

majority. But although only 66 seats in the National Assembly were won by Islami-Jamhuri-Itehad, the votes cast reveal a close fight between the two parties. Broadly, the Itehad stood for Islam and nationalism as represented by Zia ul-Haq. Its leader, Nawaz Sharif, was Zia's choice. And, as shown by the 1988 and 1990 elections and the changes in government, the values of Category *B* remain important in Pakistan even after the death of Zia ul-Haq.

4

External Affairs

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

Pakistan's foreign policy was set on the day of its creation, 14 August 1947. Partition left a residue of bitter memories on both sides of the border. In Pakistani perceptions, India's leaders continued to believe Pakistan to be an artificial creation, the gratuitous insult of a departing imperial power to the secular philosophy of modern India. Pakistani leaders reasoned that India would never accept the division of the subcontinent, and assumed they needed an immediate remedy for their weak position. The choices seemed stark: stability and strength, or the undoing of the new state.

This chapter takes the poor state of relations with India as a given. Pakistani efforts to incorporate all of Kashmir remained a live possibility in the formative years of the country's foreign policy. A strong military establishment was perceived by Pakistani leaders as the key to defence against India and the fulfilment of the desire of Kashmiri Muslims to join Pakistan.

Despite fissures and divisions in the body politic and within the leadership, Pakistan has been generally united in foreign policy. Internal and regional weaknesses were to be countered by an external search for friends who could provide a measure of immediate protection against a more powerful neighbour. In the early

1950s, when the search for protection was at its most active, the United States appeared the only real choice. The expansion of Soviet and Chinese power manifested itself to US leaders in the form of Soviet moves in Iran, threats to Turkey and Greece, the Berlin crisis, and the Korean war. The resulting policy of containment led Washington to focus on countries like Pakistan whose strategic location made them attractive. Thus, by the time Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington in 1950, the general orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy was already set.¹ For over a decade, the United States responded generously in building up Pakistan's military capability. Equally important was the psychological impact of the relationship. Once the Eisenhower Administration announced in February 1954 that the United States could provide military assistance to Pakistan, and the Mutual Defense Agreement with the USA was signed on 19 May 1954, Pakistan's security against India was established.² Of this the leadership was firmly convinced, and the view was shared by an otherwise quarrelsome lot of politicians. Pakistanis were not so naive as to believe that the American focus was a reflection of a real American preference for their country over India. But they saw Indian ties with China and the Soviet Union as manifestations of the neutralist policy that was fundamentally important to Jawaharlal Nehru. Also, with India as a founding champion of non-alignment, Pakistan could only play a losing game in the same league. Pakistan's American connection was also a result of India's refusal to be part of the Eisenhower/Dulles 'northern tier' of defence against the Soviet Union and China.

The interplay between foreign and domestic policy components in the first two decades further increased the pro-American orientation. Not only could the United States provide the necessary tools against the perceived Indian threat, it could also offer the political leaders with the necessary wherewithal for strengthening the military establishment. Political leaders in Pakistan have also historically understood that, given the siege mentality resulting from Indo-Pak tensions, the military had to be nurtured. During the long periods of martial law after 1958, the military was paramount in decision-making and did not even have to work through the political establishment. Thus the link between US assistance and enhanced military capability remained a strong one.

Pakistani leaders were extremely sensitive to shifts in Washington's moods vis-à-vis the security of their country. Thus even a hint

of improvement in Indo-US ties was minutely examined to see whether the improvement reflected a commensurate downgrading of US-Pakistani relations. The Kennedy and Johnson years left Ayub Khan feeling that Washington had begun to believe that Pakistan had no place to go, especially after Johnson cancelled both Ayub's April 1965 visit to Washington and an Aid-to-Pakistan consortium meeting in July 1965. This feeling was heightened when the United States stopped arms shipments to Pakistan during the September 1965 war with India.

Despite shifting American policies, the major determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy remained the fear of India. On this factor, domestic opinion was united. There was no special constituency of any significance pleading the case for change in the policy toward India. Thus, if the relationship with the United States was on the decline, other arrangements had to be accelerated in order to compensate for the US neglect toward Pakistan after 1965. The final display of anti-Americanism and public hysteria at the perceived 'betrayal' by the United States during the 1965 war with India manifested itself in the burning down of the USIA library in Karachi. The American Embassy itself nearly met the same fate. Such a display convinced Washington that the time was ripe for disengagement from the thankless task of playing the zero-sum game in South Asia.

Without the United States as a steady friend, Ayub turned toward the Soviet Union. He had begun to cultivate China even prior to 1965, and the policy was already paying dividends in terms of meeting the Pakistani psychological need for a reliable ally as a counter to India. The growing Sino-Indian hostility offered a fresh option to China and Pakistan. Both responded warmly to their mutual need.

With the Soviets, Pakistan found the going harder. Despite Soviet mediation at Tashkent to resolve the 1965 Indo-Pak war problems, Moscow found it difficult to offer the kind of substantial help that the United States gave earlier. The Sino-Soviet rift ensured a primary place for India in Soviet calculations. Thus, despite the great deal of fanfare with which Ayub journeyed to Moscow in 1965, and Kosygin visited Pakistan in early 1969, Soviet military assistance (the test of the worthiness of the new relationship) amounted to a mere \$30 million in Soviet military supplies of odds and ends.

1971 BANGLADESH WAR

The linkage between foreign and domestic policies was demonstrated clearly in the events leading up to and subsequent to the 1971 Indo-Pak war which brought Bangladesh into being.³ The downward political trend which began after 1966 escalated in the face of economic and social discontent which eventually forced Ayub Khan from power in 1969. Civil-military relations came under challenge as years of rule by military leaders led to widespread discontent. Political parties in both East and West Pakistan united in their demand for political participation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and called for participatory government as the only true guarantee of Pakistan's security and independence. Bhutto cited Pakistan's lasting dependence on the United States despite what he described as the failure of the American option as demonstrated in the US sale of weapons to India in 1962 and the cut-off to such sales to Pakistan in 1965.⁴ In questioning the policies of the military, Bhutto challenged the notion which had received wide support in the first two decades after 1947: that the military was the only truly patriotic group above politics and thus the genuine protector of Pakistan. Bhutto cited the military's failure to wrest Kashmir in the 1965 war as sufficient proof of the declining utility of the powerful establishment whose very *raison d'être* was to prevail against India.

Under changing conditions and with a less capable General Yahya Khan in charge, options became limited. Yahya was subject to growing pressure for change from within the political system while politicization and polarization of Pakistan was the order of the day. China remained a friend but the US connection was again necessary to replenish the military equipment drawdown resulting from the Indo-Pak war of 1965. A chance at re-establishing the US-Pakistan relationship came even as the October 1970 general elections in Pakistan resulted in a resounding victory of the Awami League in East Pakistan and the PPP emerging as the largest winner in West Pakistan. The political difficulties caused by the polarized electoral results need not be detailed here, except to point out that Yahya Khan's role in arranging Kissinger's secret trip to Peking in July 1971 ensured an American role in the ensuing events in the subcontinent.

The army's crackdown in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971 followed Bhutto's boycott of the 3 March 1971 session of the newly elected National Assembly in Dacca. Thereafter, it was only a short time before Indian involvement changed the civil war into another Indo-Pak war. The Soviet Union and the United States once again were on different sides: the former, having entered into a treaty of friendship gave India a great deal of help in supplying war material and in protecting the Indian diplomatic flank at the UN. The United States made its much publicized 'tilt' toward Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger signalled the American commitment to the territorial integrity of West Pakistan through the dispatch of a naval task force toward the Bay of Bengal. A message was also sent to Moscow that its inability to restrain India in West Pakistan could jeopardize the entire fabric of East-West relations. India accepted a ceasefire on 16 December 1971 ending the war with Pakistan, after India recognized Bangladesh on 6 December.

With the end of the tragic events of 1971, Pakistan's new leaders had to deal with the reality of a truncated Pakistan and acknowledge their own role in launching a brutal civil war against East Pakistan. For its poor performance leading up to the surrender at Dacca, the military became a much more attractive target. For the leadership, the causes behind a major domestic and foreign policy fiasco, i.e., the break-up of Pakistan, were a harsh reminder of failed policies. No lessons were necessarily learned. But the country lived with the consequences of the war. Ruptured relations with India, a demoralized military with POWs in India, an economy in shambles and political institutions in decay after 13 years of military rule were some of the immediate by-products of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. The Bangladesh war became a watershed event for Pakistan's foreign policy.

The traditional primary focus on India seemed unlikely to yield any advantages in the period immediately following the 1971 war. Furthermore, with an India focus, Pakistani foreign policy could only be reactive. Thus Bhutto seized the opportunity created by the oil price increase of 1973 which added to the wealth of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya. The economic dimension of the cooperation was reflected in the supply of Pakistani manpower, and managerial and technical expertise to these oil-rich countries.⁵ Political cooperation was embodied in the growing bilateral exchange between key Islamic countries and Pakistan. The Bhutto policy of turning

westward to the Gulf and the Middle East gave a new focus and renewed vitality to Pakistani foreign policy. Necessitated by the changed geopolitical reality of a diminished Pakistan, the growing links with Islamic countries breathed new life into a demoralized system. Bhutto took the lead in setting up the Islamic Conference, of which he remained the President until his death in April 1977. He organized the second Islamic Summit in Lahore in February 1974 which was jointly sponsored by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and attended by leaders from 37 Islamic countries.

Besides immediate economic and psychological gains, the greatest benefit of this shift came in the country's subsequent ability to acknowledge change and exploit it. Nearly a decade later, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan was ready.

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Pakistani attempts in the mid-1970s, along with those encouraged by the Shah of Iran, to bring Afghanistan into a partnership ended with the communist coup and the overthrow of Daud in April 1978. After the coup, Pakistani alarm regarding a deteriorating security posture vis-à-vis Afghanistan went largely unheeded in the West.⁶ The overthrow of Daud led to a small, steady stream of Afghan refugees into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Although Pakistan accepted the fact that Soviet-Afghan ties had been historically good, an Afghan communist regime directly on the Pakistani border was unwelcome. There was also fear that the coup might presage renewed Afghan interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by way of the issue of Pakhtunistan.⁷

Earlier concerns paled into insignificance once the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. The invasion demonstrated the interplay between the causes and the consequences of Pakistani foreign policy. The immediate reaction was a strong belief that the Soviet move augured ill for Pakistan's security because Afghanistan, in and of itself, was not seen as a sufficient prize. Zia ul-Haq spoke of the renewed Soviet interest in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. The Soviets were expected to increase pressure directly on Pakistan. As a 'frontline' state, Pakistan actively sought external assistance.

The immediate impact of the Soviet invasion came as massive numbers of Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan. The refugee exodus eventually mounted to approximately three million, mostly in the NWFP. The economic, social and ecological burden on resources was significant despite international willingness to assist in dealing with the world's largest refugee presence. For most Pakistanis, the eventual return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland became the test of the success or failure of the government's policy on Afghanistan. There was surprisingly little large-scale public criticism of the political costs, even within the NWFP which bore the brunt of the refugee presence. Key politicians, like Wali Khan, were articulate spokesmen against the government's overall Afghan policy—but even Wali remained careful in his criticism of fellow Pathans who were refugees on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.

The causes which lay behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were internal to that country. The consequences were dramatic for Pakistan, even beyond the immediate one noted above in terms of Afghan refugees. Few in Pakistan believed Soviet and Afghan government statements that the Soviet stay in Afghanistan would be short-lived. Therefore, Pakistani policy-makers focused on ways of ensuring security against further Soviet encroachment via Afghanistan. Zia ul-Haq believed that the Soviets had to be stopped inside Afghanistan. Otherwise, Pakistan itself lay open. Therefore, Pakistan led the effort on the political and diplomatic fronts of raising the costs to the Soviets. Diplomatic costs were raised through criticism in international forums. Successive UN General Assembly votes condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by unprecedented majorities. West European countries condemned the invasion as flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a non-aligned country. Although the European economic sanctions were limited, the psychological impact of criticism of the Afghan invasion was a definite minus for the Soviets.

Pakistan worked within the Islamic councils for action condemning the Soviet invasion. On 27–28 January 1980, 35 Muslim countries attended an extraordinary ministerial session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which condemned 'Soviet military aggression against the Afghan people' and called for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces. The conference adopted additional measures: (a) suspended Afghanistan's membership in the OIC; (b) invited member-states to withhold recognition of the Karmal

regime which the Soviets put in power and to sever diplomatic relations with Afghanistan; (c) called for an end of assistance to the Kabul regime; and (d) asked for support for the sovereign integrity of Islamic states neighbouring Afghanistan.

Pakistani leaders worried about the strategic impact of the Soviet invasion on the region. Given continued turbulent conditions in Iran, the ongoing Iran–Iraq war, India's potential role became a key factor. From Islamabad's point of view, the Indo–Soviet treaty of friendship remained operative. Therefore, Indian intentions and policy toward the Soviet Afghan policy was a critical part of the unfolding Afghan scenario. In order to avoid a two-front situation, Pakistani policy evolved along two parallel tracks: one, to fashion a major response with international help to challenge Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; two, to improve relations with India in order to prevent New Delhi from exploiting Pakistani vulnerability. The first track helped deal with the second, India was less likely to be tempted to act against a Pakistan which drew major international support for its Afghan policy.

After 1981, Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation intensified. The mujahidin were able, at least initially, to prevent the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) from establishing any authority beyond Kabul. Lack of progress created dissension within the PDPA ranks. Babrak Karmal was divested of the Prime Minister's job, the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA continued their hostility toward each other. The Kabul regime unsuccessfully tried to win back tribal loyalties through the establishment of the Fatherland Front, playing up ethnic and tribal differences in order to prevent the development of a broad-based coordinated opposition. Despite repeated attempts which utilized a superior military arsenal, the Soviets and the PDPA failed to penetrate mujahidin strongholds. But the Soviets were able to keep their clients in Kabul in power and to take over the workings of the government.

In addition to keeping international attention focused on Afghanistan, Pakistani policy sought to buttress the mujahidin military capability. The resistance political strategy worked through Peshawar where the Afghan Alliance parties were based. The idea was that in order to defeat the Soviets, the costs of the occupation had to be raised. The goal remained twofold and interconnected: total Soviet troop withdrawal and refugee return to Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Apart from the annual UN General Assembly debates on Afghanistan (where the vote was always overwhelmingly against Soviet occupation), Pakistani diplomacy was actively engaged in the search for a political settlement. The UN provided the auspices under which indirect rounds of talks were held at Geneva beginning with the first round in June 1982. Pakistan was the interlocutor for the Afghan resistance, pressing the Soviets to withdraw forces from Afghanistan. These talks were authorized by successive General Assembly resolutions which called for Soviet troop withdrawal; self-determination for the Afghan people; an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan; and the return of refugees with safety and honour.

Pakistani diplomacy was extremely effective in coordinating the international diplomatic effort at the UN. From time to time, various resistance political leaders in Peshawar complained about the lack of consultation on the part of the Pakistan government. However, given that the only hope for a coordinated policy against permanent Soviet occupation remained in Pakistani hands, the Afghans learned to live with the situation.

Throughout the decade, Zia ul-Haq continued support of the mujahidin effort. Pakistani involvement and Afghan commitment kept up the pressure on Soviet occupation. In response, the Soviets changed their tactics through increased attacks on civilians; expanded use of air power; high-level saturation bombing; increased frequency and numbers of Soviet troop usage. Pakistan's task became one of supporting the Afghan resistance effort to keep up pressure against Soviet moves through a variety of means involving military, political and diplomatic strategies.

Militarily, Soviet/Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) control remained largely confined to Kabul and some garrison towns. The Soviet military could only operate outside of the capital at considerable risk to itself despite its overwhelming superiority. Over time, resistance commanders inside Afghanistan learnt to coordinate their efforts with increasing success. Although they did not prevail in dislodging the Soviets from Kabul, they did prevent expansion of Soviet control, which was a major accomplishment. Politically, Afghan resistance leaders made halting progress, although an Alliance was set up in Peshawar. The Soviet Union and KHAD responded by sponsoring dozens of terrorist incidents inside Pakistan. The general Pakistani public, which was already

nervous at the swelling numbers of Afghan refugees, was the target. The refugees were already seen as receiving preferential treatment from the government in Islamabad. The Soviets countered the Pakistani offensive by blaming 'outside interference' for Afghanistan's troubles, meaning Pakistan and the United States. The Soviets also ceaselessly pressed European and third world countries to pull back support for the resistance and to accept the reality of the permanence of the 1978 communist revolution in Kabul. Offers of trade and increased economic interaction were the incentives that Moscow offered. The effort remained largely unsuccessful.

UN-sponsored negotiations made only procedural progress until Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow. Until then, no Soviet leader seemed willing to admit that the Soviets were in a no-win situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan resistance had learned how to mount successful military operations and without vastly increasing the number of Soviet troops beyond 120,000, the Soviets could not hope to prevail. Even with an increased military presence, victory was far from certain. After years of side-stepping the issue, the Soviets offered a twelve-month schedule within which they would withdraw from Afghanistan. When the Geneva Accords were finally signed on 14 April 1988, 15 February 1989 was set as the date for complete Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In order to get the agreement in place, Pakistan, representing the Afghan resistance, had wanted the Najibullah regime to be replaced by an interim government prior to the accords signature.⁸ The Soviets were unwilling to commit to the early demise of the communist regime and did not agree to an interim arrangement to precede the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. But Soviet troop withdrawal was a vindication of the Pakistani policy of supporting resistance efforts against Soviet occupation. Two clear advantages accrued even beyond the fact that the Soviets agreed, for the first time ever, to leave a communist regime in difficulty. First, Afghan refugees were closer to the goal of returning to their homeland, a key goal of Pakistani policy. Second, Afghanistan could not easily be used by the Soviets against Pakistan in ways that were feared in 1979.

Zia ul-Haq, who was the architect of Pakistan's Afghan policy, died in the air crash of 17 August 1988 which also killed several of his senior military aides and the American Ambassador. Pakistani

policy on Afghanistan, however, was not changed because its consequences were evident in the impending Soviet withdrawal of the remaining 50 per cent of its troops—the initial 50 per cent having been withdrawn by 15 May 1988.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

From Pakistan's point of view, reviving close ties was a direct and necessary outgrowth of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Washington's willingness was also an indication of the seriousness of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan. The immediate expectation in Islamabad was that the Soviets had designs beyond Afghanistan. Pakistan and perhaps Iran seemed likely targets once Soviet control over Afghanistan was consolidated. Underlying this view was the Pakistani assumption, stated earlier, that in and of itself, Afghanistan did not offer a sufficiently worthwhile prize, especially since the Soviet Union was the predominant power in Afghanistan in any case.

That the United States was serious about its concern over the unfolding events was evident in the response of the Carter Administration. Carter declared: 'Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan. This would threaten the security of all nations, including the United States.' In response to the new threat, President Carter offered 'military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north'.⁹

US assistance could not be offered to Pakistan without a waiver of the Symington amendment which prohibited such aid to any country which receives or delivers nuclear enrichment technology without adequate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The prohibition had earlier been encouraged by the Carter administration because of Pakistan's violations of the American nuclear non-proliferation policy. Pakistani leaders therefore had few expectations that President Carter would follow through on his offer of assistance, especially since Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher stated: 'We will not put aside the

nuclear issue with Pakistan because it is a basic principle of this Administration—but it is only one of several foreign policy issues.¹⁰ Secretary of Defence Harold Brown echoed similar sentiments, saying that even as it worked to 'safeguard the legitimate security interests of regional states' the United States remained concerned with the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation.¹¹ Yet, Pakistani leaders saw that the Carter Administration continued to supply enriched uranium fuel for India's Tarapur reactor without IAEA safeguards. These supplies were expressly authorized by President Carter over the objections of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Sanctity of contract and the need to keep India engaged on non-proliferation were the reasons behind the decision in favour of India. However, in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders were extremely fearful of India because of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty. For Islamabad, Washington's offer of assistance to India's nuclear programme was a jarring note in the Carter Administration policy approach toward Pakistan.

Thus, the initial US offer of \$400 million in assistance for Pakistan was dismissed by Zia ul-Haq as an inadequate response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Islamabad was unwilling to initiate the sort of relationship that the Soviet threat necessitated without some assurance of a longer-term sustained US commitment. With the US 1980 election looming around the corner, Pakistani leaders hoped for a Republican victory, and they waited.

The Reagan Administration was seen as advantageous to Pakistan. This view was based on Pakistani perceptions that, historically, Republican Presidents tended to be more friendly toward Pakistan than their Democratic counterparts. That friendship was expected to be even more pronounced in the changed atmosphere of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which made Pakistan a frontline state.

Pakistani perceptions were not without merit. Shortly after President Reagan took office, serious negotiations were started to conclude a security assistance package for Pakistan with a waiver of the Symington amendment. Afghanistan provided the rationale and Islamabad was hopeful that US Congressional concern with non-proliferation could be offset by the greater Soviet threat to the security of Southwest Asia. The assumption proved to be correct and a \$2.5 billion assistance package was approved by the Congress and utilized by Pakistan.

When Zia ul-Haq came to the United States in December 1982, it was far from clear what course the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was likely to take or how long it would last. The general feeling on Zia ul-Haq's part was that everything possible needed to be done in order to prevent the invasion from becoming permanent. The Washington visit was a chance to share assessments and Zia ul-Haq used the opportunity effectively. He had set up two tests of the seriousness of the US commitment: (a) a sufficiently large assistance package encompassing both military and economic components; (b) the sale of 40 F-16 fighters. Washington was forthcoming on both counts.

When the first assistance package ended in 1986, the Soviets were still in Afghanistan. Pakistan's interest in maintaining the American link was thus considerable and its needs were well-defined.¹² Negotiations for the second package took place in the wake of Zia ul-Haq's interest in widening the government's base through the induction of a civilian Prime Minister. The process was to be blessed by a carefully circumscribed election. The man Zia ul-Haq chose to be the second in command was Junejo. Although selected by Zia ul-Haq, Junejo expected his role as the civilian Prime Minister to grow. Because foreign policy, particularly the relationship with the United States and Afghanistan, were the special preserve of Zia ul-Haq, Junejo's role in the second US assistance package was marginal, even if somewhat visible.

Pakistan re-established many of the links with the United States which had slowly atrophied after the aid cut-off during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The links were both official and unofficial. At the former level was, for example, the resuscitation of the military-to-military relationship which had basically ceased in the 1960s once military assistance was no longer a factor. Because US assistance could only provide for a small percentage of overall Pakistani needs, both military establishments worked toward effective usage of the available funds. US Congressional concerns, regional sensitivity and the general appropriateness of the system provided the context within which both sides worked.

Consultation on Afghanistan provided yet another vehicle for official exchanges, including at the very highest levels. Both foreign policy bureaucracies also worked together to enhance the effort in meeting the Soviet challenge. Geneva talks, the annual UN General Assembly debate, consultations prior to US-Soviet talks are all

examples of the collaborative effort which sustained the joint Afghanistan policy.

Unofficial ties were exemplified in the growing exchange between scholars, editors and legislators which followed revived ties between the United States and Pakistan. These exchanges were often lively discussions of different perceptions. On the Pakistani side, there was lingering suspicion regarding American motivations and ability to sustain the relationship beyond the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Differences notwithstanding, the fact that these discussions were held was indicative of some progress toward general overall acceptance of the US-Pakistan relationship.

By the time Zia ul-Haq died in August 1988, Pakistan's ties with the United States were firm and steady. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had led to the resuscitation of the ties and the US commitment to total Soviet troop withdrawal remained in place. Some speculation regarding the future of the relationship will be offered in the final section of this paper. It suffices to say that the November 1988 election in Pakistan brought back a democratically-elected government. With the 1986-92 \$4.02 billion six-year US package of assistance at its midway point, bilateral relations continued with expectations of further progress despite the Soviet departure from Afghanistan.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA

The first three decades of Pakistan's history focused on India in a negative fashion. Initial suspicion on both sides accelerated in the shadow of two-and-a-half wars. Pakistan identified itself as a Muslim state and proudly gave religion as its very *raison d'être*. India, with a large Muslim population of its own, did not accept the notion of religion providing the sole basis of statehood. Thus mutual recrimination remained the order of the day as Pakistani leaders voiced fears of Indian aggression as played out in the 1971 Bangladesh war. Indian leaders disliked Pakistan's American orientation and its penchant for demanding equal attention with India. Kashmir provided another source of trouble. Pakistani leaders understood

that the status quo in Kashmir could not officially be made permanent. Yet, after 1965, they feared that a change would leave India at an advantage since New Delhi would never give up Kashmir.

Despite the many issues which divided India and Pakistan, a certain amount of normalcy did exist between the two neighbours. A number of reasons can be cited for this: first, Partition had occurred under British auspices. London was the shared tie in implementing the subcontinent's division. There were a multitude of complex and easy problems which faced India and Pakistan—from the division of national assets to the housing of its first officers. Despite the prevailing bitterness, officials on both side were forced to deal with one another; second, India and Pakistan were often members of the same clubs, e.g., the Commonwealth, which gave Pakistan an advantage it needed as a new nation-state. India was never in a position to deny it recognition (as did China toward Taiwan) for its own internal and external reasons. Shared family ties across the Indo-Pakistani border and the willingness, and even the insistence, of families to move back and forth on visits made it impossible for India and Pakistan to impose the geographical isolation of the population that China and Taiwan or East and West Germany maintained. This is not to say that these exchanges were always easy or welcome. From time to time, crises and wars halted the flow or made it very difficult. But except during times of actual war, whenever and wherever a border crossing was open, the visits continued. Finally, the leadership on both sides knew each other and had often worked side by side under the British. This love-hate relationship between India and Pakistan kept up the tension. However, over the years it also provided a base on which a fundamentally different relationship could at least be attempted.

Zia ul-Haq faced the threat arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan without the benefit of hindsight which showed the weaknesses of Soviet performance. In the chaotic days at the advent of the 1980s, Pakistan's future seemed far from assured. Because Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with friendly relations with the Soviet Union, Zia ul-Haq expected a critical Indian response to the Soviet invasion. Initially, New Delhi seemed to be evaluating the situation rather carefully. However, with Mrs. Gandhi

in power, the response was found wanting and Indian policy soon stood apart from the open criticism reflected in the growing international sentiment that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was unwarranted and unwelcome.

Even as Pakistan worked hard to isolate India from its traditional non-aligned friends, Zia ul-Haq understood that Pakistan's security environment had truly deteriorated. Uncertainty in Iran and Soviet military presence in Afghanistan were new potential threats. A friendly India might make a difference but a hostile India certainly could, given that the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty still stood. Therefore, Zia ul-Haq opted to seek a substantial improvement in order to raise the Indian stake in the relationship.

No dramatic overtures were possible. Domestic opinion had to be prepared. The military had to be brought on board. These tasks were made more difficult as India alone amongst the major non-aligned countries would not openly condemn Soviet action—which was taken by many in Pakistan to mean that, in fact, India actually condoned Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military feared that India was in the process of creating the classic two-front threat that Pakistan feared most. However, the public neither wanted nor really expected general war between India and Pakistan.

To relieve the military's suspicions, Zia ul-Haq began by changing the rhetoric toward India in his private conversations with outside leaders: Pakistan was the aggrieved party and even India could not fail to recognize what the Soviet action in Afghanistan meant for the security of the entire subcontinent.

Updating some of Pakistan's aging military equipment was critical as the US relationship was revived. Thus Zia ul-Haq worried that a residual 'India lobby' in the United States might successfully block the effort. The F-16s were viewed as the first real test since this was a state-of-the-art aircraft at the time. New Delhi was unhappy that Pakistan would receive such sophisticated aircraft after a long hiatus in US supplies. However, given the growing inventory of advanced Soviet, British and French aircraft in India's arsenal, opposition to 40 F-16s was difficult. In any case, the Reagan Administration made the case in Congress and with India that the Soviet threat in Afghanistan was real and warranted a serious—even if selective—augmentation of Pakistan's military capability.

Pakistan became an early beneficiary of the steady improvement in US relations with India which began under Indira Gandhi and

accelerated under Rajiv Gandhi. The improvement took place in spite of the US commitment to Pakistan after 1980. Washington seriously sought to end the traditional zero-sum game of its diplomacy on the subcontinent. There were many reasons why it made sense to make steady progress in Indo-US relations. In its wake, the progress enabled the United States to make the case for an improved Indo-Pak equation. Given Soviet pressure on Pakistan's northern border, normalization between India and Pakistan made sense.

The agenda for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement was set cautiously. New opportunities were sought but both sides had lingering suspicion about each other's motivations. New Delhi suspected Zia ul-Haq as a military man whose policies might not outlast him. Zia ul-Haq saw Rajiv Gandhi as a politician who could easily exploit anti-Pakistani feelings (e.g., as in the case of alleged Pakistani interference with the Sikhs in Indian Punjab) in order to help his personal popularity. Nonetheless, both leaders understood that a beginning had to be made.

A number of areas were singled out where progress was necessary or was possible, the basic notion being that expanded contacts across a broad spectrum builds confidence and leads to overall improvement in relations. Notable amongst the select areas were: a No-War Pact or Friendship Treaty; an agreement against attack on nuclear installations; improved trade; expanded cultural exchanges; easier travel. Progress to date has been uneven. For example, the non-attack on nuclear facilities agreement (which had languished in a near-ready state) was quickly signed when Rajiv Gandhi visited Islamabad in connection with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 1989 summit. Yet, despite many attempts, the trade issue, which India feels is the litmus test of the relationship, remains unresolved.

When Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister, the general expectation in both countries was that quick progress would be made. India was traditionally suspicious of the military leadership, even though Zia ul-Haq (whose hold over Pakistan's institutions had been strong) could be more easily forthcoming toward India. Initially, the personal rapport between Bhutto and Gandhi enabled both countries to cut through the red tape and enter into agreements. However, momentum was lost as bureaucratic foot-dragging slowed progress. Subsequent leadership changes in both countries

have occurred without any significant improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations.

CONCLUSIONS

Pakistan's foreign policy has operated within the constraints that external and internal environments impose. The former encompassed trends over which Pakistan has had little or no control, such as the US-Soviet relationship, Sino-Indian and Indo-Soviet relations. At times, as in the 1950s and early 1960s, Pakistan benefited by siding with the United States. In particular, given that Pakistan's objective was external assistance for its defense and that alternative sources for such assistance were limited, the US connection was useful. Also, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 revived the Carter Administration's interest in Pakistan, American security assistance was helpful in meeting the challenge by the Soviets to Pakistan's security. Islamabad then viewed the relationship as being positive, even beyond the material help it delivered. US ties provided psychological and diplomatic support to Pakistan against Soviet designs on Pakistan.

At other times, the external environment impinged negatively on Pakistan. Declining US interest in the mid-1960s ensured little American support for Pakistan, e.g., in the 1965 war with India. Indian actions in the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 resulted in the loss of the more populous province and the birth of Bangladesh. Pakistanis fear a similar loss of US interest now that the former Soviet troops are out of Afghanistan, despite a large residual Afghan refugee presence and the economic and social problems which accompany it.

Examples of the internal determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy can be found in its history of civil-military relations. Periods of military rule (whether under direct martial law or a modified version of the military's control of the government) coincided with a desire to enhance Pakistan's military capability, whatever the best available source. Pakistan's priorities differed under civilian regimes, even though the basic commitment to security remained the same.

When weighing the determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy against the consequences, the record is a mixed one. Some of the key examples are discussed below.

The search for security has driven much of Pakistan's foreign policy. India has been the obvious and traditional target of concern. In the 1980s, the Soviet threat via Afghanistan became the more obvious concern. From Islamabad's perspective, security was always enhanced by engaging the United States albeit with some drawbacks. The two most critical periods of US involvement with Pakistan were in 1971 and 1981. In the latter case, the United States was willing to meet the challenge of direct Soviet encroachment on Pakistan. On the other hand Pakistani leaders' expectations of active US assistance vis-à-vis India were out of place and thus could never be satisfactorily fulfilled. Still, US diplomatic intervention helped keep India from attacking West Pakistan in 1971. Thus, throughout the 1950s and 1960s many Pakistanis saw the relationship as fundamentally flawed because the United States would never be as totally supportive of Pakistan as the Soviets seemed to be of India. When Afghanistan necessitated a revived US-Pakistan relationship, critical Pakistanis charged that American security assistance was accompanied by intrusive policies on Afghanistan with major domestic consequences for Pakistan, i.e., a potentially permanent Afghan refugee presence, an armed population, growth in narcotics consumption and trafficking.

The desire for stability also determined Pakistani foreign policy. The importance of economic assistance was part and parcel of Pakistan's earlier cultivation of the United States and oil-rich Muslim countries. The Zia ul-Haq/Junejo government's subsequent emphasis on a larger economic package for the 1987-92 US security assistance package reflected its concern with domestic stability and the need for enhancement of the economic well-being of the citizens. Continued subsidization of key products reflected the government's wariness of potential political problems. Calls for an end to such subsidies were resisted even though the subsidies impinged on the overall economic picture.

Yet, there were other times when Pakistani leaders actively pursued policies which jeopardized the country's security and stability. Events leading up to the formation of Bangladesh are a case in point. The government utterly failed to deal with the

consequences of the 1970 elections which were touted as free and fair. Indian intervention should have been predicted when Pakistani political leaders created the conditions under which Bangladesh became inevitable. Pakistani reliance on the United States to prevent Indian action and subsequent victory was totally unrealistic.

Against the previous background of raised expectations and charges of promises unfulfilled, post-1982 relations between the United States and Pakistan have been remarkably harmonious. Both sides learned to say no and to accept the answer with grace. However, under certain future conditions, the relationship could change.

Despite large infusions of American economic and military assistance into Pakistan, the popular base of public support remains limited on both sides. In the United States, Pakistan's recent recognition and support from those beyond the national security apparatus has been based on Afghanistan and a return to democratic government. In Pakistan, the dependence on the United States has been recognized but carries residual resentment. The resentment may be hastened by a decline in US assistance, especially if the decline results from US criticism of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Pakistan's Islamic orientation could also negatively influence the relationship with the United States. However, thus far, Pakistan has been creative in maximizing its relations with the United States and strengthening the Islamic links. Pakistan's potential role as a 'bridge' to post-Khomeini Iran is a case in point. In fact, management of Pakistan-Iranian relations offers a good example of how well Pakistan has dealt with the changes in its regional environment. The record is, of course, not without glaring failures.

On balance, however, Pakistan has a reasonable record of managing the consequences of its foreign policy. It has exploited available opportunities and made the best of limited options. Some observations regarding Pakistan's ability on this score may be worth offering. Perhaps the single most important factor has been that only a small number of people manage the formulation and the execution of Pakistan's foreign policy. During periods of martial law, the President and a few key aides are involved. In democratic times, the Prime Minister and a few key aides are the decision-makers. A small but extremely professional foreign service establishment executes the policy—a factor which, for example,

has been evident during the Afghanistan-related events of the past decade. There are no legislative controls of any consequence. The smallness of the system enables rapid changes to be made in order to adapt Pakistani policy to new opportunities. The opening to China, normalization with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, strengthened ties with Iran and the Gulf countries after the 1973 oil embargo, the revival of the US relationship after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are all key examples of Pakistani creativity in pursuit of its foreign policy. However, the personal nature of the system carries the drawback of a narrow base of support for the policy. The absence of public or legislative support for Pakistan's current links with the United States is a case in point.