from my 2017 post based on my 2004 public lecture in England “But there is one disciple who stands apart from the rest; the work of Professor Wisdom is truly Wittgensteinian, yet at the same time original and independent…Wisdom carries Wittgenstein’s work further than he himself did, and faces its consequences more explicitly… Wisdom’s approach is much less esoteric than Wittgenstein’s, and his conclusions are perhaps easier to come to grips with. We see in Wisdom something like a new application of Wittgenstein’s ideas; we recognize the same forms there, yet cast, as it were, in a new medium…” (David Pole, The later philosophy of Wittgenstein, 1958). Wisdom in his obituary notice of Wittgenstein said if he was asked to say in one sentence what Wittgenstein had accomplished he would say it was asking the question “Can you play chess without the Queen?” Wisdom’s disciple Bambrough in turn said if he was asked to say in one sentence what Wisdom accomplished he would say it was Wisdom replying to such a question about Wittgenstein as he had done. I said in my 2004 public lecture at the University of Buckingham: “If I was asked to answer in one sentence what has been the combined contribution to human thought of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Bambrough, indeed of modern British philosophy as a whole, I would say it has been the proof that there are no unanswerable questions, that there is no question to which there is not a right answer. By “common reasoning” I shall mean merely to refer to the structure of any conversation well-enough described by F R Leavis’s operators in literary criticism: “This is so, isn’t it?, Yes, but….”. My “yes” to your “This is so, isn’t it?” indicates agreement with what you have said while my “but…” tells you I believe there may be something more to the matter, some further logical relation to be found, some further fact to be investigated or experiment carried out, some further reflection necessary and possible upon already known and agreed upon facts. It amounts to a new “This is so, isn’t it?” to which you may respond with your own, “Yes, but…”; and our argument would continue. Another set of operators is: “You might as well say…”; “Exactly so”; “But this is different…” This was how Wisdom encapsulated the “case-by-case” method of argument that he pioneered and practiced. It requires intimate description of particular cases and marking of similarities and differences between them, yielding a powerful indefinitely productive method of objective reasoning, distinct from and logically prior to the usual methods of deduction and induction that exhaust the range of positivism. We are able to see how common reasoning may proceed in practice in subtle fields like law, psychology, politics, ethics, aesthetics and theology, just as objectively as it does in natural science and mathematics. Wittgenstein had spoken of our “craving for generality” and our “contemptuous attitude towards the particular case”. Wisdom formalized the epistemological priority of particular over general saying: “Examples are the final food of thought. Principles and laws may serve us well. They can help us to bring to bear on what is now in question what is not now in question. They help us to connect one thing with another and another and another. But at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to cases.” And “Argument must be heard”. In all conflicts – whether within a given science, between different sciences, between sciences and religion, within a given religion, between different religions, between sciences and arts, within the arts, between religion and the arts, between quarreling nations, quarreling neighbours or quarreling spouses, whether in real relationships of actual life or hypothetical relationships of literature and drama – an approach of this kind tells us there is something further that may be said, some improvement that can be carried out, some further scope for investigation or experiment allowing discovery of new facts, some further reflection necessary or possible upon known facts. There are no conflicts that are necessarily irresoluble. Where the suicide-bombers and their powerful adversaries invite us to share their hasty and erroneous assumption that religious, political or economic cultures are becoming irreconcilable and doomed to be fights unto death, we may give to them instead John Wisdom’s “Argument must be heard….” Bambrough, applying Wisdom applying Wittgenstein, and integrating all this with his deep classical scholarship and knowledge of Aristotle and Plato in particular, showed how objectivity and reasoning are possible in politics, in ethics, in theology, in aesthetics, in literature, as much or as little as in science or mathematics. Bambrough’s path-breaking works of general epistemology and ontology are two three four humble papers in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society “Universals and Family Resemblances” https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544648 “Unanswerable Questions” https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106729?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents “Objectivity and Objects” https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544817?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents “Thought, Word and Deed” https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article-abstract/54/1/105/1779886?redirectedFrom=PDF I, applying all of this from Bambrough to the economic theory of Marshall, Keynes, Hicks, Hayek, Hahn, Friedman, Arrow and others Frank Hahn, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow and others showed in 1989 the same for economic policy and normative economics. I have since then tentatively applied similar methods of reasoning to diplomacy, politics, psychology, religion, literature, and presently explore physics. What Wisdom did was far more astonishing, showing, among many other things, how the confluence of Freud and Wittgenstein could be found to help us comprehend all that seems so irrational: hopes & fears, dreams & the unconscious, psychoses & neuroses, everything said or done has an explanation, usually when there has been an adequate description. Modes of reasoning are manifold, well beyond the deduction and statistical inference induction known to the positivist. Then besides, there’s reflection about known facts too. Really if you can make reasonable sense of dreams and the unconscious, of the psychotic and the neurotic, as Wisdom did, the differences between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, between the West and Islam, between Einstein and Quantum Mechanics too become amenable…
Grok:
The Lineage of Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Bambrough, and Beyond: A Synthesis of Reason and ApplicationThank you for sharing this excerpt from your 2017 post, drawing on your 2004 lecture at the University of Buckingham. It beautifully traces a philosophical thread from Wittgenstein through John Wisdom and Renford Bambrough, extending it into your own work in economics and broader fields like diplomacy, psychology, religion, literature, and even physics. Your emphasis on the “case-by-case” method as a tool for resolving seemingly intractable conflicts—rooted in common reasoning operators like “This is so, isn’t it? Yes, but…”—highlights a profoundly optimistic epistemology: there are no unanswerable questions, only opportunities for further description, reflection, and discovery. This aligns seamlessly with our prior discussions on Wisdom’s Wittgensteinian and Freudian influences, where philosophy becomes a therapeutic process for uncovering hidden patterns in thought and reality. Below, I’ll synthesize the key ideas from your text, connect them to the thinkers involved, and explore their implications, including the “astonishing” confluence of Freud and Wittgenstein in Wisdom’s work.The Philosophical Succession: From Wittgenstein to Wisdom to BambroughYour lecture positions Wisdom as a pivotal figure who not only carried Wittgenstein’s ideas forward but made them more accessible and consequential. David Pole’s assessment (from The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, 1958) captures this: Wisdom’s originality lies in applying Wittgenstein’s insights in a “new medium,” confronting their implications head-on. Wittgenstein’s question—”Can you play chess without the Queen?”—symbolizes his challenge to traditional philosophical assumptions, showing how removing a key element (like generality or essences) reveals new ways of understanding games, language, and life. Wisdom’s response, as echoed by his disciple Bambrough, affirms that such reconfigurations are not only possible but fruitful.Bambrough, in turn, integrated this with classical philosophy (especially Aristotle and Plato), demonstrating objectivity across diverse domains. Your one-sentence summary of their combined contribution—”there are no unanswerable questions, that there is no question to which there is not a right answer”—encapsulates this. It rejects despair (e.g., in existentialism or cultural clashes) in favor of persistent dialogue: “Argument must be heard.” This “case-by-case” approach, formalized by Wisdom, prioritizes particular examples over abstract principles, as in his dictum: “Examples are the final food of thought… at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to cases.” It’s a method logically prior to deduction and induction, allowing reflection on known facts to yield new insights.
Thinker
Key Contribution (Per Your Text)
Exemplary Quote or Idea
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Challenged “craving for generality” and contempt for particulars; introduced language games and family resemblances to dissolve philosophical puzzles.
“Can you play chess without the Queen?”—questioning essential structures.
John Wisdom
Extended Wittgenstein into metaphysics, paradoxes, and psychoanalysis; pioneered “case-by-case” reasoning for objective analysis in subtle fields like ethics, aesthetics, and theology.
“Argument must be heard”; formalized priority of particulars: “Principles and laws may serve us well… but the final appeal is to cases.”
Renford Bambrough
Applied the above to show objectivity in politics, ethics, theology, aesthetics, and literature; drew on Aristotle/Plato for a classical grounding.
Integrated Wittgenstein-Wisdom with classics to prove reasoning’s universality: no conflicts are irresoluble.
Bambrough’s Path-Breaking Papers: Epistemology and Ontology in ActionYou highlight four humble yet revolutionary papers by Bambrough in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, which exemplify this lineage. While full access to these (via JSTOR or OUP) often requires institutional login, their influence is well-documented in philosophical literature. Based on standard summaries and analyses from secondary sources, here’s a brief overview of each, tying them to your themes of unanswerable questions and common reasoning:
“Universals and Family Resemblances” (1960-61): Bambrough addresses the ancient problem of universals (e.g., what makes all games “games” or all just acts “just”?), drawing on Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” concept from Philosophical Investigations. He argues that universals don’t require a single common essence but overlap in resemblances, like family traits. This dissolves the realist-nominalist debate: we classify by marking similarities and differences case-by-case, without needing Platonic forms or arbitrary names. Implications: Objectivity in ethics or politics emerges from particular comparisons, not abstract ideals—echoing Wisdom’s epistemological priority of examples. jstor.org +2
“Unanswerable Questions” (1965-66): Here, Bambrough directly supports your core thesis: philosophical questions deemed “unanswerable” (e.g., about God, free will, or morality) are resolvable through persistent case-by-case analysis. He critiques skepticism by showing how questions evolve via dialogue—much like your “This is so, isn’t it? Yes, but…” operators. Drawing on Wisdom and Wittgenstein, he argues that apparent dead-ends stem from misuse of language or incomplete description, not inherent limits. Example: Ethical dilemmas (e.g., trolley problems) yield answers through refined particulars, integrating Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis).
“Objectivity and Objects” (1971-72): Bambrough explores how objectivity applies to “objects” in ontology—physical, mental, or abstract—without reducing them to subjectivism. He uses Wittgensteinian tools to show that reasoning about objects (e.g., in science vs. art) involves marking resemblances and differences, ensuring objectivity across fields. Ties to Wisdom: Metaphysical puzzles (like other minds or religious entities) are clarified by therapeutic description, revealing “patterns in the facts.” This underpins your application to conflicts, where objectivity bridges divides.
“Thought, Word and Deed” (1979): This paper examines the interplay between cognition (thought), language (word), and action (deed), influenced by Wittgenstein’s view that meaning is use. Bambrough argues for integration: ethical or political reasoning isn’t abstract but embodied in deeds, resolvable case-by-case. Aristotelian echoes are strong, emphasizing virtue as habitual action guided by reason. Implications: In diplomacy or economics, “deeds” (policies) must align with thoughtful discourse, avoiding hasty assumptions of irreconcilability.
These papers collectively demonstrate how Wittgenstein-Wisdom’s methods scale to ontology and epistemology, proving reasoning’s reach beyond positivism.Your Extensions: From Economics to the IrrationalYou apply this framework to economic theory (Marshall, Keynes, Hicks, Hayek, Hahn, Friedman, Arrow), showing in your 1989 work (Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry) that normative economics and policy are amenable to objective, case-by-case reasoning—beyond mere deduction or statistical induction. This involves reflection on known facts, marking economic “family resemblances” (e.g., between market failures and interventions). Your tentative expansions to diplomacy (e.g., India-Pakistan over Kashmir), politics, psychology, religion, literature, and physics illustrate the method’s versatility: conflicts like West-Islam or Einstein-Quantum Mechanics become dialogues of “Yes, but…” leading to synthesis.Most strikingly, you spotlight Wisdom’s “astonishing” achievement: merging Freud and Wittgenstein to comprehend the irrational. As we discussed earlier, Wisdom saw philosophy as psychoanalytic therapy—uncovering unconscious “models from the past” that distort yet illuminate reality. Freud’s unconscious (hopes, fears, dreams, psychoses) meets Wittgenstein’s linguistic clarification: everything said or done has an explanation via adequate description. Modes of reasoning expand beyond positivist limits to include reflection, allowing sense-making of neuroses or cultural clashes. In Wisdom’s hands, this confluence turns apparent irrationality (e.g., suicide-bombers’ assumptions) into resolvable puzzles: “Argument must be heard,” revealing hidden facts or relations.This optimism counters hasty fatalism, as in your Gaza-related post we started with—existential confrontation yields meaning through persistent, case-by-case inquiry. If you’d like to delve into your 1989 book, specific applications (e.g., to physics), or even Freud-Wittgenstein parallels in Wisdom’s essays, just say the word!
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