowledged in modern India. The simple secret of a stable and prosperous polity is to create institutions which harness the universal pursuit of individual self interest, and not ones which pretend that men are selfless saints. A polity where this fact is acknowledged would not have to depend for the viability of its institutions on mere exhortation, as the institutions of the Indian Republic seem perpetually fated to do, even while the competitive pursuit of self interest is everywhere manifest.

The logic of economic reasoning and the adducement of economic evidence have in the past had little effect in India because the distribution of gains and losses from the policies pursued has been closely matched by the distribution of effective political power. This distribution seems most likely to continue, and so the prospects of significant and sustained endogenous reform seem, to this author at least, very small. Changes in external constraints seem to be the only likely source of a major disturbance to the equilibrium, and there can be no guarantee that the results will be for the better. This is a sad and troubling conclusion to come to, for a citizen of India or anyone else who has loved the country. It places this author in the paradoxical position of believing his arguments to be broadly correct – while hoping they are not.

ENDNOTES (The original monograph in 1984 had footnotes, which have had to be transformed since pages, in this new HTML age, no longer have to be linear as in a book nor have to be turned in order to be read).

[1] The early studies notably include: B. R. Shenoy, `A note of dissent’, Papers relating to the formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan, Government of India Planning Commission, Delhi, 1955; Indian Planning and Economic Development, Asia Publishing, Bombay, 1963, especially pp. 17-53; P. T. Bauer, Indian Economic Policy and Development, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1961; M. Friedman, unpublished memorandum to the Government of India, November 1955 (referred to in Bauer, op. cit., p. 59 ff.); and, some years later, Sudha Shenoy, India : Progress or Poverty?, Research Monograph 27, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1971. Some of the most relevant contemporary studies are: B. Balassa, `Reforming the system of incentives in World Development, 3 (1975), pp. 365-82; `Export incentives and export performance in developing countries: a comparative analysis’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 114 (1978), pp. 24-61; The process of industrial development and alternative development strategies, Essays in International Finance No. 141, Princeton University, 1980; J. N. Bhagwati & P. Desai, India: Planning for Industrialisation, OECD, Paris : Oxford University Press, 1970; `Socialism and Indian Economic Policy’, World Development, 3 (1975), pp. 213-21; J. N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, Foreign-trade Regimes and Economic Development: India, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1975; Anne O. Krueger, `Indian planning experience’, in T. Morgan et al. (eds.), Readings in Economic Development, Wadsworth, California, 1963, pp. 403-20; `The political economy of the rent-American Economic Review, 64 (June 1974); The Benefits and Costs of Import-Substitution in India : a Microeconomic Study, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1975; Growth, distortions and patterns of trade among many countries, Studies in International Finance, Princeton University, 1977; Uma Lele, Food grain marketing in India : private performance and public policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1971; T. W. Schultz (ed.), Distortions in agricultural incentives, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1978; V. Sukhatme, “The utilization of high-yielding rice and wheat varieties in India: an economic assessment”, University of Chicago PhD thesis, 1977.

[2] S. Roy, “On liberty and economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”, University of Cambridge PhD thesis, 1982a, Chapters I and II; “Knowledge and freedom in economic theory: Parts I and II”, Centre for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Tech, working papers, 1982b. My epistemological arguments have closely followed those of Renford Bambrough, Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

[3] Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, in Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1941. We read: `. . . the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, this account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.’ (1,104a2-a9.)`. . . we do not deliberate even about all human affairs; for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts. We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done.’ (1,112a28-30.) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations(1776), eds. R. H. Campbell et al., Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1981. We read: `What is the species of domestick industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in hislocal situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.’ (Book IV. ii. 10, p. 456.) In modern times, Friedrich Hayek has always kept this fact in the foreground of his thinking. In his Individualism and Economic Order, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949, we read, for example, of `. . . the constitutional limitation of man’s knowledge and interests, the fact the he cannot know more than a tiny part of the whole of society and that therefore all that can enter into his motives are the immediate effects which his actions will have in the sphere he knows . . .’ (p. 14.) The individual agent has a `special knowledge of circumstances of the; thus `. . . practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active co-operation.’ (p. 80.)

[4] The mathematical economist will recognise these three conditions as the characteristics which define a multi-market general equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model: Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959; K. J. Arrow and F. H. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1971.

[5] This argument is discussed further in Roy (1982a), pp. 96-107, pp. 133-43.

[6] Adam Smith, op. cit., Book V. i. c., p. 723.

[7] P. A. Samuelson, `A pure theory of public expenditures’, Review of Economics & Statistics, 36, 1954,reprinted in K. J. Arrow & T. Scitovsky (eds.), Readings in Welfare Economics, R. D. Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 1969.

[8] The idea I have in the background is of some implicit public goods function endorsed more or less unanimously by citizens – but not necessarily by those with political power – with commonsense dictating the elements it should contain. Thus Let U = U (π1, π2 , …, πn) be such a function with δU/δπi > 0, δ2U/δπi2 < 0 i=1,2,…,n, where πi = 1,2,…n, is a lateral index of a public good or service like defence, civil protection, roads, dams, or the finance of basic education. Each of these is “produced” by an expenditure of public resources: πi = πi (τi ), δπi/δτi > 0, δ2πi /δτi2 < 0 i=1,2,…,k, Σ i=1,2,…,n τi = τ* where τ* is the total level of public resources available (whether by taxation or borrowing). An efficient condition, i.e., one in which given public resources are efficiently allocated among alternative public goods or services, would be δU/δπi/ δπi/δτi = δU/δπj / δπj/δτj for every i,j = 1,2,. .,n. So, if the marginal tax-rupee was put towards the production of any public good, the increase in social utility should be the same; otherwise we would find an excess supply of some public goods (e.g. bureaucrats) and an excess demand for others (e.g. courts, dams, police protection, etc.).

[9] Two examples are F. H. Hahn, On the notion of equilibrium in economics : an inaugural lecture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, and J. M. Grandmont, “Temporary general equilibrium theory : a survey”, Econometrica, vol. 46, 1977.

[10] Aristotle, op. cit., 1,094b12-1,094b27

[11] D. H. Robertson, `The Economic Outlook’, in his Utility and All That, Allen & Unwin, London, 1952, pp.51-52.

[12] Karl Popper made a similar point in The Open Society and its Enemies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, when he suggested that Plato’s question `who should rule?’ should be discarded for the question:`How can we so organise political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too muchdamage?’ (p. 120). There is relevant discussion by Renford Bambrough in `Plato’s modern friends and enemies’, Philosophy, 37, 1962, reprinted in R.Bambrough (ed.), Plato, Popper and Politics : some contributions to a modern controversy, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1967. I have discussed the relationship of expertise to democracy in Roy (1982a), pp 80-95.

[13] Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776, in The Constitution of the United States, ed. E. C. Smith, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1979, p. 21.

[14] P. T. Bauer, Dissent on Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 72, n. 2. The term `statism’ suggested itself to the author after he read M. R. Masani, “Post-Sanjay outlook: where salvation does not lie” The Statesman, 9 July 1980.

[15]G. M. Young (ed.), Macaulay: Prose and Poetry, London: Macmillan, 1952, p. 718. Some 20 years later, in Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London: J. M. Dent), J. S. Mill claimed that rule by`a superior people . . . is often of the greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress’ (Ch. IV, p. 224). Ironically, a few years ago a distinguished retired member of the Indian civil service (who happens to be a recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize) used very similar words in a newspaper article – in defence of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan!

[16] Resolution of the Indian National Congress, August 1931, reprinted in B. N. Pandey (ed.), The IndianNationalist Movement : 1885-1947, Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 67.

[17] S. Radhakrishnan, The philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, Macmillan, London, 1918, p. 232. For an excellent account of the intercourse between ancient India and ancient Greece, H. G. Rawlinson, `Early contacts between India and Europe’, in A. L. Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975. For excellent accounts of the growth of liberalism in India in the l9th and carly 20th centuries : Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism : Competition and Collaboration in the later l9th Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971, Chs. 1, 3-6; J. R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977; Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politicsand Indian Nationalism,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, Ch. 1.

[18] Ramsay Macdonald’s letter to M. K. Gandhi, 8 September 1932, reprinted in Pandey (ed.), op. cit., p. 74.

[19] Devdas Gandhi’s letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 October 1931, reprinted in Pandey (ed.), op. cit., p. 71

[20] Gandhi’s protest succeeded to the extent that the Award itself was superseded; and in unusual, euphoric displays of fraternity, `caste’ Hindus threw open temples to members of the `Depressed Classes’ and embraced them with
garlands. The compromise Pact which replaced the Communal Award removed separate electorates but still guaranteed special political representation for some years following the agreement. For an account of Gandhi’ s position on the Communal Award, Judith M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 313-21.

[21] For an eminent lawyer’s commentary, N. A. Palkhivala, The Light of the Constitution, Forum of Free Enterprise, Bombay, 1976.

[22] There is reason to think the Mughals before the British had done no better and had probably done much worse. T. Raychaudhuri, `The State and the Economy: the Mughal Empire’, in T. Raychaudhuri & I. Habib (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

[23] V. B. Singh (ed.), Nehru on Socialism, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, Delhi, 1977, pp. 56-57, 67.

[24] `Draft recommendations for the formulation of the Second Five Year Mahalanobis;`The Second Five-Year Plan – A tentative framework’, drafted by the economic ministries; and a `Memorandum’ written by a panel of prominent Indian economists – all contained in Papers relating to the formulation of the SecondFive Year Plan, Government of India: Planning Commission, 1955 – were the principal influences on the actual Second Plan. No significant understanding of markets, prices or the concept of feasibility is evident on the part of any of the authors. Shenoy’s lonely dissent has already been noted (note 1).

[25] The best descriptions of Indian industrial policy are still to be found in Bhagwati and Desai (1970), op. cit. Also C. Wadhwa, `New Industrial Licensing Policy: An Appraisal’, in C. Wadhwa (ed.), Some problems of India’seconomic policy, Tata-McGraw Hill, Delhi, 1977, pp. 290-324.

[26] Gordon Tullock is generally credited with introducing the notion of rent-seeking in `The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft’, Western Economic, Journal, 5 (June 1967), while Krueger (1974), op. cit., introduced the term itself. The collection edited by J. M. Buchanan et al., Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, Texas A&M Press, College Station, 1980, contains reprints of both papers as well as other studies.

[27] Krueger (1975), op. cit., p. 108 ff.

[28] The classic argument for a free market is in M. Friedman, `The case for flexible exchange rates’, in his Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, pp. 157-203. Also V. S. Vartikar,Commercial policy and economic development in India, Praeger, New York, 1969, based on his PhD at Wayne State University; and D. Lal, A liberal international economic order : the international monetary system and economic development, Essays in International Finance No. 139, Princeton University, October 1980.

[29] An additive sub-utility function might be defined within each set of categories UG= ∑ ai vi (Gi) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ a3, ∑ ai= 1UP= ∑ bj wj (Pj) b1 ≥ b2 ∑ bj= 1where the vi (.) and the wj (.) are further sub-utility functions defined on each category, etc. None of these has ever been spelt out by the Indian Government and certainly no amount of UP has seemed substitutable for an iota of UG.

[30] Bhagwati and Srinivasan, op. cit., p. 38.

[31] Ibid.,p. 38

[32] In 1980, for example, exports of pig-iron and of sheep- and goat-meat were banned; an export duty on jute manufactures was imposed on 18 February and lifted on 8 September. (Annual Report on Exchange Controls, International Monetary Fund, 1981, pp. 205-13.) The Import and Export Policy (April 1982, March 1983)announced by the Commerce Ministry reported the banning of exports of cane, paraffin wax, mustard and rape-seedoil, and `certain
wild-life items’, including lizards and robins. An embargo on the export of CTC (cut, tear and curl) tea was announced by the Ministry of Commerce on 24December 1983. CTC is high-quality tea which accounts for about three-quarters of India’s tea exports. The ban followed a doubling of domestic prices over the previous year, compulsory registration of tea dealers holding more than 1,000 kg. to prevent hoarding, and agreement by manufacturers to reduce their profit margins and cut prices ofpackaged tea by about 20 per cent (Financial Times, 14 December 1983). The Indian Government apparently feared that the supply of tea for the domestic market was going to run out (The Times, 5 January 1984). The effect of thesemeasures is artificially to depress prices in the domestic market whilst raising them overseas (The Economist, 14 January 1984).

[33] Pick’s Currency Year-book, various editions

[34] Krueger (1977), op. cit., pp. 27-28.

[35] Balassa (1978), op. cit., p. 39; Balassa (1980), op. cit., p. 16.

[36] Ibid.,p. 22.

[37] Short surveys of the relevant practices can be found in Lele, op. cit.,Appendix 1, pp. 225-37, and Sukhatme, op. cit., pp. 29-37. Also Gilbert Brown, `Agricultural pricing policies in developing countries’, and G. E.Schuh, `Approaches to “basic needs” and to “equity” that distort incentives in agriculture’, in Schultz (ed.), op. cit.,pp. 84-113 and pp. 307-27 respectively.

[38] Theoretical economists have long recognised that a fundamental flaw in, for example, the Arrow-Debreu model is its assumption that all conceivable futures contracts are practicable. The longest futures price actually quoted at
the Chicago Board of Trade, however, would be for silver, at about two years; for grains, the longest would be only about three months. Since the natural market outcome is a far-cry from the theory, the Indian Government’s fears about the effects of speculation appear to be much exaggerated. To see the risk-dispersing character of a futures contract, let us suppose that both buyer and seller place a probability of one-half on prices being either in 8 or 2; if they are risk-averse, they may prefer to trade at a certain futures price of 5 now, rather than wait for the future to unfold.

[39] David Hopper, `Distortions of agricultural development resulting from Government prohibitions,’ Schultz (ed.), op. cit., p. 69 ff.

[40] K. Prasad, `Foodgrains policy 1966-1976′, in Wadhwa (ed.), op. cit., p.479.

[41] Schultz (ed.), op. cit., p. 309.

[42] Sukhatme, op. cit., pp. 74-86; T. W. Schultz, `On the economics and politics of agriculture’, in Schultz(ed.), op. cit., p. 15 ff.

[43] Schultz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 92-93.

[44] Ibid.,p. 95.

[45] T. N. Srinivasan, `Income Distribution: A survey of policy-aspects’, in Wadhwa (ed.), op. cit., p. 265. That the small farmer may not find it profitable to invest in storage, and that (if it has been taxed) agriculture has been taxed regressively, are also remarked upon by Srinivasan.

[46] Lele, op. cit., p. 2, where reference is made to Sir Henry Knight, Food Administration in India, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1954.

[47] Lele, op. cit., pp. 214-24

[48] For example, M. Todaro, `A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries’, American Economic Review, March 1969, 59, pp. 138-48; J. P. Harris & M. Todaro, `Migration,unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis’, American Economic Review, March 1970 60, pp. 126-42.The best paper known to the author is by Jerome Rothenberg, `On the economics of internal migration’, Working Paper No. 189, Dept. of Economics, MIT, July 1976.

[49] Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions, Basic Books, New York, 1980, pp. 268-69.

[50] `The logic of protection’, The Statesman, Editorial, 19 March 1981; also the Editorial, `Danger of caste ethnic

[51] S. K. Datta Ray, `Backlash to protection: fancy gifts ignore real reform’, The Statesman Weekly, 21 March 1981.

[52]M. Weiner, M. F. Katzenstein, K.V.N. Rao, India’s preferential policies : migrants, the middle classes and ethnic equality, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, pp. 16-17.

[53] Ibid. p. 5

[54] P. T. Bauer, `Population explosion: myths and realities’, in Equality, the Third World and Economic Delusion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, pp. 42-65, contains some of the clearest arguments known to the author about this question; also M. Weiner, India at the Polls : the Parliamentary Election of 1977, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 1978, pp. 35-39.

[55] 10 8 million people affected by floods’, The Statesman Weekly, 22 August 1981; also `Down the drain’, Editorial in The Statesman, 8 July 1981.

[56] Justice with speed’, Editorial in The Statesman, Calcutta and New Delhi, 21 July, 1980

[57] Aristotle, op. cit., 1,094a1-1, 094b11.

[58] There are few thorough studies known to the author that are relevant. One such is Asha L. Dattar, India’s Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe 1953-1969, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.

[59] Bauer (1981) op. cit. Chapters 5 & 6.

[60]. Adam Smith op cit Book IV; also B. Baysinger et al.,`Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society’, in Buchanan et al (eds) op. cit. pp. 235-68.

[61] G. Tullock in Buchanan et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 48.

[62] Bauer (1981), op. cit., p. 144.

FA Hayek’s letter to me when I was 26


Professor Frank Hahn, who supervised my doctoral thesis, was kind enough to once say he considered me “probably the outstanding young Hayekian”.  Certainly throughout my undergraduate days at the London School of Economics and my research work at Cambridge and later in the United States, I was quite an ardent Hayekian in several respects, and I recall being thrilled to receive the enclosed letter from FA Hayek himself in February 1981.fa-hayek-to-roy-1981 My 1989 book Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (London & New York: Routledge International Library of Philosophy), now republished here, records both my praise and my criticism of Hayek. My 1984 monograph on India, also republished here, applied the work of Hayek and many others.

 

See also https://independentindian.com/2013/01/31/i-have-a-student-called-suby-roy-reflections-on-frank-hahn-1925-2013-my-master-in-economic-theory/

Annie Besant (1847-1933)

“Never forget that life can only be nobly inspired and rightly lived if you take it bravely and gallantly, as a splendid adventure in which you are setting out into an unknown country, to meet many a joy, to find many a comrade, to win and lose many a battle.”

– Annie Besant (1847-1933)



From Facebook:

Subroto Roy has just read Courtland Milloy’s review in the Washington Post of James Cameron’s “Avatar” and declares that the original and real Jake Sully was an Irishwoman named Annie Besant (1847-1933), who defined and fought for Indian independence before and better than MK Gandhi himself, and whose conservative (English) political critics had (with schoolboyish hilarity) denounced her (infamously) as a woman of “deep penetration, quick conception and easy delivery”.